Similarly, one should understand that

It’s similar to cataract-inflicted eyes
When spirits see a river’s water being pus.

It was previously explained that, ‘The mind sees hairs through the influence of this disease …,’¹ and any other similar cases may be considered along the same lines; but we shall desist from elaborating more for now.

In short, please understand that, just as what you know
Has no existence, neither does the mind itself. (6.71)

One should come to recognise that just as knowable objects have no inherent existence, the mind too that entertains images of knowable objects is in and of itself un-produced. As stated:

Without a knowing there’s no known;
And lacking that, no consciousness.
Hence you declared that knowing and
The known lack inherent existence.²

Similarly,

Consciousness is like an illusion –
Thus spoke The Sun’s Kinsman.
And what it perceives is likewise
Certainly like illusory things.³

Those who are seized by this consciousness-claiming madness⁴ and deny external objects, are sure to plunge into the ravine of self-hood, and must therefore be treated by noble compassionate practitioners with an excellent and harsh mantric cure of scripture and reasoning.

Thus, having shown how there cannot be consciousness without external objects, in order to reject the position that it simply must exist, it is said:

And if detached from subject-object there could be
Dependent nature, empty of duality,
Then who would know of its existence? Just to say,
‘It’s there but not perceived,’ is quite unreasonable. (6.72)

If a dependent nature empty of so-called apprehended and apprehender exists, through what cognition do you apprehend its existence? It is untenable that it apprehends itself, since it is contradictory for something to direct its act upon itself: the blade of a sword cannot cut itself; the tip of a finger cannot touch itself; even the strongest and most dextrous athlete isn’t able to climb onto his own shoulders; fire cannot burn itself; and an eye cannot look at itself. Another cognition cannot be apprehending it since that would conflict with your own tenets; if cognition was the object of another cognition, one could then say that this undermines the sense of cognition only. Hence there is no way whatsoever that there can be an apprehender of it; and that which cannot be apprehended cannot exist.

Now they reply, ‘It isn’t actually a case of another apprehending something else, but it has reflexive awareness. And since reflexive awareness apprehends itself, that shows it to be existent.’ To show how this can’t be, we explain:

It isn’t proven to experience itself.

It is unproven that it can so-called ‘apprehend itself.’

There are those who cite the Sautrāntika position in order to prove reflexive awareness: ‘When a fire is kindled it will simultaneously illumine itself together with vases and other things without distinction. And words signify both themselves and a referent. Similarly, when consciousness occurs it can fully discern itself and objects without distinction. Hence, reflexive awareness most certainly exists.

‘Though unwilling, one must by necessity accept reflexive awareness. Otherwise, when remembering the experience, “I saw …,” one wouldn’t then remember both the object as well as the experience, “I saw it.” Why? The memory would be of the experienced object, while the knowing of it would not have been experienced and could not then be remembered.

‘As long as awareness is not reflexive it cannot be experienced. And that there is another cognition experiencing it is unreasonable. Why? If the cognition experiencing it is other, the consequence will be that of infinite regress. If you accept that immediately following one cognition distinguishing the colour blue, there is a consciousness distinguishing that, one would need yet another experiencer of the cognition of the cognition of blue; and then yet another again; leading to the fault of infinite regress.

‘And it can’t be that cognition discerns something separate from it, since then all strings of awareness would be objects of distinct consciousnesses, and sentient beings only have a single stream of consciousness. It is like a stack of a hundred blue lotus-petals being pierced; consciousness engages with things in succession, but so rapidly that it appears to be happening simultaneously.⁵ Hence, to avoid the fault of infinite regress one must necessarily accept reflexive awareness.

‘With that, both objects involved when subsequently remembering the thought “I saw …” will be accounted for. But if the nature of cognition isn’t known by reflexive awareness, it’s illogical that its object can be remembered. And so, as the subsequent memory “I saw…” appears to one’s cognition, it may be inferred that the trigger for the cognitive experience of a subsequent memory containing both these objects must have been an experience of its own nature and the nature of the object. The subsequent memory proves the experience of oneself; and when experience of oneself exists, the dependent nature exists. You asked, “What would then know of its existence?”⁶ This is the answer.’

To show that this is illogical, it was said:

It isn’t proven to experience itself.
And if you say a later memory is proof,
You’re giving something that is unproven as proof;
And what’s not proven cannot function as a proof. (6.73)

If this is the proof they now present to substantiate it, since memory is impossible in that it’s produced neither from self nor from other, how could the unproven memory prove the unproven reflexive awareness? Even in terms of worldly conventions it would be impossible for memory to be the result of reflexive awareness. How so? If, as in the case of fire, cognition is used to prove reflexive awareness – and because of its presence, like fire is deduced from smoke, one is to be convinced of its existence via the subsequent occurrence of memory – since this reflexive awareness remains something unproven, how could memory, the result of reflexive awareness and something that doesn’t occur if reflexive awareness doesn’t exist, exist? One can’t be certain of the presence of a water-crystal gem just from seeing water, or a fire-crystal gem just from seeing fire, because even without these water may be the result of such phenomena as rain, and fire may be produced for instance by rubbing sticks together. In the same way, this shows that memory may arise in the absence of reflexive awareness. And therefore, since memory as a result of reflexive awareness is non-existent without it, you’re giving something unproven as proof. In proving reflexive awareness, this unproven term ‘memory’ has no relevance as evidence – just like thinking of sound’s impermanence as something perceived by the eyes.

But say we dispense with such analysis:

But let’s assume that self-awareness is affirmed.
That memory remembers it is still unsound,
Because it’s other, like an unknown in one’s mind.
This argument will conquer any counterclaim. (6.74)

If we do say that cognition is aware of itself and the object, it is still illogical for a remembering cognition to remember them, because the remembering cognition is accepted as other in relation to the cognition that experienced the object. The reflexive awareness and experience of the object that happened in Maitreya’s mind will not be remembered by Upagupta, because he didn’t experience them. Similarly, seeing as they are other, it would be just like an unknown mind appearing to oneself, and a subsequent consciousness taking place within a stream of mind cannot therefore have that memory, because it didn’t experience that cognition and object.

Now, one may think that such a memory can exist, since this is a case of a single continuum where things have a causal relationship. But this too is not the case because we have an argument which defeats any objection. The argument of stating, ‘Since they are other …,’ will utterly defeat any counterclaims such as, ‘They are part of the same continuum,’ or, ‘They are in a causal relationship,’ and so on. Since a moment of recollecting cognition would come about subsequent to the experience, it is something other; and being in that way just the same as having a cognition of another stream of mind, we may say that it isn’t of a single continuum as the cognition that experienced, or in a causal relationship, and so forth. So this argument of stating that they are other is a sweeping refutation.

They might then ask, ‘How do you explain it?’ To clarify:

For us, the one who has the memory is not
Distinct from he who had experience of something.
To think, ‘I saw,’ is therefore memory to us,
As is the way conventional worldly people think. (6.75)

I have already explained in relation to the experience of an object, how between the cognition that experienced the object and the cognition that remembers there cannot be otherness. And since, when there has been an experience, the rememberer is not another, it isn’t the case that the cognition which remembers that experience is not the experiencer, and the memory can therefore appear with the object. Since it isn’t the case that the discernment of the experiencing cognition isn’t the discernment of the rememberer, one can have the thought, ‘I saw….’ This is also the worldly viewpoint, which shouldn’t be subjected to rigorous analysis, since the conventions of the world operate on false premises.

This being the case:

And so, as self-awareness cannot be the case,
What is perceiving your dependent nature then?
The actor, act and object cannot be the same,
And thus to apprehend itself makes little sense. (6.76)

An awareness thinking, ‘I cognise myself,’ implies that it itself is the thing acted upon, while the cognition, the actor, is also itself. And as its act is also not then separate, it follows that the actor, the acted upon and the act would be the same. These are however not seen to be the same, just like the wood-cutter, the wood and the act of cutting are not the same. Since reflexive awareness cannot therefore exist, it doesn’t apprehend itself. As stated in the Descent Onto Langka:

Just as a sword does not cut
Its own blade; and a fingertip
Cannot touch itself; the same applies
To the mind perceiving itself.⁷

Therefore, as reflexive awareness does not exist:

If, even though it is by nature unproduced
And isn’t known, dependent nature can exist,
How has the barren woman’s son offended them
That he should suffer this denial of being real? (6.77)

As was demonstrated above, a dependent nature can be neither self- nor other-produced, and is likewise shown to be something that can’t be known. And if you do accept the existence of a dependent nature that is by nature unproduced and unknowable, why should you then not also accept the existence of things that have the same status as this dependent nature? Has the barren woman’s son harmed you in any way? A barren woman’s son too may be described as utterly unfathomable, an ineffable object of the noble ones’ wisdom⁸ , so you have to accept his existence!

If it is indeed an existent dependent nature which is, as they posit, ’… the cause for things that are but imputations…,’⁹ then logically:

When this dependent nature can’t exist at all,
Then how can it be causing relative events?

The thinking being that a cause for the relative does not then exist in the slightest. And so, for them there is nothing that can actually cause worldly conventional reality. How terrible!

When so obsessed with substance, our opponents will
Just gainsay every normal worldly principle. (6.78)

Foolishly clinging to one part of substantial reality is like pouring water into the unfired earthenware pot of the dependent nature. Due to their ignorant ways they find that they destroy everything: i.e. worldly principles that are only sound from the worldly perspective – commands such as sit!, go!, do!, cook! and so forth – as well as anything encompassed by material form, sensation and so forth. With that, nothing but failure lies ahead, and no good result will transpire.

And so, in their folly, these teachers insist on a path they themselves conceptually fabricate. But,

There is no other method that will lead to peace
Apart from noble master Nāgārjuna’s way.

How so? Since,

But they stray from the truths, the real and relative –
One gains not liberation when ignoring these. (6.79)

And why will disregarding these two hinder liberation? To explain:

Conventional truth works as a means to reach an end.
The ultimate is like the end one tries to reach.
But those who do not see how these should be discerned
Are led by faulty fancies down mistaken paths. (6.80)

As stated in the noble Absorption Revealing Reality:

The knowers of the world themselves declared,
And not by hearsay, that there are two truths:
The relative and the ultimate.
There is no such thing as a third truth.

That beings may benefit from developing
Faith in the bliss-gone ones,
For beings’ sake the Victor taught
The relative to aid the world.

Relatively the Lion of Men would
Identify six classes of beings:
Hell-beings, animals and spirits,
Demigods, humans and gods.

You, so incomparable, taught about beings
Of the world in all their distinctions:
In terms of social rank, the high and low,
As citizens, the rich and the poor,

As slaves and servants,
Men, women and neuters.
The wise who have understood relative truth
Teach in this way to aid the world.

Cyclic beings drawn to these states
Are driven by the eight concerns of beings:
Gain and loss, fame and disrepute,
Praise and blame, pleasure and pain.

When success is gained attachment grows,
While encountering loss upsets their minds;
The rest may be similarly represented.
These eight sicknesses cause constant harm.

Do understand that their judgement is mistaken
Who profess the relative to be the ultimate.
Those who say the repulsive is appealing,
Suffering is pleasure, who claim an inherent self

Where there is no self, who say the impermanent
Is permanent; they hold to signs who are thus inclined,
And when learning of the doctrine of the Sugata
They will fear it, and lacking understanding reject it.

And those who reject the teachings of the Sugata
Will suffer unbearably in the realms of hell.
Immature children who unwisely pursue pleasure
Will endure abundant sufferings.

Only those who do not err, but understand
The teachings that benefit the world,
Can shed them like a worn-out serpent skin,
Pass beyond existence and find peace.

‘All phenomena lack inherent existence,
Are empty and signless – that is the ultimate.’
Those who hear this and rejoice,
Will find the unsurpassed awakening.¹⁰

Victorious One, you who see the lack of skandhas,
The absence of all elements and sense fields,
That this house of faculties lacks all identity,
O Sage, you see all things to be like this.¹¹

So how can there ever be liberation for those separated from the relative and ultimate truths? Hence, these proponents of consciousness certainly stray, following mistaken pathways due to their erroneous ideas.
To teach the conventional truth is a method. As stated:

What is heard and what is taught
Is the inexpressible dharma –
Nothing expressed apart from superimpositions,
But heard and taught nonetheless.¹²

Only by basing oneself on the conventional truth can the ultimate be taught. And by understanding the teachings on the ultimate, the ultimate state can be attained. As stated in the Treatise:

Without relying on the conventional
The ultimate cannot be indicated.
Without relying on the ultimate
Transcendence cannot be reached.¹³

To teach the ultimate is what the method aims to do, what it should result in; meaning that it is what is aimed for, the result, that to be attained, or what should be understood.