We are not affected by this argument; we do not assert that forms and so forth are inherently produced on the conventional level whilst refuting them ultimately. How so? Since just as

A barren woman’s son cannot in fact be born
By worldly standards or in true reality.
It is the same with anything, they don’t occur
As true things in reality nor in the world. (6.111)

This being the case,

The Teacher thus proclaimed that all phenomena
Are peace from the beginning, free from any birth,
Complete transcendence¹ of a nature that is real,
Which means that there is never any birth of things. (6.112)

And seeing as we have such scriptural statements, this means that there is never any production taking place. As a scripture states:

When turning the Wheel of Dharma
You teach that all phenomena
Are primordial peace free from arising,
The transcendence of any real nature.²

Since they are the object of serene wisdom, all phenomena are peace. And why are they the object of serene wisdom? The statement, free from arising, supplies the reason: it is because they are unarisen. Since they are unarisen, they are the object of serene wisdom. Why are they unarisen? As stated, there is utter transcendence of any real nature. If something has an inherent existent nature and this then were to arise, that nature would not then be existing, and what is there then that arises? Thus it is taught that there cannot at any point be arising: what did not occur before cannot then occur later, and what occurs later cannot then transform again. So what then is there? The utter transcendence of any real nature. The word primordial is used to show that it is not the case that these are only unarisen in relation to yogic wisdom. What is then being shown? That also prior to that, in the context of worldly conventions, these are in and of themselves unarisen. Primordial is a synonym for at the start, and should be understood to apply to the context of worldly conventional reality. And thus it was that the bodhisattva noble Sarvanivaraṇa Viṣkambhin gave praise to the Illustrious One expressing his excellent qualities with the words, ‘When turning the Wheel of Dharma you teach that all phenomena ….’

Those belonging to our own side do not in fact object to this. How so? Because they accept that

Though pots and such aren’t there in true reality,
The world’s consensus is that they in fact exist.
For all phenomena this is the case, which means
It doesn’t follow they’re like barren women’s sons. (6.113)

Some think that, ‘When the bases for the imputation exist – earth, water, fire, wind, form, smell, taste and texture – a jar can be imputed with good reason, it is well-founded. But if it is the case that everything is nothing but imputation, and a basis for the imputation does not have any substantial existence, it cannot be denied that it becomes equivalent to the case of the son of a barren woman.’

This is unsound, because the basis for imputation cannot possibly be substantially established. As stated:

Apart from form and so forth
A pot cannot exist,
And apart from wind and so forth
Form can likewise not exist.³

Similarly:

Earth, water, fire and wind do not
Inherently exist by themselves.
Without three, one cannot be.
Without one, there cannot be three.

If without three each cannot be,
And without one three cannot be,
Then each exists not by itself,
And how to then form a composite?⁴

Just as you wouldn’t grant that the impermanent could arise from the permanent, it is unsound that something lacking substantial existence could come from something having substantial existence. As stated:

How can impermanent things
Come from what is permanent?
A cause and effect that are incompatible
Can never be observed.⁵

Thus, based on a collection of imputedly existent things such as a face, one will observe an imputed reflection in a mirror. Based on imputed constituent parts such as pillars and so forth, one imputes a house. A forest is similarly a conceptual designation based on trees. Just as one in dreams may experience sprouts, that are by nature uncreated, being created from seeds that are also by nature uncreated, it makes sense that all imputedly existent things, being imputations, may serve as supports for imputedly existent things. As stated:

Through mastery of magical emanation
…
Are like the city of gandharvas,
Similar to dreams and mirages.
This is therefore not a topic of dispute.⁶

Now they say, ‘If production from self, other, both and uncaused is refuted on both levels, how can one then ascertain that such things as ignorance, formations and seeds give rise to consciousness, sprouts and so forth conventionally?’

To explain:

And so, since things do not arise uncaused,
Are not the work of an almighty god,
Nor are produced from self, other, or both,
They are interdependently brought forth. (6.114)

As has been explained, the arising of things does not happen just naturally by itself; nor does it happen through such things as a creator god, time, particles, primordial nature (prakṛti), souls (puruṣa), Nārāyaṇa⁷ and so forth; nor is there production from self, other or both. And therefore it is simply the case that, in dependence on that, this arises; which ensures that worldly conventions are not violated. As the Illustrious One has stated:

The hallmark of phenomena is this: If this is present, that will happen. If this has arisen, that will arise. And so, confusion leads to formations …⁸

Similarly,

When there is this, there is that,
Like short exists when there is long.
When this takes place, that occurs,
Like light emerging from a lamp.⁹

And from the Treatise as well, where it teaches that it is simply like this:

An agent depends on there being an act,
And the act again depends on the agent.
Apart from this we see no other way
To demonstrate what these are.

And assimilation should thus be understood,
As act and agent is then excluded.
Through the case of agent and action
All remaining things can be made clear.¹⁰

This explanation of interdependence as a mere conditionality, not only renders implausible any kind of conceptual notion of production that is uncaused and so forth, but also any other sort of idea: the dualities of eternalism and nihilism, permanence and impermanence, existent things and non-existent things and so forth become impossible. To express this:

And as all things arise interdependently
These theories will not withstand analysis.
Submitted to interdependence’s arguments
All complex nets of faulty views are ripped to shreds. (6.115)

Since it is only through the reasoning which states, ‘based on this, that arises,’ that relative entities can be found to have an existent identity (svātmabhāva) and not through any other, the view presented here – arguing for a mere conditionality of dependent arising – tears up the entire net of faulty views. By positing such mere conditionality as dependent arising, one cannot accept that entities have any inherent nature whatsoever. As stated:

Something arising based on this and that
Hasn’t come into being in and of itself.
How then can that which has no self-becoming
Be seen as something that has come into being?¹¹

Similarly,

Interdependent arising itself
Is called emptiness.
This, itself being an imputation,
Conveys the middle way.¹²

And from the sutras:

What is born conditionally is unborn,
Having no inherent being of its own.
Depending on conditions they are said to be empty –
He who understands emptiness is heedful.¹³

With an inherent nature impermissible, how can any of these aforementioned explanations then be maintained in its absence? If there were any kind of inherent nature, other concepts of production would be permissible: things coming about of their own accord, from self, other, both, a creator god, or the like; and following that, once things have arisen, concepts of them remaining permanently, ending in destruction, or the like. But not otherwise. To express this:

Such theories are relevant if things exist,
But now it has been shown how things cannot exist.
Without existents such ideas can’t be maintained,
Just like a fire won’t keep burning without fuel. (6.116)

The arguments presented have left absolutely no room for an existent entity. For this reason the yogis who have actualised the noble path and see reality through non-seeing, do not observe even the slightest existent phenomenon. Also, any ideas of form and sensation, virtue and non-virtue, things and non-things and so forth, entertained since time without beginning, are prevented. To illustrate: for someone suffering from cataracts, applying eye-ointment has the effect of counteracting such mistaken ideas as seeing hairs, although there is no actual change in the nature of those hairs.

Thus,

While ordinary men are trapped by theories,
By not pursuing concepts yogis are set free.
The wise have said that it’s analysis which will
Alleviate one of conceptual ideas. (6.117)

Since it is only the conceptual ideas that trap ordinary beings who are ignorant of this reality of things, yogis are liberated when realising this reality. For this reason the master, as explained in the Middle Way Treatise, clearly sets forth that the result of analysis is the reversal of each and every conceptual idea. As stated:

If things were inherently existent,
What would be the benefit in seeing emptiness?
Conceptual seeing is that which binds us,
And that which is refuted here.¹⁴

And therefore,

He did not for the love of quarrelling present
The treatise’s explorations, but to liberate.

Thus, when the master gave the extensive presentations of reasoning in the Middle Way Treatise, he did not do so for the love of dispute, meaning that he didn’t present them in order to triumph over opponents. He presented these analyses so that beings could be liberated, thinking how excellent it would be if by presenting the reality of things through the Middle Way Treatise sentient beings could come to an unmistaken realisation of this reality and thereby reach liberation.

‘But haven’t you been systematically reiterating all these ideas held by your opponents and then proved them wrong? When using the treatise in this argumentative way, how can you propose that its purpose isn’t precisely the refutation of ideas?’

Let me explain. Although these analyses were not carried out for the purposes of dispute, the systems of our opponents being feeble will not be able to hold up in the face of a presentation of actual reality; they crumble just like darkness in the presence of light. So the fault lies not with us. To express this:

One can’t be blamed if one’s opponents’ theories
Are shattered when unravelling reality. (6.118)

As stated:

Although the tathāgatas did not teach
This dharma for the sake of dispute,
It will incinerate opposing arguments
Like fire consumes its fuel.¹⁵

If this wasn’t the case, and this dharma was taught for the sake of argumentation, one would definitely develop aversion for the faulty positions of any opponents, end up cherishing the rational approach of one’s own side, and there wouldn’t be any reversal of conceptual ideas. How so? As,

To be too fond of one’s own view, and hostile to
The views of others, this is still conceptual.

Failing to reverse conceptual ideas results in bondage, not liberation. But when this dharma isn’t used for the sake of dispute:

But when desire and aversion are dispelled,
Analysis will bring one swift deliverance. (6.119)

As stated:

Great beings are not partial,
Do not engage in arguments.
How can there be opposing views
For those who are impartial?¹⁶

Similarly,

Attached to your own position,
And disliking the position of others,
You will not reach transcendence.
Dualism does not bring peace.¹⁷

And from a sutra:

If attachment develops when learning the Dharma
And dislike stirs when hearing non-Dharma,
Pride and conceit become one’s downfall –
Pride is a catalyst that furthers suffering.¹⁸

The selflessness of phenomena having thus been demonstrated through scripture and reasoning, there now follows a presentation of the selflessness of the person:

They see how all afflictions and all faults
Come from the the view of an identity.
And realising its object as the self,
The yogi goes on to refute this self. (6.120)

The view of identity¹⁹ is to have an afflicted investigative mind that works in terms of the thoughts ‘I’ and ‘mine.’ They originate with it, meaning that the identity view is what brings them about. And what are they? The afflictions and the faults. Afflictions refer to desire and so forth. Faults refer to birth, ageing, sickness, death, grief and so forth. Every last one of these stems from the view of identity. The sutras state that all afflictions:

… have their root in the view of identity, have their cause in the view of identity, originate with the identity view.²⁰

When it states that they have their cause in the view of identity, this means that the view of identity is the cause for all of them, since mental formations will continue to be created and the suffering of birth and so forth will continue to manifest for those who have not given up the view of identity. Its reference point is the self, since self-clinging has a self as its object. So when desiring to get rid of each and every affliction and fault, it is actually the view of identity that should be abandoned; and that again is removed when having understood the selflessness of the self, which is why the yogi will first refute the self. With that refuted the view of identity too is discarded, which in turn fully counteracts afflictions and faults. Analysis of the self is therefore a means to accomplish liberation. Hence, at the very beginning yogis start by analysing the self, asking: ‘What is this so-called self, the reference point for the view of identity?’