PLATONIS FEDON, traditit Henricus Aristippus, 1156 A.D.
SIVE DE ANIMA
DIALOGI PERSONE:
ECHECRATES, FEDON, APOLLODORUS, SOCRATES, CEBES, SIMMIAS, CRITON, UNDECIM MINISTER
PHAEDO VEL DE ANIMI IMMORTALITATE, VEL DE ANIMA
ad Laurentium Medicum virum magnanimum.
DIALOGI PERSONAE.
ECHECRATES, PHAEDO, APOLLODORUS, SOCRATES, CEBES, SIMMIAS, CRITO, MINISTER VNDECIM VIRORUM.
PHAEDO translated by Benjamin Jowett, 1892
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE:
Phaedo, who is the narrator of the dialogue to Echecrates of Phlius. Socrates, Apollodorus, Simmias, Cebes, Crito and an Attendant of the Prison.
SCENE: The Prison of Socrates.
PLACE OF THE NARRATION: Phlius.
Φαίδων
τοῦτ᾽ ἔστι τὸ πλοῖον, ὥς φασιν Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐν ᾧ Θησεύς ποτε εἰς Κρήτην τοὺς “δὶς ἑπτὰ” ἐκείνους ᾤχετο (58b) ἄγων καὶ ἔσωσέ τε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐσώθη.
τῷ οὖν Ἀπόλλωνι ηὔξαντο ὡς λέγεται τότε, εἰ σωθεῖεν, ἑκάστου ἔτους θεωρίαν ἀπάξειν εἰς Δῆλον·
ἣν δὴ ἀεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἐξ ἐκείνου κατ᾽ ἐνιαυτὸν τῷ θεῷ πέμπουσιν.
ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἄρξωνται τῆς θεωρίας, νόμος ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ καθαρεύειν τὴν πόλιν καὶ δημοσίᾳ μηδένα ἀποκτεινύναι, πρὶν ἂν εἰς Δῆλόν τε ἀφίκηται τὸ πλοῖον καὶ πάλιν δεῦρο·
τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐνίοτε ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ γίγνεται, ὅταν τύχωσιν ἄνεμοι ἀπολαβόντες (58c) αὐτούς.
ἀρχὴ δ᾽ ἐστὶ τῆς θεωρίας ἐπειδὰν ὁ ἱερεὺς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος στέψῃ τὴν πρύμναν τοῦ πλοίου·
τοῦτο δ᾽ ἔτυχεν, ὥσπερ λέγω, τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῆς δίκης γεγονός.
διὰ ταῦτα καὶ πολὺς χρόνος ἐγένετο τῷ Σωκράτει ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ ὁ μεταξὺ τῆς δίκης τε καὶ τοῦ θανάτου.
FEDON. Hoc est illud navigium, ut aiunt Athenei, in quo quondam Theseus in Cretam bis septem illos vehebat agens, et salvavit equidem et ipse salvatus est.
Itaque Apollini voverunt, ut fertur, tunc, si salvarentur, uniuscuiusque anni spectaculum actum ire in Delum,
quod utique semper eciam nunc adbuc ex illo quotannis divo mittunt.
Quando quidem ergo inchoant spectaculum, lex est eis in tempore isto expiare urbem et publice nullum interimere prius quam in Delum abeat navigium et iterum veniat huc.
Hoc autem interdum in multo tempore fit, quociens contingunt venti detinentes eos.
Inicium certe spectaculi est cum sacerdos Apollinis coronet puppim navigii.
Hoc autem accidit, ut aio, pridie causam actum.
Propter ea et multum tempus factum est Socrati in carcere quod inter causam quoque et mortem.
PHAE. (33) Haec est illa navis, ut aiunt Athenienses, in qua Theseus olim bis septem illos secum tulit (34) in Cretam, servavitque illos, et ille servatus est.
Voverat autem, ut fertur, Apollini, si serva(35)rentur, quotannis in Delum spectaculum quoddam mittere.
Quod quidem nunc etiam (36) ac semper ex illo tempore singulis ad deum mittunt annis.
Cum igitur spectaculi princi(37)pium agitur, ex lege interim lustrant urbem, neminemque eo tempore publice necant, do(38)nec Delum perveniat navis rursusque Athenas revertatur ex Delo.
Id vero nonnunquam (39) longo peragitur tempore, quando eos occupant venti.
Initium vero spectaculi est post(40)quam Apollinis sacerdos navis illius coronaverit puppim.
Id vero, ut modo dicebam, pri(41)die quam iudicaretur factum erat.
Quamobrem longum tempus Socrates fuit in carce(42)re iudicium inter atque mortem.
PHAEDO: It is the ship in which, according to Athenian tradition, Theseus went to Crete when he took with him the fourteen youths, and was the saviour of them and of himself.
And they were said to have vowed to Apollo at the time, that if they were saved they would send a yearly mission to Delos.
Now this custom still continues,
and the whole period of the voyage to and from Delos, beginning when the priest of Apollo crowns the stern of the ship, is a holy season, during which the city is not allowed to be polluted by public executions;
and when the vessel is detained by contrary winds, the time spent in going and returning is very considerable.
See record before previous
As I was saying, the ship was crowned on the day before the trial,
and this was the reason why Socrates lay in prison and was not put to death until long after he was condemned.
(58e) Φαίδων
καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε θαυμάσια ἔπαθον παραγενόμενος.
οὔτε γὰρ ὡς θανάτῳ παρόντα με ἀνδρὸς ἐπιτηδείου ἔλεος εἰσῄει·
εὐδαίμων γάρ μοι ἁνὴρ ἐφαίνετο, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, καὶ τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων, ὡς ἀδεῶς καὶ γενναίως ἐτελεύτα,
ὥστε μοι ἐκεῖνον παρίστασθαι μηδ᾽ εἰς Ἅιδου ἰόντα ἄνευ θείας μοίρας ἰέναι,
ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενον εὖ πράξειν (59a) εἴπερ τις πώποτε καὶ ἄλλος.
διὰ δὴ ταῦτα οὐδὲν πάνυ μοι ἐλεινὸν εἰσῄει, ὡς εἰκὸς ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι παρόντι πένθει,
οὔτε αὖ ἡδονὴ ὡς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἡμῶν ὄντων ὥσπερ εἰώθεμεν -- καὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγοι τοιοῦτοί τινες ἦσαν --
ἀλλ᾽ ἀτεχνῶς ἄτοπόν τί μοι πάθος παρῆν καί τις ἀήθης κρᾶσις ἀπό τε τῆς ἡδονῆς συγκεκραμένη ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς λύπης, ἐνθυμουμένῳ ὅτι αὐτίκα ἐκεῖνος ἔμελλε τελευτᾶν.
καὶ πάντες οἱ παρόντες σχεδόν τι οὕτω διεκείμεθα, τοτὲ μὲν γελῶντες, ἐνίοτε δὲ δακρύοντες, εἷς δὲ ἡμῶν καὶ διαφερόντως, Ἀπολλόδωρος -- (59b) οἶσθα γάρ που τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τὸν τρόπον αὐτοῦ.
FEDON. Quin ego eciam miranda perpeciebar assistens.
Neque enim evelut decessui presentem me viri familiaris miseracio subiit;
felix quippe michi vir videbatur esse, O Echecrate; et modo et sermonibus, quam impavide et generose obiit;
unde michi constabat illum nec in Avernum euntem absque divina parea obire,
atque illue venientem bene actum ire, si quis alieubi et alius.
Propter hoc autem nichil penitus miserabile subiit, uti congruum putaretur assistenti luctui,
nec iterum obledamentum uti in philosophia nobis existentibus quemadmodum consuevimus – et enim sermones tales quidam erant,
– ceterum ineffabiliter admirabilis quedam michi passio inerat et inconsueta habitudo ab oblectamento commixta simul et a tristicia, in mente habenti quoniam mox ille futurus erat mori.
Et omnes presentes ferme similiter dispositi eramus, nunc autem ridentes, aliquociens vero lacrimantes, unus certe nostrum et differenter, Apollodorus - nosti siquidem virum et modum eius.
PHAEDO. Atqui miras quadam ratione, o Echecrates, illic praesens affectus (492, 1) eram.
Neque enim misericordia me habebat, ut familiarissimi viri morti praesentem.
Sa(2)ne beatus vir ille qui mihi, o Echecrates, videbatur, tum animi illius habitum, tum oratio(3)nem consideranti, adeo intrepide generoseque migrabat e vita,
ut videretur mihi illum in (4) vitam alteram, non absque divina forte migrare,
sed illic quoque beatum fore, siquis un(5)quam alter.
Quamobrem neque admodum commovebar ut consentaneum videretur ho(6)minem rei praesentem lugubri commoveri,
neque rursus afficiebat laetitia, quemadmodum (7) solebamus alias cum in philosophia versabamur. Nam sermones quidem eiusmodi e(8)rant,
sed revera affectus quidem mirus atque insolita voluptatis dolorisque permixtio me (9) invaserat considerantem illi paulo post moriendum fore.
Et quicunque aderamus fer(10)me similiter eramus affecti, alias quidem ridentes, alias vero lachrymantes. Vnus au(11)tem prae ceteris Apollodorus, nostri enim virum, eiusque morem.
PHAEDO: I had a singular feeling at being in his company.
For I could hardly believe that I was present at the death of a friend, and therefore I did not pity him, Echecrates;
he died so fearlessly, and his words and bearing were so noble and gracious, that to me he appeared blessed.
I thought that in going to the other world he could not be without a divine call,
and that he would be happy, if any man ever was, when he arrived there,
and therefore I did not pity him as might have seemed natural at such an hour.
But I had not the pleasure which I usually feel in philosophical discourse (for philosophy was the theme of which we spoke).
I was pleased, but in the pleasure there was also a strange admixture of pain; for I reflected that he was soon to die,
and this double feeling was shared by us all; we were laughing and weeping by turns, especially the excitable Apollodorus--you know the sort of man?
Φαίδων
οὗτός τε δὴ ὁ Ἀπολλόδωρος τῶν ἐπιχωρίων παρῆν καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἔτι Ἑρμογένης καὶ Ἐπιγένης καὶ Αἰσχίνης καὶ Ἀντισθένης·
ἦν δὲ καὶ Κτήσιππος ὁ Παιανιεὺς καὶ Μενέξενος καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς τῶν ἐπιχωρίων.
Πλάτων δὲ οἶμαι ἠσθένει.
FEDON. Hic vero Apollodorus indigenarum aderat et Critobulus et pater eius Criton, et adhuc Hermogenes et Epigenes et Eschines et Antistenes;
erat quoque et Ctisippus Peanieus et Menexenus et alii quidam indigetum.
Plato autem puto infirmabatur.
PH. Cives qui(14)dem et indigenae aderant, ipse Apollodorus et Critobulus paterque eius Crito, rursus (15) Hermogenes, Epigenes, Aeschines, Antisthenes.
Aderat et Ctesippus Paeaneus et (16) Menexenus atque alij quidem indigenae.
Plato autem, ut arbitror, aegrotabat.
PHAEDO: Of native Athenians there were, besides Apollodorus, Critobulus and his father Crito, Hermogenes, Epigenes, Aeschines, Antisthenes;
likewise Ctesippus of the deme of Paeania, Menexenus, and some others;
Plato, if I am not mistaken, was ill.
καὶ ἐκείνην μὲν ἀπῆγόν τινες τῶν τοῦ Κρίτωνος βοῶσάν (60b) τε καὶ κοπτομένην·
ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ἀνακαθιζόμενος εἰς τὴν κλίνην συνέκαμψέ τε τὸ σκέλος καὶ ἐξέτριψε τῇ χειρί, καὶ τρίβων ἅμα,
ὡς ἄτοπον, ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἔοικέ τι εἶναι τοῦτο ὃ καλοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἡδύ·
ὡς θαυμασίως πέφυκε πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν ἐναντίον εἶναι, τὸ λυπηρόν,
τὸ ἅμα μὲν αὐτὼ μὴ ᾽θέλειν παραγίγνεσθαι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἐὰν δέ τις διώκῃ τὸ ἕτερον καὶ λαμβάνῃ, σχεδόν τι ἀναγκάζεσθαι ἀεὶ λαμβάνειν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον,
ὥσπερ ἐκ μιᾶς κορυφῆς ἡμμένω (60c) δύ᾽ ὄντε.
καί μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, εἰ ἐνενόησεν αὐτὰ Αἴσωπος, μῦθον ἂν συνθεῖναι ὡς ὁ θεὸς βουλόμενος αὐτὰ διαλλάξαι πολεμοῦντα,
ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐδύνατο, συνῆψεν εἰς ταὐτὸν αὐτοῖς τὰς κορυφάς,
καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ᾧ ἂν τὸ ἕτερον παραγένηται ἐπακολουθεῖ ὕστερον καὶ τὸ ἕτερον.
ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ἔοικεν· ἐπειδὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ ἦν ἐν τῷ σκέλει τὸ ἀλγεινόν, ἥκειν δὴ φαίνεται ἐπακολουθοῦν τὸ ἡδύ.
Et illam abegerunt quidam Critonis vociferantemque atque cedentem se.
Socrates sane residens super lectum recurvavit tibiam et fricuit manu, et confricans simul:
“Quam admirabile” inquit, “O viri, videtur esse hoc quod appellant homines oblectabile;
quam admirabiliter natum est ad id quod videtur contrarium esse triste,
simul enim eidem non velle adesse homini; si quis enim persequatur alterum et adipiscatur, fere semper compelli suscipere et alterum,
velut ex una vertice counita duo existencia.
Et michi videtur, si perpendisset hec Esopus, fabulam certe composuisse, quatinus deus volens ipsa congregare repugnancia,
quando quidem non poterat, copulavit in idem ipsis vertices,
et ob hec cuicumque alterum affuerit consequetur postmodum et alterum.
Quemadmodum igitur et ipsi michi videtur, quoniam a compede erat in crure prius dolor, venire videtur, sequens oblectabile.”
Et illam quidem reduxerunt quidam Critonis domestici vociferantem atque plan(38)gentem.
Socrates autem sedens in lectica contraxit ad se crus manuque perfricuit atque (39) inter fricandum sic inquit:
“Quam mira videtur, o viri, haec res esse quam nominant homi(40)nes voluptatem
quamque miro naturaliter se habet modo ad dolorem ipsum, qui eius con(41)trarius esse videtur.
Quippe cum simul homini adesse nolint. Attamen si quis prosequi(42)tur capitque alterum, semper ferme alterum quoque accipere cogitur,
quasi ex eodem ver(43)tice sint ambo connexa.
Arbitror equidem Aesopum si haec animadvertisset fabulam (44) fuisse facturum, videlicet deum ipsum cum ipsa inter se pugnantia vellet conciliare
neque (45) id facere posset,in unum saltem eorum apices coniunxisse,
proptereaque cuicunque adest al(46)terum, eidem mox alterum quoque adesse.
Quod quidem mihi accidit in praesentia. Siqui(47)dem modo crus propter vincula afficiebatur dolore, sed huic succedere voluptas iam vi(48)detur.”
Some of Crito's people accordingly led her away, crying out and beating herself.
And when she was gone, Socrates, sitting up on the couch, bent and rubbed his leg, saying, as he was rubbing:
How singular is the thing called pleasure,
and how curiously related to pain, which might be thought to be the opposite of it;
for they are never present to a man at the same instant, and yet he who pursues either is generally compelled to take the other;
their bodies are two, but they are joined by a single head.
And I cannot help thinking that if Aesop had remembered them, he would have made a fable about God trying to reconcile their strife,
and how, when he could not, he fastened their heads together;
and this is the reason why when one comes the other follows,
as I know by my own experience now, when after the pain in my leg which was caused by the chain pleasure appears to succeed.
ὁ οὖν Κέβης ὑπολαβών, νὴ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, εὖ γ᾽ ἐποίησας ἀναμνήσας με.
περὶ γάρ τοι τῶν (60d) ποιημάτων ὧν πεποίηκας ἐντείνας τοὺς τοῦ Αἰσώπου λόγους καὶ τὸ εἰς τὸν Ἀπόλλω προοίμιον καὶ ἄλλοι τινές με ἤδη ἤροντο, ἀτὰρ καὶ Εὔηνος πρῴην, ὅτι ποτὲ διανοηθείς, ἐπειδὴ δεῦρο ἦλθες, ἐποίησας αὐτά, πρότερον οὐδὲν πώποτε ποιήσας.
εἰ οὖν τί σοι μέλει τοῦ ἔχειν ἐμὲ Εὐήνῳ ἀποκρίνασθαι ὅταν με αὖθις ἐρωτᾷ--εὖ οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ἐρήσεται--εἰπὲ τί χρὴ λέγειν.
Itaque Cebes assumens “Per Iovem, O Socrate, inquit bene egisti in memoriam revocans michi.
De poematis que composuisti producens Esopi sermones et in Apollinem prohemium et alii quidam me iam percunctati sunt, quemadmodum et Evinus pridem, quid quandoque intellectu volvens, quando quidem huc venisti, finxisti hec, prius nichil umquam componens.
Si ergo quid tibi cure est habere me Evino respondere cum me iterum percunctatus fuerit - bene novi enim quoniam sciscitabitur,– dic quid oporteat me dicere.”
Ad haec Cebes, “per Iovem”, inquit, “o Socrates, opportune mihi id in memoriam re(49)vocasti.
Cum enim poemata composueris sermones intendens Aesopi scripto in Apol(50)linem prooemio, tum alij multi me interrogaverunt, tum Evenus pauloante, quonam con(51)silio postquam in carcerem devenisti ea feceris, quae prius feceras nunquam.
Si igitur tibi (52) curae est ut habeam quid respondeam Eueno, quando iterum ex me quaesierit, quod cer(53)to scio facturum, dic quaeso, quid ei sit respondendum.”
Upon this Cebes said: I am glad, Socrates, that you have mentioned the name of Aesop.
For it reminds me of a question which has been asked by many, and was asked of me only the day before yesterday by Evenus the poet--he will be sure to ask it again, and therefore if you would like me to have an answer ready for him, you may as well tell me what I should say to him:--he wanted to know why you, who never before wrote a line of poetry, now that you are in prison are turning Aesop's fables into verse, and also composing that hymn in honour of Apollo.
λέγε τοίνυν, ἔφη, αὐτῷ, ὦ Κέβης, τἀληθῆ, ὅτι οὐκ ἐκείνῳ βουλόμενος οὐδὲ τοῖς ποιήμασιν αὐτοῦ ἀντίτεχνος (60e) εἶναι ἐποίησα ταῦτα--ᾔδη γὰρ ὡς οὐ ῥᾴδιον εἴη--
ἀλλ᾽ ἐνυπνίων τινῶν ἀποπειρώμενος τί λέγοι, καὶ ἀφοσιούμενος εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις ταύτην τὴν μουσικήν μοι ἐπιτάττοι ποιεῖν.
ἦν γὰρ δὴ ἄττα τοιάδε· πολλάκις μοι φοιτῶν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνύπνιον ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ, ἄλλοτ᾽ ἐν ἄλλῃ ὄψει φαινόμενον, τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ λέγον, “ὦ Σώκρατες”, ἔφη, “μουσικὴν ποίει καὶ ἐργάζου”.
καὶ ἐγὼ ἔν γε τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ ὅπερ ἔπραττον τοῦτο ὑπελάμβανον αὐτό μοι παρακελεύεσθαί τε (61a) καὶ ἐπικελεύειν, ὥσπερ οἱ τοῖς θέουσι διακελευόμενοι,
καὶ ἐμοὶ οὕτω τὸ ἐνύπνιον ὅπερ ἔπραττον τοῦτο ἐπικελεύειν, μουσικὴν ποιεῖν, ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὔσης μεγίστης μουσικῆς, ἐμοῦ δὲ τοῦτο πράττοντος.
νῦν δ᾽ ἐπειδὴ ἥ τε δίκη ἐγένετο καὶ ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἑορτὴ διεκώλυέ με ἀποθνῄσκειν, ἔδοξε χρῆναι, εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις μοι προστάττοι τὸ ἐνύπνιον ταύτην τὴν δημώδη μουσικὴν ποιεῖν, μὴ ἀπειθῆσαι αὐτῷ ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν·
ἀσφαλέστερον γὰρ εἶναι μὴ ἀπιέναι πρὶν ἀφοσιώσασθαι (61b) ποιήσαντα ποιήματα [καὶ] πιθόμενον τῷ ἐνυπνίῳ.
οὕτω δὴ πρῶτον μὲν εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἐποίησα οὗ ἦν ἡ παροῦσα θυσία·
μετὰ δὲ τὸν θεόν, ἐννοήσας ὅτι τὸν ποιητὴν δέοι, εἴπερ μέλλοι ποιητὴς εἶναι, ποιεῖν μύθους ἀλλ᾽ οὐ λόγους, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἦ μυθολογικός,
διὰ ταῦτα δὴ οὓς προχείρους εἶχον μύθους καὶ ἠπιστάμην τοὺς Αἰσώπου, τούτων ἐποίησα οἷς πρώτοις ἐνέτυχον.
ταῦτα οὖν, ὦ Κέβης, Εὐήνῳ φράζε, καὶ ἐρρῶσθαι καί, ἂν σωφρονῇ, ἐμὲ διώκειν ὡς τάχιστα.
(61c) ἄπειμι δέ, ὡς ἔοικε, τήμερον· κελεύουσι γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι.
“Dic autem” inquit “ei, O Cebes, que vera sunt, quoruam nee illi volens e neque poematibus ipsius ex adverso insidians esse finxi hec - vidi quippe quam non facile esset,-
immo insompniis quibusdam attemptatus quid dicere et sanctificacione lustratus, si ergo sepe hanc musicam michi iniungat facere.
Erant siquidem quedam talia: crebro ad me veniens idem insomnium in preterita vita, aliud utique in alia specie visum, eadem quoque dicens: ‘O Socrate,’ ait ‘musicam fac et operare.'
Atque ego quidem in anteacto tempore quod operabar, hoc suspicabar ipsum michi precipere et superiniungere, quemadmodum currentibus imperantes,
et michi taliter insompnium, quod agebam illud precipere, musicam facere, ceu philosophia quoque existente maxima musica me profectoo hoc agente.
Nunc sane, quoniam causa acta erat et numinus solempnitas prohibuit memori, visum est oportere, si utique multociens me iubeat insompnium hanc, publicam musicam instituere, non incredulum esse sibi, immo facere;
tucius quippe esse rebar non abire prius, ante quam sanctificarer componens poemata obsequens insompnio.
Ita sane primum quidem in deum composui cuius erat presens immolacio;
ceterum vera post deum, cogitans quoniam poetam oporteat, si quidem debeat poeta esse, fingere fabulas sed non sermones - et ipse nonne erat mithologicus? -
ob hec utique quas ad manus habebam et sciebam fabulas Esopi, has composui quibus primis incidebam.
Hec igitur, o Cebes, Evino edissere et valere et, si sapiat, me sequi quam citissime;
migro quippe, ut videtur, hodie; iubent enim Athenei.”
“Vera”, inquit, “o Cebes, responde (54) me id effecisse non ut vel ipsi gratificarer vel cum ipsius carminibus decertarem – sciebam (493, 1) enim facile id non esse –
verum ut insomnia quaedam experirer me simul expians, num (2) forte haec sit ea musica quam saepius iam exercere me iubent.
Nam frequenter superio(3)ri tempore insomnium idem, licet alia atque alia forma sese mihi offerens, eadem semper (4) ita praecepit: 'Fac, o Socrates, musicam atque exerce'.
Ego igitur quod in superiori tempo(5)re faciebam, hoc mihi praeceptum arbitrabar, et quemadmodum currentes adhortari (6) solemus,
sic quod ipse antea faciebam, ad idem me insomnium cohortari putabam quasi (7) philosophia maxima musica foret.
Postquam vero facto iam de me iudicio, mori me in(8)terim dei festivitas inhiberet, censui oportere, si forte insomnium toties iubeat popula(9)rem hanc musicam exercere, non negligere eius praeceptum.
Tutius enim fore arbitra(10)tus sum, antequam e vita migrarem, expiare animum atque ut monet insomnium poe(11)mata facere.
Quamobrem primo equidem cecini deum ipsum, cuius tunc sacra cele(12)brabantur,
atque post deum iudicans oportere eum qui poeta futurus sit non sermones (13) sed fabulas facere, me vero non esse fabulatorem,
nonnullas ex fabulis Aesopi quas scie(14)bam promptioresque habebam ut in quanque prius incidi modulatus sum.
Haec igitur, o (15) Cebes, refer Eueno et valere iube. Atque consule ut si probe sapit, me sequatur.
Migro (16) enim hinc hodie. Sic enim Athenienses iubent.”
Tell him, Cebes, he replied, what is the truth--that I had no idea of rivalling him or his poems; to do so, as I knew, would be no easy task.
But I wanted to see whether I could purge away a scruple which I felt about the meaning of certain dreams. In the course of my life I have often had intimations in dreams ‘that I should compose music.’
The same dream came to me sometimes in one form, and sometimes in another, but always saying the same or nearly the same words: ‘Cultivate and make music,’ said the dream.
And hitherto I had imagined that this was only intended to exhort and encourage me in the study of philosophy, which has been the pursuit of my life, and is the noblest and best of music.
The dream was bidding me do what I was already doing, in the same way that the competitor in a race is bidden by the spectators to run when he is already running.
But I was not certain of this, for the dream might have meant music in the popular sense of the word, and being under sentence of death, and the festival giving me a respite,
I thought that it would be safer for me to satisfy the scruple, and, in obedience to the dream, to compose a few verses before I departed.
And first I made a hymn in honour of the god of the festival,
and then considering that a poet, if he is really to be a poet, should not only put together words, but should invent stories, and that I have no invention,
I took some fables of Aesop, which I had ready at hand and which I knew--they were the first I came upon--and turned them into verse.
Tell this to Evenus, Cebes, and bid him be of good cheer; say that I would have him come after me if he be a wise man, and not tarry;
and that to-day I am likely to be going, for the Athenians say that I must.
κατὰ τί δὴ οὖν ποτε οὔ φασι θεμιτὸν εἶναι αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν ἀποκτεινύναι, ὦ Σώκρατες;
ἤδη γὰρ ἔγωγε, ὅπερ νυνδὴ σὺ ἤρου, καὶ Φιλολάου ἤκουσα, ὅτε παρ᾽ ἡμῖν διῃτᾶτο, ἤδη δὲ καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν, ὡς οὐ δέοι τοῦτο ποιεῖν·
σαφὲς δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν οὐδενὸς πώποτε οὐδὲν ἀκήκοα.
(62a) ἀλλὰ προθυμεῖσθαι χρή, ἔφη· τάχα γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἀκούσαις.
ἴσως μέντοι θαυμαστόν σοι φανεῖται εἰ τοῦτο μόνον τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ἁπλοῦν ἐστιν, καὶ οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ τἆλλα, ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς βέλτιον <ὂν> τεθνάναι ἢ ζῆν, οἷς δὲ βέλτιον τεθνάναι, θαυμαστὸν ἴσως σοι φαίνεται εἰ τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις μὴ ὅσιον αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοὺς εὖ ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ ἄλλον δεῖ περιμένειν εὐεργέτην.
CEBES. “Secundum quid igitur aliquando haut licitum esse ipsum se ipsum interimere, O Socrate?
Iam enim ego, quod nunc tu percunctatus es, eciam a Filolao audivi, quando penes nos dies agebat, iam quidem eciam ab aliis quibusdam, quoniam non oporteat hoc facere;
certum autem de hiis a nullo umquam quicquam audivi.”
“Immo satagere oportet” ait; “fors enim, et si audieris,
tamen mirabile tibi appareat, si hoc solum aliorum omnium simplex sit, et numquam contingit homini, quomodo et alia, est quando et quibus pocius mori quam vivere; quibus sane melius mori - mirandum forsitan tibi videtur si hiis hominlbus non sanctum est ipsos sibi ipsis bene facere, atqui alium convenit prestolari benefactorem.”
“Quam ob causam”, inquit Cebes, “o Socrates, nefas esse aiunt sibimet manus inferre?
(30) Iam enim quod modo quaerebas ego a Philolao audivi, cum apud nos versaretur, et ab (31) alijs insuper nonnullis non decere i facere.
Apertum tamen hac de re quicquam nihil (32) ab aliquo unquam audivi.”
“Sed attentione opus est”, inquit. “Nam et si audiveris,
mirum (33) tamen forte videri possit, si hoc solum ex alijs omnibus simplex sit, nec accidat unquam (34) homini quemadmodum caetera, quando et quibusdam melius mori quam vivere. Ita(35)que mirum tibi forte videbitur, si his quibus praestat mori, non liceat sibimet prodesse, (36) sed alium oporteat expectare qui prosit.”
Then tell me, Socrates, why is suicide held to be unlawful?
as I have certainly heard Philolaus, about whom you were just now asking, affirm when he was staying with us at Thebes:
and there are others who say the same, although I have never understood what was meant by any of them.
Do not lose heart, replied Socrates, and the day may come when you will understand.
I suppose that you wonder why, when other things which are evil may be good at certain times and to certain persons, death is to be the only exception, and why, when a man is better dead, he is not permitted to be his own benefactor, but must wait for the hand of another.
(62b) καὶ γὰρ ἂν δόξειεν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, οὕτω γ᾽ εἶναι ἄλογον·
οὐ μέντοι ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως γ᾽ ἔχει τινὰ λόγον.
ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενος περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος, ὡς ἔν τινι φρουρᾷ ἐσμεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ οὐ δεῖ δὴ ἑαυτὸν ἐκ ταύτης λύειν οὐδ᾽ ἀποδιδράσκειν,
μέγας τέ τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ οὐ ῥᾴδιος διιδεῖν·
οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ τόδε γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Κέβης, εὖ λέγεσθαι, τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι ἡμῶν τοὺς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἓν τῶν κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι.
ἢ σοὶ οὐ δοκεῖ οὕτως;
SOCRATES. “Et enim utique” inquit “videbitur” Socrates “sic equidem esse irracionabile;
minime tamen, sed fortassis habet aliquam racionem.
Qui ergo in archanis dictus super hiis sermo, quasi in quadam custodia sumus homines, et non convenit se ipsum ex ea solvere neque aufugere,
magnus profecto quidam michi videtur et non facilis perspici.
Verumptamen sed hoc equidem michi videtur, O Cebes, bene dici, deos esse nostrum procuratores, atque nos homines unam possessionum deis esse.
Vel tibi non videtur ita?”
“Atqui videri quidem”, inquit Socrates, “potest id sic absurdum.
Fortas(38)se etiam quandam habet rationem.
Profecto sermo ille qui de his arcanis habetur, in qua(39)dam custodia esse homines, neque decere quenquam ex hac seipsum solvere neque aufuge(40)re,
magnus quidem mihi videtur neque cognitu facilis.
Veruntamen id mihi, o Cebes, re(41)cte apparet dictum, deos quidem curam habere nostri, nos vero homines unam quan(42)dam ex possessionibus esse deorum.
An non ita tibi videtur?”
I admit the appearance of inconsistency in what I am saying;
but there may not be any real inconsistency after all.
There is a doctrine whispered in secret that man is a prisoner who has no right to open the door and run away;
this is a great mystery which I do not quite understand.
Yet I too believe that the gods are our guardians, and that we are a possession of theirs.
Do you not agree?
(62c) οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, καὶ σὺ ἂν τῶν σαυτοῦ κτημάτων εἴ τι αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ ἀποκτεινύοι, μὴ σημήναντός σου ὅτι βούλει αὐτὸ τεθνάναι, χαλεπαίνοις ἂν αὐτῷ καί, εἴ τινα ἔχοις τιμωρίαν, τιμωροῖο ἄν;
SOCRATES. “Nonne” inquit ille “et tu eciam tui ipsius possessionum si que ipsa se ipsam interemerit, non significante te quia velis ipsam mori, indigneris ipsi, et, si quam habeas animadversionem, punias utique?”
“Nonne igitur”, inquit, “et tu si quod ex mancipijs tuis seipsum perimeret, cum nul(44)lo modo id permisisses, irasceris utique illi? Et si potestatem haberes poena quadam affi(45)ceres?”
And if one of your own possessions, an ox or an ass, for example, took the liberty of putting himself out of the way when you had given no intimation of your wish that he should die, would you not be angry with him, and would you not punish him if you could?
ἀλλ᾽ εἰκός, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, τοῦτό γε φαίνεται.
ὃ μέντοι νυνδὴ ἔλεγες, τὸ τοὺς φιλοσόφους ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἐθέλειν (62d) ἀποθνῄσκειν, ἔοικεν τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀτόπῳ, εἴπερ ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν εὐλόγως ἔχει, τὸ θεόν τε εἶναι τὸν ἐπιμελούμενον ἡμῶν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐκείνου κτήματα εἶναι.
τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν τοὺς φρονιμωτάτους ἐκ ταύτης τῆς θεραπείας ἀπιόντας, ἐν ᾗ ἐπιστατοῦσιν αὐτῶν οἵπερ ἄριστοί εἰσιν τῶν ὄντων ἐπιστάται, θεοί, οὐκ ἔχει λόγον·
οὐ γάρ που αὐτός γε αὑτοῦ οἴεται ἄμεινον ἐπιμελήσεσθαι ἐλεύθερος γενόμενος;
ἀλλ᾽ ἀνόητος μὲν ἄνθρωπος τάχ᾽ ἂν οἰηθείη ταῦτα, φευκτέον (62e) εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου, καὶ οὐκ ἂν λογίζοιτο ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ἀπό γε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φεύγειν ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι μάλιστα παραμένειν, διὸ ἀλογίστως ἂν φεύγοι·
ὁ δὲ νοῦν ἔχων ἐπιθυμοῖ που ἂν ἀεὶ εἶναι παρὰ τῷ αὑτοῦ βελτίονι.
καίτοι οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὐναντίον εἶναι εἰκὸς ἢ ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγετο·
τοὺς μὲν γὰρ φρονίμους ἀγανακτεῖν ἀποθνῄσκοντας πρέπει, τοὺς δὲ ἄφρονας χαίρειν.
“Immo convenienter” Cebes ait “istud videtur.
Quod tamen dixisti, philosophos facile utique velle mori, assimilabitur hoc, O Socrate, inconvenienti si quidem quod nunc diximus racionabiliter se habet, deum quidem procuratorem esse nostrum et nos ipsius possessiones esse.
Nam non indignari sapientissimos ex hac cura migrantes, in qua regunt eos qui quidem optimi sunt existencium rectores, dii, non habet racionem.
Nondum quippe ipse sui ipsius existimabitur melius providere liber factus;
sed menceps homo fors autumaverit hoc, fugiendum esse a domino, et minime cogitaverit e quoniam non expedit a bono fugere, sed quam maxime permanere; ideo quidem irracionabilissime fugiet;
mentis vero compos exoptat ubique esse penes se ipso meliorem.
Et ita, O Socrate, contrarium esse convenit quam quod nunc dicebatur;
nam prudentes moleste ferre obeuntes decet, imprudentesque gaudere.”
“Consentaneum id quidem apparet”, inquit Cebes.
“Quod vero dice(48)bas modo, philosophos perfacile velle mori, absurdum, o Socrates, videtur esse, si quidem (49) quod nunc diximus rationem habet, deum videlicet nostrum esse curatorem. Nos vero (50) in rebus eius positos esse.
Nullam enim id rationem habet, prudentissimos videlicet ho(51)mines non aegre ferre ab ea cura se amoveri quam sibi praestent dij optimi omnium re(52)rum gubernatores.
Nunquid enim putaretur vir prudens ipsum se melius esse curaturum (53) si liber evaserit.
Sed demens aliquis forsitan id putaret, fugiendum scilicet esse a domino, (54) neque cogitaret non esse id quod bonum est fugiendum, sed in eo maxime permanen(494, 1)dum. Ideoque absque ratione fugeret.
Qui vero mentem habet, semper apud eum qui sit meli(2)ore esse cupit.
Atque ita, o Socrates, contra omnino conveniens esse videtur quam quod (3) paulo ante dicebatur,
Sapientes quidem decere graviter mortem ferre, Insipientes ve(4)ro libenter.”
Yes, Socrates, said Cebes, there seems to be truth in what you say.
And yet how can you reconcile this seemingly true belief that God is our guardian and we his possessions, with the willingness to die which we were just now attributing to the philosopher?
That the wisest of men should be willing to leave a service in which they are ruled by the gods who are the best of rulers, is not reasonable;
for surely no wise man thinks that when set at liberty he can take better care of himself than the gods take of him.
A fool may perhaps think so--he may argue that he had better run away from his master, not considering that his duty is to remain to the end, and not to run away from the good, and that there would be no sense in his running away.
The wise man will want to be ever with him who is better than himself.
Now this, Socrates, is the reverse of what was just now said;
for upon this view the wise man should sorrow and the fool rejoice at passing out of life.
καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας, ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν γέ μοι δοκεῖ τι καὶ αὐτῷ λέγειν Κέβης·
τί γὰρ ἂν βουλόμενοι ἄνδρες σοφοὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς δεσπότας ἀμείνους αὑτῶν φεύγοιεν καὶ ῥᾳδίως ἀπαλλάττοιντο αὐτῶν;
καί μοι δοκεῖ Κέβης εἰς σὲ τείνειν τὸν λόγον, ὅτι οὕτω ῥᾳδίως φέρεις καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπων καὶ ἄρχοντας ἀγαθούς, ὡς αὐτὸς ὁμολογεῖς, θεούς.
Et Simmias “Necnon,” ait “O Socrate, nunc eciam videtur quid michi et ipsi dicere Cebes;
quid enim profecto volentes viri sapientes quam vere dominos pociores se fugere, atque facile discedant ab eis?
Et michi videtur Cebes” ait “in te tendere verbum, quoniam tam facile fers et nos relinquens et rectores bonos, ut ipse fateris, deos.”
Tunc Simmias, “mihi quoque”, inquit, “nonnihil vi(7)detur Cebes dicere.
Quo enim consilio sapientes viri eos qui meliores revera quam ipsi sint (8) fugiant, illisque carere facile patiantur?
Atqui mihi videtur Cebes sermonem in te intende(9)re, quod tam facile et nos relinquas et deos, ut tu ipse fateris, principes bonos.”
And certainly, added Simmias, the objection which he is now making does appear to me to have some force.
For what can be the meaning of a truly wise man wanting to fly away and lightly leave a master who is better than himself?
And I rather imagine that Cebes is referring to you; he thinks that you are too ready to leave us, and too ready to leave the gods whom you acknowledge to be our good masters.
φέρε δή, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, πειραθῶ πιθανώτερον πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἀπολογήσασθαι ἢ πρὸς τοὺς δικαστάς.
ἐγὼ γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, εἰ μὲν μὴ ᾤμην ἥξειν πρῶτον μὲν παρὰ θεοὺς ἄλλους σοφούς τε καὶ ἀγαθούς, ἔπειτα καὶ παρ᾽ ἀνθρώπους τετελευτηκότας ἀμείνους τῶν ἐνθάδε, ἠδίκουν ἂν οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν τῷ θανάτῳ·
νῦν δὲ εὖ ἴστε ὅτι παρ᾽ (63c) ἄνδρας τε ἐλπίζω ἀφίξεσθαι ἀγαθούς--καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἂν πάνυ διισχυρισαίμην--ὅτι μέντοι παρὰ θεοὺς δεσπότας πάνυ ἀγαθοὺς ἥξειν, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι εἴπερ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων διισχυρισαίμην ἂν καὶ τοῦτο.
ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀγανακτῶ, ἀλλ᾽ εὔελπίς εἰμι εἶναί τι τοῖς τετελευτηκόσι καί, ὥσπερ γε καὶ πάλαι λέγεται, πολὺ ἄμεινον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τοῖς κακοῖς.
“Euge autem” inquit ille “experiar ad vos persuasibilius respondere quam ad iudices.
Ego enim” inquit, “O Simmia et Cebes, si utique non arbitrarer ventum ire primo ad deos alios sapientesque et bonos, deinceps ad homines qui iam migrarunt pociores eis qui hic, iniuste agerem revera non indignans morti.
Nunc vero bene nostis quoniam ad viros spero abiturum esse bonos - et hoc profecto nequaquam prorsus moleste ferrem, – quoniam utique ad deos dominos omnino bonos ventum ire, bene nostis quoniam, si quid aliud talium, graviter sustinerem et hoc.
Quare propter hoc non similiter indignor, immo bona spe ductus sum esse quid eciam defunctis et, velut utique eciam olim dicitur, longe melius bonis quam malis.”
“Age ergo”, inquit. “Conabor nunc apud vos (12) accuratius quam nuper apud Atheniensium iudices fecerim, me defendere.
Equidem, o Sim(13)mia atque Cebes, nisi me migraturum putarem, primum quidem ad deos alios sapientes (14) et bonos, deinde ad homines defunctos his qui hic sunt meliores, iniusta agerem non (15) moleste ferens mortem.
Nunc certe habetote sperare me ad viros bonos iturum, sed hoc (16) quidem haud omnino asseverarem. Quod vero ad deos dominos valde bonos iturus (17) sim, certum habetote siquid aliud eiusmodi et hoc utique me affirmaturum.
Propterea haud (18) similiter mortem moleste fero, sed bono animo sum speroque superesse aliquid his qui de(19)functi sunt atque ut iam dicitur multo melius bonis fore quam malis.”
Then I must try to make a more successful defence before you than I did when before the judges.
For I am quite ready to admit, Simmias and Cebes, that I ought to be grieved at death, if I were not persuaded in the first place that I am going to other gods who are wise and good (of which I am as certain as I can be of any such matters), and secondly (though I am not so sure of this last) to men departed, better than those whom I leave behind;
and therefore I do not grieve as I might have done, for I have good hope that there is yet something remaining for the dead, and as has been said of old, some far better thing for the good than for the evil.
τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Κρίτων, ἄλλο γε ἢ πάλαι μοι λέγει ὁ μέλλων σοι δώσειν τὸ φάρμακον ὅτι χρή σοι φράζειν ὡς ἐλάχιστα διαλέγεσθαι;
φησὶ γὰρ θερμαίνεσθαι μᾶλλον διαλεγομένους, δεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον προσφέρειν (63e) τῷ φαρμάκῳ·
εἰ δὲ μή, ἐνίοτε ἀναγκάζεσθαι καὶ δὶς καὶ τρὶς πίνειν τούς τι τοιοῦτον ποιοῦντας.
“Quid, O Socrate,” ait Crito “aliud quam dudum michi dicit qui debet dare farmacum quia oportet tibi dicere quam minimum disputare;
dicit siquidem calefieri magis disputantes, oportere autem nichil tale conferre e farmaco;
sin autem aliquociens compelli et bis et ter bibere quid tale facientes.
“Quidnam putas aliud, o Socrates”, inquit Crito, “quam quod iam(25)dudum mihi dicit is qui tibi venenum est daturus?
Iubet enim te moneri ut quamparcissi(26)me loquaris, dicens eos qui disputant nimium incalescere, nihil vero tale bibituris venenum (27) convenire.
Alioquin eos id fecerint, cogi interdum bis, quandoque ter venenum bi(28)bere."
Only this, Socrates, replied Crito:--the attendant who is to give you the poison has been telling me, and he wants me to tell you, that you are not to talk much,
talking, he says, increases heat, and this is apt to interfere with the action of the poison;
persons who excite themselves are sometimes obliged to take a second or even a third dose.
ἔα αὐτόν, ἔφη. ἀλλ᾽ ὑμῖν δὴ τοῖς δικασταῖς βούλομαι ἤδη τὸν λόγον ἀποδοῦναι, ὥς μοι φαίνεται εἰκότως ἀνὴρ τῷ ὄντι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίψας τὸν βίον θαρρεῖν μέλλων (64a) ἀποθανεῖσθαι καὶ εὔελπις εἶναι ἐκεῖ μέγιστα οἴσεσθαι ἀγαθὰ ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ.
πῶς ἂν οὖν δὴ τοῦθ᾽ οὕτως ἔχοι, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράσαι.
κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν ὀρθῶς ἁπτόμενοι φιλοσοφίας λεληθέναι τοὺς ἄλλους ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο αὐτοὶ ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ἢ ἀποθνῄσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι.
εἰ οὖν τοῦτο ἀληθές, ἄτοπον δήπου ἂν εἴη προθυμεῖσθαι μὲν ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο, ἥκοντος δὲ δὴ αὐτοῦ ἀγανακτεῖν ὃ πάλαι προυθυμοῦντό τε καὶ ἐπετήδευον.
“Sine ipsum” inquit Socrates; “sed vobis quidem iudicibus volo iam sermonem reddere, ceu michi videtur competenter vir vere in philosophia terens vitam confidit cum debeat mori et bone spei alumpnus esse illic maximis fretum ire bonis ex quo obierit.
Quomodo autem istud ita se habeat, o Simmia quidem et Cebes, ego experiar edisserere.
“Conantur siquidem quicumque sunt recte contingentes philosophiam latere alios quoniam nichil aliud ipsi articulantur quam defungi et defunctum ire.
Si ergo hoc verum, incongruum uti que erit animo gestire in omni vita nichil aliud quam hoc, veniente quoque ipso indignari quod olim preconcupierunt quidem et affectabant.”
"Mitte ipsum", inquit. "Ego vero, o iudices, rationem vobis iam redde(31)re volo ob quam mihi videatur vir qui per omnem vitam incubuerit philosophiae, me(32)rito magna cum fiducia imminentem expectare mortem atque bona spe esse se ibi postquam (33) hinc migraverit maxima bona reportaturum.
Quemadmodum igitur id ita se habeat, o (34) Simmia atque Cebes, conabor equidem aperire.
Quicunque philosophiam recte aliquan(35)do attigerunt, nimirum videntur latuisse ceteros homines quod nihil aliud ipsi commen(36)tarentur quam mori atque esse se mortuos.
Quod si id verum est, perabsurdum foret si cum ni(37)hil praeter hoc aliud per omnem vitam studuerint, hoc ipso adveniente quod iamdiu agi(38)tabant exercebantque, graviter ferrent."
And now, O my judges, I desire to prove to you that the real philosopher has reason to be of good cheer when he is about to die, and that after death he may hope to obtain the greatest good in the other world.
And how this may be, Simmias and Cebes, I will endeavour to explain.
For I deem that the true votary of philosophy is likely to be misunderstood by other men; they do not perceive that he is always pursuing death and dying;
and if this be so, and he has had the desire of death all his life long, why when his time comes should he repine at that which he has been always pursuing and desiring?
καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας γελάσας, νὴ τὸν Δία, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, (64b) οὐ πάνυ γέ με νυνδὴ γελασείοντα ἐποίησας γελάσαι.
οἶμαι γὰρ ἂν τοὺς πολλοὺς αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀκούσαντας δοκεῖν εὖ πάνυ εἰρῆσθαι εἰς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας--καὶ συμφάναι ἂν τοὺς μὲν παρ᾽ ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπους καὶ πάνυ--ὅτι τῷ ὄντι οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες θανατῶσι, καὶ σφᾶς γε οὐ λελήθασιν ὅτι ἄξιοί εἰσιν τοῦτο πάσχειν.
Et Simmias ridens “Per Iovem” inquit, “O Socrate, non omnino me ridere volentem effecisti ridere.
Reor enim nonnullis ipsum hoc audientibus videri bene funditus dici adversus philosophantes – et concedere quoque eos qui apud nos sunt homines, et omnino – quoniam revera philosophantes morti se parant, et ipsos non latuit quoniam digni sunt istud pati.”
Hinc Simmias arridens, "per Iovem", inquit, "o So(39)crates mihi quidem haud multum ridere cupienti risum expressisti.
Nam multos arbi(40)tror fore qui si id audierint aptissime in philosophos dictum putent, nostrosque homines (41) consensuros et valde quidem, philosophos revera mori nec tamen ignorare quam digni (42) sint morte."
Simmias said laughingly: Though not in a laughing humour, you have made me laugh, Socrates;
for I cannot help thinking that the many when they hear your words will say how truly you have described philosophers, and our people at home will likewise say that the life which philosophers desire is in reality death, and that they have found them out to be deserving of the death which they desire.
καὶ ἀληθῆ γ᾽ ἂν λέγοιεν, ὦ Σιμμία, πλήν γε τοῦ σφᾶς μὴ λεληθέναι.
λέληθεν γὰρ αὐτοὺς ᾗ τε θανατῶσι καὶ ᾗ ἄξιοί εἰσιν θανάτου καὶ οἵου θανάτου οἱ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφοι.
(64c) εἴπωμεν γάρ, ἔφη, πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, χαίρειν εἰπόντες ἐκείνοις· ἡγούμεθά τι τὸν θάνατον εἶναι;
SOCRATES. “Et vera dicerent, O Simmia, preter ipsos non latere;
latuit enim eos qualiter morti se parent et qualiter digni sunt morte et quali morte quam vere philosophi.
Dicamus enim” inquit “ad nos ipsos - valere dicentes illis - : existimamus quid mortem esse?”
"Forte id recte, o Simmia", inquit, "dicerent, praeterquam quod non ignorare (43) addunt.
Latuit sane eos, qua ratione veri philosophi et mori studeant et morte sint di(44)gni.
Sed iam relinquamus illos nobisque ipsis loquamur. Putamusne aliquid esse mor(45)tem?"
And they are right, Simmias, in thinking so, with the exception of the words ‘they have found them out’;
for they have not found out either what is the nature of that death which the true philosopher deserves, or how he deserves or desires death.
But enough of them:--let us discuss the matter among ourselves: Do we believe that there is such a thing as death?
σκέψαι δή, ὠγαθέ, ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ σοὶ συνδοκῇ ἅπερ ἐμοί· (64d) ἐκ γὰρ τούτων μᾶλλον οἶμαι ἡμᾶς εἴσεσθαι περὶ ὧν σκοποῦμεν.
φαίνεταί σοι φιλοσόφου ἀνδρὸς εἶναι ἐσπουδακέναι περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καλουμένας τὰς τοιάσδε, οἷον σιτίων [τε] καὶ ποτῶν;
ἥκιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.
SOCRATES. “Contemplare autem, O bone, si ergo et tibi simul videantur que et michi; ex hiis enim magis reor nos scire de quibus intendimus.
Videtur tibi philosophi viri esse studere circa voluptates vocatas tales quidem, quemadmodum escarum et potuum?”
“Neutiquam, O Socrate,” ait Simmias,
"Considera", inquit, "bone vir, num tibi idem quoque (49) et mihi videatur. In his enim vos arbitror planius quae perquirimus inventuros.
Vide(50)turne tibi philosophi officium esse sectari eas quae appellantur voluptates, quales sunt epu(51)larum atque poculorum?"
"Minime quidem, o Socrates", inquit.
There is another question, which will probably throw light on our present inquiry if you and I can agree about it:
--Ought the philosopher to care about the pleasures--if they are to be called pleasures--of eating and drinking?
Certainly not, answered Simmias.
τί δὲ δὴ περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν τῆς φρονήσεως κτῆσιν;
πότερον ἐμπόδιον τὸ σῶμα ἢ οὔ, ἐάν τις αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ ζητήσει (65b) κοινωνὸν συμπαραλαμβάνῃ;
οἷον τὸ τοιόνδε λέγω· ἆρα ἔχει ἀλήθειάν τινα ὄψις τε καὶ ἀκοὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις,
ἢ τά γε τοιαῦτα καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ ἡμῖν ἀεὶ θρυλοῦσιν, ὅτι οὔτ᾽ ἀκούομεν ἀκριβὲς οὐδὲν οὔτε ὁρῶμεν;
καίτοι εἰ αὗται τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα αἰσθήσεων μὴ ἀκριβεῖς εἰσιν μηδὲ σαφεῖς, σχολῇ αἵ γε ἄλλαι·
πᾶσαι γάρ που τούτων φαυλότεραί εἰσιν. ἢ σοὶ οὐ δοκοῦσιν;
SOCRATES. “Quid vero circa prudencie possessionem?
Utrum impedimentum corpus necne, si quis hoc ipsum in questione commune assumat?
Quemadmodum hoc tale quidem dico: utrum habet veritatem aliquam visusque et auditus hominibus,
sive talia et poete nobis semper ruminant, quoniam neque audimus sincere nichil neque videmus?
Eciam si isti circa corpus sensus non sinceri sunt neque evidentes, incassum autem et alii;
universi quippe hiis deteriores sunt. Vel tibi non videntur?”
"Quid autem circa sapientiae (9) ipsius acquisitionem?" inquit Socrates.
"Vtrum impedimento est corpus, si quis ipsum (10) socium ad investigandum assumpserit, necne?
Quale utique tale aliquid dico. Habentne (11) visus et auditus veritatem in hominibus aliquam?
An talia quaedam ipsi quoque poetae (12) semper canunt, nihil nos audire, nihil videre syncerum?
Atqui si ii corporis sensus syn(13)ceri certique non sunt, neque etiam alii;
quippe cum ceteri omnes his quodammodo dete(14)riores sint. An non tibi videntur?"
What again shall we say of the actual acquirement of knowledge?
--is the body, if invited to share in the enquiry, a hinderer or a helper?
I mean to say, have sight and hearing any truth in them?
Are they not, as the poets are always telling us, inaccurate witnesses?
and yet, if even they are inaccurate and indistinct, what is to be said of the other senses?
--for you will allow that they are the best of them?
ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλῃ τινὶ αἰσθήσει τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐφήψω αὐτῶν;
λέγω δὲ περὶ πάντων, οἷον μεγέθους πέρι, ὑγιείας, ἰσχύος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑνὶ λόγῳ ἁπάντων τῆς οὐσίας ὃ (65e) τυγχάνει ἕκαστον ὄν·
ἆρα διὰ τοῦ σώματος αὐτῶν τὸ ἀληθέστατον θεωρεῖται,
ἢ ὧδε ἔχει· ὃς ἂν μάλιστα ἡμῶν καὶ ἀκριβέστατα παρασκευάσηται αὐτὸ ἕκαστον διανοηθῆναι περὶ οὗ σκοπεῖ, οὗτος ἂν ἐγγύτατα ἴοι τοῦ γνῶναι ἕκαστον;
SOCRATES. “Immo alio quodam sensu quam qui per corpus pertigisti ad illa?
Dico sane de cundis, quemadmodum de magnitudine, sanitate, robore, et aliorum uno sermone universorum substancia, quod contingit unumquodque esse.
Ergo per corpus eorum veritas consideratur,
vel ita se habet; quisquis maxime nostrum et perspicacissime preparetur ipsum unumquodque perspicere de quo intendit, hic utique proxime accedat ad cognoscendum singulum?”
"An alio quodam sensu corporis attigisti?
(26) Loquor autem de omnibus, veluti de ipsa magnitudine, de sanitate, de robore ipso, ac (27) summatim de ceterorum omnium essentia, id est, quod unumquodque sit,
nunquid per (28) corpus quod in his verissimum est perspicitur?
An ita se res habet? Quicunque nostrum (29) maxime et syncerissime cogitare mente se comparat ipsum quod aggreditur cogitan(30)dum, hic proxime ad cognitionem ipsius accedit?"
Or did you ever reach them with any other bodily sense?
--and I speak not of these alone, but of absolute greatness, and health, and strength, and of the essence or true nature of everything.
Has the reality of them ever been perceived by you through the bodily organs?
or rather, is not the nearest approach to the knowledge of their several natures made by him who so orders his intellectual vision as to have the most exact conception of the essence of each thing which he considers?
ἆρ᾽ οὖν ἐκεῖνος ἂν τοῦτο ποιήσειεν καθαρώτατα ὅστις ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἴοι ἐφ᾽ ἕκαστον,
μήτε τιν᾽ ὄψιν παρατιθέμενος ἐν τῷ διανοεῖσθαι μήτε [τινὰ] ἄλλην (66a) αἴσθησιν ἐφέλκων μηδεμίαν μετὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ,
ἀλλ᾽ αὐτῇ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν εἰλικρινεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ χρώμενος αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ εἰλικρινὲς ἕκαστον ἐπιχειροῖ θηρεύειν τῶν ὄντων,
ἀπαλλαγεὶς ὅτι μάλιστα ὀφθαλμῶν τε καὶ ὤτων καὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν σύμπαντος τοῦ σώματος,
ὡς ταράττοντος καὶ οὐκ ἐῶντος τὴν ψυχὴν κτήσασθαι ἀλήθειάν τε καὶ φρόνησιν ὅταν κοινωνῇ;
ἆρ᾽ οὐχ οὗτός ἐστιν, ὦ Σιμμία, εἴπερ τις [καὶ] ἄλλος ὁ τευξόμενος τοῦ ὄντος;
SOCRATES. “Ergo igitur ille quoque hoc efficiet sincerissime, quisquis quam maxime ipso mentis intellectu eat in unumquodque,
numquam visum apponens in intelligendo, neque quem alium sensum attrahens quempiam cum raciocinacione,
sed ipsa per se ipsam pura intelligeneia fruens ipsum per se ipsum purum unumquodque conatur aucupari existencium,
sequestratus quam maxime ab oculisque et auribus et, ut dictum dicatur, ab universo corpore,
tamquam perturbante et non permittente animam possidere veritatemque et prudeneiam cum communicet?
Itaque nonne hic est, o Simmia, si quis eciam alius, adeptus veritatem?”
"Nonne igitur ille purissime (31) faceret, quicunque ipsa mentis excogitatione quammaxime se ad unumquodque confer(32)ret,
neque visum in excogitando adhibens, neque sensum prorsus ullum ratiocinationi con(33)iungens:
sed ipsa secundum seipsam mentis excogitatione syncera utens, ipsum per se (34) quodlibet syncerum existens studeret venari,
ab oculis, ab auribus, et ut summatim di(35)cam, a toto corpore liber,
utpote perturbante animum neque permittente veritatem sapien(36)tiamque assequi, siquando in communionem recipiatur?
An non hic erit, o Simmia, siquis (37) unquam alius ipsius quod vere est compos?"
And he attains to the purest knowledge of them who goes to each with the mind alone,
not introducing or intruding in the act of thought sight or any other sense together with reason,
but with the very light of the mind in her own clearness searches into the very truth of each;
he who has got rid, as far as he can, of eyes and ears and, so to speak, of the whole body,
these being in his opinion distracting elements which when they infect the soul hinder her from acquiring truth and knowledge
--who, if not he, is likely to attain the knowledge of true being?
(66b) οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ἐκ πάντων τούτων παρίστασθαι δόξαν τοιάνδε τινὰ τοῖς γνησίως φιλοσόφοις, ὥστε καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοιαῦτα ἄττα λέγειν,
ὅτι “κινδυνεύει τοι ὥσπερ ἀτραπός τις ἐκφέρειν ἡμᾶς [μετὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐν τῇ σκέψει],
ὅτι, ἕως ἂν τὸ σῶμα ἔχωμεν καὶ συμπεφυρμένη ᾖ ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ μετὰ τοιούτου κακοῦ, οὐ μή ποτε κτησώμεθα ἱκανῶς οὗ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν·
φαμὲν δὲ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἀληθές.
“Nonne igitur necesse” inquit “ex omnibus hiis constare opinionem talem quamdam vere philosophis, ut eciam ad invicem talia quedam dicant,
quoniam ‘nititur quemadmodum via irregressibilis quedam nos efferre cum racione in contemplatu;
quoniam, quamdiu corpus habuerimus et conglutinata fuerit nostra anima cum huiusmodi malo, numquam adipiscemur sufficienter quod exoptamus;
dicimus autem hoc esse verum.
Nonne igitur", inquit, "ex his omnibus necessario sequitur opinionem eiusmo(39)di legitimis philosophis usque adeo constare debere, ut ad se invicem ita loquantur?
'Ne(40)cessaria iam ratione concluditur nos quadam rationis ipsius via ad id considerando per(41)duci,
videlicet donec corpus habemus, animusque noster tanto malo erit admixtus, nun(42)quam nos id quod desideramus verum ad votum consecuturos.
[]
And when real philosophers consider all these things, will they not be led to make a reflection which they will express in words something like the following?
‘Have we not found,’ they will say, ‘a path of thought which seems to bring us and our argument to the conclusion,
that while we are in the body, and while the soul is infected with the evils of the body, our desire will not be satisfied?
and our desire is of the truth.
μυρίας μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀσχολίας παρέχει τὸ σῶμα διὰ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν (66c) τροφήν·
ἔτι δέ, ἄν τινες νόσοι προσπέσωσιν, ἐμποδίζουσιν ἡμῶν τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θήραν.
ἐρώτων δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ εἰδώλων παντοδαπῶν καὶ φλυαρίας ἐμπίμπλησιν ἡμᾶς πολλῆς,
ὥστε τὸ λεγόμενον ὡς ἀληθῶς τῷ ὄντι ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ φρονῆσαι ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται οὐδέποτε οὐδέν.
καὶ γὰρ πολέμους καὶ στάσεις καὶ μάχας οὐδὲν ἄλλο παρέχει ἢ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἱ τούτου ἐπιθυμίαι.
διὰ γὰρ τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτῆσιν πάντες οἱ πόλεμοι γίγνονται,
τὰ δὲ χρήματα (66d) ἀναγκαζόμεθα κτᾶσθαι διὰ τὸ σῶμα, δουλεύοντες τῇ τούτου θεραπείᾳ·
καὶ ἐκ τούτου ἀσχολίαν ἄγομεν φιλοσοφίας πέρι διὰ πάντα ταῦτα.
τὸ δ᾽ ἔσχατον πάντων ὅτι, ἐάν τις ἡμῖν καὶ σχολὴ γένηται ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ καὶ τραπώμεθα πρὸς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι,
ἐν ταῖς ζητήσεσιν αὖ πανταχοῦ παραπῖπτον θόρυβον παρέχει καὶ ταραχὴν καὶ ἐκπλήττει,
ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ καθορᾶν τἀληθές.
Decies autem millena quippe nobis vacaeionum impedimenta exhibet corpus propter necessarium alimentum;
amplius eciam, si qui morbi acciderint, impediunt nostram eius quod est aucupacionem.
Amoribusque et concupiscenciis et timoribus et ydolis omnifariis et nugis implet nos plurimis,
ut dicatur quam vere; revera ab eo neque sapere nobis advenit umquam nullatenus.
Et enim prelia et sediciones et pugnas nichil aliud prebet quam corpus et huius concupiscencie.
Quia propter pecuniarum possessionem universa et prelia nobis fiunt,
pecunias sane compellimur possidere propter corpus, servi facti huius cure;
et exinde impedimentum vacacionis agimus philosophiam circa propter cuncta hec.
Novissimum autem omnium quoniam, si que nobis eciam vacacio fiat ab eo, et convertamur ad considerandum quid,
in questionibus iterum undique illapsum tumultum prestat et turbacionem et stupefacit,
ut non possimus sub eo perspicere veritatem.
Impedimenta enim pe(43)ne innumerabilia corpus praebet propter necessariam eius alimoniam.
Praeterea mor(44)bi nobis hinc incidentes investigationem veritatis impediunt:
amoribus, cupiditatibus, (45) timoribus, multiplicibusque imaginibus, multis denique nugis nos implet,
ut verissime di(46)catur nihil pensi unquam ac veri nobis afferre.
Nam ad bella, ad seditiones, ad pugnas (47) nihil aliud quam corpus multiplex eiusque cupiditas impellit.
Omnia enim pecuniarum (48) gratia fiunt.
Pecunias autem quaerere cogimur corporis gratia usui eius inservientes,
atque (49) ita fit ut propter haec omnia a philosophiae studiis abstrahamur.
Extremum vero omnium (50) est, quod siquid ab ipso otii nobis contingat, nosque ad considerandum aliquid conferamus,
(51) investigantibus nobis rursus ubique sese opponens tumultu quodam perturbat animum (52) et quasi percutiens reddit attonitum,
adeo ut hoc obstaculo impediti verum perspicere (53) nequeamus.
For the body is a source of endless trouble to us by reason of the mere requirement of food;
and is liable also to diseases which overtake and impede us in the search after true being:
it fills us full of loves, and lusts, and fears, and fancies of all kinds, and endless foolery,
and in fact, as men say, takes away from us the power of thinking at all.
Whence come wars, and fightings, and factions? whence but from the body and the lusts of the body?
wars are occasioned by the love of money,
and money has to be acquired for the sake and in the service of the body;
and by reason of all these impediments we have no time to give to philosophy;
and, last and worst of all, even if we are at leisure and betake ourselves to some speculation,
the body is always breaking in upon us, causing turmoil and confusion in our enquiries,
and so amazing us that we are prevented from seeing the truth.
ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ἡμῖν δέδεικται ὅτι, εἰ μέλλομέν ποτε καθαρῶς τι εἴσεσθαι, (66e) ἀπαλλακτέον αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα·
καὶ τότε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡμῖν ἔσται οὗ ἐπιθυμοῦμέν τε καί φαμεν ἐρασταὶ εἶναι, φρονήσεως, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσωμεν, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει, ζῶσιν δὲ οὔ.
εἰ γὰρ μὴ οἷόν τε μετὰ τοῦ σώματος μηδὲν καθαρῶς γνῶναι, δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ οὐδαμοῦ ἔστιν κτήσασθαι τὸ εἰδέναι ἢ τελευτήσασιν·
τότε (67a) γὰρ αὐτὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔσται χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος, πρότερον δ᾽ οὔ.
καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἂν ζῶμεν, οὕτως, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐγγυτάτω ἐσόμεθα τοῦ εἰδέναι,
ἐὰν ὅτι μάλιστα μηδὲν ὁμιλῶμεν τῷ σώματι μηδὲ κοινωνῶμεν, ὅτι μὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, μηδὲ ἀναπιμπλώμεθα τῆς τούτου φύσεως,
ἀλλὰ καθαρεύωμεν ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ, ἕως ἂν ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς ἀπολύσῃ ἡμᾶς·
καὶ οὕτω μὲν καθαροὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀφροσύνης,
ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς μετὰ τοιούτων τε ἐσόμεθα καὶ γνωσόμεθα δι᾽ ἡμῶν (67b) αὐτῶν πᾶν τὸ εἰλικρινές, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἴσως τὸ ἀληθές·
μὴ καθαρῷ γὰρ καθαροῦ ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ οὐ θεμιτὸν ᾖ”.
τοιαῦτα οἶμαι, ὦ Σιμμία, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς ἀλλήλους λέγειν τε καὶ δοξάζειν πάντας τοὺς ὀρθῶς φιλομαθεῖς.
ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι οὕτως;
Sed procul dubio nobis demonstratum est quoniam, si debemus umquam pure quid scire, e recedendum ab eo et ipsa anima considerandum ipsas res;
et tandem, ceu videtur, nobis erit quod concupiscimus equidem, et dicimus amatores esse prudencie quando defuncti erimus, velut sermo significat, superstitibus vero minime.
Si enim non possibile quoque cum corpore quicquam elimate cognoscere, duum alterum, seu numquam est adipisci scienciam seu qui expirarunt;
tunc enim ipsa secundum ipsam erit anima extra corpus, prius vero minime.
Et in quo utique vitales auras carpserimus, ita, ut videtur, proxime erimus sciencie,
si quam maxime nichil confederemur corpori neque communicemus, quantum non omnis necessitas, neque refarciamur ipsius natura,
sed emundemur ab eo, quousque deus ipse absolverit nos.
Et sic utique sinceri sequestrati a corporis stoliditate,
ut competens, cum talibus nempe erimus atque cognoscemus per nos ipsos universitatem sinceram; hoc autem est fortassis verum;
non mundo enim mundum contingere fas est.'
Huiusmodi reor, O Simmia, necesse esse ad invicem dicereque et opinari cunctos qui recte amplectuntur disciplinam;
vel non videtur tibi siccine?”
Ceterum nobis revera demonstratum est, siquando optamus pure aliquid in(54)telligere, recedere a corpore oportere atque ipso animo res ipsas considerare.
Atque tunc, ut (496,1) apparet, compotes evademus eius quod affectamus, cuiusve amatores profitemur nos (2) esse scilicet sapientiae, cum videlicet mortui fuerimus, quemadmodum significat ratio, (3) dum autem vivemus, nequaquam.
Nempe si nihil cum corpore pure discerni potest, e (4) duobus autem alterum: aut nullo modo possumus scientiam consequi, aut post mortem.
Tunc (5) enim animus ipse per seipsum erit seorsum a corpore, prius vero nequaquam.
Atque (6) dum vivimus, ita ut videtur, proxime ad scientiam accedemus,
si quamminimum cum (7) corpore commercium habuerimus neque quicquam cum illo communi caverimus,(8) nisi quantum summa cogat necessitas, neque huius natura replebimur,
sed ab eius conta(9)gione cavebimus, quoad deus ipse nos solvat.
Atque ita puri et a corporis insania libera(10)ti,
ut consentaneum est, cum talibus erimus cognoscemusque per nos ipsos syncerum quod(11)libet, id est forsitan ipsum verum.
Nam impuro quidem purum attingere nefas est.'
Ta(12)lia equidem, o Simmia, iudico necessarium esse omnes discendi cupidos loqui invicem atque (13) opinari.
An non tibi videtur?"
It has been proved to us by experience that if we would have pure knowledge of anything we must be quit of the body--the soul in herself must behold things in themselves:
and then we shall attain the wisdom which we desire, and of which we say that we are lovers, not while we live, but after death;
for if while in company with the body, the soul cannot have pure knowledge, one of two things follows--either knowledge is not to be attained at all, or, if at all, after death.
For then, and not till then, the soul will be parted from the body and exist in herself alone.
In this present life, I reckon that we make the nearest approach to knowledge
when we have the least possible intercourse or communion with the body, and are not surfeited with the bodily nature,
but keep ourselves pure until the hour when God himself is pleased to release us.
And thus having got rid of the foolishness of the body
we shall be pure and hold converse with the pure, and know of ourselves the clear light everywhere, which is no other than the light of truth.’
For the impure are not permitted to approach the pure.
These are the sort of words, Simmias, which the true lovers of knowledge cannot help saying to one another, and thinking.
You would agree; would you not?
οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, πολλὴ ἐλπὶς ἀφικομένῳ οἷ ἐγὼ πορεύομαι, ἐκεῖ ἱκανῶς, εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι, κτήσασθαι τοῦτο οὗ ἕνεκα ἡ πολλὴ πραγματεία ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ γέγονεν, ὥστε ἥ γε (67c) ἀποδημία ἡ νῦν μοι προστεταγμένη μετὰ ἀγαθῆς ἐλπίδος γίγνεται καὶ ἄλλῳ ἀνδρὶ ὃς ἡγεῖταί οἱ παρεσκευάσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν ὥσπερ κεκαθαρμένην.
“Num ergo” inquit Socrates “si hoc vera, O dilecte, plurima spes abeunti quo ego vado sufficienter ibi, sicubi alibi, consequi istud ob quod nobis multa negociositas in preterita vita facta est; quas ob res peregrinacio que nunc michi preordinata cum optima spe fit, et alii viro qui existimat sibi instrui mentem tamquam mundificatam.”
"Si (14) haec igitur vera sunt, o amice, magna spes est eunti illuc quo nunc ego proficiscor, (15) sicubi et ibi sufficienter eius rei se compotem fieri, cuius gratia tantum nos negocium (16) in superiori vita suscepimus. Hanc ergo migrationem praesentia mihi iniunctam bona (17) spe suscipio, similiterque quivis alius qui modo putavit praeparatam sibi mentem tanquam (18) purificatam."
But, O my friend, if this is true, there is great reason to hope that, going whither I go, when I have come to the end of my journey, I shall attain that which has been the pursuit of my life. And therefore I go on my way rejoicing, and not I only, but every other man who believes that his mind has been made ready and that he is in a manner purified.
κάθαρσις δὲ εἶναι ἆρα οὐ τοῦτο συμβαίνει, ὅπερ πάλαι ἐν τῷ λόγῳ λέγεται, τὸ χωρίζειν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἐθίσαι αὐτὴν καθ᾽ αὑτὴν πανταχόθεν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος συναγείρεσθαί τε καὶ ἁθροίζεσθαι, καὶ οἰκεῖν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι καὶ ἐν τῷ (67d) ἔπειτα μόνην καθ᾽ αὑτήν, ἐκλυομένην ὥσπερ [ἐκ] δεσμῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος;
SOCRATES. “Mundificacio esse igitur numquid non hoc contingit, quod dudum in sermone dicitur, separare quam maxime a corpore animam et assuefacere ipsam secundum se ipsam ab undique ex corpore colligique et coartari, et habitare iuxta quod possibile et in nunc presenti et in deinceps solam secundum se ipsam, absolutam tamquam vinculis a corpore?”
"Purificatio vero", inquit, "nonne in hoc con(19)stitit, quod iamdudum dicebamus, videlicet ut quammaxime possumus seiungamus a cor(20)pore animum? hoc est, et in praesenti tempore et in futuro a corpore tanquam a vinculis (21) resolutum."
And what is purification but the separation of the soul from the body, as I was saying before; the habit of the soul gathering and collecting herself into herself from all sides out of the body; the dwelling in her own place alone, as in another life, so also in this, as far as she can;--the release of the soul from the chains of the body?
τῷ ὄντι ἄρα, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦντες ἀποθνῄσκειν μελετῶσι, καὶ τὸ τεθνάναι ἥκιστα αὐτοῖς ἀνθρώπων φοβερόν.
ἐκ τῶνδε δὲ σκόπει.
εἰ γὰρ διαβέβληνται μὲν πανταχῇ τῷ σώματι, αὐτὴν δὲ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἐπιθυμοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχειν, τούτου δὲ γιγνομένου εἰ φοβοῖντο καὶ ἀγανακτοῖεν, οὐ πολλὴ ἂν ἀλογία εἴη,
εἰ μὴ (68a) ἅσμενοι ἐκεῖσε ἴοιεν, οἷ ἀφικομένοις ἐλπίς ἐστιν οὗ διὰ βίου ἤρων τυχεῖν--ἤρων δὲ φρονήσεως--ᾧ τε διεβέβληντο, τούτου ἀπηλλάχθαι συνόντος αὐτοῖς;
ἢ ἀνθρωπίνων μὲν παιδικῶν καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ ὑέων ἀποθανόντων πολλοὶ δὴ ἑκόντες ἠθέλησαν εἰς Ἅιδου μετελθεῖν, ὑπὸ ταύτης ἀγόμενοι τῆς ἐλπίδος, τῆς τοῦ ὄψεσθαί τε ἐκεῖ ὧν ἐπεθύμουν καὶ συνέσεσθαι·
φρονήσεως δὲ ἄρα τις τῷ ὄντι ἐρῶν, καὶ λαβὼν σφόδρα τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην ἐλπίδα, μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι ἐντεύξεσθαι αὐτῇ (68b) ἀξίως λόγου ἢ ἐν Ἅιδου, ἀγανακτήσει τε ἀποθνῄσκων καὶ οὐχ ἅσμενος εἶσιν αὐτόσε;
οἴεσθαί γε χρή, ἐὰν τῷ ὄντι γε ᾖ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, φιλόσοφος·
σφόδρα γὰρ αὐτῷ ταῦτα δόξει, μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι καθαρῶς ἐντεύξεσθαι φρονήσει ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἐκεῖ.
εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, οὐ πολλὴ ἂν ἀλογία εἴη εἰ φοβοῖτο τὸν θάνατον ὁ τοιοῦτος;
SOCRATES. “Revera igitur, O Simmia,” infit “recte philosophantes defungi student, et defundum ire incassum ipsis hominum terribile.
Ex hiis autem considera:
si enim accusent quoque undique corpus, ipsam vero secundum se ipsam affectant animam habere, hoc autem facto si formident et indigne ferant, nonne plurima fatuitas erit,
si non gratulabundi illuc eamus, guo abeuntibus spes extat illius quod per vitam desiderabant consequi - desiderabant sane prudenciam,- cui derogabant ab ipso sequesttari coexistente ipsis?
Vel humanis quoque pueris et filiis et uxoribus obeuntibus multi certe sponte voluerunt in Avernum venire ab hac ducti spe que est videre quid ibi que optabant et cohabitare.
Prudenciam igitur quis vere amplectens, et sumens plurimum ipsam hanc spem nusquam alibi adipisci hanc digne sermone quam apud inferos, indignabitur utique moriens et non letabundus ibit illuc?
Existimari sane decet, si revera fuerit, o dilecte, philosophus.
Certissime quippe ipsi hec videhuntur, neutiquam alibi pure consequi prudenciam nisi ibi.
Sin autem hoc ita se habet, quod modo dicebam, nonne plurima temeritas erit si metuat mortem qui talis?”
"Revera igitur", inquit, "re(28)cte philosophantes mortem commentantur atque ab ea minime omnium perterrentur.
(29) Ita vera considera.
Cum enim corpus quidem ubique aspernentur, animum vero ipsum (30) cupiant secundum seipsum habere, nonne summa esset absurditas, si tunc quando id e(31)venit expavescant molesteque serant,
neque libenter illuc proficiscantur, quo cum perve(32)nerint spes est eo quidem quod amabant in vita potiri, amabant autem sapientiam, eo (33) autem cuius commercium moleste ferebant liberari?
An vero amatis et mulieribus (34) et filijs defunctis multi iam sponte voluerunt ad inferos proficisci, sperantes eos ibi vi(35)sere cum eisque versari quos amaverant.
Sapientiae autem verus amator vehementer in (36) hanc ipsam spem adductus non aliter eam pro dignitate ulla se comparaturum quam si (37) moriatur, imminentem mortem aegre feret ac non libenter hinc illuc emigrabit?
Arbi(38)trari quidem, o amice, oportet, si vere philosophus sit,
magnopere apud ipsum hanc opi(39)nionem valere, ut non alibi puram sapientiam posse assequi speret quam in futura post (40) mortem vita.
Si autem hoc ita se habet, nonne quemadmodum modo dicebam, praeter (41) rationem foret omnino si mortem vir eiusmodi formidaret?"
And the true philosophers, Simmias, are always occupied in the practice of dying, wherefore also to them least of all men is death terrible.
Look at the matter thus:
--if they have been in every way the enemies of the body, and are wanting to be alone with the soul, when this desire of theirs is granted, how inconsistent would they be if they trembled and repined,
instead of rejoicing at their departure to that place where, when they arrive, they hope to gain that which in life they desired--and this was wisdom--and at the same time to be rid of the company of their enemy.
Many a man has been willing to go to the world below animated by the hope of seeing there an earthly love, or wife, or son, and conversing with them.
And will he who is a true lover of wisdom, and is strongly persuaded in like manner that only in the world below he can worthily enjoy her, still repine at death? Will he not depart with joy?
Surely he will, O my friend, if he be a true philosopher.
For he will have a firm conviction that there and there only, he can find wisdom in her purity.
And if this be true, he would be very absurd, as I was saying, if he were afraid of death.
οὐκοῦν ἱκανόν σοι τεκμήριον, ἔφη, τοῦτο ἀνδρός, ὃν ἂν ἴδῃς ἀγανακτοῦντα μέλλοντα ἀποθανεῖσθαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἄρ᾽ (68c) ἦν φιλόσοφος ἀλλά τις φιλοσώματος;
ὁ αὐτὸς δέ που οὗτος τυγχάνει ὢν καὶ φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος, ἤτοι τὰ ἕτερα τούτων ἢ ἀμφότερα.
SOCRATES. “Numquid non igitur sufficiens tibi argumentum” inquit “hoc viri, quem si videris graviter ferre cum debeat mori, quoniam nullo modo erat philosophus, sed quidam philosomatos?
Ipse quoque hic existit et philochrimatos atgue philotimos, sive alterum horum sive utrumque.”
"Sufficiens ergo coniectura erit," inquit, "siquem videris moleste (43) mortem ferre, eum non esse philosophum, sed φιλοσώματον quendam, id est, corporis a(44)matorem,
atque eundem ferme φιλοχρήματον et φιλότιμον, id est pecuniarum honorumque cu(45)pidum, ac talem ut alterum horum affectet aut utrunque."
And when you see a man who is repining at the approach of death, is not his reluctance a sufficient proof that he is not a lover of wisdom, but a lover of the body,
and probably at the same time a lover of either money or power, or both?
τί δὲ οἱ κόσμιοι αὐτῶν;
οὐ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο πεπόνθασιν·
ἀκολασίᾳ τινὶ σώφρονές εἰσιν;
καίτοι φαμέν γε ἀδύνατον εἶναι, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως αὐτοῖς συμβαίνει τούτῳ ὅμοιον τὸ πάθος τὸ περὶ ταύτην τὴν εὐήθη σωφροσύνην·
φοβούμενοι γὰρ ἑτέρων ἡδονῶν στερηθῆναι καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντες ἐκείνων, ἄλλων ἀπέχονται ὑπ᾽ ἄλλων κρατούμενοι.
καίτοι καλοῦσί γε ἀκολασίαν (69a) τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἄρχεσθαι,
ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως συμβαίνει αὐτοῖς κρατουμένοις ὑφ᾽ ἡδονῶν κρατεῖν ἄλλων ἡδονῶν.
τοῦτο δ᾽ ὅμοιόν ἐστιν ᾧ νυνδὴ ἐλέγετο, τῷ τρόπον τινὰ δι᾽ ἀκολασίαν αὐτοὺς σεσωφρονίσθαι.
SOCRATES. Quid vero venusti eorum?
Nonne idem perpeciuntur?
Incestu quodam celibes sunt?
Eciam dicimus impossibile esse, verumptamen ipsis contingit huic similis esse passio, scilicet circa hunc fatuum celibatum;
formidantes quippe aliis voluptatibus privari et anhelantes ad illas, ab aliis abstinent tenti ab aliis;
vocant itaque incestum a voluptatibus subiugari.
Verumptamen accidit ipsis tentis a voluptatibus vincere alias voluptates.
Hoc autem simile est ei quod nunc disserebatur, modo quodam per incontinenciam ipsos continere.”
"Quid autem? Qui inter eos (2) moderati dicuntur", inquit,
"nonne simili quodam pacto affecti sunt,
intemperantia videli(3)cet quadam temperati?
Quanquam impossibile id esse dicimus, verumtamen illis evenit (4) affectio quaedam huic similis in isthac eorum fatua temperantia.
Timentes enim ne alijs (5) careant voluptatibus easque appetentes a caeteris abstinent, ab alijs superati,
etsi vocant in(6)temperantiam a voluptatibus superari.
Verumtamen accidit eis ut superati a voluptatibus (7) alias superent voluptates.
Iam vero id illi simile est quod modo dicebatur, scilicet quodam (8) modo per intemperantiam fieri temperaturos."
And are not the temperate exactly in the same case?
They are temperate because they are intemperate
--which might seem to be a contradiction,
but is nevertheless the sort of thing which happens with this foolish temperance.
For there are pleasures which they are afraid of losing; and in their desire to keep them, they abstain from some pleasures, because they are overcome by others;
and although to be conquered by pleasure is called by men intemperance,
to them the conquest of pleasure consists in being conquered by pleasure.
And that is what I mean by saying that, in a sense, they are made temperate through intemperance.
ὦ μακάριε Σιμμία, μὴ γὰρ οὐχ αὕτη ᾖ ἡ ὀρθὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγή, ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πρὸς λύπας καὶ φόβον πρὸς φόβον καταλλάττεσθαι, [καὶ] μείζω πρὸς ἐλάττω ὥσπερ νομίσματα,
ἀλλ᾽ ᾖ ἐκεῖνο μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὀρθόν, ἀντὶ οὗ δεῖ πάντα ταῦτα καταλλάττεσθαι, φρόνησις,
(69b) [καὶ τούτου μὲν πάντa1)] καὶ μετὰ τούτου [ὠνούμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενa1)] τῷ ὄντι ᾖ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ συλλήβδην ἀληθὴς ἀρετή, μετὰ φρονήσεως, καὶ προσγιγνομένων καὶ ἀπογιγνομένων καὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων·
χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως [καὶ] ἀλλαττόμενα ἀντὶ ἀλλήλων μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ᾖ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετὴ καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἀνδραποδώδης τε καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδ᾽ ἀληθὲς ἔχῃ,
τὸ δ᾽ ἀληθὲς τῷ ὄντι ᾖ (69c) κάθαρσίς τις τῶν τοιούτων πάντων καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία, καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ φρόνησις μὴ καθαρμός τις ᾖ.
καὶ κινδυνεύουσι καὶ οἱ τὰς τελετὰς ἡμῖν οὗτοι καταστήσαντες οὐ φαῦλοί τινες εἶναι,
ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι πάλαι αἰνίττεσθαι ὅτι ὃς ἂν ἀμύητος καὶ ἀτέλεστος εἰς Ἅιδου ἀφίκηται ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσεται, ὁ δὲ κεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενος μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει.
εἰσὶν γὰρ δή, [ὥς] φασιν οἱ περὶ τὰς τελετάς, “ναρθηκοφόροι (69d) μὲν πολλοί, βάκχοι δέ τε παῦροι”·
οὗτοι δ᾽ εἰσὶν κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν οὐκ ἄλλοι ἢ οἱ πεφιλοσοφηκότες ὀρθῶς.
ὧν δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ κατά γε τὸ δυνατὸν οὐδὲν ἀπέλιπον ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ προυθυμήθην γενέσθαι·
εἰ δ᾽ ὀρθῶς προυθυμήθην καί τι ἠνύσαμεν, ἐκεῖσε ἐλθόντες τὸ σαφὲς εἰσόμεθα, ἂν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ, ὀλίγον ὕστερον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ.
ταῦτ᾽ οὖν ἐγώ, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἀπολογοῦμαι, ὡς εἰκότως ὑμᾶς τε ἀπολείπων καὶ τοὺς ἐνθάδε δεσπότας οὐ (69e) χαλεπῶς φέρω οὐδ᾽ ἀγανακτῶ,
ἡγούμενος κἀκεῖ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ ἐνθάδε δεσπόταις τε ἀγαθοῖς ἐντεύξεσθαι καὶ ἑταίροις· [τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς ἀπιστίαν παρέχει]·
εἴ τι οὖν ὑμῖν πιθανώτερός εἰμι ἐν τῇ ἀπολογίᾳ ἢ τοῖς Ἀθηναίων δικασταῖς, εὖ ἂν ἔχοι.
SOCRATES. “O felix Simmia; numquid enim non hec recta ad virtutem, immo voluptates pro voluptatibus et molestias pro molestiis atque timorem pro timore commutari, et maiora pro minoribus velut nummismata;
ceterum si illud solum nummisma rectum, pro quo oportet universa hec commutari, prudencia;
et pro hac quidem cuncta, et cum hac emptaque et vendita revera erit et fortitudo et iusticia et sobrietas, et universaliter vera virtus, cum prudencia, et eorum que assunt et eorum que absunt, et voluptatum et formidinum et aliorum omnium huiuscemodi;
disterminata certe a prudencia et commutata pro invicem, nonne adumbrata descripcio quedam erit huiusmodi virtus, et procul ambiguo servilisque atque nichil sanum neque verum habens,
utique verum est certissime, purgacio est quedam talium omnium et sobrietas et iusticia et fortitudo, et ipsa prudencia nonne expurgacio quedam erit?
Atque nituntur eciam qui cerimonias nobis constituerunt non maligni quidam esse,
immo revera dudum enigmatizari quoniam quicumque non lustratus et inexpiatus in Avernum abierit in ceno iacebit, et expiatus atque lustratus iliuc migrans cum diis habitabit.
Sunt denim, ut aiunt qui circa cerimonias, ‘ferularum baiuli quidem multi, bachi quidem pauci';
hii autem sunt iuxta meam opinionem non alii quam philosophantes vere.
De quibus et ego utique secundum possibile nichil pretermisi in vita, immo omnifariam affectavi fieri;
si vero recte affectavi et quid emolumenti tulimus, illuc venientes evidentissime cognoscemus, si deus voluerit, paulo posterius, ut michi videtur.
Ista ergo ego” inquit, “O Simmia et Cebes, respondeo quam convenienter vos deserens et qui hiccine sunt e dominos non graviter fero neque indignor,
arbitratus eciam ibi haut minus quam hic dominisque bonis adherere atque amicis; plurimis autem incredulitatem prestat.
Si quid igitur vobis probabilior sum in responsione quam Atheniensium iudicibus, bene utique se habeat.”
"Animad(9)vertendum est, o beate Simmia," inquit, "ne haec haudquaquam recta sit ad virtutem via, vo(10)luptates videlicet voluptatibus, dolores doloribus, et metum metu, et maius minori tan(11)quam nummos commutare,
sed ille duntaxat rectus fit nummus, cuius gratia haec omnia (12) oporteat commutari atque venundari, scilicet sapientia, prudentia,
pro qua et cum qua (13) omnia empta ac vendita revera sit et fortitudo et temperantia et iustitia ac summatim (14) vera virtus, cum sapientia, sive prudentia, et accedentibus et recentibus voluptati(15)bus et timoribus caeterisque eiusdem.
Sinautem a sapientia segregata invicem (16) commutatur, adumbratio quaedam sit eiusmodi virtus ac revera servilis, nihil sani verique (17) possidens,
virtutis autem veritas in horum omnium purificatione revera consistat, et tem(18)perantia et iustitia et fortitudo et sapientia ipsa sit purificatio quaedam.
Quamobrem (19) hi qui mysteria nobis constituerunt, minime contemnendi videntur,
sed revera iamdudum (20) occulte nos admonere, quicunque non expiatus neque initiatus migrabit ad inferos eum ia(21)cere in luto, quicunque vero purgatus atque initiatus illuc accesserit, cum dijs habitare.
Sunt (22) enim quemadmodum dicunt, 'thyrsigeri quidem multi, Bacchi vero pauci.'
Hi vero, ut (23) equidem opinor, non alij sunt quam qui recte philosophati sunt.
Quorum quidem in num(24)mero esse me neque inferiorem quidem omni studio pro viribus conatus sum.
An vero re(25)cte contenderim aliquidque profecerim, cum illuc pervenerimus, certe sciemus si deus vo(26)luerit paulo post, ut mihi videtur.
Haec igitur mea excusatio est, o Simmia et o Cebes, quam (27) videlicet ob causam cum vos eosque qui hic sunt dominos relinquam, merito non aegre fe(28)ram neque perturber.
Spero enim me et illic non minus quam hic bonos dominos amicosque (29) inventurum. Multi vero id minime credunt.
Si igitur defensio mea vobis magis quam (30) Atheniensibus iudicibus persuasit, bene res se habet."
Yet the exchange of one fear or pleasure or pain for another fear or pleasure or pain, and of the greater for the less, as if they were coins, is not the exchange of virtue.
O my blessed Simmias, is there not one true coin for which all things ought to be exchanged?--and that is wisdom;
and only in exchange for this, and in company with this, is anything truly bought or sold, whether courage or temperance or justice. And is not all true virtue the companion of wisdom, no matter what fears or pleasures or other similar goods or evils may or may not attend her?
But the virtue which is made up of these goods, when they are severed from wisdom and exchanged with one another, is a shadow of virtue only, nor is there any freedom or health or truth in her;
but in the true exchange there is a purging away of all these things, and temperance, and justice, and courage, and wisdom herself are the purgation of them.
The founders of the mysteries would appear to have had a real meaning,
and were not talking nonsense when they intimated in a figure long ago that he who passes unsanctified and uninitiated into the world below will lie in a slough, but that he who arrives there after initiation and purification will dwell with the gods.
For ‘many,’ as they say in the mysteries, ‘are the thyrsus-bearers, but few are the mystics,'
--meaning, as I interpret the words, ‘the true philosophers.’
In the number of whom, during my whole life, I have been seeking, according to my ability, to find a place;
--whether I have sought in a right way or not, and whether I have succeeded or not, I shall truly know in a little while, if God will, when I myself arrive in the other world
--such is my belief. And therefore I maintain that I am right, Simmias and Cebes, in not grieving or repining at parting from you and my masters in this world,
for I believe that I shall equally find good masters and friends in another world. But most men do not believe this saying;
if then I succeed in convincing you by my defence better than I did the Athenian judges, it will be well.
ἐγὼ γοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ἡδέως ἂν ἀκούσαιμι ἥντινα δόξαν ἔχεις περὶ αὐτῶν.
οὔκουν γ᾽ ἂν οἶμαι, ἦ δ᾽ ὃς ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰπεῖν τινα νῦν (70c) ἀκούσαντα, οὐδ᾽ εἰ κωμῳδοποιὸς εἴη, ὡς ἀδολεσχῶ καὶ οὐ περὶ προσηκόντων τοὺς λόγους ποιοῦμαι.
“Ego igitur” inquit Cebes “libenter utique audirem quam opinionem habes de istis.”
“Non igitur reor” ait ille “dicere quempiam nunc audientem, neque si comediarum fictor fuerit, quoniam nugor et non de ad rem pertinentibus mencionem facio.
"Libenter equidem", inquit Cebes, (41) "audirem de his rebus quid sentias."
"Neminem arbitror", inquit, "haec audientem, ne si co(42)moedus quidem sit, esse dicturum nugari nunc me ac de quibus minime oporteat verba (43) facere. [marg: Proponitur discutiendum an anima hominis sit post obitum]
I am sure, said Cebes, that I should greatly like to know your opinion about them.
I reckon, said Socrates, that no one who heard me now, not even if he were one of my old enemies, the Comic poets, could accuse me of idle talking about matters in which I have no concern:
σκεψώμεθα δὲ αὐτὸ τῇδέ πῃ, εἴτ᾽ ἄρα ἐν Ἅιδου εἰσὶν αἱ ψυχαὶ τελευτησάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἴτε καὶ οὔ.
παλαιὸς μὲν οὖν ἔστι τις λόγος οὗ μεμνήμεθα, ὡς εἰσὶν ἐνθένδε ἀφικόμεναι ἐκεῖ,
καὶ πάλιν γε δεῦρο ἀφικνοῦνται καὶ γίγνονται ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων·
καὶ εἰ τοῦθ᾽ οὕτως ἔχει, πάλιν γίγνεσθαι ἐκ τῶν ἀποθανόντων τοὺς ζῶντας,
ἄλλο τι ἢ εἶεν (70d) ἂν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν ἐκεῖ;
οὐ γὰρ ἄν που πάλιν ἐγίγνοντο μὴ οὖσαι, καὶ τοῦτο ἱκανὸν τεκμήριον τοῦ ταῦτ᾽ εἶναι,
εἰ τῷ ὄντι φανερὸν γίγνοιτο ὅτι οὐδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν γίγνονται οἱ ζῶντες ἢ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων·
εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι τοῦτο, ἄλλου ἄν του δέοι λόγου.
Consideremus autem ipsum quocumque modo, sive vero in Averno sunt anime defunctorum hominum sive eciam ubi.
Vetus igitur est quidam sermo iste cuius meminimus, quoniam sunt istinc abeuntes illuc,
et iterum hue advenientes et fiunt ex mortuis;
et si hoc sic se habet, iterum fieri ex defunctis vivos,
aliud quid quam ut sint quidem anime nostre ibi?
Non enim alicubi iterum fierent si non extitissent, et hoc sufficiens argumentum ista esse,
si pro vero clarum fiat quoniam neutiquam aliunde fiunt vivi quam ex mortuis,
si vero non est hoc, alia quacumque aliqua indiget racione.”
id hoc pacto consideremus, utrum videlicet (44) apud inferos sint mortuorum animae nec ne.
Vetus quidem hic extat sermo cuius memo(45)res sumus, abire quidem illuc animas defunctorum
rursusque huc reverti fierique ex mor(46)tuis.
Atqui si hoc verum est, ut ex mortuis iterum viventes fiant,
essent animae illic nostrae.
(47) Neque enim rursus fierent si alicubi non essent. Atque haec sufficiens coniectura est ita esse,
si (48) revera constet haud aliunde viventes fieri quam ex mortuis.
At vero nisi id sit, alia opus (49) erit ratione."
Suppose we consider the question whether the souls of men after death are or are not in the world below.
There comes into my mind an ancient doctrine which affirms that they go from hence into the other world,
and returning hither, are born again from the dead.
Now if it be true that the living come from the dead,
then our souls must exist in the other world,
for if not, how could they have been born again? And this would be conclusive,
if there were any real evidence that the living are only born from the dead;
but if this is not so, then other arguments will have to be adduced.
μὴ τοίνυν κατ᾽ ἀνθρώπων, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, σκόπει μόνον τοῦτο, εἰ βούλει ῥᾷον μαθεῖν,
ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ ζῴων πάντων καὶ φυτῶν, καὶ συλλήβδην ὅσαπερ ἔχει γένεσιν περὶ πάντων (70e1)
ἴδωμεν ἆρ᾽ οὑτωσὶ γίγνεται πάντα, οὐκ ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία,
ὅσοις τυγχάνει ὂν τοιοῦτόν τι, οἷον τὸ καλὸν τῷ αἰσχρῷ ἐναντίον που καὶ δίκαιον ἀδίκῳ, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία οὕτως ἔχει.
τοῦτο οὖν σκεψώμεθα, ἆρα ἀναγκαῖον ὅσοις ἔστι τι ἐναντίον, μηδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ γίγνεσθαι ἢ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτῷ ἐναντίου.
οἷον ὅταν μεῖζόν τι γίγνηται, ἀνάγκη που ἐξ ἐλάττονος ὄντος πρότερον ἔπειτα μεῖζον γίγνεσθαι;
“Neve itaque de hominibus” ait ille “considera solum istud, si vis facile addiscere,
immo de animalibus universis et plantis, et universaliter quecumque habent generacionem,
de omnibus videamus an sic fiant universa et non aliunde quam ex contrariis contraria,
quibuscumque contingit esse tale quid, quale honestum turpi contrarium aliquo modo et iustum iniusto, et alia decem milia sic se habent.
Hoc igitur consideremus, utrum necesse quibuscumque est contrarium, haut aliunde ipsum fieri quam ex sibi ipsi contrario.
Quemadmodum cum maius quid fiat, necesse aliquo modo ex minore existente prius deinceps maius fieri.”
"Neque vero id in hominibus solum," inquit, "si pla(50)nius intelligere vis, consideres,
sed in animalibus omnibus et plantis atque, ut summatim(51) dicam, in omnibus quae gignuntur. [marg: Generationem fieri a contrarijs]
in his, inquam, omnibus consideremus nunquid om(52)nia sic fiant neque aliunde quam ex contrarijs contraria,
quibuscunque tale aliquid contin(53)git, quemadmodum pulchrum turpi quodammodo contrarium est et iustum iniusto a(54)liaque eiusmodi quamplurima videmus.
Ergo utrum necessarium sit, cuicunque aliquid est (498, 1) contrarium, nullo modo aliunde id quam ex suo contrario fieri?
Veluti quando quid ma(2)ius efficitur, necesse est ex eo quod ante fuerat minus, postea maius evadere."
Then let us consider the whole question, not in relation to man only,
but in relation to animals generally, and to plants, and to everything of which there is generation, and the proof will be easier.
Are not all things which have opposites generated out of their opposites?
I mean such things as good and evil, just and unjust--and there are innumerable other opposites which are generated out of opposites.
And I want to show that in all opposites there is of necessity a similar alternation; I mean to say,
for example, that anything which becomes greater must become greater after being less.
τί δ᾽ αὖ; ἔστι τι καὶ τοιόνδε ἐν αὐτοῖς, οἷον μεταξὺ ἀμφοτέρων πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων δυοῖν ὄντοιν δύο γενέσεις, (71b) ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ ἑτέρου ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ἀπὸ δ᾽ αὖ τοῦ ἑτέρου πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον·
μείζονος μὲν πράγματος καὶ ἐλάττονος μεταξὺ αὔξησις καὶ φθίσις, καὶ καλοῦμεν οὕτω τὸ μὲν αὐξάνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ φθίνειν;
SOCRATES. “Quid iterum? Est amplius et tale eciam in ipsis, quemadmodum inter utraque cuncta contraria duum existencium due generaciones, ab altera quidem in alterum, rursus ab altero iterum in alterum.
Maiorem enim rem et minorem inter augmentum et diminucio, atque appellamus ita hoc quidem augeri, illud vero minui?”
"Quid rursus?" inquit. "Est ne medium aliquid in(8)ter contraria duo? Duae videlicet inter illa generationes sive progressiones ab altero qui(9)dem in alterum, atque in alterum vicissim ab altero?
Sane inter maius atque minus me(10)dium obtinet incrementum et decrementum, dicimusque id quidem crescere, illud ve(11)ro decrescere."
And in this universal opposition of all things, are there not also two intermediate processes which are ever going on, from one to the other opposite, and back again;
where there is a greater and a less there is also an intermediate process of increase and diminution, and that which grows is said to wax, and that which decays to wane?
οὐκοῦν καὶ διακρίνεσθαι καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι, καὶ ψύχεσθαι καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι, καὶ πάντα οὕτω, κἂν εἰ μὴ χρώμεθα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἐνιαχοῦ, ἀλλ᾽ ἔργῳ γοῦν πανταχοῦ οὕτως ἔχειν ἀναγκαῖον, γίγνεσθαί τε αὐτὰ ἐξ ἀλλήλων γένεσίν τε εἶναι ἑκατέρου εἰς ἄλληλα;
SOCRATES. “Nonne igitur et disgregari et coartari, et algere atque calefieri, atque universa sic, tametsi non utamur nominibus alicubi, verum opere ubique ita se habere necesse est, fieri ipsa ex invicem generacionemque ex utroque in invicem?”
"Nonne similiter discerni vicissim atque confundi, (12) frigescere et incalescere, omniaque eodem pacto? Et si nomina nobis desunt alicubi, ubi(13)que tamen ita necesse est fieri, videlicet omnia ex contrarijs invicem generationemque es(14)se utriusque vicissim in alterum?"
And there are many other processes, such as division and composition, cooling and heating, which equally involve a passage into and out of one another. And this necessarily holds of all opposites, even though not always expressed in words--they are really generated out of one another, and there is a passing or process from one to the other of them?
ἰδὲ τοίνυν οὕτως, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ὅτι οὐδ᾽ ἀδίκως ὡμολογήκαμεν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ.
εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀεὶ ἀνταποδιδοίη τὰ (72b) ἕτερα τοῖς ἑτέροις γιγνόμενα, ὡσπερεὶ κύκλῳ περιιόντα,
ἀλλ᾽ εὐθεῖά τις εἴη ἡ γένεσις ἐκ τοῦ ἑτέρου μόνον εἰς τὸ καταντικρὺ καὶ μὴ ἀνακάμπτοι πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον μηδὲ καμπὴν ποιοῖτο,
οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι πάντα τελευτῶντα τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα ἂν σχοίη καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ἂν πάθοι καὶ παύσαιτο γιγνόμενα;
“Vide igitur” ait, “O Cebes, quoniam non iniuste fassi sumus, ut michi videtur.
Si enim non semper reddantur altera alteris facta, quemadmodum in giro circumeuncia,
sed directa quedam sit generacio ex altero dumtaxat in oppositum, et non recurvetur iterum in alterum neque reflexum faciat,
nosti quomam universa intereuncia eamdem figuram fingant et eamdem passionem paciantur, atque desinere que fiunt?”
"Animadverte ergo," inquit, "o Cebes, haud ab re nos haec, (37) ut arbitror, concessisse.
Nisi enim continue altera vicissim alteris redderentur quasi quo(38)dam circulo remeantia,
sed directa quaedam progressio foret duntaxat ex altero in eius op(39)positum, neque rursus reflecterentur in alterum facerentque regressum,
omnia tandem, mihi (40) crede, eandem subirent figuram atque passionem fierique cessarent."
And that these admissions were not unfair, Cebes, he said, may be shown, I think, as follows:
If generation were in a straight line only, and there were no compensation or circle in nature,
no turn or return of elements into their opposites,
then you know that all things would at last have the same form and pass into the same state, and there would be no more generation of them.
οὐδὲν χαλεπόν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ἐννοῆσαι ὃ λέγω·
ἀλλ᾽ οἷον εἰ τὸ καταδαρθάνειν μὲν εἴη,
τὸ δ᾽ ἀνεγείρεσθαι μὴ ἀνταποδιδοίη γιγνόμενον ἐκ τοῦ καθεύδοντος, οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι τελευτῶντα πάντ᾽ (72c) <ἂν> λῆρον τὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα ἀποδείξειεν καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἂν φαίνοιτο διὰ τὸ καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ταὐτὸν ἐκείνῳ πεπονθέναι, καθεύδειν.
κἂν εἰ συγκρίνοιτο μὲν πάντα, διακρίνοιτο δὲ μή, ταχὺ ἂν τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου γεγονὸς εἴη, “ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα”.
ὡσαύτως δέ, ὦ φίλε Κέβης, καὶ εἰ ἀποθνῄσκοι μὲν πάντα ὅσα τοῦ ζῆν μεταλάβοι, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀποθάνοι, μένοι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι τὰ τεθνεῶτα καὶ μὴ πάλιν ἀναβιώσκοιτο, ἆρ᾽ οὐ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη τελευτῶντα πάντα (72d) τεθνάναι καὶ μηδὲν ζῆν;
εἰ γὰρ ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων τὰ ζῶντα γίγνοιτο, τὰ δὲ ζῶντα θνῄσκοι, τίς μηχανὴ μὴ οὐχὶ πάντα καταναλωθῆναι εἰς τὸ τεθνάναι;
“Non difficile” inquit ille “intelligere quod aio;
verum possibile, si dormire quoque fiat,
expergisci vero non reddatur factum ex dormiente nosti quoniam finem capiencia cunda delirum Endimionem ostendent, et nusquam utiquam comparebunt eo quod cetera cuncta idem illi paciantur, dormire.
Et si coartentur universa, divellantur autem minime, forsan id quod est Anaxagore factum erit ‘simul universas res.’
Similiter, O amice Cebes, et si moriantur omnia quecumque vita participant, ex quo defunda erunt, manebunt in hac figura que mortua sunt et non iterato reviviscent, itaque nonne plurima necessitas finem habencia cunda mori et nichil vivere?
Si enim ex aliis vivencia gignantur, vivenciaque moriuntur, que possibilitas haut omnia consumi in moriendo?”
"Haudquaquam intellectu difficile est", inquit, "quod loquor.
Perinde e(42)nim ac si in somnum caderetur quidem,
ab eo vere in vigiliam nunquam resurgeretur, mi(43)nime te latet omnia tandem eo deventura, ut Endymion ridicula quaedam fabula videa(44)tur, neque appareat usquam, cum caetera quoque universa somno similiter opprimantur.
Pro(45)inde si confunderentur quidem omnia, nunquam vero discernerentur, Anaxagoras illud (46) repente contingeret, universa videlicet esse simul.
Eadem ratione, o amice Cebes, si quae(47)cunque vitam acceperint moriantur, mortua vero cum fuerint, mortua relinquantur ne(48)que iterum reviviscant, an non necessarium est omnino cuncta demum interijsse nihilque (49) vivere?
Nam si ex alijs quidem viventia fierent, postea vero perirent, quid obstaret quo(50)minus in interitum cuncta consumerentur?"
A simple thing enough,
which I will illustrate by the case of sleep, he replied.
You know that if there were no alternation of sleeping and waking, the tale of the sleeping Endymion would in the end have no meaning, because all other things would be asleep, too, and he would not be distinguishable from the rest.
Or if there were composition only, and no division of substances, then the chaos of Anaxagoras would come again.
And in like manner, my dear Cebes, if all things which partook of life were to die, and after they were dead remained in the form of death, and did not come to life again, all would at last die, and nothing would be alive--what other result could there be?
For if the living spring from any other things, and they too die, must not all things at last be swallowed up in death? (But compare Republic.)
ἔστιν γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτω,
καὶ ἡμεῖς αὐτὰ ταῦτα οὐκ ἐξαπατώμενοι ὁμολογοῦμεν,
ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι τῷ ὄντι καὶ τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων τοὺς ζῶντας γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὰς τῶν τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς (72e) εἶναι [καὶ ταῖς μέν γε ἀγαθαῖς ἄμεινον εἶναι, ταῖς δὲ κακαῖς κάκιον].
“Est enim” infit, “O Cebes, ut michi videtur, universo magis ita,
et nos ipsa hec non seducti confitemur.
Sed est in re vera et reviviscere atque ex defundis viventcs gigni necnon defunctorum animas extare et bonis e melius esse, malis autem deterius.”
"Est certe, o Cebes," inquit, "maxime omnium ita ut mi(52)hi videtur,
neque nos haec ipsa quasi decepti confessi sumus,
sed revera reviviscentia est, (53) atque ex mortuis viventes fiunt, mortuorumque supersunt animae. Atque bonis quidem (54) melius est, malis vero peius."
Yes, he said, Cebes, it is and must be so, in my opinion;
and we have not been deluded in making these admissions;
but I am confident that there truly is such a thing as living again, and that the living spring from the dead, and that the souls of the dead are in existence, and that the good souls have a better portion than the evil.
καὶ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης ὑπολαβών, καὶ κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνόν γε τὸν λόγον, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ ἀληθής ἐστιν, ὃν σὺ εἴωθας θαμὰ λέγειν, ὅτι ἡμῖν ἡ μάθησις οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀνάμνησις τυγχάνει οὖσα, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον ἀνάγκη που ἡμᾶς ἐν προτέρῳ τινὶ χρόνῳ μεμαθηκέναι ἃ νῦν ἀναμιμνῃσκόμεθα.
τοῦτο δὲ (73a) ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ ἦν που ἡμῖν ἡ ψυχὴ πρὶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ εἴδει γενέσθαι·
ὥστε καὶ ταύτῃ ἀθάνατον ἡ ψυχή τι ἔοικεν εἶναι.
“Eciam” inquit Cebes inferens “et iuxta mum sermonem, O Socrate, si verus est, quem tu consuevisti crebro dicere, quia nobis disciplina minime aliud quid quam monimentum contingit esse, atque secundum istum necesse ubi nos in priori aliquo tempore didicisse quorum nunc meminimus.
Hoc autem impossibile, si non esset ubi nostra anima prius quam in hoc humano fieret;
unde et ipsa immortale quid videtur anima esse.”
Atqui et secundum illud, o Socrates," inquit Cebes, "quod (499, 1) frequenter usurpare soles, si modo verum est disciplinam videlicet nostram nihil esse aliud (2) quam reminiscentiam. Et secundum hoc, inquam, necesse est nos in superiori quodam tem(3)pore ea quorum nunc reminiscimur didicisse.
Id vero fieri non posset, nisi prius anima no(4)stra fuisset alicubi quam in hanc humanam speciem deveniret.
Quamobrem et hac ra(5)tione immortale quiddam anima videtur esse."
Cebes added: Your favorite doctrine, Socrates, that knowledge is simply recollection, if true, also necessarily implies a previous time in which we have learned that which we now recollect.
But this would be impossible unless our soul had been in some place before existing in the form of man;
here then is another proof of the soul's immortality.
ἑνὶ μὲν λόγῳ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, καλλίστῳ, ὅτι ἐρωτώμενοι οἱ ἄνθρωποι,
ἐάν τις καλῶς ἐρωτᾷ, αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν πάντα ᾗ ἔχει
--καίτοι εἰ μὴ ἐτύγχανεν αὐτοῖς ἐπιστήμη ἐνοῦσα καὶ ὀρθὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἂν οἷοί τ᾽ ἦσαν τοῦτο ποιῆσαι
--ἔπειτα (73b) ἐάν τις ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἄγῃ ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἐνταῦθα σαφέστατα κατηγορεῖ ὅτι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει.
“Una autem racione” inquit Cebes “potissima, quoniam interrogari homines
si quis bene sciscitatus fuerit, ipsi dicunt cuncta praut se habent
– et, si non contingeret ipsis sciencia inesse et recta racio, non utique valerent hoc efficere;-
dehinc si quis ad descripciones agat sive aliud quid talium, hic evidentissime predicet quia hoc ita se habet.”
"Vna quidem ratio est pulcherrima", inquit Cebes, "quod interrogati homines
si quis (8) eos recte interroget, ipsi omnia quemadmodum sunt respondent
atqui nunquam id face(9)re possent nisi inesset ipsis scientia rectaque ratio.
Deinde siquis eos ad geometricas figuras (10) descriptionesque vel simile aliquid converterit, ibi manifeste comperiet ita id se habere."
One excellent proof, said Cebes, is afforded by questions.
If you put a question to a person in a right way, he will give a true answer of himself,
but how could he do this unless there were knowledge and right reason already in him?
And this is most clearly shown when he is taken to a diagram or to anything of that sort. (Compare Meno.)
εἰ δὲ μὴ ταύτῃ γε, ἔφη, πείθῃ, ὦ Σιμμία, ὁ Σωκράτης, σκέψαι ἂν τῇδέ πῄ σοι σκοπουμένῳ συνδόξῃ.
ἀπιστεῖς γὰρ δὴ πῶς ἡ καλουμένη μάθησις ἀνάμνησίς ἐστιν;
“Sin autem non hactenus” infit “persuaderis, O Simmia,” Socrates, “considera utique qualiter tibi consideranti complaceat.
Incredulus es enim quomodo que vocatur disciplina monimentum est?”
(11) Si haec, o Simmia, ratio", inquit Socrates, "tibi non satisfacit, attende, an sic tibi consideranti (12) idem quod nobis videatur.
Diffidis enim eam quam disciplinam vocant, reminiscentiam esse (13) posse."
But if, said Socrates, you are still incredulous, Simmias, I would ask you whether you may not agree with me when you look at the matter in another way;
--I mean, if you are still incredulous as to whether knowledge is recollection.
ἀπιστῶ μέν [σοι] ἔγωγε, ἦ δ᾽ ὃς ὁ Σιμμίας, οὔ, αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔφη, δέομαι παθεῖν περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, ἀναμνησθῆναι.
καὶ σχεδόν γε ἐξ ὧν Κέβης ἐπεχείρησε λέγειν ἤδη μέμνημαι καὶ πείθομαι·
οὐδὲν μεντἂν ἧττον ἀκούοιμι νῦν πῇ σὺ ἐπεχείρησας λέγειν.
“Incredulus sum ego” ait ille “nequaquam; hoc vera ipsum indigeo discere de quo sermo, reminisci.
Et ferme ex quibus Cebes conatus est dicere, iam memini atque persuadeor.
Nichilo autem minus audirem nunc, tu qualiter conatus es dicere.”
"Haud quidem diffido", inquit Simmias. "Veruntamen id expedit mihi discere de (14) quo sermo est, scilicet reminisci.
Ac ferme ex his quae Cebes coepit dicere, iam recordor et (15) credo.
Nihilo minus tamen et a te, o Socrates, qua ratione id modo probare ipse aggredie(16)baris, perlibenter audirem."
Incredulous, I am not, said Simmias; but I want to have this doctrine of recollection brought to my own recollection,
and, from what Cebes has said, I am beginning to recollect and be convinced;
but I should still like to hear what you were going to say.
ἆρ᾽ οὖν καὶ τόδε ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν ἐπιστήμη παραγίγνηται τρόπῳ τοιούτῳ, ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι;
λέγω δὲ τίνα τρόπον; τόνδε.
ἐάν τίς τι ἕτερον ἢ ἰδὼν ἢ ἀκούσας ἤ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν λαβὼν μὴ μόνον ἐκεῖνο γνῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕτερον ἐννοήσῃ οὗ μὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλη, ἆρα οὐχὶ τοῦτο δικαίως λέγομεν ὅτι ἀνεμνήσθη, οὗ τὴν ἔννοιαν (73d) ἔλαβεν;
SOCRATES. “Ergo igitur, eciam hoc fatebimur, cum sciencia advenerit modo tali, recordacionem esse?
Dico autem aliquem modum hunc:
si quis quid prius aut videns aut audiens aut aliquem alium sensum suscipiens, non solum illud cognoverit, verum eciam aliud intellexerit cuius non eadem sciencia sed alia, igitur nonne ilIius iuste dicimus quoniam recordatus fuerit, cuius intelligenciam suscepit?”
"Nunquid ergo et hoc confitemur," inquit, "quoties scientia hoc mo(19)do provenit, reminiscentiam eam esse?" [marg: Quid reminiscentia]
Dico autem hoc pacto:
siquis aliud quiddam vide(20)rit vel audiverit vel alio perceperit sensu, neque solum idipsum cognoscat, verum etiam a(21)gnoscat1 aliud quiddam, cuius non una eademque, sed alia scientia sit, nonne merito dicemus (22) hunc eius rei reminisci in cuius pervenerit notionem?"
And what is the nature of this knowledge or recollection?
I mean to ask,
Whether a person who, having seen or heard or in any way perceived anything, knows not only that, but has a conception of something else which is the subject, not of the same but of some other kind of knowledge, may not be fairly said to recollect that of which he has the conception?
πόθεν λαβόντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην;
ἆρ᾽ οὐκ ἐξ ὧν νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἢ ξύλα ἢ λίθους ἢ ἄλλα ἄττα ἰδόντες ἴσα, ἐκ τούτων ἐκεῖνο ἐνενοήσαμεν, ἕτερον ὂν τούτων;
ἢ οὐχ ἕτερόν σοι φαίνεται;
σκόπει δὲ καὶ τῇδε.
ἆρ᾽ οὐ λίθοι μὲν ἴσοι καὶ ξύλα ἐνίοτε ταὐτὰ ὄντα τῷ μὲν ἴσα φαίνεται, τῷ δ᾽ οὔ;
SOCRATES. “Unde sumens illius scienciam?
Numquid non ex quibus nunc diximus, seu ligna seu lapides, seu alia aliqua videntes equalia, ex hiis illud intelleximus, diversum ens hoc?
Seu non diversum tibi videtur?
Attende eciam et hoc modo:
ergo nonne lapides quidem equales et ligna interdum eadem cum sint, nunc autem equalia videntur, nunc vero minime?”
“Vndenam (42) scientiam eius accepimus?
An non ex his quae modo diximus, videlicet conspicati vel li(43)gna vel saxa vel alia quaedam aequalia, ex his illud excogitamus, quod aliud est quam (44) haec?
An non aliud quiddam apparet?
Considera vero et hoc pacto.
Nonne saxa vel li(45)gna aequalia dum eadem sunt, alias aequalia, alias inaequalia nobis apparent?”
And whence did we obtain our knowledge?
Did we not see equalities of material things, such as pieces of wood and stones, and gather from them the idea of an equality which is different from them?
For you will acknowledge that there is a difference.
Or look at the matter in another way:
--Do not the same pieces of wood or stone appear at one time equal, and at another time unequal?
οὐκοῦν ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν τίς τι ἰδὼν ἐννοήσῃ ὅτι βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο ὃ νῦν ἐγὼ ὁρῶ εἶναι οἷον ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων, (74e) ἐνδεῖ δὲ καὶ οὐ δύναται τοιοῦτον εἶναι [ἴσον] οἷον ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν φαυλότερον, ἀναγκαῖόν που τὸν τοῦτο ἐννοοῦντα τυχεῖν προειδότα ἐκεῖνο ᾧ φησιν αὐτὸ προσεοικέναι μέν, ἐνδεεστέρως δὲ ἔχειν;
SOCRATES.· “Nonne ergo fatemur, quociens quis quid videns animadverterit quoniam vult quidem hoc, quod nunc ego conspicio, esse quale aliud quid eorum que sunt, deficit autem et nequit tale esse equale quale illud, immo est deterius, necesse quoque eum qui hoc mente perpenderit prescisse illud cui ait ipsum assimilari, minus vera habere?”
“Nonne confitemur quando quis aliquid intuens animadvertat appetere qui(3)dem hoc quod in praesentia videt, esse tale quale quiddam aliud ex his quae sunt, verum de(4)ficere neque posse tale esse aequale, quale sit illud illud, sed deterius esse, necesse esse eum qui ani(5)madvertit, ante cognovisse illud cui dicit hoc quodammodo simile fieri, sed ad plenam simi(6)litudinem non accedere?”
And must we not allow, that when I or any one, looking at any object, observes that the thing which he sees aims at being some other thing, but falls short of, and cannot be, that other thing, but is inferior, he who makes this observation must have had a previous knowledge of that to which the other, although similar, was inferior?
οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν λαβόντες αὐτὴν πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἔχοντες ἐγενόμεθα, ἠπιστάμεθα καὶ πρὶν γενέσθαι καὶ εὐθὺς γενόμενοι οὐ μόνον τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ μεῖζον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἀλλὰ καὶ σύμπαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα;
οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἴσου νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν μᾶλλόν τι ἢ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ (75d) ἀγαθοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ὁσίου καί, ὅπερ λέγω, περὶ ἁπάντων οἷς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα τὸ “αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστι” καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν ἀποκρινόμενοι.
ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν τούτων πάντων τὰς ἐπιστήμας πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι εἰληφέναι.
SOCRATES. “Nonne igitur si sumpsimus ipsam ante quam gigneremur habentes geniti sumus, scivimus eciam ante quam gigneremur et statim geniti, non solum equale et maius et minus, verum eciam cuncta huiusmodi?
Non enim de equali nunc sermo nobis magis quam eciam de ipso hoc pulcro et ipso hoc bono et iusto et sancto, et, quod dico, de universis quibus insignimus ‘hoc quod est’ et in questionibus percunctantes et in responsionibus respondentes.
Quas ob res necessarium nobis esse istorum omnium sciencias ante quam gigneremur sumpsisse.”
“Nonne si eam sortiti ante nativitatem ipsam iam (23) habentes nati sumus, scivimus et ante ortum atque statim nati non solum ipsum aequale ma(24)iusque et minus, verumetiam eiusdem generis omnia?
Non enim de aequali magis nunc no(25)bis est sermo, quam de ipso pulchro, de ipso bono, de ipso iusto atque sancto et ut dico de (26) omnibus quibus proprie 'hoc ipsum quod est' assignamus et interrogationibus interro(27)gantes et responsionibus respondentes,
ut necessarium sit nos antequam nasceremur horum (28) omnium scientiam habuisse.”
And if we acquired this knowledge before we were born, and were born having the use of it, then we also knew before we were born and at the instant of birth not only the equal or the greater or the less, but all other ideas;
for we are not speaking only of equality, but of beauty, goodness, justice, holiness, and of all which we stamp with the name of essence in the dialectical process, both when we ask and when we answer questions.
Of all this we may certainly affirm that we acquired the knowledge before birth?
(76a) δυνατὸν γὰρ δὴ τοῦτό γε ἐφάνη, αἰσθόμενόν τι ἢ ἰδόντα ἢ ἀκούσαντα ἤ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν λαβόντα ἕτερόν τι ἀπὸ τούτου ἐννοῆσαι ὃ ἐπελέληστο, ᾧ τοῦτο ἐπλησίαζεν ἀνόμοιον ὂν ἢ ᾧ ὅμοιον·
ὥστε, ὅπερ λέγω, δυοῖν θάτερα,
ἤτοι ἐπιστάμενοί γε αὐτὰ γεγόναμεν καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα διὰ βίου πάντες,
ἢ ὕστερον, οὕς φαμεν μανθάνειν, οὐδὲν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἀναμιμνῄσκονται οὗτοι, καὶ ἡ μάθησις ἀνάμνησις ἂν εἴη.
SOCRATES. “Possibile enim hoc eciam apparuit, sensu percipiente quid vel videntem vel audientem vel aliquem alium sensum sumentem, diversum quid ab hoc animo concepisse, quod oblivione deletum crat, cui hoc assimilatum est simile existens vel cui dissimile.
Eapropter, quod dico, duorum alterum,
vel scientes illa geniti sumus vel scimus in vita universi,
vel posterius, quos dicimus addiscere, nichil nisi reminiscuntur illi, et disciplina mencio utique erit.”
“Fieri enim id posse apparuit. Videli(35)cet, ut cum quis aliquid senserit vel audiendo vel aliter sentiendo, aliud quid(36)dam ex hoc agnoscat cuius erat oblitus, cui quidem hoc quodammodo propinquabat, sive (37) simile id sit sive dissimile.
Ita quod iampridem dico, e duobus alterum.
Aut enim scientes nati (38) sumus, scimusque per omnem vitam omnes,
aut quos deinde dicimus discere, duntaxat re(39)miniscuntur atque disciplina reminiscentia est.”
So much is clear--that when we perceive something, either by the help of sight, or hearing, or some other sense, from that perception we are able to obtain a notion of some other thing like or unlike which is associated with it but has been forgotten.
Whence, as I was saying, one of two alternatives follows:
--either we had this knowledge at birth, and continued to know through life;
or, after birth, those who are said to learn only remember, and learning is simply recollection.
ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὕτως ἔχει, ἔφη, ἡμῖν, ὦ Σιμμία;
εἰ μὲν ἔστιν ἃ θρυλοῦμεν ἀεί, καλόν τέ τι καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη οὐσία,
καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πάντα ἀναφέρομεν, (76e) ὑπάρχουσαν πρότερον ἀνευρίσκοντες ἡμετέραν οὖσαν, καὶ ταῦτα ἐκείνῃ ἀπεικάζομεν, ἀναγκαῖον, οὕτως ὥσπερ καὶ ταῦτα ἔστιν, οὕτως καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν εἶναι καὶ πρὶν γεγονέναι ἡμᾶς·
εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι ταῦτα, ἄλλως ἂν ὁ λόγος οὗτος εἰρημένος εἴη;
ἆρ᾽ οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἴση ἀνάγκη ταῦτά τε εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας ψυχὰς πρὶν καὶ ἡμᾶς γεγονέναι, καὶ εἰ μὴ ταῦτα, οὐδὲ τάδε;
SOCRATES. “Ergo igitur sic” inquit “nobis habet, O Simmia?
Si vero sunt que ruminamus semper, pulcrum quid et bonum et omnis huiusmodi essencia,
et ad hanc que ex sensibus cuncta retorquemus, existentem prius adinvenientes quod nostra sit, et hec ad illius exemplar ducimus, necesse, ita ut eciam hec sunt, sic eciam nostram animam esse et ante quam gignamur nos;
si vero minime sunt hec, aliter quidem sermo hic dictus erit?
Itaque sic se habet, et eque necessarium hec quidem esse, et nostras animas prius quam gigneremur, et si non hec, neque illa?”
“An ergo sic nobis se res habet, o Simmia?
Siquidem sunt ea quae quotidie (501, 1) praedicamus, pulchrum scilicet quiddam atque bonum et omnis eiusmodi essentia,
ad (2) quam omnia sensibus percepta referimus, quae et prius erant nostra, et tanquam nostram (3) quaerentes invenimus atque ad ipsius exemplar referimus, necesse est ita ut et ipsa sunt (4) nostram quoque animam prius etiam quam nasceremur extitisse.
At si haec non sunt, frustra (5) utique ratio haec tractata esset.
An non ita se habet, atque par necessitas est, et ipsa esse, et a(6)nimas nostras antequam nascerentur, et nisi ipsa sunt neque haec utique sunt.”
Then may we not say, Simmias,
that if, as we are always repeating, there is an absolute beauty, and goodness, and an absolute essence of all things;
and if to this, which is now discovered to have existed in our former state, we refer all our sensations, and with this compare them, finding these ideas to be pre-existent and our inborn possession--then our souls must have had a prior existence,
but if not, there would be no force in the argument?
There is the same proof that these ideas must have existed before we were born, as that our souls existed before we were born; and if not the ideas, then not the souls.
ὑπερφυῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, δοκεῖ μοι ἡ αὐτὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι,
καὶ εἰς καλόν γε καταφεύγει ὁ λόγος εἰς (77a) τὸ ὁμοίως εἶναι τήν τε ψυχὴν ἡμῶν πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἣν σὺ νῦν λέγεις.
οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἔγωγε οὐδὲν οὕτω μοι ἐναργὲς ὂν ὡς τοῦτο, τὸ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτ᾽ εἶναι ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα, καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ἃ σὺ νυνδὴ ἔλεγες·
καὶ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἱκανῶς ἀποδέδεικται.
“Supra naturam” ait, “O Socrate,’ Simmias “videtur michi eadem necessitas esse,
et in bonum refugit sermo in similiter esse, animamque nostram ante quam gigneremur nos et essenciam quam tu nunc dicis.
Non enim habeo ego quiddam sic michi promptum quemadmodum hoc, universa talia esse ve1ut quale maxime, pulcrumque et bonum et cetera omnia que tu nunc disseruisti;
et michi sufficienter demonstratum est.”
“Mirifice, o (7) Socrates. Eadem mihi videtur esse necessitas,
atque pulcherrima huc ratio nos perducit, (8) ut similiter tam animam nostram quam essentiam ipsam quam modo dicebas, ante quam (9) nasceremur exstitisse confiteamur.
Nihil enim tam certum habeo, quam esse eiusmodi o(10)mnia et quidem maxime, scilicet pulchrum ipsum et bonum aliaque omnia quae tu mo(11)do dicebas.
Et quantum ad me attinet, satis est demonstratum.”
Yes, Socrates; I am convinced that there is precisely the same necessity for the one as for the other;
and the argument retreats successfully to the position that the existence of the soul before birth cannot be separated from the existence of the essence of which you speak.
For there is nothing which to my mind is so patent as that beauty, goodness, and the other notions of which you were just now speaking, have a most real and absolute existence;
and I am satisfied with the proof.
ἱκανῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὡς ἔγωγε οἶμαι·
καίτοι καρτερώτατος ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶν πρὸς τὸ ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις.
ἀλλ᾽ οἶμαι οὐκ ἐνδεῶς τοῦτο πεπεῖσθαι αὐτόν, ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι (77b) ἡμᾶς ἦν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή·
εἰ μέντοι καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν ἔτι ἔσται, οὐδὲ αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποδεδεῖχθαι,
ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι ἐνέστηκεν ὃ νυνδὴ Κέβης ἔλεγε, τὸ τῶν πολλῶν, ὅπως μὴ ἅμα ἀποθνῄσκοντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου διασκεδάννυται ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ αὐτῇ τοῦ εἶναι τοῦτο τέλος ᾖ.
τί γὰρ κωλύει γίγνεσθαι μὲν αὐτὴν καὶ συνίστασθαι ἄλλοθέν ποθεν καὶ εἶναι πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπειον σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἀφίκηται καὶ ἀπαλλάττηται τούτου, τότε καὶ αὐτὴν τελευτᾶν καὶ διαφθείρεσθαι;
“Sufficienter” ait Simmias, “ut ego quidem autumo;
tamen obstinatissimus hominum est ad non credendum raciocinacionibus;
atque reor non indigenter hoc persuaderi ei, quia ante quam gignamur nos erat nostra anima.
Si veto eciam ex quo expiraverimus adhuc erit, neque ipsi videtur michi, O Socrate, demonstrari;
immo adhuc institit quod nunc Cebes dicebat, id quod est multorum, quomodo non simul obeunte homine discindatur anima et ipsi existendi hic finis sit.
Quid namque prohibet fieri ipsam et constare aliunde ex quocumque et esse prius quam ipsa in humanum corpus veniat, ex quo vera abierit et recedat ab hoc, tunc et ipsam finem capere et corrumpi?”
“Satis et illi arbitror persuasum,” inquit Sim(13)mias,
“quamvis omnium repugnantissimus sit et ad credendum tardissimus.
Opinor ta(14)men sufficienter illi probatum, ante ortum nostrum animam extitisse.
An vero post in(15)teritum nostrum etiam futura sit nec mihi quidem ipsi, o Socrates, satis adhuc videtur (16) ostensum.
Sed nunc etiam restat multorum dubitatio illa quam in medium Cebes addu(17)xerat, ne videlicet homine moriente simul anima dissipetur atque ita esse desinat.
Quid e(18)nim prohibet fieri quidem illam et aliunde constitui atque esse prius etiam quam in cor(19)pus hominis laberetur, postquam vero ab eo discesserit, tunc illam insuper interire?”
I think, said Simmias, that Cebes is satisfied:
although he is the most incredulous of mortals,
yet I believe that he is sufficiently convinced of the existence of the soul before birth.
But that after death the soul will continue to exist is not yet proven even to my own satisfaction.
I cannot get rid of the feeling of the many to which Cebes was referring--the feeling that when the man dies the soul will be dispersed, and that this may be the extinction of her.
For admitting that she may have been born elsewhere, and framed out of other elements, and was in existence before entering the human body, why after having entered in and gone out again may she not herself be destroyed and come to an end?
(77c) εὖ λέγεις, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, ὁ Κέβης.
φαίνεται γὰρ ὥσπερ ἥμισυ ἀποδεδεῖχθαι οὗ δεῖ,
ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς ἦν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή,
δεῖ δὲ προσαποδεῖξαι ὅτι καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν οὐδὲν ἧττον ἔσται ἢ πρὶν γενέσθαι, εἰ μέλλει τέλος ἡ ἀπόδειξις ἕξειν.
“Bene inquis” ait, “O Simmia,” Cebes,
“Liquet quippe velut dimidium demonstrari quod oportet,
quoniam ante quam gignamur nos erat nostra anima;
oportet sane simul demonstrare adhuc si, eciam ut obierimus, non minus erit quam prius fuerit, si debet finem demonstracio habere.”
“Re(20)cte loqueris, Simmia”, inquit Cebes.
“Videtur enim quasi dimidium eius quod oportet (21) probatum,
ante videlicet quam nasceremur nostram animam extitisse,
oportere autem (22) id quoque ostendere, postquam mortui fuerimus non minus fore quam esset antequam (23) nasceremur, si modo finem suum demonstratio sit habitura.”
Very true, Simmias, said Cebes;
about half of what was required has been proven;
to wit, that our souls existed before we were born:
--that the soul will exist after death as well as before birth is the other half of which the proof is still wanting, and has to be supplied; when that is given the demonstration will be complete.
ἀποδέδεικται μέν, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ νῦν, εἰ ᾽θέλετε συνθεῖναι τοῦτόν τε τὸν λόγον εἰς ταὐτὸν καὶ ὃν πρὸ τούτου ὡμολογήσαμεν, τὸ γίγνεσθαι πᾶν τὸ ζῶν ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεῶτος.
εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν μὲν (77d) ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρότερον, ἀνάγκη δὲ αὐτῇ εἰς τὸ ζῆν ἰούσῃ τε καὶ γιγνομένῃ μηδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ θανάτου καὶ τοῦ τεθνάναι γίγνεσθαι, πῶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ εἶναι, ἐπειδή γε δεῖ αὖθις αὐτὴν γίγνεσθαι;
ἀποδέδεικται μὲν οὖν ὅπερ λέγετε καὶ νῦν.
ὅμως δέ μοι δοκεῖς σύ τε καὶ Σιμμίας ἡδέως ἂν καὶ τοῦτον διαπραγματεύσασθαι τὸν λόγον ἔτι μᾶλλον,
καὶ δεδιέναι τὸ τῶν παίδων, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁ ἄνεμος αὐτὴν ἐκβαίνουσαν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος διαφυσᾷ (77e) καὶ διασκεδάννυσιν,
ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅταν τύχῃ τις μὴ ἐν νηνεμίᾳ ἀλλ᾽ ἐν μεγάλῳ τινὶ πνεύματι ἀποθνῄσκων.
“Demonstratum est autem” ait, “O Simmia et Cebes,” Socrates, “eciam nunc, si vultis simul ponere hanc eciam racionem in illam, quam ante hanc confessi sumus, fieri omne vivens ex mortuo.
Si enim est anima eciam prius, necesse autem ipsi in vitam eunti et genite ex nullo alio quam ex morte et mori fieri, quo pacto non necesse ipsi eciam post quam obierit esse, quando quidem oportet ipsam rursum fieri?
Demonstratum est igitur quod dicebatur eciam nunc.
Tamen michi videris, tuque et Simmias, libenter quidem eciam hanc disquirere racionem adhuc magis,
et metuere id quod puerarum, ne quam vere ventus ipsam egredientem a corpore perflet et discindat,
aliterque eciam cum contingat quis non in tranquillo flatu, verum in magno quodam spiritu mori.”
“Demonstratum quidem (24) est”, inquit Socrates, “istud, o Simmia et o Cebes, etiam nunc, si modo velitis, et id quod (25) modo probatum est et illud quod ante concesseramus – videlicet omne vivens ex mor(26)tuo fieri – in unum connectere.
Si enim est anima prius et cum in hanc venit vitam fitque (27) homo, necesse est non aliunde eam quam ex mortuis proficisci. Cur non necessarium sit, (28) ut etiam post mortem corporis maneat, cum oporteat ipsam ad hanc vitam reverti?
De(29)monstratum igitur et nunc est quod dicitur.
Veruntamen videmini tu atque Simmias cu(30)pere idem rursus diligentius pertractari,
ac forsitan puerorum more formidatis, ne re(31)vera corpore egredientem ventus dissolvat atque dispergat,
praesertim si ventis vehemen(32)tius flantibus exeat.”
But that proof, Simmias and Cebes, has been already given, said Socrates, if you put the two arguments together--I mean this and the former one, in which we admitted that everything living is born of the dead.
For if the soul exists before birth, and in coming to life and being born can be born only from death and dying, must she not after death continue to exist, since she has to be born again?
--Surely the proof which you desire has been already furnished.
Still I suspect that you and Simmias would be glad to probe the argument further.
Like children, you are haunted with a fear that when the soul leaves the body, the wind may really blow her away and scatter her;
especially if a man should happen to die in a great storm and not when the sky is calm.
καὶ ὁ Κέβης ἐπιγελάσας, ὡς δεδιότων, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πειρῶ ἀναπείθειν·
μᾶλλον δὲ μὴ ὡς ἡμῶν δεδιότων, ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως ἔνι τις καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν παῖς ὅστις τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβεῖται.
τοῦτον οὖν πειρῶ μεταπείθειν μὴ δεδιέναι τὸν θάνατον ὥσπερ τὰ μορμολύκεια.
Atque Cebes arridens: “Ut formidantibus” inquit, “O Socrate, experire ‘O iterato suadere;
magis vero non ut nobis formidantibus, sed fors est quis et in nobis puer qui talia metuat.
Hunc itaque tempta transsuadere ut non timeat mortem tamquam mormolikia.”
Ad haec Cebes subridens, “tanquam nobis id formidantibus,” inquit, (33) “o Socrates, contra persuadere conare.
Imo vero non tanquam formidantibus nobis, sed (34) forte est inter nos puer aliquis talia metuens,
huic ergo annitamur persuadere ne mor(35)tem ceu larvas pertimescat.”
Cebes answered with a smile: Then, Socrates, you must argue us out of our fears
--and yet, strictly speaking, they are not our fears, but there is a child within us to whom death is a sort of hobgoblin;
him too we must persuade not to be afraid when he is alone in the dark.
πολλὴ μὲν ἡ Ἑλλάς, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ἐν ᾗ ἔνεισί που ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων γένη, οὓς πάντας χρὴ διερευνᾶσθαι ζητοῦντας τοιοῦτον ἐπῳδόν, μήτε χρημάτων φειδομένους μήτε πόνων,
ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν εἰς ὅτι ἂν εὐκαιρότερον ἀναλίσκοιτε χρήματα.
ζητεῖν δὲ χρὴ καὶ αὐτοὺς μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων·
ἴσως γὰρ ἂν οὐδὲ ῥᾳδίως εὕροιτε μᾶλλον ὑμῶν δυναμένους τοῦτο ποιεῖν.
“Multa quidem Grecia” ait, “O Cebes, in qua insunt alicubi boni viri, multa eciam et barbarorum genera, quos universos oportet perrimari querentes talem incantatorem, neque pecuniis parcentes, neque laboribus,
quia non est in quod magis necessario consumatis pecunias.
Querere autem oportet et ipsos cum invicem;
fors enim neque facile invenietis magis quam vos qui possint hoc efficere.”
“Ampla est,” inquit, “o Cebes, Graecia, in qua sunt viri prae(38)stantes, quamplurimae sunt barbatae nationes, per hos omnes eiusmodi medicum de(39)betis perquirere neque pecunijs parcentes neque laboribus.
Nihil est enim pro quo com(40)modius omnia quis expendat.
Perscrutandum quoque est etiam inter vos ipsos.
Forte e(41)nim non facile invenietis qui melius quam vos id queat efficere.”
Hellas, he replied, is a large place, Cebes, and has many good men, and there are barbarous races not a few: seek for him among them all, far and wide, sparing neither pains nor money;
for there is no better way of spending your money.
And you must seek among yourselves too;
for you will not find others better able to make the search.
οὐκοῦν τοιόνδε τι, ἦ δ᾽ ὃς ὁ Σωκράτης, δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἀνερέσθαι ἑαυτούς, τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ ἄρα προσήκει τοῦτο τὸ πάθος πάσχειν, τὸ διασκεδάννυσθαι,
καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ποίου τινὸς δεδιέναι μὴ πάθῃ αὐτό, καὶ τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ <οὔ>·
καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὖ ἐπισκέψασθαι πότερον [ἡ] ψυχή ἐστιν,
καὶ ἐκ τούτων θαρρεῖν ἢ δεδιέναι ὑπὲρ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς;
“Nonne igitur tale quid” infit ille “oportet nos reinterrogare nos ipsos, quali cui competit hanc passionem pati, videlicet dissipari,
atque pro quali quo formidari ne paciatur illud, et quali cui?
Et post hoc iterum examinare utrum anima sit,
atque ex hiis confidere seu metuere pro nostra anima?”
“An non tale aliquid”, in(44)quit, “a nobis ipsis sciscitari debemus? Cuinam et quali conveniat ea passio per quam dissol(45)vi possit.
Et cui qualique sit metuendum ne id patiatur.
Et secundum quam qualemque eius par(46)tem deinde considerare cuiusmodi anima sit,
demum ex his animae nostrae gratia vel con(47)sidere vel timere.”
Must we not, said Socrates, ask ourselves what that is which, as we imagine, is liable to be scattered, and about which we fear?
and what again is that about which we have no fear?
And then we may proceed further to enquire whether that which suffers dispersion is or is not of the nature of soul
--our hopes and fears as to our own souls will turn upon the answers to these questions.
ἴωμεν δή, ἔφη, ἐπὶ ταὐτὰ ἐφ᾽ ἅπερ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν (78d) λόγῳ.
αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία ἧς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἀποκρινόμενοι, πότερον ὡσαύτως ἀεὶ ἔχει κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἢ ἄλλοτ᾽ ἄλλως;
αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον, αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστιν, τὸ ὄν, μή ποτε μεταβολὴν καὶ ἡντινοῦν ἐνδέχεται;
ἢ ἀεὶ αὐτῶν ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστι, μονοειδὲς ὂν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτό, ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχει καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἀλλοίωσιν οὐδεμίαν ἐνδέχεται;
“Veniamus itaque” ait “in hec in que in priori disputacione.
Ipsa essencia cuius racionem dedimus existendi et interrogantes atque respondentes, utrum semper eodem modo se habet secundum idem seu aliter alio modo?
Ipsum hoc equale, ipsum hoc honestum, ipsum unumquodque quod est, ens, numquid permutacionem eciam quamcumque recipit?
Vel semper eorum singulum quod est, uniforme ens ipsum secundum se ipsum, eodem modo secundum idem se habet, et numquam nulla racione nullatenus nullam alteracionem recipit?”
“Redeamus iam ad illa, ad quae in superiori dispu(53)tatione processimus.
Ipsa essentia cuius interrogando respondendoque definitionem hoc (54) ipsum quod est assignavimus, utrum eodem modo et secundum eadem se semper habet, (502, 1) an alias aliter?
videlicet et ipsum aequale, ipsum pulchrum, ipsum unumquodque quod (2) est ens, utrum mutationem aliquando aliquam ipsa recipiunt,
an ipsorum unumquodque (3) semper id quod est uniforme existens ipsum per seipsum, eodem modo et secundum (4) eadem se habet, neque unquam neque usquam neque ullo pacto mutationem aliquam suscipit?”
Then now let us return to the previous discussion.
Is that idea or essence, which in the dialectical process we define as essence or true existence
--whether essence of equality, beauty, or anything else--are these essences, I say, liable at times to some degree of change?
or are they each of them always what they are, having the same simple self-existent and unchanging forms, not admitting of variation at all, or in any way, or at any time?
τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν, οἷον ἀνθρώπων ἢ ἵππων ἢ (78e) ἱματίων ἢ ἄλλων ὡντινωνοῦν τοιούτων, ἢ ἴσων [ἢ καλῶν] ἢ πάντων τῶν ἐκείνοις ὁμωνύμων;
ἆρα κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχει, ἢ πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἐκείνοις οὔτε αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς οὔτε ἀλλήλοις οὐδέποτε ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδαμῶς κατὰ ταὐτά;
SOCRATES. “Quid autem multorum bonorum, sive hominum sive equorum seu vestimentorum vel aliorum quorumcumque talium, aut equalium aut bonorum aut universorum illis equivocorum?
Igitur secundum idem se habent, vel omnino contrarie illis et neque eadem sibi ipsis neque ad invicem numquam, ut di8:um dicatur, nequaquam secundum eadem sunt?”
“Quid autem dicemus de multis”, inquit, “quae similiter pulchra dicuntur, scilicet (7) hominibus, equis, vestibus, vel alijs quibuscunque talibus, quae vel pulchra dicuntur vel (8) aequalia, vel etiam de omnibus quae illis synonyma sunt?
Num haec secundum eadem se (9) semper habent? An potius omnino contra quam illa, videlicet neque ipsa sibimet, neque in(10)vicem unquam, ut simpliciter loquar, ullo pacto secundum eadem eodemque modo se ha(11)bent?”
And what would you say of the many beautiful--whether men or horses or garments or any other things which are named by the same names and may be called equal or beautiful,--are they all unchanging and the same always, or quite the reverse?
May they not rather be described as almost always changing and hardly ever the same, either with themselves or with one another?
οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε πάλαι ἐλέγομεν, ὅτι ἡ ψυχή, ὅταν μὲν τῷ σώματι προσχρῆται εἰς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι ἢ διὰ τοῦ ὁρᾶν ἢ διὰ τοῦ ἀκούειν ἢ δι᾽ ἄλλης τινὸς αἰσθήσεως
--τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν τὸ διὰ τοῦ σώματος, τὸ δι᾽ αἰσθήσεως σκοπεῖν τι--
τότε μὲν ἕλκεται ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὰ οὐδέποτε κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντα,
καὶ αὐτὴ πλανᾶται καὶ ταράττεται καὶ εἰλιγγιᾷ ὥσπερ μεθύουσα, ἅτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη;
SOCRATES. “Nonne igitur et hoc pridem diximus, quoniam anima, cum corpore utitur ad examinandum quid aut per visum seu per auditum vel per alium aliquem sensum
- hoc enim est per corpus, per sensum speculari quid -
quociens quidem allicitur a corpore in ea que numquam secundum idem se habent,
et ipsa seducitur et turbatur et singultit velut deebriata, quemadmodum talibus contacta?”
“An non et hoc evenire in superioribus dicebamus? Vt cum anima ad (26) aliquid considerandum socium sibi corpus assumit vel per visum vel per auditum vel (27) per alium sensum,
hoc enim est per corpus considerare, quia per sensus id agitur,
tunc (28) quidem a corpore trahatur ad ea quae nunquam eodem modo sunt,
atque ipsa aberret per(29)turbeturque, quasi ebria vacillet, utpote quae talia quaedam attigerit.”
And were we not saying long ago that the soul when using the body as an instrument of perception, that is to say, when using the sense of sight or hearing or some other sense
(for the meaning of perceiving through the body is perceiving through the senses)
--were we not saying that the soul too is then dragged by the body into the region of the changeable, and wanders and is confused;
the world spins round her, and she is like a drunkard, when she touches change?
(79d) ὅταν δέ γε αὐτὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν σκοπῇ, ἐκεῖσε οἴχεται εἰς τὸ καθαρόν τε καὶ ἀεὶ ὂν καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον, καὶ ὡς συγγενὴς οὖσα αὐτοῦ ἀεὶ μετ᾽ ἐκείνου τε γίγνεται, ὅτανπερ αὐτὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν γένηται καὶ ἐξῇ αὐτῇ,
καὶ πέπαυταί τε τοῦ πλάνου καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχει, ἅτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη·
καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ πάθημα φρόνησις κέκληται;
SOCRATES. “Quociens autem ipsa per se ipsam speculetur, illuc defertur in sincerum, et semper existens et immortale et similiter se habens, et ut cognata existens ipsi semper cum ipso fit, quociens ipsa secundum se ipsam fiat et liceat ipsi,
et quiescit ab errore et circa illa semper secundum idem similiter se habet, quemadmodum talibus contacca.
Et hec ipsius passio prudencia vocata est.”
“At ve(30)ro quoties ipse animus per seipsum excogitasse, illuc se confert ad purum, sempiternum, (31) immortale, semper per eodem modo se habens, et tanquam ipsius cognatus semper inhae(32)ret illi, quoties ipse redierit in seipsum eique liceat
cessetque ab errore et circa illa semper (33) secundum eadem eodem modo se habet, utpote qui talia iam attigerit.
Atqui haec eius affe(34)ctio sapientia, sive prudentia nominatur.”
But when returning into herself she reflects, then she passes into the other world, the region of purity, and eternity, and immortality, and unchangeableness, which are her kindred, and with them she ever lives, when she is by herself and is not let or hindered;
then she ceases from her erring ways, and being in communion with the unchanging is unchanging.
And this state of the soul is called wisdom?
πᾶς ἄν μοι δοκεῖ, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, συγχωρῆσαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκ ταύτης τῆς μεθόδου, καὶ ὁ δυσμαθέστατος, ὅτι ὅλῳ καὶ παντὶ ὁμοιότερόν ἐστι ψυχὴ τῷ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ μή.
“Unusquisque quidem michi videtur” ait ille “concedere, O Socrate, ex hac methodo, eciam vix docibilis, quoniam toti et omni similius est anima semper similiter se habenti magis quam ei quod minime.”
[marg: Argumentum ab actionibus]“Arbitror equidem, o Socrates, quemli(37)bet,” inquit, “vel indocilem prorsus et pertinacem ex hac discursione concessurum, ani(38)mam et per totum atque per omne similiorem esse ei quod semper eodem modo est quam (39) opposito."
I think, Socrates, that, in the opinion of every one who follows the argument, the soul will be infinitely more like the unchangeable--even the most stupid person will not deny that.
σκόπει δή, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, εἰ ἐκ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων (80b) τάδε ἡμῖν συμβαίνει,
τῷ μὲν θείῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ νοητῷ καὶ μονοειδεῖ καὶ ἀδιαλύτῳ καὶ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοιότατον εἶναι ψυχή,
τῷ δὲ ἀνθρωπίνῳ καὶ θνητῷ καὶ πολυειδεῖ καὶ ἀνοήτῳ καὶ διαλυτῷ καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοιότατον αὖ εἶναι σῶμα.
ἔχομέν τι παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο λέγειν, ὦ φίλε Κέβης, ᾗ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει;
“Speculate” inquit, “O Cebes, si ex omnibus que dicta sunt hec nobis contingunt,
divino quippe et immortali et intelligibili et uniformi et indissolubili et semper similiter secundum idem se habenti sibi ipsi simillimum esse anima,
humano sane et mortali et insensato et multiformi et dissolubili et numquam secundum idem se habenti sibi ipsi simillimum rursus esse corpus.
Habemus quid preter hec aliud dicere, O dilecte Cebes, vel non ita se habet?”
“Animadverte iam, o Cebes, num haec ex omnibus quae dicta sunt consequantur.
(46) Videlicet ipsi divino, immortali, intelligibili, uniformi, indissolubili, semper eodem mo(47)do et secundum eadem seipsum habent, animam esse simillimam,
humano vero morta(48)li, nec intelligibili, multiformi, dissolubili, nunquam eodem modo sibimet se habenti, simili(49)mum esse corpus.
Possumusne, o amice Cebes, haec praeter aliud quicquam afferre, quo mi(50)nus ita sit?”
Then reflect, Cebes: of all which has been said is not this the conclusion?
--that the soul is in the very likeness of the divine, and immortal, and intellectual, and uniform, and indissoluble, and unchangeable;
and that the body is in the very likeness of the human, and mortal, and unintellectual, and multiform, and dissoluble, and changeable.
Can this, my dear Cebes, be denied?
ἐννοεῖς οὖν, ἔφη, ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τὸ μὲν ὁρατὸν αὐτοῦ, τὸ σῶμα, καὶ ἐν ὁρατῷ κείμενον, ὃ δὴ νεκρὸν καλοῦμεν, ᾧ προσήκει διαλύεσθαι καὶ διαπίπτειν καὶ διαπνεῖσθαι, οὐκ εὐθὺς τούτων οὐδὲν πέπονθεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιεικῶς συχνὸν ἐπιμένει χρόνον, ἐὰν μέν τις καὶ χαριέντως ἔχων τὸ σῶμα τελευτήσῃ καὶ ἐν τοιαύτῃ ὥρᾳ, καὶ πάνυ μάλα·
συμπεσὸν γὰρ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταριχευθέν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ ταριχευθέντες, ὀλίγου ὅλον μένει ἀμήχανον ὅσον χρόνον,
(80d) ἔνια δὲ μέρη τοῦ σώματος, καὶ ἂν σαπῇ, ὀστᾶ τε καὶ νεῦρα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ὅμως ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀθάνατά ἐστιν· ἢ οὔ;
SOCRATES. “Attendis igitur” inquit “quoniam, cum moriatur homo, hoc quidem visibile eius, scilicet corpus, et in visibili positum, quod quidem mortuum nuncupamus, cui congruit dissolvi et decidere et perflari non propere horum quicquam passum est, immo suaviter crebrum permaneat tempus, si quis eciam gratulabunde habens corpus obierit et in tali hora, et omnino valde;
concidens enim corpus et passatum, quemadmodum in Egipto passati, paulo minus totum maneat immensum quantum tempus,
quedam vero partes corporis, et si putrescanr, ossaque et nervi et huiusmodi cunda, tamen ut dictum dicatur immortalia sunt; necne?”
“Cernis igitur postquam mortuus homo fuerit, quod (53) in eo visibile est corpus et in loco visibili positum, quod cadaver appellamus, cui convenit (54) ut dissolvatur, concidat, diffluat, nihil horum subito pati, sed multum aliquando tempus su(503, 1)peresse, si quis corpore perbelle affecto decesserit.
[marg: Aegyptii diu servant cadavera medicamentis] Corpus enim servatum et rebus qui(2)busdam ad durationem curatum, quemadmodum in Aegypto faciunt, incredibile quod(3)dam tempus ferme integrum manet.
Quinetiam si putrescat, tamen nonnullae corporis (4) partes, ossa videlicet nervique atque similia, ut ita dicam, immortale permanent. An non?”
And do you further observe, that after a man is dead, the body, or visible part of him, which is lying in the visible world, and is called a corpse, and would naturally be dissolved and decomposed and dissipated, is not dissolved or decomposed at once, but may remain for a for some time, nay even for a long time, if the constitution be sound at the time of death, and the season of the year favourable?
For the body when shrunk and embalmed, as the manner is in Egypt, may remain almost entire through infinite ages;
and even in decay, there are still some portions, such as the bones and ligaments, which are practically indestructible:--Do you agree?
ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἄρα, τὸ ἀιδές, τὸ εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον ἕτερον οἰχόμενον γενναῖον καὶ καθαρὸν καὶ ἀιδῆ, εἰς Ἅιδου ὡς ἀληθῶς, παρὰ τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ φρόνιμον θεόν, οἷ, ἂν θεὸς θέλῃ, αὐτίκα καὶ τῇ ἐμῇ ψυχῇ ἰτέον,
αὕτη δὲ δὴ ἡμῖν ἡ τοιαύτη καὶ οὕτω πεφυκυῖα ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος εὐθὺς διαπεφύσηται καὶ ἀπόλωλεν, ὥς φασιν οἱ πολλοὶ (80e) ἄνθρωποι;
πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ φίλε Κέβης τε καὶ Σιμμία, ἀλλὰ πολλῷ μᾶλλον ὧδ᾽ ἔχει·
ἐὰν μὲν καθαρὰ ἀπαλλάττηται, μηδὲν τοῦ σώματος συνεφέλκουσα, ἅτε οὐδὲν κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἑκοῦσα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ φεύγουσα αὐτὸ καὶ συνηθροισμένη αὐτὴ εἰς ἑαυτήν,
ἅτε μελετῶσα ἀεὶ τοῦτο--
τὸ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦσα καὶ τῷ ὄντι (81a) τεθνάναι μελετῶσα ῥᾳδίως·
ἢ οὐ τοῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη μελέτη θανάτου;
SOCRATES. “Anima vero itaque, invisibile, in talem locum alterum deportatum generosum et purum et [semper utique] invisibilem, in Averno quam vere, penes bonum et prudentem deum, quo, si deus voluerit, in brevi eciam in mea anima eundum,
hec utique nobis talis et taliter nata disterminata a corpore Statim vento agitata est et interiit, ut aiunt multi homines?
Plurimum vero distat, O amice Cebesque et Simmia, immo multo magis sic habet;
si profecto pura discesserit, nichil corporis contrahens velut que nichil communicaverit ipsi in vita sponte, sed fugiens ipsum atque coartata ipsa in se ipsam,
ac si meditata semper hoc -
hoc autem nichil aliud est quam recte philosophata et pro certo mori cogitans facile;
vel non hoc utique erit meditacio mortis?”
“Anima vero quae invisibili quiddam est, in similem quendam aliumque locum migrans, (6) excellentem, purum, invisibilem, nobis occultum revera ad bonum sapientemque deum, (7) quo si deus voluerit paulo post meo quoque animo est migrandum.
Anima, inquam, talis (8) talique natura praedita, nunquid cum primum a corpore liberata fuerit, dissipatur atque (9) interibit, ut multi putant?
Permultum abest, o dilecte Cebes atque Simmia, imo multo (10) magis ita se res habet,
si quidem pura discesserit corporeum nil secum trahens, utpote (11) quae sua cum illo invita communicaverit, sed fugerit illud semper, seque in se collegerit
tan(12)quam semper id meditata.
Quod quidem nihil est aliud quam recte philosophari mor(13)temque revera facile commentari.
An non haec est meditatio mortis?”
And is it likely that the soul, which is invisible, in passing to the place of the true Hades, which like her is invisible, and pure, and noble, and on her way to the good and wise God, whither, if God will, my soul is also soon to go,
--that the soul, I repeat, if this be her nature and origin, will be blown away and destroyed immediately on quitting the body, as the many say?
That can never be, my dear Simmias and Cebes.
The truth rather is, that the soul which is pure at departing and draws after her no bodily taint, having never voluntarily during life had connection with the body, which she is ever avoiding, herself gathered into herself;
--and making such abstraction her perpetual study--
which means that she has been a true disciple of philosophy; and therefore has in fact been always engaged in the practice of dying?
For is not philosophy the practice of death?--
οὐκοῦν οὕτω μὲν ἔχουσα εἰς τὸ ὅμοιον αὐτῇ τὸ ἀιδὲς ἀπέρχεται, τὸ θεῖόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ φρόνιμον,
οἷ ἀφικομένῃ ὑπάρχει αὐτῇ εὐδαίμονι εἶναι, πλάνης καὶ ἀνοίας καὶ φόβων καὶ ἀγρίων ἐρώτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κακῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀπηλλαγμένῃ, ὥσπερ δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τῶν μεμυημένων, ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον μετὰ θεῶν διάγουσα;
οὕτω φῶμεν, ὦ Κέβης, ἢ ἄλλως;
SOCRATES. “Nonne sic se habens in simile sibi invisibile abit, divinumque et immortale atque prudens,
quo advenienti est sibi felicem esse, ab errore et fatuitate et timoribus et agrestibus amoribus et aliis malis humanis privatam, quemadmodum dicitur de exequiatis, quam vere reliquum tempus cum diis degens?
Sic dicemus, O Cebes, vel aliter?”
“Anima, (14) inquam, si sic affecta discesserit, nonne ad aliquid sibi simile divinum abit, divinum et im(15)mortale et sapiens?
Quo cum pervenerit, evadit felix, ab errore, dementia, timoribus du(16)risque amoribus, caeterisque humanis liberata malis. Et quemadmodum de initiatis dici so(17)let, revera reliquum tempus vitam cum diis agit?
“Itane dicendum est, o Cebes, an aliter?”
That soul, I say, herself invisible, departs to the invisible world--to the divine and immortal and rational:
thither arriving, she is secure of bliss and is released from the error and folly of men, their fears and wild passions and all other human ills, and for ever dwells, as they say of the initiated, in company with the gods (compare Apol.).
Is not this true, Cebes?
(81b) ἐὰν δέ γε οἶμαι μεμιασμένη καὶ ἀκάθαρτος τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλάττηται,
ἅτε τῷ σώματι ἀεὶ συνοῦσα καὶ τοῦτο θεραπεύουσα καὶ ἐρῶσα καὶ γοητευομένη ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ ὑπό τε τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν,
ὥστε μηδὲν ἄλλο δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀληθὲς ἀλλ᾽ ἢ τὸ σωματοειδές, οὗ τις ἂν ἅψαιτο καὶ ἴδοι καὶ πίοι καὶ φάγοι καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἀφροδίσια χρήσαιτο,
τὸ δὲ τοῖς ὄμμασι σκοτῶδες καὶ ἀιδές, νοητὸν δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ αἱρετόν, τοῦτο δὲ εἰθισμένη μισεῖν τε καὶ τρέμειν καὶ φεύγειν,
οὕτω (81c) δὴ ἔχουσαν οἴει ψυχὴν αὐτὴν καθ᾽ αὑτὴν εἰλικρινῆ ἀπαλλάξεσθαι;
SOCRATES. “Si autem, arbitror, commaculata et immunda a corpore discesserit,
quasi que corpori semper cohesit et huius cure intendit et dilexit, atque attonita est ab ipso a concupiscenciis et voluptatibus,
ut nichil aliud existimet esse verum nisi corporeum, quod quis utique tangat sive conspiciat vel comedat vel bibat atque venereis utatur,
atque quod oculis opacum et invisibile, intellectuale vero et philosophie appetibile, huic vero consueta infestare quidem et horrere atque fugere,
sic autem se habentem putas animam ipsam secundum se ipsam puram discessisse?”
“Sin autem polluta impuraque decedat,
utpote quae corpus (19) semper amplexa ipsum duntaxat coluerit et amaverit, eiusque voluptatibus et libidini(20)bus quasi veneficijs quibusdam delinita fuerit et usqueadeo capta,
ut nihil aliud putet (21) esse verum, nisi quod corporeum sit, quod tangi, quod videri possit, quodve bibat et quod (22) edat et quo in venereis utatur.
Quod vero oculis quidem occultum et invissibile sit, ve(23)runtamen intelligibile et philosophia comprehendendum, habere odio consueverit tre(24)mereque et fugere.
Sic, inquam, institutam animam putas ne ipsam per se synceram evade(25)re?”
But the soul which has been polluted, and is impure at the time of her departure,
and is the companion and servant of the body always, and is in love with and fascinated by the body and by the desires and pleasures of the body,
until she is led to believe that the truth only exists in a bodily form, which a man may touch and see and taste, and use for the purposes of his lusts,
--the soul, I mean, accustomed to hate and fear and avoid the intellectual principle, which to the bodily eye is dark and invisible, and can be attained only by philosophy;
--do you suppose that such a soul will depart pure and unalloyed?
εἰκὸς μέντοι, ὦ Κέβης·
καὶ οὔ τί γε τὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν αὐτὰς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὰς τῶν φαύλων, αἳ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀναγκάζονται πλανᾶσθαι δίκην τίνουσαι τῆς προτέρας τροφῆς κακῆς οὔσης.
καὶ μέχρι γε τούτου πλανῶνται, ἕως ἂν τῇ (81e) τοῦ συνεπακολουθοῦντος, τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς, ἐπιθυμίᾳ πάλιν ἐνδεθῶσιν εἰς σῶμα·
ἐνδοῦνται δέ, ὥσπερ εἰκός, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἤθη ὁποῖ᾽ ἄττ᾽ ἂν καὶ μεμελετηκυῖαι τύχωσιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ.
SOCRATES. “Congrue quidem, O Cebes;
et nequaquam bonorum has esse, sed malignorum, que circa talia coguntur errare ulcionem dantes prioris educacionis prava cum esset;
atque usque hue errabunde vagantur, donec vivendi consequenti - corporali specie - voto, rursus induantur corpus.
Induuntur profecto, ut decet, tales mores qualia quedam studio et sollicitudine meditabantur in vita.”
“Consentaneum tamen, o Cebes,
non esse has (34) bonorum animas, sed malorum quae circa haec oberrare coguntur, poenas dantes vitae (35) improbe actae.
Itaque tandiu circunvagantur quoad cupiditate naturae corporeae comi(36)tante rursus induant corpus.
Induunt autem, ut decens est, eiusmodi mores quales in (37) vita exercuerunt.”
Yes, that is very likely, Cebes;
and these must be the souls, not of the good, but of the evil, which are compelled to wander about such places in payment of the penalty of their former evil way of life;
and they continue to wander until through the craving after the corporeal which never leaves them, they are imprisoned finally in another body.
And they may be supposed to find their prisons in the same natures which they have had in their former lives.
εἰς δέ γε θεῶν γένος μὴ φιλοσοφήσαντι καὶ παντελῶς (82c) καθαρῷ ἀπιόντι οὐ θέμις ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἀλλ᾽ ἢ τῷ φιλομαθεῖ.
ἀλλὰ τούτων ἕνεκα, ὦ ἑταῖρε Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλόσοφοι ἀπέχονται τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμιῶν ἁπασῶν καὶ καρτεροῦσι καὶ οὐ παραδιδόασιν αὐταῖς ἑαυτούς,
οὔ τι οἰκοφθορίαν τε καὶ πενίαν φοβούμενοι, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ φιλοχρήματοι·
οὐδὲ αὖ ἀτιμίαν τε καὶ ἀδοξίαν μοχθηρίας δεδιότες, ὥσπερ οἱ φίλαρχοί τε καὶ φιλότιμοι, ἔπειτα ἀπέχονται αὐτῶν.
SOCRATES. “In deorum genus nonne philosophanti et omnimode puro migranti minime fas est meare alii quam disciplinarum amatori?
Immo ea propter, O Simmia quoque et Cebes, recte philosophantes abstinent ab eis que secundum corpus sunt concupiscenciis omnibus et fortes fiunt et non tradunt eis se ipsos
minime edificiorum ruinam et egestatem formidantes, ceu multi pecuniarum amatores;
neque iterum dedecusque et ignobilitatem molestie metuentes, quemadmodum appetitores magistratuum et ambiciosi honorum, deinceps abstinent ab eis.”
“In deorum vero genus nulli fas est pervenire, praeter eos qui discen(50)di cupiditate flagrantes et philosophati sunt et puri penitus decesserunt.
Horum qui(51)dem gratia, o amice Simmia atque Cebes, qui recte philosophantur, ab hominibus cor(52)poris cupiditatibus abstinent atque ita perseverant, nec se illis unquam tradunt
ne(53)que familiae iacturam paupertatemque formidant – quemadmodum multi pecuniarum (54) cupiditi –
neque rursus contemptum atque ignominiam – quemadmodum qui magistratus (504, 1) ambiunt et honores – deinde ab his abstinent.”
No one who has not studied philosophy and who is not entirely pure at the time of his departure is allowed to enter the company of the Gods, but the lover of knowledge only.
And this is the reason, Simmias and Cebes, why the true votaries of philosophy abstain from all fleshly lusts, and hold out against them and refuse to give themselves up to them,
--not because they fear poverty or the ruin of their families, like the lovers of money, and the world in general;
nor like the lovers of power and honour, because they dread the dishonour or disgrace of evil deeds.
(82d) οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς.
τοιγάρτοι τούτοις μὲν ἅπασιν, ὦ Κέβης, ἐκεῖνοι οἷς τι μέλει τῆς ἑαυτῶν ψυχῆς ἀλλὰ μὴ σώματι πλάττοντες ζῶσι, χαίρειν εἰπόντες,
οὐ κατὰ ταὐτὰ πορεύονται αὐτοῖς ὡς οὐκ εἰδόσιν ὅπῃ ἔρχονται, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἡγούμενοι οὐ δεῖν ἐναντία τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ πράττειν καὶ τῇ ἐκείνης λύσει τε καὶ καθαρμῷ ταύτῃ δὴ τρέπονται ἐκείνῃ ἑπόμενοι, ᾗ ἐκείνη ὑφηγεῖται.
“Non utique per Iovem” ait ille.
“Ergo hiis quidem universis” infit, “O Cebes, illi quibus cura est ipsorum anime sed non corpora plasmantes viventibus, gaudere dicentes,
haut secundum eadem incedunt illis quasi ignorantibus quo vadant, ipsi autem precedentes non adversa philosophie agere, et ipsius solucioni quidem atque expurgacioni hue vertuntur illam sequentes, quo ilia ducit.”
“Non per (2) Iovem.
Quamobrem hi qui animum suum colunt, neque corpori fingendo vivunt spre(3)tis his omnibus,
haudquaquam ea gradiuntur via illi quos narravimus, (4) quia videlicet quo proficiscantur ignorent. Ipsi vero existimantes philosophiae eiusque (5) solutioni repugnandum non esse, hanc ea sequuntur via qua eos ipsa ducit.”
No indeed, he replied;
and therefore they who have any care of their own souls, and do not merely live moulding and fashioning the body, say farewell to all this;
they will not walk in the ways of the blind: and when philosophy offers them purification and release from evil, they feel that they ought not to resist her influence, and whither she leads they turn and follow.
ἐγὼ ἐρῶ, ἔφη.
γιγνώσκουσι γάρ, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, οἱ φιλομαθεῖς (82e) ὅτι παραλαβοῦσα αὐτῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἡ φιλοσοφία ἀτεχνῶς διαδεδεμένην ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ προσκεκολλημένην,
ἀναγκαζομένην δὲ ὥσπερ διὰ εἱργμοῦ διὰ τούτου σκοπεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντα ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτὴν δι᾽ αὑτῆς,
καὶ ἐν πάσῃ ἀμαθίᾳ κυλινδουμένην,
καὶ τοῦ εἱργμοῦ τὴν δεινότητα κατιδοῦσα ὅτι δι᾽ ἐπιθυμίας ἐστίν,
ὡς ἂν μάλιστα αὐτὸς ὁ δεδεμένος συλλήπτωρ (83a) εἴη τοῦ δεδέσθαι, --ὅπερ οὖν λέγω,
γιγνώσκουσιν οἱ φιλομαθεῖς ὅτι οὕτω παραλαβοῦσα ἡ φιλοσοφία ἔχουσαν αὐτῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἠρέμα παραμυθεῖται καὶ λύειν ἐπιχειρεῖ,
ἐνδεικνυμένη ὅτι ἀπάτης μὲν μεστὴ ἡ διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων σκέψις, ἀπάτης δὲ ἡ διὰ τῶν ὤτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων,
πείθουσα δὲ ἐκ τούτων μὲν ἀναχωρεῖν, ὅσον μὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι,
αὐτὴν δὲ εἰς αὑτὴν συλλέγεσθαι καὶ ἁθροίζεσθαι παρακελευομένη, πιστεύειν δὲ μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ ἀλλ᾽ (83b) ἢ αὐτὴν αὑτῇ, ὅτι ἂν νοήσῃ αὐτὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ τῶν ὄντων·
ὅτι δ᾽ ἂν δι᾽ ἄλλων σκοπῇ ἐν ἄλλοις ὂν ἄλλο, μηδὲν ἡγεῖσθαι ἀληθές·
εἶναι δὲ τὸ μὲν τοιοῦτον αἰσθητόν τε καὶ ὁρατόν, ὃ δὲ αὐτὴ ὁρᾷ νοητόν τε καὶ ἀιδές.
ταύτῃ οὖν τῇ λύσει οὐκ οἰομένη δεῖν ἐναντιοῦσθαι ἡ τοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφου ψυχὴ οὕτως ἀπέχεται τῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ λυπῶν [καὶ φόβων] καθ᾽ ὅσον δύναται,
λογιζομένη ὅτι, ἐπειδάν τις σφόδρα ἡσθῇ ἢ φοβηθῇ [ἢ λυπηθῇ] ἢ ἐπιθυμήσῃ, οὐδὲν τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἔπαθεν ἀπ᾽ (83c) αὐτῶν ὧν ἄν τις οἰηθείη,
οἷον ἢ νοσήσας ἤ τι ἀναλώσας διὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας,
ἀλλ᾽ ὃ πάντων μέγιστόν τε κακῶν καὶ ἔσχατόν ἐστι, τοῦτο πάσχει καὶ οὐ λογίζεται αὐτό.
“Ego dicam” ait.
“Cognoscunt siquidem” infit ille “amatores scienciarum quoniam assumens ipsorum animam philosophia mirabiliter ut iunctam corpori atque conglutinatam,
compulsam vera quasi per incarceracionem per hoc speculari que sunt et non ipsam per se ipsam,
et in omni impericia convolutam,
et carceris molestiam perspiciens quoniam per concupiscenciam extat,
utcumque precipue ipse vinctus adiutor fuerit ad vinciendum, - quod autem dico,
cognoscunt disciplinarum amatores quoniam ita assumens philosophia se habentem ipsorumanimam tranquille consolatur et solvere articulatur,
declarans quia fallacia quidem plena per oculos examinacio, fallacia vero per aures et alios sensus,
persuadens ex hiis discedere quantum non necesse ipsis frui,
ipsamque in se ipsam colligi atque coherceri precipiens, credereque nulli alii nisi se sibi, quoniam utique intelligat ipsa secundum se ipsam ipsum secundum se ipsum quod est:
aliquando vero per alia considcraverit in aliis existens, aliud nichil autumare verum;
esse profecto quod tale est sensibileque et visibile, quod autem ipsa videt intelligibileque et invisibile.
Huic tamen solucioni haut dignum ducens oportere contraire quam vere philosophi anima hactenus abstinet a voluptatibus et tristiciis et concupiscenciis atque timoribus quantum valet,
cogitans quoniam, ex quo plurimum exultet aut tristetur vel metuat sive concupiscat, nullum eatenus malum tolleravit eorum que quidem quis existimaverit,
quemadmodum egrotans seu in aliquo consumptus propter concupiscencias,
immo quod cunctorum maximum malorum et ultimum, hoc perpetitur et non mente discutit ipsum.”
“Dicam equidem.
Cognoscunt profecto viri scientiae cupidi, quem(7)admodum eorum animam suscipit revera ligatam in corpore atque implicatam,
ac per (8) ipsum quasi per carcerem quendam res considerare coactant, cumque per seipsam id non (9) faciat,
omni prorsus inscita involutam.
Cognoscunt praeterea, quemadmodum phil(10)losophia perspiciens quam callide corporeum vinculum astringat animam, quippe (11) cum per ipsam fiat concupiscentiam,
per quam devinctus animus adiuror sit ad seip(12)sum devinciendum.
Cognoscunt, inquam, viri scientiae cupidi, quemadmodum philoso(13)sophia eorum animam ita constitutam suscipiens paulatim instruit solvereque aggreditur,
(14) ostendens quam fallax oculorum, quam fallax aurium, caeterumque sensuum sit iudi(15)cium,
suadens ab his discedere, quatenus haerere illis summa non cogat necessitas,
seque (16) in seipsam revocare atque colligere, nec ulli credere praeterquam sibi, quatenus videlicet (17) ipsa per seipsam intelligat quodlibet eorum quae sunt,
existens per seipsum. Quod ve(18)ro ipsa per alia consideret existens in alijs, nihil existimare verum,
esse vero eiusmo(19)di quidem sensibile atque visibile, quod autem ipsa per se consideret, intelligibile atque in(20)visibile.
Huic ergo solutioni veri philosophi animus repugnandum non esse iudicans, (21) sic a voluptatibus, cupiditatibus, doloribus, timoribus, pro viribus abstinet,
iudicans (22) quando quis vehementer delectetur vel metuat vel doleat aut cupiat, haud tantum ab (23) his duntaxat pati malum, quantum quis forsan existimarit,
videlicet si propter concu(24)piscentias vel aegrotet quispiam, vel pecunias consumpserit,
sed quod malorum omnium (25) maximum, extremum, turpissimum est, perpeti neque tamen illud animadvertere.”
I will tell you, he said.
The lovers of knowledge are conscious that the soul was simply fastened and glued to the body
--until philosophy received her, she could only view real existence through the bars of a prison, not in and through herself;
she was wallowing in the mire of every sort of ignorance;
and by reason of lust had become the principal accomplice in her own captivity.
This was her original state; and then, as I was saying,
and as the lovers of knowledge are well aware, philosophy, seeing how terrible was her confinement, of which she was to herself the cause, received and gently comforted her and sought to release her,
pointing out that the eye and the ear and the other senses are full of deception,
and persuading her to retire from them, and abstain from all but the necessary use of them,
and be gathered up and collected into herself, bidding her trust in herself and her own pure apprehension of pure existence,
and to mistrust whatever comes to her through other channels and is subject to variation;
for such things are visible and tangible, but what she sees in her own nature is intelligible and invisible.
And the soul of the true philosopher thinks that she ought not to resist this deliverance, and therefore abstains from pleasures and desires and pains and fears, as far as she is able;
reflecting that when a man has great joys or sorrows or fears or desires, he suffers from them, not merely the sort of evil which might be anticipated
--as for example, the loss of his health or property which he has sacrificed to his lusts--
but an evil greater far, which is the greatest and worst of all evils, and one of which he never thinks.
ὅτι ἑκάστη ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη ὥσπερ ἧλον ἔχουσα προσηλοῖ αὐτὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ προσπερονᾷ καὶ ποιεῖ σωματοειδῆ, δοξάζουσαν ταῦτα ἀληθῆ εἶναι ἅπερ ἂν καὶ τὸ σῶμα φῇ.
ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ ὁμοδοξεῖν τῷ σώματι καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν ἀναγκάζεται οἶμαι ὁμότροπός τε καὶ ὁμότροφος γίγνεσθαι καὶ οἵα μηδέποτε εἰς Ἅιδου καθαρῶς ἀφικέσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἀεὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀναπλέα ἐξιέναι,
ὥστε ταχὺ πάλιν πίπτειν εἰς (83e) ἄλλο σῶμα καὶ ὥσπερ σπειρομένη ἐμφύεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἄμοιρος εἶναι τῆς τοῦ θείου τε καὶ καθαροῦ καὶ μονοειδοῦς συνουσίας.
SOCRATES. “Quoniam omnis voluptas et tristicia tamquam clavum habens acclavat ipsam ad corpus atque affigit et facit corporee forme similem, opinantem hec vera esse quecumque et corpus dicat.
Ex hoc quippe quod consenserit corpori et ipsis gaudeat, cogitur, reor, unius conversacionis et unius mods fieri, et que numquam pure ad inferos ire, atque semper referta corpore migrare,
ut mature rursum cadat in aliud corpus, et tamquam pariter sata innascatur, et ex hiis exsors sit divinique et sinceri et uniformis coessencie.”
“Quoniam omnis voluptas atque dolor quasi (31) clavum tenens animam corpori affigit atque connectit efficitque corpoream adeo, ut iam (32) opinetur ea esse vera quae suadeat corpus.
Nempe ex eo quod eadem opinetur cum cor(33)pore, eisdemque oblectetur, cogitur, ut eiusdem moris eiusdemque alimoniae fieri, ut (34) nunquam possit pura in vitam alteram proficisci, sed semper plena corporis labe egre(35)diatur.
Ideoque cito cadat rursus in aliud corpus et quasi sata iterum innascatur, atque pro(36)terea a commercio divinae, purae, uniformis essentiae aliena prorsus evadat.”
Why, because each pleasure and pain is a sort of nail which nails and rivets the soul to the body, until she becomes like the body, and believes that to be true which the body affirms to be true;
and from agreeing with the body and having the same delights she is obliged to have the same habits and haunts, and is not likely ever to be pure at her departure to the world below, but is always infected by the body;
and so she sinks into another body and there germinates and grows, and has therefore no part in the communion of the divine and pure and simple.
οὐ γάρ· ἀλλ᾽ οὕτω λογίσαιτ᾽ ἂν ψυχὴ ἀνδρὸς φιλοσόφου, καὶ οὐκ ἂν οἰηθείη τὴν μὲν φιλοσοφίαν χρῆναι αὐτὴν λύειν, λυούσης δὲ ἐκείνης, αὐτὴν παραδιδόναι ταῖς ἡδοναῖς καὶ λύπαις ἑαυτὴν πάλιν αὖ ἐγκαταδεῖν καὶ ἀνήνυτον ἔργον πράττειν Πηνελόπης τινὰ ἐναντίως ἱστὸν μεταχειριζομένης,
ἀλλὰ γαλήνην τούτων παρασκευάζουσα, ἑπομένη τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ ἀεὶ ἐν τούτῳ οὖσα, τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστον (84b) θεωμένη καὶ ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου τρεφομένη,
ζῆν τε οἴεται οὕτω δεῖν ἕως ἂν ζῇ, καὶ ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς τὸ συγγενὲς καὶ εἰς τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀφικομένη ἀπηλλάχθαι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κακῶν.
ἐκ δὴ τῆς τοιαύτης τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ φοβηθῇ, [ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐπιτηδεύσασα,] ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ὅπως μὴ διασπασθεῖσα ἐν τῇ ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνέμων διαφυσηθεῖσα καὶ διαπτομένη οἴχηται καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ᾖ.
SOCRATES. “Non enim, immo hactenus meditabitur anima philosophi, atque numquam existimabit philosophiam oportere se ipsam solvere, solvente vero ilia ipsam tradere voluptatibus atque tristiciis se ipsam iterum iliaqueare et inutile opus agere Penelopes quamdam ex adverso telam machinantis,
sed tranquillitatem horum struens, sequens raciocinacionem et semper in ea existens, quod verum, quod divinum, quod opinione non captabile speculata et ab eo educata,
degere quidem ita existimet oportere donec vixerit, atque ubi expiraverit in cognatum atque simile migrans alienam reddi ab humanis malis.
Ex tali alimento nichil molestum metuat, hec vero sollicitans, O Simmia quidem et Cebes, ne forte divulsa in discessu a corpore a ventis flatu agitata et avolans feratur atque non amplius nusquam sit.”
“Non certe. Sed ita veri philosophi animus cogitaret nec (40) ullo modo arbitraretur, cum ipsum philosophia solvisset, oportere iterum voluptatibus (41) doloribusque se dedere iterumque vinciri atque irritum opus facere, quasi telam Penelopes (42) retexentem.
Imo vero horum tranquillitati studens sequensque rationem ac semper in (43) ea permanens, verum et divinum opinionemque supereminens contemplatur,
a quo nu(44)tritus ita vivendum censet quandiu vivat, atque sperat se ubi decesserit in cognatum at(45)que tale migrantem ab humanis exim malis.
Ex huiusmodi quidem educatione non est (46) cur metuat, o Simmia et Cebes, ne cum recedat a corpore, distrahatur et dissipetur o(47)mnisque in ventos vita recedat et supersit nihil quicquam.”
Certainly not! The soul of a philosopher will reason in quite another way; she will not ask philosophy to release her in order that when released she may deliver herself up again to the thraldom of pleasures and pains, doing a work only to be undone again, weaving instead of unweaving her Penelope's web.
But she will calm passion, and follow reason, and dwell in the contemplation of her, beholding the true and divine (which is not matter of opinion), and thence deriving nourishment.
Thus she seeks to live while she lives, and after death she hopes to go to her own kindred and to that which is like her, and to be freed from human ills.
Never fear, Simmias and Cebes, that a soul which has been thus nurtured and has had these pursuits, will at her departure from the body be scattered and blown away by the winds and be nowhere and nothing.
(84c) σιγὴ οὖν ἐγένετο ταῦτα εἰπόντος τοῦ Σωκράτους ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον,
καὶ αὐτός τε πρὸς τῷ εἰρημένῳ λόγῳ ἦν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὡς ἰδεῖν ἐφαίνετο, καὶ ἡμῶν οἱ πλεῖστοι·
Κέβης δὲ καὶ Σιμμίας σμικρὸν πρὸς ἀλλήλω διελεγέσθην.
καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἰδὼν αὐτὼ ἤρετο, τί; ἔφη, ὑμῖν τὰ λεχθέντα μῶν μὴ δοκεῖ ἐνδεῶς λέγεσθαι;
πολλὰς γὰρ δὴ ἔτι ἔχει ὑποψίας καὶ ἀντιλαβάς, εἴ γε δή τις αὐτὰ μέλλει ἱκανῶς διεξιέναι.
εἰ μὲν οὖν τι ἄλλο σκοπεῖσθον, οὐδὲν λέγω·
εἰ δέ τι περὶ τούτων ἀπορεῖτον, μηδὲν ἀποκνήσητε καὶ αὐτοὶ εἰπεῖν καὶ (84d) διελθεῖν,
εἴ πῃ ὑμῖν φαίνεται βέλτιον <ἂν> λεχθῆναι,
καὶ αὖ καὶ ἐμὲ συμπαραλαβεῖν, εἴ τι μᾶλλον οἴεσθε μετ᾽ ἐμοῦ εὐπορήσειν.
Silencium ergo factum est hec inquiente Socrate ad multum tempus,
et ipse quidem penes dictum sermonem erat Socrates, ut videre videbatur, atque nostrum plurimi;
Cebes autem et Simmias paulisper ad invicem disceptabant;
et Socrates intuens illos interrogabat: “Quid?” infit, “Vobis que dicta sunt, putasne videtur minus dictum fuisse?
Multas quippe eciam adhuc habent suspecciones et sustcntaciones, si quis ipsa debeat sufficienter percurrere.
Si vero quid aliud speculamini, nichil dico;
si vero de hiis hesitaveritis, nichil respondebitis et ipsi dicere atque examinare,
si quomodo vobis videatur melius dici,
atque rursum me pariter apprehendere, si quid pocius opinemini mecum ambigere.”
(48) Cum haec Socrates dixisset, longum factum est silentium.
Et ipse quidem So(49)crates quae dicta fuerant secum ut videbatur repetabat, idemque plerique no(50)strum faciebant.
Cebes autem et Simmias parumper insuper invicem col(51)locuti sunt.
Hos ergo intuitus Socrates, “quidnam vobis”, inquit, “de his quae (52) dicta sunt videtur?
Multae enim adhuc du(53)bitationes obiectionesque supersunt, si quis sufficienter ea sit tractaturus.
Si igitur aliud (54) quiddam inter vos agitatis, nihil dico.
Sin autem in his quae dicta sunt haesitatis, ne ve(505, 1)reamini loqui atqui percurrere,
siqua in parte putatis melius dici posse.
Quinetiam socium (2) mea assumite, si mecum id commodius fieri posse existimatis.”
When Socrates had done speaking, for a considerable time there was silence;
he himself appeared to be meditating, as most of us were, on what had been said;
only Cebes and Simmias spoke a few words to one another.
And Socrates observing them asked what they thought of the argument, and whether there was anything wanting?
For, said he, there are many points still open to suspicion and attack, if any one were disposed to sift the matter thoroughly.
Should you be considering some other matter I say no more,
but if you are still in doubt do not hesitate to say exactly what you think,
and let us have anything better which you can suggest;
and if you think that I can be of any use, allow me to help you.
καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Σιμμίας·
καὶ ἐγώ τέ σοι ἐρῶ ὃ (85c) ἀπορῶ, καὶ αὖ ὅδε, ᾗ οὐκ ἀποδέχεται τὰ εἰρημένα.
ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἴσως ὥσπερ καὶ σοὶ τὸ μὲν σαφὲς εἰδέναι ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ ἢ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἢ παγχάλεπόν τι,
τὸ μέντοι αὖ τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ αὐτῶν μὴ οὐχὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐλέγχειν καὶ μὴ προαφίστασθαι πρὶν ἂν πανταχῇ σκοπῶν ἀπείπῃ τις, πάνυ μαλθακοῦ εἶναι ἀνδρός·
δεῖν γὰρ περὶ αὐτὰ ἕν γέ τι τούτων διαπράξασθαι,
ἢ μαθεῖν ὅπῃ ἔχει ἢ εὑρεῖν ἤ,
εἰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατον, τὸν γοῦν βέλτιστον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λόγων λαβόντα καὶ δυσεξελεγκτότατον, (85d) ἐπὶ τούτου ὀχούμενον ὥσπερ ἐπὶ σχεδίας κινδυνεύοντα διαπλεῦσαι τὸν βίον,
εἰ μή τις δύναιτο ἀσφαλέστερον καὶ ἀκινδυνότερον ἐπὶ βεβαιοτέρου ὀχήματος, [ἢ] λόγου θείου τινός, διαπορευθῆναι.
καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔγωγε οὐκ ἐπαισχυνθήσομαι ἐρέσθαι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ ταῦτα λέγεις, οὐδ᾽ ἐμαυτὸν αἰτιάσομαι ἐν ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ ὅτι νῦν οὐκ εἶπον ἅ μοι δοκεῖ.
ἐμοὶ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τόνδε σκοπῶ τὰ εἰρημένα, οὐ πάνυ φαίνεται ἱκανῶς εἰρῆσθαι.
“Bene” ait “dicis” Simmias;
“et ego a te quero unde dubius sum et item iste quoque, quo pacto non recipit dicta.
Michi siquidem videtur, O Socrate, de talibus forsitan quemadmodum et tibi, evidenter quidem scire in presenti vita vel impossibile esse vel perdifficile quid,
ceterum vero ipsa que dicta sunt de hiis non omnimode argumento discutere et non discedere prius quam utique undequaque examinans dicendo deficiat quis, prorsus mollis esse viri.
Oportere namque circa hec unum quid istorum peragere,
seu discere quo pacto se habeat, vel irrvenire, aut,
si hec impossibile, igitur optimam humanarum racionem sumentem et maxime irreprehensibilem, in hac vectum ut in scindula conantem transnare hanc vitam,
nisi quis valeat firmius et tucius in firmiori vectura seu racione divina aliqua transmeare.
Quin eciam et nunc ego quidem non erubescam sciscitari, cum et tu hec dicas, neque me ipsum causabor in postero tempore quod nunc non dicerem que michi videntur.
Michi quippe, O Socrate, quociens et ad me ipsum et ad hunc respicio que dicta sunt, non omnino videntur ad plenum dici.”
“Praeclare loqueris”, inquit Simmias.
“Itaque et ego tibi aperiam qua in re dubitem, et (22) rursus hic Cebes quidnam ex superiori disputationi minus admittat.”
“Mihi quidem, o So(23)crates quemadmodum fortasse tibi quoque, videtur de his quidem rebus manifesta veritas (24) in vita praesenti aut nullo modo aut summa cum difficultate intelligi posse.
Quae porro (25) de his dicuntur, ea non omni modo et explorare et non prius desistere quam examinan(26)do omnia, animum despondeas, mollis nimium iudico esse viri.
Oportet enim circa haec al(27)terutrum efficere,
aut discere invenireque quemadmodum se habebant,
aut si haec fieri neque(28)ant, optimam atque tutissimam humanarum rationum eligere, qua quis tanquam rate ve(29)hatur atque ita procellas huius vitae pertranseat,
si nequeat firmiori quodam vehiculo vel di(30)vino aliquo verbo tutius ac minori cum periculo tranare.
Atque ego nunc non verebor in(31)terrogare, praesertim cum ad hoc ipse nos adhorteris, ne forte meipsum quandoque sim cul(32)paturus, quod nunc quae mihi videantur minime dixerim.
Profecto mihi, o Socrates, una (33) cum hoc Cebete tua dicta reputanti haud satis confirmata videntur.”
Very good, Socrates, said Simmias;
then I will tell you my difficulty, and Cebes will tell you his.
I feel myself, (and I daresay that you have the same feeling), how hard or rather impossible is the attainment of any certainty about questions such as these in the present life.
And yet I should deem him a coward who did not prove what is said about them to the uttermost, or whose heart failed him before he had examined them on every side.
For he should persevere until he has achieved one of two things:
either he should discover, or be taught the truth about them;
or, if this be impossible, I would have him take the best and most irrefragable of human theories, and let this be the raft upon which he sails through life
--not without risk, as I admit, if he cannot find some word of God which will more surely and safely carry him.
And now, as you bid me, I will venture to question you, and then I shall not have to reproach myself hereafter with not having said at the time what I think.
For when I consider the matter, either alone or with Cebes, the argument does certainly appear to me, Socrates, to be not sufficient.
ταύτῃ ἔμοιγε, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ᾗ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἁρμονίας ἄν τις καὶ λύρας τε καὶ χορδῶν τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον λόγον εἴποι, ὡς ἡ μὲν ἁρμονία ἀόρατον καὶ ἀσώματον καὶ πάγκαλόν τι καὶ (86a) θεῖόν ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ἡρμοσμένῃ λύρᾳ, αὐτὴ δ᾽ ἡ λύρα καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ σώματά τε καὶ σωματοειδῆ καὶ σύνθετα καὶ γεώδη ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ θνητοῦ συγγενῆ.
ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἢ κατάξῃ τις τὴν λύραν ἢ διατέμῃ καὶ διαρρήξῃ τὰς χορδάς, εἴ τις διισχυρίζοιτο τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ ὥσπερ σύ, ὡς ἀνάγκη ἔτι εἶναι τὴν ἁρμονίαν ἐκείνην καὶ μὴ ἀπολωλέναι
--οὐδεμία γὰρ μηχανὴ ἂν εἴη τὴν μὲν λύραν ἔτι εἶναι διερρωγυιῶν τῶν χορδῶν καὶ τὰς χορδὰς θνητοειδεῖς οὔσας, τὴν δὲ ἁρμονίαν (86b) ἀπολωλέναι τὴν τοῦ θείου τε καὶ ἀθανάτου ὁμοφυῆ τε καὶ συγγενῆ, προτέραν τοῦ θνητοῦ ἀπολομένην
--ἀλλὰ φαίη ἀνάγκη ἔτι που εἶναι αὐτὴν τὴν ἁρμονίαν, καὶ πρότερον τὰ ξύλα καὶ τὰς χορδὰς κατασαπήσεσθαι πρίν τι ἐκείνην παθεῖν--
καὶ γὰρ οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶμαι ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτόν σε τοῦτο ἐντεθυμῆσθαι, ὅτι τοιοῦτόν τι μάλιστα ὑπολαμβάνομεν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι
ὥσπερ ἐντεταμένου τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν καὶ συνεχομένου ὑπὸ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ ξηροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ καὶ τοιούτων τινῶν, κρᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ ἁρμονίαν (86c) αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν,
ἐπειδὰν ταῦτα καλῶς καὶ μετρίως κραθῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα--εἰ οὖν τυγχάνει ἡ ψυχὴ οὖσα ἁρμονία τις, δῆλον ὅτι, ὅταν χαλασθῇ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἀμέτρως ἢ ἐπιταθῇ ὑπὸ νόσων καὶ ἄλλων κακῶν, τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν ἀνάγκη εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει ἀπολωλέναι, καίπερ οὖσαν θειοτάτην, ὥσπερ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἁρμονίαι αἵ τ᾽ ἐν τοῖς φθόγγοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς τῶν δημιουργῶν ἔργοις πᾶσι, τὰ δὲ λείψανα τοῦ σώματος ἑκάστου πολὺν χρόνον παραμένειν, (86d) ἕως ἂν ἢ κατακαυθῇ ἢ κατασαπῇ--
ὅρα οὖν πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον τί φήσομεν, ἐάν τις ἀξιοῖ κρᾶσιν οὖσαν τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ θανάτῳ πρώτην ἀπόλλυσθαι.
“Sic michi quidem” ait ille, “prout et de armonia si quis et lira quoque atque fidibus eundem sermonem hunc dicat, quoniam autem armonia invisibile et incorporeum et optimum quid atque divinum est in aptata lira, ipsa vero lira et corde corpora et corporea necnon composita atque terrestria sunt et mortalitati cognata.
Ubi ergo vel confringat quis liram aut secet seu rumpat fides, si quis instat eidem racioni quemadmodum tu, quoniam necesse superesse armoniam illam et minime disperiisse
- nulla quippe possibilitas erit liram adhuc disruptis fidibus atque fides mortali forme similes esse, armoniam vero perire numini et immortali similem in nativitate et coortivam, priorem mortali disperdi
- immo dicat necesse adhuc alicubi esse ipsam armoniam, et prius ligna atque cordas putrefieri quam quid ipsam pati -
et enim igitur, O Socrate, opinor ego quidem et ipsum te hoc concepisse, quoniam tale quid precipue suspieamur animam esse,
quemadmodum intensi corporis nostri et concreti a fervido et algido et arido atque liquentc et talium quorumdam, mixtionem esse necnon armoniam ipsorum horum animam nostram,
ex quo hec metrice et bene misceantur ad invicem – si ergo contingat animam esse armoniam quamdam, liquet quando remittatur corpus nostrum preter modum vel subiciarur ab egritudinibus atque aliis malis, arumam quoque necesse statim est deperire, et cum sit divinissima, quemadmodum cetere armonie que in sonis et in artificum operibus omnibus, reliquias autem corporis cuiusque multo tempore permanere, donec comburantur vel putrefiant;
contuere igitur ad hunc sermonem quid dicemus, si quis probet crasim animam eorum que in corpore in eo quod vocatur letum primam interim.”
(35) “In hac utique”, inquit Simmias. “Nempe de harmonia et lyra, et fidibus idem posset quispiam (36) dicere, harmoniam videlicet esse invisibile quiddam et incorporeum et perpulchrum (37) atque divinum in lyra rite temperata, ipsam vero lyram fidesque corporea esse, atque corporea (38) et composita terrestriaque et mortali cognata.
Cum igitur aliquis vel lyram fregerit vel fi(39)des inciderit sive disruperit, poterit quis eadem qua tu ratione probare, necessarium esse (40) illam superesse harmoniam neque disperdi.
Nulla enim machinatio foret lyram quidem es(41)se adhuc fidibus iam disruptis atque ipsas fides mortalis generis, harmoniam vero, quae di(42)vini et immortalis cognata erat, priusquam mortale illud interisse.
Ille vero diceret adhuc esse (43) alicubi harmoniam, atque prius ligna et fides putrefieri quam illa aliquid patiatur.
Arbitror (44) equidem, o Socrates, te animadvertisset, nos tale aliquid potissimum esse animam cogitare.
(45) Esse videlicet in corpore nostro intentionem, et complexionem quandam ex calido, frigi(46)do, sicco, humido caeterisque talibus, horumque temperantiam consonantiamque animam esse,
(47) resultantem videlicet in corpore postquam haec ipsa bene moderateque invicem tempera(48)ta fuerint. Si ergo anima harmonia quaedam est, quoties horum natura in corpore propter (49) morbos aliaque mala immoderate vel remittitur vel intenditur, necesse est animam quidem (50) quamvis divinissimam subito interire, sicut solent caeterae consonantiae, sive quae in voci(51)bus, sive quae in alijs artificum operibus fiunt. Reliquias autem corporis cuiusque diutius (52) permanere, quousque vel ardeant, vel putrefiant.
Considera igitur quid huic rationi sit re(53)sponendum, si quis censeat animam temperamentum quoddam esse eorum quae sunt in (54) corpore, prioremque in morte perire.”
In this respect, replied Simmias:--Suppose a person to use the same argument about harmony and the lyre--might he not say that harmony is a thing invisible, incorporeal, perfect, divine, existing in the lyre which is harmonized, but that the lyre and the strings are matter and material, composite, earthy, and akin to mortality?
And when some one breaks the lyre, or cuts and rends the strings, then he who takes this view would argue as you do, and on the same analogy, that the harmony survives and has not perished
--you cannot imagine, he would say, that the lyre without the strings, and the broken strings themselves which are mortal remain, and yet that the harmony, which is of heavenly and immortal nature and kindred, has perished--perished before the mortal.
The harmony must still be somewhere, and the wood and strings will decay before anything can happen to that.
The thought, Socrates, must have occurred to your own mind that such is our conception of the soul;
and that when the body is in a manner strung and held together by the elements of hot and cold, wet and dry, then the soul is the harmony or due proportionate admixture of them.
But if so, whenever the strings of the body are unduly loosened or overstrained through disease or other injury, then the soul, though most divine, like other harmonies of music or of works of art, of course perishes at once, although the material remains of the body may last for a considerable time, until they are either decayed or burnt.
And if any one maintains that the soul, being the harmony of the elements of the body, is first to perish in that which is called death, how shall we answer him?
διαβλέψας οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὥσπερ τὰ πολλὰ εἰώθει, καὶ μειδιάσας,
δίκαια μέντοι, ἔφη, λέγει ὁ Σιμμίας.
εἰ οὖν τις ὑμῶν εὐπορώτερος ἐμοῦ, τί οὐκ ἀπεκρίνατο;
καὶ γὰρ οὐ φαύλως ἔοικεν ἁπτομένῳ τοῦ λόγου.
δοκεῖ μέντοι μοι χρῆναι πρὸ τῆς ἀποκρίσεως ἔτι πρότερον κέβητος ἀκοῦσαι (86e) τί αὖ ὅδε ἐγκαλεῖ τῷ λόγῳ, ἵνα χρόνου ἐγγενομένου βουλευσώμεθα τί ἐροῦμεν,
ἔπειτα [δὲ] ἀκούσαντας ἢ συγχωρεῖν αὐτοῖς ἐάν τι δοκῶσι προσᾴδειν, ἐὰν δὲ μή, οὕτως ἤδη ὑπερδικεῖν τοῦ λόγου.
ἀλλ᾽ ἄγε, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ὦ Κέβης, λέγε, τί ἦν τὸ σὲ αὖ θρᾶττον [ἀπιστίαν παρέχει].
Dispiciens itaque Socrates, ut plurimum consuevit, et arridens:
“Iusta” infit “Simmias dicit.
Si ergo quis vestrum copiosior me, ut quid non respondeat?
Non enim inepte tangenti racionem.
Videtur sane michi portare ante responsionem eciam prius Cebetem audire quid rursum ipse petit sermonem, quatenus tempore facto deliberemus quid dicamus,
deinceps audientes vel assentire eis, si quid videantur concinere; sin autem minime, ita demum agere pro iusticia sermonis.
Immo age” infit ille, “O Cebes, dic quid erat quod te iterum turbans incredulitatem prestar.”
Tunc Socrates quemadmodum saepe solebat, intuens (506, 1) acrius atque ridens
“Iuste”, inquit, “tu quidem loqueris Simmia.
Si quis ergo vestrum me fa(2)cundio est, cur his non respondebat?
Nonne enim ignave rationem attigisse videtur.
Iu(3)dico tamen antequam Simmiae respondeatur, quid Cebes quoque damnet, esse audiendum ut (4) tempore interiecto deliberandi habeamus facultatem.
Deinde his auditis vel his conceden(5)dum, si consentanea vero videantur afferre, sin vero minus, rationem superiorem defen(6)dendam esse atque retinendam.
Quamobrem dic age, o Cebes, quidnam potissimum te tur(7)bet, quo minus assentiaris.”
Socrates looked fixedly at us as his manner was, and said with a smile:
Simmias has reason on his side;
and why does not some one of you who is better able than myself answer him?
for there is force in his attack upon me.
But perhaps, before we answer him, we had better also hear what Cebes has to say that we may gain time for reflection, and when they have both spoken,
we may either assent to them, if there is truth in what they say, or if not, we will maintain our position.
Please to tell me then, Cebes, he said, what was the difficulty which troubled you?
λέγω δή, ἦ δ᾽ ὃς ὁ Κέβης.
ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται ἔτι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος εἶναι, καί, ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν, (87a) ταὐτὸν ἔγκλημα ἔχειν.
ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρὶν εἰς τόδε τὸ εἶδος ἐλθεῖν, οὐκ ἀνατίθεμαι μὴ οὐχὶ πάνυ χαριέντως καί, εἰ μὴ ἐπαχθές ἐστιν εἰπεῖν, πάνυ ἱκανῶς ἀποδεδεῖχθαι·
ὡς δὲ καὶ ἀποθανόντων ἡμῶν ἔτι που ἔστιν, οὔ μοι δοκεῖ τῇδε.
ὡς μὲν οὐκ ἰσχυρότερον καὶ πολυχρονιώτερον ψυχὴ σώματος, οὐ συγχωρῶ τῇ Σιμμίου ἀντιλήψει·
δοκεῖ γάρ μοι πᾶσι τούτοις πάνυ πολὺ διαφέρειν.
τί οὖν, ἂν φαίη ὁ λόγος, ἔτι ἀπιστεῖς,
ἐπειδὴ ὁρᾷς ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τό γε ἀσθενέστερον ἔτι ὄν;
τὸ δὲ πολυχρονιώτερον (87b) οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἔτι σῴζεσθαι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ;
πρὸς δὴ τοῦτο τόδε ἐπίσκεψαι, εἴ τι λέγω·
εἰκόνος γάρ τινος, ὡς ἔοικεν, κἀγὼ ὥσπερ Σιμμίας δέομαι.
ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ ὁμοίως λέγεσθαι ταῦτα ὥσπερ ἄν τις περὶ ἀνθρώπου ὑφάντου πρεσβύτου ἀποθανόντος λέγοι τοῦτον τὸν λόγον,
ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι που σῶς, τεκμήριον δὲ παρέχοιτο θοἰμάτιον ὃ ἠμπείχετο αὐτὸς ὑφηνάμενος ὅτι ἐστὶ σῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν,
καὶ εἴ τις (87c) ἀπιστοίη αὐτῷ, ἀνερωτῴη πότερον πολυχρονιώτερόν ἐστι τὸ γένος ἀνθρώπου ἢ ἱματίου ἐν χρείᾳ τε ὄντος καὶ φορουμένου, ἀποκριναμένου δή [τινος] ὅτι πολὺ τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, οἴοιτο ἀποδεδεῖχθαι ὅτι παντὸς ἄρα μᾶλλον ὅ γε ἄνθρωπος σῶς ἐστιν, ἐπειδὴ τό γε ὀλιγοχρονιώτερον οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν.
τὸ δ᾽ οἶμαι, ὦ Σιμμία, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει· σκόπει γὰρ καὶ σὺ ἃ λέγω.
πᾶς [γὰρ] ἂν ὑπολάβοι ὅτι εὔηθες λέγει ὁ τοῦτο λέγων·
ὁ γὰρ ὑφάντης οὗτος πολλὰ κατατρίψας τοιαῦτα ἱμάτια καὶ ὑφηνάμενος ἐκείνων μὲν ὕστερος ἀπόλωλεν πολλῶν (87d) ὄντων, τοῦ δὲ τελευταίου οἶμαι πρότερος, καὶ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον τούτου ἕνεκα ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ἱματίου φαυλότερον οὐδ᾽ ἀσθενέστερον.
τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ταύτην οἶμαι εἰκόνα δέξαιτ᾽ ἂν ψυχὴ πρὸς σῶμα,
καί τις λέγων αὐτὰ ταῦτα περὶ αὐτῶν μέτρι᾽ ἄν μοι φαίνοιτο λέγειν, ὡς ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ πολυχρόνιόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ὀλιγοχρονιώτερον·
ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἂν φαίη ἑκάστην τῶν ψυχῶν πολλὰ σώματα κατατρίβειν, ἄλλως τε κἂν πολλὰ ἔτη βιῷ
--εἰ γὰρ ῥέοι τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἀπολλύοιτο ἔτι ζῶντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, (87e) ἀλλ᾽ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀεὶ τὸ κατατριβόμενον ἀνυφαίνοι
--ἀναγκαῖον μεντἂν εἴη, ὁπότε ἀπολλύοιτο ἡ ψυχή, τὸ τελευταῖον ὕφασμα τυχεῖν αὐτὴν ἔχουσαν καὶ τούτου μόνου προτέραν ἀπόλλυσθαι,
ἀπολομένης δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τότ᾽ ἤδη τὴν φύσιν τῆς ἀσθενείας ἐπιδεικνύοι τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταχὺ σαπὲν διοίχοιτο.
ὥστε τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ οὔπω ἄξιον πιστεύσαντα θαρρεῖν ὡς (88a) ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν ἔτι που ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔστιν.
εἰ γάρ τις καὶ πλέον ἔτι τῷ λέγοντι ἢ ἃ σὺ λέγεις συγχωρήσειεν, δοὺς αὐτῷ μὴ μόνον ἐν τῷ πρὶν καὶ γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς χρόνῳ εἶναι ἡμῶν τὰς ψυχάς, ἀλλὰ μηδὲν κωλύειν καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν ἐνίων ἔτι εἶναι καὶ ἔσεσθαι καὶ πολλάκις γενήσεσθαι καὶ ἀποθανεῖσθαι αὖθις -- οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὸ φύσει ἰσχυρὸν εἶναι, ὥστε πολλάκις γιγνομένην ψυχὴν ἀντέχειν --
δοὺς δὲ ταῦτα ἐκεῖνο μηκέτι συγχωροῖ, μὴ οὐ πονεῖν αὐτὴν ἐν ταῖς πολλαῖς γενέσεσιν καὶ τελευτῶσάν γε ἔν τινι τῶν θανάτων παντάπασιν ἀπόλλυσθαι,
τοῦτον δὲ τὸν (88b) θάνατον καὶ ταύτην τὴν διάλυσιν τοῦ σώματος ἣ τῇ ψυχῇ φέρει ὄλεθρον μηδένα φαίη εἰδέναι--ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι ὁτῳοῦν αἰσθέσθαι ἡμῶν--
εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, οὐδενὶ προσήκει θάνατον θαρροῦντι μὴ οὐκ ἀνοήτως θαρρεῖν, ὃς ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ ἀποδεῖξαι ὅτι ἔστι ψυχὴ παντάπασιν ἀθάνατόν τε καὶ ἀνώλεθρον·
εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνάγκην εἶναι ἀεὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ἀποθανεῖσθαι δεδιέναι ὑπὲρ τῆς αὑτοῦ ψυχῆς μὴ ἐν τῇ νῦν τοῦ σώματος διαζεύξει παντάπασιν ἀπόληται.
“Dico nempe” ait ille.
“Michi siquidem videtur adhuc in eodem sermo esse, et quod in prioribus diximus eamdem calumpniam habere.
Quoniam autem erat nostra anima et ante quam in hanc speciem veniret, non contrapono neque non omnino gratulabunde et, si non molestum est dicere, penitus satis demonstratum esse.
Quoniam autem et defunctis nobis adhuc alicubi erit, non michi videtur hactenus.
Quod autem non validius et diutumius anima corpore, non assencior Simmie argumentacioni;
videtur namque michi omnibus hiis valde differre.”
SOCRATES. “'Quid ergo?’ dicat sermo. ‘Adhuc hesitas,
quoniam quidem vides mortuo homine quod est infirmius adhuc superesse,
quod vero diuturnius non videtur tibi necessarium esse adhuc salvari hoc tempore?’“
CEBES. “Ad hoc istud quidem intuere, si quid dico:
ymagine quippe aliqua, ut videtur, et ego velut Simmias indigeo.
Michi namque videtur ita dici hec quemadmodum si quis de homine textore sene moriente dicat hunc sermonem,
quia non interiit is homo, sed est ubi forsan, argumentumque prebeat hanc vestem quam vestiebat ipse texens quoniam est integra et non deperiit,
atque si quis hesitans hoc requirat utrum diuturnius est genus hominis seu vestis in usu existentis et vestite, respondente vero aliquo quia longe hominis, opinetur demonstrari quoniam universo igitur magis homo superstes est, quoniam quod minus diuturnum non deperiit.
Hoc reor, Simmia, non ita se habet; contemplare quippe et tu que dico.
Unusquisque utique suspicetur quoniam fatue dixerit qui hoc dixerit;
nam textor iste multas deterens tales vestes, illis posterius interiit multe cum essent, extrema vero prior, et nichilo quid magis ea propter homo est veste deterius neque imbecillius.
Eamdem quoque hanc, opinor, ymaginem recipiet anima erga corpus,
atque aliquis dicens ipsa hec de illis modeste michi videbitur dicere, quoniam anima quidem diuturnum est, corpus vero imbecillius et minus diuturnum.
Quin immo utique dicat singulam animarum multa corpora deterere, aliter quidem et si multos annos vixerit
– si enim fluat corpus et pereat adhuc vivente homine, atqui anima semper detritum retexit
- necesse profecto erit, cum perierit anima, ultimam texturam contingere ipsam habere et hac sola priorem interire,
cum autem perierit anima, tunc iam naturam imbecillitatis ostendet corpus et mox putrefaccum avolabit.
Quas ob res hanc racionem haut dignum credentem confidere quoniam, simul obierimus, adhuc aliquatenus anima nostrum est.
Si quis enim et plus adhuc dicenti quam que tu dicis assensum prestiterit, dans sibi non solum in eo quod fuit prius quam fuissemus nos tempore esse nostri animam, immo nichil prohibere, eciam simul expiraverimus, quorumdam adhuc esse atque fore et frequenter nasci atque mori iterum - ita quippe ipsum e natura validum esse, ut crebro genitam animam sustinere,-
concedens autem hec, illi nondum assenciatur, neu non dolere ipsam in multis genituris, atque finem recipientem in aliquo letorum omnifariam perire,
hoc vero letum et hanc dissolucionem corporis, que anime ferat interitum, neminem dicat scire – impossibile enim esse cuilibet sentire nostrum -
si vero hoc ita se habet, nulli competit mortem confidenti neve non insensate confidere, quisquis non habet demonstrare quia est anima omnimode immortale quidem et ininteribile;
sin autem, necesse esse semper eum qui futurus est mori formidare pro sui ipsius anima, ne in presenti corporis disiugacione penitus pereat.”
“Dicam”, inquit Cebes.
“Mihi quidem videtur eodem revolvi, (8) eidemque quod in superioribus diximus, crimini obnoxia esse.
Quod enim fuerit anima no(9)stra prius quam in humanam descenderet speciem, haud equidem retracto quin bellissime (10) dictum fuerit ac nisi dictum esset grave, sufficienter demonstratum asseverarem.
Attamen (11) nobis mortuis superfore, non sic assentior.
Neque tamen Simmiae concedo obijcienti non (12) esse animam validiorem corpore atque diuturniorem.
Videtur profecto mihi his omnibus (13) anima praestare quamplurimum.”
“Hic ergo ratio superior ad me conversa sic inquiet. (14) 'Quidnam ulterius ambigis?
Cum videas homine defuncto quod in eo imbecillius fue(15)rat superesse,
cur non concedis oportere etiam quod validius diuturniusque erat, hoc ipso (16) in tempore superesse?'"
"Sed adverte iam quanti momenti sit, quod ad id respondeo.
Simili(17)tudine mihi quoque opus est, quemadmodum Simmiae.
Profecto mihi perinde haec dici vi(18)dentur si quis de homine textore sene defuncto diceret
nondum interisse illum, sed for(19)te alicubi superesse, coniecturamque afferret vestis, qua ipse cum texuisset usus fuerit, affe(20)retque eum adhuc esse incolumem neque interijsse,
ac si quis id non credat, interrogaretur (21) ab eo utrum diuturnius sit hominis genus an vestis qua quotidie quis utatur. Quod si re(22)spondeat genus humanum diuturnius esse, tunc demonstratum id esse putaret, videlicet (23) multo propterea magis sospitem esse hominem, quandoquidem quod in eo erat fragili(24)us, nondum perierit.
Hoc autem, o Simmia, ita se habere non arbitror. Sed considera tu (25) quoque quid dicam.
Profecto quivis intelligere inepte illud adduci.
Nam hic textor qui mul(26)tas contriverit vestes multasque texuerit, multis quidem posterior obijt, ultima vero prior, (27) neque propterea magis sequitur hominem esse veste viliorem atque debiliorem.
Eandem fie(28)ri similitudinem animae ad corpus posse aritror,
ac si quis de his duobus eadem illa ad(29)ducat, congrue dicere videretur – videlicet animam quidem esse diuturniorem, corpus ve(30)ro debilius minusque diuturnum –
verum diceret quemlibet animorum plura consumere (31) corpora, praesertim si multos vivant annos.
Si enim fluat corpus, homineque etiam viven(32)te dissolvatur, anima vero quod consumitur retexat continue,
necessarium tamen erit (33) quando perierit anima, tunc ultimam habere vestem, eaque sola priorem perire.
Cum ve(34)ro perierit anima, tunc demum imbecillitatem naturae suae corpus ostendere, cito putre(35)scens atque evanescens,
ut hac ratione nondum considere valeamus tunc etiam cum decesse(36)rimus animam nostram superfore.
Nam si quis dicenti etiam plura quam quae tu dicis con(37)cesserit, nec solum ante ortum nostrum animam extitisse, verum etiam nihil prohibere e(38)tiam post obitum quorundam nostrum remanere, saepiusque accedere ac decedere fateatur: (39) adeo enim naturam animae validam esse, ut saepius corpori indita se corpusque servet.
His ta(40)men concessis nondum illud tibi daret, non defatigari in multis generationibus animam,(41) sed tandem aliqua ex pluribus morte diceret omnino deleri.
Quinetiam adderet nemi(42)nem mortem illam dissolutionemque corporis, quae animae quoque interitum infert, posse (43) discernere, esse enim impossibile ut quisquam nostrum id sentiat.
Quod quidem si ita se (44) habeat, nemo non stulte in morte confidit nisi demonstrare possit animam omnino immor(45)talemque atque indissolubilem esse.
Alioquin consentaneum est necessarium esse ut qui mori(46)turus est animae metuat suae semperque sit sollicitus ne in ea quae proxime imminet corpo(47)ris disiunctione prorsus intereat.”
Cebes said: I will tell you.
My feeling is that the argument is where it was, and open to the same objections which were urged before;
for I am ready to admit that the existence of the soul before entering into the bodily form has been very ingeniously, and, if I may say so, quite sufficiently proven;
but the existence of the soul after death is still, in my judgment, unproven.
Now my objection is not the same as that of Simmias; for I am not disposed to deny that the soul is stronger and more lasting than the body,
being of opinion that in all such respects the soul very far excels the body.
Well, then, says the argument to me, why do you remain unconvinced?
--When you see that the weaker continues in existence after the man is dead,
will you not admit that the more lasting must also survive during the same period of time?
Now I will ask you to consider whether the objection,
which, like Simmias, I will express in a figure, is of any weight.
The analogy which I will adduce is that of an old weaver, who dies, and after his death somebody says:
--He is not dead, he must be alive;--see, there is the coat which he himself wove and wore, and which remains whole and undecayed.
And then he proceeds to ask of some one who is incredulous, whether a man lasts longer, or the coat which is in use and wear; and when he is answered that a man lasts far longer, thinks that he has thus certainly demonstrated the survival of the man, who is the more lasting, because the less lasting remains.
But that, Simmias, as I would beg you to remark, is a mistake;
any one can see that he who talks thus is talking nonsense.
For the truth is, that the weaver aforesaid, having woven and worn many such coats, outlived several of them, and was outlived by the last; but a man is not therefore proved to be slighter and weaker than a coat.
Now the relation of the body to the soul may be expressed in a similar figure;
and any one may very fairly say in like manner that the soul is lasting, and the body weak and shortlived in comparison.
He may argue in like manner that every soul wears out many bodies, especially if a man live many years.
While he is alive the body deliquesces and decays, and the soul always weaves another garment and repairs the waste.
But of course, whenever the soul perishes, she must have on her last garment, and this will survive her;
and then at length, when the soul is dead, the body will show its native weakness, and quickly decompose and pass away.
I would therefore rather not rely on the argument from superior strength to prove the continued existence of the soul after death.
For granting even more than you affirm to be possible, and acknowledging not only that the soul existed before birth, but also that the souls of some exist, and will continue to exist after death, and will be born and die again and again, and that there is a natural strength in the soul which will hold out and be born many times
--nevertheless, we may be still inclined to think that she will weary in the labours of successive births, and may at last succumb in one of her deaths and utterly perish;
and this death and dissolution of the body which brings destruction to the soul may be unknown to any of us, for no one of us can have had any experience of it:
and if so, then I maintain that he who is confident about death has but a foolish confidence, unless he is able to prove that the soul is altogether immortal and imperishable.
But if he cannot prove the soul's immortality, he who is about to die will always have reason to fear that when the body is disunited, the soul also may utterly perish.
(88c) πάντες οὖν ἀκούσαντες εἰπόντων αὐτῶν ἀηδῶς διετέθημεν, ὡς ὕστερον ἐλέγομεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους,
ὅτι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔμπροσθεν λόγου σφόδρα πεπεισμένους ἡμᾶς πάλιν ἐδόκουν ἀναταράξαι καὶ εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταβαλεῖν οὐ μόνον τοῖς προειρημένοις λόγοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὰ ὕστερον μέλλοντα ῥηθήσεσθαι,
μὴ οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι εἶμεν κριταὶ ἢ καὶ τὰ πράγματα αὐτὰ ἄπιστα ᾖ.
FEDON. Omnes igitur audientes dicentes illos amare dispositi sumus, sicut posterius diximus ad invicem,
quoniam a priori disputacione plurimum persuasos nos olim videbantur returbare et in incredulitatem detrudere non tantum pretaxatis sermonibus, immo eciam in posterius debencia dici,
ne nullius digni essemus iudices quia et res ipse incredibiles essent.
Omnes igitur cum haec audivissemus conturbati sumus, ut (48) postea invicem aperuimus,
quod cum superiori disputatione nobis fuisset magnopere per(49)suasum, viderentur nos ab eo statu in praesentia deturbasse atque eo iam deiecisse ut nedum (50) rationibus iam adductis, sed et dicendis insuper,
fidem ullam adhiberemus verentes ne (51) vel nos nequaquam boni essemus iudices vel res ipsae fide essent indignae.
All of us, as we afterwards remarked to one another, had an unpleasant feeling at hearing what they said.
When we had been so firmly convinced before, now to have our faith shaken seemed to introduce a confusion and uncertainty, not only into the previous argument, but into any future one;
either we were incapable of forming a judgment, or there were no grounds of belief.
Ἐχεκράτης
νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ὦ Φαίδων, συγγνώμην γε ἔχω ὑμῖν.
καὶ γὰρ αὐτόν με νῦν ἀκούσαντά σου τοιοῦτόν τι λέγειν (88d) πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν ἐπέρχεται·
“τίνι οὖν ἔτι πιστεύσομεν λόγῳ;
ὡς γὰρ σφόδρα πιθανὸς ὤν, ὃν ὁ Σωκράτης ἔλεγε λόγον, νῦν εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταπέπτωκεν”.
θαυμαστῶς γάρ μου ὁ λόγος οὗτος ἀντιλαμβάνεται καὶ νῦν καὶ ἀεί, τὸ ἁρμονίαν τινὰ ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ ὥσπερ ὑπέμνησέν με ῥηθεὶς ὅτι καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ταῦτα προυδέδοκτο.
καὶ πάνυ δέομαι πάλιν ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄλλου τινὸς λόγου ὅς με πείσει ὡς τοῦ ἀποθανόντος οὐ συναποθνῄσκει ἡ ψυχή.
λέγε οὖν πρὸς Διὸς πῇ ὁ Σωκράτης μετῆλθε τὸν λόγον;
καὶ πότερον (88e) κἀκεῖνος, ὥσπερ ὑμᾶς φῄς, ἔνδηλός τι ἐγένετο ἀχθόμενος ἢ οὔ,
ἀλλὰ πρᾴως ἐβοήθει τῷ λόγῳ;
[ἢ] καὶ ἱκανῶς ἐβοήθησεν ἢ ἐνδεῶς;
πάντα ἡμῖν δίελθε ὡς δύνασαι ἀκριβέστατα.
ECHECRATES. Per deos, O Fedon, veniam habeo vobis;
et enim ipsi michi nunc audienti te tale quid dicere ad me ipsum subit:
‘Cui ergo amplius credemus racioni?
Nam quam plurimum probabilis existens quem Socrates dixit sermonem, nunc in ambiguitatem delapsus est.’
Firmiter siquidem michi sermo iste tenetur et nunc et semper, armoniam quamdam nostrum esse animam, et quemadmodum in memoriam reduxit me dictus; nam et ipsi michi hec prius videbantur.
Et funditus egeo iterate quasi ex principio alia quadam racione, que michi persuadeat quod moriente non commoritur anima.
Dic itaque, per Iovem, quo pacto Socrates pertransiit sermonem
et utrum eciam ille, quemadmodum vos dicis, apparuit molestatus necne,
immo e tranquille succurrit sermoni?
Sive eciam sufficienter succurrit sive minus?
Hec nobis edissere prout potes accuratissime.
ECHE. Veniam e(52)quidem per Iovem do vobis, o Phaedo.
Nam mihi quidem modo te audienti tale quiddam (53) veniebat in mentem.
"Cuinam deinde rationi credemus?
Quippe cum ratio illa Socratis usque (54) adeo paulo ante probabilis, iam fidem amiserit."
Mirum est enim quantum apud me contra (507, 1) possit ratio illa semperque potuerit, quae animam nostram harmoniam quandam esse pro(2)bat et nunc quidem audita me subito in memoriam revocavit, quantum mihi quoque alias (3) persuaserit.
Quo efficitur ut alia quadam ratione iterum tanquam ab initio prorsus indigeam, (4) quae mihi persuadeat animam cum corpore non interire.
Dic ergo per Iovem, precor, quo (5) pacto disputationem peregerit Socrates
et utrum ipse quoque quemadmodum de vobis (6) ipse fateris, graviter id ferre visus fuerit an contra
benigne suam defenderit rationem,
prae(7)terea utrum satis nec ne eam tutatus fuerit.
Haec nobis quam potes diligentissime refer o(8)mnia.
ECHECRATES: There I feel with you--by heaven I do, Phaedo,
and when you were speaking, I was beginning to ask myself the same question:
What argument can I ever trust again?
For what could be more convincing than the argument of Socrates, which has now fallen into discredit?
That the soul is a harmony is a doctrine which has always had a wonderful attraction for me, and, when mentioned, came back to me at once, as my own original conviction.
And now I must begin again and find another argument which will assure me that when the man is dead the soul survives.
Tell me, I implore you, how did Socrates proceed?
Did he appear to share the unpleasant feeling which you mention?
or did he calmly meet the attack?
And did he answer forcibly or feebly?
Narrate what passed as exactly as you can.
Φαίδων
καὶ μήν, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, πολλάκις θαυμάσας Σωκράτη οὐ πώποτε μᾶλλον ἠγάσθην ἢ τότε παραγενόμενος.
(89a) τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ὅτι λέγοι ἐκεῖνος ἴσως οὐδὲν ἄτοπον·
ἀλλὰ ἔγωγε μάλιστα ἐθαύμασα αὐτοῦ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο, ὡς ἡδέως καὶ εὐμενῶς καὶ ἀγαμένως τῶν νεανίσκων τὸν λόγον ἀπεδέξατο,
ἔπειτα ἡμῶν ὡς ὀξέως ᾔσθετο ὃ ᾽πεπόνθεμεν ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων,
ἔπειτα ὡς εὖ ἡμᾶς ἰάσατο καὶ ὥσπερ πεφευγότας καὶ ἡττημένους ἀνεκαλέσατο καὶ προύτρεψεν πρὸς τὸ παρέπεσθαί τε καὶ συσκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον.
FEDON. Revera, O Echecrate, valde miratus Socratem, numquam magis admiracione perculsus sum quam tunc presens.
Id igitur habere quod dicit ille, fors nichil incongruum;
sed ego maxime miratus sum de ipso primum quidem hoc, quam dulciter quam pie quam gaudenter adolescencium verbum recipiebat,
deinceps quam acute novit quod passi sumus a sermonibus,
deinde quam bene nos sanabat, et velut profugos atque victos revocabat, et convertit ad exequendum et coexaminandum sermonem.
PHAE. Equidem, o Echecrates, saepe admiratus Socratem, nunquam maiori cum vo(9)luptate quam tunc praesens sum admiratus meque affuisse ibi mirifice gaudeo.
Habuisse qui(10)dem illum quod obiectionibus responderet, forte non est mirandum,
sed haec in eo potissi(11)mum sum admiratus, primo quidem quam iucunde, benigne, amice adolescentium ver(12)ba recepit,
deinde quam sagaciter sensit nos illorum rationibus fuisse commotos,
demum (13) quam opportune nobis adhibuit medicinam et quasi fugientes atque victos revocavit nos (14) convertitque ad prosequendum atque considerandum.
PHAEDO: Often, Echecrates, I have wondered at Socrates, but never more than on that occasion.
That he should be able to answer was nothing,
but what astonished me was, first, the gentle and pleasant and approving manner in which he received the words of the young men,
and then his quick sense of the wound which had been inflicted by the argument, and the readiness with which he healed it.
He might be compared to a general rallying his defeated and broken army, urging them to accompany him and return to the field of argument.
Φαίδων
ἐγὼ ἐρῶ. ἔτυχον γὰρ ἐν δεξιᾷ αὐτοῦ καθήμενος (89b) παρὰ τὴν κλίνην ἐπὶ χαμαιζήλου τινός, ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ πολὺ ὑψηλοτέρου ἢ ἐγώ.
καταψήσας οὖν μου τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ συμπιέσας τὰς ἐπὶ τῷ αὐχένι τρίχας--εἰώθει γάρ, ὁπότε τύχοι, παίζειν μου εἰς τὰς τρίχας--
Αὔριον δή, ἔφη, ἴσως, ὦ Φαίδων, τὰς καλὰς ταύτας κόμας ἀποκερῇ.
FEDON. Contingit enim me sedere in dextera eius, iuxta lectum in humili quodam, ipse vero in multo sublimiori quam ego.
Contrectans ergo michi caput et apprehendens in cervice crines - consuevit enim, quociens contingebat, ludere michi in crines -
“Cras utique” ait “forsitan, O Fedon, pulcras has comas tondebis.”
PHAE. Di(15)cam equidem. Sedebam forte ad dexteram eius in subsellio quodam humili iuxta lectu(16)lum. Ipse vero Socrates sedebat longe superior.
Attrectans igitur caput meum compri(17)mensque crines super cervicem, consueverat enim nonnunquam ubi contigisset in meos cri(18)nes ludere.
“Cras forsitan,” inquit, “o Phaedo, istas pulchras incides comas.”
PHAEDO: You shall hear, for I was close to him on his right hand, seated on a sort of stool, and he on a couch which was a good deal higher.
He stroked my head, and pressed the hair upon my neck--he had a way of playing with my hair; and then he said:
To-morrow, Phaedo, I suppose that these fair locks of yours will be severed.
τήμερον, ἔφη, κἀγὼ τὰς ἐμὰς καὶ σὺ ταύτας, ἐάνπερ γε ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ καὶ μὴ δυνώμεθα αὐτὸν ἀναβιώσασθαι.
(89c) καὶ ἔγωγ᾽ ἄν, εἰ σὺ εἴην καί με διαφεύγοι ὁ λόγος, ἔνορκον ἂν ποιησαίμην ὥσπερ Ἀργεῖοι,
μὴ πρότερον κομήσειν, πρὶν ἂν νικήσω ἀναμαχόμενος τὸν Σιμμίου τε καὶ κέβητος λόγον.
“Hodie” infit “et ego meas et tu istas, si quidem nobis sermo finem ceperit et non valuerimus eum in robur vitale reducere.
Et ego quidem, si tibi sit et me fugiat racio, iusiurandum utique faciam ve1ut Argivi,
non prius comas nutrire quam utique vicero decertans Simmie atque Cebetis sermonem.”
(20) “Imo hodie et ego meas et tu tuas, si nobis ratio intereat, neque eam ipsi suscitare possimus.
(21) Atqui si ego tu essem, ac me fugeret ratio, more Argivorum iurarem
non prius comam nu(22)triturum quam vicissem Simmiam Cebetemque expugnavissem.”
To-day, he replied, and not to-morrow, if this argument dies and we cannot bring it to life again, you and I will both shave our locks;
and if I were you, and the argument got away from me, and I could not hold my ground against Simmias and Cebes, I would myself take an oath, like the Argives,
not to wear hair any more until I had renewed the conflict and defeated them.
(89d) μὴ γενώμεθα, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, μισόλογοι, ὥσπερ οἱ μισάνθρωποι γιγνόμενοι·
ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἔφη, ὅτι ἄν τις μεῖζον τούτου κακὸν πάθοι ἢ λόγους μισήσας.
γίγνεται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τρόπου μισολογία τε καὶ μισανθρωπία.
ἥ τε γὰρ μισανθρωπία ἐνδύεται ἐκ τοῦ σφόδρα τινὶ πιστεῦσαι ἄνευ τέχνης,
καὶ ἡγήσασθαι παντάπασί γε ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ ὑγιῆ καὶ πιστὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἔπειτα ὀλίγον ὕστερον εὑρεῖν τοῦτον πονηρόν τε καὶ ἄπιστον, καὶ αὖθις ἕτερον·
καὶ ὅταν τοῦτο πολλάκις πάθῃ τις καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων μάλιστα οὓς ἂν ἡγήσαιτο (89e) οἰκειοτάτους τε καὶ ἑταιροτάτους, τελευτῶν δὴ θαμὰ προσκρούων μισεῖ τε πάντας καὶ ἡγεῖται οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς εἶναι τὸ παράπαν.
ἢ οὐκ ᾔσθησαι σύ πω τοῦτο γιγνόμενον;
“Ne simus” ait ille “misologi, velut qui misantropi fiunt;
quia non est quod utique quis maius hoc malum tolleret quam si raciocinaciones abhorreat.
Fit autem ex eodem modo misologia et misantropia.
Namque misantropia ingreditur ex hoc quod nimium alicui credatur absque arte;
et autumetur omnino in omnibus verum esse atque sanum et fidelem virum, deinde paulo posterius inveniatur hic nequam et infidelis et statim alter;
et cum hoc frequencius paciatur quis et ab hiis maxime quoscumque iudicabit familiarissimos et amicissimos, ad ultimum autem crebro propulsans exosos habet cunctos et arbitratur nullius nichil esse sanum penitus.
Vel non nosti nondum hoc factum?”
“Ne rationum”, inquit, “osores evadamus, quemadmodum nonnulli ho(27)minum osores fiunt.
Nullum enim maius quam hoc malum nobis posset accidere, videlicet si ra(28)tiones odio habuerimus.
Fit autem eodem pacto odium et adversus rationes et adversus (29) homines.
Odium quidem contra homines tunc maxime subit, quando alicui nimium cre(30)dimus absque arte,
putamusque ipsum omnino verum et syncerum fidumque virum esse, deinde (31) vero mox pravum infidumque deprehendimus, rursusque alium eodem pacto.
Itaque quando (32) quis saepius offensus ita decipitur, praesertim ab ijs quos praecipue familiarissimos amicis(33)simosque existimabat, odit tandem plurimum universos putatque nihil omnino apud quen(34)quam esse syncerum.
An te latuit id ita accidere consuevisse?"
Lest we become misologists, he replied,
no worse thing can happen to a man than this.
For as there are misanthropists or haters of men, there are also misologists or haters of ideas, and both spring from the same cause, which is ignorance of the world.
Misanthropy arises out of the too great confidence of inexperience;
--you trust a man and think him altogether true and sound and faithful, and then in a little while he turns out to be false and knavish;
and then another and another, and when this has happened several times to a man, especially when it happens among those whom he deems to be his own most trusted and familiar friends, and he has often quarreled with them, he at last hates all men, and believes that no one has any good in him at all.
You must have observed this trait of character?
ὥσπερ, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, περὶ τῶν σφόδρα σμικρῶν καὶ μεγάλων·
οἴει τι σπανιώτερον εἶναι ἢ σφόδρα μέγαν ἢ σφόδρα σμικρὸν ἐξευρεῖν ἄνθρωπον ἢ κύνα ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν;
ἢ αὖ ταχὺν ἢ βραδὺν ἢ αἰσχρὸν ἢ καλὸν ἢ λευκὸν ἢ μέλανα;
ἢ οὐχὶ ᾔσθησαι ὅτι πάντων τῶν τοιούτων τὰ μὲν ἄκρα τῶν ἐσχάτων σπάνια καὶ ὀλίγα, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ ἄφθονα καὶ πολλά;
“Quemadmodum” ait ille “de valde exiguis et ingentibus;
putes quid rarius esse seu valde modicum reperire virum sive canem vel aliud quidlibet?
Aut item velocem vel tardum seu bonum aut turpe vel candidum sive atrum?
Vel ignorasti quoniam omnium huiusmodi extremitates quidem ultimorum rare et pauce, que vero in medio innumera et multa?”
“Quemadmodum videlicet in rebus contingit valde aut parvis aut (39) magnis”, inquit.
“An tu arbitraris quicquam esse rarius quam valde magnum aut valde par(40)vum reperire hominem vel canem vel quodvis aliud?
Atque rursus celerrimum et tardissimum, (41) pulcherrimum, turpissimum, albissimum, nigerrimum?
An ignoras in his omnibus extre(42)morum summa, rara quidem et pauca esse, media vero frequentia atque multa?”
I mean, he replied, as you might say of the very large and very small,
that nothing is more uncommon than a very large or very small man; and this applies generally to all extremes,
whether of great and small, or swift and slow, or fair and foul, or black and white:
and whether the instances you select be men or dogs or anything else, few are the extremes, but many are in the mean between them. Did you never observe this?
εἰκὸς γάρ, ἔφη.
ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ μὲν οὐχ ὅμοιοι οἱ λόγοι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις,
ἀλλὰ σοῦ νυνδὴ προάγοντος ἐγὼ ἐφεσπόμην,
ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνῃ, ᾗ, ἐπειδάν τις πιστεύσῃ λόγῳ τινὶ ἀληθεῖ εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς περὶ τοὺς λόγους τέχνης, κἄπειτα ὀλίγον ὕστερον αὐτῷ δόξῃ ψευδὴς εἶναι, ἐνίοτε μὲν ὤν, ἐνίοτε δ᾽ οὐκ ὤν, καὶ αὖθις ἕτερος καὶ ἕτερος·
--καὶ μάλιστα δὴ οἱ (90c) περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους διατρίψαντες οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι τελευτῶντες οἴονται σοφώτατοι γεγονέναι καὶ κατανενοηκέναι μόνοι
ὅτι οὔτε τῶν πραγμάτων οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδὲ βέβαιον οὔτε τῶν λόγων,
ἀλλὰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ ἐν Εὐρίπῳ ἄνω κάτω στρέφεται καὶ χρόνον οὐδένα ἐν οὐδενὶ μένει.
“Convenit enim” ait,
“Atqui hoc modo quoque non similes causaciones hominibus sunt,
atqui te modo preeunte ego consequar,
atqui illo modo, quo ubi quis crediderit sermoni alieni quod verus sit absque illa que circa raciones est arte, atque dehinc posterius paulo ipsi videatur falsus esse, plerumque vero sit, interdum quoque non sit, et statim alter atque alter;
et maxime quidem, qui circa antilogicas oraciones frequenciam habentes, nosti quoniam in novissimo existentes autumant se sapientissimos esse et perintelligere soli
quoniam neque rerum nullius nichil integrum neque certum neque oracionum,
immo cuncta que sunt mirabiliter tamquam in Euripo sursum deorsum vergunt et momento nullo in nullo manent.”
“Consen(45)taneum quidem,” inquit,
“verum non hoc pacto similes rationes sunt atque homines,
sed te nunc (46) ducentem prosecutus,
imo vero in hoc similitudo consistit, quando videlicet quis abs(47)que rationum arte crediderit rationem aliquam esse veram, sed paulo post appareat falsa (48) quae quidem aliquando talis est, aliquando minime et rursus altera similiter atque altera.
(49) Praecipue vero illis id evenit qui plurimum rationes contradictorias agitant. Hos enim scis (50) putare tandem se sapientissimos evasisse solosque animadvertisse
neque in rebus neque in ra(51)tionibus esse sanum aliquid aut firmum,
sed omnia revera tanquam in Euripo sursum deor(52)sumque iactari, nullumque tempus in aliquo permanere.”
Yes, that is very likely, he replied;
although in this respect arguments are unlike men
--there I was led on by you to say more than I had intended;
but the point of comparison was, that when a simple man who has no skill in dialectics believes an argument to be true which he afterwards imagines to be false, whether really false or not, and then another and another,
he has no longer any faith left, and great disputers, as you know, come to think at last that they have grown to be the wisest of mankind;
for they alone perceive the utter unsoundness and instability of all arguments,
or indeed, of all things, which, like the currents in the Euripus, are going up and down in never-ceasing ebb and flow.
οὐκοῦν, ὦ Φαίδων, ἔφη, οἰκτρὸν ἂν εἴη τὸ πάθος, εἰ ὄντος δή τινος ἀληθοῦς καὶ βεβαίου λόγου καὶ δυνατοῦ (90d) κατανοῆσαι,
ἔπειτα διὰ τὸ παραγίγνεσθαι τοιούτοις τισὶ λόγοις, τοῖς αὐτοῖς τοτὲ μὲν δοκοῦσιν ἀληθέσιν εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ μή, μὴ ἑαυτόν τις αἰτιῷτο μηδὲ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀτεχνίαν, ἀλλὰ τελευτῶν διὰ τὸ ἀλγεῖν ἅσμενος ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀπώσαιτο καὶ ἤδη τὸν λοιπὸν βίον μισῶν τε καὶ λοιδορῶν τοὺς λόγους διατελοῖ,
τῶν δὲ ὄντων τῆς ἀληθείας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης στερηθείη.
SOCRATES. “Nonne igitur, O Fedon, miserabilis utique erit passio, si cum sit sane quidam verus et firmus et facilis ad intelligendum,
deinde eo quod annectatur talibus sermonibus, iisdem tum vero videntur veri esse, tum certe minime non se ipsum incuset neque ipsius sui insciciam, sed in novissimo eo quod doleat libens in sermones a se ipso causam pellat, atque demum reliquum tempus vite infestans et contumeliis afficiens sermonum sciencias vitam exigat,
eorum profecto que sunt veritate atque sciencia privetur.”
(53) “Nonne”, inquit, “aegritudo haec Phaedo miserabilis esset, si cum ratio aliqua vera firmaque sit (54) comprehendique valeat,
postea tamen auditis huiuscemodi rationibus quae modo afferre (507, 1) vera, modo falsa videntur, aliquis hinc in ambiguitatem deductus, non seipsum neque eius (2) inertiam ob id accuset, sed tandem velut aeger libenter culpam omnem a seipso in ipsas (3) transferat rationes, et in reliqua vita eas odio habeat atque vituperet,
rerum iam ipsarum (4) veritate scientiaque privatus.”
Yes, Phaedo, he replied, and how melancholy, if there be such a thing as truth or certainty or possibility of knowledge
--that a man should have lighted upon some argument or other which at first seemed true and then turned out to be false, and instead of blaming himself and his own want of wit, because he is annoyed, should at last be too glad to transfer the blame from himself to arguments in general:
and for ever afterwards should hate and revile them, and lose truth and the knowledge of realities.
πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν, ἔφη, τοῦτο εὐλαβηθῶμεν, καὶ μὴ (90e) παρίωμεν εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν ὡς τῶν λόγων κινδυνεύει οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς εἶναι,
ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὅτι ἡμεῖς οὔπω ὑγιῶς ἔχομεν, ἀλλὰ ἀνδριστέον καὶ προθυμητέον ὑγιῶς ἔχειν,
σοὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα βίου παντὸς ἕνεκα, ἐμοὶ δὲ (91a) αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα τοῦ θανάτου,
ὡς κινδυνεύω ἔγωγε ἐν τῷ παρόντι περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου οὐ φιλοσόφως ἔχειν ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ οἱ πάνυ ἀπαίδευτοι φιλονίκως.
καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ὅταν περί του ἀμφισβητῶσιν, ὅπῃ μὲν ἔχει περὶ ὧν ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾖ οὐ φροντίζουσιν, ὅπως δὲ ἃ αὐτοὶ ἔθεντο ταῦτα δόξει τοῖς παροῦσιν, τοῦτο προθυμοῦνται.
καὶ ἐγώ μοι δοκῶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι τοσοῦτον μόνον ἐκείνων διοίσειν·
οὐ γὰρ ὅπως τοῖς παροῦσιν ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω δόξει ἀληθῆ εἶναι προθυμήσομαι, εἰ μὴ εἴη πάρεργον, ἀλλ᾽ ὅπως αὐτῷ ἐμοὶ ὅτι μάλιστα δόξει οὕτως (91b) ἔχειν.
λογίζομαι γάρ, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε--θέασαι ὡς πλεονεκτικῶς--εἰ μὲν τυγχάνει ἀληθῆ ὄντα ἃ λέγω, καλῶς δὴ ἔχει τὸ πεισθῆναι·
εἰ δὲ μηδέν ἐστι τελευτήσαντι, ἀλλ᾽ οὖν τοῦτόν γε τὸν χρόνον αὐτὸν τὸν πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ἧττον τοῖς παροῦσιν ἀηδὴς ἔσομαι ὀδυρόμενος, ἡ δὲ ἄνοιά μοι αὕτη οὐ συνδιατελεῖ--κακὸν γὰρ ἂν ἦν--ἀλλ᾽ ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἀπολεῖται.
παρεσκευασμένος δή, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, οὑτωσὶ ἔρχομαι ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον·
ὑμεῖς μέντοι, ἂν ἐμοὶ πείθησθε, (91c) σμικρὸν φροντίσαντες Σωκράτους, τῆς δὲ ἀληθείας πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἐὰν μέν τι ὑμῖν δοκῶ ἀληθὲς λέγειν, συνομολογήσατε,
εἰ δὲ μή, παντὶ λόγῳ ἀντιτείνετε, εὐλαβούμενοι ὅπως μὴ ἐγὼ ὑπὸ προθυμίας ἅμα ἐμαυτόν τε καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐξαπατήσας, ὥσπερ μέλιττα τὸ κέντρον ἐγκαταλιπὼν οἰχήσομαι.
“Primum itaque” infit “hoc vereamur, et non transeamus ad animam tamquam in discrimine sit racionum nichil sanum esse,
sed multo magis quoniam nos nondum sane habemus, immo viriliter agendum et affectandum sane habere,
tibi profecto et ceteris et future vite tocius gracia, michi quoque causa ipsius necis,
ut nitar ego quidem in presenti de ipso hoc non philosophice me habere, sed velut ex omni parte imperiti avare.
Et enim quociens illi de quo hesitaverint, qui se habeant de quibuscumque mencio fuerit, non curant, qui vero que ipsi posuerint ea videantur presentibus, hoc attendunt.
Et ego michi videor in presenti eatenus dumtaxat ab illis distare;
non enim qualiter assistentibus que ego dico videantur vera esse attendam, nisi esset preter rem, immo quomodo ipsi michi quam maxime videantur sic se habere.
Cogito quippe, O amice dilecte, contemplari tamquam avare; si enim accidat vera esse que dico, bene quidem se habebit ad persuadendum;
si vera nichil est obeunti, ceterum hoc utique tempore ipso quod ante migracionem minus presentibus amarus ero lamentans; atque impericia michi ipsa celeriter complebitur - malum namque esset - atqui paulo posterius disperibit.
Preparatus quoque” infit, “O Simmiaque et Cebes, sic venio in oracionem.
Vos autem, si michi credideritis, parum curantes Socratem, veritatem certe multo magis, si nempe vobis videar verum dicere, una confitemini;
sin autem, omni racione renitimini, veriti uti non ego ab affectu simul me ipsumque et vos fallens, tamquam apis centrum intus relinquens avehar.
“In primis igitur”, in(5)quit, “diligenter id caveamus ne persuadeamus nobis nihil in rationibus esse sanum,
sed mul(6)to magis nondum esse nos sanos. Itaque totis viribus ut sani afficiamur est annitendum,
ti(7)bi quidem et alijs totius reliquae vitae gratia, mihi vero gratia mortis qui in periculo sum,
(8) ne in hoc ipso tempore, non ut philosophum me geram, sed ut contentiosum atque per(9)tinacem, quod quidam homines a disciplina alienissimi facere solent.
Illi enim ubi aliqua (10) de re ambigitur, non ut res ipsa de qua agitur se habeat curant, sed ut quae posuerunt ipsi (11) praesentibus videantur vera obnixe contendunt.
Atque ego mihi videor in hoc dun(12)taxat in praesentia ab illis differre,
quod non ut praesentibus probem ea quae dico annitar, ni(13)si quatenus forte contigerit, sed ut mihi ipsi vera quammaxime videantur.
Sic enim cogi(14)to, dulcis amice, et vide quanto cum lucro sit ratio mea. Si forte vera sunt quae dico, operae (15) precium est ita credere:
sin autem nihil superest post mortem, attamen hoc ipsum tempus (16) ante obitum praesentibus minus ero molestus, minusque deplorabo. Haec autem ignorantiae (17) minime perseverabit mecum, malum id quidem esset, sed paulo post delebitur.
Sic equidem, o (18) Simmia et Cebes, paratus revertor ad disputandum.
Vos tamen si mihi assentiamini, non (19) Socrati cedite, sed veritati. Si enim vera vobis loqui videbor, concedite. Sin minus, omni(20)no contradicite,
diligenter caventes ne ego dum annitor meipsum simul vosque decipiam (21) et velut apes aculeo in vobis relicto abeam. [marg. Provebium Velut apes relicto aculeo a bis]
Let us then, in the first place, he said, be careful of allowing or of admitting into our souls the notion that there is no health or soundness in any arguments at all.
Rather say that we have not yet attained to soundness in ourselves, and that we must struggle manfully and do our best to gain health of mind
--you and all other men having regard to the whole of your future life, and I myself in the prospect of death.
For at this moment I am sensible that I have not the temper of a philosopher; like the vulgar, I am only a partisan.
Now the partisan, when he is engaged in a dispute, cares nothing about the rights of the question, but is anxious only to convince his hearers of his own assertions.
And the difference between him and me at the present moment is merely this
--that whereas he seeks to convince his hearers that what he says is true, I am rather seeking to convince myself;
to convince my hearers is a secondary matter with me. And do but see how much I gain by the argument.
For if what I say is true, then I do well to be persuaded of the truth, but if there be nothing after death, still, during the short time that remains, I shall not distress my friends with lamentations, and my ignorance will not last, but will die with me, and therefore no harm will be done.
This is the state of mind, Simmias and Cebes, in which I approach the argument.
And I would ask you to be thinking of the truth and not of Socrates: agree with me, if I seem to you to be speaking the truth;
or if not, withstand me might and main, that I may not deceive you as well as myself in my enthusiasm, and like the bee, leave my sting in you before I die.
ἀλλ᾽ ἰτέον, ἔφη.
πρῶτόν με ὑπομνήσατε ἃ ἐλέγετε, ἐὰν μὴ φαίνωμαι μεμνημένος.
Σιμμίας μὲν γάρ, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ἀπιστεῖ τε καὶ φοβεῖται μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ ὅμως καὶ θειότερον καὶ (91d) κάλλιον ὂν τοῦ σώματος προαπολλύηται ἐν ἁρμονίας εἴδει οὖσα·
Κέβης δέ μοι ἔδοξε τοῦτο μὲν ἐμοὶ συγχωρεῖν, πολυχρονιώτερόν γε εἶναι ψυχὴν σώματος, ἀλλὰ τόδε ἄδηλον παντί, μὴ πολλὰ δὴ σώματα καὶ πολλάκις κατατρίψασα ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ τελευταῖον σῶμα καταλιποῦσα νῦν αὐτὴ ἀπολλύηται,
καὶ ᾖ αὐτὸ τοῦτο θάνατος, ψυχῆς ὄλεθρος, ἐπεὶ σῶμά γε ἀεὶ ἀπολλύμενον οὐδὲν παύεται.
ἆρα ἄλλ᾽ ἢ ταῦτ᾽ ἐστίν, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἃ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι;
Verum eundum” inquit.
“Primo michi in memoriam ferte que dixistis, si non videor reminisci.
Simmias enim dubitatque et metuit ne anima tamen, quamvis et magis divinum et pulcherrimum cum sit corpore, prius pereat in specie armonie existens;
Cebesque michi visus est hoc michi concedere, diuturniorem esse animam corpore, sed hoc incertum cuique, ne multa quidem corpora et multociens deterens anima novissime corpus deserens nunc ipsa pereat,
et sit ipsum hoc mors, anime interitus, quando quidem corpus semper disperiens minime quiescit.
Itaque nisi hec sint, O Simmia et Cebes, que convenit nos attendere?”
Sed iam accedendum est.
Primum quidem re(22)digite in memoriam mihi quae dicebatis, si minus meminisse vobis videbor.
Simmias qui(23)dem, ut arbitror diffidit ac metuit ne anima quamvis divinior pulchriorque corpore, prius (24) tamen pro harmoniae natura intereat.
Cebes autem mihi visus est concedere diuturnio(25)rem esse animam corpore, sed is addidit scire posse neminem, ne cum multa saepius con(26)sumpserit corpora, tandem quandoque postremum relinquens corpus,
ipsa quoque pereat, (27) atque mors eiusmodi tantum sit interitus animae, corpus vero dissolvi continue consueve(28)rit.
An non haec sunt, o Simmia et Cebes, quae nos oportet considerare?”
And now let us proceed, he said.
And first of all let me be sure that I have in my mind what you were saying.
Simmias, if I remember rightly, has fears and misgivings whether the soul, although a fairer and diviner thing than the body, being as she is in the form of harmony, may not perish first.
On the other hand, Cebes appeared to grant that the soul was more lasting than the body, but he said that no one could know whether the soul, after having worn out many bodies, might not perish herself and leave her last body behind her;
and that this is death, which is the destruction not of the body but of the soul, for in the body the work of destruction is ever going on.
Are not these, Simmias and Cebes, the points which we have to consider?
καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη σοι, ἔφη, ὦ ξένε Θηβαῖε, ἄλλα δόξαι, ἐάνπερ μείνῃ ἥδε ἡ οἴησις, τὸ ἁρμονίαν μὲν εἶναι σύνθετον πρᾶγμα, ψυχὴν δὲ ἁρμονίαν τινὰ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐντεταμένων συγκεῖσθαι·
οὐ γάρ που ἀποδέξῃ γε (92b) σαυτοῦ λέγοντος ὡς πρότερον ἦν ἁρμονία συγκειμένη, πρὶν ἐκεῖνα εἶναι ἐξ ὧν ἔδει αὐτὴν συντεθῆναι. ἢ ἀποδέξῃ;
Et Socrates: “Ceterum necesse tibi” ait, “O peregrine Thebane, alia opinari, si quidem maneat hec quoque opinacio, armoniam nempe esse compositam rem, animamque armoniam quam ex eis que secundum corpus intensa sunt componi;
haut enim alicubi demonstrabitur temet inquiente quatinus prius armoniam compositam, ante quam ista sint ex quibus oportuit illam constare; vel recipis?”
“At vero necesse est,” inquit, “hospes The(36)bane, aliter tibi videri si in hac opinione permanseris, harmoniam videlicet esse composi(37)tum quoddam, animam vero harmoniam quandam ex his quae per corpus intensa sunt (38) constitutam.
Nunquam enim admittes consonantiam compositam prius esse quam illa (39) ex quibus componi consonantiam oportebat. Nunquid admittes?”
But, rejoined Socrates, you will have to think differently, my Theban friend, if you still maintain that harmony is a compound, and that the soul is a harmony which is made out of strings set in the frame of the body;
for you will surely never allow yourself to say that a harmony is prior to the elements which compose it.
αἰσθάνῃ οὖν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ὅτι ταῦτά σοι συμβαίνει λέγειν, ὅταν φῇς μὲν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπου εἶδός τε καὶ σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, εἶναι δὲ αὐτὴν συγκειμένην ἐκ τῶν οὐδέπω ὄντων;
οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἁρμονία γέ σοι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ᾧ ἀπεικάζεις, ἀλλὰ πρότερον καὶ ἡ λύρα καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ καὶ (92c) οἱ φθόγγοι ἔτι ἀνάρμοστοι ὄντες γίγνονται, τελευταῖον δὲ πάντων συνίσταται ἡ ἁρμονία καὶ πρῶτον ἀπόλλυται.
οὗτος οὖν σοι ὁ λόγος ἐκείνῳ πῶς συνᾴσεται;
“Scias igitur” ait is “quia non hec tibi contingit dicere, quociens inquis esse animam prius eciam quam in hominis formamque et corpus introeat, esse sane illam constantem ex eis que nondum sunt?
Non enim armonia quoque tibi tale est cui assimilas, atqui prius et lira et fides et soni adhuc anarmosti existentes fiunt, novissime certe cunctorum componitur armonia, et prima interit.
Hec itaque racio illi quo pacto concinet?”
“Animadverteris igitur”, inquit, “cogi te id confiteri, quando dicis animum (41) quidem esse prius quam in humanam speciem corpusque deveniret atque esse corporis (42) consonantiam, videlicet ex his quae nondum sunt eam constitui.
Neque enim talis tibi (43) est consonantia, cui tu simile esse dicis. Immo vero prius est ipsa lyra, et fides, et soni ad (44) huc inconcinni, tandem vero ex omnibus componitur consonantia omnium postrema, (45) primasque disperditur.
Hic itaque sermo quonam pacto tuo illi concinet?”
But do you not see that this is what you imply when you say that the soul existed before she took the form and body of man, and was made up of elements which as yet had no existence?
For harmony is not like the soul, as you suppose; but first the lyre, and the strings, and the sounds exist in a state of discord, and then harmony is made last of all, and perishes first.
And how can such a notion of the soul as this agree with the other?
πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἔφη, ἐκεῖνον, ὦ Σώκρατες. ὅδε μὲν γάρ (92d) μοι γέγονεν ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως μετὰ εἰκότος τινὸς καὶ εὐπρεπείας, ὅθεν καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖ ἀνθρώποις·
ἐγὼ δὲ τοῖς διὰ τῶν εἰκότων τὰς ἀποδείξεις ποιουμένοις λόγοις σύνοιδα οὖσιν ἀλαζόσιν, καὶ ἄν τις αὐτοὺς μὴ φυλάττηται, εὖ μάλα ἐξαπατῶσι, καὶ ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν.
ὁ δὲ περὶ τῆς ἀναμνήσεως καὶ μαθήσεως λόγος δι᾽ ὑποθέσεως ἀξίας ἀποδέξασθαι εἴρηται.
ἐρρήθη γάρ που οὕτως ἡμῶν εἶναι ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρὶν εἰς σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, ὥσπερ αὐτῆς ἐστιν ἡ οὐσία ἔχουσα τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὴν τοῦ “ὃ ἔστιν” (92e) ἐγὼ δὲ ταύτην, ὡς ἐμαυτὸν πείθω, ἱκανῶς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀποδέδεγμαι.
ἀνάγκη οὖν μοι, ὡς ἔοικε, διὰ ταῦτα μήτε ἐμαυτοῦ μήτε ἄλλου ἀποδέχεσθαι λέγοντος ὡς ψυχή ἐστιν ἁρμονία.
“Longe magis illum” infit, “O Socrate. Hie enim michi factus est absque demonstracione cum conveniente quodam et decore, unde et multis videtur hominibus;
ego autem per convenienciam demonstraciones facientibus sermonibus concino, cum sint elati, et si quis eos non observaverit facillime fallant et in geometria et in aliis universis.
Verum de recordacione et disciplina sermo per ypothesim dignam suscipi dicitur.
Dictum est enim alicubi nostrum sic esse anima eciam ante quam in corpus veniret, prout eius est essencia habens agnomen hoc ab hoc ‘quod est'. Ego vero hoc, ut michi ipsi persuadeo, sufficienterque et recte demonstravi.
Necesse itaque michi, ceu videtur, propter hec neque me ipso neque alio recipere dicente quoniam anima est armonia.”
“Primum quidem potius eligo”, inquit. (50) “Id nanque alterum absque demonstratione admisi ex verisimili quadam convenientia, quem(51)admodum videtur et multis.
Ego autem ea verba quae per id quod convenit demonstra(52)tiones faciunt, semper inania iudicavi. Ac nisi quis caveat valde decipiunt et in geometria (53) et in caeteris omnibus.
Ratio vero de reminiscentia atque disciplina fundamento innitur fi(54)de digno.
Dictum est enim animam nostram ita esse alicubi, prius etiam quam laberetur in (509, 1) corpus, ut illa ipsius essentia habeat eius 'quod vere est' cognomentum. Ego vero hanc ut (2) mihimet persuadeo, sufficienter recteque admisi
proptereaque neque mihi neque alijs animam (3) appellantibus harmoniam assentiri possum."
I think, he replied, that I have a much stronger faith, Socrates, in the first of the two, which has been fully demonstrated to me, than in the latter, which has not been demonstrated at all, but rests only on probable and plausible grounds; and is therefore believed by the many.
I know too well that these arguments from probabilities are impostors, and unless great caution is observed in the use of them, they are apt to be deceptive--in geometry, and in other things too.
But the doctrine of knowledge and recollection has been proven to me on trustworthy grounds;
and the proof was that the soul must have existed before she came into the body, because to her belongs the essence of which the very name implies existence.
Having, as I am convinced, rightly accepted this conclusion, and on sufficient grounds, I must, as I suppose, cease to argue or allow others to argue that the soul is a harmony.
ἢ οὐχί, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ἂν μὲν μᾶλλον ἁρμοσθῇ καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον, (93b) εἴπερ ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι, μᾶλλόν τε ἂν ἁρμονία εἴη καὶ πλείων, εἰ δ᾽ ἧττόν τε καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἔλαττον, ἥττων τε καὶ ἐλάττων;
“Vel non” ait ille, “si mage moduletur, et adhuc si oportet hoc fieri, magis utique armonia erit et maior, si vero minus et ad minus, minus quidem et minor?”
“Nonne si ma(11)gis plusque contemperetur, si modo id admittit, magis plusque consonantia est? Sin vero mi(12)nus atque perpaucum, minus perpaucumque similiter?”
I mean to say that a harmony admits of degrees, and is more of a harmony, and more completely a harmony, when more truly and fully harmonized, to any extent which is possible; and less of a harmony, and less completely a harmony, when less truly and fully harmonized.
τῶν οὖν θεμένων ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι τί τις φήσει ταῦτα ὄντα εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς, τήν τε ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν;
πότερον ἁρμονίαν αὖ τινα ἄλλην καὶ ἀναρμοστίαν;
καὶ τὴν μὲν ἡρμόσθαι, τὴν ἀγαθήν, καὶ ἔχειν ἐν αὑτῇ ἁρμονίᾳ οὔσῃ ἄλλην ἁρμονίαν, τὴν δὲ ἀνάρμοστον αὐτήν τε εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἔχειν ἐν αὑτῇ ἄλλην;
SOCRATES. “Eorum itaque qui ponunt animam armoniam esse quis quid dicet hec cum sint esse in animabus, virtutem et maliciam?
Utrum armoniam item aliquam aliam et anarmostiam?
Et hanc quoque modulari, scilicet bonam, et habere in se ipsa, armonia cum sit, aliam armoniam, illam nempe immodulatam esse et non habere in se ipsa aliam?”
“Eorum er(17)go qui animam esse asserunt harmoniam, quis quidnam dicet esse in animabus, haec scili(18)cet vitium et virtutem?
An aliam quandam consonantiam atque dissonantiam?
et bonam (19) quidem esse consonantem, et cum ipsa consonantia sit, alteram in se consonantiam possi(20)dere, malam vero dissonantem et ipsam esse nec aliam in se habere?”
But what will those who maintain the soul to be a harmony say of this presence of virtue and vice in the soul?
--will they say that here is another harmony, and another discord,
and that the virtuous soul is harmonized, and herself being a harmony has another harmony within her, and that the vicious soul is inharmonical and has no harmony within her?
(94a) μᾶλλον δέ γέ που, ὦ Σιμμία, κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κακίας οὐδεμία ψυχὴ μεθέξει, εἴπερ ἁρμονία ἐστίν·
ἁρμονία γὰρ δήπου παντελῶς αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὖσα, ἁρμονία, ἀναρμοστίας οὔποτ᾽ ἂν μετάσχοι.
SOCRATES. “Magis quoque alicubi, O Simmia, iuxta rectam racionem vicio nulla anima participabit, si armonia sit;
armonia quippe prorsus ipsum hoc cum sit, armonia, anarmostia numquam utique participabit.”
(33) “Quinimmo secundum rectam, Simmia, rationem nulla usquam anima pravitate erit affe(34)cta, si fuerit consonantia.
Quandoquidem consonantia vera secundum id quod consonan(35)tia est, nunquam fit dissonantia particeps.”
Or speaking more correctly, Simmias, the soul, if she is a harmony, will never have any vice;
because a harmony, being absolutely a harmony, has no part in the inharmonical.
πότερον συγχωροῦσαν τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πάθεσιν ἢ καὶ ἐναντιουμένην;
λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε, οἷον καύματος ἐνόντος καὶ δίψους ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον ἕλκειν, τὸ μὴ πίνειν,
καὶ πείνης ἐνούσης ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ ἐσθίειν,
καὶ ἄλλα μυρία που ὁρῶμεν (94c) ἐναντιουμένην τὴν ψυχὴν τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα· ἢ οὔ;
“Utrum assencientem eis que secundum corpus passionibus vel eciam adversantem?
Dico autem tale, veluti estu insistente atque siti in contrarium trahentem, scilicet non bibendum,
necnon fame insistente ad non comedendum,
et alia decem milia perspicimus adversantem animam eis que secundum corpus, seu non?”
“Vtrum corporis (42) perturbationibus indulgentem an potius repugnantem?
Dico autem tale quiddam, ve(43)luti si sub aestu sitis angat, interea tamen adversatur animus retrahitque in contrarium ne bi(44)bat,
similiterque si premat fames, ne edat,
in alijsque quamplurimis videmus corporis affe(45)ctibus repugnantem. Nonne?”
And is the soul in agreement with the affections of the body? or is she at variance with them?
For example, when the body is hot and thirsty, does not the soul incline us against drinking?
and when the body is hungry, against eating?
And this is only one instance out of ten thousand of the opposition of the soul to the things of the body.
τί οὖν; νῦν οὐ πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἡμῖν φαίνεται ἐργαζομένη, ἡγεμονεύουσά τε ἐκείνων πάντων ἐξ ὧν φησί τις αὐτὴν (94d) εἶναι,
καὶ ἐναντιουμένη ὀλίγου πάντα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου καὶ δεσπόζουσα πάντας τρόπους, τὰ μὲν χαλεπώτερον κολάζουσα καὶ μετ᾽ ἀλγηδόνων, τά τε κατὰ τὴν γυμναστικὴν καὶ τὴν ἰατρικήν, τὰ δὲ πρᾳότερον,
καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀπειλοῦσα, τὰ δὲ νουθετοῦσα, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὀργαῖς καὶ φόβοις ὡς ἄλλη οὖσα ἄλλῳ πράγματι διαλεγομένη;
SOCRATES. “Quid igitur? Nonne omne quod est contrarium nobis videtur operari, principari illis omnibus ex quibus dicit quis illam esse
et adversari ferme in universis per omne vivendi tempus, atque dominari omnibus modis, hec vero gravius animadvertens et cum doloribus, hec sane secundum exercitatoriam et medicinalem, hec prafecto micius
atque hec certe minans, hec nempe monens ad concupiscencias et iras et timores, quasi alia esset alii rei collocuta?
"Quid vero nunc? Nonne (49) contra omnino videtur agere, quatenus ea ducit omnia ex quibus dixerit aliquis ipsam (50) constitui?
atque ferme omnibus per omnem vitam repugnat multisque dominatur modis, (51) interdum rigidius quodam cum supplicio puniens per gymnasticam atque medicinam, (52) interdum vero mitius
castigans comminando aut monendo adversus cupiditates et iras, (53) atque timores, tanquam altera quaedam res contra alteram loquens,
And yet do we not now discover the soul to be doing the exact opposite--leading the elements of which she is believed to be composed;
almost always opposing and coercing them in all sorts of ways throughout life, sometimes more violently with the pains of medicine and gymnastic; then again more gently;
now threatening, now admonishing the desires, passions, fears, as if talking to a thing which is not herself, as Homer in the Odyssee represents Odysseus doing in the words--
εἶεν δή, ἦ δ᾽ ὃς ὁ Σωκράτης, τὰ μὲν Ἁρμονίας ἡμῖν τῆς Θηβαϊκῆς ἵλεά πως, ὡς ἔοικε, μετρίως γέγονεν·
τί δὲ δὴ τὰ Κάδμου, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, πῶς ἱλασόμεθα καὶ τίνι λόγῳ;
“Esto quidem” ait ille Socrates, “sane ea que de Armonia nobis Thebaica propicia aliquatenus, ut videtur, modeste facta sunt;
quid autem ea que Cadmi” ait, “O Cebes, qui propiciabimus et qua racione?”
“Age harmoniam Theba(8)nam satis, ut videtur, iam placavimus.
Rationem vero Cadmeam, o Cebes, quonam pacto (9) et qua ratione placabimus?”
Thus much, said Socrates, of Harmonia, your Theban goddess, who has graciously yielded to us;
but what shall I say, Cebes, to her husband Cadmus, and how shall I make peace with him?
σύ μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ἐξευρήσειν·
τουτονὶ γοῦν τὸν λόγον τὸν πρὸς τὴν ἁρμονίαν θαυμαστῶς μοι εἶπες ὡς παρὰ δόξαν.
Σιμμίου γὰρ λέγοντος ὅτε ἠπόρει, πάνυ ἐθαύμαζον (95b) εἴ τι ἕξει τις χρήσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ αὐτοῦ·
πάνυ οὖν μοι ἀτόπως ἔδοξεν εὐθὺς τὴν πρώτην ἔφοδον οὐ δέξασθαι τοῦ σοῦ λόγου.
ταὐτὰ δὴ οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι καὶ τὸν τοῦ Κάδμου λόγον εἰ πάθοι.
“Tu michi videris” infit Cebes “adinvenire;
hunc ergo sermonem qui ad armoniam mirabiliter michi dixisti tamquam preter opinionem.
Simmia quippe dicente quod dubitaverit penitus mirabar si quid habuerit quis uti racione ipsius;
funditus ita que michi incompetenter visum est confestim primum ingressum non recipere tue oracionis.
Hec utique non mirer et Cadmi sermonem si paciatur.”
“Tu mihi, o Socrates, viam”, inquit Cebes, “inventurus videris.
(10) Nempe rationem hanc adversus harmoniam mirifice praeter opinionem nostram exco(11)gitasti.
Cum enim audirem Simmiam dubitantem, valde admirabar si quis rationibus eius (12) resistere posset.
Itaque summae mihi fuit admirationi, ipsum nec primum quidem potuisse (13) rationis tuae imperium sustinere.
Quapropter non admirarer si Cadmeus quoque sermo (14) idem pateretur."
I think that you will discover a way of propitiating him, said Cebes;
I am sure that you have put the argument with Harmonia in a manner that I could never have expected.
For when Simmias was mentioning his difficulty, I quite imagined that no answer could be given to him,
and therefore I was surprised at finding that his argument could not sustain the first onset of yours,
and not impossibly the other, whom you call Cadmus, may share a similar fate.
ὠγαθέ, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, μὴ μέγα λέγε, μή τις ἡμῖν βασκανία περιτρέψῃ τὸν λόγον τὸν μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι.
ἀλλὰ δὴ ταῦτα μὲν τῷ θεῷ μελήσει, ἡμεῖς δὲ Ὁμηρικῶς ἐγγὺς ἰόντες πειρώμεθα εἰ ἄρα τι λέγεις.
ἔστι δὲ δὴ τὸ κεφάλαιον ὧν ζητεῖς·
ἀξιοῖς ἐπιδειχθῆναι ἡμῶν τὴν ψυχὴν (95c) ἀνώλεθρόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον οὖσαν,
εἰ φιλόσοφος ἀνὴρ μέλλων ἀποθανεῖσθαι, θαρρῶν τε καὶ ἡγούμενος ἀποθανὼν ἐκεῖ εὖ πράξειν διαφερόντως ἢ εἰ ἐν ἄλλῳ βίῳ βιοὺς ἐτελεύτα, μὴ ἀνόητόν τε καὶ ἠλίθιον θάρρος θαρρήσει.
τὸ δὲ ἀποφαίνειν ὅτι ἰσχυρόν τί ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ θεοειδὲς καὶ ἦν ἔτι πρότερον, πρὶν ἡμᾶς ἀνθρώπους γενέσθαι, οὐδὲν κωλύειν φῂς πάντα ταῦτα μηνύειν ἀθανασίαν μὲν μή,
ὅτι δὲ πολυχρόνιόν τέ ἐστιν ψυχὴ καὶ ἦν που πρότερον ἀμήχανον ὅσον χρόνον καὶ ᾔδει τε καὶ ἔπραττεν πολλὰ ἄττα·
ἀλλὰ γὰρ (95d) οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἦν ἀθάνατον, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εἰς ἀνθρώπου σῶμα ἐλθεῖν ἀρχὴ ἦν αὐτῇ ὀλέθρου, ὥσπερ νόσος·
καὶ ταλαιπωρουμένη τε δὴ τοῦτον τὸν βίον ζῴη καὶ τελευτῶσά γε ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ θανάτῳ ἀπολλύοιτο.
διαφέρειν δὲ δὴ φῂς οὐδὲν εἴτε ἅπαξ εἰς σῶμα ἔρχεται εἴτε πολλάκις, πρός γε τὸ ἕκαστον ἡμῶν φοβεῖσθαι·
προσήκει γὰρ φοβεῖσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἀνόητος εἴη, τῷ μὴ εἰδότι μηδὲ ἔχοντι λόγον διδόναι (95e) ὡς ἀθάνατόν ἐστι.
τοιαῦτ᾽ ἄττα ἐστίν, οἶμαι, ὦ Κέβης, ἃ λέγεις·
καὶ ἐξεπίτηδες πολλάκις ἀναλαμβάνω, ἵνα μή τι διαφύγῃ ἡμᾶς, εἴ τέ τι βούλει, προσθῇς ἢ ἀφέλῃς.
“O bone” inquit Socrates, “ne magna dicas, ne forte quis nostrum fascino invertat sermonem futurum dici;
verum hec quoque deo cure erunt, nos autem Omerice prope euntes temptabimus si certe quid dicas.
Estque capitulum horum que queris.
Postulas demonstrari nostrum animam indestructibilemque et immortalem esse,
si philosophus vir futurus mori, confidens et cogitans cum expiraverit illic bene actum ire differenter quam si in alia vita degens obierit haut inutili quoque et fatua confidencia fidet.
Pronunciare profecto quoniam potens quid est anima et deiforme et quoniam erat eciam prius, ante quam nos homines fieremus, nichil prohibere dicis universa hec monere immortalitatem quoque minime,
quoniam diuturnius est anima et aliquo modo erat prius immensum tempus, et novitque et egit multa quedam.
Immo nichilo magis erat immortale, atqui in hominis corpus venire primordium erat ipsi interitus quemadmodum morbus;
et captivata utique hanc vitam degat et desinens in eo quod vocatur mors intereat.
Differre quidem ais, nichil sive semel in corpus veniat sive multociens ad hoc quemque nostrum formidare.
Convenit siquidem metuere nisi insensatus fuerit, non scienti neque habenti racionem reddere quoniam immortale est.
Talia quedam sunt, opinor, O Cebes, que dicis;
et ex studio frequencius repeto, neu quid subterfugiat nos, si vero quid velis apponas vel demas.'
“Parcius ista, bone vir, nequa invidia nobis sequentia interturbet.
Sed haec (15) quidem deo curae erunt, nos autem ut ait Homerus comminus congressi periculum fa(16)ciamus an forte quid dicas.
Summa vero eorum quae perquiris est eiusmodi:
demonstran(17)dum esse iudicas animam nostram indissolubilem immortalemque esse,
ne vir philosophus (18) in morte securus magnaque cum fiducia sperans in alia vita longe beatiorem ob philoso(19)phiae studium se futurum, insipiens sit stulteque confidat.
Ostendere autem validum quid(20)dam esse animam atque divinis persimile priusque etiam quam nos extitisse, nihil impedi(21)mento esse ais quo minus haec omnia non immortalitatem quidem significent,
sed dun(22)taxat animam corpore diuturniorem esse multaque ante nos secula fuisse novisseque et (23) egisse permulta,
nihilo tamen magis ob hoc immortalem esse existimandam. Immo hunc (24) ipsum in humanum corpus ingressum quasi morbum quendam interitus eius initium (25) esse,
adeo ut et in hac vita sit misera et in corporis morte depereat.
Nihil autem differre (26) censes, sive semel tantum, sive saepius labatur in corpus ut quivis nostrum pertimescat.
(27) Merito nanque timendum esse nisi stultus sit, ei qui neque sciat neque assignare queat im(28)mortalitatis animae rationem.
Talia quaedam sunt quae dicis, o Cebes, egoque ea consulto
(29) saepius repeto ne quid nos fugiat, sive addere his quicquam velis, sive demere.”
Nay, my good friend, said Socrates, let us not boast, lest some evil eye should put to flight the word which I am about to speak.
That, however, may be left in the hands of those above, while I draw near in Homeric fashion, and try the mettle of your words.
Here lies the point:
--You want to have it proven to you that the soul is imperishable and immortal,
and the philosopher who is confident in death appears to you to have but a vain and foolish confidence,
if he believes that he will fare better in the world below than one who has led another sort of life, unless he can prove this;
and you say that the demonstration of the strength and divinity of the soul, and of her existence prior to our becoming men, does not necessarily imply her immortality.
Admitting the soul to be longlived, and to have known and done much in a former state, still she is not on that account immortal;
and her entrance into the human form may be a sort of disease which is the beginning of dissolution, and may at last, after the toils of life are over, end in that which is called death.
And whether the soul enters into the body once only or many times, does not, as you say, make any difference in the fears of individuals.
For any man, who is not devoid of sense, must fear, if he has no knowledge and can give no account of the soul's immortality.
This, or something like this, I suspect to be your notion, Cebes;
and I designedly recur to it in order that nothing may escape us, and that you may, if you wish, add or subtract anything.
ὁ οὖν Σωκράτης συχνὸν χρόνον ἐπισχὼν καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτόν τι σκεψάμενος,
οὐ φαῦλον πρᾶγμα, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ζητεῖς·
ὅλως γὰρ δεῖ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὴν αἰτίαν διαπραγματεύσασθαι.
(96a) ἐγὼ οὖν σοι δίειμι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐὰν βούλῃ, τά γε ἐμὰ πάθη·
ἔπειτα ἄν τί σοι χρήσιμον φαίνηται ὧν ἂν λέγω, πρὸς τὴν πειθὼ περὶ ὧν δὴ λέγεις χρήσῃ.
FEDON. Itaque Socrates crebrum tempus detinens et penes se ipsum quid contuitus:
“Haut contemptibilem rem” infit, “O Cebes, percunctaris;
ex toto enim de generacione et corrupcione causam disquirere.
Ego igitur expono tibi de illis, si vis, meas passiones;
deinceps si quid tibi utile videatur eorum quecumque assero, ad persuasionem de quibuscumque dixeris uteris.”
Tunc Socrates cum aliquantum se recepisset ad se conversus
“Haud leve quiddam re(32)quiris,” inquit,“o Cebes,
sed cuius gratia oporteat generationis corruptionisque causam per(33)tractare.
Ego igitur si vis ea tibi quae mihi evenerunt enarrabo.
Deinde si quid eorum quae (34) dixero ad quaestionis tuae veritatem aperiendam conducere putabis, utere.”
Socrates paused awhile, and seemed to be absorbed in reflection.
At length he said: You are raising a tremendous question, Cebes,
involving the whole nature of generation and corruption,
about which, if you like, I will give you my own experience;
and if anything which I say is likely to avail towards the solution of your difficulty you may make use of it.
ἄκουε τοίνυν ὡς ἐροῦντος.
ἐγὼ γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, νέος ὢν θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπεθύμησα ταύτης τῆς σοφίας ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν·
ὑπερήφανος γάρ μοι ἐδόκει εἶναι, εἰδέναι τὰς αἰτίας ἑκάστου, διὰ τί γίγνεται ἕκαστον καὶ διὰ τί ἀπόλλυται καὶ διὰ τί ἔστι.
καὶ πολλάκις (96b) ἐμαυτὸν ἄνω κάτω μετέβαλλον σκοπῶν πρῶτον τὰ τοιάδε·
“ἆρ᾽ ἐπειδὰν τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν σηπεδόνα τινὰ λάβῃ, ὥς τινες ἔλεγον, τότε δὴ τὰ ζῷα συντρέφεται;
καὶ πότερον τὸ αἷμά ἐστιν ᾧ φρονοῦμεν, ἢ ὁ ἀὴρ ἢ τὸ πῦρ;
ἢ τούτων μὲν οὐδέν, ὁ δ᾽ ἐγκέφαλός ἐστιν ὁ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων τοῦ ἀκούειν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὀσφραίνεσθαι, ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνοιτο μνήμη καὶ δόξα, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης λαβούσης τὸ ἠρεμεῖν, κατὰ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην;
καὶ αὖ τούτων τὰς φθορὰς σκοπῶν, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν οὐρανόν (96c) τε καὶ τὴν γῆν πάθη, τελευτῶν οὕτως ἐμαυτῷ ἔδοξα πρὸς ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν ἀφυὴς εἶναι ὡς οὐδὲν χρῆμα.
τεκμήριον δέ σοι ἐρῶ ἱκανόν·
ἐγὼ γὰρ ἃ καὶ πρότερον σαφῶς ἠπιστάμην, ὥς γε ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐδόκουν, τότε ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως οὕτω σφόδρα ἐτυφλώθην,
ὥστε ἀπέμαθον καὶ ταῦτα ἃ πρὸ τοῦ ᾤμην εἰδέναι,
περὶ ἄλλων τε πολλῶν καὶ διὰ τί ἄνθρωπος αὐξάνεται.
τοῦτο γὰρ ᾤμην πρὸ τοῦ παντὶ δῆλον εἶναι, ὅτι διὰ τὸ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν·
(96d) ἐπειδὰν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν σιτίων ταῖς μὲν σαρξὶ σάρκες προσγένωνται, τοῖς δὲ ὀστοῖς ὀστᾶ, καὶ οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τὰ αὐτῶν οἰκεῖα ἑκάστοις προσγένηται, τότε δὴ τὸν ὀλίγον ὄγκον ὄντα ὕστερον πολὺν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὕτω γίγνεσθαι τὸν σμικρὸν ἄνθρωπον μέγαν.
οὕτως τότε ᾤμην· οὐ δοκῶ σοι μετρίως;
SOCRATES. “Audi ergo velut dicentem.
Ego siquidem” ait, “O Cebes, iunior cum essem pervalde affectavi hanc sapienciam quam appellant de natura historiam;
splendidissima namque michi visa est esse, nosse causas uniuscuiusque, quare generetur singulum et quare dispereat et quare sit;
et sepe me ipsum sursum deorsum mutabam dispiciens primo talia quoque:
anne ubi fervidum et algidum putrefaccionem aliquam sumant, velut quidam inquiebant, tunc animalia connutriri;
et utrum sanguis sit quo sentimus, vel aer aut ignis,
sive horum nichil, cerebrum vera sit quod sensus exhibeat audiendi et videndi atque olfaciendi, ex hiis autem fiat memoria et opinio, ex memoria nempe et opinione sumente quietem, et secundum hec fieri scienciam;
et item horum corrupciones inspiciens et eas que circa celumque et terram passiones, novissime tamen michi ipsi videbar ad hanc consideracionem obtusus esse quantum nullam rem;
argumentum quoque tibi dicam ydoneum;
ego namque que prius manifeste sciebam, velut michi et aliis videbatur, demum ab ilia consideracione itatenus excecatus sum,
ut dediscerem eciam ea que ante hoc estimabam nosse,
de aliis vera multis et propter quid homo crescit.
Hoc namque rebar prius cuilibet liquidum esse, quia propter comedere et potum sumere;
quando quidem ex cibariis carnibus carnes accrescunt, ossibusque ossa et ita iuxta eamdem racionem eciam aliis sui ipsorum propria singulis adiciuntur, demum utique modica sarcina cum sit, posterius multam fieri, atque sic fieri parvum hominem magnum.
Ita tunc opinabar; nonne videor tibi modeste?”
“Audi igitur iam narrantem.
Equidem, o Cebes, cum essem iuvenis mira qua(36)dam eius sapientiae cupiditate flagrabam quam naturae vocant historiam.
Praeclarissimum (37) enim esse censebam causas intelligere per quas singula fiant atque intereant et qua sint ra(38)tione,
saepiusque me sursum deorsumque iactavi talia quaedam primo considerans
nunquid (39) postquam calidum et frigidum putrefactionem aliquam acceperunt, quemadmodum nonnulli di(40)xerunt, tunc animalia convalescant.
Praeterea utrum sit quo sapimus vel aer vel (41) ignis,
aut nihil horum sit, sed cerebrum quod praebeat sensus audiendi, vivendi, olfaciendi, ex (42) his autem memoria et opinio fiat, ex memoria vero et opinione quietem accipiente per haec (43) scientia oriatur.
Proinde horum corruptiones considerans atque eas quae circa coelum ter(44)ramque passiones contingunt, tandem adeo mihi ad haec consideranda visus sum hebes ut ni(45)hil magis.
Coniecturam vero ad id afferam tibi sufficientem.
Nempe ob eiusmodi conside(46)rationem usqueadeo sum occaecatus ut ea etiam quae prius manifeste sciebam, ut mihi alijsque (47) videbatur,
dediscerem et alia videlicet multa quae antea me scire putabam
et qua ratio(48)ne homo crescat.
Id nanque opinabar ante esse cuilibet manifestum, hominem videlicet per ci(49)bum potumque augeri.
Quando enim per haec carnes carnibus ossaque ossibus adduntur eo(50)demque modo in alijs quando sua cuique adhibentur, tunc sane molem primo parvam deinde (51) magnam evadere, atque ita parvum hominem effici magnum.
Sic ego tunc opinabar, nonne sa(52)tis belle tibi videor?”
Then I will tell you, said Socrates.
When I was young, Cebes, I had a prodigious desire to know that department of philosophy which is called the investigation of nature;
to know the causes of things, and why a thing is and is created or destroyed appeared to me to be a lofty profession;
and I was always agitating myself with the consideration of questions such as these:
--Is the growth of animals the result of some decay which the hot and cold principle contracts, as some have said?
Is the blood the element with which we think, or the air, or the fire?
or perhaps nothing of the kind--but the brain may be the originating power of the perceptions of hearing and sight and smell, and memory and opinion may come from them, and science may be based on memory and opinion when they have attained fixity.
And then I went on to examine the corruption of them, and then to the things of heaven and earth, and at last I concluded myself to be utterly and absolutely incapable of these enquiries,
as I will satisfactorily prove to you.
For I was fascinated by them to such a degree that my eyes grew blind to things which I had seemed to myself, and also to others, to know quite well;
I forgot what I had before thought self-evident truths;
e.g. such a fact as that the growth of man
is the result of eating and drinking;
for when by the digestion of food flesh is added to flesh and bone to bone, and whenever there is an aggregation of congenial elements, the lesser bulk becomes larger and the small man great.
Was not that a reasonable notion?
σκέψαι δὴ καὶ τάδε ἔτι.
ᾤμην γὰρ ἱκανῶς μοι δοκεῖν, ὁπότε τις φαίνοιτο ἄνθρωπος παραστὰς μέγας σμικρῷ μείζων (96e) εἶναι αὐτῇ τῇ κεφαλῇ, καὶ ἵππος ἵππου·
καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων ἐναργέστερα, τὰ δέκα μοι ἐδόκει τῶν ὀκτὼ πλέονα εἶναι διὰ τὸ δύο αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, καὶ τὸ δίπηχυ τοῦ πηχυαίου μεῖζον εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἡμίσει αὐτοῦ ὑπερέχειν.
SOCRATES. “Dispice vero et ista adhuc.
Autumabam quippe sufficienter videri michi, quociens quis appareat astans homo magnus parvo, maior esse ipso capite, et equus equo;
et adhuc hiis evidencius decem michi videbantur octo plura esse eo quod duo eis addantur, et bicubitum cubitali maius esse eo quod medietate ipsum superet.”
“Animadverte haec insuper.
Arbitrabar (53) enim satis recte mihi videri quoties hominem vel equum magnum parvo propinquum, al(54)terum altero iudicaram capite ipso esse maiorem.
Atque multo etiam evidentius decem plura (511, 1) apparebant mihi quam octo, propterea quod denarius duo praeter octonarium contine(2)ret. Praeterea bicubitum cubitali maius, quoniam dimidio superaret.”
Well; but let me tell you something more.
There was a time when I thought that I understood the meaning of greater and less pretty well; and when I saw a great man standing by a little one, I fancied that one was taller than the other by a head; or one horse would appear to be greater than another horse:
and still more clearly did I seem to perceive that ten is two more than eight, and that two cubits are more than one, because two is the double of one.
πόρρω που, ἔφη, νὴ Δία ἐμὲ εἶναι τοῦ οἴεσθαι περὶ τούτων του τὴν αἰτίαν εἰδέναι, ὅς γε οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι ἐμαυτοῦ οὐδὲ ὡς ἐπειδὰν ἑνί τις προσθῇ ἕν, ἢ τὸ ἓν ᾧ προσετέθη δύο γέγονεν, <ἢ τὸ προστεθέν>, ἢ τὸ προστεθὲν καὶ ᾧ προσετέθη (97a) διὰ τὴν πρόσθεσιν τοῦ ἑτέρου τῷ ἑτέρῳ δύο ἐγένετο·
θαυμάζω γὰρ εἰ ὅτε μὲν ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν χωρὶς ἀλλήλων ἦν, ἓν ἄρα ἑκάτερον ἦν καὶ οὐκ ἤστην τότε δύο, ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐπλησίασαν ἀλλήλοις, αὕτη ἄρα αἰτία αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι, ἡ σύνοδος τοῦ πλησίον ἀλλήλων τεθῆναι.
οὐδέ γε ὡς ἐάν τις ἓν διασχίσῃ, δύναμαι ἔτι πείθεσθαι ὡς αὕτη αὖ αἰτία γέγονεν, ἡ σχίσις, τοῦ δύο γεγονέναι·
ἐναντία γὰρ (97b) γίγνεται ἢ τότε αἰτία τοῦ δύο γίγνεσθαι.
τότε μὲν γὰρ ὅτι συνήγετο πλησίον ἀλλήλων καὶ προσετίθετο ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ, νῦν δ᾽ ὅτι ἀπάγεται καὶ χωρίζεται ἕτερον ἀφ᾽ ἑτέρου.
οὐδέ γε δι᾽ ὅτι ἓν γίγνεται ὡς ἐπίσταμαι, ἔτι πείθω ἐμαυτόν, οὐδ᾽ ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἑνὶ λόγῳ δι᾽ ὅτι γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι, κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τῆς μεθόδου,
ἀλλά τιν᾽ ἄλλον τρόπον αὐτὸς εἰκῇ φύρω, τοῦτον δὲ οὐδαμῇ προσίεμαι.
“Procul in quibusdam” inquiebat, “per Iovem, me esse ab estimacione de hiis hanc causam cognoscere, qui non approbo me ipsum, neque quociens uni quis adiciat unum, sive unum cui appositum est duo factum est, sive quod appositum est, et cui appositum est propter apposicionem alterius ad alterum duo facta sunt;
admiror enim si quociens utrumque ipsorum sequestratum ab invicem erat, unum fors utrumque erat et non erant tunc duo, cum vero appropiassent sibi invicem, hec igitur ipsis causa facta est ut duo essent, conventus propinque invicem posicionis.
Neque quociens si quis unum scindat, possum adhuc persuaded quatinus ipsa item causa facta est scissura, ut duo fierent;
contraria quippe fit que tunc fuit causa uti duo fierent;
tunc siquidem quando coacta sunt prope ad invicem et apponebatur alterum alteri, nunc profecto quoniam abactum est et separatur alterum ab altero.
Neque propter quid unum fit ut scio, persuadeo michi ipsi neque aliud quippiam uno verbo propter quid vel generatur vel corrumpitur vel est, iuxta hunc modum methodi,
verum aliquem alium modum incassum permisceo, huic autem nullatenus accedo.
“Procul equidem per Iovem abesse mihi videor ut alicuius (4) horum causam intelligere putem qui nondum mihijpsi persuadere possum ut quando quis (5) uni addat unum, tunc vel illud unum cui unum adiunctum est fiat duo, vel et adiunctum (6) et illud cui adiunctum est propter alterius ad alterum adiunctionem evadat duo.
Admiror (7) equidem si cum utrunque horum separatum erat, utrunque unum erat neque erant tunc duo, (8) postquam invicem cohaeserunt, haec ipsa causa fuerit ut duo fierent, congressio videlicet per (9) quam propius iam posita sunt.
Neque etiam si quis unum dividat, adhuc possum persuaderi (10) hanc ipsam divisionem causam esse ut duo evadant.
Contraria enim tunc atque superius cau(11)sa fit qua duo fiant.
Tunc enim quia coniungebantur propius invicem, alterumque admo(12)vebatur alteri, nunc vero quoniam removetur alterum ab altero atque separatur.
Neque propter (13) quid unum fiat adhuc scire me arbitror neque ut summatim dicam, aliud quicquam quare fiat (14) aut pereat aut sit, per hanc ipsam viam me nosse profiteor,
sed alium quendam ipse modum (15) frustra misceo, hunc vero nullo modo admitto.
I should be far enough from imagining, he replied, that I knew the cause of any of them, by heaven I should; for I cannot satisfy myself that, when one is added to one, the one to which the addition is made becomes two, or that the two units added together make two by reason of the addition.
I cannot understand how, when separated from the other, each of them was one and not two, and now, when they are brought together, the mere juxtaposition or meeting of them should be the cause of their becoming two:
neither can I understand how the division of one is the way to make two;
for then a different cause would produce the same effect,
--as in the former instance the addition and juxtaposition of one to one was the cause of two, in this the separation and subtraction of one from the other would be the cause.
Nor am I any longer satisfied that I understand the reason why one or anything else is either generated or destroyed or is at all,
but I have in my mind some confused notion of a new method, and can never admit the other.
ἀλλ᾽ ἀκούσας μέν ποτε ἐκ βιβλίου τινός, ὡς ἔφη, Ἀναξαγόρου (97c) ἀναγιγνώσκοντος, καὶ λέγοντος ὡς ἄρα νοῦς ἐστιν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος, ταύτῃ δὴ τῇ αἰτίᾳ ἥσθην τε καὶ ἔδοξέ μοι τρόπον τινὰ εὖ ἔχειν τὸ τὸν νοῦν εἶναι πάντων αἴτιον,
καὶ ἡγησάμην, εἰ τοῦθ᾽ οὕτως ἔχει, τόν γε νοῦν κοσμοῦντα πάντα κοσμεῖν καὶ ἕκαστον τιθέναι ταύτῃ ὅπῃ ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχῃ·
εἰ οὖν τις βούλοιτο τὴν αἰτίαν εὑρεῖν περὶ ἑκάστου ὅπῃ γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι, τοῦτο δεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ εὑρεῖν, ὅπῃ βέλτιστον αὐτῷ ἐστιν ἢ εἶναι ἢ (97d) ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν·
ἐκ δὲ δὴ τοῦ λόγου τούτου οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπεῖν προσήκειν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀλλ᾽ ἢ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον.
ἀναγκαῖον δὲ εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον εἰδέναι·
τὴν αὐτὴν γὰρ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην περὶ αὐτῶν.
ταῦτα δὴ λογιζόμενος ἅσμενος ηὑρηκέναι ᾤμην διδάσκαλον τῆς αἰτίας περὶ τῶν ὄντων κατὰ νοῦν ἐμαυτῷ, τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν, καί μοι φράσειν πρῶτον μὲν πότερον ἡ γῆ πλατεῖά ἐστιν ἢ (97e) στρογγύλη,
ἐπειδὴ δὲ φράσειεν, ἐπεκδιηγήσεσθαι τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην, λέγοντα τὸ ἄμεινον καὶ ὅτι αὐτὴν ἄμεινον ἦν τοιαύτην εἶναι·
καὶ εἰ ἐν μέσῳ φαίη εἶναι αὐτήν, ἐπεκδιηγήσεσθαι ὡς ἄμεινον ἦν αὐτὴν ἐν μέσῳ εἶναι·
καὶ εἴ μοι (98a) ταῦτα ἀποφαίνοι, παρεσκευάσμην ὡς οὐκέτι ποθεσόμενος αἰτίας ἄλλο εἶδος.
καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἡλίου οὕτω παρεσκευάσμην ὡσαύτως πευσόμενος, καὶ σελήνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρων, τάχους τε πέρι πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ τροπῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων, πῇ ποτε ταῦτ᾽ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ἕκαστον καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἃ πάσχει.
οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε αὐτὸν ᾤμην, φάσκοντά γε ὑπὸ νοῦ αὐτὰ κεκοσμῆσθαι, ἄλλην τινὰ αὐτοῖς αἰτίαν ἐπενεγκεῖν ἢ ὅτι βέλτιστον αὐτὰ οὕτως ἔχειν (98b) ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἔχει·
ἑκάστῳ οὖν αὐτῶν ἀποδιδόντα τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ κοινῇ πᾶσι τὸ ἑκάστῳ βέλτιστον ᾤμην καὶ τὸ κοινὸν πᾶσιν ἐπεκδιηγήσεσθαι ἀγαθόν·
καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἀπεδόμην πολλοῦ τὰς ἐλπίδας, ἀλλὰ πάνυ σπουδῇ λαβὼν τὰς βίβλους ὡς τάχιστα οἷός τ᾽ ἦ ἀνεγίγνωσκον, ἵν᾽ ὡς τάχιστα εἰδείην τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον.
Immo cum audissem aliquando ex libro quodam, ut ait, Anaxagora legente et dicente quoniam animus est perornansque et omnium causa, huic vero cause applaudebam quidem et visum est michi modo quodam bene se habere animum esse universorum causam,
et cogitabam utrum hoc ita se habet, mentem quoque ornantem cuncta ornare et singulum ponere ut utcumque potissime se habeat;
si ergo quis voluerit causam invenire singuli qualiter fit vel interit vel est, hoc oportere de ipso reperire qualiter optime ipsi sit vel esse vel aliud quodcumque pati vel agere;
ex racione ista nichil aliud considerare competit homini et de ipso et de aliis nisi optimum et potissimum;
necesseque esse eumdem hunc et deterius scire;
eamdem enim esse scienciam illorum.
Hec vero meditatus alacer invenisse putabam doctorem cause eorum que sunt iuxta animum michi ipsi Anaxagoram, et michi exponere primum equidem utrum sit terra latitudine distracta vel rotunda;
cumque exposuisset, superaddere ut recitaret causam et necessitatem, dicentem quod pocius et quoniam ipsam pocius erat talem esse;
et si in medio dicat esse ipsam superaddere ut recitet quoniam pocius erat ipsi in medio esse;
et si michi hec diffinirentur, astruebam quoniam non amplius ponerem cause aliam speciem.
Eciam et de sole ita astruebam similiter interrogaturus de luna et aliis astris, de celeritate quidem ad invicem et conversionibus et aliis passionibus, qualiter quando ista pocius est singulum et facere et pati que paciuntur.
Non enim umquam ipsum rebar asserentem quoque ab animo hec ornari, aliam aliquam causam ipsis superinducere quam quoniam melius ipsa sic se habere sit prout habent.
Unicuique igitur eorum reddentem causam et communiter universis, singulo optimum rebar et commune omnibus superexponere bonum;
et non utique redderem pro multo has spes; immo summo opere sumens hos libros quantocius poteram legebam, uti quantocius cognoscerem potissimum et deterius.
Verum cum audissem aliquando ex libro, ut ille (16) aiebat, Anaxagorae legentem quendam hanc Anaxagoriae ipsius sententiam, videlicet men(17)tem omnia exornare omniumque causam esse, hoc utique causae genere magnopere sum de(18)lectatus – existimans quodammodo consentaneum mentem esse omnium causam –
putabamque si (19) id ita esset ut mens omnia exornaret, singula per haec ita esse disposita ut optime disponi po(20)tuerant.
Propterea si quis vellet causam invenire qua singula fiant aut pereant aut sint, hoc (21) ipsum esse inveniendum, qua videlicet ratione optimum sit unicuique aut esse aut quodvis (22) aliud pati vel agere.
Atque hoc pacto nihil aliud considerandum homini vel de seipso vel de (23) alijs, nisi quod potissimum sit et optimum.
Necesse vero est eum qui id norit, illud quoque quod (24) est deterius cognovisse,
quippe cum eadem horum scientia sit.
Haec utique mecum ipse re(25)putans gaudebam, invenisse ratus Anaxagoram magistrum qui me id quod tantopere cu(26)piebam causas rerum doceret primumque mihi diceret utrum plana sit terra vel rotunda.
Et (27) cum haec dixisset, subiungeret mihi causam atque necessitatem, afferens videlicet id ipsum quod (28) melius est, meliusque fuisse eam esse talem.
Proinde si terram diceret in mundo mediam esse, mox (29) exponeret melius extitisse ut media esset.
Quod si ille haec ostenderet, ita me comparabam (30) quasi nullam amplius causarum speciem positurus.
Praeterea de sole et luna caeterisque stel(31)lis earumque inter se velocitate conversionibusque et de huiusmodi omnibus me similiter (32) quaesiturum auditurumque comparaveram, quod videlicet et qua ratione haec melius sit sin(33)gula vel facere vel pati, quodcunque agant vel patiantur.
Neque enim putabam cum ab initio (34) dixisset mente omnia exornari, ipsum aliam postea causam rebus assignaturum praeterquam (35) quod optimum sit eas ita se ut habent habere.
Itaque arbitrabar eum in reddendis tum singu(36)lorum, tum cunctorum communiter causis, singulis quidem assignare quod unicuique optimum, (37) cunctis vero commune bonum.
Neque vero spes ipse meas parvifaciebam, sed summo quo(38)dam studio acceptos libros quam velocissime poterant lectitavi ut ocyssime quid optimum (39) quidve eius contrarium esset cognoscerem.
Then I heard some one reading, as he said, from a book of Anaxagoras, that mind was the disposer and cause of all, and I was delighted at this notion, which appeared quite admirable, and I said to myself:
If mind is the disposer, mind will dispose all for the best, and put each particular in the best place;
and I argued that if any one desired to find out the cause of the generation or destruction or existence of anything, he must find out what state of being or doing or suffering was best for that thing,
and therefore a man had only to consider the best for himself and others,
and then he would also know the worse,
since the same science comprehended both.
And I rejoiced to think that I had found in Anaxagoras a teacher of the causes of existence such as I desired, and I imagined that he would tell me first whether the earth is flat or round;
and whichever was true, he would proceed to explain the cause and the necessity of this being so, and then he would teach me the nature of the best and show that this was best;
and if he said that the earth was in the centre, he would further explain that this position was the best,
and I should be satisfied with the explanation given, and not want any other sort of cause.
And I thought that I would then go on and ask him about the sun and moon and stars, and that he would explain to me their comparative swiftness, and their returnings and various states, active and passive, and how all of them were for the best.
For I could not imagine that when he spoke of mind as the disposer of them, he would give any other account of their being as they are, except that this was best;
and I thought that when he had explained to me in detail the cause of each and the cause of all, he would go on to explain to me what was best for each and what was good for all.
These hopes I would not have sold for a large sum of money, and I seized the books and read them as fast as I could in my eagerness to know the better and the worse.
ἀπὸ δὴ θαυμαστῆς ἐλπίδος, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ᾠχόμην φερόμενος, ἐπειδὴ προϊὼν καὶ ἀναγιγνώσκων ὁρῶ ἄνδρα τῷ μὲν νῷ οὐδὲν χρώμενον οὐδέ τινας αἰτίας ἐπαιτιώμενον εἰς τὸ (98c) διακοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα, ἀέρας δὲ καὶ αἰθέρας καὶ ὕδατα αἰτιώμενον καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα.
καί μοι ἔδοξεν ὁμοιότατον πεπονθέναι ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις λέγων ὅτι Σωκράτης πάντα ὅσα πράττει νῷ πράττει, κἄπειτα ἐπιχειρήσας λέγειν τὰς αἰτίας ἑκάστων ὧν πράττω, λέγοι πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι διὰ ταῦτα νῦν ἐνθάδε κάθημαι, ὅτι σύγκειταί μου τὸ σῶμα ἐξ ὀστῶν καὶ νεύρων,
καὶ τὰ μὲν ὀστᾶ ἐστιν στερεὰ καὶ διαφυὰς ἔχει χωρὶς ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων, τὰ δὲ νεῦρα οἷα ἐπιτείνεσθαι (98d) καὶ ἀνίεσθαι, περιαμπέχοντα τὰ ὀστᾶ μετὰ τῶν σαρκῶν καὶ δέρματος ὃ συνέχει αὐτά·
αἰωρουμένων οὖν τῶν ὀστῶν ἐν ταῖς αὑτῶν συμβολαῖς χαλῶντα καὶ συντείνοντα τὰ νεῦρα κάμπτεσθαί που ποιεῖ οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι ἐμὲ νῦν τὰ μέλη, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν συγκαμφθεὶς ἐνθάδε κάθημαι·
καὶ αὖ περὶ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ὑμῖν ἑτέρας τοιαύτας αἰτίας λέγοι, φωνάς τε καὶ ἀέρας καὶ ἀκοὰς καὶ ἄλλα μυρία (98e) τοιαῦτα αἰτιώμενος,
ἀμελήσας τὰς ὡς ἀληθῶς αἰτίας λέγειν, ὅτι, ἐπειδὴ Ἀθηναίοις ἔδοξε βέλτιον εἶναι ἐμοῦ καταψηφίσασθαι, διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἐμοὶ βέλτιον αὖ δέδοκται ἐνθάδε καθῆσθαι, καὶ δικαιότερον παραμένοντα ὑπέχειν τὴν δίκην ἣν ἂν κελεύσωσιν·
ἐπεὶ νὴ τὸν κύνα, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, πάλαι ἂν (99a) ταῦτα τὰ νεῦρα καὶ τὰ ὀστᾶ ἢ περὶ Μέγαρα ἢ Βοιωτοὺς ἦν, ὑπὸ δόξης φερόμενα τοῦ βελτίστου, εἰ μὴ δικαιότερον ᾤμην καὶ κάλλιον εἶναι πρὸ τοῦ φεύγειν τε καὶ ἀποδιδράσκειν ὑπέχειν τῇ πόλει δίκην ἥντιν᾽ ἂν τάττῃ.
ἀλλ᾽ αἴτια μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα καλεῖν λίαν ἄτοπον·
εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ὅτι ἄνευ τοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχειν καὶ ὀστᾶ καὶ νεῦρα καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἔχω οὐκ ἂν οἷός τ᾽ ἦ ποιεῖν τὰ δόξαντά μοι, ἀληθῆ ἂν λέγοι·
ὡς μέντοι διὰ ταῦτα ποιῶ ἃ ποιῶ, καὶ ταῦτα νῷ πράττων, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ (99b) τῇ τοῦ βελτίστου αἱρέσει, πολλὴ ἂν καὶ μακρὰ ῥᾳθυμία εἴη τοῦ λόγου.
τὸ γὰρ μὴ διελέσθαι οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι ὅτι ἄλλο μέν τί ἐστι τὸ αἴτιον τῷ ὄντι, ἄλλο δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἄνευ οὗ τὸ αἴτιον οὐκ ἄν ποτ᾽ εἴη αἴτιον·
ὃ δή μοι φαίνονται ψηλαφῶντες οἱ πολλοὶ ὥσπερ ἐν σκότει, ἀλλοτρίῳ ὀνόματι προσχρώμενοι, ὡς αἴτιον αὐτὸ προσαγορεύειν.
διὸ δὴ καὶ ὁ μέν τις δίνην περιτιθεὶς τῇ γῇ ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ μένειν δὴ ποιεῖ τὴν γῆν, ὁ δὲ ὥσπερ καρδόπῳ πλατείᾳ βάθρον τὸν ἀέρα ὑπερείδει·
(99c) τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὡς οἷόν τε βέλτιστα αὐτὰ τεθῆναι δύναμιν οὕτω νῦν κεῖσθαι, ταύτην οὔτε ζητοῦσιν οὔτε τινὰ οἴονται δαιμονίαν ἰσχὺν ἔχειν,
ἀλλὰ ἡγοῦνται τούτου Ἄτλαντα ἄν ποτε ἰσχυρότερον καὶ ἀθανατώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἅπαντα συνέχοντα ἐξευρεῖν,
καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον συνδεῖν καὶ συνέχειν οὐδὲν οἴονται.
ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν τῆς τοιαύτης αἰτίας ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἔχει μαθητὴς ὁτουοῦν ἥδιστ᾽ ἂν γενοίμην·
ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταύτης ἐστερήθην καὶ οὔτ᾽ αὐτὸς εὑρεῖν οὔτε παρ᾽ ἄλλου μαθεῖν οἷός τε ἐγενόμην, τὸν δεύτερον (99d) πλοῦν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας ζήτησιν ᾗ πεπραγμάτευμαι βούλει σοι, ἔφη, ἐπίδειξιν ποιήσωμαι, ὦ Κέβης;
“Admirabili vero spe, O dilecte, ferebar deportatus, cum vero processissem et legissem conspicio virum animo minime fruentem neque aliguas causas pro causis inducentem ad perornandum res, aeras quoque atque etheras et aguas pro causis ferentem et alia multa et innumera.
Et michi videbatur simillimum guid pati ac si utigue quis dicens guoniam Socrates quecumque agit animo agit, et deinceps, perscrutans dicere causas singulorum que facio, dicat primum quidem quoniam propter hoc nunc istic sedeo quoniam componitur michi corpus ex ossibus et nervis,
et ossa quidem sunt solida atque diafias habent seorsum ab invicem, verum nervi ydonei extendi et remitti, amplectencia ossa cum carnibus et pelle que continet ea:
suspensis quippe ossibus in suis enbolis remissos et intensos nervos curvari facit possibile quoque me nunc artus, et ob istam causam incurvatus hic sedeo;
et item super hoc quod discepto vobis alias huiusmodi causas dicat, voces sane et aeras et aures et alia decem milia huiusmodi pro causis ferens,
negligens quam vere causas dicere, scilicet quoniam Atheneis visum est melius me condempnare, propter hec utigue et michi melius iterum visum est, hic sedere et iustius manentem suscipere iudicium quodcumque preceperint,
quoniam per canem, ut ego reor, dudum hii nervi et hec ossa vel circa Megara vel Viotos essent, ab estimacione lata melioris nisi iustius cogitarem et honestius esse quam clam discedere et aufugere, sustinere urbi iudicium guodcumque disposuerit.
Verum causas quidem talia vocare valde inconveniens;
quod si guis dicat guoniam sine talium habitacione et ossium et nervorum et aliorum quecumque habeo non utique possem facere que videntur, michi, vera profecto dicet;
quoniam utique propter hec ago que ago, et ista mente ago, atqui non optimi eleccione multa guidem et longa desidia esset racionis;
quia non distingui possibile esset quoniam aliud quidem est causa vere, aliud quoque sine quo causa numquam erit causa;
quod utique michi videntur disquirentes multi tamquam in tenebris, alieno oculo freti, ut causam ipsum appellent.
Quocirca nempe hic profecto dinen circumponens terre sub celo manere facit terram, hic autem velut cardopo lata profundum aera deorsum despicit;
eam vera que est quam possibile ipsa potissimum poni potenciam ita nunc poni, hanc neque vestigant neque aliquam existimant demonicam vim habere,
immo arbitrantur isto utique aliquando Athlanta robustiorem et immortaliorem et magis universa continentem adinvenire,
id autem quod est et quam vere bonum et oportunum colligare et continere minus opinantur.
Ego sane huiuscemodi cause quomodocumque se habeat discipulus cuiuscumque libentissime quoque fierem;
cumque hac privatus essem et neque ipse invenire neque ab alio discere quivi, secundam navem in cause examinacionem qualiter disquiratur vis tibi” ait “demonstracionem faciam, O Cebes?”
Hac igitur miserabili spe ductus cum legeret per(40)go, video hominem mente quidem nullo utentem nec causam ullam ad ipsum rerum (41) ornatum referentem, sed aereas naturas et aethereas aqueasque et talia multa incredibilia pro (42) rerum causis assignantem.
Qua quidem in re ille mihi perinde visus est agere, ac si quis dice(43)ret Socratem quaecunque facit mente facere, deinde volens singulorum quae facio causas ex(44)plicare, dicat primum quidem nunc me hic propterea sedere, quoniam corpus meum ex ossi(45)bus nervisque componitur,
et ossa quidem solida sunt et iuncturarum intervalla invicem ha(46)bent, nervi autem sic instituti ut extendi et contrahi valeant, complectantur ossa cum car(47)nibus atque cute, quae res illa continet.
Elatis igitur ossibus in suis coniunctionibus, nervi (48) qui et intendunt et remittunt commode, faciunt ut flectendi cuiusque membri habeam fa(49)cultatem atque hanc ob causam hic inflexus sedeam.
Ac rursus disputationis meae alias quas(50)dam eiusmodi causas assignaret, voces et aerem et auditum aliaque generis eiusdem quam(51)plurima,
causas verissimas negligens, videlicet quoniam Atheniensibus melius visum fue(52)rit me condemnare, ideoque mihi etiam melius sit visum hic sedere, iustiusque iudicarim expe(53)ctantem dare poenas quas illi iubeant.
Profecto per Canem iamdiu, ut arbitror, hi nervi atque (54) haec ossa apud Megarenses aut Boeotius essent ipsius quod optimum est opinione delata, (512, 1) nisi iustius honestiusque censuissem poenas civitati pendere quascunque a me exigat, quam (2) subterfugere atque exulem vivere.
Verum talia quaedam causas appellare a ratione est re(3)motissimum.
Siquis autem dixerit absque ossibus et nervis atque similibus non posse me quae (4) mihi facienda videantur implere, vere utique dicet.
Attamen asserere propter haec me fa(5)cere quacunque facio, dum ipsa mente ago, non autem eius quod optimum sit optione, (6) multa magnaque sermonis negligentia esset.
Nam qui sic est affectus nequit discernere a(7)liam quidem esse veram rei alicuius causam, aliud vero illud sine quo ipsa causa esse non (8) potest causa.
Quod quidem multi mihi videntur quasi in tenebris attrectantes alieno ap(9)pellare nomine dum causam nuncupant.
Quapropter nonnulli vertiginem circumponen(10)tes terrae sub coelo eam stabilem faciunt, alij vero tanquam latum pistoris alveum aere ve(11)lut base suffulciunt.
Potentiam vero ipsam, qua nunc ita disposita sit ut optime disponi po(12)terat, neque perquirunt neque daemonicam quandam habere vim putant,
sed Atlantem quen(13)dam robustiorem et immortaliorem magisque omnia continentem invenisse se opinantur.
(14) Ipsum autem bonum atque decens connectere atque continere revera nihil existimant.
Ego (15) igitur libentissime cuiusvis essem discipulus ut quemadmodum se habeat haec ipsa causa (16) discerem.
Postquam vero hac privatus sum, neque ipse invenire neque ab alio discere po(17)tui, secundam navigationem ad causam investigandam molitus sum. Visne, o Cebes, hanc (18) tibi a me demonstrari?”
What expectations I had formed, and how grievously was I disappointed! As I proceeded, I found my philosopher altogether forsaking mind or any other principle of order, but having recourse to air, and ether, and water, and other eccentricities.
I might compare him to a person who began by maintaining generally that mind is the cause of the actions of Socrates, but who, when he endeavoured to explain the causes of my several actions in detail, went on to show that I sit here because my body is made up of bones and muscles;
and the bones, as he would say, are hard and have joints which divide them, and the muscles are elastic, and they cover the bones, which have also a covering or environment of flesh and skin which contains them;
and as the bones are lifted at their joints by the contraction or relaxation of the muscles, I am able to bend my limbs, and this is why I am sitting here in a curved posture
--that is what he would say, and he would have a similar explanation of my talking to you, which he would attribute to sound, and air, and hearing, and he would assign ten thousand other causes of the same sort,
forgetting to mention the true cause, which is, that the Athenians have thought fit to condemn me, and accordingly I have thought it better and more right to remain here and undergo my sentence;
for I am inclined to think that these muscles and bones of mine would have gone off long ago to Megara or Boeotia--by the dog they would, if they had been moved only by their own idea of what was best, and if I had not chosen the better and nobler part, instead of playing truant and running away, of enduring any punishment which the state inflicts.
There is surely a strange confusion of causes and conditions in all this.
It may be said, indeed, that without bones and muscles and the other parts of the body I cannot execute my purposes.
But to say that I do as I do because of them, and that this is the way in which mind acts, and not from the choice of the best, is a very careless and idle mode of speaking.
I wonder that they cannot distinguish the cause from the condition, which the many, feeling about in the dark, are always mistaking and misnaming.
And thus one man makes a vortex all round and steadies the earth by the heaven; another gives the air as a support to the earth, which is a sort of broad trough.
Any power which in arranging them as they are arranges them for the best never enters into their minds;
and instead of finding any superior strength in it, they rather expect to discover another Atlas of the world who is stronger and more everlasting and more containing than the good;
--of the obligatory and containing power of the good they think nothing;
and yet this is the principle which I would fain learn if any one would teach me.
But as I have failed either to discover myself, or to learn of any one else, the nature of the best, I will exhibit to you, if you like, what I have found to be the second best mode of enquiring into the cause.
(100b) ἀλλ᾽, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ὧδε λέγω, οὐδὲν καινόν,
ἀλλ᾽ ἅπερ ἀεί τε ἄλλοτε καὶ ἐν τῷ παρεληλυθότι λόγῳ οὐδὲν πέπαυμαι λέγων.
ἔρχομαι [γὰρ] δὴ ἐπιχειρῶν σοι ἐπιδείξασθαι τῆς αἰτίας τὸ εἶδος ὃ πεπραγμάτευμαι,
καὶ εἶμι πάλιν ἐπ᾽ ἐκεῖνα τὰ πολυθρύλητα καὶ ἄρχομαι ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνων, ὑποθέμενος εἶναί τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ μέγα καὶ τἆλλα πάντα·
ἃ εἴ μοι δίδως τε καὶ συγχωρεῖς εἶναι ταῦτα, ἐλπίζω σοι ἐκ τούτων τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιδείξειν καὶ ἀνευρήσειν ὡς ἀθάνατον [ἡ] ψυχή.
“Verum” ait ille “quod dico, neutiquam recens,
immo que semper in alio tempore et in preterito sermone haut cessavi dicere.
Venio siquidem satagens tibi ostendere cause speciem quam investigavi,
et venio rursum ad ilia plurimum ruminata atque ordior ab illis, ponens esse quid honestum ipsum secundum se et bonum et magnum et alia universa;
que si michi das et concedis esse hec, spero tibi ex hiis causam ostendere, atque inventum ire quoniam immortale anima.”
“Verum novum nihil adduco,
sed quae et saepe alias in superiori dis(32)putatione dicere nunquam destiti.
Pergo iam igitur demonstrare tibi causae speciem quam (33) continue pertractavi
ac redeo ad illa iam saepius decantata ab eisque exordior supponens (34) aliquid esse ipsum per se pulchrum et bonum et magnum et caetera omnia.
Quae qui(35)dem si tu mihi decederis eaque esse concesseris, spero tibi ex his ipsam causam demonstrare (36) itemque invenire esse animam immortalem."
There is nothing new, he said, in what I am about to tell you;
but only what I have been always and everywhere repeating in the previous discussion and on other occasions:
I want to show you the nature of that cause which has occupied my thoughts.
I shall have to go back to those familiar words which are in the mouth of every one, and first of all assume that there is an absolute beauty and goodness and greatness, and the like;
grant me this, and I hope to be able to show you the nature of the cause, and to prove the immortality of the soul.
οὐ τοίνυν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ἔτι μανθάνω οὐδὲ δύναμαι τὰς ἄλλας αἰτίας τὰς σοφὰς ταύτας γιγνώσκειν·
ἀλλ᾽ ἐάν τίς μοι λέγῃ (100d) δι᾽ ὅτι καλόν ἐστιν ὁτιοῦν, ἢ χρῶμα εὐανθὲς ἔχον ἢ σχῆμα ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα χαίρειν ἐῶ,--ταράττομαι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι--
τοῦτο δὲ ἁπλῶς καὶ ἀτέχνως καὶ ἴσως εὐήθως ἔχω παρ᾽ ἐμαυτῷ, ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ αὐτὸ καλὸν ἢ ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἴτε παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία εἴτε ὅπῃ δὴ καὶ ὅπως †προσγενομένη·
οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο διισχυρίζομαι, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ [γίγνεται] καλά.
τοῦτο γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀσφαλέστατον εἶναι καὶ ἐμαυτῷ ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ ἄλλῳ, καὶ τούτου ἐχόμενος (100e) ἡγοῦμαι οὐκ ἄν ποτε πεσεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὁτῳοῦν ἄλλῳ ἀποκρίνασθαι ὅτι τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ [γίγνεται] καλά·
ἢ οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ;
“Non igitur” ait ille “adhuc perpendo neque valeo alias causas, sapientes istas, cognoscere;
ceterum si quis michi dicat quare bonum est quidlibet sive quoniam colorem floridum habens seu quoniam figuram vel aliud quidlibet talium, sane reliqua gaudere sino - turbor quippe in aliis universis,-
hoc autem simpliciter et mirabiliter et fortasse temere habeo penes me ipsum, quia non aliud quid efficit ipsum bonum quam illius boni sive presencia sive communicacio sive qualitercumque et quomodo adherens;
nam nondum hoc perscrutor, verum quoniam bono cuncta bona.
Id siquidem michi videtur firmissimum esse et michi ipsi respondere atque alii, et hoc fultus autumo numquam labi, immo fixum esse, et michi et cuilibet alii respondere quoniam bono bona bona fiunt.
Vel non eciam tibi videtur?”
“Ergo nondum ultra percipio neque possum caeteras istas praeclaras cau(42)sas cognoscere.
Siquis autem mihi dixerit quare pulchrum sit quodlibet, videlicet quia (43) vel colorem habeat floridum vel figuram vel aliud quodvis talium, caetera equidem va(44)lere sino. In caeteris enim omnibus soleo perturbari.
Id vero unum simpliciter atque pro(45)culdubio et forte iam inepte penes me teneo: nihil aliud esse quod aliquid faciat pul(46)chrum quam ipsius pulchri sive praesentiam sive communionem sive qualicunque ra(47)tione et quocunque modo id proveniat.
Neque enim id adhuc affirmarem, sed pulchro (48) pulchra omnia esse pulchra.
Id mihi videtur tutissimum tam mihi quam alijs responde(49)re, atque huic fundamento innixus puto nunquam cadere, sed et me et quemvis alium (50) tuto respondere posse, quacunque pulchra sunt, ipso pulchro fieri pulchra.
Nonne et (51) ipse consentis?”
He proceeded: I know nothing and can understand nothing of any other of those wise causes which are alleged;
and if a person says to me that the bloom of colour, or form, or any such thing is a source of beauty, I leave all that, which is only confusing to me,
and simply and singly, and perhaps foolishly, hold and am assured in my own mind that nothing makes a thing beautiful but the presence and participation of beauty in whatever way or manner obtained;
for as to the manner I am uncertain, but I stoutly contend that by beauty all beautiful things become beautiful.
This appears to me to be the safest answer which I can give, either to myself or to another, and to this I cling, in the persuasion that this principle will never be overthrown, and that to myself or to any one who asks the question, I may safely reply, That by beauty beautiful things become beautiful.
Do you not agree with me?
οὐδὲ σὺ ἄρ᾽ ἂν ἀποδέχοιο εἴ τίς τινα φαίη ἕτερον ἑτέρου τῇ κεφαλῇ μείζω εἶναι, καὶ τὸν ἐλάττω τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῳ (101a) ἐλάττω, ἀλλὰ διαμαρτύροιο ἂν ὅτι σὺ μὲν οὐδὲν ἄλλο λέγεις ἢ ὅτι τὸ μεῖζον πᾶν ἕτερον ἑτέρου οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ μεῖζόν ἐστιν ἢ μεγέθει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μεῖζον, διὰ τὸ μέγεθος, τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ ἔλαττον ἢ σμικρότητι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἔλαττον, διὰ τὴν σμικρότητα,
φοβούμενος οἶμαι μή τίς σοι ἐναντίος λόγος ἀπαντήσῃ, ἐὰν τῇ κεφαλῇ μείζονά τινα φῇς εἶναι καὶ ἐλάττω, πρῶτον μὲν τῷ αὐτῷ τὸ μεῖζον μεῖζον εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἔλαττον,
ἔπειτα τῇ κεφαλῇ σμικρᾷ οὔσῃ τὸν (101b) μείζω μείζω εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο δὴ τέρας εἶναι, τὸ σμικρῷ τινι μέγαν τινὰ εἶναι·
ἢ οὐκ ἂν φοβοῖο ταῦτα;
SOCRATES. “Neque tu itaque recipias si quis aliquem dicat alterum altero capite maiorem esse necnon minorem eodem modo minorem esse, verum testificeris utique quoniam tu quidem nichil aliud asseris quam quia maius omne alterum altero nichilo alio maius est quam magnitudine, et ob hoc maius, ob magnitudinem, sane minus nichilo alio minus quam exiguitate et ob hoc minora, ob exiguitatem,
metuens, reor, ne que tibi adversans racio obviet, si capite maiorem quem dixeris esse et minorem, primum autem eodem maius maius esse et minus minus;
deinde capite modicum cum sit maiorem maiorem esse, et hoc quidem portentum esse, modico quodam magnum aliquem esse?
Vel utique non metuas ista?”
“Igitur neque tu quidem assentieris si quis aliquem dixerit (54) alio quodam capite esse maiorem, atque eum qui minor est, eodem capite esse minorem, sed (513, 1) testificaberis te quidem nihil aliud esse dicturum, quam omne maius alio non alia re ulla (2) quam magnitudine esse maius, atque ob hoc maius, ob ipsam scilicet magnitudinem. Minus (3) autem, nullo similiter alio quam parvitate et propter hoc esse minus, propter ipsam vide(4)licet parvitatem,
metuens ut puto ne siquem dixeris capite maiorem esse vel minorem, (5) quispiam tibi sic obijciat. Primum quidem eadem re maius fore maius et minus fore (6) minus,
deinde quod capite quae res parva est, maiorem affirmes esse maiorem. Hoc autem (7) dicet monstro esse persimile, ut paulo aliquo magnum quiddam esse dicas.
Nonne haec me(8)tueres?”
Then if a person were to remark that A is taller by a head than B, and B less by a head than A, you would refuse to admit his statement, and would stoutly contend that what you mean is only that the greater is greater by, and by reason of, greatness, and the less is less only by, and by reason of, smallness;
and thus you would avoid the danger of saying that the greater is greater and the less less by the measure of the head, which is the same in both,
and would also avoid the monstrous absurdity of supposing that the greater man is greater by reason of the head, which is small.
You would be afraid to draw such an inference, would you not?
οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, τὰ δέκα τῶν ὀκτὼ δυοῖν πλείω εἶναι, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπερβάλλειν, φοβοῖο ἂν λέγειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ πλήθει καὶ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος;
καὶ τὸ δίπηχυ τοῦ πηχυαίου ἡμίσει μεῖζον εἶναι ἀλλ᾽ οὐ μεγέθει;
ὁ αὐτὸς γάρ που φόβος.
“Numquid igitur” ait ille “decem octo duobus plura esse, et ob hanc causam excedere, timeasne dicere, sed non multitudine atque propter multitudinem?
Necnon bicubitum cubitali medietate maius esse sed non magnitudine?
Eadem enim formido.”
“Nonne similiter quoque metueres dice(9)re”, inquit, “decem plura quam octo esse duobus, atque ob hanc causam superare, potius quam mul(10)titudine atque propter multitudinem?
Ac similiter bicubitum cubitali maius esse dimidio (11) potius quam multitudine?
Id enim similiter est metuendum.”
In like manner you would be afraid to say that ten exceeded eight by, and by reason of, two; but would say by, and by reason of, number;
or you would say that two cubits exceed one cubit not by a half, but by magnitude?
-for there is the same liability to error in all these cases.
τί δέ; ἑνὶ ἑνὸς προστεθέντος τὴν πρόσθεσιν αἰτίαν εἶναι (101c) τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἢ διασχισθέντος τὴν σχίσιν οὐκ εὐλαβοῖο ἂν λέγειν;
καὶ μέγα ἂν βοῴης ὅτι οὐκ οἶσθα ἄλλως πως ἕκαστον γιγνόμενον ἢ μετασχὸν τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ἑκάστου οὗ ἂν μετάσχῃ,
καὶ ἐν τούτοις οὐκ ἔχεις ἄλλην τινὰ αἰτίαν τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἀλλ᾽ ἢ τὴν τῆς δυάδος μετάσχεσιν, καὶ δεῖν τούτου μετασχεῖν τὰ μέλλοντα δύο ἔσεσθαι, καὶ μονάδος ὃ ἂν μέλλῃ ἓν ἔσεσθαι,
τὰς δὲ σχίσεις ταύτας καὶ προσθέσεις καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς τοιαύτας κομψείας ἐῴης ἂν χαίρειν, παρεὶς ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῖς σεαυτοῦ σοφωτέροις·
σὺ δὲ δεδιὼς ἄν, τὸ (101d) λεγόμενον, τὴν σαυτοῦ σκιὰν καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν, ἐχόμενος ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς τῆς ὑποθέσεως, οὕτως ἀποκρίναιο ἄν.
εἰ δέ τις αὐτῆς τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἔχοιτο, χαίρειν ἐῴης ἂν καὶ οὐκ ἀποκρίναιο ἕως ἂν τὰ ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνης ὁρμηθέντα σκέψαιο εἴ σοι ἀλλήλοις συμφωνεῖ ἢ διαφωνεῖ·
ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτῆς δέοι σε διδόναι λόγον, ὡσαύτως ἂν διδοίης, ἄλλην αὖ ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθέμενος ἥτις τῶν ἄνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνοιτο, (101e) ἕως ἐπί τι ἱκανὸν ἔλθοις,
ἅμα δὲ οὐκ ἂν φύροιο ὥσπερ οἱ ἀντιλογικοὶ περί τε τῆς ἀρχῆς διαλεγόμενος καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἐκείνης ὡρμημένων, εἴπερ βούλοιό τι τῶν ὄντων εὑρεῖν;
ἐκείνοις μὲν γὰρ ἴσως οὐδὲ εἷς περὶ τούτου λόγος οὐδὲ φροντίς·
ἱκανοὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ σοφίας ὁμοῦ πάντα κυκῶντες ὅμως δύνασθαι αὐτοὶ αὑτοῖς ἀρέσκειν·
σὺ δ᾽, εἴπερ εἶ τῶν φιλοσόφων, (102a) οἶμαι ἂν ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω ποιοῖς.
SOCRATES. “Quid sane? Uni uno apposito apposicionem causam esse ut duo fiant seu discisso discissionem non verearis utique dicere?
Et magna voce clames quoniam nequaquam arbitramur alio quolibet modo singulum factum quam participans propria essencia singuli quocumque participet,
et in hiis minime habes aliquam aliam causam ut duo fiant, sed binarii participacionem, et oportere hoc participare que debent duo fore, atque unitate quodcumque debeat unum fore,
porra scissiones has et apposiciones atque alias huiusmodi compsias sinas nempe valere, permittens respondere se ipso sapiencioribus;
tu veritus quoque, ut solet dici, sui ipsius umbram et impericiam, fultus illa soliditate ypotheseos, ita respondeas equidem.
Si vera quis ipsa ypothesi innitatur, valere sinas quidem et non respondeas, donec que ab illa oriantur consideres utrum tibi ad invicem consonent vel discrepent;
quoniam quidem illius ipsius oporteat te dare racionem, similiter certe metuas aliam iterum ypothesim ponens que superiorum optima videatur quousque in quidpiam ydoneum venias,
simulque numquam misceas quemadmodum antilogici de principio disputans et de hiis que ex illo oriuntur, si velis quid eorum que sunt invenire?
Illis namque forsan nullus super hoc sermo neque sollicitudo;
ydonei enim a sapiencia simul omnia movendo confundentes tamen posse ipsi ipsis placere;
tu autem si es de philosophis, autumo quoque velut ego dico facies.”
“Quid vero si uni (12) addatur unum, additamentum ipsum esse causam ut duo fiant, vel si dividatur, divisionem (13) ipsam duorum esse causam, dicere non formidares?
Altiusque exclamares nescire te quo(14)nam alio pacto quicquam fiat, nisi participatione quadam essentiae unicuique propriae, cu(15)ius sit particeps?
Atque in his nullam aliam habere te causam, cur duo fiant praeter duitatis (16) ipsius participationem, sed oportere huius participia fore, quaecunque futura sunt duo, et (17) similiter unitatis quodcunque futurum sit unum?
Has vero divisiones adiunctionesque et cae(18)teras eiusmodi argutias valere sineres relinqueresque sapientioribus te per eas pro arbitrio (19 responsuris.
[marg: Proverbium Tuam umbram metuis] Tu vero tuam, quemadmodum dici solet, metuens umbram et imperitiam at(20)que innixus tutissimae illi positioni, sic utique responderes?
At vero si quis eandem positio(21)nem complexus instaret velere sineres, neque prius responderes quam quae inde manant (22) considerasses utrum consonent invicem aut dissonent?
Vbi vero illius ipsius rationem o(23)porteret afferre, eodem modo afferres atque aliam rursus positionem adduceres quae supe(24)riorum optima videretur, quoad ad aliquid sufficiens pervenires?
Nunquam vero simul (25) confunderes contentiosorum more, ubi et de principio et de his quae a principio deducun(26)tur disputas, si modo velles eorum aliquid quae vere sunt invenire?
Nam illis fortasse nul(27)lus hac de re sermo est, nulla cura.
Possunt enim prae sapientia et simul omnia commiscere (28) et tamen sibimet placere.
Tu vero si ex philosophorum numero es, quae dico, ut arbitror, (29) facies.”
Again, would you not be cautious of affirming that the addition of one to one, or the division of one, is the cause of two?
And you would loudly asseverate that you know of no way in which anything comes into existence except by participation in its own proper essence,
and consequently, as far as you know, the only cause of two is the participation in duality--this is the way to make two, and the participation in one is the way to make one.
You would say: I will let alone puzzles of division and addition--wiser heads than mine may answer them;
inexperienced as I am, and ready to start, as the proverb says, at my own shadow, I cannot afford to give up the sure ground of a principle.
And if any one assails you there, you would not mind him, or answer him, until you had seen whether the consequences which follow agree with one another or not,
and when you are further required to give an explanation of this principle, you would go on to assume a higher principle, and a higher, until you found a resting-place in the best of the higher;
but you would not confuse the principle and the consequences in your reasoning, like the Eristics--at least if you wanted to discover real existence.
Not that this confusion signifies to them, who never care or think about the matter at all,
for they have the wit to be well pleased with themselves however great may be the turmoil of their ideas.
But you, if you are a philosopher, will certainly do as I say.
Φαίδων
ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐπεὶ αὐτῷ ταῦτα συνεχωρήθη, (102b) καὶ ὡμολογεῖτο εἶναί τι ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τούτων τἆλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἴσχειν, τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα ἠρώτα, εἰ δή, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς,
ταῦτα οὕτως λέγεις, ἆρ᾽ οὐχ, ὅταν Σιμμίαν Σωκράτους φῇς μείζω εἶναι, Φαίδωνος δὲ ἐλάττω, λέγεις τότ᾽ εἶναι ἐν τῷ Σιμμίᾳ ἀμφότερα, καὶ μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότητα;
FEDON. Velut opinor ego, quando quidem ipsi talia concessa sunt, bet fatebatur esse quid unaqueque speeierum et hiis participancia ipsorum horum denominacionem habere, hoc quidem post hec interrogabat: “Si autem” infit ille
“hec ita dicis, nonne, cum Simmiam Socrate dicis maiorem esse, Fedone vera minorem, ais tunc in Simmia esse utraque, et magnitudinem et exiguitatem?”
PHAE. Vt equidem arbitror, postquam (34) haec illi Socrati concesserunt consenseruntque speciem quamlibet aliquid esse et quae ha(35)rum participia sunt ipsarum denominationem habere, deinceps hunc in modum interro(36)gavit: “Si
haec ita se habent, nonne quando Simmiam dicis, Socrate, quidem maiorem esse, (37) Phaedone vero minorem, tunc affirmas in Simmia utrunque esse et magnitudinem simul (38) et parvitatem?”
PHAEDO: After all this had been admitted, and they had that ideas exist, and that other things participate in them and derive their names from them, Socrates, if I remember rightly, said:--
This is your way of speaking; and yet when you say that Simmias is greater than Socrates and less than Phaedo, do you not predicate of Simmias both greatness and smallness?
ἀλλὰ γάρ, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ὁμολογεῖς τὸ τὸν Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν Σωκράτους οὐχ ὡς τοῖς ῥήμασι λέγεται οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς (102c) ἔχειν;
οὐ γάρ που πεφυκέναι Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν τούτῳ, τῷ Σιμμίαν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ μεγέθει ὃ τυγχάνει ἔχων·
οὐδ᾽ αὖ Σωκράτους ὑπερέχειν ὅτι Σωκράτης ὁ Σωκράτης ἐστίν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι σμικρότητα ἔχει ὁ Σωκράτης πρὸς τὸ ἐκείνου μέγεθος;
“Verum enim vero” infit ille “fateris ‘Simmiam superare Socratem’ non uti verbis dicitur ita et verum se habere?
Non enim aptum natum esse Simmiam superexcedere eo quod est Simmiam esse, immo magnitudine quam contingit habere;
neque iterum Socratem superexcedere quoniam Socrates Socrates est, ceterum quia exiguitatem habet Socrates ad illius magnitudinem?”
“Attamen Simmiam confiteris excedere Socratem non ita re(39)vera ut verba sonant.
Non enim ita natura institutum esse existimas Simmiam ut ea ra(40)tione superet qua est Simmias, sed magnitudine quam habet,
neque rursus Socratem eo quod (41) Socrates est excedi, sed quia parvitatem prae magnitudine illius habeat.”
But still you allow that Simmias does not really exceed Socrates, as the words may seem to imply, because he is Simmias, but by reason of the size which he has;
just as Simmias does not exceed Socrates because he is Simmias,
any more than because Socrates is Socrates, but because he has smallness when compared with the greatness of Simmias?
οὕτως ἄρα ὁ Σιμμίας ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει σμικρός τε καὶ μέγας εἶναι, ἐν μέσῳ ὢν ἀμφοτέρων, τοῦ μὲν τῷ μεγέθει (102d) ὑπερέχειν τὴν σμικρότητα ὑπέχων, τῷ δὲ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς σμικρότητος παρέχων ὑπερέχον.
καὶ ἅμα μειδιάσας, ἔοικα, ἔφη, καὶ συγγραφικῶς ἐρεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ οὖν ἔχει γέ που ὡς λέγω.
SOCRATES. “Sic igitur Simmias denominacionem habet pusillusque et magnus esse, in medio ens utrorumque, huius autem eo quod magnitudine parvitatem superet supergressus, illi vero magnitudinem parvitatis superans.”
Unaque subridens: “Visus sum” ait “eciam conscriptive dicere, verum habet se aliquo modo ut dico.”
“Sic itaque Simmias denominationem par(44)vi habet et magni. Siquidem in amborum medio positus alterius quidem parvitatem ma(45)gnitudine superat, alterius vero magnitudini parvitate cedit.”
Et simul subridens inquit: (46) “Videor equidem affectatius descripsisse. Veruntamen est ut dico”.
And therefore Simmias is said to be great, and is also said to be small, because he is in a mean between them, exceeding the smallness of the one by his greatness, and allowing the greatness of the other to exceed his smallness.
He added, laughing, I am speaking like a book, but I believe that what I am saying is true.
λέγω δὴ τοῦδ᾽ ἕνεκα, βουλόμενος δόξαι σοὶ ὅπερ ἐμοί.
ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται οὐ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος οὐδέποτ᾽ ἐθέλειν ἅμα μέγα καὶ σμικρὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος οὐδέποτε προσδέχεσθαι τὸ σμικρὸν οὐδ᾽ ἐθέλειν ὑπερέχεσθαι,
ἀλλὰ δυοῖν τὸ ἕτερον, ἢ φεύγειν καὶ ὑπεκχωρεῖν ὅταν αὐτῷ (102e) προσίῃ τὸ ἐναντίον, τὸ σμικρόν, ἢ προσελθόντος ἐκείνου ἀπολωλέναι·
ὑπομένον δὲ καὶ δεξάμενον τὴν σμικρότητα οὐκ ἐθέλειν εἶναι ἕτερον ἢ ὅπερ ἦν.
ὥσπερ ἐγὼ δεξάμενος καὶ ὑπομείνας τὴν σμικρότητα, καὶ ἔτι ὢν ὅσπερ εἰμί, οὗτος ὁ αὐτὸς σμικρός εἰμι·
ἐκεῖνο δὲ οὐ τετόλμηκεν μέγα ὂν σμικρὸν εἶναι·
ὡς δ᾽ αὕτως καὶ τὸ σμικρὸν τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὐκ ἐθέλει ποτὲ μέγα γίγνεσθαι οὐδὲ εἶναι, οὐδ᾽ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἐναντίων, ἔτι ὂν ὅπερ ἦν, ἅμα τοὐναντίον γίγνεσθαί τε (103a) καὶ εἶναι,
ἀλλ᾽ ἤτοι ἀπέρχεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἐν τούτῳ τῷ παθήματι.
SOCRATES. “Aio vero ea propter, volens ut videretur tibi quod michi;
michi autem videtur non solum ipsa magnitudo numquam velle simul magnum et parvum esse, verum eciam que in nobis magnitudo numquam suscipere parvum neque velle superari,
immo duorum alterum, vel fugere et cedere quando sibi advenerit contrarium, scilicet parvum, vel adveniente illo disperire;
expectans autem et recipiens exiguitatem nolle esse alterum quam quod fuerat.
Velut ego suscipiens et sustinens parvitatem et adhuc, cum sim ceu sum, ipse idem pusillus sum;
illud autem non est ausum magnum ens exiguum esse;
non dissimiliter modicum quod in nobis non vult umquam magnum fieri neque esse, neque aliud nullum contrariorum, adhuc cum sit quod fuerat, simul contrarium fierique et esse,
immo vel abscedit vel interit in hac passione.”
“Dico (47) autem propterea, quia cupio videri tibi quod et mihi videtur.
Opinor enim non solum ma(48)gnitudinem ipsam nunquam velle magnam simul parvamque esse, verumetiam neque hanc (49) quae in nobis est magnitudinem unquam recipere parvitatem, neque superari velle,
sed e (50) duobus alterum accidere, vel fugere seque subtrahere quando adventat contraria parvi(51)tas, vel cum advenerit, interire,
nolle autem expectare atque in parvitate recipienda (52) aliud esse quam erat.
Quemadmodum ego cum susceperim sustinuerimque parvitatem, (53) quandiu is ipse sum qui sum, sic ipsemet sum parvus.
Illud autem magnum quod ip(54)sum est, nunquam sustinuit esse parvum,
similiter parvum quod est in nobis, nunquam (514, 1) vult magnum aut fieri aut esse. Neque aliud quicquam contrarium, quamdiu est id quod (2) erat patitur simul contrarium fieri aut esse,
sed aut abit aut perit cum adventat contrarium.”
I speak as I do because I want you to agree with me in thinking,
not only that absolute greatness will never be great and also small, but that greatness in us or in the concrete will never admit the small or admit of being exceeded:
instead of this, one of two things will happen, either the greater will fly or retire before the opposite, which is the less, or at the approach of the less has already ceased to exist;
but will not, if allowing or admitting of smallness, be changed by that;
even as I, having received and admitted smallness when compared with Simmias, remain just as I was, and am the same small person.
And as the idea of greatness cannot condescend ever to be or become small,
in like manner the smallness in us cannot be or become great; nor can any other opposite which remains the same ever be or become its own opposite,
but either passes away or perishes in the change.
καί τις εἶπε τῶν παρόντων ἀκούσας--ὅστις δ᾽ ἦν, οὐ σαφῶς μέμνημαι--
πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἡμῖν λόγοις αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν νυνὶ λεγομένων ὡμολογεῖτο,
ἐκ τοῦ ἐλάττονος τὸ μεῖζον γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μείζονος τὸ ἔλαττον, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς αὕτη εἶναι ἡ γένεσις τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων;
Et quidam dixit ex eis qui presentes erant cum audisset - quis autem esset non certe reminiscor -:
“Pro diis, nonne in prioribus nobis sermonibus ipsum contrarium nunc dictorum concedebatur,
ex maiore minus fieri et ex minore maius, atque mirabiliter ipsa esse generacio contrariis ex contrariis?
Tunc quidam eorum qui aderant, haec audiens, (4) quis autem ille fuerit non satis memini,
“Dij boni,” inquit, “nonne in superioribus contrarium (5) eorum quae dicuntur nobis est concessum,
videlicet ex minori maius fieri, atque ex maiori (6) minus, esseque proculdubio generationem contrarium ex contrarijs?
Hereupon one of the company, though I do not exactly remember which of them, said:
In heaven's name, is not this the direct contrary of what was admitted before
--that out of the greater came the less and out of the less the greater, and that opposites were simply generated from opposites;
καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης παραβαλὼν τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ ἀκούσας, (103b) ἀνδρικῶς, ἔφη, ἀπεμνημόνευκας, οὐ μέντοι ἐννοεῖς τὸ διαφέρον τοῦ τε νῦν λεγομένου καὶ τοῦ τότε.
τότε μὲν γὰρ ἐλέγετο ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πράγματος τὸ ἐναντίον πρᾶγμα γίγνεσθαι, νῦν δέ, ὅτι αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίον οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο, οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει.
τότε μὲν γάρ, ὦ φίλε, περὶ τῶν ἐχόντων τὰ ἐναντία ἐλέγομεν, ἐπονομάζοντες αὐτὰ τῇ ἐκείνων ἐπωνυμίᾳ, νῦν δὲ περὶ ἐκείνων αὐτῶν ὧν ἐνόντων ἔχει τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὰ ὀνομαζόμενα·
(103c) αὐτὰ δ᾽ ἐκεῖνα οὐκ ἄν ποτέ φαμεν ἐθελῆσαι γένεσιν ἀλλήλων δέξασθαι.
καὶ ἅμα βλέψας πρὸς τὸν Κέβητα εἶπεν, ἆρα μή που, ὦ Κέβης, ἔφη, καὶ σέ τι τούτων ἐτάραξεν ὧν ὅδε εἶπεν;
Atque Socrates apprehendens caput et audiens: “Viriliter” infit “memorasti; non tamen perpendis discrepanciam nunc dicti et tunc.
Tunc quippe inquiebatur ex contraria re contrariam rem generari, nunc vero quoniam ipsum contrarium sibi ipsi contrarium numquam fiat, neque in nobis neque in natura.
Tunc siquidem, O amice, de habentibus contraria ‘O diximus agnominantes ipsa illorum denominacione, nunc sane de illis ipsis quorum inherencium habent denominacionem que sunt nominata;
ipsa quoque illa numquam dicimus velle generacionem ab invicem recipere.”
Simulque respiciens in Cebetem infit: “Numquid in aliquo” dixit, “O Cebes, et te quid horum turbavit que is dixit?”
Cum vero Socrates admovens caput auscultasset, “viriliter”, inquit, (8) “id recordatus es. Non tamen intelligis differentiam inter id quod modo dictum est, atque il(9)lud superius.
Tunc enim dicebatur ex contraria re, rem contrariam fieri, nunc vero con(10)trarium ipsum sibimet contrarium fieri nunquam, neque quod in nobis, neque quod in natu(11)ra contrarium est.
Tunc quidem, o amice, de his quae habent contraria dicebamus, haec il(12)lorum cognomine appellantes. At nunc de illis ipsis loquimur quae his insunt quorumve (13) praesentia cognomen habent ea quae nominantur.
Illa vero ipsa dicimus nunquam velle mu(14)tuam inter se generationem suscipere.”
Et simul Cebetem intuitus inquit: “Num te quoque, Ce(15)bes, aliquid eorum quae nunc obiecta sunt perturbavit?”
Socrates inclined his head to the speaker and listened.
I like your courage, he said, in reminding us of this. But you do not observe that there is a difference in the two cases.
For then we were speaking of opposites in the concrete, and now of the essential opposite which, as is affirmed, neither in us nor in nature can ever be at variance with itself:
then, my friend, we were speaking of things in which opposites are inherent and which are called after them, but now about the opposites which are inherent in them and which give their name to them;
and these essential opposites will never, as we maintain, admit of generation into or out of one another.
ἀλλὰ τόδε γ᾽ οἶμαι δοκεῖ σοι, οὐδέποτε χιόνα γ᾽ οὖσαν δεξαμένην τὸ θερμόν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν, ἔτι ἔσεσθαι ὅπερ ἦν, χιόνα καὶ θερμόν,
ἀλλὰ προσιόντος τοῦ θερμοῦ ἢ ὑπεκχωρήσειν αὐτῷ ἢ ἀπολεῖσθαι.
SOCRATES. “Verum hoc equidem, rear, videtur tibi, numquam nivem existentem recipientem fervidum, ceu in prioribus diximus, adhuc fore quod erat, nivem et torrentem,
immo accedente calido vel cedere vel interire.”
“Sed hoc quoque tibi videri puto, nivem (21) quandiu nix est nunquam suscepturam esse calorem, quemadmodum in superioribus di(22)cebamus. Ac esse nivem ut erat prius simulque calidam,
sed adventante calore aut subterfu(23)gere aut interire.”
Yes.
And yet you will surely admit, that when snow, as was before said, is under the influence of heat, they will not remain snow and heat;
ἔστιν ἄρα, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, περὶ ἔνια τῶν τοιούτων, ὥστε μὴ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος ἀξιοῦσθαι τοῦ αὑτοῦ ὀνόματος εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλο τι ὃ ἔστι μὲν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο, ἔχει δὲ τὴν ἐκείνου μορφὴν ἀεί, ὅτανπερ ᾖ.
ἔτι δὲ ἐν τῷδε ἴσως ἔσται σαφέστερον ὃ λέγω·
τὸ γὰρ περιττὸν ἀεί που δεῖ τούτου τοῦ ὀνόματος τυγχάνειν ὅπερ νῦν λέγομεν· ἢ οὔ;
“Est igitur” infit ille “circa quedam talium, quatinus non solum ipsa species exigat idem nomen in eternum tempus, immo et aliud quid quod est quidem non illud, habet autem illius formam semper, quamdiu fuerit.
Amplius certe in istis fors erit cercius quod dico;
quoniam impar semper competit hoc nomine censeri quod nunc dicimus; necne?”
“Sunt igitur quaedam eiusmodi ut non solum speciem ipsam nomi(26)ne suo dignentur per omne tempus, sed et aliud quiddam quod quidem non est primum (27) illud, habet vero quandiu est illius formam.
In hoc rursus tibi quod volo forte manifestius (28) erit.
Impar enim semper oportet nomen id quod nunc dicimus possidere. Nonne?”
That is true, he said.
And in some cases the name of the idea is not only attached to the idea in an eternal connection, but anything else which, not being the idea, exists only in the form of the idea, may also lay claim to it.
I will try to make this clearer by an example:--The odd number is always called by the name of odd?
ἆρα μόνον τῶν ὄντων--τοῦτο γὰρ ἐρωτῶ--ἢ καὶ ἄλλο (104a) τι ὃ ἔστι μὲν οὐχ ὅπερ τὸ περιττόν,
ὅμως δὲ δεῖ αὐτὸ μετὰ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ὀνόματος καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖν ἀεὶ διὰ τὸ οὕτω πεφυκέναι ὥστε τοῦ περιττοῦ μηδέποτε ἀπολείπεσθαι;
λέγω δὲ αὐτὸ εἶναι οἷον καὶ ἡ τριὰς πέπονθε καὶ ἄλλα πολλά.
σκόπει δὲ περὶ τῆς τριάδος.
ἆρα οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τῷ τε αὑτῆς ὀνόματι ἀεὶ προσαγορευτέα εἶναι καὶ τῷ τοῦ περιττοῦ, ὄντος οὐχ ὅπερ τῆς τριάδος;
ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως οὕτως πέφυκε καὶ ἡ τριὰς καὶ ἡ πεμπτὰς καὶ ὁ ἥμισυς τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἅπας, ὥστε (104b) οὐκ ὢν ὅπερ τὸ περιττὸν ἀεὶ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἐστι περιττός·
καὶ αὖ τὰ δύο καὶ [τὰ] τέτταρα καὶ ἅπας ὁ ἕτερος αὖ στίχος τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ οὐκ ὢν ὅπερ τὸ ἄρτιον ὅμως ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἄρτιός ἐστιν ἀεί·
συγχωρεῖς ἢ οὔ;
SOCRATES. “Igitur solum eorum que sunt - hoc enim quero - sive eciam aliud quid quod est eciam non quod impar,
tamen oportet ipsum cum eadem appellacione et hoc vocare semper eo quod sic e natura sit uti ab impare numquam absit?
Dico vero ipsum esse quemadmodum ternarius passus est et alia multa.
Attende vero et de ternario:
itaque nonne videtur tibi sui vocabulo semper appellandus esse atque imparis, existentis non quod quidem ternarius?
Verumptamen ita natum fuisse et ternarius et quinarius et dimidius numeri omnis, quare cum non sit quod impar, semper quisque eorum est impar;
et item duo atque quatuor et universus alter item versus numeri, cum non sit quod par, tamen quisque eorum par est semper;
concedis necne?”
“Num id solum ex omnibus? Hoc enim quaero: an aliud quiddam quod qui((30)dem est non idipsum impar,
attamen hoc oportet una cum suo nomine, hoc insuper nomi(31)ne alio semper appellari, propterea quod ita natura sit institutum ut nunquam ab impari (32) deseratur?
Dico autem hoc effectum esse ceu ternarium aliaque permulta.
Considera vero (33) de ternario.
An non tibi videtur hunc et suijpsius nomine semper nuncupandum esse et (34) simul nomine imparis? Quod quidem impar non idem est quod est ternarius.
Verunta(35)men ita natura comparatus est, et ternarius et quinarius et omnis medietas numeri, ut (36) quanvis non idem sit quod impar, semper tamen eorum quivis sit impar.
Praeterea duo et (37) quatuor, omnisque alter numeri ordo quanvis idem quod par non sit, simul tamen quilibet (38) illorum par semper existit.
Concedis necne?”
But is this the only thing which is called odd?
Are there not other things which have their own name, and yet are called odd, because, although not the same as oddness, they are never without oddness?
--that is what I mean to ask--whether numbers such as the number three are not of the class of odd.
And there are many other examples:
would you not say, for example, that three may be called by its proper name, and also be called odd, which is not the same with three?
and this may be said not only of three but also of five, and of every alternate number--each of them without being oddness is odd,
and in the same way two and four, and the other series of alternate numbers, has every number even, without being evenness.
Do you agree?
ὃ τοίνυν, ἔφη, βούλομαι δηλῶσαι, ἄθρει.
ἔστιν δὲ τόδε, ὅτι φαίνεται οὐ μόνον ἐκεῖνα τὰ ἐναντία ἄλληλα οὐ δεχόμενα,
ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσα οὐκ ὄντ᾽ ἀλλήλοις ἐναντία ἔχει ἀεὶ τἀναντία,
οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἔοικε δεχομένοις ἐκείνην τὴν ἰδέαν ἣ ἂν τῇ ἐν αὐτοῖς οὔσῃ ἐναντία ᾖ, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιούσης αὐτῆς ἤτοι (104c) ἀπολλύμενα ἢ ὑπεκχωροῦντα.
ἢ οὐ φήσομεν τὰ τρία καὶ ἀπολεῖσθαι πρότερον καὶ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πείσεσθαι, πρὶν ὑπομεῖναι ἔτι τρία ὄντα ἄρτια γενέσθαι;
“Quod igitur” infit “volo declarare, considera.
Est quidem hoc eciam, quod apparet non solum illa adversancia se invieem non recipiencia,
immo eciam quecumque, cum non sint sibi invicem adversancia,
habent semper adversancia, neque ista assimilatur recipientibus illam ydeam que utique ei que in ipsa est contraria fuerit, atqui adveniente ipsa sive interire sive abscedere.
At nonne dicemus tria et deperire prius et aliud quodlibet pati, prius quam sustineant adhuc tria cum sint paria fieri?”
“Contemplare ergo quid velim.
(39) Est autem eiusmodi: videntur quidem non solum ipsa inter se contraria sese invicem non (40) recipere,
verumetiam quaecunque talia sunt, ut licet contraria inter se non sint,
semper ta(41)men contraria possideant, nunquam recipere speciem illam quae ipsi speciei quam in se ha(42)bent contraria sit, sed hac adveniente aut perire protinus aut abire.
An non dicimus tria(43) et deficere et aliud quodvis pati prius, quam sustinere ut quatenus tria sunt paria fiant?”
Then now mark the point at which I am aiming:
--not only do essential opposites exclude one another,
but also concrete things, which, although not in themselves opposed, contain opposites;
these, I say, likewise reject the idea which is opposed to that which is contained in them, and when it approaches them they either perish or withdraw.
For example; Will not the number three endure annihilation or anything sooner than be converted into an even number, while remaining three?
πάλιν δή μοι, ἔφη, ἐξ ἀρχῆς λέγε.
καὶ μή μοι ὃ ἂν ἐρωτῶ ἀποκρίνου, ἀλλὰ μιμούμενος ἐμέ.
λέγω δὴ παρ᾽ ἣν τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγον ἀπόκρισιν, τὴν ἀσφαλῆ ἐκείνην, ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἄλλην ὁρῶν ἀσφάλειαν.
εἰ γὰρ ἔροιό με ᾧ ἂν τί ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐγγένηται θερμὸν ἔσται, οὐ τὴν (105c) ἀσφαλῆ σοι ἐρῶ ἀπόκρισιν ἐκείνην τὴν ἀμαθῆ, ὅτι ᾧ ἂν θερμότης, ἀλλὰ κομψοτέραν ἐκ τῶν νῦν, ὅτι ᾧ ἂν πῦρ·
οὐδὲ ἂν ἔρῃ ᾧ ἂν σώματι τί ἐγγένηται νοσήσει, οὐκ ἐρῶ ὅτι ᾧ ἂν νόσος, ἀλλ᾽ ᾧ ἂν πυρετός·
οὐδ᾽ ᾧ ἂν ἀριθμῷ τί ἐγγένηται περιττὸς ἔσται, οὐκ ἐρῶ ᾧ ἂν περιττότης, ἀλλ᾽ ᾧ ἂν μονάς, καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως.
ἀλλ᾽ ὅρα εἰ ἤδη ἱκανῶς οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι βούλομαι.
SOCRATES. “Iterum profecto michi e principio dic,
et neque michi quicquid percunctatus fuero respondeas, verum imitando me.
Aio quidem preter quam primo dicebam responsionem, scilicet firmam illam, ceterum quam ex eis que dida sunt aliam perspicio firmitudinem.
Si enim scisciteris me quod, cum in corpore insit, calidum sit, minime firmam tibi dicam responsionem illam indisciplinatam, quoniam cuicumque calor, atqui comiorem ex hiis que nunc quoniam cuicumque ignis;
neque si dixerit quod cum corpori insit languescet, non inquiam cuicumque languor, verum cuicumque febris;
neque quod cum in numera sit impar est, non inquiam cuicumque imparitas, immo cuicumque monas, atque alia hoc pacto.
Sed vide utrum iam satis nosti quid velim.”
“Rursus tanquam a principio mihi dicis.
Nec tamen per id (14) quod nunc interrogo, sed per aliud quiddam mihi respondeas me imitatus.
Dico autem (15) praeter tutam responsionem illam a principio positam, iuxta tutam quoque responsionem aliam (16) per ea quae modo dicta sunt adinventam.
Nempe si me interroges, o Socrates, quidnam (17) in corpore si sit calescet corpus, non tutam responsionem illam rudemque tibi dabo, videli(18)cet si caliditas, sed exquisitionem ex praesentibus verbis, ut si insit ignis.
Similiter si me in(19)terroges, quid si in corpore sit aegrotabit, non respondebo si aegrotatio, sed se febris.
Rur(20)sus si perconteris, quid si insit numero fuerit impar, non dicam si imparitas, imo si unitas, (21) atque in caeteris eodem pacto.
Sed vide an dum quid velim plane cognoveris.”
And now, he said, let us begin again;
and do not you answer my question in the words in which I ask it:
let me have not the old safe answer of which I spoke at first, but another equally safe, of which the truth will be inferred by you from what has been just said.
I mean that if any one asks you ‘what that is, of which the inherence makes the body hot,’ you will reply not heat (this is what I call the safe and stupid answer), but fire, a far superior answer, which we are now in a condition to give.
Or if any one asks you ‘why a body is diseased,’ you will not say from disease, but from fever;
and instead of saying that oddness is the cause of odd numbers, you will say that the monad is the cause of them:
and so of things in general, as I dare say that you will understand sufficiently without my adducing any further examples.
(106b) οὐκοῦν καὶ ὧδε, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη περὶ τοῦ ἀθανάτου εἰπεῖν;
εἰ μὲν τὸ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν, ἀδύνατον ψυχῇ, ὅταν θάνατος ἐπ᾽ αὐτὴν ἴῃ, ἀπόλλυσθαι·
θάνατον μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων οὐ δέξεται οὐδ᾽ ἔσται τεθνηκυῖα, ὥσπερ τὰ τρία οὐκ ἔσται, ἔφαμεν, ἄρτιον, οὐδέ γ᾽ αὖ τὸ περιττόν, οὐδὲ δὴ πῦρ ψυχρόν, οὐδέ γε ἡ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ θερμότης.
“ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει”, φαίη ἄν τις, “ἄρτιον μὲν τὸ περιττὸν μὴ γίγνεσθαι ἐπιόντος τοῦ ἀρτίου, ὥσπερ ὡμολόγηται, (106c) ἀπολομένου δὲ αὐτοῦ ἀντ᾽ ἐκείνου ἄρτιον γεγονέναι;”
τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμεν διαμαχέσασθαι ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόλλυται·
τὸ γὰρ ἀνάρτιον οὐκ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν·
ἐπεὶ εἰ τοῦτο ὡμολόγητο ἡμῖν, ῥᾳδίως ἂν διεμαχόμεθα ὅτι ἐπελθόντος τοῦ ἀρτίου τὸ περιττὸν καὶ τὰ τρία οἴχεται ἀπιόντα·
καὶ περὶ πυρὸς καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὕτως ἂν διεμαχόμεθα. ἢ οὔ;
SOCRATES. “Igitur et hoc” ait “necesse de immortali dicere?
Si enim immortale eciam indestructibile est, impossibile anime, quociens letum in illam veniat, perire;
mortem enim ex ante dictis haut recipiet neque erit mortua, quemadmodum non erunt tria, ut diximus, par, neque iterum impar, neque ignis gelidum, neque in igne calor.
‘Ceterum quid prohibet’ dicat utique quis ‘par quidem impar non fieri superveniente pari, ceu concessum est, intereunteque ipso, pro illo par fieri?’
Ista inquientem non habebimus expugnare quoniam non disperit.
Nam impar non indestructibile est,
quia si hoc concederetur nobis, facile nempe expugnaremus quoniam superveniente pari impar et tria avolant abeuncia;
et de igne et calido atque de ceteris ita utique expugnaremus; necne?”
“Eodem pacto de immortali quoque (39) necesse est dicamus.
Si enim quod est immortale, interire nequit, impossibile est animam (40) imminente morte perire.
Nam mortem quidem quemadmodum ex superioribus constat, non (41) recipiet neque interierit, quemadmodum ternarius nunquam ut diximus par erit neque rursus (42) impar erit par, neque ignis frigidus, neque caliditas quae inest igni, frigiditas unquam erit.
'Cae(43)terum' dicet quispiam, 'quidnam prohibet, quo minus ipsum impar, par quidem non fiat (44) adveniente pari, quemadmodum inter nos convenit, attamen eo dissoluto par pro ipso suc(45)cedat?'
Ita dicenti repugnare non valeremus, quin sit destructum.
Quippe cum non idem sit (46) impar atque indissolubile.
Alioquin si nobis id constitisset, facile obtineremus invadente pa(47)ri impar ternariumque salvum discedere.
Similiterque de igne et calido caeterisque asseremus. (48) Nonne ita?”
And the same may be said of the immortal:
if the immortal is also imperishable, the soul when attacked by death cannot perish;
for the preceding argument shows that the soul will not admit of death, or ever be dead, any more than three or the odd number will admit of the even, or fire or the heat in the fire, of the cold.
Yet a person may say: ‘But although the odd will not become even at the approach of the even, why may not the odd perish and the even take the place of the odd?’
Now to him who makes this objection, we cannot answer that the odd principle is imperishable;
for this has not been acknowledged,
but if this had been acknowledged, there would have been no difficulty in contending that at the approach of the even the odd principle and the number three took their departure;
and the same argument would have held good of fire and heat and any other thing.
οὔκουν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἔχω παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο τι λέγειν οὐδέ πῃ ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις.
ἀλλ᾽ εἰ δή τι Σιμμίας ὅδε ἤ τις ἄλλος ἔχει λέγειν, εὖ ἔχει μὴ κατασιγῆσαι·
ὡς οὐκ οἶδα εἰς ὅντινά τις ἄλλον καιρὸν ἀναβάλλοιτο ἢ τὸν νῦν παρόντα, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων βουλόμενος ἤ τι εἰπεῖν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι.
“Nullatenus habeo ego quidem” ait, “O Socrate, preter hec aliud quid dicere neque diffiteri sermonibus.
Sed si quis Simmias hic sive quis alius habet dicere, bene se habet quatinus non pretereat silencio,
quia non novi in quo quis utique alio tempore resumat quam nunc presenti, de huiuscemodi volens sive dicere sive audire.”
“Nihil equidem, o Socrates, adversus haec habeo quo minus ratio(6)nibus tuis assentiar.
Verum siquid aut hic Simmias aut alius quisquam habet quod dicat, (7) operaeprecium fuerit non siluisse.
Nescio enim in quod aliud quis differat tempus, siquid (8) de rebus eiusmodi vel dicere vel audire desideret.”
I am convinced, Socrates, said Cebes, and have nothing more to object;
but if my friend Simmias, or any one else, has any further objection to make, he had better speak out, and not keep silence,
since I do not know to what other season he can defer the discussion, if there is anything which he wants to say or to have said.
οὐ μόνον γ᾽, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ ταῦτά τε εὖ λέγεις καὶ τάς γε ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρώτας, καὶ εἰ πισταὶ ὑμῖν εἰσιν, ὅμως ἐπισκεπτέαι σαφέστερον·
καὶ ἐὰν αὐτὰς ἱκανῶς διέλητε, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ἀκολουθήσετε τῷ λόγῳ, καθ᾽ ὅσον δυνατὸν μάλιστ᾽ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπακολουθῆσαι·
κἂν τοῦτο αὐτὸ σαφὲς γένηται, οὐδὲν ζητήσετε περαιτέρω.
“Non solum" infit, "O Simmia" Socrates, “verum hec bene dicis atque ypotheses primas, et si credibiles vobis sint, tamen attendende clarius;
et si ipsas sufficienter distinguat, ve1ut ego reor, consequetur racioni quantum possibile maxime homini consequi;
et si ipsum hoc evidens fiat, nichil queretur ulterius.”
“Quinimmo et haec bene dicis, Simmia, et positiones primae quamvis (12) fide vobis dignae videantur, diligentius tamen considerandae,
atque si illas sufficienter , ut ar(13)bitror, susceperitis, hanc sequemini rationem quantum fieri ab homine potest.
Quod si hoc (14) ipsum fuerit manifestum, nihil ulterius perquiretis.”
Yes, Simmias, replied Socrates, that is well said: and I may add that first principles, even if they appear certain, should be carefully considered;
and when they are satisfactorily ascertained, then, with a sort of hesitating confidence in human reason, you may, I think, follow the course of the argument;
and if that be plain and clear, there will be no need for any further enquiry.
(107c) ἀλλὰ τόδε γ᾽, ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, δίκαιον διανοηθῆναι, ὅτι, εἴπερ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος, ἐπιμελείας δὴ δεῖται οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρόνου τούτου μόνον ἐν ᾧ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός,
καὶ ὁ κίνδυνος νῦν δὴ καὶ δόξειεν ἂν δεινὸς εἶναι, εἴ τις αὐτῆς ἀμελήσει.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ὁ θάνατος τοῦ παντὸς ἀπαλλαγή, ἕρμαιον ἂν ἦν τοῖς κακοῖς ἀποθανοῦσι τοῦ τε σώματος ἅμ᾽ ἀπηλλάχθαι καὶ τῆς αὑτῶν κακίας μετὰ τῆς ψυχῆς·
νῦν δ᾽ ἐπειδὴ ἀθάνατος φαίνεται οὖσα, οὐδεμία ἂν (107d) εἴη αὐτῇ ἄλλη ἀποφυγὴ κακῶν οὐδὲ σωτηρία πλὴν τοῦ ὡς βελτίστην τε καὶ φρονιμωτάτην γενέσθαι.
οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἔχουσα εἰς Ἅιδου ἡ ψυχὴ ἔρχεται πλὴν τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς,
ἃ δὴ καὶ μέγιστα λέγεται ὠφελεῖν ἢ βλάπτειν τὸν τελευτήσαντα εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ἐκεῖσε πορείας.
“Immo hoc eciam” ait, “O viri, iustum intelligi, quoniam, si quidem anima immortalis est, sollicitudine indiget non pro tempore isto solum, in quo utique vocamus vivere, verum pro universo,
et periculum nunc quoque eciam videbitur grave esse, si quis eam neglexerit.
Si enim esset nex universi liberacio, lucrum inventum certe esset malis morientibus a corpore pariter liberari et ipsorum malicia cum anima;
nunc sane quoniam immortalis apparet esse, nulla profecto erit ipsi alia fuga malorum neque salvacio quam ut optima atque prudentissima fiat.
Nichil enim aliud habens in Avernum anima venit, preter doctrinam et educacionem,
que utique dicuntur maxime iuvare sive obesse obeuntem statim in principio quod illuc ducit itineris.
(15) “Hoc aiunt, o viri, iustum est cogitare, si anima sit immortalis, eam non solum (16) temporis huius in quo vivere dicimur, verum etiam universi gratia curatio(17)ne plurimum indigere.
Nam grave periculum fore putandum est, si quis ne(18)glexerit animam.
Si enim mors totius dissolutio esset, nimirum improbi lu(19)crarentur, cum et a corpore et ab eorum pravitate cum anima liberarentur.
(20) Nunc autem cum anima immortalis appareat, nulla superest malorum declinatio, nulla (21) salus, nisi ut optima et prudentissima fiat.
Nihil enim aliud cum migrat ad manes anima (22) secum transfert praeter eruditionem atque educationem.
Quae quidem statim in princi(23)pio transmigrationis illius plurimum vel prodesse vel obesse dicuntur.
But then, O my friends, he said, if the soul is really immortal, what care should be taken of her, not only in respect of the portion of time which is called life, but of eternity!
And the danger of neglecting her from this point of view does indeed appear to be awful.
If death had only been the end of all, the wicked would have had a good bargain in dying, for they would have been happily quit not only of their body, but of their own evil together with their souls.
But now, inasmuch as the soul is manifestly immortal, there is no release or salvation from evil except the attainment of the highest virtue and wisdom.
For the soul when on her progress to the world below takes nothing with her but nurture and education;
and these are said greatly to benefit or greatly to injure the departed, at the very beginning of his journey thither.
λέγεται δὲ οὕτως, ὡς ἄρα τελευτήσαντα ἕκαστον ὁ ἑκάστου δαίμων, ὅσπερ ζῶντα εἰλήχει, οὗτος ἄγειν ἐπιχειρεῖ εἰς δή τινα τόπον, οἷ δεῖ τοὺς συλλεγέντας διαδικασαμένους εἰς Ἅιδου (107e) πορεύεσθαι μετὰ ἡγεμόνος ἐκείνου ᾧ δὴ προστέτακται τοὺς ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε πορεῦσαι·
τυχόντας δὲ ἐκεῖ ὧν δὴ τυχεῖν καὶ μείναντας ὃν χρὴ χρόνον ἄλλος δεῦρο πάλιν ἡγεμὼν κομίζει ἐν πολλαῖς χρόνου καὶ μακραῖς περιόδοις.
ἔστι δὲ ἄρα ἡ πορεία οὐχ ὡς ὁ Αἰσχύλου Τήλεφος λέγει·
ἐκεῖνος (108a) μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῆν οἶμόν φησιν εἰς Ἅιδου φέρειν, ἡ δ᾽ οὔτε ἁπλῆ οὔτε μία φαίνεταί μοι εἶναι.
οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἡγεμόνων ἔδει·
οὐ γάρ πού τις ἂν διαμάρτοι οὐδαμόσε μιᾶς ὁδοῦ οὔσης.
νῦν δὲ ἔοικε σχίσεις τε καὶ τριόδους πολλὰς ἔχειν·
ἀπὸ τῶν θυσιῶν τε καὶ νομίμων τῶν ἐνθάδε τεκμαιρόμενος λέγω.
ἡ μὲν οὖν κοσμία τε καὶ φρόνιμος ψυχὴ ἕπεταί τε καὶ οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ τὰ παρόντα·
ἡ δ᾽ ἐπιθυμητικῶς τοῦ σώματος ἔχουσα, ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν εἶπον, περὶ ἐκεῖνο πολὺν (108b) χρόνον ἐπτοημένη καὶ περὶ τὸν ὁρατὸν τόπον, πολλὰ ἀντιτείνασα καὶ πολλὰ παθοῦσα, βίᾳ καὶ μόγις ὑπὸ τοῦ προστεταγμένου δαίμονος οἴχεται ἀγομένη.
ἀφικομένην δὲ ὅθιπερ αἱ ἄλλαι, τὴν μὲν ἀκάθαρτον καί τι πεποιηκυῖαν τοιοῦτον, ἢ φόνων ἀδίκων ἡμμένην ἢ ἄλλ᾽ ἄττα τοιαῦτα εἰργασμένην, ἃ τούτων ἀδελφά τε καὶ ἀδελφῶν ψυχῶν ἔργα τυγχάνει ὄντα,
ταύτην μὲν ἅπας φεύγει τε καὶ ὑπεκτρέπεται καὶ οὔτε συνέμπορος οὔτε ἡγεμὼν ἐθέλει γίγνεσθαι,
αὐτὴ (108c) δὲ πλανᾶται ἐν πάσῃ ἐχομένη ἀπορίᾳ ἕως ἂν δή τινες χρόνοι γένωνται,
ὧν ἐλθόντων ὑπ᾽ ἀνάγκης φέρεται εἰς τὴν αὐτῇ πρέπουσαν οἴκησιν·
ἡ δὲ καθαρῶς τε καὶ μετρίως τὸν βίον διεξελθοῦσα, καὶ συνεμπόρων καὶ ἡγεμόνων θεῶν τυχοῦσα, ᾤκησεν τὸν αὐτῇ ἑκάστη τόπον προσήκοντα.
Fertur autem ita, quoniam igitur obeuntem quemque cuiusque demon, quemadmodum viventem sortitus est, iste agere satagit in quemdam locum, ubi decet congregatos post quam iudicati fuerint in Avernum ire, et cum duce illo cui preordinatum est eos qui hinc sunt illuc iter agere;
et sortitos illa que decet sortiri et manentes quo necesse est tempore alius hue rursum dux advehit in multis temporis et productis periodis.
Estque igitur via non velut Eschili Telefus ait;
ille namque simplicem stratam dicit in Avernum ferre, que neque simplex neque una michi videtur esse.
Neque enim ductorum opus esset;
neque enim quilibet erraret aliquatenus una via cum esset.
Nunc autem videtur scissionesque et periodos non paucas habere;
ab immolacionibus et legitimis que hic fiunt coniectans dico.
Itaque honesta et prudens anima sequiturque et non ignorat presencia;
concupiscibiliter profecto a corpore habita, quod in priori dicebam, circa illud multo tempore attonita et circa visibilem locum, multa quidem renitens atque multa passa, violencia et vix a preordinato demone asportatur acta.
Advenientemque ubi alie, porro immundam et que quid patraverit huiuscemodi, seu cedibus iniustis contactam sive alia quedam talia operatam que hiis sororiaque et sororiarum animarum opera contingunt esse,
hanc equidem omnis fugitque et avertitur et neque comitator neque ductor vult fieri,
ipsaque errat vagabunda in omni tenta ambiguitate, donec quedam tempora compleantur,
quibus advenientibus ex necessitate fertur in sibi convenientem habitacionem,
que vero sincere et modeste vitam transegit, et comites atque duces deos sortita, habitavit sibi unicuique locum congruentem.
Ferunt enim (24) quemlibet hinc illuc emigrantem ab eo daemone quem vivens sortitus fuerat in locum (25) quendam duci, ubi oporteat omnes una collectos iudicari, ac deinde ad inferos profici(26)sci eo duce, cui mandatum erat ut hinc decedentes ad illa loca traducat.
Sortitos vero il(27)lic quae oportebat sortiri, tempusque debitum commoratos, ab alio quodam duce rursus (28) huc reduci post multos temporis longosque circuitus.
Est autem iter non tale quale ait Te(29)lephus apud Aeschylum.
Ille siquidem simplicem inquit viam ad inferos ferre. Ego ve(30)ro neque simplicem neque unam esse puto.
Alioquin nullis ducibus opus esset,
quippe (31) cum unica via aberrare possit nemo.
Quinimmo multos tramites multosque anfractus ha(32)bere.
Quod quidem ex sacrificijs et ritibus coniectare licet.
Animus ergo moderatus et (33) prudens ducem sponte sequitur neque ignorat praesentia.
Sed qui cupiditate corporis (34) est infectus, quemadmodum supra dixi, per multum tempus ad ipsam ardenter affici(35)tur et circa locum visibilem multis reluctatus modis multaque perpessus, vix tandem ab (36) eo adducitur daemone, cui eius cura erat iniuncta.
Cum vero ad ea loca ubi alij quoque (37) animi sunt pervenerit, quisquis admodum immundus est et huiusmodi obnoxius crimi(38)ni qui vel iniustis se contaminaverit caedibus vel alia his similia similiumque animorum (39) opera perpetraverit,
hunc quidem animum omnes fugiunt atque declinant, nec reperi(40)tur ullus qui vel socius vel dux eius fieri velit.
Itaque omni auxilio destitutus eo usque per(41)errat, quoad certa temporum curricula impleantur.
Quibus tandem impletis in habita(42)tionem sibi convenientem ab ipsa necessitate transfertur.
Qui vero puram moderatamque (43) transegerit vitam, deos socios ducesque nactus ibi habitat, ubi unicuique convenit.
For after death, as they say, the genius of each individual, to whom he belonged in life, leads him to a certain place in which the dead are gathered together, whence after judgment has been given they pass into the world below, following the guide, who is appointed to conduct them from this world to the other:
and when they have there received their due and remained their time, another guide brings them back again after many revolutions of ages.
Now this way to the other world is not, as Aeschylus says in the Telephus, a single and straight path
--if that were so no guide would be needed,
for no one could miss it;
but there are many partings of the road, and windings,
as I infer from the rites and sacrifices which are offered to the gods below in places where three ways meet on earth.
The wise and orderly soul follows in the straight path and is conscious of her surroundings;
but the soul which desires the body, and which, as I was relating before, has long been fluttering about the lifeless frame and the world of sight, is after many struggles and many sufferings hardly and with violence carried away by her attendant genius,
and when she arrives at the place where the other souls are gathered, if she be impure and have done impure deeds, whether foul murders or other crimes which are the brothers of these, and the works of brothers in crime
--from that soul every one flees and turns away; no one will be her companion, no one her guide,
but alone she wanders in extremity of evil until certain times are fulfilled,
and when they are fulfilled, she is borne irresistibly to her own fitting habitation;
as every pure and just soul which has passed through life in the company and under the guidance of the gods has also her own proper home.
ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ Σιμμία, οὐχ ἡ Γλαύκου τέχνη γέ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι διηγήσασθαι ἅ γ᾽ ἐστίν·
ὡς μέντοι ἀληθῆ, χαλεπώτερόν μοι φαίνεται ἢ κατὰ τὴν Γλαύκου τέχνην,
καὶ ἅμα μὲν ἐγὼ ἴσως οὐδ᾽ ἂν οἷός τε εἴην, ἅμα δέ, εἰ καὶ ἠπιστάμην, ὁ βίος μοι δοκεῖ ὁ ἐμός, ὦ Σιμμία, τῷ μήκει τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖν.
τὴν μέντοι ἰδέαν τῆς γῆς οἵαν (108e) πέπεισμαι εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς τόπους αὐτῆς οὐδέν με κωλύει λέγειν.
SOCRATES. “Immo vero, O Simmia, haut Glauci quoque michi ars videtur esse enarrare que sunt;
velut quidem vera, difficilius michi videtur quam secundum Glauci artem,
et simul nempe ego forsan minime potens ero, simulque et diffiderem, vita michi videtur mea, O Simmia, longitudini e sermonis non sufficere.
Verum ydeam terre qualem persuadeor esse, et locos ipsius nichil me prohibet dicere.”
(48) “Atqui, o Simmia, nequaquam mihi videtur ars Glauci quae ea sint narrare,
sed quod ve(49)ra sint probare, artis Glauci facultatem mihi videtur excedere.
Praeterea ego forsan non (50) sufficerem. Quinetiam si id scirem, haec tamen vita mea, o Simmia, longiori huic narratio(51)ni nequaquam sufficeret.
Formam tamen orbis terrae eiusque loca cuiusmodi esse rear, ni(52)hil prohibet dicere.”
And I, Simmias, replied Socrates, if I had the art of Glaucus would tell you;
although I know not that the art of Glaucus could prove the truth of my tale,
which I myself should never be able to prove, and even if I could, I fear, Simmias, that my life would come to an end before the argument was completed.
I may describe to you, however, the form and regions of the earth according to my conception of them.
πέπεισμαι τοίνυν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ἐγὼ ὡς πρῶτον μέν, εἰ ἔστιν ἐν μέσῳ τῷ οὐρανῷ περιφερὴς οὖσα, μηδὲν αὐτῇ δεῖν μήτε (109a) ἀέρος πρὸς τὸ μὴ πεσεῖν μήτε ἄλλης ἀνάγκης μηδεμιᾶς τοιαύτης, ἀλλὰ ἱκανὴν εἶναι αὐτὴν ἴσχειν τὴν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑαυτῷ πάντῃ καὶ τῆς γῆς αὐτῆς τὴν ἰσορροπίαν·
ἰσόρροπον γὰρ πρᾶγμα ὁμοίου τινὸς ἐν μέσῳ τεθὲν οὐχ ἕξει μᾶλλον οὐδ᾽ ἧττον οὐδαμόσε κλιθῆναι, ὁμοίως δ᾽ ἔχον ἀκλινὲς μενεῖ.
πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, τοῦτο πέπεισμαι.
“Persuadeor igitur” ait is “ego quoniam prima nempe, si est in medio celo periferes existens, nichil ipsi egere neque aere ad non cadendum, neque alia necessitate aliqua tali, atque sufficientem ipsam quidem tenere similitudinem celi ipsius sibi ipsi undique atque terre ipsius isorropiam.
Isorropa quippe res similis alicuius in medio posita non habebit magis neque minus ex nulla parte declinari, similiter vero se habens non inclinatum manet.
Prime sane hoc persuadeor.”
“Persuasum mihi quidem est, primo si (53) est terra in coeli medio rotunda, nihil ei opus esse vel aere vel alia necessitate eiusmodi ad (54) hoc ut nunquam decidat. Sed ad eam sustinendam satis id esse, quod et coelum undique (517, 1) sibijpsi simillimum est omnino, et terra undique aequilibris.
Res enim aequilibris in similis (2) alicuius medio posita nec magis nec minus potest in partem aliquam inclinari. Cumque si(3)militer se habeat, ab inclinatione permanet aliena.
Primo igitur mihi esse ita est persuasum.”
Well, then, he said, my conviction is, that the earth is a round body in the centre of the heavens, and therefore has no need of air or any similar force to be a support, but is kept there and hindered from falling or inclining any way by the equability of the surrounding heaven and by her own equipoise.
For that which, being in equipoise, is in the centre of that which is equably diffused, will not incline any way in any degree, but will always remain in the same state and not deviate.
And this is my first notion.
λέγεται τοίνυν, ἔφη, ὦ ἑταῖρε, πρῶτον μὲν εἶναι τοιαύτη ἡ γῆ αὐτὴ ἰδεῖν, εἴ τις ἄνωθεν θεῷτο, ὥσπερ αἱ δωδεκάσκυτοι σφαῖραι, ποικίλη, χρώμασιν διειλημμένη, ὧν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε εἶναι χρώματα ὥσπερ δείγματα, οἷς δὴ οἱ γραφῆς (110c) καταχρῶνται.
ἐκεῖ δὲ πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν ἐκ τοιούτων εἶναι, καὶ πολὺ ἔτι ἐκ λαμπροτέρων καὶ καθαρωτέρων ἢ τούτων·
τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἁλουργῆ εἶναι [καὶ] θαυμαστὴν τὸ κάλλος, τὴν δὲ χρυσοειδῆ, τὴν δὲ ὅση λευκὴ γύψου ἢ χιόνος λευκοτέραν,
καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων χρωμάτων συγκειμένην ὡσαύτως, καὶ ἔτι πλειόνων καὶ καλλιόνων ἢ ὅσα ἡμεῖς ἑωράκαμεν.
καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ ταῦτα τὰ κοῖλα αὐτῆς, ὕδατός τε καὶ ἀέρος ἔκπλεα (110d) ὄντα, χρώματός τι εἶδος παρέχεσθαι στίλβοντα ἐν τῇ τῶν ἄλλων χρωμάτων ποικιλίᾳ, ὥστε ἕν τι αὐτῆς εἶδος συνεχὲς ποικίλον φαντάζεσθαι.
ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ οὔσῃ τοιαύτῃ ἀνὰ λόγον τὰ φυόμενα φύεσθαι, δένδρα τε καὶ ἄνθη καὶ τοὺς καρπούς·
καὶ αὖ τὰ ὄρη ὡσαύτως καὶ τοὺς λίθους ἔχειν ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον τήν τε λειότητα καὶ τὴν διαφάνειαν καὶ τὰ χρώματα καλλίω·
ὧν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε λιθίδια εἶναι ταῦτα τὰ ἀγαπώμενα μόρια, σάρδιά τε καὶ ἰάσπιδας καὶ σμαράγδους (110e) καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα·
ἐκεῖ δὲ οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐ τοιοῦτον εἶναι καὶ ἔτι τούτων καλλίω.
τὸ δ᾽ αἴτιον τούτου εἶναι ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι οἱ λίθοι εἰσὶ καθαροὶ καὶ οὐ κατεδηδεσμένοι οὐδὲ διεφθαρμένοι ὥσπερ οἱ ἐνθάδε ὑπὸ σηπεδόνος καὶ ἅλμης ὑπὸ τῶν δεῦρο συνερρυηκότων, ἃ καὶ λίθοις καὶ γῇ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις τε καὶ φυτοῖς αἴσχη τε καὶ νόσους παρέχει.
τὴν δὲ γῆν αὐτὴν κεκοσμῆσθαι τούτοις τε ἅπασι καὶ ἔτι χρυσῷ τε καὶ ἀργύρῳ καὶ (111a) τοῖς ἄλλοις αὖ τοῖς τοιούτοις.
ἐκφανῆ γὰρ αὐτὰ πεφυκέναι, ὄντα πολλὰ πλήθει καὶ μεγάλα καὶ πανταχοῦ τῆς γῆς, ὥστε αὐτὴν ἰδεῖν εἶναι θέαμα εὐδαιμόνων θεατῶν.
ζῷα δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῇ εἶναι ἄλλα τε πολλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπους, τοὺς μὲν ἐν μεσογαίᾳ οἰκοῦντας, τοὺς δὲ περὶ τὸν ἀέρα ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς περὶ τὴν θάλατταν, τοὺς δ᾽ ἐν νήσοις ἃς περιρρεῖν τὸν ἀέρα πρὸς τῇ ἠπείρῳ οὔσας·
καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ, ὅπερ ἡμῖν τὸ ὕδωρ τε καὶ ἡ θάλαττά ἐστι πρὸς τὴν ἡμετέραν χρείαν, τοῦτο ἐκεῖ (111b) τὸν ἀέρα, ὃ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀήρ, ἐκείνοις τὸν αἰθέρα.
τὰς δὲ ὥρας αὐτοῖς κρᾶσιν ἔχειν τοιαύτην ὥστε ἐκείνους ἀνόσους εἶναι καὶ χρόνον τε ζῆν πολὺ πλείω τῶν ἐνθάδε,
καὶ ὄψει καὶ ἀκοῇ καὶ φρονήσει καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις ἡμῶν ἀφεστάναι τῇ αὐτῇ ἀποστάσει ᾗπερ ἀήρ τε ὕδατος ἀφέστηκεν καὶ αἰθὴρ ἀέρος πρὸς καθαρότητα.
καὶ δὴ καὶ θεῶν ἄλση τε καὶ ἱερὰ αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ἐν οἷς τῷ ὄντι οἰκητὰς θεοὺς εἶναι, καὶ φήμας τε καὶ μαντείας καὶ αἰσθήσεις τῶν θεῶν καὶ τοιαύτας συνουσίας (111c) γίγνεσθαι αὐτοῖς πρὸς αὐτούς·
καὶ τόν γε ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ ἄστρα ὁρᾶσθαι ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν οἷα τυγχάνει ὄντα, καὶ τὴν ἄλλην εὐδαιμονίαν τούτων ἀκόλουθον εἶναι.
SOCRATE. “Primum utique esse talis terra ipsa perspici, si quis desuper consideret eam quemadmodum dodekaskite spere, variis colorum accionibus circumvolute, quorum et qui hic sunt colores tamquam exempla quibus scriptores utuntur,
ibi quoque universam terram ex huiuscemodi esse et multo adhuc ex nitidioribus atque sincerioribus quam hiis;
hanc quippe purpuream esse et admirandam nitore, hanc profecto auriformem, illam sane quecumque alba gipso seu nive candidiorem
atque aliis coloribus infectam eodem modo, et adhuc plurium et formosiorum quam quecumque nos conspeximus.
Et enim ipsa hec concava telluris, aqua quidem et aere plena, coloris quamdam speciem prestare radiancia in aliorum colorum varietate, unde unam quamdam ipsius speciem continuam variam admirari.
In hac nimirum existente tall proporcionale est oriencia nasci, arboresque et lucos [atque fructus;
et iterum montes eodem modo] atque fructus, et item montes similiter et lapides habere iuxta eamdem proporcionem, perfectionem et perspicuitatem atque colores mage decoros;
de quibus et qui hic lapides sunt hec a deo dilecta frustula, sardiaque et iaspidas et smaragdos et cuncta huiuscemodi;
ibi vera nichil quod non tale sit, et adhuc hiis formosiora.
Causam sane huius esse, quoniam illi lapilli puri sunt et non obesi neque corrupti tamquam qui hic a putredine et salsugine ab hue confluentibus, que et lapidibus et telluri et aliis animalibus atque plantis deformitates ac morbos prebent.
Terram vera ipsam ornari talibus universis et adhuc auroque et argento atque aliis huiusmodi.
Fulgencia enim ipsa oriri cum sint plurima multitudine et magna et ubi que terre, unde ipsam sciendum est spectaculum beatorum spectatorum.
Animalia vera in ea esse alia quidem multa et homines, hos utique in mesogea habitantes, illos vera circa aera tamquam circa mare, istosque in insulis quas circumfluere aera ad tellurem existentes;
atque uno verbo quicquid nobis aqua vel pontus est ad nostrum usum, hoc illic aera, quod certe nobis aer, illis ethera.
Atque horas ipsius complexionem habere talem quatinus ipsi salubres sint et tempus degere multum plus quam qui hic,
et visu et auditu et prudencia et cunctis talibus a nobis distare ea discrepancia qua nempe aerque ab aqua differt et ether ab aere in sinceritate.
Et utique deorum nemoraque et sacraria ipsis esse, in quibus revera habitatores deos esse, et responsaque atque mantias et sensus deorum atque tales coessencias fieri ipsis ad ipsos;
necnon solem et lunam atque stellas conspici ab eis qualia contingunt esse, et aliam felicitatem horum consequentem esse.
[marg: Fabula de terra pura, et quae in ea sunt] “Ferunt igitur, o amice,” inquit, “primum quidem talem (32) videri terrae illius faciem siquis superne despiciat, quales sunt hae pilae quae ex corijs duode(33)cim contextae sunt, varijs scilicet distinctam coloribus, quorum hi nostri colores quibus pi(34)ctores utuntur similitudinem quandam retinent.
Illic vero universam terram ex talibus mul(35)toque etiam nitidioribus ac purioribus esse,
partimque quidem purpuream mira pulchritudine (36) praeditam, partim vero coloris aurei, partim gypso et nive candidiorem.
Praeterea ex colo(37)ribus alijs similiter exornatam ac etiam pluribus pulchrioribusque quam in nostram notiti(38)am pervenerunt.
Enimvero has ipsas ipsius concavitates aqua aereque repletas speciem quan(39)dam coloris splendidam in primis afferre inter caeterorum colorum varietatem ut una quae(40)dam species eius varia semper appareat.
In huiusmodi vero terra convenienti ratione simi(41)les nasci arbores et flores et fructus.
Praeterea montes et lapides ibidem simili ratione ha(42)bere perfectionem atque perspicuitatem coloresque admodum pulchriores.
Quorum quidem (43) particula quaedam sint lapilli qui apud nos habentur in precio, Sardia, Iaspides, Smaragdi, (44) caeterique eiusmodi.
Illic vero nihil esse quod non tale sit aut etiam pulchrius.
Cuius quidem rei (45) causa sit, quoniam lapides illi puri sint neque quemadmodum nostri a putredine salsugineque (46) attriti atque corrupti, quibus in hunc locum confluentibus lapides et tellus animaliaque et plan(47)tae inficiuntur atque aegrotare coguntur.
Terram vero ipsam his omnibus exornari, atque au(48)ro etiam et argento caeterisque similibus.
Praefulgentia quidem haec ibi nasci et multa et ma(49)gna perque omnem terram ut eam videre spectatorum felicium sit spectaculum.
Proinde ibi es(50)se animalia multa et homines partim regionem mediterraneam incolentes, partim circa ae(51)rem quemadmodum nos circa maris littora, partim etiam insulas quae haud procul a conti(52)nenti positae aere circundantur.
Sed ut summatim dicam, quod nobis aqua est et mare ad (53) usum nostrum, idem illic esse aerem, quod vero nobis aer, id illis aetherem esse.
Tempora (54) vero apud illos tantam habere temperiem, ut illi et sine morbo continue et longe diutius (518, 1) quam nostri vivant.
Item visu, auditu, prudentia caeterisque talibus nobis tantum praestare, (2) quantum et aer aquae et aether aeri puritate praestate.
Praeterea illic esse deorum templa (3) et lucos in quibus revera dij familiariter habitent, et responsa et divinationes deorumque (4) sensus familiaritatesque eiusmodi hominibus ad deos esse.
Solem quoque et lunam stellas(5)que alias quales revera sunt apud eos videri, caeteris in rebus beatitudinem eos his rebus con(6)gruam possidere.
The tale, my friend, he said, is as follows:--In the first place, the earth, when looked at from above, is in appearance streaked like one of those balls which have leather coverings in twelve pieces, and is decked with various colours, of which the colours used by painters on earth are in a manner samples.
But there the whole earth is made up of them, and they are brighter far and clearer than ours;
there is a purple of wonderful lustre, also the radiance of gold, and the white which is in the earth is whiter than any chalk or snow.
Of these and other colours the earth is made up, and they are more in number and fairer than the eye of man has ever seen;
the very hollows (of which I was speaking) filled with air and water have a colour of their own, and are seen like light gleaming amid the diversity of the other colours, so that the whole presents a single and continuous appearance of variety in unity.
And in this fair region everything that grows--trees, and flowers, and fruits--are in a like degree fairer than any here;
and there are hills, having stones in them in a like degree smoother, and more transparent, and fairer in colour
than our highly-valued emeralds and sardonyxes and jaspers, and other gems, which are but minute fragments of them:
for there all the stones are like our precious stones, and fairer still (compare Republic).
The reason is, that they are pure, and not, like our precious stones, infected or corroded by the corrupt briny elements which coagulate among us, and which breed foulness and disease both in earth and stones, as well as in animals and plants.
They are the jewels of the upper earth, which also shines with gold and silver and the like,
and they are set in the light of day and are large and abundant and in all places, making the earth a sight to gladden the beholder's eye.
And there are animals and men, some in a middle region, others dwelling about the air as we dwell about the sea; others in islands which the air flows round, near the continent:
and in a word, the air is used by them as the water and the sea are by us, and the ether is to them what the air is to us.
Moreover, the temperament of their seasons is such that they have no disease, and live much longer than we do,
and have sight and hearing and smell, and all the other senses, in far greater perfection, in the same proportion that air is purer than water or the ether than air.
Also they have temples and sacred places in which the gods really dwell, and they hear their voices and receive their answers, and are conscious of them and hold converse with them,
and they see the sun, moon, and stars as they truly are, and their other blessedness is of a piece with this.
καὶ ὅλην μὲν δὴ τὴν γῆν οὕτω πεφυκέναι καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν γῆν·
τόπους δ᾽ ἐν αὐτῇ εἶναι κατὰ τὰ ἔγκοιλα αὐτῆς κύκλῳ περὶ ὅλην πολλούς, τοὺς μὲν βαθυτέρους καὶ ἀναπεπταμένους μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἡμεῖς οἰκοῦμεν, τοὺς δὲ βαθυτέρους ὄντας τὸ χάσμα αὐτοὺς ἔλαττον ἔχειν τοῦ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν (111d) τόπου, ἔστι δ᾽ οὓς καὶ βραχυτέρους τῷ βάθει τοῦ ἐνθάδε εἶναι καὶ πλατυτέρους.
τούτους δὲ πάντας ὑπὸ γῆν εἰς ἀλλήλους συντετρῆσθαί τε πολλαχῇ καὶ κατὰ στενότερα καὶ εὐρύτερα καὶ διεξόδους ἔχειν,
ᾗ πολὺ μὲν ὕδωρ ῥεῖν ἐξ ἀλλήλων εἰς ἀλλήλους ὥσπερ εἰς κρατῆρας, καὶ ἀενάων ποταμῶν ἀμήχανα μεγέθη ὑπὸ τὴν γῆν καὶ θερμῶν ὑδάτων καὶ ψυχρῶν,
πολὺ δὲ πῦρ καὶ πυρὸς μεγάλους ποταμούς, πολλοὺς δὲ ὑγροῦ πηλοῦ καὶ καθαρωτέρου καὶ βορβορωδεστέρου, (111e) ὥσπερ ἐν Σικελίᾳ οἱ πρὸ τοῦ ῥύακος πηλοῦ ῥέοντες ποταμοὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ῥύαξ·
ὧν δὴ καὶ ἑκάστους τοὺς τόπους πληροῦσθαι, ὡς ἂν ἑκάστοις τύχῃ ἑκάστοτε ἡ περιρροὴ γιγνομένη.
ταῦτα δὲ πάντα κινεῖν ἄνω καὶ κάτω ὥσπερ αἰώραν τινὰ ἐνοῦσαν ἐν τῇ γῇ·
ἔστι δὲ ἄρα αὕτη ἡ αἰώρα διὰ φύσιν τοιάνδε τινά.
ἕν τι τῶν χασμάτων τῆς γῆς ἄλλως τε (112a) μέγιστον τυγχάνει ὂν καὶ διαμπερὲς τετρημένον δι᾽ ὅλης τῆς γῆς, τοῦτο ὅπερ Ὅμηρος εἶπε, λέγων αὐτό
Atque totam profecto terram ita natam esse et ea que circa terram;
loca autem in ea esse secundum concavitates ipsius decusate circa totam plurima, hec equidem profundiora et expansa magis quam in quo nos habitamus, illa vera profundiora existencia eo quod chasma ipsa minus habeant eo quod penes nos loco, est autem quos et breviores profunditate eo quod hic est et laciores.
Hec equidem omnia sub terra alternatim forari in multis partibus et iuxta arciora et laciora et transmeaciones habere,
qua multam quidem aquam fluere ex alternis in alterna ve1uti in crateras et iugiter fluencium fluviorum immensas magnitudines sub terra et fervidarum aquarum et gelidarum,
multum vero ignem et ignis magna Rumina nonnullos liquidi uti et purioris et lutulencioris, seu in Sicilia ante torrentem luti decurrentes fluvii, atque ipse torrens;
de quibus utique singula loca repleri, quorum singulis contingat undique decusata defluxio facta.
Ista vero universa movere sursum et deorsum quasi eoram quamdam inherentem in terra;
est autem hec eora per naturam talem quamdam.
Unum quoddam chasmatum telluris aliter quidem maximum contingit esse et per ulterius perforatum per totam aridam, illud quod Omerus dicens ait ipsum
Itaque universam terram sic natura institutam et quae circa eam sunt (7) similiter tradunt.
Esse praeterea in ipsa per eius concavitates loca in circulum multa, par(8)tim quidem profundiora atque ampliora quam sit regio a nobis culta, partim vero pro(9)fundiora quidem, sed hiatum angustiorem habentia nostra hac regione, esse et alicubi mi(10)nus profunda, sed ampliora quam nostra.
Haec autem omnia sub terra sibi invicem obvia(11)re atque irrumpere multis undique modis, tum per angustiora, tum per ampliora, discur(12)susque habere
et exitus quibus magna aquarum copia ex alijs in alia velut in crateres con(13)fluat. Item perpetuorum fluminum sub terra incredibiles magnitudines aquarum, tum ca(14)lidarum, tum etiam frigidarum,
plurimumque ignem, et ignis ingentes amnes, multos quo(15)que lutulenti humoris partim quidem purioris partim vero sordidioris, ceu torrens luti (16) qui in Sicilia est, et iuxta ipsum amnes lutei inde fluentes.
Quibus singula compleri loca (17) quaecunque eos contigit perfluere.
Haec autem omnia sursum deorsumque ferri veluti va(18)se pensili quodam sub terram posito atque ita librato ut utrinque vicissim inclinet atque at(19)tollat.
Est autem id vas pensile ob naturam quandam eiusmodi.
Vnus aliquis ex terrae hi(20)atibus est profecto quam maximus perque universam terram traiectus et patens, de quo (21) Homerus:
Such is the nature of the whole earth, and of the things which are around the earth;
and there are divers regions in the hollows on the face of the globe everywhere, some of them deeper and more extended than that which we inhabit, others deeper but with a narrower opening than ours, and some are shallower and also wider.
All have numerous perforations, and there are passages broad and narrow in the interior of the earth, connecting them with one another;
and there flows out of and into them, as into basins, a vast tide of water, and huge subterranean streams of perennial rivers, and springs hot and cold,
and a great fire, and great rivers of fire, and streams of liquid mud, thin or thick (like the rivers of mud in Sicily, and the lava streams which follow them),
and the regions about which they happen to flow are filled up with them.
And there is a swinging or see-saw in the interior of the earth
which moves all this up and down, and is due to the following cause:
--There is a chasm which is the vastest of them all, and pierces right through the whole earth; this is that chasm which Homer describes in the words,--
ὃ καὶ ἄλλοθι καὶ ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν Τάρταρον κεκλήκασιν.
εἰς γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ χάσμα συρρέουσί τε πάντες οἱ ποταμοὶ καὶ ἐκ τούτου πάλιν ἐκρέουσιν·
γίγνονται δὲ ἕκαστοι τοιοῦτοι δι᾽ οἵας ἂν καὶ τῆς γῆς ῥέωσιν.
ἡ δὲ (112b) αἰτία ἐστὶν τοῦ ἐκρεῖν τε ἐντεῦθεν καὶ εἰσρεῖν πάντα τὰ ῥεύματα, ὅτι πυθμένα οὐκ ἔχει οὐδὲ βάσιν τὸ ὑγρὸν τοῦτο.
αἰωρεῖται δὴ καὶ κυμαίνει ἄνω καὶ κάτω, καὶ ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ περὶ αὐτὸ ταὐτὸν ποιεῖ·
συνέπεται γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ ὅταν εἰς τὸ ἐπ᾽ ἐκεῖνα τῆς γῆς ὁρμήσῃ καὶ ὅταν εἰς τὸ ἐπὶ τάδε, καὶ ὥσπερ τῶν ἀναπνεόντων ἀεὶ ἐκπνεῖ τε καὶ ἀναπνεῖ ῥέον τὸ πνεῦμα, οὕτω καὶ ἐκεῖ συναιωρούμενον τῷ ὑγρῷ τὸ πνεῦμα δεινούς τινας ἀνέμους καὶ ἀμηχάνους παρέχεται καὶ (112c) εἰσιὸν καὶ ἐξιόν.
ὅταν τε οὖν ὑποχωρήσῃ τὸ ὕδωρ εἰς τὸν τόπον τὸν δὴ κάτω καλούμενον, τοῖς κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνα τὰ ῥεύματα [διὰ] τῆς γῆς εἰσρεῖ τε καὶ πληροῖ αὐτὰ ὥσπερ οἱ ἐπαντλοῦντες·
ὅταν τε αὖ ἐκεῖθεν μὲν ἀπολίπῃ, δεῦρο δὲ ὁρμήσῃ, τὰ ἐνθάδε πληροῖ αὖθις, τὰ δὲ πληρωθέντα ῥεῖ διὰ τῶν ὀχετῶν καὶ διὰ τῆς γῆς, καὶ εἰς τοὺς τόπους ἕκαστα ἀφικνούμενα, εἰς οὓς ἑκάστοις ὡδοποίηται, θαλάττας τε καὶ λίμνας καὶ ποταμοὺς καὶ κρήνας ποιεῖ·
ἐντεῦθεν δὲ πάλιν δυόμενα (112d) κατὰ τῆς γῆς, τὰ μὲν μακροτέρους τόπους περιελθόντα καὶ πλείους, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττους καὶ βραχυτέρους,
πάλιν εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐμβάλλει, τὰ μὲν πολὺ κατωτέρω <ἢ> ᾗ ἐπηντλεῖτο, τὰ δὲ ὀλίγον·
πάντα δὲ ὑποκάτω εἰσρεῖ τῆς ἐκροῆς, καὶ ἔνια μὲν καταντικρὺ <ἢ> ᾗ [εἰσρεῖ] ἐξέπεσεν, ἔνια δὲ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέρος·
ἔστι δὲ ἃ παντάπασιν κύκλῳ περιελθόντα, ἢ ἅπαξ ἢ καὶ πλεονάκις περιελιχθέντα περὶ τὴν γῆν ὥσπερ οἱ ὄφεις, εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν κάτω καθέντα πάλιν ἐμβάλλει.
(112e) δυνατὸν δέ ἐστιν ἑκατέρωσε μέχρι τοῦ μέσου καθιέναι, πέρα δ᾽ οὔ·
ἄναντες γὰρ ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς ῥεύμασι τὸ ἑκατέρωθεν γίγνεται μέρος.
quod et alibi ille et alii nonnulli poetarum Tartarum vocaverunt.
In hoc siquidem chasma confluunt universi fluvii et ex hoc item effluunt;
fiuntque singuli tales per qualem utique terram fluunt.
Causa sane est effluendique hinc et influendi hec fluenta, quia fundum non habent neque basim liquidum istud.
Suspendetur quoque et fluctuat sursum ac deorsum, et aer atque spiritus qui circa ipsum hoc efficit;
sequitur enim ipsum et quociens in ulteriora telluris impetum faciet et quociens in ea que hic, atque sicuti respirancium semper expirat et respirat currens spiritus; similiter eciam ibi una suspensus cum liquido spiritus graves quosdam ventos et immensos prebet ingrediens et egrediens.
Cumque igitur impetum faciens recedet aqua in locum qui iusum vocatur, eis qui iuxta illos fluenta per terram influit et replet ea tamquam haurientes;
cum vero item inde defecerit, huc certe impetuabit, ea que hic replet iterum, ceterum repleta fluunt per meatus terre atque in loca singula veniencia, in que singulum iter facit, mariaque et lacus et flumina atque fontes facit;
at istinc denuo introeuncia per terram, hec quoque remociora loca pertranseuncia et plura, illa nempe pauciora et breviora,
iterato in Tartarum immittuntur, hec quidem valde inferius quam hauriebantur, illa quoque parum;
cuncta nimirum inferius influunt quam effluxerint, et quedam certe ex opposito quo influunt exciderunt, quedam profecto secundum eamdem partem;
sunt sane que omnifariam in giro circumveniencia, vel semel vel eciam pluries circumvoluta circa tellurem quasi serpentes, quo possunt deorsum descendencia rursum illabuntur.
Ceterum possibile ab undique usque medium descendere, ulteriusque minime;
nam ad ambos decursus que utrimque fit pars.
Quod et ipse alibi et mul(22)ti poetarum Tartarum appellarunt.
In hoc utique receptaculum omnia confluunt flumi(23)na atque inde rursus effluunt.
Talia vero sunt singula per quales labuntur terras.
Quod au(24)tem hinc effluant omnia rursusque refluant, haec est causa, quod hic humor nec fundamen(25)tum habet nec firmamentum.
Itaque elevatur et sursum deorsumque redundat. Idemque facit (26) aer et spiritus qui circa ipsum versatur.
Sequitur enim ipsum, et quando ad superiora ter(27)rae et quando ad haec nostra perlabitur. Et quemadmodum in respirantem flatus conti(28)nue expirat atque respirat, sic et ibi spiritus una cum humore elatus vehementes quosdam (29) ventos et incredibiles commovet, sive effluat.
Quapropter cum aqua in locum (30) inferiorem delabitur per meatus terrae iuxta eiusmodi rivos influit passimque per eos ex(31)undat et implet velut hi qui hauriunt.
Cum vero illinc huc erumpit, haec quoque iterum lo(32)ca conplet. Plena vero cum sint, per rivos terraeque meatus exuberat. Et cum humores singu(33)li illuc profluxerint quo quisque profluit opportunius, maria, lacus, flumina, fontes effici(34)unt.
Proinde rursus hinc relabentes per terram, partim quidem per longiores pluresque an(35)fractus,
partim vero per pauciores atque breviores rursus in Tartarum confluunt. Alij certe (36) multo profundius quam hausti fuerint, alij vero paulo,
omnes autem inferius influunt quam (37) effluxerint, et alij per contrariam partem elabuntur quam elapsi fuerint, alij vero per partem e(38)andem.
At quidem passim circunfluentes aut semel aut saepius spirasque circa orbem terra(39)rum instar anguium replicantes, quantum fieri potest infra relapsi iterum commiscentur.
Li(40)cet autem utrinque ad medium usque defluere, ultra vero nequaquam.
Vlterior enim prolap(41)sus utrinque foret ascensus.
and which he in other places, and many other poets, have called Tartarus.
And the see-saw is caused by the streams flowing into and out of this chasm,
and they each have the nature of the soil through which they flow.
And the reason why the streams are always flowing in and out, is that the watery element has no bed or bottom,
but is swinging and surging up and down, and the surrounding wind and air do the same;
they follow the water up and down, hither and thither, over the earth--just as in the act of respiration the air is always in process of inhalation and exhalation;--and the wind swinging with the water in and out produces fearful and irresistible blasts:
when the waters retire with a rush into the lower parts of the earth, as they are called, they flow through the earth in those regions, and fill them up like water raised by a pump,
and then when they leave those regions and rush back hither, they again fill the hollows here, and when these are filled, flow through subterranean channels and find their way to their several places, forming seas, and lakes, and rivers, and springs.
Thence they again enter the earth, some of them making a long circuit into many lands, others going to a few places and not so distant;
and again fall into Tartarus, some at a point a good deal lower than that at which they rose, and others not much lower,
but all in some degree lower than the point from which they came.
And some burst forth again on the opposite side, and some on the same side, and some wind round the earth with one or many folds like the coils of a serpent, and descend as far as they can, but always return and fall into the chasm.
The rivers flowing in either direction can descend only to the centre and no further,
for opposite to the rivers is a precipice.
τὰ μὲν οὖν δὴ ἄλλα πολλά τε καὶ μεγάλα καὶ παντοδαπὰ ῥεύματά ἐστι·
τυγχάνει δ᾽ ἄρα ὄντα ἐν τούτοις τοῖς πολλοῖς τέτταρ᾽ ἄττα ῥεύματα, ὧν τὸ μὲν μέγιστον καὶ ἐξωτάτω ῥέον περὶ κύκλῳ ὁ καλούμενος Ὠκεανός ἐστιν,
τούτου δὲ καταντικρὺ καὶ ἐναντίως ῥέων Ἀχέρων, ὃς δι᾽ ἐρήμων τε τόπων (113a) ῥεῖ ἄλλων καὶ δὴ καὶ ὑπὸ γῆν ῥέων εἰς τὴν λίμνην ἀφικνεῖται τὴν Ἀχερουσιάδα,
οὗ αἱ τῶν τετελευτηκότων ψυχαὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἀφικνοῦνται καί τινας εἱμαρμένους χρόνους μείνασαι, αἱ μὲν μακροτέρους, αἱ δὲ βραχυτέρους, πάλιν ἐκπέμπονται εἰς τὰς τῶν ζῴων γενέσεις.
τρίτος δὲ ποταμὸς τούτων κατὰ μέσον ἐκβάλλει, καὶ ἐγγὺς τῆς ἐκβολῆς ἐκπίπτει εἰς τόπον μέγαν πυρὶ πολλῷ καόμενον, καὶ λίμνην ποιεῖ μείζω τῆς παρ᾽ ἡμῖν θαλάττης, ζέουσαν ὕδατος καὶ πηλοῦ·
ἐντεῦθεν δὲ (113b) χωρεῖ κύκλῳ θολερὸς καὶ πηλώδης, περιελιττόμενος δὲ τῇ γῇ ἄλλοσέ τε ἀφικνεῖται καὶ παρ᾽ ἔσχατα τῆς Ἀχερουσιάδος λίμνης, οὐ συμμειγνύμενος τῷ ὕδατι· περιελιχθεὶς δὲ πολλάκις ὑπὸ γῆς ἐμβάλλει κατωτέρω τοῦ Ταρτάρου·
οὗτος δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὃν ἐπονομάζουσιν Πυριφλεγέθοντα, οὗ καὶ οἱ ῥύακες ἀποσπάσματα ἀναφυσῶσιν ὅπῃ ἂν τύχωσι τῆς γῆς.
τούτου δὲ αὖ καταντικρὺ ὁ τέταρτος ἐκπίπτει εἰς τόπον πρῶτον δεινόν τε καὶ ἄγριον, ὡς λέγεται, χρῶμα δ᾽ ἔχοντα ὅλον οἷον ὁ (113c) κυανός,
ὃν δὴ ἐπονομάζουσι Στύγιον, καὶ τὴν λίμνην ἣν ποιεῖ ὁ ποταμὸς ἐμβάλλων, Στύγα·
ὁ δ᾽ ἐμπεσὼν ἐνταῦθα καὶ δεινὰς δυνάμεις λαβὼν ἐν τῷ ὕδατι, δὺς κατὰ τῆς γῆς, περιελιττόμενος χωρεῖ ἐναντίος τῷ Πυριφλεγέθοντι καὶ ἀπαντᾷ ἐν τῇ Ἀχερουσιάδι λίμνῃ ἐξ ἐναντίας·
καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ τούτου ὕδωρ οὐδενὶ μείγνυται, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὗτος κύκλῳ περιελθὼν ἐμβάλλει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐναντίος τῷ Πυριφλεγέθοντι·
ὄνομα δὲ τούτῳ ἐστίν, ὡς οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγουσιν, κωκυτός.
“Itaque alia multaque et magna atque omnifaria fluenta sunt;
continguntque igitur in hiis multis quatuor quedam fluenta, quorum quidem maximum et exterius fluens per amfractum nuncupatus Occeanus est;
huic vera ex opposito et contrarius fluens Acheron, qui per erimosque locos currit alios et sub terram fluens in paludem venit Acherusiada,
quo defunctorum anime plurimorum perveniunt et quedam fato previsa tempora manentes, hee quidem producciora, ille vera breviora, denuo emittuntur in animalium generaciones.
Tercium quoque flumen per hoc secundum medium erumpit, et prope erupcionem excidit in locum magnum igne multo combustum, et lacum efficit maiorem quod penes nos mari, ferventem aqua et luto;
hinc vero cedit circulariter turbidum et lutulentum, circumvolurumque telluri aliunde quidem venit et iuxta extrema Acherusiados lacus, non commixtum aque; circumvolutumque frequenter sub terram intrat inferius Tartaro;
hoc autem est quod agnominant Piriflegetonta, cuius eciam defluxiones apospasmata exalant ubicumque contingant terre.
Huic autem ex adverso quartum excidit in locum primum gravemque et agrestem, ut fertur, coloremque habens totum qualem Occeanus,
quem uti que agnominant Stigium, et lacum facit flumen ingrediens stiga;
hoc autem illapsum illic et vires robustas sumens in aqua bis per terram circumvolutum cedit ex adverso Piriflegetonti, atque obviat in Acherusia palude ex contrario;
et minime huius aqua alicui miscetur, verum eciam hoc decusate circumveniens immittit se in Tartarum oppositum Piriflegetonti;
nomenque huic est, ceu poete aiunt, Cocitos.
Proinde sunt et alia multa et magna variaque fluenta,
sed praeci(42)pua quatuor, quorum quidem maximum atque extimum terram circundans Oceanus (43) appellatur.
Econtraria vero huius regione fluit Acheron qui per deserta alia fluens loca (44) atque per subterranea in paludem defluit Acherusiam.
Quo plerique defunctorum deveni(45)unt animi ibique per fatalia quaedam temporum curricula commorati, partim quidem lon(46)giora, partim vero breviora, rursus in generationes animalium relabuntur.
Tertius vero (47) fluvius horum medius duorum interfluit. Nec admodum lnoge [longe] progressus in locum cadit (48) vastum multo igne flagrantem efficitque paludem nostro mari maiorem aqua lutoque ferventem.
(49) Hinc vero turbidus lutulentusque terraque circundata, et alibi, et ad extrema palu(50)dis Acherusiae pervenit, nec tamen illius aquae miscetur, sed sub terra saepius revolutus absor(51)ptusque defluit infra tartarum.
Hunc fluvium Pyriphlegethontem nominant, cuius rivi quidam (52) inde velut evulsi quacunque terrarum contigerit manant.
E contraria vero huius regione fluvi(53)us quartus primum in locum erumpit ferum et asperum ut ferunt. Colorem vero locus ta(54)lem habet totus, qualis est Cyneus,
quem Stygium nominant. Hic autem fluvius prolapsus (519, 1) paludem efficit Stygem.
In hunc vero incidens locum viresque vehementes in aqua assu(2)mens sub terram se condit, circunvolutus atque adversus Pyriphlegethontem labitur et in Ache(3)rusia palude e contraria parte illi fit obviam.
Nec ulli huius aqua miscetur, sed revolutus (4) in gyrum contra Pyriphlegethontem irrumpit in tartarum.
Poetae vero hunc appellant (5) Cocytum.
Now these rivers are many, and mighty, and diverse,
and there are four principal ones, of which the greatest and outermost is that called Oceanus, which flows round the earth in a circle;
and in the opposite direction flows Acheron, which passes under the earth through desert places into the Acherusian lake:
this is the lake to the shores of which the souls of the many go when they are dead, and after waiting an appointed time, which is to some a longer and to some a shorter time, they are sent back to be born again as animals.
The third river passes out between the two, and near the place of outlet pours into a vast region of fire, and forms a lake larger than the Mediterranean Sea, boiling with water and mud;
and proceeding muddy and turbid, and winding about the earth, comes, among other places, to the extremities of the Acherusian Lake, but mingles not with the waters of the lake, and after making many coils about the earth plunges into Tartarus at a deeper level.
This is that Pyriphlegethon, as the stream is called, which throws up jets of fire in different parts of the earth.
The fourth river goes out on the opposite side, and falls first of all into a wild and savage region, which is all of a dark-blue colour, like lapis lazuli;
and this is that river which is called the Stygian river, and falls into and forms the Lake Styx,
and after falling into the lake and receiving strange powers in the waters, passes under the earth, winding round in the opposite direction, and comes near the Acherusian lake from the opposite side to Pyriphlegethon.
And the water of this river too mingles with no other, but flows round in a circle and falls into Tartarus over against Pyriphlegethon;
and the name of the river, as the poets say, is Cocytus.
(113d) τούτων δὲ οὕτως πεφυκότων, ἐπειδὰν ἀφίκωνται οἱ τετελευτηκότες εἰς τὸν τόπον οἷ ὁ δαίμων ἕκαστον κομίζει, πρῶτον μὲν διεδικάσαντο οἵ τε καλῶς καὶ ὁσίως βιώσαντες καὶ οἱ μή.
καὶ οἳ μὲν ἂν δόξωσι μέσως βεβιωκέναι, πορευθέντες ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀχέροντα, ἀναβάντες ἃ δὴ αὐτοῖς ὀχήματά ἐστιν, ἐπὶ τούτων ἀφικνοῦνται εἰς τὴν λίμνην, καὶ ἐκεῖ οἰκοῦσί τε καὶ καθαιρόμενοι τῶν τε ἀδικημάτων διδόντες δίκας ἀπολύονται, εἴ τίς τι ἠδίκηκεν, τῶν τε εὐεργεσιῶν (113e) τιμὰς φέρονται κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἕκαστος·
οἳ δ᾽ ἂν δόξωσιν ἀνιάτως ἔχειν διὰ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων, ἢ ἱεροσυλίας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἢ φόνους ἀδίκους καὶ παρανόμους πολλοὺς ἐξειργασμένοι ἢ ἄλλα ὅσα τοιαῦτα τυγχάνει ὄντα, τούτους δὲ ἡ προσήκουσα μοῖρα ῥίπτει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον, ὅθεν οὔποτε ἐκβαίνουσιν.
οἳ δ᾽ ἂν ἰάσιμα μὲν μεγάλα δὲ δόξωσιν ἡμαρτηκέναι ἁμαρτήματα,
οἷον πρὸς πατέρα ἢ μητέρα (114a) ὑπ᾽ ὀργῆς βίαιόν τι πράξαντες, καὶ μεταμέλον αὐτοῖς τὸν ἄλλον βίον βιῶσιν, ἢ ἀνδροφόνοι τοιούτῳ τινὶ ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ γένωνται,
τούτους δὲ ἐμπεσεῖν μὲν εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἀνάγκη, ἐμπεσόντας δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐνιαυτὸν ἐκεῖ γενομένους ἐκβάλλει τὸ κῦμα, τοὺς μὲν ἀνδροφόνους κατὰ τὸν Κωκυτόν, τοὺς δὲ πατραλοίας καὶ μητραλοίας κατὰ τὸν Πυριφλεγέθοντα·
ἐπειδὰν δὲ φερόμενοι γένωνται κατὰ τὴν λίμνην τὴν Ἀχερουσιάδα, ἐνταῦθα βοῶσί τε καὶ καλοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν οὓς ἀπέκτειναν, οἱ δὲ οὓς ὕβρισαν, καλέσαντες δ᾽ ἱκετεύουσι (114b) καὶ δέονται ἐᾶσαι σφᾶς ἐκβῆναι εἰς τὴν λίμνην καὶ δέξασθαι,
καὶ ἐὰν μὲν πείσωσιν, ἐκβαίνουσί τε καὶ λήγουσι τῶν κακῶν, εἰ δὲ μή, φέρονται αὖθις εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον καὶ ἐκεῖθεν πάλιν εἰς τοὺς ποταμούς, καὶ ταῦτα πάσχοντες οὐ πρότερον παύονται πρὶν ἂν πείσωσιν οὓς ἠδίκησαν·
αὕτη γὰρ ἡ δίκη ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν αὐτοῖς ἐτάχθη.
οἳ δὲ δὴ ἂν δόξωσι διαφερόντως πρὸς τὸ ὁσίως βιῶναι, οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ τῶνδε μὲν τῶν τόπων τῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ ἐλευθερούμενοί τε καὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι (114c) ὥσπερ δεσμωτηρίων, ἄνω δὲ εἰς τὴν καθαρὰν οἴκησιν ἀφικνούμενοι καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς οἰκιζόμενοι.
τούτων δὲ αὐτῶν οἱ φιλοσοφίᾳ ἱκανῶς καθηράμενοι ἄνευ τε σωμάτων ζῶσι τὸ παράπαν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον, καὶ εἰς οἰκήσεις ἔτι τούτων καλλίους ἀφικνοῦνται, ἃς οὔτε ῥᾴδιον δηλῶσαι οὔτε ὁ χρόνος ἱκανὸς ἐν τῷ παρόντι.
Hiis autem hactenus naris, quociens abeunt defuncti in locum quo demon unumquemque deportat, primum quidem in causam ducuntur quique bene et sanae degerunt et qui minime.
Necnon quicumque videbuntur mediocriter vitam transegisse abeuntes in Acheronta, ascendentes que quidem vehicula ipsis sunt, in hiis perveniunt in lacum, et ibi habitant, atque expiati ab iniusticiis dantes penas absolvuntur, si quis quid iniuste egit, necnon beneficiorum honores ferunt iuxta quod dignum est unusquisque.
Sane quicumque videbuntur incurabiliter se habere ob magnitudines piaculorum, sacrilegia multa et magna sive cedes iniustas et exleges plurimas patrantes vel alia quecumque contingunt esse talia, hos competens equidem parca iacit in Tartarum unde numquam egrediuntur.
Certe quicumque curabilia quidem ingenciaque videbuntur commisisse scelera,
velut ad genitorem seu genitricem ob iram violentum quid patrantes, atque penituit eos aliam vitam degent quam viricide,
tali quodam alio modo fient hos equidem irruere in Tartarum necesse, lapsosque ipsos et annum ibi complentes eicit unda, viricidas quidem ad Cocitum, atque patricidas et matricidas in Piriflegetonta;
quando vero lati erunt ad paludem Acherusiada, hic boantque et vocant, hii quidem quos interemerunt, illi vero quos contumeliis affecerunt, vocantesque supplicant et obsecrant permittere eos exire in lacum et recipi,
et si quidem persuaserint egrediunturque et terminant mala, sin autem, feruntur item in Tartarum et inde iterato in flumina, et ipsa hec perpessi haut prius requiem consequuntur ante quam placaverint quos leserunt;
hic enim cruciatus a iudicibus ipsis ordinatus est.
Quicumque sane videbuntur differenter quam religiose vixisse, isti sunt qui a locis qui in terra sunt liberati et absoluti tamquam a vinculorum loco, superiusque in sinceram habitacionem venientes et in terra mansitantes.
Horumque ipsorum quicumque philosophia satis expurgati sine corporibus degunt prorsus in deinceps tempus, et in mansiones adhuc meliores hiis perveniunt, quas neque facile exequi neque tempus sufficiens impresenciarum.
Cum vero haec ita natura disposita sint, quando in eum locum defuncti perve(6)nerint quo daemon unum quenque perducit, primo illic iudicantur, et qui honeste sancteque (7) et qui aliter vixerint.
Itaque quicunque in vita quodammodo tenuisse medium quoddam conpe(8)riuntur, ad Acherontem profecti vehiculis quae unicuique adsunt in paludem perveniunt (9) Acherusiam, ibique habitant purganturque poenas dantes iniuriarum. Et cum purificati sunt (10) absolvuntur rursusque pro merito singuli benefactorum praemia reportant.
Qui vero ob (11) scelerum magnitudinem insanabiles esse videntur, qui videlicet sacrilegia multa et ma(12)gna, vel caedes iniquas vel alia horum similia perpetraverint, hos omnes conveniens sors (13) mergit in tartarum, unde nunquam egrediuntur.
Qui autem sanabilia quidem peccata sed (14) ingentia commiserunt,
veluti siqui contra patrem vel matrem irati per vim aliquid fece(15)rint, sed poenitentia ducti eos in caetera vita coluerint, vel qui simili quodam pacto fue(16)rint homicidae,
eos in tartarum quidem necesse est cadere, sed ibi per annum commorati a (17) fluctu eijciuntur, homicidae quidem per Cocytum, parentum vero violatores per Pyri(18)phlegethontem.
Postquam vero ab his delati fluminibus ad paludem Acherusiam perve(19)nerunt, clamant illic vocitantque eos quos vel necaverunt vel iniurijs affecerunt, supplici(20)terque rogant atque deprecantur, ut eos permittant progredi per paludem ibique absolvi,
ac si (21) impetraverint, penetrant illuc finemque malorum accipiunt. Sin minus queant persuade(22)re, referuntur in tartarum atque inde rursus in flumina neque per haec mala deferri prius cel(23)sant quam ab his quos affecerunt iniurijs impetraverint.
Haec enim poena illis a iudici(24)bus est imposita.
Qui autem pie prae caeteris vixisse inveniuntur, hi sunt qui ex his terre(25)nis locis tanquam e carcere soluti atque liberati ad altiora transcendunt puramque supra ter(26)ram habitant regionem.
Inter has autem quicunque satis per philosophiam purgati sunt, (27) absque corporibus omnino totum per tempus vivunt habitationesque his etiam pulchrio(28)res nanciscuntur. Quarum pulchritudo neque facilis dictu est neque praesens tempus ad (29) dicendum sufficeret.
Such is the nature of the other world; and when the dead arrive at the place to which the genius of each severally guides them, first of all, they have sentence passed upon them, as they have lived well and piously or not.
And those who appear to have lived neither well nor ill, go to the river Acheron, and embarking in any vessels which they may find, are carried in them to the lake, and there they dwell and are purified of their evil deeds, and having suffered the penalty of the wrongs which they have done to others, they are absolved, and receive the rewards of their good deeds, each of them according to his deserts.
But those who appear to be incurable by reason of the greatness of their crimes--who have committed many and terrible deeds of sacrilege, murders foul and violent, or the like--such are hurled into Tartarus which is their suitable destiny, and they never come out.
Those again who have committed crimes, which, although great, are not irremediable
--who in a moment of anger, for example, have done violence to a father or a mother, and have repented for the remainder of their lives, or, who have taken the life of another under the like extenuating circumstances--
these are plunged into Tartarus, the pains of which they are compelled to undergo for a year, but at the end of the year the wave casts them forth--mere homicides by way of Cocytus, parricides and matricides by Pyriphlegethon--
and they are borne to the Acherusian lake, and there they lift up their voices and call upon the victims whom they have slain or wronged, to have pity on them, and to be kind to them, and let them come out into the lake.
And if they prevail, then they come forth and cease from their troubles; but if not, they are carried back again into Tartarus and from thence into the rivers unceasingly, until they obtain mercy from those whom they have wronged:
for that is the sentence inflicted upon them by their judges.
Those too who have been pre-eminent for holiness of life are released from this earthly prison, and go to their pure home which is above, and dwell in the purer earth;
and of these, such as have duly purified themselves with philosophy live henceforth altogether without the body, in mansions fairer still which may not be described, and of which the time would fail me to tell.
ἅπερ ἀεὶ λέγω, ἔφη, ὦ Κρίτων, οὐδὲν καινότερον·
ὅτι ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμελούμενοι ὑμεῖς καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς καὶ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν χάριτι ποιήσετε ἅττ᾽ ἂν ποιῆτε, κἂν μὴ νῦν ὁμολογήσητε·
ἐὰν δὲ ὑμῶν [μὲν] αὐτῶν ἀμελῆτε καὶ μὴ ᾽θέλητε ὥσπερ κατ᾽ ἴχνη κατὰ τὰ νῦν τε εἰρημένα καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ζῆν, οὐδὲ ἐὰν πολλὰ ὁμολογήσητε (115c) ἐν τῷ παρόντι καὶ σφόδρα, οὐδὲν πλέον ποιήσετε.
“Que utique semper” inquit “dico, O Crito, nichil recencius;
quoniam vestrum ipsorum curam habentes vos et michi et meis, atque vobis ipsis in gracia facietis quecumque egeritis, et si nequaquam nunc fateamini;
si vero vestrum ipsorum curam contempseritis et nolueritis tamquam ad vestigia secundum modo dicta et que in priori tempore vitam duccre, neque si multum fassi fueritis et impresenciarum atque validius nichilo magis facietis.”
“Nihil equidem”, inquit, “novi praecipio, sed quod semper vobis praedico,
videlicet si ve(48)tri curam habebitis, et mihi et vobis ipsis grata evadent quaecunque feceritis etiam si nunc (49) verbis non concedatis.
At vero si vos ipsos neglexeritis nolentes secundum ea quae nunc (50) ex superiori tempore dicta sunt, quasi per vestigia vitam dirigere, nihil prorsus proficietis, (51) etsi multa nobis nunc disputantibus concedatis.”
Nothing particular, Crito, he replied:
only, as I have always told you, take care of yourselves; that is a service which you may be ever rendering to me and mine and to all of us, whether you promise to do so or not.
But if you have no thought for yourselves, and care not to walk according to the rule which I have prescribed for you, not now for the first time, however much you may profess or promise at the moment, it will be of no avail.
ὅπως ἄν, ἔφη, βούλησθε, ἐάνπερ γε λάβητέ με καὶ μὴ ἐκφύγω ὑμᾶς.
γελάσας δὲ ἅμα ἡσυχῇ καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀποβλέψας εἶπεν·
οὐ πείθω, ὦ ἄνδρες, Κρίτωνα, ὡς ἐγώ εἰμι οὗτος Σωκράτης, ὁ νυνὶ διαλεγόμενος καὶ διατάττων ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων,
ἀλλ᾽ οἴεταί με ἐκεῖνον εἶναι (115d) ὃν ὄψεται ὀλίγον ὕστερον νεκρόν, καὶ ἐρωτᾷ δὴ πῶς με θάπτῃ.
ὅτι δὲ ἐγὼ πάλαι πολὺν λόγον πεποίημαι, ὡς, ἐπειδὰν πίω τὸ φάρμακον, οὐκέτι ὑμῖν παραμενῶ, ἀλλ᾽ οἰχήσομαι ἀπιὼν εἰς μακάρων δή τινας εὐδαιμονίας,
ταῦτά μοι δοκῶ αὐτῷ ἄλλως λέγειν, παραμυθούμενος ἅμα μὲν ὑμᾶς, ἅμα δ᾽ ἐμαυτόν.
ἐγγυήσασθε οὖν με πρὸς Κρίτωνα, ἔφη, τὴν ἐναντίαν ἐγγύην ἢ ἣν οὗτος πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἠγγυᾶτο.
οὗτος μὲν γὰρ ἦ μὴν παραμενεῖν·
ὑμεῖς δὲ ἦ μὴν μὴ παραμενεῖν ἐγγυήσασθε ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνω, ἀλλὰ οἰχήσεσθαι (115e) ἀπιόντα,
ἵνα Κρίτων ῥᾷον φέρῃ, καὶ μὴ ὁρῶν μου τὸ σῶμα ἢ καόμενον ἢ κατορυττόμενον ἀγανακτῇ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ ὡς δεινὰ πάσχοντος, μηδὲ λέγῃ ἐν τῇ ταφῇ ὡς ἢ προτίθεται Σωκράτη ἢ ἐκφέρει ἢ κατορύττει.
εὖ γὰρ ἴσθι, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ὦ ἄριστε Κρίτων, τὸ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν οὐ μόνον εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο πλημμελές, ἀλλὰ καὶ κακόν τι ἐμποιεῖ ταῖς ψυχαῖς.
ἀλλὰ θαρρεῖν τε χρὴ καὶ φάναι τοὐμὸν σῶμα θάπτειν, καὶ θάπτειν (116a) οὕτως ὅπως ἄν σοι φίλον ᾖ καὶ μάλιστα ἡγῇ νόμιμον εἶναι.
“Proutcumque” dixit “volueritis, si quidem comprehenderitis me et non effugero vos.”
FEDO. Ridensque pariter quiete et ad nos respiciens dixit:
“Haut persuadeo’ inquit, “O viri, Critona quoniam ego sum hic Socrates qui nunc disputo et digero unumquodque eorum que dicta sunt,
atqui suspicatur me aillum esse quem videbitis paulo posterius mortuum, atque percunctatur quonam modo me sepeliat.
Nam et ego pridem plurimum sermonem feci, quoniam, ex quo bibero farmacum, non iam vos prestolabor, verum deportabor migrans in beatorum quasdam felicitates;
ista michi videor ipsi aliter dicere consolatus quidem vos pariterque me ipsum.
Fideiubete igitur me erga Critona” inquit “contraria fideiussione quam qua iste erga iudices fideiubebat.
Hic enim certe permanere,
vos vero certe non permanere fideiubete ut obiero, immo deportari abeuntem,
quatinus Crito facile ferat et ne conspiciens mei corpus seu crematum seu defossum indignetur pro me quasi gravia paciente, neque dicat in sepultura quoniam aut proponitur Socrates vel effertur sive defoditur.
Bene enim nosti” ait ille, “O optime Crito, quod non bene dicitur, non solum in hoc ipsum delictum, immo eciam malum quid infert animabus.
Verum confidereque oportet et dicere meum corpus sepelire, et sepelire sic quomodocumque tibi amicum fuerit et maxime arbitreris legitimum esse.”
“Vtcunque”, inquit, “libet”, si tamen me apprehendetis, ac nisi (53) ego vos effugero.”
Et simul subridens et ad nos conversus,
“non persuadeo”, inquit Critoni, (519, 1) “me esse hunc Socratem qui nunc disputo et singula dicta dispono.
Sed opinatur me illud (2) esse quod paulo post videbit cadaver. Itaque interrogat quemadmodum me sepeliat.
Quod (3) autem iamdiu plurimis verbis contendo, postquam venenum bibero, haud ulterius apud (4) vos me esse futurum, sed ad beatorum profecturum felicitates,
hoc quidem mihi videor (5) frustra Critoni dixisse consolans vos simul atque meipsum.
Fideiubete igitur pro me Cri(6)toni contraria quadam fideiussione quam ipse iudicibus fideiussit.
Ille enim me iudicio (7) sistere,
vos autem me non sistere cum obiero fideiubere, sed abiturum,
ut Crito obitum fa(8)cilius meum ferat, neve meum corpus vel cremari cernens vel sepeliri, me deploret quasi (9) dira patientem. Neque dicat in funere proponi Socratem aut efferri aut sub terram con(10)di.
Certum id habeto, optime Crito, quod maledictum est non solum in hoc ipso delin(11)quere, verumetiam animis nonnihil officere.
At enim considere oportet atque dicere cor(12)pus sepeliri meum atque ita sepeliri ut tibi placebit, maximeque iustum esse censebis.”
In any way that you like; but you must get hold of me, and take care that I do not run away from you.
Then he turned to us, and added with a smile:
--I cannot make Crito believe that I am the same Socrates who have been talking and conducting the argument;
he fancies that I am the other Socrates whom he will soon see, a dead body--and he asks, How shall he bury me?
And though I have spoken many words in the endeavour to show that when I have drunk the poison I shall leave you and go to the joys of the blessed,
--these words of mine, with which I was comforting you and myself,
have had, as I perceive, no effect upon Crito.
And therefore I want you to be surety for me to him now, as at the trial he was surety to the judges for me:
but let the promise be of another sort;
for he was surety for me to the judges that I would remain, and you must be my surety to him that I shall not remain, but go away and depart;
and then he will suffer less at my death, and not be grieved when he sees my body being burned or buried. I would not have him sorrow at my hard lot, or say at the burial, Thus we lay out Socrates, or, Thus we follow him to the grave or bury him; for false words are not only evil in themselves, but they infect the soul with evil.
Be of good cheer, then, my dear Crito, and say that you are burying my body only, and do with that whatever is usual, and what you think best.
ταῦτ᾽ εἰπὼν ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἀνίστατο εἰς οἴκημά τι ὡς λουσόμενος, καὶ ὁ Κρίτων εἵπετο αὐτῷ, ἡμᾶς δ᾽ ἐκέλευε περιμένειν.
περιεμένομεν οὖν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διαλεγόμενοι περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ἀνασκοποῦντες,
τοτὲ δ᾽ αὖ περὶ τῆς συμφορᾶς διεξιόντες ὅση ἡμῖν γεγονυῖα εἴη,
ἀτεχνῶς ἡγούμενοι ὥσπερ πατρὸς στερηθέντες διάξειν ὀρφανοὶ τὸν ἔπειτα βίον.
ἐπειδὴ (116b) δὲ ἐλούσατο καὶ ἠνέχθη παρ᾽ αὐτὸν τὰ παιδία
--δύο γὰρ αὐτῷ ὑεῖς σμικροὶ ἦσαν, εἷς δὲ μέγας--
καὶ αἱ οἰκεῖαι γυναῖκες ἀφίκοντο ἐκεῖναι, ἐναντίον τοῦ Κρίτωνος διαλεχθείς τε καὶ ἐπιστείλας ἅττα ἐβούλετο, τὰς μὲν γυναῖκας καὶ τὰ παιδία ἀπιέναι ἐκέλευσεν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἧκε παρ᾽ ἡμᾶς.
Hec dicens ille surrexit in habitaculum quoddam ut lavandus et Crito sequebatur eum nosque precepit operiri.
Prestolabamur igitur ad nos ipsos disputantes de eis que dicta sunt et intencionem adhibentes,
tandem iterum de iactura pertractantes quanta nobis facta fuerit,
mirabiliter iudicantes tamquam a patre privati victum ire orphani in deinceps.
Ubi autem lotus est et admissi ad eum pueri
- duo namque filii parvuli erant unusque magnus -
et proprie uxores veniebant, ille, adversus Critona collocutusque et iniungens que volebat, mulieres ac pueros abire precepit ipseque venit versus nos.
His (13) dictis surrexit intravitque cubiculum quoddam quasi lavaturus. Crito autem secutus est. (14) Nos vero exspectare iussit.
Expectabamus ergo de his quae dicta erant inter nos colloquen(15)tes rursusque considerantes.
Praeterea conquerebamur fortunam nostram,
qui tanquam (16) parente orbati reliquum vitae tempus orphani futuri essemus.
Cum Socrates lotus esset, (17) delati sunt ad eum pueri sui.
Duos enim filios habebat parvulos, unum vero iam gran(18)dem.
Venerunt et mulieres domesticae. Ad eas Socrates cum praesente Critone verba fe(19)cisset et quae volebat mandavisset, mulieres quidem et pueros abire iussit, ipse vero ad nos (20) redijt,
When he had spoken these words, he arose and went into a chamber to bathe; Crito followed him and told us to wait.
So we remained behind, talking and thinking of the subject of discourse,
and also of the greatness of our sorrow;
he was like a father of whom we were being bereaved, and we were about to pass the rest of our lives as orphans.
When he had taken the bath his children were brought to him
--(he had two young sons and an elder one);
and the women of his family also came, and he talked to them and gave them a few directions in the presence of Crito; then he dismissed them and returned to us.
καὶ ἦν ἤδη ἐγγὺς ἡλίου δυσμῶν·
χρόνον γὰρ πολὺν διέτριψεν ἔνδον.
ἐλθὼν δ᾽ ἐκαθέζετο λελουμένος καὶ οὐ πολλὰ ἄττα μετὰ ταῦτα διελέχθη,
καὶ ἧκεν ὁ τῶν ἕνδεκα ὑπηρέτης καὶ στὰς (116c) παρ᾽ αὐτόν,
ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, οὐ καταγνώσομαί γε σοῦ ὅπερ ἄλλων καταγιγνώσκω, ὅτι μοι χαλεπαίνουσι καὶ καταρῶνται ἐπειδὰν αὐτοῖς παραγγείλω πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον ἀναγκαζόντων τῶν ἀρχόντων.
σὲ δὲ ἐγὼ καὶ ἄλλως ἔγνωκα ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ γενναιότατον καὶ πρᾳότατον καὶ ἄριστον ἄνδρα ὄντα τῶν πώποτε δεῦρο ἀφικομένων,
καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν εὖ οἶδ᾽ ὅτι οὐκ ἐμοὶ χαλεπαίνεις, γιγνώσκεις γὰρ τοὺς αἰτίους, ἀλλὰ ἐκείνοις.
νῦν οὖν, οἶσθα γὰρ ἃ ἦλθον (116d) ἀγγέλλων, χαῖρέ τε καὶ πειρῶ ὡς ῥᾷστα φέρειν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα.
καὶ ἅμα δακρύσας μεταστρεφόμενος ἀπῄει.
Et erat iam prope solis occasum;
tempus enim multum moratus est intus.
Veniensque sedebat lotus et non multa aliqua post hec disputavit,
et venit undecim minister, et stans iuxta eum:
“O Socrate” inquit, “nequaquam condempnabo te cuius alios condempno, quoniam michi molesti sunt quociens ipsis annuncio bibere farmacum compellentibus principibus.
Te autem ego et aliter cognovi in hoc tempore generasissimumque et mansuetissimus atque optimum virum existentem umquam huc veniencium,
et nunc quidem bene novi quoniam neutiquam michi indignaris - cognoscis enim eos qui causa sunt - immo istis.
Modo - nosti quippe que veni nuncians - vale et experire quam facillime ferre inevitabilia.”
Et simul lacrimatus retroversus abiit.
iam circiter solis occasum,
permultum enim temporis spatium intus fuerat commo(21)ratus.
Cum vero ad nos venisset lotus, consedit. Nec multa post haec locutus erat,
cum ve(22)nit Vndecimvirorum lictor. Qui illi adstans,
“o Socrates”, inquit, “non arbitror eam in te no(23)vitatem me deprehensurum quam deprehendere in caeteris soleo. Illi enim indignantur (24) mihi atque execrantur quando illis denuncio venenum esse bibendum, ita magistratibus (25) compellentibus.
Te vero cognovi praesertim in hoc tempore generosissimum mansue(26)tissimumque et optimum virum omnium qui unquam hunc in locum devenerunt,
et nunc (27) equidem certe scio te mihi haud infestum fore, sed illis penes quos rei huius causam esse (28) cognoscis.
Nunc ego scis quem tibi nuncium afferam. Vale atque annitere quae necessa(29)ria sunt pro viribus facile ferre”,
et simul his dictis abibat lachrymans.
Now the hour of sunset was near,
for a good deal of time had passed while he was within.
When he came out, he sat down with us again after his bath, but not much was said.
Soon the jailer, who was the servant of the Eleven, entered and stood by him, saying:
--To you, Socrates, whom I know to be the noblest and gentlest and best of all who ever came to this place, I will not impute the angry feelings of other men, who rage and swear at me, when, in obedience to the authorities, I bid them drink the poison--
indeed, I am sure that you will not be angry with me; for others, as you are aware, and not I, are to blame.
And so fare you well, and try to bear lightly what must needs be--you know my errand.
Then bursting into tears he turned away and went out.
καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἀναβλέψας πρὸς αὐτόν, καὶ σύ, ἔφη, χαῖρε, καὶ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ποιήσομεν.
καὶ ἅμα πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὡς ἀστεῖος, ἔφη, ὁ ἄνθρωπος·
καὶ παρὰ πάντα μοι τὸν χρόνον προσῄει καὶ διελέγετο ἐνίοτε καὶ ἦν ἀνδρῶν λῷστος, καὶ νῦν ὡς γενναίως με ἀποδακρύει.
ἀλλ᾽ ἄγε δή, ὦ Κρίτων, πειθώμεθα αὐτῷ, καὶ ἐνεγκάτω τις τὸ φάρμακον, εἰ τέτριπται·
εἰ δὲ μή, τριψάτω ὁ ἄνθρωπος.
Atque Socrates respiciens in ipsum “Et tu” inquit “vale et nos hec agemus.”
Et simul ad nos “Quam elegans” inquit “homo;
et per universum tempus michi aderat et disputabat interdum et erat virorum facetissimus, et nunc quam generose me lamentatur.
Immo age, O Crito, persuadeamus ipsi, et afferat quis farmacum, si tritum est;
si vera minime, terat homo.”
Socrates autem in (30) eum respiciens, “et tu”, inquit, “vale, et nos id faciemus.”
Simulque ad nos conversus, “Quam ur(31)banus est homo hic”, inquit.
“Neque solum in hoc, sed in superiori etiam tempore me salu(32)tabat colloquebaturque nonnunquam fuitque semper virorum optimus. Et nunc quam in(33)genue me deplorat?
Sed age, o Crito, illi pareamus, ac si iam tritum est venenum, aliquis (34) huc afferat.
Si nondum est tritum, conterat ille.”
Socrates looked at him and said: I return your good wishes, and will do as you bid.
Then turning to us, he said, How charming the man is:
since I have been in prison he has always been coming to see me, and at times he would talk to me, and was as good to me as could be, and now see how generously he sorrows on my account.
We must do as he says, Crito; and therefore let the cup be brought, if the poison is prepared:
if not, let the attendant prepare some.
(116e) καὶ ὁ Κρίτων, ἀλλ᾽ οἶμαι, ἔφη, ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔτι ἥλιον εἶναι ἐπὶ τοῖς ὄρεσιν καὶ οὔπω δεδυκέναι.
καὶ ἅμα ἐγὼ οἶδα καὶ ἄλλους πάνυ ὀψὲ πίνοντας, ἐπειδὰν παραγγελθῇ αὐτοῖς,
δειπνήσαντάς τε καὶ πιόντας εὖ μάλα, καὶ συγγενομένους γ᾽ ἐνίους ὧν ἂν τύχωσιν ἐπιθυμοῦντες.
ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ἐπείγου· ἔτι γὰρ ἐγχωρεῖ.
“At reor” infit “ego quidem, O Socrate, adhuc solem esse super montes necdum introiisse.
Et pariter ego vidi et multos omnino sero bibentes, ubi nunciatum est illis,
cenantesque et bibentes bene valde, et assistentes aliquos quorum fuerunt desiderabiles.
Verum nequaquam insta; adhuc enim licet.”
“At reor equidem,” inquit Crito, “o Socrates, (35) nondum solem reliquisse montes nec occidisse.
Et novi alios postquam id sibi nunciatum (36) est valde sero bibere illud consuevisse,
largiter coenatos atque potos, interdum vero etiam il(37)lorum potitos quorum amore afficiebantur.
Quamobrem ne adeo festines, adhuc enim su(38)perest tempus.”
Yet, said Crito, the sun is still upon the hill-tops,
and I know that many a one has taken the draught late, and after the announcement has been made to him,
he has eaten and drunk, and enjoyed the society of his beloved;
do not hurry--there is time enough.
καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰκότως γε, ἔφη, ὦ Κρίτων, ἐκεῖνοί τε ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν, οὓς σὺ λέγεις
--οἴονται γὰρ κερδαίνειν ταῦτα ποιήσαντες--
καὶ ἔγωγε ταῦτα εἰκότως οὐ ποιήσω·
οὐδὲν γὰρ (117a) οἶμαι κερδανεῖν ὀλίγον ὕστερον πιὼν
ἄλλο γε ἢ γέλωτα ὀφλήσειν παρ᾽ ἐμαυτῷ, γλιχόμενος τοῦ ζῆν καὶ φειδόμενος οὐδενὸς ἔτι ἐνόντος.
ἀλλ᾽ ἴθι, ἔφη, πείθου καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποίει.
“Convenienter quoque” inquit, “O Crito, illi hec faciunt quos tu dicis
- existimant enim lucrari hec agentes,-
et ego quidem ista convenienter non agam;
nichil quippe reor lucri facere paulo posterius migrans,
aliud quidem quam risum debere apud me ipsum, gliscens vivere et parcens nulli amplius superstanti.
Sed i” inquit, “persuade neque aliter facias.”
Tunc Socrates, “merito,” inquit, “o Crito, illi ista faciunt.
Putant enim haec faci(39)entes lucrari.
Atque ego merito ista non faciam.
Nihil enim me lucraturum spero si paulo po(40)sterius venenum bibero,
nisi ut mihi ipsi sim ridiculus tanquam vitae cupidus atque parcus (41) eius rei servator, cuius nihil iam amplius mihi adest.
Sed age iam mihi obtempera, nec ali(42)ter facias.”
Socrates said: Yes, Crito, and they of whom you speak are right in so acting,
for they think that they will be gainers by the delay;
but I am right in not following their example,
for I do not think that I should gain anything by drinking the poison a little later;
I should only be ridiculous in my own eyes for sparing and saving a life which is already forfeit.
Please then to do as I say, and not to refuse me.
καὶ ὁ Κρίτων ἀκούσας ἔνευσε τῷ παιδὶ πλησίον ἑστῶτι.
καὶ ὁ παῖς ἐξελθὼν καὶ συχνὸν χρόνον διατρίψας ἧκεν ἄγων τὸν μέλλοντα δώσειν τὸ φάρμακον, ἐν κύλικι φέροντα τετριμμένον.
ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης τὸν ἄνθρωπον, εἶεν, ἔφη, ὦ βέλτιστε, σὺ γὰρ τούτων ἐπιστήμων, τί χρὴ ποιεῖν;
Et Crito audiens innuit puero prope stanti;
atque puer egrediens et continuo tempore intus moratus venit ducens eum qui debuit dare farmacum, in calice ferentem tritum.
Intuitusque Socrates hominem: “Esto” inquit, “O potissime; tu enim horum gnarus dic quid oportet facere.”
Crito vero his auditis annuit puero, qui longe non aberat.
Ille vero egressus et ali(43)quantulum commoratus redijt, eum qui venenum daturus erat secum ducens. Attulit autem (44) in calice id attritum.
Hunc aspiciens Socrates, “Cedo,” inquit, “bone vir, tu enim harum rerum (45) peritiam habes, quid me facere oportet?”
Crito made a sign to the servant, who was standing by;
and he went out, and having been absent for some time, returned with the jailer carrying the cup of poison.
Socrates said: You, my good friend, who are experienced in these matters, shall give me directions how I am to proceed.
καὶ ἅμα ὤρεξε τὴν κύλικα τῷ Σωκράτει.
καὶ ὃς λαβὼν καὶ μάλα ἵλεως, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, οὐδὲν τρέσας οὐδὲ διαφθείρας οὔτε τοῦ χρώματος οὔτε τοῦ προσώπου, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ εἰώθει ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλέψας πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον,
τί λέγεις, ἔφη, περὶ τοῦδε τοῦ πώματος πρὸς τὸ ἀποσπεῖσαί τινι;
ἔξεστιν ἢ οὔ;
Et una porrexit calicem Socrati.
Et ille recipiens et valde propicius, O Echecrate, nichil tremens neque vicians neque corporis neque coloris neque vultus, immo velut consueverat tauratim respiciens in hominem
“Quid ais” inquit “de hoc poculo ad hauriendum alicui?
Sufficit necne?”
Haec dicens porrexit (47) calicem Socrati.
Socrates vero hilariter admodum, o Echecrates, accepit, nihil omnino com(48)motus neque colore neque vultu mutato. Sed quemadmodum consueverat taurine illum aspi(49)ciens,
“quid ais?” inquit. “Licetne ex hoc poculo nonnihil spargendo sacrificare?”
[see previous]
At the same time he handed the cup to Socrates,
who in the easiest and gentlest manner, without the least fear or change of colour or feature, looking at the man with all his eyes, Echecrates, as his manner was, took the cup and said:
What do you say about making a libation out of this cup to any god?
May I, or not?
(117c) μανθάνω, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς·
ἀλλ᾽ εὔχεσθαί γέ που τοῖς θεοῖς ἔξεστί τε καὶ χρή, τὴν μετοίκησιν τὴν ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε εὐτυχῆ γενέσθαι·
ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ εὔχομαί τε καὶ γένοιτο ταύτῃ.
καὶ ἅμ᾽ εἰπὼν ταῦτα ἐπισχόμενος καὶ μάλα εὐχερῶς καὶ εὐκόλως ἐξέπιεν.
καὶ ἡμῶν οἱ πολλοὶ τέως μὲν ἐπιεικῶς οἷοί τε ἦσαν κατέχειν τὸ μὴ δακρύειν,
ὡς δὲ εἴδομεν πίνοντά τε καὶ πεπωκότα, οὐκέτι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐμοῦ γε βίᾳ καὶ αὐτοῦ ἀστακτὶ ἐχώρει τὰ δάκρυα,
ὥστε ἐγκαλυψάμενος ἀπέκλαον ἐμαυτόν--οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐκεῖνόν γε, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ τύχην, οἵου ἀνδρὸς (117d) ἑταίρου ἐστερημένος εἴην.
ὁ δὲ Κρίτων ἔτι πρότερος ἐμοῦ, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ οἷός τ᾽ ἦν κατέχειν τὰ δάκρυα, ἐξανέστη.
Ἀπολλόδωρος δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ οὐδὲν ἐπαύετο δακρύων, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε ἀναβρυχησάμενος κλάων καὶ ἀγανακτῶν οὐδένα ὅντινα οὐ κατέκλασε τῶν παρόντων πλήν γε αὐτοῦ Σωκράτους.
ἐκεῖνος δέ, --οἷα, ἔφη, ποιεῖτε, ὦ θαυμάσιοι.
ἐγὼ μέντοι οὐχ ἥκιστα τούτου ἕνεκα τὰς γυναῖκας ἀπέπεμψα, ἵνα μὴ (117e) τοιαῦτα πλημμελοῖεν·
καὶ γὰρ ἀκήκοα ὅτι ἐν εὐφημίᾳ χρὴ τελευτᾶν.
ἀλλ᾽ ἡσυχίαν τε ἄγετε καὶ καρτερεῖτε.
“Disco” inquit ille;
“verum orare deos licet expeditque et decet transmigracionem istinc quidem istuc fortunatam fieri;
que quidem et ego ora et fiat ita.”
Et pariter dicens ista sustinens valde hilariter et facile ebibit.
Et nostrum plurimi tam mansuete potentes erant tenere ut non lacrimarentur;
ut vera vidimus bibentemque et lapsum nondum, verum ego quidem ipse vim et violenciam michi inferens sine lacrimarum eciam stilla permansi,
qua de re velatus deflebam me ipsum, non enim illum, atqui mei ipsius casum, quali viro privatus fuerim.
Ceterum Crito iam prior me, quoniam impos erat tenere lacrimas, exsurrexit.
Apollodorus vera in priori tempore non quiescebat lacrimari, et utique tunc rugiens flens et indignans nullum quempiam non deflevit presencium preter ipsum Socratem.
Ille autem “Que” inquit “agitis, O mirabiles?
Ego siquidem non incassum huius causa mulieres hinc dimisi, neve talia delinquerent;
et enim e audivi quoniam in bona voce decet defungi;
verum silencium agite et sustinete.’
“Intelligo”, inquit.
“Sed et licet et (51) oportet orare deos ut felix sit transmigratio nostra.
Quod equidem obsecro, atque utinam (52) ita fiat.”
Et simul his dictis admovens facile admodum alacriterque ebibit.
Plerique nostrum eo (53) usque retinere quodammodo lachrymas potueramus.
At postquam et bibentem vidimus (521, 1) et bibisse, ulterius non potuimus, sed me quidem dolor adeo superabat ut lachrymae largi(2)ter iam mihi profluerent.
Quapropter me protegens deplorabam non illum quidem, sed (3) fortunam meam, qui tali amico orbatus essem.
Crito autem etiam prius cum lachrymas ne(4)quiret continere, surrexerat.
Sed Apollodorus nec in superiori quidem tempore unquam (5) lachrymare cessaverat. Tunc vero praecipue vociferans seque ipsum afflictans neminem re(6)liquit praesentium, cuius vicem non deploraret praeter unius Socratis vicem.
Ille vero haec (7) animadvertens, “Quidnam,” inquit, “o viri mirabiles, agitis?
Atqui ego maxime hanc ob cau(8)sam mulieres abegeram ne talia facerent.
Audiveram enim cum gratulatione et applausum esse (9) ex hac vita migrandum.
Quiescite igitur atque tolerate.”
I understand, he said:
but I may and must ask the gods to prosper my journey from this to the other world
--even so--and so be it according to my prayer.
Then raising the cup to his lips, quite readily and cheerfully he drank off the poison.
And hitherto most of us had been able to control our sorrow;
but now when we saw him drinking, and saw too that he had finished the draught, we could no longer forbear, and in spite of myself my own tears were flowing fast;
so that I covered my face and wept, not for him, but at the thought of my own calamity in having to part from such a friend.
Nor was I the first; for Crito, when he found himself unable to restrain his tears, had got up, and I followed;
and at that moment, Apollodorus, who had been weeping all the time, broke out in a loud and passionate cry which made cowards of us all. Socrates alone retained his calmness:
What is this strange outcry? he said.
I sent away the women mainly in order that they might not misbehave in this way,
for I have been told that a man should die in peace.
Be quiet, then, and have patience.
καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀκούσαντες ᾐσχύνθημέν τε καὶ ἐπέσχομεν τοῦ δακρύειν.
ὁ δὲ περιελθών, ἐπειδή οἱ βαρύνεσθαι ἔφη τὰ σκέλη, κατεκλίνη ὕπτιος
--οὕτω γὰρ ἐκέλευεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος--
καὶ ἅμα ἐφαπτόμενος αὐτοῦ οὗτος ὁ δοὺς τὸ φάρμακον,
διαλιπὼν χρόνον ἐπεσκόπει τοὺς πόδας καὶ τὰ σκέλη, κἄπειτα σφόδρα πιέσας αὐτοῦ τὸν πόδα ἤρετο εἰ αἰσθάνοιτο, (118a) ὁ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔφη.
καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὖθις τὰς κνήμας· καὶ ἐπανιὼν οὕτως ἡμῖν ἐπεδείκνυτο ὅτι ψύχοιτό τε καὶ πήγνυτο.
καὶ αὐτὸς ἥπτετο καὶ εἶπεν ὅτι, ἐπειδὰν πρὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ γένηται αὐτῷ, τότε οἰχήσεται.
Et nos audientes erubuimus quoque et continuimus a lacrimatu.
Hic veto deambulans, quia sibi gravari dixit crura, reclinatus est supinus
- sic enim preceperat homo;-
et simul tangens ipsum is qui dedit farmacum,
intermittens tempus consideravit pedes et crura, et deinde valde apprehendens ipsius pedes interrogabat utrum sentiret; hic vero “Minime” inquit;
et post hoc iterum tibias; et ascendens ita nobis ipsis ostendebat quoniam algebatque et congelabatur,
et ipse tangebat et dicebat: “Ex quo in corde fiet sibi, tunc asportabitur.”
Nos vero haec audientes erubui(10)mus destitimusque a lachrymis.
Sed ipse cum inter deambulandum crura iam gravari sen(11)tiret, iacuit resupinus
– sic enim qui venenum praebuit iusserat.
Qui paulo post eum tan(12)gens
pedes et crura consideravit. Deinde gravius conprimens pedem eius, quasivit an senti(13)ret. Negavit Socrates.
Ille rursus pressit tibias paulatimque manu ascendens ostendit nobis (14) frigere eas atque rigere.
Et ipse attigit rursus aitque "cum ad cor pervenerit, tunc esse decessu(15)rum."
When we heard his words we were ashamed, and refrained our tears;
and he walked about until, as he said, his legs began to fail, and then he lay on his back,
according to the directions,
and the man who gave him the poison now and then looked at his feet and legs;
and after a while he pressed his foot hard, and asked him if he could feel; and he said, No;
and then his leg, and so upwards and upwards, and showed us that he was cold and stiff.
And he felt them himself, and said: When the poison reaches the heart, that will be the end.
ἥδε ἡ τελευτή, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, τοῦ ἑταίρου ἡμῖν ἐγένετο, ἀνδρός, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαῖμεν ἄν, τῶν τότε ὧν ἐπειράθημεν ἀρίστου καὶ ἄλλως φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιοτάτου.
Hic vero finis, O Echecrate, amici nobis fuit, viri, ut nos asserimus, eorum qui tunc quorum experienciam habuimus optimi et aliter prudentissimi atque iustissimi.
Hic fi(20)nis fuit amici nostri, o Echecrates, viri nostro quidem iudicio, omnium quos expertisu(21)mus optimi et apprime sapientissimi atque iustissimi.
Such was the end, Echecrates, of our friend; concerning whom I may truly say, that of all the men of his time whom I have known, he was the wisest and justest and best.
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