That is not so, since it is impossible for the mental consciousness to arise in dreams. So,

Just like for you externals are not there
In dreams, the mind as well is not produced.

Hence,

All three, the eye, the object seen, the mind
Which they engender, each of these are false. (6.51)

The perception of forms happens when the eye, the form and the mind are in proximity. Likewise, when objects are distinguished in dreams, a coming together of these three is observed. And just as in that context eyes and form are found to be non-existent, eye-consciousness too has no existence. And just as with these three, the same is the case for the rest:

The rest, with ears and such, are unproduced.

The words ears and so forth include the rest, from sound and ear consciousness up to and including mentation, mental phenomena and mental consciousness. Thus, since all of these triads are false within the dream, it makes no sense to say that the mental consciousness exists in dreams.
Some think that, ‘The form apprehended by the mental consciousness belongs to the sense field of mental phenomena, and does exist in the dream. Hence, it is not at all the case that consciousness exists without objects.’ But this sentiment is also unreasonable, since the three are utterly unfeasible in dreams. If they say they have accepted this in order disprove the scriptural tradition of the others, the dream example becomes meaningless, because what is deemed not false cannot serve to illustrate things that are considered false.

To explain that, since the three are unreal in dreams, this may be used as a proof to confirm unsubstantiality, and that therefore in the waking state as well all phenomena are shown to be without intrinsic nature, it was said:

The same holds true awake as when you dream
Since all things are deceptive; there’s no mind,
There are no objects and no faculties. (6.52)

It should be acknowledged that, just as in dreams objects, faculties and consciousness are false, the same is the case in the waking state. Hence:

As when perceiving illusory beings
That appear while not really there,
The Sugata taught that these phenomena
Are like illusions, similar to dreams.¹

Similarly,

Existence as a being is like a dream –
None are born, there are none who die.
The labels and lives of beings are not found;
These dharmas are like bubbles and plantain trees.²

These and similar statements clearly express this.

Thus, these three are explained to be unproduced both with regard to the cognition of waking life and the dream state:

But just as one may see them when asleep,
The three are still here now when we’re awake.

While the sleep of unknowing remains, for those who have emerged from the sleep state and are awake, these three parts continue to be present – even though not produced in and of themselves – as dream perceptions caused by the sleep of ignorance. The same is the case for those who are asleep and have not emerged from the state of dreaming; this triad exists with the same type of nature also then.

And just as when awake the three are gone,
They’re gone when from delusion’s sleep we wake. (6.53)

When sleep ends and one is awake, the dream perceptions involving the three do not persist. Likewise, for those who have fully eradicated the sleep of ignorance and directly perceive the dharma expanse (dharmadhātu), these three do not exist. Hence, consciousness does not exist in the absence of external phenomena.

They might argue: ’Someone with cataracts does perceive things that are non-existent, such as hairs. Therefore consciousness must exist without external things.’ This is also untenable. Why?

The hairs an eye disease will make appear;
The mind which the afflicted sense affects;
His intellect will see them both as real.
With healthy sight they are both seen as false. (6.54)

This is to be regarded exactly as with dreams. From the perspective of the one with cataracts the appearance of hairs exists, while from the perspective of the one without cataracts both are unproduced, since one can hardly confirm consciousness in the absence of objects.

This must necessarily be agreed to. Otherwise,

If there could be cognition without something known,
One would expect that healthy vision too should know
These hairs when gazing at the spot where hairs appear.
This doesn’t happen, hence this cannot be the case. (6.55)

If a cognition having the features of hair strands could arise for the one with cataracts without existing hair strands, then someone without cataracts directing their gaze to the same place where the one with cataracts is seeing hairs should also have a mental experience of them, since they are equally non-existent for both. Hence it is illogical to say that consciousness arises in the absence of objects.

They might say: ’This would be the case if an existent object was the cause for the arising of consciousness. So how is it? It is the ripening or non-ripening of former imprints deposited in the consciousness that determines whether a particular consciousness arises or not. Hence, only when an imprint of another cognition in the form of hair strands left there ripens, does a cognition having these features occur; otherwise not.’ To then explain how this too is unfeasible:

‘There is no ripe potential for the healthy one,
And therefore he does not have this experience;
It’s not because there’s nothing there that can be known.’
But since potential is unreal this doesn’t work. (6.56)

… such a knowable object is lacking means that the knowable thing does not exist. Only if a so-called potential was something existent would there be the occurrence or non-occurrence of consciousness related to its ripening or non-ripening. Therefore this doesn’t prove it.

So why can’t potential exist? To explain:

Potential for what has arisen cannot be,
Nor can it be for what in fact is unproduced.

Is this assumed potential something connected with a present consciousness, or with a past or future consciousness? In the case of a produced present consciousness, there cannot be potential. When we talk of the potential’s we are using the sixth case,³ and to say that the essentially resultant consciousness is itself the very cause is illogical. If it were, we would have a causeless result, and once the sprout is produced the seed would also not be destroyed. Therefore it is impossible for a produced consciousness to have potential.

When we say from the potential we are using the fifth case,⁴ and as has already been explained, since it is existent it would be illogical for a produced consciousness to then originate from a potential. Hence there cannot be potential for that which is already a product.

Nor can that consciousness, when by nature unproduced, have potential. Because

With no distinction one cannot distinguish it,
Or else the barren woman’s son would be a fact. (6.57)

Without something distinct one cannot make distinctions. How so? When referring to consciousness potential, consciousness distinguishes the potential, and potential is the basis distinguished. But a thing yet to be produced cannot be used to indicate negation or affirmation in relation to something, saying it is a consciousness such-and-such or non-consciousness such-and-such. That being the case, what sort of distinction would one then actually be making by saying it is the potential for that? And when it can’t be distinguished as such, to say that will come from it won’t serve to identify it, and one isn’t actually indicating anything at all.

If one still insists that something unproduced can have potential, one would have to agree that a barren woman can have a son. Therefore, potential for something unproduced cannot exist.

They might then think: ‘The consciousness in question is an anticipated consciousness that will arise by virtue of this potential, and as it is the potential for that consciousness we can say, “It arises from this.” In this way the entities of distinguisher and basis distinguished are established, just as in everyday language one might say, “Please make some boiled rice,” or “Please weave a garment from this yarn.” This is explained in a treatise as well:’

‘There are three that enter the womb,
The cakravartin and the two self-manifest ones,
….’⁵

To explain how this is empty rhetorics:

You may suggest that in the future it will be.
But lacking in potential it cannot spring forth.

Things that may occur at certain times can arise, but what is certain never to arise – such as a barren woman’s son or things such as space – will not. Thus in this context, if the potential did exist, consciousness could certainly come into being. But when the future consciousness does not exist, and its potential therefore doesn’t exist, as is the case for such things as a barren woman’s son, the absence of its potential means that it certainly can’t arise. This also applies when explaining boiled rice and so forth.

And although it is indeed the case that consciousness and potential are mutually reliant, a thing that is dependent does not in fact have existence. Thus,

And mutual dependence used to prove something,
The wise will say this fails to prove establishment. (6.58)

To say, ‘When consciousness exists, its potential is a fact; and consciousness arises from that,’ describes a case of mutual dependence. If they say, ‘That is exactly the way of things,’ they are effectively saying that consciousness does not inherently exist. For example, only when there is long can there be short, and when there is short can there be long; only when there is there can here exist, and when there is here can there exist. These are all nominal imputations lacking any intrinsic establishment. So if that is the case, they are in fact agreeing with us. As explained:

A cause in the absence of an effect
Has no existence as a cause.
Hence, it necessarily follows
That every effect is also a cause.⁶

And from the Treatise:

If a thing is dependently established,
And that upon which it depends
Is established only in dependence on it,
What is then established in dependence on what?⁷

Meaning that, if a thing such as consciousness were established in dependence on a particular potential, and that particular potential the consciousness relies on to establish its nature in turn depends on it; in establishing these two it must then be asked which is established in dependence on which? It continues:

How can a dependently established entity
Depend when it is not established?
And if you say the established depends,
Its dependence makes no sense.⁸

Meaning that, if consciousness is established in dependence on a potential, is it established or not as it depends on that potential? If it is not established it can’t rely on that potential, because it is as unestablished as the horns of a donkey. On the other hand, if it is established while depending, its establishment would mean that it cannot be dependent.

The wise have thus stated that, ‘Things that are established in mutual dependence are not established.’ A future phenomenon cannot therefore have potential.

To explain that past potential likewise cannot be, it was said:

If it comes from a ceased potential’s ripening,
A separate potential then brings forth something.

If it is so that, as a result of a produced consciousness having ceased a particular potential is left in the substrate consciousness, and through the ripening of this ceased consciousness’s potential a consciousness arises, this would be an instance of something other arising from an extraneous potential. How so? Because:

As parts of a continuum must be distinct …,

‘Tan- means to extend’.⁹ Accordingly, a continuum (saṃtāna) implies a succession, like the continuum of a river, and means that there is a continuous flow, a continuous transmission, with a connection between cause and result. In its usage in the case of the succession of birth and death, there is a sense of a sustaining of the conditioned moments of the three times in a continuous and unbroken sequential state, and as the parts of this continuum exist in substantial instances, the branches of the continuum being instances of substance are what is spoken of as the continuity. These are mutually other and separate things, and our opponents accept their otherness. Hence, when caused by these imprints a latter resultant moment occurs, it is different from the causal moment during which the imprints were set in place, and as such this will be a case of something distinct coming from a separate potential. If they think, ‘This is what we assert, and it is unmistaken,’ that is not so. What one is in fact saying by this assertion is that anything can be produced from anything, as explained in the line:

One could have everything come from just anything. (6.59)

The refutation of other-production has already been covered, and will not be reiterated here.¹⁰

To this they reply:

‘The parts of a continuum are separate,
But their continuum is an unbroken whole,
Hence there’s no fault.’ …

‘The substantial moments of the sequence are indeed mutually distinct but the continuum is a singular thing, so it does not follow that everything can be produced from everything.’