The selflessness of phenomena having thus been demonstrated through scripture and reasoning, there now follows a presentation of the selflessness of the person:

They see how all afflictions and all faults
Come from the the view of an identity.
And realising its object as the self,
The yogi goes on to refute this self. (6.120)

The view of identity¹ is to have an afflicted investigative mind that works in terms of the thoughts ‘I’ and ‘mine.’ They originate with it, meaning that the identity view is what brings them about. And what are they? The afflictions and the faults. Afflictions refer to desire and so forth. Faults refer to birth, ageing, sickness, death, grief and so forth. Every last one of these stems from the view of identity. The sutras state that all afflictions:

… have their root in the view of identity, have their cause in the view of identity, originate with the identity view.²

When it states that they have their cause in the view of identity, this means that the view of identity is the cause for all of them, since mental formations will continue to be created and the suffering of birth and so forth will continue to manifest for those who have not given up the view of identity. Its reference point is the self, since self-clinging has a self as its object. So when desiring to get rid of each and every affliction and fault, it is actually the view of identity that should be abandoned; and that again is removed when having understood the selflessness of the self, which is why the yogi will first refute the self. With that refuted the view of identity too is discarded, which in turn fully counteracts afflictions and faults. Analysis of the self is therefore a means to accomplish liberation. Hence, at the very beginning yogis start by analysing the self, asking: ‘What is this so-called self, the reference point for the view of identity?’

One may then ask, ‘What is this self, the reference point for the view of identity? This we do not know.’

To take one such case:

Misguided ones belive the self consumes and lasts,
Is uncreative, and lacks features or pursuits.
The differences between the schools of Tīrthikas
Are based on minor variations on this theme. (6.121)

As the Sāṃkhyas say:

Primordial nature is uncreated.
The seven – the great principle, etc – are both created and creative.³
The sixteen⁴ are just created.
Soul is neither created nor creative.⁵

The primordial nature (or primordial creator; prakṛti)⁶ is so called because it has creative potential (prakaraṇa). In what situation is it creative? When seeing the desire of a soul (puruṣa).⁷ When a soul gives rise to desire to enjoy objects such as sound, being aware of the soul’s desire, nature joins with the soul leading to the production of sound and so forth. The order in which this takes place is in the following:

From the primordial nature comes the great principle (mahat),⁸ from which comes the ego (ahaṃkara), and from this again the group of sixteen. Among the sixteen, the five elements come from the five, meaning that sound and so forth give rise to the elements.⁹

That it is uncreated implies that it has creative potential, but is not itself created in the way that the great principle is. The great principle and so forth have creative potential as well as being created manifestations, which is why it is stated that the seven – the great principle, etc – are both created and creative; the great principle and the others are creators from the point of view of their own creations, and they are created from the point of view of the primordial nature. The sixteen that consist of the mind faculty and so forth are only creations, which is why it says that the sixteen are created. The word just (tu) makes it clear that they are exclusively creations. When it comes to souls, the phrase soul is neither created nor creative, is saying that it does not have creative potential nor is a created manifestation.

This being the order in which all types of manifest creations happen, something should be said about how the soul becomes a consumer as it gives rise to desire. This happens when, governed by the understanding mind the mental faculties of the ear and so forth focus on the apprehended object, such as sound, making the soul aware of the mentally grasped object. Since it is therefore in the soul’s nature to entertain this mental awareness, it is said that ‘the self enjoys the objects.’ Desire hence leads to the passionate consumption of objects, but when passion is diminished and the soul becomes free from the desire for objects, a gradual development of meditative absorptions can take place leading to the adoption of divine sensory powers. With that one comes to see the reality of things through divine sight, and on observing this gives rise to a sense of shame, similar to that felt by an adulteress; and with no further incitement towards the self there is then release. A step by step reversal of all the groups of manifest creations leads to pleace without any further appearances, at which point the soul is left in its solitary state, and this is what is called liberation.

It is permanent in the sense that, although temporarily crippled by manifest creations, it always remains uncrippled in its original and isolated stated. While the primordial nature is an active creator, and among the manifest creations some are also active creators, the self is a non-creator in the sense of being a disinterested spectator to activities. The way in which it is an enjoyer has already been explained above. It is without properties (guṇa) since it is not of the nature of rajas, tamas and sattva.¹⁰ Since pervasiveness does not involve activity, it is inactive. These are the characteristics of the soul (puruṣa).

It was mentioned that, ‘while the primordial nature is an active creator, and among the manifest creations some are also active creators…;’ so which of the manifest creations are active creators and which are not? We will go into some detail to explain this matter.

Rajas, tamas and sattva are the three properties. Rajas is characterised by movement and involvement, tamas by heaviness and darkness, and sattva by lightness and clarity. They are synonymous with happiness, suffering and confusion. In the primary principle (pradhāna) these are in perfect equilibrium, their qualities in their original form cancelling each other out. The primordial nature (prakṛti) is the state when these have not yet manifestly evolved.

As was said, ‘from the primordial nature comes the great principle (mahat),’ a synonym for intelligence (buddhi). From the great principle comes the ego (ahaṃkara), which has three forms: changeable (vikāra[?]), luminous (sāttvika) and dark (tāmasika). From the changeable ego come the five subtle elements (tanmātra): form, sound, smell, taste and texture. From the subtle elements come the major elements: earth, water, fire, wind and ether. From the luminous ego come the five motor organs (voice, hands, legs, anus and genitals) and five mental organs (eyes, ears, nose, tongue and skin), which together with mind, which has both characteristics, makes eleven. The dark ego is involved in both other types of ego. The great principle, the ego and the five subtle elements are creators and creations, while the ten faculties, mind and major elements are only creations. The primordial nature is uncreated. This is what the scripture states.

The different systems of the misguided (tīrthika) are similar to that propounded by the Sāṃkhyas with minor variations. The Vaiśeṣikas say that the self has nine principles: intelligence, pleasure, pain, desire, anger, effort, righteousness (dharma), non-righteousness (adharma) and creative force. Intelligence is what apprehends objects. Pleasure is the experience of desired objects. Pain it its opposite. Attachment is to be drawn towards desirable things. Aversion is to feel opposed to undesirable objects. Effort is to have the adroitness to bring one’s goals to completion. Righteousness is what brings higher states and the excellent goal. Non-righteousness is the opposite. Creative force is what thinking leads to, and is the cause of thinking.

As long as these nine principles of the self remain present in the self, one will keep engaging in their related virtuous and non-virtuous activities, thus perpetuating cyclic existence. When the soul, through discriminative insight, manages to sever the principles of intelligence and so forth at the root, it will remain in its own true state and become liberated.

The self is also described as permanent, a creator, a consumer, endowed with properties and, since it is pervasive, inactive. There are some who hold that it is active due to the fact that it contracts and expands. The Vedavādins assert for instance that it is like the space inhabiting jars: a difference in bodies makes what is singular manifold.

The differences between the systems of misguided schools are hence based on minor variations in how the self is specified to be.

Concerning this self that is talked about in the various scriptural traditions of the misguided:

Since it is unborn, like a barren woman’s son,
There cannot be a self like that of which you speak,
It cannot be the basis for the sense of self –
As even relative that would not be allowed. (6.122)

This is because it would contradict their own inferential logic. Since it is unborn, just like the son of a barren woman, a self such as they present it, cannot exist. And, being unborn, it can also not be the reference for the ego (ahaṃkara). One should see that, not only is it unreasonable for it to exist and be the reference for ego in actual reality, but also relatively it doesn’t have these two traits.

And not only does it not make sense that it is something existent and supports the ego, also

And since its qualities that one may find described
Within the various scriptures of the Tīrthikas
Are contradicted when they argue it’s unborn,
These features will amount to nothing in the end. (6.123)

According to the scriptures of the Sāṃkhyas, the self is characterised as being permanent, a non-creator, a consumer, without features and inactive. But this self can’t be permanent, can’t be a non-creator and so forth, and can’t be inactive because – as they themselves say – it is unborn, just as the son of a barren woman. This will apply equally against the tradition of the Vaiśeṣikas, using the same line of reasoning, ‘The self can’t be permanent, can’t be a non-creator…,’ and so forth. This position can in fact be used against any proponent of self, using the argument of it being unborn and the example of the barren woman’s son to expose the thing itself and its features.

This being the case,

There is therefore no self distinct from aggregates,

There is therefore no self that exists as something separate from the aggregates, since apart from the them no self can be perceived. If it did exist as something separate from the aggregates, it would be something that could be established on its own, but this is not the case. Hence, no self exists that is distinct from the aggregates,

Since it can’t be perceived without the aggregates.

As stated:

It is not possible for there to be a self
That is different from the assimilated.
If separate it should be perceived also without
The assimilated, yet it is not.¹¹

Likewise,

If it was different from the aggregates,
It would not have the aggregates’ characteristics.¹²

Not only is a self that is different from the aggregates non-existent; also

Since they know no such thing and still think there’s a self,
The worldly wouldn’t claim the ego is thus based. (6.124)

Even those who do not identify the self in these particular ways will still due to their habitual clinging have notions of ‘I’ and ‘mine,’ and thus believe in a self. It is therefore not viable that there is a self distinct from the aggregates that forms the support for the ego.

They may then think, ‘Even though they do not at present think of it in terms of being permanent, unproduced and so forth, from past familiarity they still have the view that it is the ego’s reference point.’

That is not so. It is not the case that only those who have a familiarity with the scriptures of these individuals believe in a self.

One may observe that there are those without such prior familiarity, who still maintain a sense of ego in this life have, such as:

Through aeons born among for instance animals,
They would not think it unproduced and permanent.
Yet still they would be harbouring a sense of self.
There is therefore no self distinct from aggregates. (6.125)

Beings that have not left the animal states for an untold number of aeons, will not during that time have considered there to be a self that has these features. The words for instance (api) are meant to include hell beings and so forth. Having observed that those who haven’t been exposed to a self that that havs these features, still have a sense of ego, what rational individual would then insist that such a self, forming the basis for a sense of ego, exists? There cannot therefore be a self that is distinct from the aggregates.

There are some belonging to our own side who say:

Some say no self is found distinct from aggregates,
The reference for self-view is thus the aggregates.

The reasonings presented have shown that no self can be found separate from the aggregates. There is therefore no self that is distinct from the aggregates, and the aggregates are hence the only reference for the view of identity. This is why it is said that the self is merely the aggregates alone. This is the position held by the noble Saṃmitīya school¹³ , who belong to our own tradition.

Among them,

While some insist all five support the view of self,
Some others will insist it is the mind alone. (6.126)

For some it is the five aggregates (form, feeling, perception, formations and consciousness) which serve as the reference for the view of identity, and maintain that it is in connection with them that this conception of selfhood occurs. As is stated:

The Illustrious One said: O mendicants, those ascetics and brahmins who perceive things in terms of ‘I’, are in fact only perceiving the five assimilated aggregates.¹⁴

They therefore say that it was in order to clarify the statement, ‘The view you have is in relation to a collection (kāya) that is by nature perishing (√sad-), and not in relation to an I or a mine,’¹⁵ that he expressed the view (dṛṣṭi) that insists on I and mine as being the view of identity (satkāyadṛṣṭi).¹⁶

Others claim that the self is in the mind, and refer to verses such as the following, where the mind is spoken of as the self:

Oneself is one’s own protector.
Who else can protect one?
The wise attain the higher realms
By properly taming the self.¹⁷

How do they support this? By saying that there is no self apart from the aggregates, and that other sutra statements talk of taming the mind:

To tame the mind is excellent.
Taming the mind brings happiness.¹⁸

The mind being the basis of the ego, is thus labeled the self.

To reply to this:

The aggregates are multiple, so if they are
The self, the consequence would be a lot of selves.
The self is then a substance, and can be observed,
And what you can engage is not a fallacy. (6.127)

To hold the position that the aggregates are the self will mean that the self is manifold because the aggregates are manifold. And if it was the case that mind is the self, one could distinguish between eye-consciousness and so forth, or between the different moments of consciousness appearing and disappearing, and the self would also then be multiple. Fault like this must be mentioned if one is to follow reason. What the faults will be, is in this way explained to those who profess the self to be the aggregates or the consciousness, and other faults that befall them are mentioned in relation to each of these positions. A scriptural source states that, ‘With birth in the world, only a single individual is born,’¹⁹ which means that the self is not held to be multiple.

Concerning the statement the self would be substantial, since the concept of aggregate is used in relation to substances of form and so forth distinguished in terms of the past and so forth, and it is only in relation to these that the convention self is used, the self too would be a substance. And that is not the intent of the following statements:

Mendicants, these five are mere names, mere conventions, mere designations. Which five? The past, the future, space, transcendence and the individual.²⁰

And:

As with a gathering of parts
One may speak of a chariot,
Contingent on the aggregates
Convention grants a sentient being.²¹

Since it follows that the self would be substantial, the aggregates cannot therefore be the self.

Also, since the view of identity would be based in something substantial, not being mistaken it would be equal to conceptions such as blue or yellow. To give up the view of identity would not then an abandonment of the origin, but would simply be like letting go of an attraction towards an object, such as visual impressions of blue, yellow and so forth.

Also,

Nirvana would be the destruction of the self.
Before, it would arise and vanish all the time.
Without an agent the result would not exist.
Distinct are culprit and experiencing side. (6.128)

If the self were made up of the aggregates, when one reaches nirvana and the aggregates are discontinued, the self would be annihilated. Such a belief in annihilation would be a nihilistic view, since according to yourself it constitutes an extremist view to think that there is permanence or annihilation in relation to any idea of selfhood involved in the ‘I’- and ‘mine’-based view of self. One cannot therefore accept that the self is discontinued at the time of nirvana, since that would constitute an extremist view. Hence, the self cannot be made up of the aggregates.

Just as prior to entering nirvana, the aggregates arise and vanish every instant, the self too would be arising and vanishing, since the self is made up of the aggregates. And just as one couldn’t then say, ‘This body of mine came into being,’ the statement, ‘At that point, at that time, I was a king named Māndātṛ,’ would not have been made, because the self, just like the body, would have been destroyed, and it would be accepted that it was another that was born at present. As the Treatise states:

The assimilated, which arises
And ceases to be, is not the self.
How indeed could the assimilated
Become the that which assimilates.²²

Likewise,

If the self were the aggregates,
It would be appearing and disappearing.²³

And if it keeps appearing and disappearing, an agent self does not exist, which means it cannot have a relationship to a result. If the act by which it comes into being is impermanent, the agent then no longer existing, having nothing to support it the act as well will not exist. There will then be no viable relationship between actions and their results.

If the result of karma produced in a prior moment were experienced in subsequent moments, the result of karma accumulated by one would be experienced by another, which is why it says, the culprit and the experiencer would be other. What has been done can then disappear, and there can be consequences from what one has not done. The Treatise states:

If it were different, even in the absence
Of that it could then still be present.
And what was would likewise then remain,
It could now be born without having died.

Karmas would disappear, be annihilated,
And the consequence of acts carried out by one
Could be experienced by another.
These and other faults would follow.²⁴

It does not therefore make sense that the aggregates can be the self.

They might then say: ‘Although the former and latter moments are indeed different, they form a single continuum and we are therefore not at fault.’

To reply:

‘It’s really one continuum, thus we’re not at fault;’
The problems with continua were shown before.

This was treated when it was said, things related respectively to Maitreya and Upagupta…²⁵ And as stated:

If being a human is different from a god,
That would mean impermanence.
If being a human is different from a god,
A continuity becomes untenable.²⁶

Thus, since it does not make sense that things that are mutually distinct can be included within a single continuum, this consequence cannot be avoided.

To express that neither the aggregates nor the mind can therefore be the self, it was said:

The aggregates or mind as self thus makes not sense,

The foregoing discussion of unwanted consequences is not the only thing that shows how untenable it is for the aggregates or the mind to be the self. In addition:

The world as finite and so forth was not endorsed. (6.129)

Since it was not mentioned whether there is an end to the world and so forth, it does not make sense to say that the aggregates or the mind is the self. The fourteen indeterminable issues are mentioned by all schools:

‘The world is eternal’ or ‘the world is not eternal;’ or ‘the world is both eternal and not eternal’ or ‘the world is neither eternal nor not eternal…;’²⁷

Since the Illustrious One said that no reply could be given to these, they are classified as indeterminable issues (avyākṛtamūla).

These were hence dismissed, and if a mendicant upholds the idea that the world is eternal, the scriptures of the Pūrvaśaila school state that, ‘The one who upholds the view that the world is eternal is subject to expulsion. The one who upholds the view that the world is not eternal is subject to expulsion. The one who upholds the view that the world is both eternal and not eternal is subject to expulsion. The one who upholds the view that the world is neither eternal nor not eternal is subject to expulsion;’ and that one should not associate with them.²⁸

There are thus said to be fourteen indeterminable issues. And if you take the word world to mean the aggregates, since the aggregates arise and cease and are therefore impermanent, one would in effect determine that the world is not eternal. And by saying that the aggregates are not present subsequent to nirvana, one is determining that the world is finite. One would similarly have determined that the Tathāgata does not exist after death. But since the statements saying that the world is finite and so forth were dismissed, it is thus unreasonable that the aggregates themselves can be the self.

Also,

For you, when yogis understand the lack of self,
All things would then lose their existence certainly.

If the aggregates or the mind were the self, when the yogi ponders the truth and understands the truth of suffering in terms of non-self – that ‘all phenomena are selfless’ – then it would be seeing the lack of aggregates that would be seeing the lack of self, which is not what you assert. The aggregates cannot therefore be the self.

One might contend, ‘When the term self is used in the context of the relationship between the act and its result, it can only be referring to the aggregates as there is nothing else that can be the self. But when seeing the lack of self, it is the soul (puruṣa), the inner experiencer (antaḥkaraṇa) imagined by non-buddhists, that is being referred to. Thus, when seeing selflessness one is just seeing the idea of a lack of this inner soul, and it does not follow that one is seeing the lack of all things.’

To reply:

If it is an eternal self that is dismissed,
Then neither mind nor aggregates can be the self. (6.130)

If you worry that the consequence will be that there are then no existent things, and so seize on the idea that the term self refers to a permanent self, no longer thinking that it is the aggregates or the mind that are the self, then you have deserted your own position.

One might then think, ‘I do not agree that that is what it is referring in that context, and therefore I am not at fault.’

Well, this too will not suffice. How can you just be adopting whatever unreasonable position that you like, saying that in that particular case it is the inner soul that is the self, and otherwise it is the aggregates? If you say it is because it just can’t be, it has also already been shown that it is impossible that it can be referring to the aggregates. Hence, if you do not accept that in the context of the thought, ‘all phenomena are selfless,’ the term self refers to the aggregates, you cannot claim that it does so elsewhere. If you claim that it does refer to the aggregates elsewhere, then you will have to say it does in this context too.

Also,

For you the yogi seeing selflessness would not
Then realise the reality of form and such.
Not having seen its nature, when perceiving form
They’re caught by it, creating passion and so forth. (6.131)

Someone who has not savoured the nectar found in the centre of the flower cannot gain an experience of it merely by saying that there is a cuckoo upon the flower. And once its flavour is known, the experience will not go away, and one cannot rid oneself of the accompanying clinging, just by saying there’s no cuckoo upon flower.

It’s the same in this case. If a yogi sees that phenomena like forms and so forth lack a permanent self but does not come to understand their nature, what will he have gained? And, although by perceiving the nature of forms and so forth the attachment to such perceptions are relinquished, what effect will that have on the non-existent self? Nobody who understands its lack of existence and abandons attachment to these objects is doing this so that it may experience pleasure, thinking, ‘May the inner soul be happy!’; or, worrying that it will suffer, avoids those things that are uncomfortable to it. Since perception of form leads to this involvement, attachment and so forth will be the outcome. And since coming to understand its nature will not lead to the destruction of attachment and so forth, this approach may be considered equal to that of non-Buddhist schools.

One might think, ‘We accept the validity of the scriptures, and will not be harmed by these logical measures. And the scriptures do state that the aggregates constitute the self:

O mendicants, those ascetics and brahmins who perceive things in terms of ‘I’, are in fact only perceiving the five assimilated aggregates.²⁹

‘And so, this is the case here too.’

That aggregates are self, you base this claim upon
The Teacher’s statement that, ‘The aggregates are self.’
But this refutes a self distinct from aggregates,
As other sutras state that form is not the self. (6.132)

This sutra where it is recognised that, ‘The aggregates are the self,’ is not in fact saying that the aggregates constitute the self. What does it then say? The intent of the Illustrious One was to indicate that there is no self whatsoever separate from the aggregates, in order to refute the scriptures of the misguided using the relative truth, and to clarify what is the unmistaken relative truth. If you ask how one can be certain that this is a refutation of a self that is distinct from the aggregates, the reason is that other sutras refute the idea that form and so forth constitute the self.

‘How so?’

That neither form nor feeling constitute the self,
Nor do perception, formations, or consciousness,
Has been proclaimed in various other sutra quotes.
In brief, that aggregates are self is not affirmed. (6.133)

It is therefore certain that when this sutra states, ‘[when they] regard these five assimilated aggregates as the self…,’³⁰ it is in fact refuting that there is a self that is something other than the aggregates. While instances when form and so forth constituting a self is refuted, should be taken to express a refutation of the self that is the object of the view of identity, as dependently imputed in relation to the assimilated aggregates, since these are contexts where one is considering the actual reality of things. And it makes sense that one will be freed from attachment to form and so forth since, ‘When the assimilator is not observed, what it assimilates will likewise not be present.’ As this is what is stated in other sutras, the previous sutra quote is not therefore claiming that the aggregates are the self.

Also, although this sutra statement is phrased as an affirmation, it wouldn’t serve to indicate that the aggregates constitute the self. And why? As,

When saying it’s the aggregates that are the self,
It’s their collection, not the aggregates themselves.

For example, when saying that the trees make up the forest, it is the collection of trees that are a forest. It is not the trees themselves, since it would then follow that the forest is present in each individual tree. Likewise, it is the collection of the aggregates that make up the self.

And since a collection isn’t actually anything whatsoever:

But this does not exist, and so it cannot be –
Can’t be protector, cannot tame, nor serve as judge. (6.134)

The Illustrious One spoke of a protector and a judge in the statement:

Oneself is one’s own protector.
Oneself is one’s own enemy.
Oneself is one’s own judge
Of one’s good and bad deeds.³¹

And of a tamer in the statement:

The wise attain the higher realms
By properly taming their self.³²

A collection however, not being something substantially existent, cannot logically be a protector, a tamer, or a judge, and the collection is therefore not the self.

One may think, ‘Because the collection is not anything apart from the collected parts, one identifies the result as the collection of parts. It is hence permissible to speak of a protector, a tamer and a judge.’

This cannot be, since the problems with that have already been explained. And also,

A chariot would be the presence of its parts.
As with a chariot, the same goes for the self.

From a sutra:

‘A self’, you say, O demon mind;
A fancy you thus entertain.
It’s void this heap, of factors formed.
There is no being present here.

As with a gathering of parts
One may speak of a chariot,
Contingent on the aggregates
Convention grants a sentient being.³³

Thus,

‘Contingent on the aggregates,’ the sutra states.
The self is thus not just the aggregates combined. (6.135)

Something that is contingently imputed cannot be reduced to the assembly of its perceived parts, because a dependent labelling is taking place, just as when elements combine to form a product. Although things may be produced from the elements and receive labels such as blue and so forth, or eye and so forth, these two types of phenomena are not just the mere assembly of the elements. Similarly, although the self has the characteristic of being an imputation made in relation to the aggregates, that it is just the assembly of the aggregates does not suffice.

One might object, ‘That is inconclusive owing to things such as pots.’

No it isn’t, since one cannot prove that such things as pots are reducible to the gathering of form and so forth, and because of similar criticisms.³⁴

One could ask, ‘If the mere collection of wheels and so forth is not the chariot, then what is?’ And it might then be supposed that only when the wheels and so forth assume a certain shape does the term chariot become applicable. And likewise, that the self is just the arrangement of form and so forth.

But that is not so. And why?

‘It is the shape,’ you say, but shape belongs to form.
So though you say it’s these that constitute the self,
The mental groups cannot then be what this self is

And why is that?

Due to the fact that these cannot assume a shape. (6.136)

Meaning that this is so because they have no physical form.

Furthermore,

It makes no sense that grasped and grasper are the same,

Why?

Since act and actor then would be identical.

The grasper means the one who assimilates by performing the grasping, while the act is the assimilation that takes place when something is grasped. And here, the grasper is a reference to the self, while the grasped refers to the five aggregates. If the self is the mere collection of form and so forth, then the grasper and the act are identical. But this would not be acceptable, since it would then follow that the elements and the material components they make up, and the pot and the potter, are identical. As stated:

If fuel were the fire,
Act and actor are identical.³⁵

And,

The fire and the fuel thus fully clarify
All such relationships,
The self and what is assimilated, along with things
Like earthen pots, woollen cloths and such.³⁶

Here it is saying that, just as fire and fuel cannot be claimed to be identical, this claim does not hold for the self and the assimilated either.

One might think, ‘There is no existent assimilator doing the acting, there is nothing more than the mere collection of the assimilated.’
But to explain how this is unreasonable:

‘There is no actor, just the act,’ you might then think.
But no, since without actor there can be no act. (6.137)

Thus it can’t be like that: if one does not accept an actor, the act which is then unfounded cannot be accepted. As the Treatise states:

And assimilation should thus be understood,
As act and agent is then excluded.
Through the case of agent and action
All remaining things can be made clear.³⁷

Here, the verb root has been combined with the lyuṭ-suffix³⁸ , making upādāna, with reference to the act of assimilation. But since a verb root cannot occur isolated from its function, the way it functions implies that which is assimilated and the assimilator; since in the word in question, assimilation (upādāna), the verb has been supplied with a lyuṭ-suffix, by the rule which states, ‘kṛt and lyuṭ are inclusive,’³⁹ it is also expressive of that which is assimilated.

Thus, just as it is in relation to an actor that the acted is designated, and in relation to the acted that an actor is designated, the assimilator is similarly designated in relation to the assimilated, and the assimilated in relation to the assimilator. It states:

So it is neither distinct from the assimilated,
Nor the same as the assimilated.
There is no self without the assimilated,
Still one can’t conclude that it does not exist.⁴⁰

This is saying that there cannot be an act in the absence of an actor. And when it is stated that, ‘Though the actor is not apprehended, the act still exists, as does its result,’⁴¹ this is meant to refute an inherently existent actor. It is not to be understood as saying that conventional norms of what is dependently designated should be discarded. As stated:

A person affected by ignorance generates meritorious formations…⁴²

Also,

The Sage states that the self is recognised
With reference to earth, water, fire, wind,
To consciousness and space – six elements –
And six supports of contact, such as eyes; (6.138)

And is assumed from mind and mental states.
And it is therefore these though not the same,
Nor just the mere collection they make up.
One cannot find the sense of self in these. (6.139)

From the sutras:

O Great King. The person, the individual, is the six elements, the six fields of contact and the eighteen movements of the mind.⁴³

The six elements are earth, water, fire, wind, consciousness and space, and it is in relation to these that the self is imputed. The six supports of contact, such as eyes, refer to the sense field of visual perception and so forth, up to the sense field of mental perception, and it is in relation to these that the self is imputed.

The eighteen movements of the mind refers to the six ways the mind can be pleasantly involved with visual, audible, olfactory, palatable, tactile, or mental objects, the ways it can be unpleasantly involved with these, and the ways it can have a neutral involvement with these; and in relation to these, and assumed from the mind and mental states, the self is imputed.

Since it is stated that, ‘the self is imputed in relation to the elements and so forth,’ it here states, it is these though not the same, meaning that it is not anything other nor is it the same. It neither makes sense that is it just the mere collection of these. Since it cannot be that the self is these aforementioned phenomena, it does not stand to reason that the ego mind is found in them. And when the aggregates cannot be the abode of the ego, and is not something other than the aggregates, the ego then has no abode; and the yogi seeing no ‘I’ comes to understand that neither does ‘mine’ have any essence, eliminates every conditioned phenomenon and transcends to the state free from adoption, illustrating how brilliant this analysis is.

If those saying the aggregates, or the mind, are the abodes of the self were right, a sense of self would remain as long the aggregates were present, since they constitute the actual basis for the sense of self. To explain:

That seeing selflessness would shed the lasting self
While not believing it to be ego’s support,
I find it quite astounding then to hear you say
That knowing selflessness uproots the view of self. (6.140)

If the ego is based in a permanent self, and without it the ego is shed, yet you claim the abode of the self to be something other than that, and that only through seeing that something else is lacking that the sense of ego is halted – my goodness! How extraordinary!

To clarify this lack of a relationship through an example:

Like he who finds that there’s a snake within his wall,
Proclaiming it’s no elephant to ease his fright
And to escape the harm the serpent can inflict,
Will surely end up being ridiculed by all. (6.141)

Someone encountering a dangerous situation, but who does not see the danger they’re in and fails to take the appropriate steps to avoid it, thus remaining relaxed and displaying no anxiety, will end up being bitten by the snake. That no elephant is present will not be helpful in removing the danger the snake poses. It is the same when one says that the aggregates or consciousness are the self, as a lack of a permanent self will not then be any help in removing the ego which is based in the aggregates. This cyclic state will certainly not then subside.

Having thus given an exhaustive treatment of these two positions, showing how the self can neither be composed of nor distinct from the aggregates, it is discussed how the self cannot be existent within a relationship of support and supported:

The self is not within the aggregates,
Nor are the aggregates found in the self.
If they were different that could be surmised.
As they’re not different it’s but an idea. (6.142)

If there were a difference it would make sense that things could be a support and a supported, as when saying there is curd in a bowl. The bowl and the curd being different from the worldly point of view, are seen to be in a relationship of support and supported. But since the aggregates are not separate from the self in this manner, and the self is not separate from the aggregates, these two cannot be in a relationship of support and supported.

To indicate how the self cannot be the possessor of the aggregates it was said:

One cannot claim the self possesses form, because
There is no self, so ownership does not apply.
One owns a cow: distinct. One has a body: same.
But form is not the same nor different from the self. (6.143)

That the self could be the same as or different from the aggregates has already been disproved. Possession too is problematic. When saying that Devadatta has a body no difference perceived, while when saying he owns a cow a difference certainly exists. But as there is neither identity nor difference in relation to form and the self, it isn’t possible to say that the self could possess form.

Now, to enumerate the mistaken perceptions and aspects involved in the view of identity by summarising the positions that have been refuted, it is said:

Form’s not the self, the self does not possess the form,
There is no self in form, and form’s not within self –
All aggregates considered in this fourfold way
And added up amount to twenty views of self. (6.144)

When the five aggregates’ lack of self is considered in terms of the four aspects of the view of identity, the twentyfold view of identity emerges. But in the Treatise, in the context of the fivefold analysis, doesn’t it state the following?

He is not the aggregates, nor different from them,
The aggregates are not in him, nor is he in them,
The Tathāgata does not possess the aggregates –
So who is the Tathāgata?⁴⁴

But how can that make twenty as mentioned above, when multiplied by five? This division of the view of identity is found presented in the sutras, and as there is no way of being caught up in a self without perceiving the aggregates, it is the fourfold way of perceiving the aggregates that is relevant. There would in fact be no way of coming to believe in a self if it weren’t for the aggregates, and the fifth aspect is therefore not possible in relation to the view of identity. The view of identity is therefore only twentyfold. The fifth way mentioned in the Treatise – that of otherness – should be taken as refutating the traditions of the misguided (tīrthika).

As the scriptures state, when the twenty lofty peaks of the view of identity are brought down, the resultant state of a stream-enterer will manifest:

The vajra-wisdom seeing selflessness brings down
The mountains of the view of self, and when that goes
The lofty peaks that rest upon this massive range
Of viewing an identity are also crushed. (6.145)

For as long as the noble vajra of wisdom does not descend upon the mountain of the view of identity, the rock face of afflictions will grow daily, emerging from beginningless cyclic existence as it rises as high as the hilltops of the three worlds, spreading throughout all directions and emerging from the golden ground of ignorance. When demolished by the vajra of realising selflessness, those lofty peaks, here to be understood as its summits, will be destroyed together with it.

Now, for the refutation of a substantially existent imputed self as proposed by the Saṃmitīyas, it was said:

Some claim the person is substantial, yet cannot
Be labeled same or other, permanent or not,
That it’s an object of the six consciousnesses,
And claim this is the basis for the sense of self. (6.146)

As said here: firstly, not being able to be perceived except for the aggregates, the person cannot be distinct from them; it is further also not constituted by the aggregates, as its arising and ceasing would be a consequence; hence rendering being described as the same as or different from the aggregates impossible. As it cannot be the same or different, it cannot be described as permanent or impermanent either, but it is known by the six consciousnesses. It further makes sense that the person is substantially existent, being described as the actor and the enjoyer, and that which links samsara and nirvana, bondage and liberation. This is what is held to be the abode for the sense of self.

To explain how it does not make sense to say this:

To say, ‘mind is distinct from body,’ means it’s not
Ineffable – real things can’t be ineffable.
If self was proven to be real in any way,
It would be real, like mind, and not ineffable. (6.147)

After this verse, showing how something cannot at the same time be ineffable and substantially existent,

… to explain how it has imputed existence, it was said:

Since, as you say, a pot is not real in itself –
There’s nothing to point out apart from form and such –
Do not then think the self exists from its own side
When it’s ineffable except for aggregates. (6.148)

The sense intended here is that a pot can neither be described as the same as, nor different from, form and so forth, and is thence held to have imputed existence. And as with a pot, the self too should then be an imputation.

After having given refutation and proof in the two foregoing verses, and seeing as an existent thing may be talked of in terms of sameness and difference, we now embark upon a refutation of the self based on the fact that it does not have the features of an existent entity.

You would agree that consciousness is not distinct
From its own self, yet is a thing distinct from form.
As these two aspects may be seen in entities,
No self exists; it lacks the features of a thing. (6.149)

If, as you say, the self is substantially existent, it should surely be like consciousness, which is not distinct from itself, while it is distinct from form and so forth. But, as it is not, it is therefore not an entity that has the features phenomena usually have. Hence, the self is not an existent entity like a pot.