δόξειε δ’ ἂν καὶ παρὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους ἕτερος (11) εἶναι προτέρου τρόπος·
τῶν γὰρ ἀντιστρεφόντων κατὰ τὴν τοῦ (12) εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν τὸ αἴτιον ὁπωσοῦν θατέρῳ τοῦ εἶναι πρότε(13)ρον εἰκότως φύσει λέγοιτ’ ἄν.
ὅτι δ’ ἔστι τινὰ τοιαῦτα, (14) δῆλον·
τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἄνθρωπον ἀντιστρέφει κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶ(15)ναι ἀκολούθησιν πρὸς τὸν ἀληθῆ περὶ αὐτοῦ λόγον·
εἰ γὰρ (16) ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἀληθὴς ὁ λόγος ᾧ λέγομεν ὅτι ἔστιν ἄν(17)θρωπος·
καὶ ἀντιστρέφει γε, —εἰ γὰρ ἀληθὴς ὁ λόγος ᾧ λέ(18)γομεν ὅτι ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος·—
ἔστι δὲ ὁ μὲν ἀλη(19)θὴς λόγος οὐδαμῶς αἴτιος τοῦ εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα, τὸ μέντοι (20) πρᾶγμα φαίνεταί πως αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι ἀληθῆ τὸν λόγον·
(21) τῷ γὰρ εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ μὴ ἀληθὴς ὁ λόγος ἢ ψευ(22)δὴς λέγεται.
ὥστε κατὰ πέντε τρόπους πρότερον ἕτερον ἑτέρου (23) λέγοιτ’ ἄν.
(21) Videtur autem praeter eos qui dicti sunt alter esse prioris modus;
(22) eorum enim quae conuertuntur secundum essentiae consequentiam, quod (23) alterius quomodolibet causa est digne prius natura dicitur.
Quoniam (24) autem sunt quaedam talia, manifestum est;
nam esse hominem conuertitur (25) secundum subsistentiae consequentiam ad uerum de eo sermonem;
nam, si (26) est homo, uerus sermo est quo dicimus quoniam est homo,
et conuertitur (27) (nam, si uerus est: sermo quo dicimus quoniam est homo, hominem esse (28) necesse est);
est autem uerus sermo nullo modo causa subsistendi rem, (29) res autem uidetur quodammodo causa esse ut sermo uerus sit;
nam, (30) quoniam est res uel non est, uerus sermo uel falsus dicitur.
Quare (31) secundum quinque modos prius alterum altero dicitur.
Yet it would seem that besides those mentioned there is yet another.
For in those things, the being of each of which implies that of the other, that which is in any way the cause may reasonably be said to be by nature ’prior’ to the effect.
It is plain that there are instances of this.
The fact of the being of a man carries with it the truth of the proposition that he is, and the implication is reciprocal:
for if a man is, the proposition wherein we allege that he is true,
and conversely, if the proposition wherein we allege that he is true, then he is.
The true proposition, however, is in no way the cause of the being of the man, but the fact of the man’s being does seem somehow to be the cause of the truth of the proposition,
for the truth or falsity of the proposition depends on the fact of the man’s being or not being.
Thus the word ’prior’ may be used in five senses.