You are here: BP HOME > TLB > Nāgārjuna: Mūlamadhyamakakārikā > fulltext
Nāgārjuna: Mūlamadhyamakakārikā

Choose languages

Choose images, etc.

Choose languages
Choose display
  • Enable images
  • Enable footnotes
    • Show all footnotes
    • Minimize footnotes
DiacriticaDiacritica-helpSearch-help
ā ī ū ṛ ṝ ḷ
ḹ ’ ṃ ḥ ṅ ñ
ṭ ḍ ṇ ṣ ś ź
š č ǰ γ    
Note on the transliteration:
The transliteration system of the BP/TLB is based on the Unicode/UTF-8 system. However, there may be difficulties with some of the letters – particularly on PC/Windows-based systems, but not so much on the Mac. We have chosen the most accepted older and traditional systems of transliteration against, e.g, Wylie for Tibetan, since with Unicode it is possible, in Sanskrit and Tibetan, etc., to represent one sound with one letter in almost all the cases (excepting Sanskrit and Tibetan aspirated letters, and Tibetan tsa, tsha, dza). We thus do not use the Wylie system which widely employs two letters for one sound (ng, ny, sh, zh etc.).
 
Important:
We ask you in particular to note the use of the ’ apostrophe and not the ' representing the avagrāha in Sanskrit, and most important the ’a-chuṅ in Tibetan. On the Mac the ’ is Alt-M.
 
If you cannot find the letters on your key-board, you may click on the link "Diacritica" to access it for your search.
Choose specific texts..
Nāgārjuna: Mūlamadhyamakakārikā
    Click to Expand/Collapse Option Complete text
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionTitle
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionPreface
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapters I-V
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapters VI-X
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapters XI-XV
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapters XVI-XX
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapters XXI-XXV
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapters XXVI-XXVII
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionColophon
Back to library
  punarbhavāya saṃskārān avidyānivṛtas tridhā |
abhisaṃskurute yāṃs tair gatiṃ gacchati karmabhiḥ || 1 || 
中論觀十二因緣品第二十六(九偈)  眾生癡所覆 為後起三行
以起是行故 隨行墮六趣 
  ma rig bsgribs pas yang srid phyir | | ’du byed rnam pa gsum po dag |
|(6)mngon par ’du byed gang yin pa’i | | las de dag gis ’gro bar ’gro | | 
[Chapter] 26: An Analysis of the Twelve Components (dvadasanga) (the twelve spokes)  1. “What is hidden by ignorance (1)” (avidyanivrta) has caused the three kinds of conditioned things (2) (samskara) to be made for rebirth —
By those actions it [i.e., ” what is hidden by ignorance”] goes forward. 
Analysis of the Twelve Links of Becoming  In order to become again, those obscured by ignorance are moved into destinies by actions which are impelled [by] the three kinds of formative impulses. 
   
(17) ＊中論 觀十二因縁品第二十六 九偈  (18)問曰汝以摩訶衍説第一義道。我今欲聞(19)説聲聞法入第一義道。答曰(20)衆生癡所覆 爲後起三行(21)以起是行故 隨行墮六趣 
   
   
   
vijñānaṃ saṃniviśate saṃskārapratyayaṃ gatau |
saṃniviṣṭe ’tha vijñāne nāmarūpaṃ niṣicyate || 2 || 
以諸行因緣 識受六道身
以有識著故 增長於名色 
’du byed rkyen can rnam par shes | | ’gro ba rnams su ’jug par ’gyur | |
rnam par shes pa zhugs gyur na | | ming dang gzugs ni chags par ’gyur | | 
2. Consciousness (3), presupposing that which is conditioned (samskara), enters on its course.
When consciousness is begun, the “name-and-form’- (namarupa) (4) is instilled. 
Consciousness conditioned by formative impulses enters into destinies. When consciousness has entered, name and form develop. 
 
(22)以諸行因縁 識受六道身(23)以有識著故 増長於名色 
 
 
 
niṣikte nāmarūpe tu ṣaḍāyatanasaṃbhavaḥ |
ṣaḍāyatanam āgamya saṃsparśaḥ saṃpravartate || 3 || 
名色增長故 因而生六入
情塵識和合 而生於六觸 
ming dang gzugs (7)ni chags gyur na | | skye mched drug ni ’byung bar ’gyur | |
skye mched drug la brten nas ni | | reg pa yang dag ’byung bar ’gyur | | 
3. When the “name-and-form” is instilled, the six domains of sense perceptions (5) (ayatana) are produced.
Having arrived at the six domains of sense perceptions, the process of perception begins to function. 
When name and form develop, the six senses emerge. In dependence upon the six senses, impact actually occurs. 
 
(24)名色増長故 因而生六入(25)情塵識和合 而生於六觸 
 
 
 
cakṣuḥ pratītya rūpaṃ ca samanvāhāram eva ca |
nāmarūpaṃ pratītyaivaṃ vijñānaṃ saṃpravartate || 4 || 
 
ming dang gzugs dang dran byed la | | brten nas skye ba kho na ste | |
de ltar ming dang gzugs brten nas | | rnam par (17b1)shes pa skye bar ’gyur | | 
4. Consciousness begins to function presupposing the eye, the visual forms, and ability of mental association—
Presupposing “name-and-form.” 
Just as [it] only arises in dependence on the eye, [visual] form and attention, so consciousness arises in dependence on name and form. 
 
 
 
 
 
saṃnipātas trayāṇāṃ yo rūpavijñānacakṣuṣām |
sparśaḥ sa tasmāt sparśāc ca vedanā saṃpravartate || 5 || 
因於六觸故 即生於三受
以因三受故 而生於渴愛 
mig dang gzugs dang rnam par shes | | gsum po ’dus pa gang yin pa | |
de ni reg pa’o reg de las | | tshor ba kun tu ’byung bar ’gyur | | 
5. That which is the coincidence (6) (samnipata) of visual form, consciousness, and the eye:
That is sensual perception; and from perception, sensation (7) begins to function. 
The gathering of the three: eye and [visual] form and consciousness, that is “impact.” From impact feeling totally arises. 
 
(26)因於六觸故 即生於三受(27)以因三受故 而生於渇愛 
 
 
 
vedanāpratyayā tṛṣṇā vedanārthaṃ hi tṛṣyate |
tṛṣyamāṇa upādānam upādatte caturvidham || 6 || 
 
tshor ba’i rkyen gyis sred pa ste | | tshor ba’i don du sred par ’gyur | |
sred (2)par gyur na nye bar len | | rnam pa bzhi po nyer len ’gyur | | 
6. “Craving (8)” (trsna) [for existing things] is conditioned by sensation.
Certainly [a person] craves for the sake of sensation.
The one who craves acquires the four-fold acquisition (9) (upadana)
[namely sexual pleasure, false views, ascetic morality and vows, and the doctrine of self-existence]. 
Due to the condition of feeling, there is craving; one craves for what is felt. When one craves, one clings to the four aspects of clinging [sense objects, views, morals and rules, and views of self]. 
 
 
 
 
 
upādāne sati bhava upādātuḥ pravartate |
syād dhi yady anupādāno mucyeta na bhaved bhavaḥ || 7 || 
因愛有四取 因取故有有
若取者不取 則解脫無有 
nyer len yod na len pa po’i | | srid pa rab tu ’byung bar ’gyur | |
gal te nye bar len med na | | grol bar ’gyur te srid mi ’gyur | | 
7. When the acquisition exists, the acquirer begins to function (10) (i.e. existence, becoming).
If he were someone without acquisition, that being would be released, and would not exist. 
When there is clinging, the becoming of the clinger fully arises. When there is no clinging, one is freed; there is no [more] becoming. 
 
(28)因愛有四取 因取故有有(29)若取者不取 則解脱無有 
 
 
 
pañca skandhāḥ sa ca bhavo bhavāj jātiḥ pravartate |
jarāmaraṇaduḥkhādi śokāḥ saparidevanāḥ || 8 || 
從有而有生 從生有老死
從老死故有 憂悲諸苦惱 
srid pa de yang phung po lnga | | srid pa las ni skye (3)bar ’gyur | |
rga shi dang ni mya ngan dang | | smre sngags ’don bcas sdug bsngal dang | | 
8. That being is the five “groups of universal elements” (skandha). Because of a being, birth (11) begins to function.
Growing old, dying, sorrow (dukkha) (12), etc., grief and regrets, 
Becoming is the five aggregates; from becoming one is born. Aging, death, torment, lamentation, pain, 
 
(36c1)從有而有生 從生有老死(2)從老死故有 憂悲諸苦惱 
 
 
 
daurmanasyam upāyāsā jāter etat pravartate |
kevalasyaivam etasya duḥkhaskandhasya saṃbhavaḥ || 9 || 
如是等諸事 皆從生而有
但以是因緣 而集大苦陰 
yid mi bde dang ’khrug pa rnams | de dag skye las rab tu ’byung | |
de ltar sdug bsngal phung po ni | | ’ba’ zhig pa ’di ’byung bar ’gyur | | 
9. Despair and agitation: all this results from birth;
That “produced being” is a single mass of sorrows (dukkha). 
mental unhappiness, anxiety: these vividly emerge from birth. Likewise, the entire mass of anguish emerges. 
 
(3)如是等諸事 皆從生而有(4)但以是因縁 而集大苦陰 
 
 
 
saṃsāramūlaṃ saṃskārān avidvān saṃskaroty ataḥ |
avidvān kārakas tasmān na vidvāṃs tattvadarśanāt || 10 || 
是謂為生死 諸行之根本
無明者所造 智者所不為 
’khor ba’i (4)rtsa ba ’du byed de | | de phyir mkhas rnams ’du mi byed | |
de phyir mi mkhas byed po yin | | mkhas min de nyid mthong phyir ro | | 
10. Thus the ignorant people construct the conditioned things (samskara); [that is] the source for existence-in-flux.
The one who constructs is ignorant; the wise person is not [one who constructs] because he perceives true reality. 
The root of life is formative impulses. Therefore, the wise do not form impulses. Therefore, the unwise are formers, but not the wise since they see reality. 
 
(5)是謂爲生死 諸行之根本(6)無明者所造 智者所不爲 
 
 
 
avidyāyāṃ niruddhāyāṃ saṃskārāṇām asaṃbhavaḥ |
avidyāyā nirodhas tu jñānasyāsyaiva bhāvanāt || 11 || 
 
ma rig ’gags par gyur na ni | | ’du byed rnams kyang ’byung mi ’gyur | |
ma rig ’gag par ’gyur ba ni | | shes (5)pas de nyid bsgoms pas so | | 
11. When ignorance ceases, the constructed phenomena do not come into existence.
A person’s cessation of ignorance proceeds on the basis of “becoming” [enlightened] through knowledge. 
When ignorance stops, formative impulses too do not occur. The stopping of ignorance [comes] through practising that with understanding. 
 
 
 
 
 
tasya tasya nirodhena tat tan nābhipravartate |
duḥkhaskandhaḥ kevalo ’yam evaṃ samyag nirudhyate || 12 || 
以是事滅故 是事則不生
但是苦陰聚 如是而正滅 
de dang de ni ’gags gyur pas | | de dang de ni mngon mi ’byung | |
sdug bsngal phung po ’ba’ zhig pa | | de ni de ltar yang dag ’gag | | 
12. Through cessation of every [component] none functions;
That single mass of sorrow (dukkha) is thus completely destroyed. 
By the stopping of the former, the latter will clearly not occur. The entire mass of anguish will likewise completely stop. 
 
(7)以是事滅故 是事則不生(8)但是苦陰聚 如是而正滅(9)凡夫爲無明所盲故。以身口意業。爲後身(10)起六趣諸行。隨所起行有上中下。識入六(11)趣隨行受身。以識著因縁故名色集。名(12)色集故有六入。六入因縁故有六觸。六觸因(13)縁故有三受。三受因縁故生渇愛。渇愛因縁(14)故有四取。四取取時以身口意業起罪福。(15)令後三有相續。從有而有生。從生而有老(16)死。從老死有憂悲苦惱種種衆患。但有大(17)苦陰集。是故知凡夫無智。起此生死諸行根(18)本。智者所不起。以如實見故。則無明滅。(19)無明滅故諸行亦滅。以因滅故果亦滅。如(20)是修習觀十二因縁生滅智故是事滅。是事(21)滅故乃至生老死憂悲大苦陰皆如實正滅。(22)正滅者畢竟滅。是十二因縁生滅義。如阿毘(23)曇修多羅中廣説 
 
 
 
dvādasāṅgabhāvaparīkṣā nāma ṣaḍviṃśatitamaṃ prakaraṇaṃ || 
 
srid pa’i yan lag bcu gnyis brtag pa zhes bya ba ste rab tu byed pa nyi shu drug (6)pa’o || 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  [abhūm atītam adhvānaṃ nābhūvam iti dṛṣṭayaḥ |]1
yās tāḥ śāśvatalokādyāḥ pūrvāntaṃ samupāśritāḥ || 1 || 
中論觀邪見品第二十七(三十一偈)  我於過去世 為有為是無
世間常等見 皆依過去世 
  || ’das dus byung ma byung zhes dang | | ’jig rten rtag pa la sogs par | |
lta ba gang yin de dag ni | | mngon gyi mtha’ la brten pa yin | | 
[Chapter] 27: An Analysis of the Views (drsti) About Reality (dogmas)  1. Those [views] relating to the limits of the past reality are: “The world is eternal,” etc.,
[And “I have existed in the past,” “I have not existed in the past,” etc.] 
Investigation of Views  Those views such as “I occurred or did not occur in the past,” the world is permanent, are dependent on the extreme of before. 
   
(24)＊中論 觀邪見品第二十七 三十一偈  (25)問曰。已聞大乘法破邪見。今欲聞聲聞法(26)破邪見。答曰(27)我於過去世 爲有爲是無(28)世間常等見 皆依過去世 
   
   
   
dṛṣṭayo na bhaviṣyāmi kim anyo ’nāgate ’dhvani |
bhaviṣyāmīti cāntādyā aparāntaṃ samāśritāḥ || 2 || 
我於未來世 為作為不作
有邊等諸見 皆依未來世 
ma ’ongs dus gzhan ’byung ’gyur dang | | mi ’byung ’jig rten mtha’ sogs par | |
lta (7)ba gang yin de dag ni | | phyi ma’i mtha’ la brten pa yin | | 
2. The assertion: “I will not become something different in a future time,”
“I will become [something different],” and the alternative, etc., are relating to an end [in the future]. 
Those views such as I will occur or not occur at another time in the future, the world has an end, are dependent on the extreme of Later. 
 
(29)我於未來世 爲作爲不作(37a1)有邊等諸見 皆依未來世(2)我於過去世。爲有爲無。爲有無爲非有非(3)無。是名常等諸見依過去世。我於未來世。(4)爲作爲不作。爲作不作爲非作非不作。是(5)名邊無邊等諸見依未來世。如是等諸邪(6)見。何因縁故名爲邪見。 
 
 
 
abhūm atītam adhvānam ity etan nopapadyate |
yo hi janmasu pūrveṣu sa eva na bhavaty ayam || 3 || 
過去世有我 是事不可得
過去世中我 不作今世我 
’das pa’i dus na byung gyur zhes | | bya ba de ni mi ’thad do | |
sngon tshe rnams su gang byung ba | | de nyid ’di ni ma yin no | | 
3. [The assertion:] “I existed in a past time (1)” does not obtain,
Since this [present being] is not (i.e. “ii” is not the same as “i”) that one who [was] in a former birth. 
It is incorrect to say: “I occurred at a time in the past.” Whatever occurred before, that is not this. 
 
是事今當説(7)過去世有我 是事不可得(8)過去世中我 不作今世我 
 
 
 
sa evātmeti tu bhaved upādānaṃ viśiṣyate |
upādānavinirmukta ātmā te katamaḥ punaḥ || 4 || 
若謂我即是 而身有異相
若當離於身 何處別有我 
de nyid bdag tu ’gyur snyam na | | nye bar len pa tha dad ’gyur | |
nye bar lan (18a1)pa ma gtogs par | | khyod kyi bdag ni gang zhig yin | | 
4. Were he [in a previous birth], that individual self (ātma) which he acquires [in coming into existence] would be different.
Moreover, what kind of individual self is there without acquisition (upadana)? 
If you think that that became me, then that-which-is-clung-to would be something else. What is your self apart from that-which-is-clung-to? 
 
(9)若謂我即是 而身有異相(10)若當離於身 何處別有我 
 
 
 
upādānavinirmukto nāsty ātmeti kṛte sati |
syād upādānam evātmā nāsti cātmeti vaḥ punaḥ || 5 || 
離有無身我 是事為已成
若謂身即我 若都無有我 
nye bar len pa ma gtogs pa’i | | bdag yod ma yin byas pa’i tshe | |
nye bar len nyid bdag yin na | | khyod kyi bdag ni med pa yin | | 
5. If it were held that: “There is no individual self without the acquisition,”
Then the individual self would be [only] the acquisition or it is not an individual self [at all]. 
Were you [to say] that there exists no self apart from that-which-is-clung-to, if the very that-which-is-clung-to were the self, your self would be non-existent. 
 
(11)離有無身我 是事爲已成(12)若謂身即我 若都無有我 
 
 
 
na copādānam evātmā vyeti tat samudeti ca |
kathaṃ hi nāmopādānam upādātā bhaviṣyati || 6 || 
但身不為我 身相生滅故
云何當以受 而作於受者 
nye bar len nyid bdag ma yin | | de ’byung ba dang ’jig (2)pa yin | |
nye bar blang ba ji lta bur | | nye bar len po yin par ’gyur | | 
6. The individual self is not the acquisition, since that [acquisition] appears and disappears.
Now really, how will “he who acquires” become “that which is acquired? 
The very that-which-is-clung-to is not the self: it arises and passes away. How can that-which-has-been-clung-to be the one that clings? 
 
(13)但身不爲我 身相生滅故(14)云何當以受 而作於受者 
 
 
 
anyaḥ punar upādānād ātmā naivopapadyate |
gṛhyeta hy anupādāno yady anyo na ca gṛhyate || 7 || 
若離身有我 是事則不然
無受而有我 而實不可得 
bdag ni nye bar len pa las | | gzhan du ’thad pa nyid ma yin | |
gal te gzhan na len med par | | gzung yod rigs na gzung du med | | 
7. Moreover, it does not obtain that the individual self is different from the acquisition.
If the individual self were different, it would be perceived without the acquisition; but [in fact] it is not so perceived. 
It is not correct for the self to be other than that-which-is-clung-to. If it were other, with nothing to cling to, then something [i.e. the self] fit to be apprehended would not be apprehended. 
 
(15)若離身有我 是事則不然(16)無受而有我 而實不可得 
 
 
 
evaṃ nānya upādānān na copādānam eva saḥ |
ātmā nāsty anupādāno nāpi nāsty eṣa niścayaḥ || 8 || 
今我不離受 亦不即是受
非無受非無 此即決定義 
de ltar len las gzhan ma yin | | de ni nyer len nyid (3)kyang min | |
bdag ni nye bar len med min | | med pa nyid du’ang de ma nges | | 
8. Thus that [individual self] is not different from nor identical to the acquisition.
The individual self is not without acquisition; but there is no certainty that “It does not exist.” 
In that way, it is not other than that-which-is-clung-to nor is it that-which-is-clung-to. The self is not not that-which-is-clung-to, nor can it be ascertained as nothing. 
 
(17)今我不離受 亦不即是受(18)非無受非無 此即決定義(19)我於過去世有者。是事不然。何以故。先世(20)中我不即作今我。有常過故。若常則有無(21)量過。何以故。如人修福因縁故作天而後(22)作人。若先世我即是今我者。天即是人。又(23)人以罪業因縁故作旃陀羅。後作婆羅門。(24)若先世我即是今我者。旃陀羅即是婆羅門。(25)譬如舍衞國婆羅門名提婆達。到王舍城(26)亦名提＊婆達。不以至王舍城故爲異。若(27)先作天後作人。則天即是人。旃陀羅即是(28)婆羅門。但是事不然。何以故。天不即是人。(29)旃陀羅不即是婆羅門。有此等常過故。若(37b1)謂先世我不作今我。如人浣衣時名爲浣(2)者。刈時名爲刈者。而浣者與刈者雖不異。(3)而浣者不即是刈者。如是我受天身名爲(4)天。我受人身名爲人。我不異而身有異(5)者。是事不然。何以故。若即是者。不應言(6)天作人。今浣者於刈者。爲異爲不異。若(7)不異。浣者應即是刈者。如是先世天即是(8)人。旃陀羅即是婆羅門。我亦有常過。若異(9)者。浣者即不作刈者。如是天不作人。我亦(10)無常。無常則無我相。是故不得言即是。問(11)曰。我即是。但因受故分別是天是人。受名(12)五陰身。以業因縁故分別是天是人是旃陀(13)羅是婆羅門。而我實非天非人。非旃陀羅(14)非婆羅門。是故無如是過。答曰。是事不然。(15)何以故。若身作天作人。作旃陀羅作婆羅(16)門。非是我者。則離身別有我。今罪福生死(17)往來。皆是身非是我。罪因縁故墮三惡道。(18)福因縁故生三善道。若苦樂瞋喜憂怖等。皆(19)是身非我者。何用我爲。如治俗人罪。不豫(20)出家人。五陰因縁相續罪福不失故有解脱。(21)若皆是身非我者。何用我爲。問曰。罪福等(22)依止於我。我有所知身無所知故。知者應(23)是我。起業因縁罪福是作法。當知應有作(24)者。作者是我。身是我所用。亦是我所住處。譬(25)如舍主以草木泥墍等治舍。自爲身故(26)隨所用治舍有好惡。我亦如是。隨作善(27)惡等得好醜身。六道生死皆我所作。是故罪(28)福之身皆屬於我。譬如舍但屬舍主不屬(29)他人。答曰。是喩不然。何以故。舍主有形。有(37c1)觸有力故能治舍。汝所説我無形無觸(2)故無作力。自無作力亦不能使他作。若世(3)間有一法無形無觸能有所作者。則可(4)信受知有作者。但是事不然。若我是作者。(5)則不應自作苦事。若是念者。可貪樂事(6)不應忘失。若我不作苦而苦強生者。餘一(7)切皆亦自生。非我所作。若見者是我。眼能(8)見色眼應是我。若眼見而非我。則違先言(9)見者是我。若見者是我。我則不應得聞聲(10)等諸塵。何以故。眼是見者。不能得聞聲等(11)塵故。是故我是見者。是事不然。若謂如刈(12)者用鎌刈草。我亦如是以手等能有所作(13)者。是事不然。何以故。今離鎌別有刈者。(14)而離身心諸根無別作者。若謂作者雖非(15)眼耳等所得亦有作者。則石女兒能有所(16)作。如是一切諸根皆應無我。若謂右眼(17)見物而左眼識。當知別有見者。是事不然。(18)今右手習作左手不能。是故無別有作者。(19)若別有作者。右手所習左手亦應能。而實(20)不能。是故更無作者。復次有我者言。見(21)他食果口中涎出。是爲我相。是事不然。何(22)以故。是念力故非是我力。又亦即是破我(23)因縁。人在衆中愧於涎出。而涎強出不得(24)自在。當知無我。復次又有顛倒過罪。先(25)世是父今世爲子。是父子我一。但身有異。(26)如從一舍至一舍。父故是父。不以入異(27)舍故便有異。若有我是二應一。如是則有(28)大過。若謂無我五陰相續中亦有是過。是(29)事不然。何以故。五陰雖相續。或時有用(38a1)或時無用。如蒲桃漿持戒者應飮蒲＊桃酒(2)不應飮。若變爲苦酒還復應飮。五陰相續(3)亦如是。有用有不用。若始終一我有如是(4)過。五陰相續無如是過。但五陰和合故假名(5)爲我無有決定。如梁椽和合有舍。離梁(6)椽無別舍。如是五陰和合故有我。若離(7)五陰實無別我。是故我但有假名無有定(8)實。汝先説離受別有受者。以受分別受者(9)是天是人。是皆不然。當知但有受無別受(10)者。若謂離受別有我。是事不然。若離受(11)有我。云何可得説是我相。若無相可説。(12)則離受無我。若謂離身無我但身是我。是(13)亦不然。何以故。身有生滅相。我則不爾。復(14)次云何以受即名受者。若謂離受有受者。(15)是亦不然。若不受五陰而有受者。應離(16)五陰別有受者。眼等根可得而實不可得。(17)是故我不離受。不即是受。亦非無受。亦復(18)非無。此是定義。是故當知。過去世有我者。(19)是事不然。 
 
 
 
nābhūm atītam adhvānam ity etan nopapadyate |
yo hi janmasu pūrveṣu tato ’nyo na bhavaty ayam || 9 || 
過去我不作 是事則不然
過去世中我 異今亦不然 
’das pa’i dus na ma byung zhes | | bya ba de yang mi ’thad do | |
sngon tshe rnams su gang byung ba | | de las ’di gzhan ma yin no | | 
9. [The assertion:] “I have not existed in a past time (2)” does not obtain,
For that one [now living] is not different (i.e. “ii” is not different than “i”) from that one who was in a former birth. 
It is incorrect to say: “I did not occur at a time in the past.” Whatever occurred before, this is not other than that. 
 
何以故(20)過去我不作 是事則不然(21)過去世中我 異今亦不然 
 
 
 
yadi hy ayaṃ bhaved anyaḥ pratyākhyāyāpi taṃ bhavet |
tathaiva ca sa saṃtiṣṭhet tatra jāyeta cāmṛtaḥ || 10 || 
若謂有異者 離彼應有今
我住過去世 而今我自生 
gal te ’di ni gzhan gyur na | | de med par yang ’byung bar ’gyur | (4)de bzhin de ni gnas ’gyur zhing | | der ma shi bar skye bar ’gyur | | 
10. If that [present person] were different, he would exist in exclusion of that [former] one.
Therefore either that [former person] persists, or he would be born eternal! 
If this were other, it would arise even without that. Likewise, that could remain and be born without dying in that [former life]. 
 
(22)若謂有異者 離彼應有今(23)我住過去世 而今我自生 
 
 
 
[ucchedaḥ karmaṇāṃ nāśaḥ kṛtam anyena karma ca |
pratisaṃvedayed anya evam ādi prasajyate || 11 ||]2  
如是則斷滅 失於業果報
彼作而此受 有如是等過 
chad dang las rnams chud za dang | | gzhan gyis byas pa’i las rnams ni | |
gzhan gyis so sor myong ba dang | | de la sogs par thal bar ’gyur | | 
11. 1  
Cut off and actions wasted, acts committed by others would be experienced by someone else. Such would be the consequences. 
 
(24)如是則斷滅 失於業果報(25)彼作而此受 有如是等過 
 
 
 
nāpy abhūtvā samudbhūto doṣo hy atra prasajyate |
kṛtako vā bhaved ātmā saṃbhūto vāpy ahetukaḥ || 12 || 
先無而今有 此中亦有過
我則是作法 亦為是無因 
ma byung ba las ’byung min te | | ’di la skyon du thal bar (5)’gyur | |
bdag ni byas par ’gyur ba dang | | ’byung ba’am rgyu med can du ’gyur | | 
12. There is no existing thing which is “that which has not existed prior.” Therefore, the error logically follows that
Either the individual self is “what is produced” or it originates without a cause. 
There is no occurence from what has not occured. In that case faults would follow: the self would be something made or even though it occured it would be uncaused. 
 
(26)先無而今有 此中亦有過(27)我則是作法 亦爲是無因(28)過去世中我。不作今我。是事不然。何以故。(29)過去世中我。與今我不異。若今我與過去(38b1)世我異者。應離彼我而有今我。又過去世(2)我。亦應住彼此身自更生。若爾者即墮斷(3)邊。失諸業果報。又彼人作罪此人受報。有(4)如是等無量過。又是我應先無而今有。是亦(5)有過。我則是作法。亦是無因生。是故過去(6)我。不作今我。是事不然。 
 
 
 
evaṃ dṛṣtir atīte yā nābhūm aham abhūm aham |
ubhayaṃ nobhayaṃ ceti naiṣā samupapadyate || 13 || 
如過去世中 有我無我見
若共若不共 是事皆不然 
de ltar bdag byung bdag ma byung | | gnyis ka gnyis ka ma yin par | |
’das la lta ba gang yin pa | | de dag ’thad pa ma yin no | | 
13. Thus the view concerning the past which [asserts] “I have existed (1),” or “I have not existed (2),”
Both [“existed and not existed”] (3) or neither (4): this does not obtain at all. 
Therefore, “the self occured, did not occur, both or neither:” all those views of the past are invalid. 
 
復次(7)如過去世中 有我無我見(8)若共若不共 是事皆不然(9)如是推求過去世中邪見有無。亦有亦無。非(10)有非無。是諸邪見。先説因縁過故。 
 
 
 
adhvany anāgate kiṃ nu bhaviṣyāmīti darśanam |
na bhaviṣyāmi cety etad atītenādhvanā samam || 14 || 
我於未來世 為作為不作
如是之見者 皆同過去世 
ma ’ongs dus gzhan ’byung ’gyur dang | | ’byung bar (6)mi ’gyur zhes bya bar | |
lta ba gang yin de dag ni | | ’das pa’i dus dang mtshungs pa yin | | 
14. [The views:] “I will become something in a future time (1′),”
Or “I will not become (2′) [something],” etc. (3′) (4′), [should be considered] like those [views] of the past. 
“I will occur at another time in the future,” “I will not occur:” all those views are similar to [those of] the past. 
 
是皆不(11)然(12)我於未來世 爲作爲不作(13)如是之見者 皆同過去世(14)我於未來世中。爲作爲不作。如是四句。如(15)過去世中過咎。應在此中説。 
 
 
 
sa devaḥ sa manuṣyaś ced evaṃ bhavati śāśvatam |
anutpannaś ca devaḥ syāj jāyate na hi śāśvatam || 15 || 
若天即是人 則墮於常邊
天則為無生 常法不生故 
gal te lha de mi de na | | de lta na ni rtag par ’gyur | |
lha ni ma skyes nyid ’gyur te | | rtag la skye ba med phyir ro | | 
15. If “This is a man, this is a god” [obtains], then eternity (i) exists,
For god is unproduced, and certainly something eternal would not be born. 
If the divine were human, then there would be something permanent. The divine is utterly unborn, because there is no birth in permanence. 
 
復次(16)若天即是人 則墮於常邊(17)天則爲無生 常法不生故(18)若天即是人。是則爲常。若天不生人中。云(19)何名爲人。常法不生故。常亦不然。 
 
 
 
devād anyo manuṣyaś ced aśāśvatam ato bhavet |
devād anyo manuṣyaś cet saṃtatir nopapadyate || 16 || 
若天異於人 是即為無常
若天異人者 是則無相續 
gal te lha las mi gzhan na | | de lta na ni mi rtag ’gyur | |
gal te (7)lha mi gzhan yin na | | rgyud ni ’thad par mi ’gyur ro | | 
16. If man is different from god, there would exist something non-eternal (ii).
If man is different from god, then a continuity does not obtain.(i.e. they cannot be different) 
If the human were other than the divine, then there would be no permanence. If the divine and the human were different, there could be no continuity [between them]. 
 
復次(20)若天異於人 是即爲無常(21)若天異人者 是則無相續(22)若天與人異。則爲無常。無常則爲斷滅等(23)過。如先説過。若天與人異。則無相續。若有(24)相續。不得言異。 
 
 
 
divyo yady ekadeśaḥ syād ekadeśaś ca mānuṣaḥ |
aśāśvataṃ śāśvataṃ ca bhavet tac ca na yujyate || 17 || 
若半天半人 則墮於二邊
常及於無常 是事則不然 
gal te phyogs gcig lha yin la | | phyogs gcig mi ni yin gyur na | |
rtag dang mi rtag ’gyur ba yin | | de yang rigs pa ma yin no | | 
17. If one part were divine and another part human, (i.e. a man with an eternal soul)
Then there would be something non-eternal [together with] that which is eternal (iii); but that is not possible. 
If one part were divine and one part were human, there would be both permanence and no permanence. But that is not reasonable. 
 
復次(25)若半天半人 則墮於二邊(26)常及於無常 是事則不然(27)若衆生半身是天。半身是人。若爾則有常(28)無常。半天是常。半人是無常。但是事不然。(29)何以故。一身有二相過故。 
 
 
 
aśāśvataṃ śāśvataṃ ca prasiddham ubhayaṃ yadi |
siddhe na śāśvataṃ kāmaṃ naivāśāśvatam ity api || 18 || 
若常及無常 是二俱成者
如是則應成 非常非無常 
gal te rtag dang mi rtag pa | | gnyis ga grub par gyur na ni | |
rtag pa ma yin mi rtag min | | (18b1)’grub par ’gyur bar ’dod la rag | | 
18. If something both non-eternal and eternal were proved,
Then, no doubt, something “neither eternal nor non-eternal (iv)” is proved. 
If both permanence and impermanence were established, you would have to assert non-permanence and non-impermance as established. 
 
復次(38c1)若常及無常 是二倶成者(2)如是則應成 非常非無常(3)若常無常二倶成者。然後成非常非無常。與(4)常無常相違故。今實常無常不成。是故非常(5)非無常亦不成。復次今生死無始。是亦不(6)然。 
 
 
 
kutaścid āgataḥ kaścit kiṃcid gacchet punaḥ kva cit |
yadi tasmād anādis tu saṃsāraḥ syān na cāsti saḥ || 19 || 
法若定有來 及定有去者
生死則無始 而實無此事 
gal te gang zhig gang nas gar | | ’ong zhing gong du’ang ’gro ’gyur na | |
de phyir ’khor ba thog med par | | ’gyur na de ni yod ma yin | | 
19. If someone, having come from somewhere, in some way goes somewhere again,
Then there would be existence-in-flux with no beginning; but this is not the case. 
If something came from somewhere and went somewhere, then samsara would be without beginning. That is not the case. 
 
何以故(7)法若定有來 及定有去者(8)生死則無始 而實無此事(9)法若決定有所從來。有所從去者。生死(10)則應無始。是法以智慧推求。不得有所(11)從來。有所從去。是故生死無始。是事不然。 
 
 
 
nāsti cec chāśvataḥ kaścit ko bhaviṣyaty aśāśvataḥ |
śāśvato ’śāśvataś cāpi dvābhyām ābhyāṃ tiraskṛtaḥ || 20 || 
今若無有常 云何有無常
亦常亦無常 非常非無常 
gal te rtag pa ’ga’ med na | | mi rtag gang zhig yin par ’gyur | |
rtag pa dang ni mi rtag dang | | de gnyis (2)bsal bar gyur pa’o | | 
20. If someone who is eternal does not exist, who will exist being non-eternal,
Or who being both eternal and non-eternal, or devoid of these two [characteristics]? 
If there were nothing permanent at all, what thing could be impermanent, permanent and impermanent, free of both? 
 
(12)復次(13)今若無有常 云何有無常(14)亦常亦無常 非常非無常(15)若爾者。以智慧推求。無法可得常者。誰當(16)有無常。因常有無常故。若二倶無者。云何(17)有亦有常亦無常。若無有常無常。云何有(18)非有常非無常。因亦有常亦無常故。有非(19)有常非無常。是故依止過去世常等四句不(20)可得。有邊無邊等四句依止未來世。是事不(21)可得。今當説。 
 
 
 
antavān yadi lokaḥ syāt paralokaḥ kathaṃ bhavet |
athāpy anantavāl lokaḥ paralokaḥ kathaṃ bhavet || 21 || 
若世間有邊 云何有後世
若世間無邊 云何有後世 
gal te ’jig rten mtha’ yod na | | ’jig rten pha rol ji ltar ’gyur | |
gal te ’jig rten mtha’ med na | | ’jig rten pha rol ji ltar ’gyur | | 
21. If the world would come to an end, how would an other-world come into existence?
If the world would not come to an end, how would an other-world come into being? 
If this world had an end, how would the next world come to be? If this world had no end, how would the next world come to be? 
 
何以故(22)若世間有邊 云何有後世(23)若世間無邊 云何有後世(24)若世間有邊。不應有後世。而今實有後世。(25)是故世間有邊不然。若世間無邊。亦不應(26)有後世。而實有後世。是故世間無邊亦不(27)然。復次是二邊不可得。 
 
 
 
skandhānām eṣa saṃtāno yasmād dīpārciṣām iva |
tasmān nānantavattvaṃ ca nāntavattvaṃ ca yujyate || 22 || 
五陰常相續 猶如燈火炎
以是故世間 不應邊無邊 
gang phyir phung po rnams kyi rgyun | | ’di ni mar me’i ’od dang mtshungs | |
de phyir mtha’ yod nyid dang ni | | (3)mtha’ med nyid kyang mi rigs so | | 
22. Since the continuity of the “groups of universal elements” (skandhas) [from one moment to the next] functions like flames of lamps,
[The view:] “both having an end and not having an end” is not possible. 
Because the continuity of the aggregates is similar to the light of a lamp, therefore the very existence or non-existence of an end is unreasonable. 
 
何以故(28)五陰常相續 猶如燈火炎(29)以是故世間 不應邊無邊(39a1)從五陰復生五陰。是五陰次第相續。如衆(2)縁和合有燈炎。若衆縁不盡燈則不滅。若(3)盡則滅。是故不得説世間有邊無邊。 
 
 
 
pūrve yadi ca bhajyerann utpadyeran na cāpy amī |
skandhāḥ skandhān pratītyemān atha loko ’ntavān bhavet || 23 || 
若先五陰壞 不因是五陰
更生後五陰 世間則有邊 
gal te snga ma ’jig ’gyur zhing | | phung po ’di la brten byas nas | |
phung po de ni mi ’byung na | | des na ’jig rten mtha’ yod ’gyur | | 
23. If the former [“groups”] would disappear, those [new] “groups” which are dependent on those [former] “groups” would not arise;
Therefore, the world would come to an end (ii). 
If the former perished and that [future] aggregate did not arise in dependence upon this aggregate, then this world would have an end. 
 
復(4)次(5)若先五陰壞 不因是五陰(6)更生後五陰 世間則有邊 
 
 
 
pūrve yadi na bhajyerann utpadyeran na cāpy amī |
skandhāḥ skandhān pratītyemāṃl loko ’nanto bhaved atha || 24 || 
若先陰不壞 亦不因是陰
而生後五陰 世間則無邊 
gal te snga ma mi ’jig cing | | phung po ’di la brten byas nas | |
phung po de ni mi ’byung na | | (4)des na ’jig rten mtha’ med ’gyur | | 
24. If the former [“groups”] would not disappear, these [new] “groups” which are dependent on those [former] “groups” would not arise;
Therefore, the world would be eternal (i). 
If the former did not perish and that [future] aggregate did not arise in dependence upon this aggregate, then this world would not have an end. 
 
(7)若先陰不壞 亦不因是陰(8)而生後五陰 世間則無邊(9)若先五陰壞。不因是五陰更生後五陰。如(10)是則世間有邊。若先五陰滅已。更不生餘五(11)陰。是名爲邊。邊名末後身。若先五陰不壞。(12)不因是五陰而生後五陰。世間則無邊。是(13)則爲常。而實不爾。是故世間無邊。是事不(14)然。世間有二種。國土世間。衆生世間。此是(15)衆生世間。 
 
 
 
antavān ekadeśaś ced ekadeśas tv anantavān |
syād antavān anantaś ca lokas tac ca na yujyate || 25 || 
真法及說者 聽者難得故
如是則生死 非有邊無邊 
gal te phyogs gcig mtha’ yod la | | phyogs gcig mtha’ ni med ’gyur na | |
’jig rten mtha’ yod mtha’ med ’gyur | | de yang rigs pa ma yin no | | 
25. If one part were finite and the other were infinite,
The world would be both finite and infinite (iii); but this is not possible. 
If one part had an end and one part did not have an end, the world would be with and without an end. That too is unreasonable. 
 
復次如四百觀中説(16)眞法及説者 聽者難得故(17)如是則生死 非有邊無邊(18)不得眞法因縁故。生死往來無有邊。或時(19)得聞眞法得道故。不得言無邊。 
 
 
 
kathaṃ tāvad upādātur ekadeśo vinaṅkṣyate |
na naṅkṣyate caikadeśa evaṃ caitan na yujyate || 26 || 
若世半有邊 世間半無邊
是則亦有邊 亦無邊不然 
ji lta bur na nyer len po’i | | phyogs gcig rnam par ’jig (5)’gyur la | |
phyogs gcig rnam par ’jig mi ’gyur | | de ltar de ni mi rigs so | | 
26. Therefore, how can it be that one part of “one who acquires” [karma] will be destroyed, (i.e. the body – man?)
And one part not destroyed? (i.e. the very subtle mind — the divine part?) This is not possible. 
How can one part of the one-who-clings perish while one part does not perish? Likewise, that is unreasonable. 
 
今當更(20)破亦有邊亦無邊(21)若世半有邊 世間半無邊(22)是則亦有邊 亦無邊不然(23)若世間半有邊半無邊。則應是亦有邊亦無(24)邊。若爾者。則一法二相。是事不然。 
 
 
 
upādānaikadeśaś ca kathaṃ nāma vinaṅkṣyate |
na naṅkṣyate caikadeśo naitad apy upapadyate || 27 || 
彼受五陰者 云何一分破
一分而不破 是事則不然 
ji lta bur na nyer blang ba | | phyogs gcig rnam par ’jig ’gyur la | |
phyogs gcig rnam par ’jig mi ’gyur | | de ltar de yang mi rigs so | | 
27. How, indeed, can it be that one part of the acquisition [of karma] (i.e. the learning stored in the body) will be destroyed,
And one part not destroyed? (i.e. the learning stored in the mind) That, certainly does not obtain. 
How can one part of that-which-is-clung-to perish while one part does not perish? Likewise, that is unreasonable. 
 
何以故(25)彼受五陰者 云何一分破(26)一分而不破 是事則不然 
 
 
 
antavac cāpy anantaṃ ca prasiddham ubhayaṃ yadi |
siddhe naivāntavat kāmaṃ naivānantavad ity api || 28 || 
受亦復如是 云何一分破
一分而不破 是事亦不然 
gal te mtha’ (6)yod mtha’ med pa | | gnyis ka grub par gyur na ni | |
mtha’ yod ma yin mtha’ med min | | ’grub par ’gyur bar ’dod la rag | | 
28. If the [view] “both finite and infinite” were proved,
Then no doubt, “neither finite nor infinite” (i.e. nothing at all) could be proved. 
If both the presence and absence of an end were established, you would have to assert non-presence and non-absence as established. 
 
(27)受亦復如是 云何一分破(28)一分而不破 是事亦不然(29)受五陰者。云何一分破。一分不破。一事不(39b1)得亦常亦無常。受亦如是。云何一分破。一(2)分不破。常無常二相過故。是故世間亦有邊(3)亦無邊則不然。 
 
 
 
atha vā sarvabhāvānāṃ śūnyatvāc chāśvatādayaḥ |
kva kasya katamāḥ kasmāt saṃbhaviṣyanti dṛṣṭayaḥ || 29 || 
若亦有無邊 是二得成者
非有非無邊 是則亦應成 
yang na dngos po thams cad dag | stong phyir rtag la sogs lta ba | |
gang dag gang du gang la ni | | (7)ci las kun tu ’byung bar ’gyur | | 
29. Because of the emptiness of all existing things,
How will the views about “eternity,” etc., come into existence, about what, of whom, and of what kind? 
And because all things are empty, about what and in whom do views such as that of permanence spring forth? 
 
今當破非有邊非無邊見(4)若亦有無邊 是二得成者(5)非有非無邊 是則亦應成(6)與有邊相違故有無邊。如長相違有短。與(7)有無相違。則有亦有亦無。與亦有亦無相(8)違故。則有非有非無。若亦有邊亦無邊定成(9)者。應有非有邊非無邊。何以故。因相待故。(10)上已破亦有邊亦無邊第三句。今云何當有(11)非有邊非無邊。以無相待故。如是推求。依(12)止未來世有邊等四見皆不可得。 
 
 
 
sarvadṛṣṭiprahāṇāya yaḥ saddharmam adeśayat |
anukampām upādāya taṃ namasyāmi gautamam || 30 || 
一切法空故 世間常等見
何處於何時 誰起是諸見 
 
30. To him, possessing compassion, who taught the real dharma
For the destruction of all views—to him, Gautama, I humbly offer reverence. 
I bow down to Gautama, whose kindness holds one close, who revealed the sublime dharma in order to let go of all views. 
 
復次(13)一切法空故 世間常等見(14)何處於何時 誰起是諸見(15)上以聲聞法破諸見。今此大乘法中説。諸(16)法從本＊以來畢竟空性。如是空性法中無(17)人無法。不應生邪見正見。處名土地。時(18)名日月歳數。誰名爲人。是名諸見體。若有(19)常無常等決定見者。應當有人出生此見。(20)破我故無人生是見。應有處所色法現見(21)尚可破。何況時方。若有諸見者應有定實。(22)若定則不應破。上來＊以種種因縁破。是故(23)當知見無定體。云何得生。如偈説。何處(24)於何時。 
 
 
 
dṛṣṭiparīkṣā nāma saptaviṃśatitamaṃ prakaraṇaṃ samāptaṃ | 
 
lta ba brtag pa zhes bya ba ste rab tu byed pa nyi shu bdun pa’o || || 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Permanent link
Go to Wiki Documentation
Enhet: Det humanistiske fakultet   Utviklet av: IT-seksjonen ved HF
Login