Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν συμβαίνει ἐξ ὧν σὺ ὁμολογεῖς, τὸ μετὰ μορίου ἀρετῆς πράττειν ὅτι ἂν πράττῃ, τοῦτο ἀρετὴν εἶναι: τὴν γὰρ δικαιοσύνην μόριον φῂς ἀρετῆς εἶναι, καὶ ἕκαστα τούτων.
τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο λέγω; ὅτι ἐμοῦ δεηθέντος ὅλον εἰπεῖν τὴν ἀρετήν, αὐτὴν μὲν πολλοῦ δεῖς εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἐστίν, πᾶσαν δὲ φῂς πρᾶξιν ἀρετὴν εἶναι, ἐάνπερ μετὰ μορίου (79c) ἀρετῆς πράττηται, ὥσπερ εἰρηκὼς ὅτι ἀρετή ἐστιν τὸ ὅλον καὶ ἤδη γνωσομένου ἐμοῦ, καὶ ἐὰν σὺ κατακερματίζῃς αὐτὴν κατὰ μόρια.
δεῖται οὖν σοι πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τῆς αὐτῆς ἐρωτήσεως, ὦ φίλε Μένων, τί ἐστιν ἀρετή, εἰ μετὰ μορίου ἀρετῆς πᾶσα πρᾶξις ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη; τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν λέγειν, ὅταν λέγῃ τις, ὅτι πᾶσα ἡ μετὰ δικαιοσύνης πρᾶξις ἀρετή ἐστιν.
ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι πάλιν δεῖσθαι τῆς αὐτῆς ἐρωτήσεως, ἀλλ᾽ οἴει τινὰ εἰδέναι μόριον ἀρετῆς ὅτι ἐστίν, αὐτὴν μὴ εἰδότα;
SOCRATES. Nonne contingit ex quibus tu confiteris cum particula virtutis agere quicquid agat, [id est] istud virtutem esse. Nam iustitiam particulam ais virtutis esse, et singula horum.
Quid ergo dico hoc? Quoniam me rogante in toto dicere virtutem, ipsam autem multo deficis dicere quid est, omnemque actum inquis virtutem esse, siquidem cum particula virtutis agatur, ac si dixeris quid virtus est in toto, et iam non cognoscente me, atque si tu dispergeres eam per particulas.
Opus est itaque tibi iterato a principio, ceu michi videtur, eadem questione, o amice Menon, quid est virtus, si cum particula virtutis omnis actus virtus quoque sit. Hoc enim est dicere, cum inquiat quidam: omnis cum iustitia actus virtus est.
An non videtur tibi denuo opus esse eadem questione, sed autumas quempiam nosse particulam virtutis quid est, ipsam nescientem?
SO. Nonne efficitur ex iis quæ iam concessisti, virtutem esse agere cum parte virtutis quicquid agitur? Iustitiam enim huiusmodi singuala virtutis particulas confiteris.
ME. Quid tum? SO. Quia cum rogassem ut totam ipsam virtutem ostenderes, quid ipsa fit, nullo modo explicuisti; omnem vero actionem quæcunque cum parte virtutis sit, vistutem esse dixisti, quasi quid tota virtus sit summatim prædixeris, atque ipse intelligere tum queam, si abs te in particulas dividant.
Eadem igitur quæstio rursus o Meno tibi suboritur, quid virtus sit, si quidem omnis actio cum virtutis parte fit virtus. Id nanque tunc dicitur, cum omnis actio cum iustitia virtus esse definint.
An non eadem iterum quæstione opus esse vides? Num putas quempiam virtutis partem aliquam nosse, qui totius naturam minime norit?
SOCRATES: Then it follows from your own admissions, that virtue is doing what you do with a part of virtue; for justice and the like are said by you to be parts of virtue.
MENO: What of that?
SOCRATES: What of that! Why, did not I ask you to tell me the nature of virtue as a whole? And you are very far from telling me this; but declare every action to be virtue which is done with a part of virtue; as though you had told me and I must already know the whole of virtue, and this too when frittered away into little pieces.
And, therefore, my dear Meno, I fear that I must begin again and repeat the same question: What is virtue? for otherwise, I can only say, that every action done with a part of virtue is virtue; what else is the meaning of saying that every action done with justice is virtue?
Ought I not to ask the question over again; for can any one who does not know virtue know a part of virtue?