Quoniam igitur quae sit imperfecti, quae etiam perfecti boni forma uidisti, nunc demonstrandum reor quonam haec felicitatis perfectio constituta sit.
In quo illud primum arbitror inquirendum, an aliquod huiusmodi bonum quale paulo ante definisti in rerum natura possit exsistere, ne nos praeter rei subiectae veritatem cassa cogitationis imago decipiat.
Sed quin exsistat sitque hoc ueluti quidam omnium fons bonorum negari nequit.
Omne enim quod inperfectum esse dicitur, id inminutione perfecti inperfectum esse perhibetur.
Quo fit, ut si in quolibet genere inperfectum quid esse uideatur, in eo perfectum quoque aliquid esse necesse sit.
Etenim perfectione sublata, unde illud quod inperfectum perhibetur exstiterit ne fingi quidem potest.
Neque enim ab deminutis inconsummatisque natura rerum coepit exordium, sed ab integris absolutisque procedens in haec extrema atque effeta dilabitur.
Quod si, uti paulo ante monstrauimus, est quaedam boni fragilis inperfecta felicitas, esse aliquam solidam perfectamque non potest dubitari.”
“Firmissime,” inquam, “uerissimeque conclusum est.”
“Quo uero,” inquit, “habitet, ita considera.
Deum rerum omnium principem bonum esse communis humanorum conceptio probat animorum.
Nam cum nihil deo melius excogitari queat, id quo melius nihil est bonum esse quis dubitet?
Ita uero bonum esse deum ratio demonstrat, ut perfectum quoque in eo bonum esse conuincat.
Nam ni tale sit, rerum omnium princeps esse non poterit.
Erit enim eo praestantius aliquid perfectum possidens bonum, quod hoc prius atque antiquius esse uideatur; omnia namque perfecta minus integris priora esse claruerunt.
Quare ne in infinitum ratio prodeat, confitendum est summum deum summi perfectique boni esse plenissimum.
Sed perfectum bonum ueram esse beatitudinem constituimus; ueram igitur beatitudinem in summo deo sitam esse necesse est.”
“Accipio,” inquam, “nec est quod contradici ullo modo queat.”
“Sed quaeso,” inquit, “te uide quam id sancte atque inuiolabiliter probes quod boni summi summum deum diximus esse plenissimum.”
“Quonam,” inquam, “modo?”
“Ne hunc rerum omnium patrem illud summum bonum quo plenus esse perhibetur uel extrinsecus accepisse uel ita naturaliter habere praesumas, quasi habentis dei habitaeque beatitudinis diuersam cogites esse substantiam.
Nam si extrinsecus acceptum putes, praestantius id quod dederit ab eo quod acceperit existimare possis.
Sed hunc esse rerum omnium praecellentissimum dignissime confitemur.
Quod si natura quidem inest, sed est ratione diuersum, cum de rerum principe loquamur deo, fingat qui potest: quis haec diuersa coniunxerit?
Postremo quod a qualibet re diuersum est, id non est illud a quo intellegitur esse diuersum.
Quare quod a summo bono diuersum est sui natura, id summum bonum non est--quod nefas est de eo cogitare quo nihil constat esse praestantius.
Omnino enim nullius rei natura suo principio melior poterit exsistere, quare quod omnium principium sit, id etiam sui substantia summum esse bonum uerissima ratione concluserim.”
“Rectissime,” inquam.
“Sed summum bonum beatitudinem esse concessum est.”
“Ita est,” inquam.
“Igitur,” inquit, “deum esse ipsam beatitudinem necesse est confiteri.”
“Nec propositis,” inquam, “prioribus refragari queo et illis hoc inlatum consequens esse perspicio.”
“Respice,” inquit, “an hinc quoque idem firmius approbetur, quod duo summa bona quae a se diuersa sint esse non possunt.
Etenim quae discrepant bona, non esse alterum quod sit alterum liquet; quare neutrum poterit esse perfectum, cum alterutri alterum deest.
Sed quod perfectum non sit, id summum non esse manifestum est; nullo modo igitur quae summa sunt bona ea possunt esse diuersa.
Atqui et beatitudinem et deum summum bonum esse collegimus; quare ipsam necesse est summam esse beatitudinem quae sit summa diuinitas.”
“Nihil,” inquam, “nec reapse uerius nec ratiocinatione firmius nec deo dignius concludi potest.”
“Super haec,” inquit, “igitur ueluti geometrae solent demonstratis propositis aliquid inferre quae porismata ipsi uocant, ita ego quoque tibi ueluti corollarium dabo.
Nam quoniam beatitudinis adeptione fiunt homines beati, beatitudo uero est ipsa diuinitas, diuinitatis adeptione beatos fieri manifestum est: sed uti iustitiae adeptione iusti, sapientiae sapientes fiunt, ita diuinitatem adeptos deos fieri simili ratione necesse est.
Omnis igitur beatus deus, sed natura quidem unus; participatione uero nihil prohibet esse quam plurimos.”
“Et pulchrum,” inquam, “hoc atque pretiosum, siue porisma siue corollarium uocari mauis.”
“Atqui hoc quoque pulchrius nihil est, quod his annectendum esse ratio persuadet.”
“Quid?” inquam.
“Cum multa,” inquit, “beatitudo continere uideatur, utrumne haec omnia unum ueluti corpus beatitudinis quadam partium uarietate coniungant an sit eorum aliquid quod beatitudinis substantiam compleat, ad hoc uero cetera referantur?”
“Vellem,” inquam, “id ipsarum rerum commemoratione patefaceres.”
“Nonne,” inquit, “beatitudinem bonum esse censemus?”
“Ac summum quidem,” inquam.
“Addas,” inquit, “hoc omnibus licet.
Nam eadem sufficientia summa est, eadem summa potentia, reuerentia quoque, claritas ac uoluptas beatitudo esse iudicatur.
Quid igitur?
Haecine omnia bonum--sufficientia potentia ceteraque--ueluti quaedam beatitudinis membra sunt an ad bonum ueluti ad uerticem cuncta referuntur?”
“Intellego,” inquam, “quid inuestigandum proponas, sed quid constituas audire desidero.”
“Cuius discretionem rei sic accipe.
Si haec omnia beatitudinis membra forent, a se quoque inuicem discreparent.
Haec est enim partium natura ut unum corpus diuersa componant.
Atqui haec omnia idem esse monstrata sunt; minime igitur membra sunt.
Alioquin ex uno membro beatitudo uidebitur esse coniuncta--quod fieri nequit.”
“Id quidem,” inquam, “dubium non est, sed id quod restat exspecto.”
“Ad bonum uero cetera referri palam est.
Idcirco enim sufficientia petitur quoniam bonum esse iudicatur, idcirco potentia quoniam id quoque esse creditur bonum; idem de reuerentia, claritudine, iucunditate coniectare licet.
Omnium igitur expetendorum summa atque causa bonum est.
Quod enim neque re neque similitudine ullum in se retinet bonum, id expeti nullo modo potest.
Contraque etiam quae natura bona non sunt, tamen si esse uideantur, quasi uere bona sint appetuntur.
Quo fit uti summa, cardo atque causa expetendorum omnium bonitas esse iure credatur.
Cuius uero causa quid expetitur, id maxime uidetur optari, ueluti si salutis causa quispiam uelit equitare, non tam equitandi motum desiderat quam salutis effectum.
Cum igitur omnia boni gratia petantur, non illa potius quam bonum ipsum desideratur ab omnibus.
Sed propter quod cetera optantur, beatitudinem esse concessimus; quare sic quoque sola quaeritur beatitudo.
Ex quo liquido apparet ipsius boni et beatitudinis unam atque eandem esse substantiam.”
“Nihil uideo cur dissentire quispiam possit.”
“Sed deum ueramque beatitudinem unum atque idem esse monstrauimus.”
“Ita,” inquam.
“Securo igitur concludere licet dei quoque in ipso bono nec usquam alio sitam esse substantiam.
For as moche thanne as thou hast seyn, which is the forme of good that nis nat parfit, and which is the forme of good that is parfit, now trowe I that it were good to shewe in what this perfeccioun of blisfulnesse is set.
And in this thing, I trowe that we sholden first enquere for to witen, yif that any swiche maner good as thilke good that thou has diffinisshed a litel heer-biforn, that is to seyn, soverein good, may ben founde in the nature of thinges; for that veyn imaginacioun of thought ne[ ] deceyve us nat, and putte us out of the sothfastnesse of thilke thing that is summitted unto us.
But it may nat ben deneyed that thilke good ne is, and that it nis right as welle of alle goodes.
For al thing that is cleped inparfit is proeved inparfit by the amenusinge of perfeccioun or of thing that is parfit.
And ther-of comth it, that in every thing general, yif that men sen any-thing that is inparfit, certes, in thilke general ther mot ben som-thing that is parfit;
for yif so be that perfeccioun is don awey, men may nat thinke ne seye fro whennes thilke thing is that is cleped inparfit.
For the nature of thinges ne took nat hir beginninge of thinges amenused and inparfit, but it procedeth of thinges that ben al hoole and absolut , and descendeth so doun in-to outterest thinges, and in-to thinges empty and with-outen frut.
But, as I have y-shewed a litel her-biforn, that yif ther be a blisfulnesse that be freele and veyn and inparfit, ther may no man doute that ther nis som blisfulnesse that is sad, stedefast, and parfit.’
Boece. ‘This is concluded,’ quod I, ‘fermely and sothfastly.’
Philosophie. ‘But considere also,’ quod she, ‘in wham this blisfulnesse enhabiteth.
The comune acordaunce and conceite of the corages of men proeveth and graunteth, that god, prince of alle thinges, is good.
For, so as nothing ne may ben thought bettre than god, it may nat ben douted thanne that he, that nothing nis bettre, that he nis good.
Certes, resoun sheweth that god is so good, that it proveth by verray force that parfit good is in him.
For yif god ne is swich, he ne may nat ben prince of alle thinges;
for certes som-thing possessing in it-self parfit good, sholde ben more worthy than god, and it sholde semen that thilke thing were first, and elder than god. For we han shewed apertly that alle thinges that ben parfit ben first or thinges that ben unparfit;
and for-thy, for as moche as that my resoun or my proces ne go nat a-wey with-oute an ende, we owen to graunten that the soverein god is right ful of soverein parfit good.
And we han establisshed that the soverein good is verray blisfulnesse: thanne mot it nedes be, that verray blisfulnesse is set in soverein god.’
‘This take I wel,’ quod I, ‘ne this ne may nat ben withseid in no manere.’
‘But I preye,’ quod she, ‘see now how thou mayst proeven, holily and with-oute corupcioun, this that I have seyd, that the soverein god is right ful of soverein good.’
‘In which manere?’ quod I.
‘Wenest thou aught ,’ quod she, ‘that this prince of alle[ ] thinges have y-take thilke soverein good any-wher out of himself, of which soverein good men proveth that he is ful, right as thou mightest thinken that god, that hath blisfulnesse in him-self, and thilke blisfulnesse that is in him, weren dyvers in substaunce?
For yif thou wene that god have received thilke good out of him-self, thou mayst wene that he that yaf thilke good to god be more worthy than is god.
But I am bi-knowen and confesse, and that right dignely, that god is right worthy aboven alle thinges;
and, yif so be that this good be in him by nature, but that it is dyvers fro him by weninge resoun, sin we speke of god prince of alle thinges: feigne who-so[ ] feigne may, who was he that hath conioigned thise dyverse thinges to-gider?
And eek, at the laste, see wel that a thing that is dyvers from any thing, that thilke thing nis nat that same thing fro which it is understonden to ben dyvers.
Thanne folweth it, that thilke thing that by his nature is dyvers fro soverein good, that that thing nis nat soverein good; but certes, that were a felonous corsednesse to thinken that of him that nothing nis more worth.
For alwey, of alle thinges, the nature of hem ne may nat ben bettre than his biginning; for which I may concluden, by right verray resoun, that thilke that is biginning of alle thinges, thilke same thing is soverein good in his substaunce.’
Boece. ‘Thou hast seyd rightfully,’ quod I.
Philosophie. ‘But we han graunted,’ quod she, ‘that the soverein good is blisfulnesse.’
‘And that is sooth,’ quod I.
‘Thanne,’ quod she, ‘moten we nedes graunten and confessen80 that thilke same soverein good be god.’
‘Certes,’ quod I, ‘I ne may nat denye ne withstonde the resouns purposed; and I see wel that it folweth by strengthe of the premisses.’
‘Loke now,’ quod she, ‘yif this be proved yit more fermely thus: that ther ne mowen nat ben two soverein goodes that ben dyverse amonge hem-self.
For certes, the goodes that ben dyverse amonges hem-self , that oon nis nat that that other is; thanne ne[may] neither of hem ben parfit, so as either of[ ] hem lakketh to other.
But that that nis nat parfit, men may seen apertly that it nis nat soverein. The thinges, thanne, that ben sovereinly goode, ne mowen by no wey ben dyverse.
But I have wel concluded that blisfulnesse and god ben the soverein good; for whiche it mot nedes ben, that soverein blisfulnesse is soverein divinitee.’
‘Nothing,’ quod I, ‘nis more soothfast than this, ne more ferme by resoun; ne a more worthy thing than god may nat ben concluded.’
‘Up-on thise thinges thanne,’ quod she, ‘right as thise geometriens, whan they han shewed hir proposiciouns, ben wont to bringen in thinges that they clepen porismes, or declaraciouns[ ]100of forseide thinges, right so wole I yeve thee heer as a corollarie, or a mede of coroune.
For-why, for as moche as by the getinge of blisfulnesse men ben maked blisful, and blisfulnesse is divinitee: thanne is it manifest and open, that by the getinge of divinitee men ben maked blisful. Right as by the getinge of Iustice [they ben maked iust ], and by the getinge of sapience[ ] they ben maked wyse: right so, nedes, by the semblable resoun, whan they han geten divinitee, they ben maked goddes.
Thanne is every blisful man god; but certes, by nature, ther nis but o god; but, by the participacioun of divinitee, ther ne let ne desturbeth nothing that ther ne ben manye goddes.’
‘This is,’ quod I, ‘a fair thing and a precious, clepe it as thou wolt; be it porisme or corollarie,’ or mede of coroune or declaringes.
‘Certes,’ quod she, ‘nothing nis fayrer than is the thing that by resoun sholde ben added to thise forseide thinges.’
‘What thing?’ quod I.
‘So,’ quod she, ‘as it semeth that blisfulnesse conteneth many thinges, it were for to witenwhether that alle thise thinges maken or conioignen as a maner body of blisfulnesse, by dyversitee of parties or of membres; or elles, yif that any of alle thilke thinges be swich that it acomplisshe by him-self the substaunce of blisfulnesse, so that alle thise othre thinges ben referred and brought to blisfulnesse,’ that is to seyn, as to the cheef of hem.
‘I wolde,’ quod I, ‘that thou makedest me cleerly to understonde what thou seyst, and that thou recordedest me the forseyde thinges.’
‘Have I nat iuged,’ quod she, ‘that blisfulnesse is good?’
‘Yis, forsothe,’ quod I; ‘and that soverein good.’
‘Adde thanne,’ quod she, ‘thilke good, that is maked blisfulnesse, to alle the forseide thinges;
for thilke same blisfulnesse that is demed to ben soverein suffisaunce, thilke selve is soverein power, soverein reverence, soverein cleernesse or noblesse, and soverein delyt.
Conclusio. What seyst thou thanne of alle thise thinges,
that is to seyn, suffisaunce, power, and this othre thinges; ben they thanne as membres of blisfulnesse, or ben they referred and brought to soverein good, right as alle thinges that ben brought to the chief of hem?’
‘I understonde wel;’ quod I, ‘what thou purposest to seke;140 but I desire for to herkne that thou shewe it me.’
‘Tak now thus the discrecioun of this questioun,’ quod she.
‘Yif alle thise thinges,’ quod she, ‘weren membres to felicitee, than weren they dyverse that oon from that other;
and swich is the nature of parties or of membres, that dyverse membres compounen a body.’
‘Certes,’ quod I, ‘it hath wel ben shewed heer-biforn, that alle thise thinges ben alle o thing.’ ‘Thanne ben they none membres,’ quod she;
‘for elles it sholde seme that blisfulnesse were conioigned al of on membre allone; but that is a thing that may nat be don.’
‘This thing,’ quod I, ‘nis nat doutous; but I abyde to herknen the remnaunt of thy questioun.’
‘This is open and cleer,’ quod she, ‘that alle othre thinges ben referred and brought to good.
For therefore is suffisaunce requered, for it is demed to ben good; and forthy is power requered, for men trowen also that it be good; and this same thing mowen we thinken and coniecten of reverence, and of noblesse, and of delyt.
Thanne is soverein good the somme and the cause of al that aughte ben desired;
for-why thilke thing that with-holdeth no good in it-self, ne semblaunce of good, it ne may nat wel in no manere be desired ne requered.
And the contrarie: for thogh that thinges by hir nature ne ben nat goode, algates, yif men wene that ben goode, yit ben they desired as though that they weren verrayliche goode.
And therfor is it that men oughten to wene by right, that bountee be the soverein fyn, and the cause of alle the thinges that ben to requeren.
But certes, thilke that is cause for which men requeren any thing, it semeth that thilke same thing be most desired. As thus: yif that a wight wolde ryden for cause of hele, he ne desireth nat so mochel the moevinge to ryden, as the effect of his hele.
Now thanne, sin that alle thinges ben requered for the grace of good, they ne ben nat desired of alle folk more thanne the same good.
But we han graunted that blisfulnesse is that thing, for whiche that alle thise othre thinges ben desired; thanne is it thus: that, certes, only blisfulnesse is requered and desired.
By whiche thing it sheweth cleerly, that of good and of blisfulnesse is al oon and the same substaunce.’
‘I see nat,’ quod I, ‘wherfore that men mighten discorden in this.’
‘And we han shewed that god and verray blisfulnesse is al oo thing.’
‘That is sooth,’ quod I.
‘Thanne mowen we conclude sikerly, that the substaunce of god is set in thilke same good, and in non other place.
Complete text
Book I: THE SORROWS OF BOETHIUS