Having thus also refuted production from other, now in relation to the refutation of production from both, it was said:

That things arise from both will not be reasonable,
Because one will encounter faults explained above.

For the Possibilists (syādvādika), production takes place both from self and other, meaning that they believe in production from both. A pot, they say, comes about through factors such as a lump of clay, a stick, a potter’s wheel, string, water, the potter and so forth. Since the clay and the pot aren’t separate things, the pot produced exists in the nature of the clay, hence self-production. Since such things as the work of the potter involved in its production are distinct from it, there is other-production. This is the idea underlying their belief in both self- and other-production.

And just as with the external environment, individual creatures also come about from self and other. In this regard they present a list of principles: ‘There are nine principles involved in this: life-force, inanimate factors, merit, negativity, defilements, vows and so forth.’ Given that Maitreya’s future birth exists in the nature of his life-force, there is self-production, because Maitreya and his life-force are not separate things. Life-force is a component of migratory existence, and these opponents therefore assert that it is a cause for existences such as that of a god. Since one’s birth takes place through external factors such as one’s father and mother, religious ways or lack thereof, defilements and so forth, there is other-production. ‘Hence,’ they say, ‘we are not affected by the statement, “There is no production from self, nor is there production from other,” because we propose that there is neither exclusively self-production nor other-production.’

This is not a reasonable argument, as explained: Production from both is likewise unjustified. Why? Since it would involve the faults already mentioned. Because holding the position of both involves the faults already pointed out for both positions, production from both is not possible.

Because the pot exists in the nature of the clay there is no production, since it already exists. As has been explained:

If it came from itself there would be nothing gained.
What is produced, produced once more – that makes no sense.¹

Similarly, it should be acknowledged that as he already exists by nature of his life-force, Maitreya isn’t then born.

Because the pot is not present in the identity of the water, string, wheel and so forth, it cannot be produced from them. As has been explained:

If it were possible that something else could be produced
Based on what’s other, utter darkness should emerge from flames;
And one would see production of all things from everything,
Since in their difference every non-producer is the same.²

The case of Maitreya arising from what is other, such as his father and mother, may be explained in the same manner.

Just as it was previously shown how production from self and from other is untenable in the worldly relative and ultimately, to now conclude the above treatment that showed that the reasoning presented by the Syādvādikas does not work it was said:

Not in the world nor actually can this be claimed ...

To express that, we do not merely allude to the reasons presented above that show how production from both is untenable, but will explain so here as well, it was said:

When by each one production cannot be sustained. (6.98)

For example, since a single sesame seed may yield oil, many of them will as well, while this is not the case for sand where such a capacity is not observed. Likewise, it is when productive ability is there for individual members that a collection of such things will have it too. Hence, production from both is unreasonable.