Bibliotheca Polyglotta

(ἀνάγκη) Τὰ μὲν οὖν παρεληλυθότα τῶν εἰρημένων πλὴν βραχέων ἐπιδέδεικται τὰ διὰ νοῦ δεδημιουργημένα· δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ δι’ ἀνάγκης γιγνόμενα τῷ λόγῳ παραθέσθαι. μεμειγμένη γὰρ οὖν ἡ τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου γένεσις ἐξ ἀνάγκης τε καὶ νοῦ συστάσεως ἐγεννήθη· νοῦ δὲ ἀνάγκης ἄρχοντος τῷ πείθειν αὐτὴν τῶν γιγνομένων τὰ πλεῖστα ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον ἄγειν, ταύτῃ κατὰ ταῦτά τε δι’ ἀνάγκης ἡττωμένης ὑπὸ πειθοῦς ἔμφρονος οὕτω κατ’ ἀρχὰς συνίστατο τόδε τὸ πᾶν. εἴ τις οὖν ᾗ γέγονεν κατὰ ταῦτα ὄντως ἐρεῖ, μεικτέον καὶ τὸ τῆς πλανωμένης εἶδος αἰτίας, ᾗ φέρειν πέφυκεν· ὧδε οὖν πάλιν ἀναχωρητέον, καὶ λαβοῦσιν αὐτῶν τούτων προσήκουσαν ἑτέραν ἀρχὴν αὖθις αὖ, καθάπερ περὶ τῶν τότε νῦν οὕτω περὶ τούτων πάλιν ἀρκτέον ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς. τὴν δὴ πρὸ τῆς οὐρανοῦ γενέσεως πυρὸς ὕδατός τε καὶ ἀέρος καὶ γῆς φύσιν θεατέον αὐτὴν καὶ τὰ πρὸ τούτου πάθη· νῦν γὰρ οὐδείς πω γένεσιν αὐτῶν μεμήνυκεν, ἀλλ’ ὡς εἰδόσιν πῦρ ὅτι ποτέ ἐστιν καὶ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν λέγομεν ἀρχὰς αὐτὰ τιθέμενοι στοιχεῖα τοῦ παντός, προσῆκον αὐτοῖς οὐδ’ ἂν ὡς ἐν συλλαβῆς εἴδεσιν μόνον εἰκότως ὑπὸ τοῦ καὶ βραχὺ φρονοῦντος ἀπεικασθῆναι. νῦν δὲ οὖν τό γε παρ’ ἡμῶν ὧδε ἐχέτω· τὴν μὲν περὶ ἁπάντων εἴτε ἀρχὴν εἴτε ἀρχὰς εἴτε ὅπῃ δοκεῖ τούτων πέρι τὸ νῦν οὐ ῥητέον, δι’ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν, διὰ δὲ τὸ χαλεπὸν εἶναι κατὰ τὸν παρόντα τρόπον τῆς διεξόδου δηλῶσαι τὰ δοκοῦντα, μήτ’ οὖν ὑμεῖς οἴεσθε δεῖν ἐμὲ λέγειν, οὔτ’ αὐτὸς αὖ πείθειν ἐμαυτὸν εἴην ἂν δυνατὸς ὡς ὀρθῶς ἐγχειροῖμ’ ἂν τοσοῦτον ἐπιβαλλόμενος ἔργον· τὸ δὲ κατ’ ἀρχὰς ῥηθὲν διαφυλάττων, τὴν τῶν εἰκότων λόγων δύναμιν, πειράσομαι μηδενὸς ἧττον εἰκότα, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἔμπροσθεν ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς περὶ ἑκάστων καὶ συμπάντων λέγειν. θεὸν δὴ καὶ νῦν ἐπ’ ἀρχῇ τῶν λεγομένων σωτῆρα ἐξ ἀτόπου καὶ ἀήθους διηγήσεως πρὸς τὸ τῶν εἰκότων δόγμα διασῴζειν ἡμᾶς ἐπικαλεσάμενοι πάλιν ἀρχώμεθα λέγειν. Ἡ δ’ οὖν αὖθις ἀρχὴ περὶ τοῦ παντὸς ἔστω μειζόνως τῆς πρόσθεν διῃρημένη· τότε μὲν γὰρ δύο εἴδη διειλόμεθα, νῦν δὲ τρίτον ἄλλο γένος ἡμῖν δηλωτέον. τὰ μὲν γὰρ δύο ἱκανὰ ἦν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λεχθεῖσιν, ἓν μὲν ὡς παραδείγματος εἶδος ὑποτεθέν, νοητὸν καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὄν, μίμημα δὲ παραδείγματος δεύτερον, γένεσιν ἔχον καὶ ὁρατόν. τρίτον δὲ τότε μὲν οὐ διειλόμεθα, νομίσαντες τὰ δύο ἕξειν ἱκανῶς· νῦν δὲ ὁ λόγος ἔοικεν εἰσαναγκάζειν χαλεπὸν καὶ ἀμυδρὸν εἶδος ἐπιχειρεῖν λόγοις ἐμφανίσαι. τίν’ οὖν ἔχον δύναμιν καὶ φύσιν αὐτὸ ὑποληπτέον; τοιάνδε μάλιστα· πάσης εἶναι γενέσεως ὑποδοχὴν αὐτὴν οἷον τιθήνην. εἴρηται μὲν οὖν τἀληθές, δεῖ δὲ ἐναργέστερον εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ, χαλεπὸν δὲ ἄλλως τε καὶ διότι προαπορηθῆναι περὶ πυρὸς καὶ τῶν μετὰ πυρὸς ἀναγκαῖον τούτου χάριν· τούτων γὰρ εἰπεῖν ἕκαστον ὁποῖον ὄντως ὕδωρ χρὴ λέγειν μᾶλλον ἢ πῦρ, καὶ ὁποῖον ὁτιοῦν μᾶλλον ἢ καὶ ἅπαντα καθ’ ἕκαστόν τε, οὕτως ὥστε τινὶ πιστῷ καὶ βεβαίῳ χρήσασθαι λόγῳ, χαλεπόν. πῶς οὖν δὴ τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ καὶ πῇ καὶ τί περὶ αὐτῶν εἰκότως διαπορηθέντες ἂν λέγοιμεν; πρῶτον μέν, ὃ δὴ νῦν ὕδωρ ὠνομάκαμεν, πηγνύμενον ὡς δοκοῦμεν λίθους καὶ γῆν γιγνόμενον ὁρῶμεν, τηκόμενον δὲ καὶ διακρινόμενον αὖ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο πνεῦμα καὶ ἀέρα, συγκαυθέντα δὲ ἀέρα πῦρ, ἀνάπαλιν δὲ συγκριθὲν καὶ κατασβεσθὲν εἰς ἰδέαν τε ἀπιὸν αὖθις ἀέρος πῦρ, καὶ πάλιν ἀέρα συνιόντα καὶ πυκνούμενον νέφος καὶ ὁμίχλην, ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἔτι μᾶλλον συμπιλουμένων ῥέον ὕδωρ, ἐξ ὕδατος δὲ γῆν καὶ λίθους αὖθις, κύκλον τε οὕτω διαδιδόντα εἰς ἄλληλα, ὡς φαίνεται, τὴν γένεσιν. οὕτω δὴ τούτων οὐδέποτε τῶν αὐτῶν ἑκάστων φανταζομένων, ποῖον αὐτῶν ὡς ὂν ὁτιοῦν τοῦτο καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο παγίως διισχυριζόμενος οὐκ αἰσχυνεῖταί τις ἑαυτόν; οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλ’ ἀσφαλέστατα μακρῷ περὶ τούτων τιθεμένους ὧδε λέγειν· ἀεὶ ὃ καθορῶμεν ἄλλοτε ἄλλῃ γιγνόμενον, ὡς πῦρ, μὴ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἑκάστοτε προσαγορεύειν πῦρ, μηδὲ ὕδωρ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀεί, μηδὲ ἄλλο ποτὲ μηδὲν ὥς τινα ἔχον βεβαιότητα, ὅσα δεικνύντες τῷ ῥήματι τῷ τόδε καὶ τοῦτο προσχρώμενοι δηλοῦν ἡγούμεθά τι· φεύγει γὰρ οὐχ ὑπομένον τὴν τοῦ τόδε καὶ τοῦτο καὶ τὴν τῷδε καὶ πᾶσαν ὅση μόνιμα ὡς ὄντα αὐτὰ ἐνδείκνυται φάσις. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἕκαστα μὴ λέγειν, τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἀεὶ περιφερόμενον ὅμοιον ἑκάστου πέρι καὶ συμπάντων οὕτω καλεῖν, καὶ δὴ καὶ πῦρ τὸ διὰ παντὸς τοιοῦτον, καὶ ἅπαν ὅσονπερ ἂν ἔχῃ γένεσιν· ἐν ᾧ δὲ ἐγγιγνόμενα ἀεὶ ἕκαστα αὐτῶν φαντάζεται καὶ πάλιν ἐκεῖθεν ἀπόλλυται, μόνον ἐκεῖνο αὖ προσαγορεύειν τῷ τε τοῦτο καὶ τῷ τόδε προσχρωμένους ὀνόματι, τὸ δὲ ὁποιονοῦν τι, θερμὸν ἢ λευκὸν ἢ καὶ ὁτιοῦν τῶν ἐναντίων, καὶ πάνθ’ ὅσα ἐκ τούτων, μηδὲν ἐκεῖνο αὖ τούτων καλεῖν. ἔτι δὲ σαφέστερον αὐτοῦ πέρι προθυμητέον αὖθις εἰπεῖν. εἰ γὰρ πάντα τις σχήματα πλάσας ἐκ χρυσοῦ μηδὲν μεταπλάττων παύοιτο ἕκαστα εἰς ἅπαντα, δεικνύντος δή τινος αὐτῶν ἓν καὶ ἐρομένου τί ποτ’ ἐστί, μακρῷ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἀσφαλέστατον εἰπεῖν ὅτι χρυσός, τὸ δὲ τρίγωνον ὅσα τε ἄλλα σχήματα ἐνεγίγνετο, μηδέποτε λέγειν ταῦτα ὡς ὄντα, ἅ γε μεταξὺ τιθεμένου μεταπίπτει, ἀλλ’ ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον μετ’ ἀσφαλείας ἐθέλῃ δέχεσθαί τινος, ἀγαπᾶν. ὁ αὐτὸς δὴ λόγος καὶ περὶ τῆς τὰ πάντα δεχομένης σώματα φύσεως. ταὐτὸν αὐτὴν ἀεὶ προσρητέον· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ἑαυτῆς τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἐξίσταται δυνάμεως - δέχεταί τε γὰρ ἀεὶ τὰ πάντα, καὶ μορφὴν οὐδεμίαν ποτὲ οὐδενὶ τῶν εἰσιόντων ὁμοίαν εἴληφεν οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς· ἐκμαγεῖον γὰρ φύσει παντὶ κεῖται, κινούμενόν τε καὶ διασχηματιζόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν εἰσιόντων, φαίνεται δὲ δι’ ἐκεῖνα ἄλλοτε ἀλλοῖον - τὰ δὲ εἰσιόντα καὶ ἐξιόντα τῶν ὄντων ἀεὶ μιμήματα, τυπωθέντα ἀπ’ αὐτῶν τρόπον τινὰ δύσφραστον καὶ θαυμαστόν, ὃν εἰς αὖθις μέτιμεν. ἐν δ’ οὖν τῷ παρόντι χρὴ γένη διανοηθῆναι τριττά, τὸ μὲν γιγνόμενον, τὸ δ’ ἐν ᾧ γίγνεται, τὸ δ’ ὅθεν ἀφομοιούμενον φύεται τὸ γιγνόμενον. καὶ δὴ καὶ προσεικάσαι πρέπει τὸ μὲν δεχόμενον μητρί, τὸ δ’ ὅθεν πατρί, τὴν δὲ μεταξὺ τούτων φύσιν ἐκγόνῳ, νοῆσαί τε ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως, ἐκτυπώματος ἔσεσθαι μέλλοντος ἰδεῖν ποικίλου πάσας ποικιλίας, τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ ἐν ᾧ ἐκτυπούμενον ἐνίσταται γένοιτ’ ἂν παρεσκευασμένον εὖ, πλὴν ἄμορφον ὂν ἐκείνων ἁπασῶν τῶν ἰδεῶν ὅσας μέλλοι δέχεσθαί ποθεν. ὅμοιον γὰρ ὂν τῶν ἐπεισιόντων τινὶ τὰ τῆς ἐναντίας τά τε τῆς τὸ παράπαν ἄλλης φύσεως ὁπότ’ ἔλθοι δεχόμενον κακῶς ἂν ἀφομοιοῖ, τὴν αὑτοῦ παρεμφαῖνον ὄψιν. διὸ καὶ πάντων ἐκτὸς εἰδῶν εἶναι χρεὼν τὸ τὰ πάντα ἐκδεξόμενον ἐν αὑτῷ γένη, καθάπερ περὶ τὰ ἀλείμματα ὁπόσα εὐώδη τέχνῃ μηχανῶνται πρῶτον τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ ὑπάρχον, ποιοῦσιν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀώδη τὰ δεξόμενα ὑγρὰ τὰς ὀσμάς· ὅσοι τε ἔν τισιν τῶν μαλακῶν σχήματα ἀπομάττειν ἐπιχειροῦσι, τὸ παράπαν σχῆμα οὐδὲν ἔνδηλον ὑπάρχειν ἐῶσι, προομαλύναντες δὲ ὅτι λειότατον ἀπεργάζονται. ταὐτὸν οὖν καὶ τῷ τὰ τῶν πάντων ἀεί τε ὄντων κατὰ πᾶν ἑαυτοῦ πολλάκις ἀφομοιώματα καλῶς μέλλοντι δέχεσθαι πάντων ἐκτὸς αὐτῷ προσήκει πεφυκέναι τῶν εἰδῶν. διὸ δὴ τὴν τοῦ γεγονότος ὁρατοῦ καὶ πάντως αἰσθητοῦ μητέρα καὶ ὑποδοχὴν μήτε γῆν μήτε ἀέρα μήτε πῦρ μήτε ὕδωρ λέγωμεν, μήτε ὅσα ἐκ τούτων μήτε ἐξ ὧν ταῦτα γέγονεν· ἀλλ’ ἀνόρατον εἶδός τι καὶ ἄμορφον, πανδεχές, μεταλαμβάνον δὲ ἀπορώτατά πῃ τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ δυσαλωτότατον αὐτὸ λέγοντες οὐ ψευσόμεθα. καθ’ ὅσον δ’ ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων δυνατὸν ἐφικνεῖσθαι τῆς φύσεως αὐτοῦ, τῇδ’ ἄν τις ὀρθότατα λέγοι· πῦρ μὲν ἑκάστοτε αὐτοῦ τὸ πεπυρωμένον μέρος φαίνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ὑγρανθὲν ὕδωρ, γῆν τε καὶ ἀέρα καθ’ ὅσον ἂν μιμήματα τούτων δέχηται. λόγῳ δὲ δὴ μᾶλλον τὸ τοιόνδε διοριζομένους περὶ αὐτῶν διασκεπτέον· ἆρα ἔστιν τι πῦρ αὐτὸ ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ πάντα περὶ ὧν ἀεὶ λέγομεν οὕτως αὐτὰ καθ’ αὑτὰ ὄντα ἕκαστα, ἢ ταῦτα ἅπερ καὶ βλέπομεν, ὅσα τε ἄλλα διὰ τοῦ σώματος αἰσθανόμεθα, μόνα ἐστὶν τοιαύτην ἔχοντα ἀλήθειαν, ἄλλα δὲ οὐκ ἔστι παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ μάτην ἑκάστοτε εἶναί τί φαμεν εἶδος ἑκάστου νοητόν, τὸ δ’ οὐδὲν ἄρ’ ἦν πλὴν λόγος; οὔτε οὖν δὴ τὸ παρὸν ἄκριτον καὶ ἀδίκαστον ἀφέντα ἄξιον φάναι διισχυριζόμενον ἔχειν οὕτως, οὔτ’ ἐπὶ λόγου μήκει πάρεργον ἄλλο μῆκος ἐπεμβλητέον· εἰ δέ τις ὅρος ὁρισθεὶς μέγας διὰ βραχέων φανείη, τοῦτο μάλιστα ἐγκαιριώτατον γένοιτ’ ἄν. ὧδε οὖν τήν γ’ ἐμὴν αὐτὸς τίθεμαι ψῆφον. εἰ μὲν νοῦς καὶ δόξα ἀληθής ἐστον δύο γένη, παντάπασιν εἶναι καθ’ αὑτὰ ταῦτα, ἀναίσθητα ὑφ’ ἡμῶν εἴδη, νοούμενα μόνον· εἰ δ’, ὥς τισιν φαίνεται, δόξα ἀληθὴς νοῦ διαφέρει τὸ μηδέν, πάνθ’ ὁπόσ’ αὖ διὰ τοῦ σώματος αἰσθανόμεθα θετέον βεβαιότατα. δύο δὴ λεκτέον ἐκείνω, διότι χωρὶς γεγόνατον ἀνομοίως τε ἔχετον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν διὰ διδαχῆς, τὸ δ’ ὑπὸ πειθοῦς ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ μετ’ ἀληθοῦς λόγου, τὸ δὲ ἄλογον· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀκίνητον πειθοῖ, τὸ δὲ μεταπειστόν· καὶ τοῦ μὲν πάντα ἄνδρα μετέχειν φατέον, νοῦ δὲ θεούς, ἀνθρώπων δὲ γένος βραχύ τι. τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων ὁμολογητέον ἓν μὲν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ εἶδος ἔχον, ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, οὔτε εἰς ἑαυτὸ εἰσδεχόμενον ἄλλο ἄλλοθεν οὔτε αὐτὸ εἰς ἄλλο ποι ἰόν, ἀόρατον δὲ καὶ ἄλλως ἀναίσθητον, τοῦτο ὃ δὴ νόησις εἴληχεν ἐπισκοπεῖν· τὸ δὲ ὁμώνυμον ὅμοιόν τε ἐκείνῳ δεύτερον, αἰσθητόν, γεννητόν, πεφορημένον ἀεί, γιγνόμενόν τε ἔν τινι τόπῳ καὶ πάλιν ἐκεῖθεν ἀπολλύμενον, δόξῃ μετ’ αἰσθήσεως περιληπτόν· τρίτον δὲ αὖ γένος ὂν τὸ τῆς χώρας ἀεί, φθορὰν οὐ προσδεχόμενον, ἕδραν δὲ παρέχον ὅσα ἔχει γένεσιν πᾶσιν, αὐτὸ δὲ μετ’ ἀναισθησίας ἁπτὸν λογισμῷ τινι νόθῳ, μόγις πιστόν, πρὸς ὃ δὴ καὶ ὀνειροπολοῦμεν βλέποντες καί φαμεν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναί που τὸ ὂν ἅπαν ἔν τινι τόπῳ καὶ κατέχον χώραν τινά, τὸ δὲ μήτ’ ἐν γῇ μήτε που κατ’ οὐρανὸν οὐδὲν εἶναι. ταῦτα δὴ πάντα καὶ τούτων ἄλλα ἀδελφὰ καὶ περὶ τὴν ἄυπνον καὶ ἀληθῶς φύσιν ὑπάρχουσαν ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ὀνειρώξεως οὐ δυνατοὶ γιγνόμεθα ἐγερθέντες διοριζόμενοι τἀληθὲς λέγειν, ὡς εἰκόνι μέν, ἐπείπερ οὐδ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐφ’ ᾧ γέγονεν ἑαυτῆς ἐστιν, ἑτέρου δέ τινος ἀεὶ φέρεται φάντασμα, διὰ ταῦτα ἐν ἑτέρῳ προσήκει τινὶ γίγνεσθαι, οὐσίας ἁμωσγέπως ἀντεχομένην, ἢ μηδὲν τὸ παράπαν αὐτὴν εἶναι, τῷ δὲ ὄντως ὄντι βοηθὸς ὁ δι’ ἀκριβείας ἀληθὴς λόγος, ὡς ἕως ἄν τι τὸ μὲν ἄλλο ᾖ, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο, οὐδέτερον ἐν οὐδετέρῳ ποτὲ γενόμενον ἓν ἅμα ταὐτὸν καὶ δύο γενήσεσθον. Οὗτος μὲν οὖν δὴ παρὰ τῆς ἐμῆς ψήφου λογισθεὶς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ δεδόσθω λόγος, ὄν τε καὶ χώραν καὶ γένεσιν εἶναι, τρία τριχῇ, καὶ πρὶν οὐρανὸν γενέσθαι· τὴν δὲ δὴ γενέσεως τιθήνην ὑγραινομένην καὶ πυρουμένην καὶ τὰς γῆς τε καὶ ἀέρος μορφὰς δεχομένην, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τούτοις πάθη συνέπεται πάσχουσαν, παντοδαπὴν μὲν ἰδεῖν φαίνεσθαι, διὰ δὲ τὸ μήθ’ ὁμοίων δυνάμεων μήτε ἰσορρόπων ἐμπίμπλασθαι κατ’ οὐδὲν αὐτῆς ἰσορροπεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἀνωμάλως πάντῃ ταλαντουμένην σείεσθαι μὲν ὑπ’ ἐκείνων αὐτήν, κινουμένην δ’ αὖ πάλιν ἐκεῖνα σείειν· τὰ δὲ κινούμενα ἄλλα ἄλλοσε ἀεὶ φέρεσθαι διακρινόμενα, ὥσπερ τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν πλοκάνων τε καὶ ὀργάνων τῶν περὶ τὴν τοῦ σίτου κάθαρσιν σειόμενα καὶ ἀνικμώμενα τὰ μὲν πυκνὰ καὶ βαρέα ἄλλῃ, τὰ δὲ μανὰ καὶ κοῦφα εἰς ἑτέραν ἵζει φερόμενα ἕδραν· τότε οὕτω τὰ τέτταρα γένη σειόμενα ὑπὸ τῆς δεξαμενῆς, κινουμένης αὐτῆς οἷον ὀργάνου σεισμὸν παρέχοντος, τὰ μὲν ἀνομοιότατα πλεῖστον αὐτὰ ἀφ’ αὑτῶν ὁρίζειν, τὰ δὲ ὁμοιότατα μάλιστα εἰς ταὐτὸν συνωθεῖν, διὸ δὴ καὶ χώραν ταῦτα ἄλλα ἄλλην ἴσχειν, πρὶν καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἐξ αὐτῶν διακοσμηθὲν γενέσθαι. καὶ τὸ μὲν δὴ πρὸ τούτου πάντα ταῦτ’ εἶχεν ἀλόγως καὶ ἀμέτρως· ὅτε δ’ ἐπεχειρεῖτο κοσμεῖσθαι τὸ πᾶν, πῦρ πρῶτον καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα, ἴχνη μὲν ἔχοντα αὑτῶν ἄττα, παντάπασί γε μὴν διακείμενα ὥσπερ εἰκὸς ἔχειν ἅπαν ὅταν ἀπῇ τινος θεός, οὕτω δὴ τότε πεφυκότα ταῦτα πρῶτον διεσχηματίσατο εἴδεσί τε καὶ ἀριθμοῖς. τὸ δὲ ᾗ δυνατὸν ὡς κάλλιστα ἄριστά τε ἐξ οὐχ οὕτως ἐχόντων τὸν θεὸν αὐτὰ συνιστάναι, παρὰ πάντα ἡμῖν ὡς ἀεὶ τοῦτο λεγόμενον ὑπαρχέτω· νῦν δ’ οὖν τὴν διάταξιν αὐτῶν ἐπιχειρητέον ἑκάστων καὶ γένεσιν ἀήθει λόγῳ πρὸς ὑμᾶς δηλοῦν, ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐπεὶ μετέχετε τῶν κατὰ παίδευσιν ὁδῶν δι’ ὧν ἐνδείκνυσθαι τὰ λεγόμενα ἀνάγκη, συνέψεσθε.

Nunc quoniam cuncta exceptis admodum paucis executi sumus, quae providae mentis intellectus instituit, oportet de illis etiam, quae necessitas invehit, dicere, mixta siquidem mundi sensilis ex necessitatis intellegentiaeque coetu constitit generatio dominante intellectu et salubri persuasione rigorem necessitatis assidue trahente ad optimos actus. Itaque uicta et parente providis auctoritatibus necessitate prima rerum mundique exordia constiterunt. Si quis ergo vere iuxtaque meram fidem mundi huius institutionem insinuaturus erit, hunc oportet erraticae quoque causae speciem demonstrare. Quod ita demum commode fiet, si ad eorum quae erroribus implicant originem facto recursu, perinde ut in his quae ex mente sunt fecimus, genituram substantiamque eorum ab exordio retexamus naturamque ignis et terrae, caeterarum item materiarum, ex quibus mundi sensilis coagmentata molitio est, consideremus nec naturam modo veram illam veterem, quae fuit ante concretionem, sed antiquas etiam ipsorum elementorum perpessiones. Nullus quippe ad hoc usque tempus genituram eorum indicavit, sed tamquam scientibus, quid sit ignis et caetera, sic loquimur et dicimus initia uniuersitatis, constituentes ea quae ne syllabarum quidem locum vicemque pro veri examinis ratione obtinent. Nostra igitur haec est professio nihil ad praesens de universitatis vel initio vel initiis, ut quidam putant, esse dicendum, non quo sit ullum impedimentum praeter inextricabilem difficultatem, sed quod ita instituto sermone sit impossibile admodum perueniri ad explanationem rei. Neque igitur vos id expectetis nec ego mihi persuadeam posse me tantum et tanti oneris sustinere. Atque illud potius observabo, quod initio sermonis precario petivi, in rebus imaginariis proclivibusque ad fallendum rationibus rerum earundem verisimilibus assertionibus imaginariisque contentus sim nitia singulorum et universorum originem pandens. Deum ergo etiam nunc auxiliatorem invocabimus ante auspicium dictionis, liberatorem ex turbida et procellosa coepti sermonis iactatione. Erit ergo initium tale demum universae imaginariae rei, eademque magnificentius dividetur. Etenim tunc duae modo species veniebant in divisionem, at nunc tertium quoque aliud oborietur genus. Quippe in prioribus duo nobis satis abunde sufficere videbantur, unum perpetuum carens generatione exemplaris eminentiae, alterum simulacrum et imago eius aeternitati propagata secundae generationis idque visibile. At vero tertium tunc quidem minime divisimus; at nunc impositura nobis necessitatem ratio videtur ire obuiam manumque conserere adversum inexpugnabilem omni ratione et omni eloquio fraudem crassis tenebris involutam. Quam igitur eius vim quamue esse naturam putandum est? Opinor, omnium quae gignuntur receptaculum est, quasi quaedam nutricula. Atque hoc quod de ea dicitur verum est quidem, sed dicendum videtur paulo apertius; est tamen arduum eo magis, quod praeconfundi mentis aciem necesse est et aestuare tam de igni quam de caeteris materiis, qui magis aquam iure aquam dici putarique oporteat quam terram, cum nulla sit certa et stabilis proprietas corporum quae cuiusque indicet naturalem germanitatem. Principio ut de aqua, cuius modo fecimus mentionem, ordiamur: cum astringitur in glaciem, certe saxum terrenaeque soliditatis corpus et minime fusile apparet, eadem haec ignita et diffluens discretaque uarie in humorem, spiritum et aereas auras dissoluitur; aer porro exustus ignem creat rursumque extinctus ignis aera corpulentior factus instituit, aer item crassior factus in nubes nebulasque concrescit, quibus elisis et expressis pluviae stagnorumque et fontium largitas demumque ex aqua terrenae moles aggerantur. Atque ita circuitu quodam uires fomentaque generationis corporibus invicem sibi mutuantibus nec in una eademque forma perseverantibus quae tandem erit certa eorum et a cunctatione semota comprehensio? Nulla certe. Quapropter de cunctis huius modi mutabilibus ita est habendum: hoc quod saepe alias aliter formatum nobis videtur et plerumque iuxta ignis effigiem non est, opinor, ignis sed igneum quiddam, nec aer sed aereum, nec omnino quicquam velut habens ullam stabilitatem. Denique ne pronominibus quidem ullis signanda sunt quibus in demonstratione uti solemus, cum dicimus 'hoc', vel 'illud'; fugiunt enim nec expectant eam appellationem quae de his tamquam existentibus habetur. Igitur ignem quoque eum esse vere putandum, qui semper idem est, et omne cuius proprietas manet. At vero id, in quo fieri singula haec uidentur et demum dissolui pereuntiaque ad alias inde transire formas, solum illud appellandum puto certo pronomine recte quippe de eo dici posse 'hoc' uel 'illud' -- porro quod recipit qualitatem vel etiam verti potest in contrarias qualitates calidum dici uel candidum, proprioque et certo nomine appellari quod sit incertum et mutabile minime convenire. Sed, opinor, apertius etiamnunc de eodem erit dissertare conandum. Si quis enim cunctas formas figurasque ex una eademque auri materia fictas iugiter et sine intermissione in alias atque alias reformet, tunc, si quis electa qualibet una figura quaerat quae sit, opinor posse firme et diligenter ac sine reprehensione responderi aurum illud esse nec addere trianguli cylindriue cuiusue alterius videbitur. Eadem et consimilis ratio difficultasque in ea natura, quae cuncta recipit corpora, reperitur. Haec quippe minime recedit ex condicione propria; recipit enim cuncta nec ullam ex isdem formam trahit, et cum velut intra gremium eius formentur quae recipiuntur, ipsa informis manet estque usus eius similis molli cedentique materiae, in quam imprimuntur varia signacula, moveturque et conformatur omnimode ab introeuntibus, ipsa nec formam nec motum habens ex natura sua. Quae vero ingrediuntur, formas mutant aliasque alia et diuersa cernuntur, eademque quae introeunt et egrediuntur simulacra sunt uere existentium rerum miro quodam uixque explicabili modo formata ab isdem vere existentibus rebus, quem ad modum mox demonstrare nitemur pro viribus. At vero nunc trinum genus animo sumendum est: quod gignitur, item aliud in quo gignitur, praeterea tertium ex quo similitudinem trahit mutuaturque quod gignitur. Decet ergo facere comparationem similitudinemque impertiri illi quidem quod suscipit matris, at vero unde obvenit patris, illi autem naturae quae inter haec duo est prolis. Simul ita intellegendum, fieri non posse, ut una existat facies, quae omnes rerum omnium formas uultusque contineat variaque corporis undique ora demonstret, nisi subiecto prius informi aliquo corporum gremio, perinde ut quae in picturis substernitur infectio decolor ad colorum lumina subvehenda. Etenim si erit alicuius eorum quae in se recipit simile receptaculum, cum quid obueniet dissimile his quibus simile est, discordabit, opinor, vultus eius cum introgressi corporis vultu nullamque exprimet similitudinem. Ex quo fit, ut receptaculi sinus nullam propriam naturaliterque expressam habeat figuram proptereaque informis intellegatur omni quippe forma carens, ut qui odora pigmenta conficiunt ante omnia curant, ut nullius sint odoris proprii quae condientur, susceptura uidelicet humidos sucos odoraminum, et qui materiis mollibus impressionique cedentibus insignire formas aliquas uolunt, pure leuigatas apparant nec ullam omnino formam in apparata leuigatione apparere patiuntur; sic ei, quod omnibus rerum omnium formis et figuris aeternae vitae mansurisque per saecula recte insignietur, nulla omnino propria species falsa opinione tribuenda est. Ideoque facti generati uisibilis animalis matrem corporeaeque substantiae receptaculum neque terram neque aquam nec vero ignem vel aera nec quicquam aliud, quod ex his creatum est, nec vero ex quibus haec ipsa subsistunt appellandum, sed inuisibilem potius speciem quandam et informem capacitatem mira quadam et incomprehensibili ratione inter nullam et aliquam substantiam nec plane intellegibilem nec plane sensibilem positam, sed quae ex his quae in ea commutantur intellegi tamen posse videatur. Ignis quidem pars eius ignita, humectata vero pars eiusdem aqua, si modo expertis rei pars ulla dici potest; terra quoque et aer ratione illa, si forte qua simulacra eorum recipit in se, de quibus singulis huius modi tractatus instituendus videtur: estne aliquis ignis seorsum positus et incommunicabilis, item caeterae species, quas concipientes mente dicimus semper separatas a coetu corporearum specierum fore archetypa exemplaria rei sensilis, an haec sola sunt quae videntur quaeque corporis intentione sentimus, nec praeter haec ulla sunt uspiam, sed frustra praesumitur esse intellegibiles species, quarum sint imagines sensiles, easque nihil aliud esse quam verba? Quod quidem neque inexaminatum relinqui placet nec ad prolixum natura sua tractatum minime pertinens ad rem verborum agmen addendum; at uero si quis amplae rei finis disceptationem compendio: dirimet, hunc certe asciscere operae pretium facientis est. Ipse igitur, quid de hac re sentiam, dicam. Si intellectus itemque vera opinio duae res sunt, necesse est haec ipsa per semet esse intellectu potius quam sensibus assequenda; sin vero, ut quibusdam videtur, vera opinio ab intellectu nihil differt, omnia quae corpore[a] sentimus certa habenda sunt. Sed opinor duo esse dicendum, propterea quod utraque magna differentia distant, quippe quorum alterum doctrina nobis insinuet, alterum persuasionis assumptio, et alterum quidem semper cum ratione vera, porro sine ulla ratione alterum, item alterum nulla persuasione transducibile, alterum nutans, incertum semper et derivabile. Quid quod rectae opinionis omnis vir particeps, intellectus vero dei proprius et paucorum admodum lectorum hominum? Quod cum ita sit, fatendum est esse eius modi speciem semotam a sensibus in semet locatam sine ortu sine occasu, quae neque in se recipit quicquam aliunde neque ipsa procedit ad aliud quicquam, inuisibilem insensilem, soli mentis intentioni animadversionique perspicuam; porro quod ab hoc secundum est, natiuum sensile sustentabile consistens aliquo in loco et rursum cum immutatione et interitu recedens, sensibus et opinione noscendum. Tertium genus est loci, quod ne ad interitum quidem pertinet; sedem porro praebet his quae generantur, sed ipsum sine sensu tangentis tangitur, adulterina quadam ratione opinabile. cum id animo intuemur, patimur quod somniantes: putamus enim necesse esse, ut omne quod est in aliquo sit loco positum regionemque obtineat ullam, porro quod neque in terra neque in caelo sit minime existere. Ob quam depravationem itemque alias consanguineas ne in reputatione quidem et consideratione vere existentis uereque peruigilis naturae mente consistimus propter huius modi somnia, cum ne imaginari quidem ullam huius lubricae speciem formamque valeamus; propriam quippe nullam habet et habere omnes videtur, cum intra gremium eius conversione ad aliud ex alio formae transfigurantur. Idemque hoc in altero, inter aliquam et nullam substantiam positum, invenitur suam nullam habet nec tamen nihil est, at enim vere existentium rerum assertio perspicua rationis luce firmatur docens, dum quidem erit hoc aliud itemque illud aliud, neutrum in neutro posse consistere nec simul idem unum et duo fieri. Haec est meae quidem sententiae mens esse et ante mundi quoque sensilis exornationem fuisse tria haec: existens locum generationem. Igitur generationis nutriculam humectatam modo, modo ignitam, terraeque item et aeris formas suscipientem caeterasque pedissequas passiones perpetientem omniformem visu videri; quod tamen privatim neque similibus viribus neque exaequatis potentiis instruatur, nihil esse eius aequale, sed undique uergentem et in pronum vel absonum praeponderantem agitari quidem materiis agitantibus invicemque reciproco pulsu pulsare atque agitare materias. Ex quo fluctu turbatas materias in diuersa raptari discernique a se, perinde ut quae in frumenti purgatione pistoriis instrumentis motu et excussione discerni videmus, gravia quidem et solida seorsum, tenuia vero et levia in aliam partem; nequaquam disparari proptereaque sedibus fuisse diuisa ante mundi scilicet exornationem. Ac tunc quidem erat huius modi rationis expers rerum inordinata confusio, sed ubi cuncta redigi ad modum placuit, ignem primo terramque et aera atque aquam continuavit opifex deus, non talia ut nunc sunt, sed quae praeferrent elementorum vestigia in eo squalore ac deformitate qui apparet in his quibus divina deest prospicientia; nunc uero singulis luce ac specie tributa numerus quoque illustratorum omnium genituram sequebatur pulchris omnibus ex non talibus quondam institutis. Nunc iam ordinationem genituramque eorum singillatim demonstrari conuenit nouo quidem et inusitato genere demonstrationis, verum vobis, qui omnes eruditionis ingenuae vias peragraveritis, neque incognito et ex levi admonitione perspicuo.

Hactenus opera mentis paucis exceptis tractavimus. (36) Oportet autem de his quoque quae necessitas invehit, dicere. Mundi enim huius genera(37)tio ex necessitatis mentisque coitu mixta est. Nam cum mens necessitati dominaretur, pro(38)pterea quod persuadendo eam ad optimos ut plurimum rerum eventus induceret, ipsaque (39) hac ratione cedens sapienti persuasioni pareret, mundi huius exordia constiterunt. O(40)portet igitur eum qui mundi constitutionem vere narratus erit, erraticae quoque causae (41) speciem pro naturae ipsius instinctu miscere. Quod ita commode fiet, si horum ipsorum (42) convenienti principio sumpto, sic de his quemadmodum de superioribus ab ipsa rursus (43) origine differamus. Naturam ergo et passiones ignis, aquae, aeris, atque terrae, generatio(44)nem coeli praecedentes consideremus. Nullus profecto ad hoc usque tempus eorum gene(45)rationem ostendit, sed quasi notum sit quid sit ignis et reliqua, sic de illis erba facimus, (46) eaque mundi primordia constituimus, cum nec syllabarum quidem nedum elementorum (47) vicem tenere apud homines mentis quoquo modo compotes debeant. Nos vero in (48) praesenti nihil de principio universorum, sive principiis, sive quomodocunque aliter id ap(49)pelletur, dicendum putamus. ….? Cui quidem disputationi nihil aliud impedimento est, ni(50)si quod difficile sit praesenti disputandi modo quae de his videntur exprimere. Neque igi(51)tur vos id expectabitis, neque ego mihi persuadebo recte me tantum opus aggredi posse. (52) Quod autem ab initio dixi, verisimilitudinis vim servabimus, studebimusque in rationi(53)bus verisimilibus circa haec assignandis nulli cedere. Atque ita et singula et universe (54) a principio exponemus. Deum igitur etiam nunc disputationis servatorem in primis (1) oremus, ut nos ex admirabili et insolita expositione ad verisimilem doctrinam traducat, (2) atque ita institut disputationem exordiamur. Sed hanc de universo disputationem ab am(3)pliori divisione quam supra ducamus. Tunc enim duas in species facta divisio est. Nunc (4) tertium genus addendum. Duo enim in superioribus sufficiebant. Unum quidem exem(5)plaris loco, semper idem, solaque intelligentia comprehendum. Alterum simulacrum (6) ab hoc exemplari deductum, generationi oculisque subiectum. Cum vero duo haec suffi(7)cere putaremus, tertium non adiunximus. Nunc autem cogere nos ratio videtur, ut dif(8)ficilem et obscuram speciem declarare conemur. Quam igitur vim, quamve naturam ha(9)bere putandum. Hanc utique, generationis horum omnium receptaculum et quasi nu(10)tricem esse. Quod quamvis vere dicatur, paulo tamen apertius est dicendum. Arduum id qui(11)dem, eo maxime, quod ad huius rei demonstrationem dubitare prius necesse est et inquirere (12) de igni et reliquis quae elementa vocantur, quid istorum aquam potius quam ignem, aut ae(13)rem potius quam terram, aut certum aliquid unum magis quam cuncta vocare oporte(14)at. Difficile sane certum aliquid et firmum de istis asserere. Quonam igitur pacto, et qua (15) ratione, et quod probabile in huiusmodi inquisitione dicemus. Principio id corpus (16) quod modo aquam nominavimus, quando in solidam concrescit materiam, lapis et ter(17)ra fieri videtur: quando vero liquescit et diffluit, spiritus atque aer. Item aer exustus (18) ignis efficitur. Ignis extinctus et corpulentior factus creat. Rursus crassior fa(19)ctus aer, in nebulas nubesque concrescit. His etiam magis compressis pluviae defluunt. (20) Ex aqua rursus terra lapidesque gignuntur. Atque ita videmus haec omnia circuitu quo(21)dam sibi invicem vires fomentaque generationis vicissim tribuere. Quae cum nunquam (22) eadem appareant permanere, quisnam sine rubore redargutionisque suspitione poterit i(23)storum aliquid unum potius quam aliud certe et firmiter appellare. Nemo certe. Qua(24)re tutissimus in his hic erit loquendi modus. Hoc quod semper alias aliter formatum vi(25)detur, et plerunque iuxta ignis effigiem, non est utique ignis hoc aliquid, sed tale, id est ig(26)neum quiddam: nec aqua hoc aliquid, sed tale quid id est aqueum, nec aliud quicquam (27) velut ullam habens stabilitatem. Denique nec pronominibus quidem ullis haec signan(28)da sunt, quibus in rei cuiuslibet demonstratione, cum hoc vel illud dicimus, uti solemus. (29) fugiunt enim, nec expectant vel eam demonstrationem, quae hoc et huius et huc desig(30)nat: vel appellationem, quae de his tanquam de existentibus et stabilibus habeatur. Igitur (31) huiusmodi omnia neque hoc, neque illud, sed tale potius, aut tale propter similitudinem ali(32)quam appellare debemus. Et ignem quidem ubique tale, ac de ceteris quae gignuntur eo(33)dem pacto. At vero ilud in quo fieri singula haec videntur, ac deinde dissolvi, solum iis pro(34)nominibus quibus hoc vel illud signamus, appllandum puto. Quale vero quodammo(35)do, calidum scilicet vel album, vel aliquid tale contrariorum, vel ex contrariis illud mini(36)me appellandum. Sed apertius quod volumus exponamus. Siquis enim cunctas figuras ex (37) una eademque auri materia fictas continue in alias et alias reformet, deque una quadam illa(38)rum praesens aliquis quid sit quaeret, vere admodum et tutissime respondere possumus (39) aurum illud esse: triangulum vero esse aut aliam figuram earum quae impressae sunt et (40) continuo permutantur, quasi revera sint non licet dicere. [see previous?] Sola quippe illa responsione tan(41)quam tutissima contenti esse debemus. Eadem de illa natura quae cuncta recipit corpora (42) ratio est: idem semper esse dicenda est. Siquidem ex propria potentia recedit nunquam. Sus(43)cipit enim semper omnia, nec ullam unquam iis similem ullo pacto sibi formam contra(44)hit. Omnis sane natura fictioni subiecta est, agitataque ab ingredientibus et figurata quo(45)dammodo, alias aliter se habere videtur. Quae vero ingrediuntur et exeunt, vere ac sem(46)per existentium rerum simulacra sunt, miro et vix explicabili modo ab ipsis rebus quae ve(47)re sunt, figurati, quemadmodum deinceps narrabimus. Tria in praesenti genera sumenda (48) sunt. Unum quod gignitur. Aliud in quo gignitur. Aliud a quo similitudinem trahit quod (49) nascitur. Idcirco comparare haec ita decet. Quod recipit, matri: unde recipit, patri: naturam (50) istorum mediam, proli. Sed ita intelligendum est, quod cum esse debeat effigies rerum omni (51) formarum varietate distincta, nunquam illud ipsum formationis huius gremium bene erit prae(52)paratum, nisi informe sit, et suapte natura omnibus formis quas recepturum est, careat. Nam (53) fierit alicuius eorum quae in se recipit simile, cum contrariam eius cuius simile est naturam (54) aut aliam prorsus suscipiet, nequaquam eius similitudinem et exprimet, cum prae se tulerit (1) suam. Quo fit, ut nullam sibi propriam habeat speciem, quod est omnia genera suscep(2)turum. Ut qui ungenta suaviter redolentia consecturi sunt, humidam materiam quam (3) certo condire odore volunt, ita preparant, ut odorem nullum proprium habeat: et qui (4) materiis mollibus impressionique cedentibus figuras imprimere aliquas volunt, nullam (5) omnino priorem in eis figuram apparere patiuntur, sed exactissima quadam levigatio(6)ne eas poliunt: Ita illud quod in omnibus passim aeternorum omnium simulacris recte fi(7)gurandum est, his omnibus formis natura sua carere necesse est. Quamobrem universi, (8) quod et genitum est, et sensibus omnibus manifestum, matrem ipsam receptaculumque, (9) neque terram, neque aerem, neque ignem, neque aquam esse dicamus, neque rursus ex (10) his aliquid constitutum, aut aliqua ex quibus proprie haec ipsa subsistunt: sed invisibilem (11) potius speciem quandam et informem finum omnium capacem, qui modo quodam am(12)biguo et vix explicabili divinae et intelligibilis naturae fit particeps. Ipse quidem compre(13)hendi per se nullo pacto potest: sed quantum ex supradictis naturam eius attingere licet, (14) sic utique recte possumus dicere: Ignem quidem, partem eius ignitam videri: humefactam (15) vero partem, aquam: Terram quoque aeremque similiter, quatenus ipsorum simulacra sus(16)cipit. Sed de his ita distinguentes ratione considerare debemus, fitne ignis aliquis seorsum (17) a materia ipse permanens in seipso, et cetera quae saepe dicimus per seipsa manere: an (18) haec sola sunt, quae corporis sensu percipimus, et talem in se continent veritatem, nec ul(19)lo pacto praeter haec ulla sunt uspiam, sed frustra intelligibilem uniuscuiusque speciem a(20)liquam ponere solemus, nec aliud haec sunt quam verba. Quod quidem neque ita vel a(21)liter se habere temere et sine exanimatione asserendum, neque ad praesentem disputatio(22)nem natura sua prolixam, alia quoque prolixa, et ad rem minime pertinens addenda vi(23)detur. Ea vero circunscriptio quae brevibus magna comprehendar, admodum oppotu(24)na videbitur. Ita igitur ipse meam hac de re sententiam feram. Si intellectus et vera opi(25)nio duo genera sunt, necesse est huiusmodi species esse, quae per se ipsae sint, et intelligen(26)tia potius quam sensibus comprehendantur. Sin autem ut quibusdam videtur, vera opi(27)nio ab intellectu nihilo differt, omnia quae corporis sensus attingit, certa habenda sunt. (28) Sed opinor duo esse dicenda, quia seorsum sunt facta, et dissimilia sunt. Quippe quo(29)rum alterum doctrina nobis insinuat, alterum persuasio: et illud quidem semper cum ra(30)tione vera, hoc autem sine ratione: illud nulla persuasione mutabile, hoc contra huic mu(31)tationei subiectum. Vera quidem opinionis vir quilibet particeps: Intelligentiae vero dii (32) quidem omnes, homines vero pauci admodum participes sunt. Quae cum ita se habe(33)ant, fateri oportet esse speciem quae semper eadem sit sine ortu atque interitu, quae nec in se (34) accipiat quicquam aliud aliunde, nec ipsa procedat ad aliud quicquam, sensuque corporis (35) nullo percipiatur: atque hoc est quod ad solam intelligentiam pertinet, eiusque intentionis (36) est proprium. Sed est aliquid post hoc quod cum ipso non ratione, sed nomine convenit, (37) eiusque simillitudinem gerit, genitum sensibus manifestum, quod fertur et sustentatur ab (38) alio semper, et in aliquo loco gignitur, rursusque inde recedit opinione per sensus compre(39)hendum. Tertium genus locus est, qui interit quidem nunquam, sed omnibus quae (40) gignuntur, sedem exhibet. hic sine tangentis sensu tangitur, adulterina quadam ratione (41) vix opinabilis. Denique cum ad hunc animo respicimus, somniamus quodammodo, ne(42)cessariumque putamus, ut quicquid est, in aliquo sit loco positum, regionemque obtineat ali(43)quam: et neque in terra, neque in coelo sit, minime esse credimus: atque has omnes et simi(44)les passiones a pervigili vereque existente natura ipsi huiusmodi somniis occupati secerne(45)re non valemus. Ideoque nec discernere id etiam possumus, quod imagini quidem postquam (46) idipsum in quo facta est non ipsius est, sed ea semper alterius fertur simulacrum, non in(47)iuria convenit ut in alio quodam sit, atque ita quodammodo essentiae fiat particeps, aliter ve(48)ro esse nullo modo possit. Ei autem quod vere est, vera haec et exquisita ratio suffragatur, (49) docens quod dum res ita se habet, ut hoc quidem aliud sit, et illud aliud, neutrum in neutro un(50)quam factum unum simul idem et duo fient. Haec tandem meae mentis summatim sen(51)tentia sit, et ante coeli ortum rastione triplici fuisse tria haec, existens, locum, et genera(52)rationem. Generationis vero nutricem, ignitam et humefactam, terrae item et aeris for(53)mas suscipientem, passionesque horum pedissequas perpetientem, omniformem aspectu (54) videri. Verum quia nec similibus neque ad pondus ex aequatis viribus referta est, nulla ex (1) parte aequilibrem esse, sed in aequaliter undique vergentem declinantemque ab illis qui(2)dem quae diximus agitari, rursusque ipsam commotam eadem agitare. Quo pulsu conci(3)ta in diversa raptari atque discerni, perinde ut quae in frumenti purgatione pistoriis instru(4)mentis iactata atque excussa discerni videmus, [pistor: “møller, baker” pictor: “maler”] atque alio solida graviaque, alio rara et levia fer(5)ri. [undersøk sammenhengen nærmere. ?] Sic illa tunc quatuor genera ab ipso eorum receptaculo instrumenti illius pistorii/pictorii instar (6) tumultuante et discernente commota, dissimilia quaeque a dissimillimis longe separaban(7)tur, simillima vero rursus coibant: atque idcirco etiam ante mundi exornationem sedi(8)bus divisa erant, sed neque his ratio inerat, neque modus. At vero ubi cuncta redigi ad(9)modum placuit, deus ignem primo ac terram, aeremque, et aquam, quae quidem elemen(10)torum praeserebant vestigia, sed ita erant affecta ut par est illa a quibus deus abest, distin(11)ctis figuris, speciebus, et numeris exornavit. Ea vero apud nos sententia semper rata in(12)dubiaque prae ceteris habeatur, quod deus illa cum talia non essent. quam pulcherrime (13) optimeque fieri poterat, ordinavit. Nunc iam dispositionem genituramque ipsorum singillatim (14) demonstrari convenit. novo quidem et inusitato demonstrationis genere, sed vobis qui (15) omnes eruditionis ingenuae vias peragravistis, plano atque perspicuo.

[So far we have spoken chiefly of the works of mind; now we must tell of the works of necessity and of the variable cause. Thus we are led to consider the nature of the four elements.] Thus far in what we have been saying, with small exceptions, the works of intelligence have been set forth; and now we must place by the side of them in our discourse the things which come into being through necessity —for the creation is mixed, being made up of necessity and mind. Mind, the ruling power, persuaded necessity to bring the greater part of created things to perfection, and thus and after this manner in the beginning, when the influence of reason got the better of necessity, the universe was created. But if a person will truly tell of the way in which the work was accomplished, he must include the other influence of the variable cause as well. Wherefore, we must return again and find another suitable beginning, as about the former matters, so also about these. To which end we must consider the nature of fire, and water, and air, and earth, such as they were prior to the creation of the heaven, and what was happening to them in this previous state; for no one has as yet explained the manner of their generation, but we speak of fire and the rest of them, whatever they mean, as though men knew their natures, and we maintain them to be the first principles and letters or elements of the whole, when they cannot reasonably be compared by a man of any sense even to syllables or first compounds. And let me say thus much: I will not now speak of the first principle or principles of all things, or by whatever name they are to be called, for this reason,—because it is difficult to set forth my opinion according to the method of discussion which we are at present employing. Do not imagine, any more than I can bring myself to imagine, that I should be right in undertaking so great and difficult a task. Remembering what I said at first about probability, I will do my best to give as probable an explanation as any other,—or rather, more probable; and I will first go back to the beginning and try to speak of each thing and of all. Once more, then, at the commencement of my discourse, I call upon God, and beg him to be our saviour out of a strange and unwonted enquiry, and to bring us to the haven of probability. So now let us begin again. [At the beginning of our discourse we assumed two natures: (1) an intelligible pattern; (2) a created copy. Now we must add a third—(3) the receptacle of all generation. i. e. space.] This new beginning of our discussion of the universe requires a fuller division than the former; for then we made two classes, now a third must be revealed. The two sufficed for the former discussion: one, which we assumed, was a pattern intelligible and always the same; and the second was only the imitation of the pattern, generated and visible. There is also a third kind which we did not distinguish at the time, conceiving that the two would be enough. But now the argument seems to require that we should set forth in words another kind, which is difficult of explanation and dimly seen. What nature are we to attribute to this new kind of being? We reply, that it is the receptacle, and in a manner the nurse, of all generation. I have spoken the truth; but I must express myself in clearer language, and this will be an arduous task for many reasons, and in particular because I must first raise questions concerning fire and the other elements, and determine what each of them is; for to say, with any probability or certitude, which of them should be called water rather than fire, and which should be called any of them rather than all or some one of them, is a difficult matter. How, then, shall we settle this point, and what questions about the elements may be fairly raised? [Since the elements are perpetually changing into and out of one another and have in them nothing permanent, they should be called, not ‘this’ or ‘that,’ but always ‘such.’ Unchanging space is the only fixed nature. An illustration. Space is that which, being without form, can receive any form, i. e. the impress of any idea. The three natures which have been assumed may be likened to a father, child, and mother. The elements are only affections of space, produced by the impression of ideas.] In the first place, we see that what we just now called water, by condensation, I suppose, becomes stone and earth; and this same element, when melted and dispersed, passes into vapour and air. Air, again, when inflamed, becomes fire; and again fire, when condensed and extinguished, passes once more into the form of air; and once more, air, when collected and condensed, produces cloud and mist; and from these, when still more compressed, comes flowing water, and from water comes earth and stones once more; and thus generation appears to be transmitted from one to the other in a circle. Thus, then, as the several elements never present themselves in the same form, how can any one have the assurance to assert positively that any of them, whatever it may be, is one thing rather than another? No one can. But much the safest plan is to speak of them as follows: —Anything which we see to be continually changing, as, for example, fire, we must not call ‘this’ or ‘that,’ but rather say that it is ‘of such a nature;’ nor let us speak of water as ‘this,’ but always as ‘such;’ nor must we imply that there is any stability in any of those things which we indicate by the use of the words ‘this’ and ‘that,’ supposing ourselves to signify something thereby; for they are too volatile to be detained in any such expressions as ‘this,’ or ‘that,’ or ‘relative to this,’ or any other mode of speaking which represents them as permanent. We ought not to apply ‘this’ to any of them, but rather the word ‘such;’ which expresses the similar principle circulating in each and all of them; for example, that should be called ‘fire’ which is of such a nature always, and so of everything that has generation. That in which the elements severally grow up, and appear, and decay, is alone to be called by the name ‘this’ or ‘that;’ but that which is of a certain nature, hot or white, or anything which admits of opposite qualities, and all things that are compounded of them, ought not to be so denominated. Let me make another attempt to explain my meaning more clearly. Suppose a person to make all kinds of figures of gold and to be always transmuting one form into all the rest;—somebody points to one of them and asks what it is. By far the safest and truest answer is, That is gold; and not to call the triangle or any other figures which are formed in the gold ‘these,’ as though they had existence, since they are in process of change while he is making the assertion; but if the questioner be willing to take the safe and indefinite expression, ‘such,’ we should be satisfied. And the same argument applies to the universal nature which receives all bodies —that must be always called the same; for, while receiving all things, she never departs at all from her own nature, and never in any way, or at any time, assumes a form like that of any of the things which enter into her; she is the natural recipient of all impressions, and is stirred and informed by them, and appears different from time to time by reason of them. But the forms which enter into and go out of her are the likenesses of real existences modelled after their patterns in a wonderful and inexplicable manner, which we will hereafter investigate. For the present we have only to conceive of three natures: first, that which is in process of generation; secondly, that in which the generation takes place; and thirdly, that of which the thing generated is a resemblance. And we may liken the receiving principle to a mother, and the source or spring to a father, and the intermediate nature to a child; and may remark further, that if the model is to take every variety of form, then the matter in which the model is fashioned will not be duly prepared, unless it is formless, and free from the impress of any of those shapes which it is hereafter to receive from without. For if the matter were like any of the supervening forms, then whenever any opposite or entirely different nature was stamped upon its surface, it would take the impression badly, because it would intrude its own shape. Wherefore, that which is to receive all forms should have no form; as in making perfumes they first contrive that the liquid substance which is to receive the scent shall be as inodorous as possible; or as those who wish to impress figures on soft substances do not allow any previous impression to remain, but begin by making the surface as even and smooth as possible. In the same way that which is to receive perpetually and through its whole extent the resemblances of all eternal beings ought to be devoid of any particular form. Wherefore, the mother and receptacle of all created and visible and in any way sensible things, is not to be termed earth, or air, or fire, or water, or any of their compounds, or any of the elements from which these are derived, but is an invisible and formless being which receives all things and in some mysterious way partakes of the intelligible, and is most incomprehensible. In saying this we shall not be far wrong; as far, however, as we can attain to a knowledge of her from the previous considerations, we may truly say that fire is that part of her nature which from time to time is inflamed, and water that which is moistened, and that the mother substance becomes earth and air, in so far as she receives the impressions of them. But have ideas any existence? Let us consider this question more precisely. Is there any self-existent fire? and do all those things which we call self-existent exist? or are only those things which we see, or in some way perceive through the bodily organs, truly existent, and nothing whatever besides them? And is all that which we call an intelligible essence nothing at all, and only a name? Here is a question which we must not leave unexamined or undetermined, nor must we affirm too confidently that there can be no decision; neither must we interpolate in our present long discourse a digression equally long, but if it is possible to set forth a great principle in a few words, that is just what we want. [We must admit that they have, if, as is the case, mind and true opinion differ; for corresponding to the difference between these mental states, there must be a difference between the objects apprehended by them. Space is not perceived by sense, but by a kind of spurious reason.] Thus I state my view: —If mind and true opinion are two distinct classes, then I say that there certainly are these self-existent ideas unperceived by sense, and apprehended only by the mind; if, however, as some say, true opinion differs in no respect from mind, then everything that we perceive through the body is to be regarded as most real and certain. But we must affirm them to be distinct, for they have a distinct origin and are of a different nature; the one is implanted in us by instruction, the other by persuasion; the one is always accompanied by true reason, the other is without reason; the one cannot be overcome by persuasion, but the other can: and lastly, every man may be said to share in true opinion, but mind is the attribute of the gods and of very few men. Wherefore also we must acknowledge that there is one kind of being which is always the same, uncreated and indestructible, never receiving anything into itself from without, nor itself going out to any other, but invisible and imperceptible by any sense, and of which the contemplation is granted to intelligence only. And there is another nature of the same name with it, and like to it, perceived by sense, created, always in motion, becoming in place and again vanishing out of place, which is apprehended by opinion and sense. And there is a third nature, which is space, and is eternal, and admits not of destruction and provides a home for all created things, and is apprehended without the help of sense, by a kind of spurious reason, and is hardly real; which we beholding as in a dream, say of all existence that it must of necessity be in some place and occupy a space, but that what is neither in heaven nor in earth has no existence. Of these and other things of the same kind, relating to the true and waking reality of nature, we have only this dreamlike sense, and we are unable to cast off sleep and determine the truth about them. For an image, since the reality, after which it is modelled, does not belong to it, and it exists ever as the fleeting shadow of some other, must be inferred to be in another [i. e. in space], grasping existence in some way or other, or it could not be at all. But true and exact reason, vindicating the nature of true being, maintains that while two things [i. e. the image and space] are different they cannot exist one of them in the other and so be one and also two at the same time. [Space, being, and generation existed before the heaven. Space, on taking the forms of the elements, was filled with dissimilar forces, which swayed her to and fro. Thus earth, air, fire and water, were sifted into their proper places, while they were yet in a rudimentary state, before God perfected them by form and number.] Thus have I concisely given the result of my thoughts; and my verdict is that being and space and generation, these three, existed in their three ways before the heaven; and that the nurse of generation, moistened by water and inflamed by fire, and receiving the forms of earth and air, and experiencing all the affections which accompany these, presented a strange variety of appearances; and being full of powers which were neither similar nor equally balanced, was never in any part in a state of equipoise, but swaying unevenly evenly hither and thither, was shaken by them, and by its motion again shook them; and the elements when moved were separated and carried continually, some one way, some another; as, when grain is shaken and winnowed by fans and other instruments used in the threshing of corn, the close and heavy particles are borne away and settle in one direction, and the loose and light particles in another. In this manner, the four kinds or elements were then shaken by the receiving vessel, which, moving like a winnowing machine, scattered far away from one another the elements most unlike, and forced the most similar elements into close contact. Wherefore also the various elements had different places before they were arranged so as to form the universe. At first, they were all without reason and measure. But when the world began to get into order, fire and water and earth and air had only certain faint traces of themselves, and were altogether such as everything might be expected to be in the absence of God; this, I say, was their nature at that time, and God fashioned them by form and number. Let it be consistently maintained by us in all that we say that God made them as far as possible the fairest and best, out of things which were not fair and good. And now I will endeavour to show you the disposition and generation of them by an unaccustomed argument, which I am compelled to use; but I believe that you will be able to follow me, for your education has made you familiar with the methods of science.

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