Now they say, ‘If production from self, other, both and uncaused is refuted on both levels, how can one then ascertain that such things as ignorance, formations and seeds give rise to consciousness, sprouts and so forth conventionally?’

To explain:

And so, since things do not arise uncaused,
Are not the work of an almighty god,
Nor are produced from self, other, or both,
They are interdependently brought forth. (6.114)

As has been explained, the arising of things does not happen just naturally by itself; nor does it happen through such things as a creator god, time, particles, primordial nature (prakṛti), souls (puruṣa), Nārāyaṇa¹ and so forth; nor is there production from self, other or both. And therefore it is simply the case that, in dependence on that, this arises; which ensures that worldly conventions are not violated. As the Illustrious One has stated:

The hallmark of phenomena is this: If this is present, that will happen. If this has arisen, that will arise. And so, confusion leads to formations …²

Similarly,

When there is this, there is that,
Like short exists when there is long.
When this takes place, that occurs,
Like light emerging from a lamp.³

And from the Treatise as well, where it teaches that it is simply like this:

An agent depends on there being an act,
And the act again depends on the agent.
Apart from this we see no other way
To demonstrate what these are.

And assimilation should thus be understood,
As act and agent is then excluded.
Through the case of agent and action
All remaining things can be made clear.⁴

This explanation of interdependence as a mere conditionality, not only renders implausible any kind of conceptual notion of production that is uncaused and so forth, but also any other sort of idea: the dualities of eternalism and nihilism, permanence and impermanence, existent things and non-existent things and so forth become impossible. To express this:

And as all things arise interdependently
These theories will not withstand analysis.
Submitted to interdependence’s arguments
All complex nets of faulty views are ripped to shreds. (6.115)

Since it is only through the reasoning which states, ‘based on this, that arises,’ that relative entities can be found to have an existent identity (svātmabhāva) and not through any other, the view presented here – arguing for a mere conditionality of dependent arising – tears up the entire net of faulty views. By positing such mere conditionality as dependent arising, one cannot accept that entities have any inherent nature whatsoever. As stated:

Something arising based on this and that
Hasn’t come into being in and of itself.
How then can that which has no self-becoming
Be seen as something that has come into being?⁵

Similarly,

Interdependent arising itself
Is called emptiness.
This, itself being an imputation,
Conveys the middle way.⁶

And from the sutras:

What is born conditionally is unborn,
Having no inherent being of its own.
Depending on conditions they are said to be empty –
He who understands emptiness is heedful.⁷

With an inherent nature impermissible, how can any of these aforementioned explanations then be maintained in its absence? If there were any kind of inherent nature, other concepts of production would be permissible: things coming about of their own accord, from self, other, both, a creator god, or the like; and following that, once things have arisen, concepts of them remaining permanently, ending in destruction, or the like. But not otherwise. To express this:

Such theories are relevant if things exist,
But now it has been shown how things cannot exist.
Without existents such ideas can’t be maintained,
Just like a fire won’t keep burning without fuel. (6.116)

The arguments presented have left absolutely no room for an existent entity. For this reason the yogis who have actualised the noble path and see reality through non-seeing, do not observe even the slightest existent phenomenon. Also, any ideas of form and sensation, virtue and non-virtue, things and non-things and so forth, entertained since time without beginning, are prevented. To illustrate: for someone suffering from cataracts, applying eye-ointment has the effect of counteracting such mistaken ideas as seeing hairs, although there is no actual change in the nature of those hairs.

Thus,

While ordinary men are trapped by theories,
By not pursuing concepts yogis are set free.
The wise have said that it’s analysis which will
Alleviate one of conceptual ideas. (6.117)

Since it is only the conceptual ideas that trap ordinary beings who are ignorant of this reality of things, yogis are liberated when realising this reality. For this reason the master, as explained in the Middle Way Treatise, clearly sets forth that the result of analysis is the reversal of each and every conceptual idea. As stated:

If things were inherently existent,
What would be the benefit in seeing emptiness?
Conceptual seeing is that which binds us,
And that which is refuted here.⁸

And therefore,

He did not for the love of quarrelling present
The treatise’s explorations, but to liberate.

Thus, when the master gave the extensive presentations of reasoning in the Middle Way Treatise, he did not do so for the love of dispute, meaning that he didn’t present them in order to triumph over opponents. He presented these analyses so that beings could be liberated, thinking how excellent it would be if by presenting the reality of things through the Middle Way Treatise sentient beings could come to an unmistaken realisation of this reality and thereby reach liberation.

‘But haven’t you been systematically reiterating all these ideas held by your opponents and then proved them wrong? When using the treatise in this argumentative way, how can you propose that its purpose isn’t precisely the refutation of ideas?’

Let me explain. Although these analyses were not carried out for the purposes of dispute, the systems of our opponents being feeble will not be able to hold up in the face of a presentation of actual reality; they crumble just like darkness in the presence of light. So the fault lies not with us. To express this:

One can’t be blamed if one’s opponents’ theories
Are shattered when unravelling reality. (6.118)

As stated:

Although the tathāgatas did not teach
This dharma for the sake of dispute,
It will incinerate opposing arguments
Like fire consumes its fuel.⁹

If this wasn’t the case, and this dharma was taught for the sake of argumentation, one would definitely develop aversion for the faulty positions of any opponents, end up cherishing the rational approach of one’s own side, and there wouldn’t be any reversal of conceptual ideas. How so? As,

To be too fond of one’s own view, and hostile to
The views of others, this is still conceptual.

Failing to reverse conceptual ideas results in bondage, not liberation. But when this dharma isn’t used for the sake of dispute:

But when desire and aversion are dispelled,
Analysis will bring one swift deliverance. (6.119)

As stated:

Great beings are not partial,
Do not engage in arguments.
How can there be opposing views
For those who are impartial?¹⁰

Similarly,

Attached to your own position,
And disliking the position of others,
You will not reach transcendence.
Dualism does not bring peace.¹¹

And from a sutra:

If attachment develops when learning the Dharma
And dislike stirs when hearing non-Dharma,
Pride and conceit become one’s downfall –
Pride is a catalyst that furthers suffering.¹²