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Aristoteles: Rhetorica

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[2.4.1] (34) Τίνας δὲ φιλοῦσι καὶ μισοῦσι, καὶ διὰ τί, τὴν φιλίαν καὶ (35) τὸ φιλεῖν ὁρισάμενοι λέγωμεν. 
فأما من 1 يصادقون ومن أجل أىّ شيء فإنّا حين نحدّ الصداقة نقول 
Part 4. Let us now turn to Friendship and Enmity, and ask towards whom these feelings are entertained, and why. We will begin by defining and friendly feeling. 
[2.4.2] ἔστω δὴ τὸ φιλεῖν τὸ βούλε(36)σθαί τινι ἃ οἴεται ἀγαθά,  ἐκείνου ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ μὴ αὑτοῦ,  καὶ τὸ (1381a1) κατὰ δύναμιν πρακτικὸν εἶναι τούτων. 
إن الصداق هي أن يكون الإنسان يهوى الخير لذلك  من أجل ذاك وليس من أجل نفسه  وأن يكون من جهة القوة فعّالا لذلك 
We may describe friendly feeling towards any one as wishing for him what you believe to be good things,  not for your own sake but for his,  and being inclined, so far as you can, to bring these things about. 
φίλος δέ ἐστιν ὁ φιλῶν (2) καὶ ἀντιφιλούμενος·  οἴονται δὲ φίλοι εἶναι οἱ οὕτως ἔχειν (3) οἰόμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους. 
فالصديق هو الذى يحبّ ويحبّ معا  وقد يُظَنّ أنّ الأصدقاء هم الـ<ـذين يكونـ>ـون بهذه الحال أعنى أن يكون كلّ واحد منهم يظنّ بصاحبه المودّة 
A friend is one who feels thus and excites these feelings in return:  those who think they feel thus towards each other think themselves friends. 
[2.4.3] τούτων δὲ ὑποκειμένων ἀνάγκη φίλον (4) εἶναι τὸν συνηδόμενον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς καὶ συναλγοῦντα τοῖς (5) λυπηροῖς μὴ διά τι ἕτερον ἀλλὰ δι’ ἐκεῖνον·  γιγνομένων γὰρ (6) ὧν βούλονται χαίρουσιν πάντες, τῶν ἐναντίων δὲ λυποῦνται, (7) ὥστε τῆς βουλήσεως σημεῖον αἱ λῦπαι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί. 
فإذا كان هذا موضوعا فالصديق لا محالة [16] هو الذى يستلذّ الخير الذى يكون لصاحبه ويشركه في المؤذيات المحزنات ليس من أجل شيء آخر [17] ولكن من أجل ذاك فقط  فإنّ هذا إذا كان هكذا فكلّ أحد يفرح به وأمّا الأضداد المعاندون [18] فيحزنون لذلك فعلامة الهوى إذًا المحزنات واللذيذات 
This being assumed, it follows that your friend is the sort of man who shares your pleasure in what is good and your pain in what is unpleasant, for your sake and for no other reason.  This pleasure and pain of his will be the token of his good wishes for you, since we all feel glad at getting what we wish for, and pained at getting what we do not. 
[2.4.4] καὶ οἷς (8) δὴ ταὐτὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά, καὶ οἱ τοῖς αὐτοῖς φίλοι καὶ οἱ τοῖς (9) αὐτοῖς ἐχθροί·  ταὐτὰ γὰρ τούτοις βούλεσθαι ἀνάγκη,  ὥστε (10) ἅπερ αὑτῷ καὶ ἄλλῳ βουλόμενος τούτῳ φαίνεται φίλος εἶναι. 
ثمّ الذين تكون الخيرات والشرور [19] لهم هي بأعيانها لهؤلاء ثمّ الذين يستبين أنهم أصدقاء في الاتي فيها بأعيانها يكون الأعداء [20]  فإنّ هؤلاء باضطرار يهوون هذه الأمور  فإذا كان يهوى مثل هذا لذاك لا من أجل شيء آخر [21] استبان عند ذلك أنّه صديق [[L93]] 
Those, then, are friends to whom the same things are good and evil; and those who are, moreover, friendly or unfriendly to the same people;  for in that case they must have the same wishes,  and thus by wishing for each other what they wish for themselves, they show themselves each other’s friends. 
[2.4.5] (11) καὶ τοὺς πεποιηκότας εὖ φιλοῦσιν, ἢ αὐτοὺς ἢ ὧν κήδονται, (12) ἢ εἰ μεγάλα, ἢ εἰ προθύμως, ἢ εἰ ἐν τοιούτοις καιροῖς, καὶ (13) αὐτῶν ἕνεκα,  ἢ οὓς ἂν οἴωνται βούλεσθαι ποιεῖν εὖ.  [2.4.6] καὶ τοὺς (14) τῶν φίλων φίλους καὶ φιλοῦντας οὓς αὐτοὶ φιλοῦσιν. καὶ τοὺς (15) φιλουμένους ὑπὸ τῶν φιλουμένων αὐτοῖς.  [2.4.7] καὶ τοὺς τοῖς (16) αὐτοῖς ἐχθροὺς καὶ μισοῦντας οὓς αὐτοὶ μισοῦσιν, καὶ τοὺς (17) μισουμένους ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτοῖς μισουμένων·  πᾶσιν γὰρ τούτοις (18) τὰ αὐτὰ ἀγαθὰ φαίνεται εἶναι καὶ αὐτοῖς, ὥστε βούλεσθαι τὰ (19) αὐτοῖς ἀγαθά, ὅπερ ἦν τοῦ φίλου.  [2.4.8] ἔτι τοὺς εὐποιητικοὺς εἰς (20) χρήματα καὶ εἰς σωτηρίαν·  διὸ τοὺς ἐλευθερίους καὶ ἀνδρείους (21) τιμῶσι [2.4.9] καὶ τοὺς δικαίους·  τοιούτους δ’ ὑπολαμβάνουσι τοὺς (22) μὴ ἀφ’ ἑτέρων ζῶντας·  τοιοῦτοι δ’ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐργάζεσθαι, καὶ (23) τούτων οἱ ἀπὸ γεωργίας, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ αὐτουργοὶ μάλιστα. 
ثمّ يحبّون أيضا الذين يحسنون إمّا إليهم أنفسهم وإمّا إلى [22] من يعنون به أو الذين فعلوا به الأمور الجسيمة بهشاشة ونشاط أو في مثل هذا الوقت [23] أو لقوا بسببهم مثل ذلك  والذين <يظنّون أنهم> يهمّون بالإحسان إليهم  وأصدقاء أصدقائهم [24] والذين يحبّون من أحبّوه هم والذين هم محبوبون من المحبوبين عندهم  والذين يعادون أو يبغضون [28v1] من يبغضونه هم والذين يبغضهم المبغضون منهم  لهؤلاء جميعا يُرون أنّ الخيرات التى [2] لأولئك هي لهم أيضا فقد يهوون لذلك أن تكون الخيرات التى لهم لأصدقائهم كما هي لهم [3]  أعني الذين كانوا يحسنون إليهم فى المال وأفعال الكرم  ولذلك ما قد يكرمون الأسخياء [4] والشجعاء والأبرار أيضا  فقد يُظنّ بهذه الصفة الذين ليس معاشهم من أصحابهم  لكن [5] من الكدّ والكسب ثمّ من هؤلاء أيضا الذين معاشهم من الحرث وأشياء أخر يعملونها [6] لأنفسهم 
Again, we feel friendly to those who have treated us well, either ourselves or those we care for, whether on a large scale, or readily, or at some particular crisis; provided it was for our own sake.  And also to those who we think wish to treat us well.  And also to our friends’ friends, and to those who like, or are liked by, those whom we like ourselves.  And also to those who are enemies to those whose enemies we are, and dislike, or are disliked by, those whom we dislike.  For all such persons think the things good which we think good, so that they wish what is good for us; and this, as we saw, is what friends must do.  And also to those who are willing to treat us well where money or our personal safety is concerned:  and therefore we value those who are liberal, brave, or just.  The just we consider to be those who do not live on others;  which means those who work for their living, especially farmers and others who work with their own hands. 
[2.4.10] (24) καὶ τοὺς σώφρονας, ὅτι οὐκ ἄδικοι.  καὶ τοὺς ἀπράγμονας (25) διὰ τὸ αὐτό.  [2.4.11] καὶ οἷς βουλόμεθα φίλοι εἶναι, ἂν φαίνωνται (26) βουλόμενοι·  εἰσὶ δὲ τοιοῦτοι οἵ τ’ ἀγαθοὶ κατ’ ἀρετὴν καὶ οἱ (27) εὐδόκιμοι ἢ ἐν ἅπασιν ἢ ἐν τοῖς βελτίστοις ἢ ἐν τοῖς θαυ(28)μαζομένοις ὑφ’ αὑτῶν ἢ ἐν τοῖς θαυμάζουσιν αὐτούς. 
فقد يُظنّ هؤلاء بزيادة أعفّاء غير ظلّامين  ثمّ السليمة صدورهم من أجل هذه [7] العلّة أيضا  والذين قد نهوى أن نصادقهم إن هم هووا ذلك  وهؤلاء هم الخيار ذوو [8] الفضيلة ثمّ السعداء المنجحين إمّا في كل وإمّا في الفضائل أو في الّاتي قد يتعجّب منها [9] أو في الّاتي يتعجّب منهم فيها 
We also like temperate men, because they are not unjust to others;  and, for the same reason, those who mind their own business.  And also those whose friends we wish to be, if it is plain that they wish to be our friends:  such are the morally good, and those well thought of by every one, by the best men, or by those whom we admire or who admire us. 
[2.4.12] ἔτι (29) τοὺς ἡδεῖς συνδιαγαγεῖν καὶ συνδιημερεῦσαι·  τοιοῦτοι δ’ (30) οἱ εὔκολοι καὶ μὴ ἐλεγκτικοὶ τῶν ἁμαρτανομένων  καὶ μὴ (31) φιλόνικοι μηδὲ δυσέριδες  (πάντες γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι μαχη(32)τικοί, οἱ δὲ μαχόμενοι τἀναντία φαίνονται βούλεσθαι),  [2.4.13] καὶ (33) οἱ ἐπιδέξιοι καὶ τῷ τωθάσαι καὶ τῷ ὑπομεῖναι·  ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ γὰρ (34) ἀμφοτέρως σπεύδουσι τῷ πλησίον, δυνάμενοί τε σκώπτεσθαι (35) καὶ ἐμμελῶς σκώπτοντες. 
ثمّ جميع الطيّبين أو اللذيذة عشرتهم وملازمتهم النهار كلّه [10]  فإنّ مثل هؤلاء سهلة أخلاقهم وليسوا بموبّخين على الخطأ والإساءة  ولا يشغبون ولا [11] يتعسرون ولا يتحرّشون  وجميع هؤلاء الذين هم بهذه الصفات صخّابون والصخّابون قد [12] يرون أضدادا  وكذلك الذين يكونون متهيّئين للضرب والصبر  فكلاهما [[L94]] يوجدان [13] مسارعين إلى هذا وإلى عذل القريب إذا أمكنهم أن يعذلوا وإذا كان العذل من جهة [14] الشفقة 
And also those with whom it is pleasant to live and spend our days:  such are the good—tempered, and those who are not too ready to show us our mistakes,  and those who are not cantankerous or quarrelsome  — such people are always wanting to fight us, and those who fight us we feel wish for the opposite of what we wish for ourselves —  and those who have the tact to make and take a joke;  here both parties have the same object in view, when they can stand being made fun of as well as do it prettily themselves. 
[2.4.14] καὶ τοὺς ἐπαινοῦντας τὰ ὑπ(36)άρχοντα ἀγαθά,  καὶ τούτων μάλιστα ἃ φοβοῦνται μὴ ὑπ (1381b1) άρχειν αὐτοῖς.  [2.4.15] καὶ τοὺς καθαρείους περὶ ὄψιν, περὶ ἀμπεχόνην, (2) περὶ ὅλον τὸν βίον.  [2.4.16] καὶ τοὺς μὴ ὀνειδιστὰς μήτε τῶν ἁμαρ(3)τημάτων μήτε τῶν εὐεργετημάτων·  ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἐλεγ(4)κτικοί.  [2.4.17] καὶ τοὺς μὴ μνησικακοῦντας, μηδὲ φυλακτικοὺς τῶν (5) ἐγκλημάτων, ἀλλ’ εὐκαταλλάκτους·  οἵους γὰρ ἂν ὑπολαμ(6)βάνωσιν εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ πρὸς αὑτοὺς οἴονται.  [2.4.18] (7) καὶ τοὺς μὴ κακολόγους μηδὲ εἰδότας μήτε τὰ τῶν πλησίον (8) κακὰ μήτε τὰ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τἀγαθά·  ὁ γὰρ ἀγαθὸς ταῦτα (9) δρᾷ.  [2.4.19] καὶ τοὺς μὴ ἀντιτείνοντας τοῖς ὀργιζομένοις ἢ σπουδά(10)ζουσιν·  μαχητικοὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι.  καὶ τοὺς πρὸς αὐτοὺς (11) σπουδαίως πως ἔχοντας,  οἷον θαυμάζοντας αὐτοὺς καὶ σπου(12)δαίους ὑπολαμβάνοντας καὶ χαίροντας αὐτοῖς,  [2.4.20] καὶ ταῦτα (13) μάλιστα πεπονθότας περὶ ἃ μάλιστα βούλονται αὐτοὶ ἢ (14) θαυμάζεσθαι ἢ σπουδαῖοι δοκεῖν εἶναι ἢ ἡδεῖς.  [2.4.21] καὶ τοὺς (15) ὁμοίους καὶ ταὐτὰ ἐπιτηδεύοντας,  ἐὰν μὴ παρενοχλῶσι μηδ’ (16) ἀπὸ ταὐτοῦ ᾖ ὁ βίος·  γίγνεται γὰρ οὕτω τὸ “κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ”.  [2.4.22] (17) καὶ τοὺς τῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιθυμοῦντας, ὧν ἐνδέχεται ἅμα μετ(18)έχειν αὐτούς·  εἰ δὲ μή, ταὐτὸ καὶ οὕτω συμβαίνει.  [2.4.23] καὶ (19) πρὸς οὓς οὕτως ἔχουσιν ὥστε μὴ αἰσχύνεσθαι τὰ πρὸς (20) δόξαν, μὴ καταφρονοῦντες.  καὶ πρὸς οὓς αἰσχύνονται τὰ (21) πρὸς ἀλήθειαν. 
والذين يمدحونهم أيضا قد يرون أنّهم يشركونهم في الخيرات التي هي لهم [15]  وعلى أنّهم قد يخافون في بعضها ألّا يكون لهم  ثمّ الذين يرى لباسهم نظيفا طول أعمارهم [16]  ثمّ الذين لا يعيّرون لا بالذنوب ولا بالعنايات  فإنّ اللذين يفعلان ذلك جميعا موبّخان [17]  والذين لا يصرّون علي الضغن ولا يقيمون على العذل واللحي لكنّهم يرضون سريعا  فقد يظنّون [18] أنّهم كما هم لآخرين كذلك هم لهم أيضا  والذين لا ينطقون بالشرّ ولا يعرفون شرور أقاربهم [19] ولا شرور أنفسهم لكنّ الخيرات  لأنّهم أخيار  وكذلك الذين لا يشغبون على الذين يغضبون <أو> [20] يجدّون  فإنّ الذين هم على خلاف ذلك صخّابون  ثم الذين هم لهم بهذه الحال 2   أعني كالذين [21] يتعجّبون من أنفسهم ويظنّون بأنفسهم أنّهم أفاضل ثمّ الذين يفرحون بهم وبما هم لهم [22]  ولا سيما إذا كانوا قد ألموا أو لقوا شيئا ثم الذين يهوون بزيادة أن يظنّوا عندهم [23] عجيبين أو متعجّبا منهم أو أفاضل أو لذيذين طيّبين  أو الذين يبدعون الأمور التي هي بأعيانها [24] عندهم عجيبة  إن لم يكونوا يتأذّون بهم أو يكون معاشهما ومكسبهما من ذلك الأمر [25] بعينه  كالذي يكون بين الفاخراني والفاخراني  ثم الذين يشتهون ما هم له مشتهون [29r1] أعني الأمر قد يمكن أن يشركوا فيه معا  فإنّه إن لم يكن كذلك فقد يعرض حينئذ أيضا [2] [[L95]] عارض  والذين هم عندهم لهذه الحال أعنى الذين لا يخزون عندهم من اللاتي هي للحمد أن تهاونوا بها  والذين يخزون عندهم من الثقة الصادقة 
And we also feel friendly towards those who praise such good qualities as we possess,  and especially if they praise the good qualities that we are not too sure we do possess.  And towards those who are cleanly in their person, their dress, and all their way of life.  And towards those who do not reproach us with what we have done amiss to them or they have done to help us,  for both actions show a tendency to criticize us.  And towards those who do not nurse grudges or store up grievances, but are always ready to make friends again;  for we take it that they will behave to us just as we find them behaving to every one else.  And towards those who are not evil speakers and who are aware of neither their neighbours’ bad points nor our own, but of our good ones only,  as a good man always will be.  And towards those who do not try to thwart us when we are angry or in earnest,  which would mean being ready to fight us.  And towards those who have some serious feeling towards us,  such as admiration for us, or belief in our goodness, or pleasure in our company;  especially if they feel like this about qualities in us for which we especially wish to be admired, esteemed, or liked.  And towards those who are like ourselves in character and occupation,  provided they do not get in our way or gain their living from the same source as we do  — for then it will be a case of ‘potter against potter’: Potter to potter and builder to builder begrudge their reward.  And those who desire the same things as we desire, if it is possible for us both to share them together;  otherwise the same trouble arises here too.  And towards those with whom we are on such terms that, while we respect their opinions, we need not blush before them for doing what is conventionally wrong:  as well as towards those before whom we should be ashamed to do anything really wrong. 
[2.4.24] καὶ πρὸς οὓς φιλοτιμοῦνται, ἢ ὑφ’ ὧν (22) ζηλοῦσθαι βούλονται καὶ μὴ φθονεῖσθαι, τούτους ἢ φιλοῦσιν (23) ἢ βούλονται φίλοι εἶναι.  [2.4.25] καὶ οἷς ἂν τἀγαθὰ συμπράττωσιν, (24) ἐὰν μὴ μέλλῃ αὐτοῖς ἔσεσθαι μείζω κακά.  [2.4.26] καὶ οἳ ὁμοίως (25) καὶ τοὺς ἀπόντας καὶ τοὺς παρόντας φιλοῦσιν·  διὸ καὶ τοὺς (26) περὶ τοὺς τεθνεῶτας τοιούτους πάντες φιλοῦσιν.  καὶ ὅλως (27) τοὺς σφόδρα φιλοφίλους καὶ μὴ ἐγκαταλείποντας·  μάλιστα (28) γὰρ φιλοῦσι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τοὺς φιλεῖν ἀγαθούς.  [2.4.27] καὶ τοὺς μὴ (29) πλαττομένους πρὸς αὐτούς·  τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ καὶ τὰ φαῦλα τὰ (30) ἑαυτῶν λέγοντες·  εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι πρὸς τοὺς φίλους τὰ πρὸς (31) δόξαν οὐκ αἰσχυνόμεθα·  εἰ οὖν ὁ αἰσχυνόμενος μὴ φιλεῖ, (32) ὁ μὴ αἰσχυνόμενος φιλοῦντι ἔοικεν. 
والذين هم عندهم مكرّمون والذين يحبّون أن يحسدوهم ولا يغتالوا بهم ولا يحبّونهم أو يهوون أن يحبّونهم ويكونوا أصدقاءهم  والذين يفعلون بهم الخيرات إن لم يكن يتبع ذلك شرّ هو أعظم أو أفظع  والذين يحبّون الأباعد والأقارب بحال واحدة  والذين توقّوا بالقرب ممّن هو بهذه الصفة فكل أحد يحبّهم  والجملة الذين يودّون أصدقاءهم جدّا جدّا ولا يخذلونهم  فإن الأصدقاء الخيار أحبّ إليهم من الخيار  والذين ليس ودّهم بالترائي والتصنّع  وكذلك الذين يُخبرونهم بمساوئهم  فقد أنبأنا أنّهم عند الأصدقاء لا يخزون من اللاتي هنّ للحمد  فالذي لا يخزي قد يودّ والذي يخزي لا يشبه الذي يودّ 
Again, our rivals, and those whom we should like to envy us — though without ill—feeling — either we like these people or at least we wish them to like us.  And we feel friendly towards those whom we help to secure good for themselves, provided we are not likely to suffer heavily by it ourselves.  And those who feel as friendly to us when we are not with them as when we are  — which is why all men feel friendly towards those who are faithful to their dead friends.  And, speaking generally, towards those who are really fond of their friends and do not desert them in trouble;  of all good men, we feel most friendly to those who show their goodness as friends.  Also towards those who are honest with us,  including those who will tell us of their own weak points:  it has just been said that with our friends we are not ashamed of what is conventionally wrong,  and if we do have this feeling, we do not love them; if therefore we do not have it, it looks as if we did love them. 
καὶ τοὺς μὴ φοβερούς, (33) καὶ οὓς θαρροῦμεν·  οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὃν φοβεῖται φιλεῖ.  [2.4.28] (34) εἴδη δὲ φιλίας ἑταιρεία οἰκειότης συγγένεια καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα.  [2.4.29] (35) ποιητικὰ δὲ φιλίας χάρις καὶ τὸ μὴ δεηθέντος ποιῆσαι καὶ (36) τὸ ποιήσαντα μὴ δηλῶσαι·  αὐτοῦ γὰρ οὕτως ἕνεκα φαίνεται (37) καὶ οὐ διά τι ἕτερον. 
والذين ليسوا مخوّفين والذين قد يثقون بهم أو يأمنونهم  فأمّا أنواع الصداقة فالصحبة والأنسة والوصلة ومهما كان من هذا النحو  وأمّا فواعل الصداقة فالأيادي أو المنن وأن يفعل به حين لا يحتاج وإذا فعل لم يخبر  وأن يستبين أنّه إنّما فعل من أجل ذاك لا من أجل شيء آخر 
We also like those with whom we do not feel frightened or uncomfortable  — nobody can like a man of whom he feels frightened.  Friendship has various forms—comradeship, intimacy, kinship, and so on.  Things that cause friendship are: doing kindnesses; doing them unasked; and not proclaiming the fact when they are done,  which shows that they were done for our own sake and not for some other reason. 
[2.4.30] (1382a1) περὶ δ’ ἔχθρας καὶ τοῦ μισεῖν φανερὸν ὡς ἐκ τῶν ἐναν(2)τίων ἔστι θεωρεῖν.  ποιητικὰ δὲ ἔχθρας ὀργή, ἐπηρεασμός, δια(3)βολή.  [2.4.31] ὀργὴ μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς αὑτόν, ἔχθρα δὲ καὶ (4) ἄνευ τοῦ πρὸς αὑτόν·  ἂν γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνωμεν εἶναι τοιόνδε, (5) μισοῦμεν.  καὶ ἡ μὲν ὀργὴ ἀεὶ περὶ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα, οἷον Καλ(6)λίᾳ ἢ Σωκράτει,  τὸ δὲ μῖσος καὶ πρὸς τὰ γένη· τὸν γὰρ κλέ(7)πτην μισεῖ καὶ τὸν συκοφάντην ἅπας.  καὶ τὸ μὲν ἰατὸν (8) χρόνῳ, τὸ δ’ ἀνίατον.  καὶ τὸ μὲν λύπης ἔφεσις, τὸ δὲ κακοῦ·  (9) αἴσθεσθαι γὰρ βούλεται ὁ ὀργιζόμενος, τῷ δ’ οὐδὲν διαφέρει.  (10) ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν λυπηρὰ αἰσθητὰ πάντα, τὰ δὲ μάλιστα κακὰ (11) ἥκιστα αἰσθητά, ἀδικία καὶ ἀφροσύνη· οὐδὲν γὰρ λυπεῖ ἡ (12) παρουσία τῆς κακίας.  καὶ τὸ μὲν μετὰ λύπης, τὸ δ’ οὐ (13) μετὰ λύπης·  ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὀργιζόμενος λυπεῖται, ὁ δὲ μισῶν οὔ.  (14) καὶ ὁ μὲν πολλῶν ἂν γενομένων ἐλεήσειεν, ὁ δ’ οὐδενός·  ὁ μὲν (15) γὰρ ἀντιπαθεῖν βούλεται ᾧ ὀργίζεται, ὁ δὲ μὴ εἶναι. 
Enmity and Hatred should clearly be studied by reference to their opposites.  Enmity may be produced by anger or spite or calumny.  Now whereas anger arises from offences against oneself, enmity may arise even without that;  we may hate people merely because of what we take to be their character.  Anger is always concerned with individuals — a Callias or a Socrates —  whereas hatred is directed also against classes: we all hate any thief and any informer.  Moreover, anger can be cured by time; but hatred cannot.  The one aims at giving pain to its object, the other at doing him harm;  the angry man wants his victims to feel; the hater does not mind whether they feel or not.  All painful things are felt; but the greatest evils, injustice and folly, are the least felt, since their presence causes no pain.  And anger is accompanied by pain, hatred is not;  the angry man feels pain, but the hater does not.  Much may happen to make the angry man pity those who offend him, but the hater under no circumstances wishes to pity a man whom he has once hated:  for the one would have the offenders suffer for what they have done; the other would have them cease to exist. 
[2.4.32] (16) φανερὸν οὖν ἐν τούτων ὅτι ἐνδέχεται ἐχθροὺς καὶ φίλους (17) καὶ ὄντας ἀποδεικνύναι καὶ μὴ ὄντας ποιεῖν καὶ φάσκοντας (18) διαλύειν,  καὶ δι’ ὀργὴν ἢ δι’ ἔχθραν ἀμφισβητοῦντας ἐφ’ ὁπο(19)τέραν ἂν προαιρῆταί τις ἄγειν. 
It is plain from all this that we can prove people to be friends or enemies; if they are not, we can make them out to be so; if they claim to be so, we can refute their claim;  and if it is disputed whether an action was due to anger or to hatred, we can attribute it to whichever of these we prefer. 
 
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Enhet: Det humanistiske fakultet   Utviklet av: IT-seksjonen ved HF
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