 Title
|
|
Preface
|
 Chapter 1: Pramuditā
|
|
Chapter 2: Vimalā
|
|
Chapter 3: Prabhākarī
|
|
Chapter 4: Arciṣmatī
|
|
Chapter 5: Sudurjayā
|
|
Chapter 6: Abhimukhī
|
|
Chapter 7: Dūraṃgamā
|
|
Chapter 8: Acalā
|
|
Chapter 9: Sādhumatī
|
|
Chapter 10: Dharmameghā
|
|
Chapter 11: buddhabhūmi
|
They might then think: ‘The consciousness in question is an anticipated consciousness that will arise by virtue of this potential, and as it is the potential for that consciousness we can say, “It arises from this.” In this way the entities of distinguisher and basis distinguished are established, just as in everyday language one might say, “Please make some boiled rice,” or “Please weave a garment from this yarn.” This is explained in a treatise as well:’
‘There are three that enter the womb,
The cakravartin and the two self-manifest ones,
….’1
To explain how this is empty rhetorics:
You may suggest that in the future it will be.
But lacking in potential it cannot spring forth.
Things that may occur at certain times can arise, but what is certain never to arise – such as a barren woman’s son or things such as space – will not. Thus in this context, if the potential did exist, consciousness could certainly come into being. But when the future consciousness does not exist, and its potential therefore doesn’t exist, as is the case for such things as a barren woman’s son, the absence of its potential means that it certainly can’t arise. This also applies when explaining boiled rice and so forth.
And although it is indeed the case that consciousness and potential are mutually reliant, a thing that is dependent does not in fact have existence. Thus,
And mutual dependence used to prove something,
The wise will say this fails to prove establishment. (6.58)
To say, ‘When consciousness exists, its potential is a fact; and consciousness arises from that,’ describes a case of mutual dependence. If they say, ‘That is exactly the way of things,’ they are effectively saying that consciousness does not inherently exist. For example, only when there is long can there be short, and when there is short can there be long; only when there is there can here exist, and when there is here can there exist. These are all nominal imputations lacking any intrinsic establishment. So if that is the case, they are in fact agreeing with us. As explained:
A cause in the absence of an effect
Has no existence as a cause.
Hence, it necessarily follows
That every effect is also a cause.2
And from the Treatise:
If a thing is dependently established,
And that upon which it depends
Is established only in dependence on it,
What is then established in dependence on what?3
Meaning that, if a thing such as consciousness were established in dependence on a particular potential, and that particular potential the consciousness relies on to establish its nature in turn depends on it; in establishing these two it must then be asked which is established in dependence on which? It continues:
How can a dependently established entity
Depend when it is not established?
And if you say the established depends,
Its dependence makes no sense.4
Meaning that, if consciousness is established in dependence on a potential, is it established or not as it depends on that potential? If it is not established it can’t rely on that potential, because it is as unestablished as the horns of a donkey. On the other hand, if it is established while depending, its establishment would mean that it cannot be dependent.
The wise have thus stated that, ‘Things that are established in mutual dependence are not established.’ A future phenomenon cannot therefore have potential.