athāpi matam apekṣya prameyan arthān pramāṇānāṃ siddhir bhavatīti, evaṃ siddhasya pramāṇacatuṣṭayasya sādhanaṃ bhavati | kiṃ kāraṇaṃ |
na hy asiddhasyārthasyāpekṣaṇaṃ bhavati na hy asiddho devadattaḥ kaṃcid artham apekṣate |
na ca siddhasya sādhanam iṣṭaṃ kṛtasya karaṇān upapatter iti |
若汝復謂 待所量物量得成者 如是四量皆有待成 何以故
若物未成云何相待 物若已成不須相待 天得未成則不待物
若已成者更不待成 如物已作無作因緣
’on te gźal bar bya ba’i don rnams la ltos nas tshad ma rnams ’grub pa yin par ’dod do źe na | de lta na ni don ma grub pa ni ltos pa med pa yin te |
lha sbyin ma grub pa na ni don ’ga’ la yaṅ ltos pa ma yin pas khyod kyis tshad ma gźi ’gyur ba ’grub par byed pa yin no ||
grub pa sgrub par byed pa yaṅ ’dod pa ma yin te | byas pa byed par mi ’thad pa’i phyir ro ||
If it is admitted that the ‘means of true cognition’ are established in relation to the ‘objects to be cognized’, then the four ‘means of true cognition’, which are [already] established, are established [anew].- Why? -
Because an object that is not established does not require something else. For instance, Devadatta, who is not [yet] established, does not require anything whatever.
But it is not admissible that something that is [already] established be established [anew]. One does not do something that is [already] done.