Bibliotheca Polyglotta

Plato: Meno

Complete text

Πλάτωνος Μένων

PROLOGUS INTERPRETIS

Ut pictura poesis: erit que si propius stes
Te capiat magis, et quedam si longius abstes.

Platonicis ergo propius assistas scriptis, ut te magis ac magis ritu suo capiant et oblectent. Quis enim tui similium ignorat, quis scripturarum frequenti lectione fretus hesitat, quis prophetici dogmatis ambigit perscrutator, quam alta, quam perinscrutabilia, quanta subnixa firmitudine Platonis sensa et sententie consistant, qui Atticorum illustravit mores et sapientiam, qui Academicam instituit philosophiam, qui Sicule mansuefecit aule tyrannidem, a quo Aristotelica subtilitas est derivata, a quo tam Peripatus quam Licium exordium sumpsit philosophandi? Hec ergo quanto magis appropinquaveris, tanto magis admiraberis. Singula quippe verba suas ostendent questiones. Quodsi unam solveris, Ydre capita surgentia formidabis. Unicus namque hic in ethicis, singularis in theologicis, universos sermones morum condit dulcedine, divinitatis vallat et soliditate, diversis principiis inchoatos uno fine cunctos concludit tractatus. Omnia nimirum refert ad superum numina, quasi ab eis cuncta processisse crediderit. Accedas itaque, dilecte ac venerande, et Platonice nardi gustes odorem reficereque ac tante replearis flagrantie suavitate atque Menonem Platonis ea recipias devotione, qua et a te postulatus et a me datus esse cognoscitur. In quo transferendo magis dictionum idiomati deservivi, ne de proprii confisus parvitate ingenii alienos intruderem sensus; unde et agrestioris forsan et minus compte videbitur orationis in Latiari. Transfusis siquidem in varia vasa poculis gustus acerbior.

Aliquem tibi sane transferri Platonicorum dialogorum petenti Menonem potius interpretatus sum. Virtutis nimirum alumno sermo de virtute et magis competere et magis gratus esse credebatur. Cuius intuitus, cuius actus virtutis vigor, cuius opera virtute virent, cuius sermones virtutem redolent, huic quid virtute gratius videretur? Quanta igitur virtute hic de virtute disputet Plato, tue virtus scientie non ignorabit, ubi lectum et relectum presens opusculum virtute firmaveris memorie. In quo te quantis pretulerim precibus, te latere nolim. Iussu namque domini mei, gloriosissimi Siculorum regis Guilelmi, Gregorii Nazanzeni opuscula translaturus eram, qui eodem numero quo et Atheniensis Plato dictavit sermones. Rogatus item a Maione magno Sicilie admirabili atque ab Hugone Epanormitane sedis archipontifice Laertium Diogenem De vita et conversatione dogmateque philosophorum in Ytalicas transvertere sillabas parabam. Quibus ad tempus postpositis tuo potius acquievi consilio. In quo manifestius ostenditur quam diligenter amicorum votis obeditur, propter quos nonnunquam dominorum iussum preteritur. Promptius enim agitur quidquid ex animo venit.

MENO DIALOGUS

ARGUMENTUM MARSILII IN MENONEM DE VIRTUTE.

Quatuor esse argumentationum genera, quibus Plato utitur, exemplum, inductionem, ratiocinationem, et enthymema, et quo pacto fiant, satis in Alcino compendio, quod et nos traduximus, declaratur. Ubi etiam tres Platonicorum dialogurum species inveniemus, et quibus argumentationibus in unaquaque dialogi specie uti soleat. Aut enim solum inquirit, falsave confutat dialogus, aut solum vera exponit ac docet, aut in utroque versatur.Primus inquisituus et contetiosus. Expositiuus alter. Postremus mixtus est dictus. Meno autem licet mixtus sit, maiori tamen ex parte contendit et confutat, et omnes argumentationes attingit. Ut nisi quis ex aliis Platonis dialogis, qui ad epositionem magis quam ad disceptationem pertinent, sensa colligat, et Menoni huic adiiciat, difficile summam disputationis huius elicere possit. est auteem hæc, quid virtus sit, et quomodo nobis adsit, inquirere. Id Socrates efficit, dum quatuor Menonis, Aristippi, Gorgiæ, et Prodici de virtute definitiones confutat, et definitionem suam post illas inductam geminis obiectionibus retractat. Veritas quippe ex redargutione falsitas elucet. Est autem hominis virtus awffection sive habitus animæ, quo potentia naturalis eius quam optime suum opus exercet. quæ definition in libirs de Republice traditur. OPus cuiusque potentiæ tunc optime exercetur, cum ad finem suum dirigitur. Quod ad finem sonsert, utile dicitur. Merito igitur in hac disputatione commune virtutis officium id esse traditur, ut et actiones et ea quibus agendo utimur, utilia reddat. Illa itaque definition huic dialogo consonat, cunctisque virtutibus est communuis. Virtutum profecto species plures sunt, pro virium animæ et actuum diversitate, in quibus una tamen quæ dicta est communis virtutis ration semper inspicitur. Prima vis animæ mens est, cuius actus est perpetua contemplation veritatis. Secunda ratio, cuius actus veritatis investigation. Tertia phantasia, cuius actus collectio eorum quæ sensus eius nuncii porrigunt, perque illa discursus. Atque hæ sunt vires animæ, quæ cognitivæ dicuntur. Restant tres aliæ, quaæ appetitivuas vocant: Voluntas, et irascendi vis, et concupiscendi. Voluntatis actus, appetere quæ mens et ratio porrigit. Irascibilis, aggrendi quæ ratio et phantasia proponit. Concupisibilis actus, adsciscere quæ phantasia sensusque obiiciunt. Sex insuper istis duæ subiiciuntur, movendi et nutriendi vigor. sed hæ cum superioribus, aut nihil, aut vix, et parum admodum in virtute communicant. Affection mentis que contemplationem perficit, sapien(14)tia est; quæ quæ rationis indaginem, scinetia, atque prudentia. Scinetia idem adagationem corum quæ natura fecit, prudentia consulattionem in iis quæ nos agimus. Quæ phantasiæ discursum opinio recta, quam sagacitatem qui dum vocant. Iustitia voluntatem et liberalitas. Irascibilem fortitudo eiusque pesdissequæ. Concupiscibilem continentia simul et temperantia. His Omnibus id est commune, ut quælibet earum sit affetio actum potentiæ naturalis perficiens, dum decorum reddit et utilem ad finem ultimum consequendum. Variæ vero virtutes diverso modo habentur. Sapientia quidem natura; est enim æterna rationum omnium in mente complexio, perpetuusque veritatis intuitus. Scientia per doctrinam philosophiæ quæ reminiscentiam præstat, acqueritur, dum ratio quæ pennæ olim abiecit ad mentem conversa reminiscendo iterum alas recuperat. Prudentia doctrina simul et longo usu rerum advenit. Recta opinio exemplis, autoritate, inductione forte. Iustitia fortitudoque, et temperantia, cæteræque morales virtutes prudentiæ rectæque, opinionis legibus et exercitatione legitima perficiuntur. Unde duo hæc moralium virtutum principia Plato posuit, prudentiam et rectam opinionem. Quamobrem prudentia sæpenumero totius moralis virtutis apud Platonem nomen usurpat. Est et virtus quædam ad rectam opinionem attinens, qua legitimi principes ac cives, in agendo honesti, contemplationis tamen expertes bonum publicum curant, quam civilem peritiam nominant. Eamque Plato facultatem, et in Theage, et in præsenti Menone, haud aliter quam forte divina, dari civilibus hominibus disputat. Hac igitur summula quis mentem Platonis in Menone colliget, et huiusmodi præmissa distinctione contradictiones renuet, obiectionesque vitabit. Disputationem vero illam de remini scientia geometricisque figuris in argumento tractare idcirco non placuit, quaniam non ut principicalis, sed ut accessoria est inferta. Argumentum autem summam rei caputque requirit. Singual quippe discutere non argumenti, sed commentarii potius est officium.

MENO VEL DE VIRTUTE
MENO, SOCRATES, PUER, ANYTUS

MENO translated by Benjamin Jowett, 1892
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE:
Meno, Socrates, A Slave of Meno (Boy), Anytus.

(70a) Μένων
ἔχεις μοι εἰπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἆρα διδακτὸν ἡ ἀρετή; ἢ οὐ διδακτὸν ἀλλ᾽ ἀσκητόν; ἢ οὔτε ἀσκητὸν οὔτε μαθητόν, ἀλλὰ φύσει παραγίγνεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἢ ἄλλῳ τινὶ τρόπῳ;

MENON. Habes michi dicere, o Socrates, utrum docibile virtus? Seu non docibile, verum usu et conversatione comparabile? Sive neque usu et conversatione comparabile, ceterum natura inest hominibus sive alio aliquo modo?

Potes ne mihi ostendere Socrates, doceri virtus possit necne, an exercitatione potius acquiratur? Aut non fortasse nec doctina, nec usu hominibus comparetur, sed ipsa natura, vel alio quopiam modo homninibus insit?

MENO: Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue is acquired by teaching or by practice; or if neither by teaching nor by practice, then whether it comes to man by nature, or in what other way?

Σωκράτης
ὦ Μένων, πρὸ τοῦ μὲν Θετταλοὶ εὐδόκιμοι ἦσαν ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν καὶ ἐθαυμάζοντο ἐφ᾽ ἱππικῇ τε καὶ πλούτῳ, (70b) νῦν δέ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα οἱ τοῦ σοῦ ἑταίρου Ἀριστίππου πολῖται Λαρισαῖοι. τούτου δὲ ὑμῖν αἴτιός ἐστι Γοργίας: ἀφικόμενος γὰρ εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἐραστὰς ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ εἴληφεν Ἀλευαδῶν τε τοὺς πρώτους, ὧν ὁ σὸς ἐραστής ἐστιν Ἀρίστιππος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Θετταλῶν. καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἔθος ὑμᾶς εἴθικεν, ἀφόβως τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἐάν τίς τι ἔρηται, ὥσπερ εἰκὸς τοὺς (70c) εἰδότας, ἅτε καὶ αὐτὸς παρέχων αὑτὸν ἐρωτᾶν τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῷ βουλομένῳ ὅτι ἄν τις βούληται, καὶ οὐδενὶ ὅτῳ οὐκ ἀποκρινόμενος. ἐνθάδε δέ, ὦ φίλε Μένων, τὸ ἐναντίον περιέστηκεν: ὥσπερ αὐχμός τις τῆς σοφίας γέγονεν, καὶ κινδυνεύει (71a) ἐκ τῶνδε τῶν τόπων παρ᾽ ὑμᾶς οἴχεσθαι ἡ σοφία. εἰ γοῦν τινα ἐθέλεις οὕτως ἐρέσθαι τῶν ἐνθάδε, οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐ γελάσεται καὶ ἐρεῖ: ‘ὦ ξένε, κινδυνεύω σοι δοκεῖν μακάριός τις εἶναι—ἀρετὴν γοῦν εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴθ᾽ ὅτῳ τρόπῳ παραγίγνεται εἰδέναι—ἐγὼ δὲ τοσοῦτον δέω εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε μὴ διδακτὸν εἰδέναι, ὥστ᾽ οὐδὲ αὐτὸ ὅτι ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ παράπαν ἀρετὴ τυγχάνω εἰδώς.’ (71b) ἐγὼ οὖν καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Μένων, οὕτως ἔχω: συμπένομαι τοῖς πολίταις τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, καὶ ἐμαυτὸν καταμέμφομαι ὡς οὐκ εἰδὼς περὶ ἀρετῆς τὸ παράπαν: ὃ δὲ μὴ οἶδα τί ἐστιν, πῶς ἂν ὁποῖόν γέ τι εἰδείην; ἢ δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τε εἶναι, ὅστις Μένωνα μὴ γιγνώσκει τὸ παράπαν ὅστις ἐστίν, τοῦτον εἰδέναι εἴτε καλὸς εἴτε πλούσιος εἴτε καὶ γενναῖός ἐστιν, εἴτε καὶ τἀναντία τούτων; δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι;

SOCRATES. O Menon, hactenus quidem Tessali laudabiles erant inter Grecos et ammirandi effecti sunt in re equestri et divitiis, nunc autem, ut michi videtur, etiam in sapientia, et non nullatenus tui amatoris Aristippi cives Larissei. Huius rei uti que vobis causa est Gorgias; veniens siquidem in urbem amatores in sapientia sumpsit Aleuandorum quoque primos, de quibus tuus amator est Aristippus, necnon aliorum Tessalorum. Quin etiam et hanc consuetudinem vos rite habere instituit, intrepide et magnificenter respondere, si quis quid percunctetur, vel ut convenit scientes; quemadmodum et ipse exhibens se rogare Grecorum volenti quidquid quis velit, et nemini cui non respondens. Hic profecto, o dilecte Menon, econtra conversatus est; tamquam caligo quedam sapientie factus est; atque laborat ex hiis equidem locis ad vos transferri sapientia. Si ergo quempiam velis interrogare eorum qui penes nos, nullus qui non rideat et dicat: “O peregrine, laboro tibi videri beatus quis esse; virtus igitur sive docibile sive quocumque modo inest, scire - hactenus indigeo sive docibile sive non docibile nosse, ut neque ipsum hoc, quod unquam prorsus virtus est, norim.” Egoque ipse, o Menon, sic me habeo. Conindigeo civibus hac re, et meipsum redarguo quasi nescius de virtute universaliter. Qui autem non novi quid sit, quomodo utique quale quid sit sciam? Videtur tibi possibile esse, qui Menona non novit universaliter quis est, hunc scire sive bonus sive dives sive etiam generosus est, vel etiam contraria horum? Videtur tibi possibile esse?

SO. Hactenus o Meno Thessalici homines inter græcos illustres, tum equestri facultate, tum etiam divitiis habiti sunt. Nunc autem, ut mihi videtur, sapientiæ quoque gloriam consequentur, præsertim amici tui Aristippi Larissæi concives. Atque eius quidem rei autor vobis Gorgias extitit, qui in urbem vestram profectus amicos sibi ob sapientiam comparavit cum reliquos Thessalicorum optimates, tum maxime Alevandrum familiam, ex qua amicus tuus Aristippus originem ducit. Quamobrem sic vos Gorgias assuefecit, ut intrepide et alto animo interrogantibus respondeatis, quemadmodum scientes decet. quippe et ipse concedebat Græcorum cuique rogare quicquid quisque vellet, ac singulis etiam respondebat. Nobis vero o amice Meno contrarium contingit: siquidem sapientia nostra quoddammodo iam exaruit, atque ex iis locis ad vos divertisse videtur. Itaque si quemnostrorum hominum hoc pacto perconteris, nemo erit qui non rideat. O hospes forte tibi beatus quidam videor, quem nosse existimas, utrum doctrina, an alia quadam ratione virtus hominibus comparetur. Ego vero usqueadeo ab hac cogitione absum, ut nec quid ipsa sit virtus intelligam. Atque ipse quoque o Meno sic affectus sum; in eadem quippe paupertate animi qua et concives mei, versor, ac meipsum sępe accuso, utpote quid sit virtus penitus ignorans. Cum vero quid sit nesciam, quonam pacto qualis sit norim? Num tibi fieri posse videtur, ut qui nullo modo quis Meno sit norit, utrum bonus, dives, generosus, ancontra sit norit?

SOCRATES: O Meno, there was a time when the Thessalians were famous among the other Hellenes only for their riches and their riding; but now, if I am not mistaken, they are equally famous for their wisdom, especially at Larisa, which is the native city of your friend Aristippus. And this is Gorgias’ doing; for when he came there, the flower of the Aleuadae, among them your admirer Aristippus, and the other chiefs of the Thessalians, fell in love with his wisdom. And he has taught you the habit of answering questions in a grand and bold style, which becomes those who know, and is the style in which he himself answers all comers; and any Hellene who likes may ask him anything. How different is our lot! my dear Meno. Here at Athens there is a dearth of the commodity, and all wisdom seems to have emigrated from us to you. I am certain that if you were to ask any Athenian whether virtue was natural or acquired, he would laugh in your face, and say: ‘Stranger, you have far too good an opinion of me, if you think that I can answer your question. For I literally do not know what virtue is, and much less whether it is acquired by teaching or not.’ And I myself, Meno, living as I do in this region of poverty, am as poor as the rest of the world; and I confess with shame that I know literally nothing about virtue; and when I do not know the ‘quid’ of anything how can I know the ‘quale’? How, if I knew nothing at all of Meno, could I tell if he was fair, or the opposite of fair; rich and noble, or the reverse of rich and noble? Do you think that I could?

Μένων
οὐκ ἔμοιγε. ἀλλὰ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀληθῶς (71c) οὐδ᾽ ὅτι ἀρετή ἐστιν οἶσθα, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα περὶ σοῦ καὶ οἴκαδε ἀπαγγέλλωμεν;

MENON. Minime michi quidem; sed tu, o Socrates, vere neque quia virtus est scisti, verum hec de te domi nuntiabimus?

ME. Mihi quidem nequaquam. At vero ipse revera o Socrates, quid sit virtus ignoras. Ista de te domi renunciabimus?

MENO: No, indeed. But are you in earnest, Socrates, in saying that you do not know what virtue is? And am I to carry back this report of you to Thessaly?

Σωκράτης
μὴ μόνον γε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι οὐδ᾽ ἄλλῳ πω ἐνέτυχον εἰδότι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ.

SOCRATES. Non solum, o dilecte, ceterum et quoniam neque alium aliquem conveni scientem, velut michi videor.

SO. Non id quæso solum Meno domi dices, verum etiam quod nullum unquam, ut mihi quidem videtur, isthuc scientem nactus sim.

SOCRATES: Not only that, my dear boy, but you may say further that I have never known of any one else who did, in my judgment.

Μένων
τί δέ; Γοργίᾳ οὐκ ἐνέτυχες ὅτε ἐνθάδε ἦν;

MENON. Quid utique? Gorgiam haud convenisti, cum hic esset?

ME. Nunquam ne igitur Gorgiam cum hic commoraretur convenisti?

MENO: Then you have never met Gorgias when he was at Athens?

Σωκράτης
ἔγωγε.

SOCRATES. Ego sane.

SO. Equidem.

SOCRATES: Yes, I have.

Μένων
εἶτα οὐκ ἐδόκει σοι εἰδέναι;

MENON. Deinceps nequaquam visus est tibi nosse?

ME. An hæc ignorare tibi visus est?

MENO: And did you not think that he knew?

Σωκράτης
οὐ πάνυ εἰμὶ μνήμων, ὦ Μένων, ὥστε οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν ἐν τῷ παρόντι πῶς μοι τότε ἔδοξεν. ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως ἐκεῖνός τε οἶδε, καὶ σὺ ἃ ἐκεῖνος ἔλεγε: ἀνάμνησον οὖν (71d) με πῶς ἔλεγεν. εἰ δὲ βούλει, αὐτὸς εἰπέ: δοκεῖ γὰρ δήπου σοὶ ἅπερ ἐκείνῳ.

SOCRATES. Haud omnino sum memor, o Menon; qua de re minime habeo dicere in presenti, quo pacto michi tunc visum est. Atqui fors ille quidem novit, et tu que ille asseruit. Recordare itaque michi quid astruebat. Quodsi volueris, ipse dic; videntur quippe tibi que illi.

SO. Haud satis o Meno memini, ideoque quid tum mihi visum fuerit, in præsentia referre nequeo. Sed forte et ille novit, et tu quid ille docuerit, tenes; quare si placet, ipse dicas. Nam tibi forsitan cum illo convenit.

SOCRATES: I have not a good memory, Meno, and therefore I cannot now tell what I thought of him at the time. And I dare say that he did know, and that you know what he said: please, therefore, to remind me of what he said; or, if you would rather, tell me your own view; for I suspect that you and he think much alike.

Μένων
ἔμοιγε.

MENON. Michi profecto.

ME. Convenit equidem.

MENO: Very true.

Σωκράτης
ἐκεῖνον μὲν τοίνυν ἐῶμεν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἄπεστιν: σὺ δὲ αὐτός, ὦ πρὸς θεῶν, Μένων, τί φῂς ἀρετὴν εἶναι; εἶπον καὶ μὴ φθονήσῃς, ἵνα εὐτυχέστατον ψεῦσμα ἐψευσμένος ὦ, ἂν φανῇς σὺ μὲν εἰδὼς καὶ Γοργίας, ἐγὼ δὲ εἰρηκὼς μηδενὶ πώποτε εἰδότι ἐντετυχηκέναι.

SOCRATES. Illum certe sinamus, quoniam et abest. Tu vero ipse, o pro diis, Menon, quid ais virtutem esse? Dicito et ne invideas, quatenus fortunatissimum mendacium mentitus fuerim, si videaris tu quidem scius atque Gorgias, ego dixerim nullum umquam scientem convenisse.

SO. Eum igitur cum absit, omittamus. ipse vero o Meno, dic per deos obsecro quid esse virtutem existimes; dic inquam, nec invideas, ut fortunati cuiusdam mendacii redarguar, siquidem tu et Gorgias id nosse videamini, ego vero nemini unquam hoc scienti occurrisse dicam.

SOCRATES: Then as he is not here, never mind him, and do you tell me: By the gods, Meno, be generous, and tell me what you say that virtue is; for I shall be truly delighted to find that I have been mistaken, and that you and Gorgias do really have this knowledge; although I have been just saying that I have never found anybody who had.

(71e) Μένων
ἀλλ᾽ οὐ χαλεπόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπεῖν. πρῶτον μέν, εἰ βούλει ἀνδρὸς ἀρετήν, ῥᾴδιον, ὅτι αὕτη ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς ἀρετή, ἱκανὸν εἶναι τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν, καὶ πράττοντα τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δ᾽ ἐχθροὺς κακῶς, καὶ αὐτὸν εὐλαβεῖσθαι μηδὲν τοιοῦτον παθεῖν. εἰ δὲ βούλει γυναικὸς ἀρετήν, οὐ χαλεπὸν διελθεῖν, ὅτι δεῖ αὐτὴν τὴν οἰκίαν εὖ οἰκεῖν, σῴζουσάν τε τὰ ἔνδον καὶ κατήκοον οὖσαν τοῦ ἀνδρός. καὶ ἄλλη ἐστὶν παιδὸς ἀρετή, καὶ θηλείας καὶ ἄρρενος, καὶ πρεσβυτέρου ἀνδρός, εἰ μὲν βούλει, ἐλευθέρου, εἰ δὲ βούλει, (72a) δούλου. καὶ ἄλλαι πάμπολλαι ἀρεταί εἰσιν, ὥστε οὐκ ἀπορία εἰπεῖν ἀρετῆς πέρι ὅτι ἐστίν: καθ᾽ ἑκάστην γὰρ τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῶν ἡλικιῶν πρὸς ἕκαστον ἔργον ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἡ ἀρετή ἐστιν, ὡσαύτως δὲ οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἡ κακία.

MENON. Atqui non difficile, o Socrates, dicere. Primum quidem, si velis viri virtutem, leve; quoniam hec est viri virtus: ydoneum esse bene civitati providere, atque providentem amicis benefacere inimicisque male, et se precavere nil tale tolerare. Quod si volueris mulieris virtutem, haud molestum pertransire: quoniam decet eam domum bene dispensare, salva facientem que intrinsecus et obsequentem esse viro. Et alia pueri virtus et femine ac masculi; necnon senioris viri, si vero velis liberi, si certe velis servi. Atque alie permulte virtutes sunt. Quas ob res neutiquam hesitatio dicere de virtute quid. Penes unamquamque siquidem actionum et etatum ad singulum opus unicuique nostrum virtus est, nec dissimiliter utique reor, o Socrates, et malitia.

ME. At o Socrates nequaquam difficile est id dicere; et primo quidem si lubet quæ viri sit virtus. hæc plane est, ad civilium rerum administrationem sufficientem esse, iisque tractandis amicos iuvare, inimicos lædere, necnon diligenter cavere, ne quid ipse tale aliquando patiatur. Quod si ulterius quæ sit mulieris virtus nosse requiris, neque id arduum erit. Est enim mulieris virtus, domum recte gubernare, dum curat domestica, viroque obedit. Alia quoque virtus est pueri fæminæque et masculi, et viri iam ætate gravis, necnon liberi si velis, alia et alia servi. Atque aliæ permultæ virtutes sunt. Quamobrem haud deest, quid de virtute dicamus. Enimvero in unaquaque actione atque ætate ad unumquodque opus singulis hominibus virtus adest. Totidem præterea et de vitio o Socrates, ut arbitror, dici possent.

MENO: There will be no difficulty, Socrates, in answering your question. Let us take first the virtue of a man--he should know how to administer the state, and in the administration of it to benefit his friends and harm his enemies; and he must also be careful not to suffer harm himself. A woman’s virtue, if you wish to know about that, may also be easily described: her duty is to order her house, and keep what is indoors, and obey her husband. Every age, every condition of life, young or old, male or female, bond or free, has a different virtue: there are virtues numberless, and no lack of definitions of them; for virtue is relative to the actions and ages of each of us in all that we do. And the same may be said of vice, Socrates (Compare Arist. Pol.).

Σωκράτης
πολλῇ γέ τινι εὐτυχίᾳ ἔοικα κεχρῆσθαι, ὦ Μένων, εἰ μίαν ζητῶν ἀρετὴν σμῆνός τι ἀνηύρηκα ἀρετῶν παρὰ σοὶ κείμενον. ἀτάρ, ὦ Μένων, κατὰ ταύτην τὴν εἰκόνα τὴν (72b) περὶ τὰ σμήνη, εἴ μου ἐρομένου μελίττης περὶ οὐσίας ὅτι ποτ᾽ ἐστίν, πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς ἔλεγες αὐτὰς εἶναι, τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω μοι, εἴ σε ἠρόμην: ‘ἆρα τούτῳ φῂς πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς εἶναι καὶ διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων, τῷ μελίττας εἶναι; ἢ τούτῳ μὲν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν, ἄλλῳ δέ τῳ, οἷον ἢ κάλλει ἢ μεγέθει ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ τῶν τοιούτων;’ εἰπέ, τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω οὕτως ἐρωτηθείς;

SOCRATES. Plurima quadam felicitate videor frui, o Menon, si unam inquirens virtutem examen quoddam inveni virtutum a te positarum. Quasi, o Menon, iuxta hanc ymaginem circa examina, si me rogante apis super essentia quid est, multas et omniformes diceres eas esse, quid utique responderes michi, si te interrogavero: “Ergo in hoc inquis multas et omniformes esse et differentes ab invicem, in hoc quod apes sunt? Sive in hoc nempe haud discrepant, alio vero aliquo, velut aut pulchritudine vel magnitudine vel aliquo alio talium?” Dic, quid respondeas sic interrogatus?

SO. Non parum in hac venatione fortunatus sum o Meno; siquidem unam virtutem investigans, examen quoddam virtutum apud te habitantium repperi. Verumtamen o Meno si eadem examinis similitudine percontanti mihi quæ sit apis substantia, multiplices earum esse substantias respondisses, ego vero iterum te rogam, nunquid hoc quo apes sunt, an alio quopiam, veluti pulchritudine, vel magnitude, aut alio quopiam huiusmodi apum substantias diversas esse dicis, quid inquam sic interroganti potissimum responderes?

SOCRATES: How fortunate I am, Meno! When I ask you for one virtue, you present me with a swarm of them (Compare Theaet.), which are in your keeping. Suppose that I carry on the figure of the swarm, and ask of you, What is the nature of the bee? and you answer that there are many kinds of bees, and I reply: But do bees differ as bees, because there are many and different kinds of them; or are they not rather to be distinguished by some other quality, as for example beauty, size, or shape? How would you answer me?

Μένων
τοῦτ᾽ ἔγωγε, ὅτι οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν, ᾗ μέλιτται εἰσίν, ἡ ἑτέρα τῆς ἑτέρας.

MENON. Hoc ego sane, quoniam neutique distant, prout apes sunt, altera ab altera.

ME. Quod eo quod apes sunt, minime differunt.

MENO: I should answer that bees do not differ from one another, as bees.

(72c) Σωκράτης
εἰ οὖν εἶπον μετὰ ταῦτα: ‘τοῦτο τοίνυν μοι αὐτὸ εἰπέ, ὦ Μένων: ᾧ οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν ἀλλὰ ταὐτόν εἰσιν ἅπασαι, τί τοῦτο φῂς εἶναι;’ εἶχες δήπου ἄν τί μοι εἰπεῖν;

SOCRATES. Ergo inquam post hec: “Hoc igitur michi o Menon, quo minime dissident at idem sunt cuncte; quid hec inquis esse? Haberes quidpiam michi dicere?”

SO. Et si ego posthæc rogem, quid ergo est o Meno, quid nihil inter se differunt, sed idem sunt cunctæ? habes quod respondeas?

SOCRATES: And if I went on to say: That is what I desire to know, Meno; tell me what is the quality in which they do not differ, but are all alike;--would you be able to answer?

Μένων
ἔγωγε.

MENON. Ego sane.

Habeo profecto.

MENO: I should.

Σωκράτης
οὕτω δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν: κἂν εἰ πολλαὶ καὶ παντοδαπαί εἰσιν, ἕν γέ τι εἶδος ταὐτὸν ἅπασαι ἔχουσιν δι᾽ ὃ εἰσὶν ἀρεταί, εἰς ὃ καλῶς που ἔχει ἀποβλέψαντα τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον τῷ ἐρωτήσαντι ἐκεῖνο δηλῶσαι, ὃ τυγχάνει (72d) οὖσα ἀρετή: ἢ οὐ μανθάνεις ὅτι λέγω;

SOCRATES. Ita profecto et de virtutibus: tamen etsi multe et omniformes sunt, unam utique quandam speciem eandem universe habent, propter quam sunt virtutes; in quam bene se habet respicientem eum qui respondet id demonstrate, quid contingit esse virtus. Seu non addiscis que dico?

SO. Eadem itaque ratione virtutes quanquam multæ atque variæ sunt, unum tamen speciem quandam in omnibus eandem habent qua virtutes existunt, in quam respicere decet eum, qui responsurus sit interroganti cuiquam quid virtus fit. Tenes quid dicam?

SOCRATES: And so of the virtues, however many and different they may be, they have all a common nature which makes them virtues; and on this he who would answer the question, ‘What is virtue?’ would do well to have his eye fixed: Do you understand?

Μένων
δοκῶ γέ μοι μανθάνειν: οὐ μέντοι ὡς βούλομαί γέ πω κατέχω τὸ ἐρωτώμενον.

MENON. Videor quoque michi addiscere; non tamen ut volo adverto quid queritur.

Intelligere videor, nondum tamen utvellem quod quæris plane comprehendo.

MENO: I am beginning to understand; but I do not as yet take hold of the question as I could wish.

Σωκράτης
πότερον δὲ περὶ ἀρετῆς μόνον σοι οὕτω δοκεῖ, ὦ Μένων, ἄλλη μὲν ἀνδρὸς εἶναι, ἄλλη δὲ γυναικὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἢ καὶ περὶ ὑγιείας καὶ περὶ μεγέθους καὶ περὶ ἰσχύος ὡσαύτως; ἄλλη μὲν ἀνδρὸς δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ὑγίεια, ἄλλη δὲ γυναικός; ἢ ταὐτὸν πανταχοῦ εἶδός ἐστιν, ἐάνπερ ὑγίεια (72e) ᾖ, ἐάντε ἐν ἀνδρὶ ἐάντε ἐν ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν ᾖ;

SOCRATES. An de virtute dumtaxat sic tibi videtur, o Menon alia quidem viri esse, alia vero mulieris et ceterorum, sive etiam de sanitate et de magnitudine et de robore eodem modo; alia quidem viri videtur tibi esse sanitas, alia mulieris? Sive eadem ubique species est, si quidem sanitas sit, seu in viro seu in alio quocumque sanitas?

SO. Utrum vero circa virtutem id solum o Meno tibi videtur, aliam quidem viri esse, aliam mulieris, et aliam reliquorum, an etiam circa sanitatem, magnitudinemque, et robur eodem modo, ut alia quidem viri sanitas sit mulieris alia? an potius eadem ubique sanitatis species est, si quidem sanitas sit, seu viro, sive mulieri, sive alteri quiqunque adsit?

SOCRATES: When you say, Meno, that there is one virtue of a man, another of a woman, another of a child, and so on, does this apply only to virtue, or would you say the same of health, and size, and strength? Or is the nature of health always the same, whether in man or woman?

Μένων
ἡ αὐτή μοι δοκεῖ ὑγίειά γε εἶναι καὶ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός.

MENON. Eadem michi videtur sanitas esse et viri et mulieris.

ME. Eadem mihi sanitas et viri simul et mulieris esse videtur.

MENO: I should say that health is the same, both in man and woman.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν καὶ μέγεθος καὶ ἰσχύς; ἐάνπερ ἰσχυρὰ γυνὴ ᾖ, τῷ αὐτῷ εἴδει καὶ τῇ αὐτῇ ἰσχύϊ ἰσχυρὰ ἔσται; τὸ γὰρ τῇ αὐτῇ τοῦτο λέγω: οὐδὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ ἰσχὺς εἶναι ἡ ἰσχύς, ἐάντε ἐν ἀνδρὶ ᾖ ἐάντε ἐν γυναικί. ἢ δοκεῖ τί σοι διαφέρειν;

SOCRATES. Igitur et magnitudo et robur? Si robusta mulier sit, eadem specie et eodem robore robusta erit? Hoc enim, quod est eadem, istud aio. Nichil differt ad robur esse, iuxta quod robur, sive in vira sit sive in muliere. An videtur tibi quid differre?

SO. Nonne igitur si quidem robusta sit fæmina, eadem specie roboris robusta erit? Cum vero tandem dico, qua nihil differt, qua robur ut robur sit intelligo, seu viro, seu mulieri insit. Num tibi diferre quicquam videt?

SOCRATES: And is not this true of size and strength? If a woman is strong, she will be strong by reason of the same form and of the same strength subsisting in her which there is in the man. I mean to say that strength, as strength, whether of man or woman, is the same. Is there any difference?

Μένων
οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

MENON. Non michi equidem.

ME. Minime.

MENO: I think not.

(73a) Σωκράτης
ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἀρετὴ εἶναι διοίσει τι, ἐάντε ἐν παιδὶ ᾖ ἐάντε ἐν πρεσβύτῃ, ἐάντε ἐν γυναικὶ ἐάντε ἐν ἀνδρί;

SOCRATES. At virtus, ad hoc ut virtus sit, discrepabit quidquam, an in puero sit an in sene, an in vira an in muliere?

SO. Ergo et virtus, ut virtus sit, differt iuvenem, aut senem, aut virum, aut fæminam ornet?

SOCRATES: And will not virtue, as virtue, be the same, whether in a child or in a grown-up person, in a woman or in a man?

Μένων
ἔμοιγέ πως δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο οὐκέτι ὅμοιον εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις τούτοις.

MENON. Michi sane videtur, o Socrates, illud nondum simile aliis hiis.

ME. Mihi quidem o Socrates hoc cæreterorum simile nequaquam esse videt.

MENO: I cannot help feeling, Socrates, that this case is different from the others.

Σωκράτης
τί δέ; οὐκ ἀνδρὸς μὲν ἀρετὴν ἔλεγες πόλιν εὖ διοικεῖν, γυναικὸς δὲ οἰκίαν;

SOCRATES. Quid autem? Numquid non viri virtutem astruxisti civitatem bene disponere, mulieris vera domum?

Nonne viri virtutem esse dixisti, recte Rempub. gubernare, mulieris vero domum?

SOCRATES: But why? Were you not saying that the virtue of a man was to order a state, and the virtue of a woman was to order a house?

Μένων
ἔγωγε.

MENON. Ego vera.

ME. Dixi equidem.

MENO: I did say so.

Σωκράτης
ἆρ᾽ οὖν οἷόν τε εὖ διοικεῖν ἢ πόλιν ἢ οἰκίαν ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν, μὴ σωφρόνως καὶ δικαίως διοικοῦντα;

SOCRATES. Est igitur possibile bene disponere aut urbem aut domum aut aliud quidpiam, non sobrie ac iuste disponentem?

SO. An potest quicquam civitatem vel domum, aut aliquid aliud recte disponere, nisi temperate sive prudenter ac iuste disponat?

SOCRATES: And can either house or state or anything be well ordered without temperance and without justice?

Μένων
οὐ δῆτα.

MENON. Neutiquam.

ME. Non certe.

MENO: Certainly not.

(73b) Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν ἄνπερ δικαίως καὶ σωφρόνως διοικῶσιν, δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ σωφροσύνῃ διοικήσουσιν;

SOCRATES. Igitur siquidem iuste et sobrie disponunt, iustitia et sobrietate disponent?

SO. Non ne si temperate iusteque instituunt, temperantia, iustitiaque instituent.

SOCRATES: Then they who order a state or a house temperately or justly order them with temperance and justice?

Μένων
ἀνάγκη.

MENON. Necesse.

ME. Necesse est.

MENO: Certainly.

Σωκράτης
τῶν αὐτῶν ἄρα ἀμφότεροι δέονται, εἴπερ μέλλουσιν ἀγαθοὶ εἶναι, καὶ ἡ γυνὴ καὶ ὁ ἀνήρ, δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης.

SOCRATES. Eorundem itaque utrique indigent, si debent boni esse, et mulier et vir, iustitie atque sobrietatis.

SO. Utrique igitur tam vir quam mulier indiget, si boni futuri sint, temperantia scilicet atque iustitia.

SOCRATES: Then both men and women, if they are to be good men and women, must have the same virtues of temperance and justice?

Μένων
φαίνονται.

MENON. Videtur.

ME. Apparet.

MENO: True.

Σωκράτης
τί δὲ παῖς καὶ πρεσβύτης; μῶν ἀκόλαστοι ὄντες καὶ ἄδικοι ἀγαθοὶ ἄν ποτε γένοιντο;

SOCRATES. Quid sane puer atque senex? Numquid incesti existentes et iniusti, boni umquam fiant?

SO. Quid vero puer ac senex quatenus intemperati et iniusti sunt, num boni fient?

SOCRATES: And can either a young man or an elder one be good, if they are intemperate and unjust?

Μένων
οὐ δῆτα.

MENON. Nequaquam.

ME. Nequaque.

MENO: They cannot.

Σωκράτης
ἀλλὰ σώφρονες καὶ (73c) δίκαιοι;

SOCRATES. At sobrii atque iusti?

MENON. Neutiquam.

SOCRATES. Verum sobrii et iusti?

SO. At dum temperati et iusti.

SOCRATES: They must be temperate and just?

Μένων
ναί.

MENON. Ne.

ME. Ita.

MENO: Yes.

Σωκράτης
πάντες ἄρ᾽ ἄνθρωποι τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ ἀγαθοί εἰσιν: τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ τυχόντες ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται.

SOCRATES. Universi ergo homines eadem modo boni sunt; eadem quippe consecuti boni efficiuntur.

SO. Universi igitur homines eadem ratione boni fiunt, nam eorundem participatione boni semper efficiuntur.

SOCRATES: Then all men are good in the same way, and by participation in the same virtues?

Μένων
ἔοικε.

MENON. Videtur.

ME. Videtur.

MENO: Such is the inference.

Σωκράτης
οὐκ ἂν δήπου, εἴ γε μὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἦν αὐτῶν, τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν τρόπῳ ἀγαθοὶ ἦσαν.

SOCRATES. Non utique aliquo pacto, si non eadem virtus omnium est, eodem quoque modo boni essent.

Nunquam eadem ratione boni sint ni illorum virtus sit eadem?

SOCRATES: And they surely would not have been good in the same way, unless their virtue had been the same?

Μένων
οὐ δῆτα.

MENON. Nullatenus.

ME. Nunquam.

MENO: They would not.

Σωκράτης
ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ πάντων ἐστίν, πειρῶ εἰπεῖν καὶ ἀναμνησθῆναι τί αὐτό φησι Γοργίας εἶναι καὶ σὺ μετ᾽ ἐκείνου.

SOCRATES. Quandoquidem igitur eadem virtus omnium est, experior dicere ac reminisci, quid ipsum ait Gorgias esse, necnon tu cum illo.

Quoniam ergo eadem virtus est omnium, conare in memoriam reducere quidnam hoc esse Gorgias dixit, ac tu una consenseris.

SOCRATES: Then now that the sameness of all virtue has been proven, try and remember what you and Gorgias say that virtue is.

Μένων
τί ἄλλο γ᾽ ἢ ἄρχειν οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρώπων; (73d) εἴπερ ἕν γέ τι ζητεῖς κατὰ πάντων.

MENON. Quid aliud revera quam principari sufficientem esse hominibus, siquidem unum quoque sciscitaris de omnibus?

ME. Quidnam aliud quam præesse hominibus posse? Siquid unum in omnibus exigis.

MENO: Will you have one definition of them all?

Σωκράτης
ἀλλὰ μὴν ζητῶ γε. ἀλλ᾽ ἆρα καὶ παιδὸς ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετή, ὦ Μένων, καὶ δούλου, ἄρχειν οἵω τε εἶναι τοῦ δεσπότου, καὶ δοκεῖ σοι ἔτι ἂν δοῦλος εἶναι ὁ ἄρχων;

SOCRATES. Ceterum sciscitor sane. Verum an pueri eadem virtus, o Menon, atque servi, principari sufficientes esse domino? An videtur tibi adhuc utique servus esse qui principatur?

SO. Requiro equidem, attamen eadem ne pueri et servi virtus erit o Meno pręesse posse domino, ac videt tibi etiam tum servus esse cum imperat?

SOCRATES: That is what I am seeking.

MENO: If you want to have one definition of them all, I know not what to say, but that virtue is the power of governing mankind.

SOCRATES: And does this definition of virtue include all virtue? Is virtue the same in a child and in a slave, Meno? Can the child govern his father, or the slave his master; and would he who governed be any longer a slave?

Μένων
οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

MENON. Haud omnino michi videtur, o Socrates.

ME. Haud certe mihi videtur o Socrates.

MENO: I think not, Socrates.

Σωκράτης
οὐ γὰρ εἰκός, ὦ ἄριστε: ἔτι γὰρ καὶ τόδε σκόπει. ἄρχειν φῂς οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι. οὐ προσθήσομεν αὐτόσε τὸ δικαίως, ἀδίκως δὲ μή;

SOCRATES. Minime quippe congruum, o optime. Adhuc enim et hoc considera: principari inquis possibile esse. Nonne annectemus ad hoc iuste, iniuste certe minime?

SO. Necque enim isthuc optime vir fas esset, sed hoc rursus considera, utrum dominari posse aliquem putas, si iuste præesse dicamus; iniuste vero, nequaquam.

SOCRATES: No, indeed; there would be small reason in that. Yet once more, fair friend; according to you, virtue is ‘the power of governing;’ but do you not add ‘justly and not unjustly’?

Μένων
οἶμαι ἔγωγε: ἡ γὰρ δικαιοσύνη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀρετή ἐστιν.

MENON. Puto ego quidem; nam iustitia, o Socrates, virtus est.

ME. Puto equidem, iustitia enim virtus est.

MENO: Yes, Socrates; I agree there; for justice is virtue.

(73e) Σωκράτης
πότερον ἀρετή, ὦ Μένων, ἢ ἀρετή τις;

SOCRATES. Utrum vel virtus, o Menon, vel virtus quedam?

SO. Utum virtus o Meno, an virtus quædam?

SOCRATES: Would you say ‘virtue,’ Meno, or ‘a virtue’?

Μένων
πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις;

MENON. Quid hoc ais?

ME. Quo pacto id ais?

MENO: What do you mean?

Σωκράτης
ὡς περὶ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν. οἷον, εἰ βούλει, στρογγυλότητος πέρι εἴποιμ᾽ ἂν ἔγωγε ὅτι σχῆμά τί ἐστιν, οὐχ οὕτως ἁπλῶς ὅτι σχῆμα. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὕτως ἂν εἴποιμι, ὅτι καὶ ἄλλα ἔστι σχήματα.

SOCRATES. Tamquam de alio quocumque. Ut, si velis, de rotunditate dicerem ego quoque, quoniam figura quedam est, non ita simpliciter quoniam figura. Eapropter sane sic dicerem, quoniam et alie sunt figure.

SO. Quemadmodum de quovis alio. ut ecce de rotunditate figuram quandam esse dicerem, non simpliciter figuram, ob eam sane causam ita loquerer, quia aliæ quoque figuræ præter rotunditatem sunt.

SOCRATES: I mean as I might say about anything; that a round, for example, is ‘a figure’ and not simply ‘figure,’ and I should adopt this mode of speaking, because there are other figures.

Μένων
ὀρθῶς γε λέγων σύ, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐγὼ λέγω οὐ μόνον δικαιοσύνην ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλας εἶναι ἀρετάς.

MENON. Recte diceres tu, quoniam et ego dico non solum iustitiam verum etiam alias esse virtutes.

ME. Recte inquis. Atqui et ipse non iustitiam tantum, verum alias quoque virtutes esse dico.

MENO: Quite right; and that is just what I am saying about virtue--that there are other virtues as well as justice.

(74a) Σωκράτης
τίνας ταύτας; εἰπέ. οἷον καὶ ἐγώ σοι εἴποιμι ἂν καὶ ἄλλα σχήματα, εἴ με κελεύοις: καὶ σὺ οὖν ἐμοὶ εἰπὲ ἄλλας ἀρετάς.

SOCRATES. Quas istas? Dic. Quemadmodum et ego tibi dicam etiam alias figuras, si michi imperes; atque tu igitur michi die alias virtutes.

SO. At quas dicis alias explica obsecro. Equidem si me de aliis figuris interrogasses, utique respondissem, itaque tu quæ sint aliæ virtutes ostende.

SOCRATES: What are they? tell me the names of them, as I would tell you the names of the other figures if you asked me.

Μένων
ἡ ἀνδρεία τοίνυν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἀρετὴ εἶναι καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ σοφία καὶ μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ ἄλλαι πάμπολλαι.

MENON. Fortitudo igitur michi utique videtur virtus esse et sobrietas ac sapientia, necnon magnidecentia atque quam plurime.

ME. Fortitudo, temperantia, sapientia, magnificentia, cæteræque permultæ.

MENO: Courage and temperance and wisdom and magnanimity are virtues; and there are many others.

Σωκράτης
πάλιν, ὦ Μένων, ταὐτὸν πεπόνθαμεν: πολλὰς αὖ ηὑρήκαμεν ἀρετὰς μίαν ζητοῦντες, ἄλλον τρόπον ἢ νυνδή: τὴν δὲ μίαν, ἣ διὰ πάντων τούτων ἐστίν, οὐ δυνάμεθα ἀνευρεῖν.

SOCRATES. Item, o Menon, idem toleravimus; multas adinvenimus virtutes unam investigantes, alio modo quam nunc quoque. Unam autem, que per omnes istas est, nequivimus reperire.

SO. In idem recidimus. Multas rursum virtutes, dum quærimus unam, invenimus, sed alio pacto; unam vero quæ per omnes diffunditur, reperire nequimus.

SOCRATES: Yes, Meno; and again we are in the same case: in searching after one virtue we have found many, though not in the same way as before; but we have been unable to find the common virtue which runs through them all.

Μένων
οὐ γὰρ δύναμαί πω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς σὺ ζητεῖς, (74b) μίαν ἀρετὴν λαβεῖν κατὰ πάντων, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις.

MENON. Minime namque valeo quolibet pacto, o Socrates, vel uti tu queris, unam virtutem sumere de omnibus ceu in aliis.

ME. Nondum queo o Socrates, quod quæris, unam in omnibus virtutem quemadmodum in cæteris assequi.

MENO: Why, Socrates, even now I am not able to follow you in the attempt to get at one common notion of virtue as of other things.

Σωκράτης
εἰκότως γε: ἀλλ᾽ ἐγὼ προθυμήσομαι, ἐὰν οἷός τ᾽ ὦ, ἡμᾶς προβιβάσαι. μανθάνεις γάρ που ὅτι οὑτωσὶ ἔχει περὶ παντός: εἴ τίς σε ἀνέροιτο τοῦτο ὃ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ‘τί ἐστιν σχῆμα, ὦ Μένων;’ εἰ αὐτῷ εἶπες ὅτι στρογγυλότης, εἴ σοι εἶπεν ἅπερ ἐγώ, ‘πότερον σχῆμα ἡ στρογγυλότης ἐστὶν ἢ σχῆμά τι;’ εἶπες δήπου ἂν ὅτι σχῆμά τι.

SOCRATES. Competenter utique; verum ego studebo, si sufficiens fuero, nos preinstruere. Scis etenim, quoniam ita se habet de universo. Si quis te roget hoc quod ego modo dicebam: ‘quid est figura, o Menon?’, si ipsi diceres quia rotunditas, si tibi diceret que quidem et ego: ‘utrum scema rotunditas an scema quoddam?’, diceres uti que quoniam figura quedam?

SO. Non ab re quidem; at ego si modo potuero, perducere nos conabor. Videsne sic in cunctis contingere, siquis a te petat idem quo modo dicebam, quid figura sit, ac tu quod sit rotunditas responderes, et ille tibi quæ et ego inferret, utrum rotunditas sit figura, an figura quædam, an non illi diceres figuram quandam esse?

SOCRATES: No wonder; but I will try to get nearer if I can, for you know that all things have a common notion. Suppose now that some one asked you the question which I asked before: Meno, he would say, what is figure? And if you answered ‘roundness,’ he would reply to you, in my way of speaking, by asking whether you would say that roundness is ‘figure’ or ‘a figure;’ and you would answer ‘a figure.’

Μένων
πάνυ γε.

MENON. Penitus sane.

ME. Prorsus.

MENO: Certainly.

(74c) Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν διὰ ταῦτα, ὅτι καὶ ἄλλα ἔστιν σχήματα;

SOCRATES. Nonne ideo quoniam alia sunt scemata?

SO. Nonne ob id quod aliæ quoque figura sunt?

SOCRATES: And for this reason--that there are other figures?

Μένων
ναί.

MENON. Etiam.

ME. Ita.

MENO: Yes.

Σωκράτης
καὶ εἴ γε προσανηρώτα σε ὁποῖα, ἔλεγες ἄν;

SOCRATES. Et si addiderit sciscitari a te ‘qualia’, diceres profecto?

SO. Quod si quales illæ sint quærat, evestigio respondebis?

SOCRATES: And if he proceeded to ask, What other figures are there? you would have told him.

Μένων
ἔγωγε.

MENON. Ego vero.

ME. Equidem.

MENO: I should.

Σωκράτης
καὶ αὖ εἰ περὶ χρώματος ὡσαύτως ἀνήρετο ὅτι ἐστίν, καὶ εἰπόντος σου ὅτι τὸ λευκόν, μετὰ ταῦτα ὑπέλαβεν ὁ ἐρωτῶν: ‘πότερον τὸ λευκὸν χρῶμά ἐστιν ἢ χρῶμά τι;’ εἶπες ἂν ὅτι χρῶμά τι, διότι καὶ ἄλλα τυγχάνει ὄντα;

SOCRATES. Et rursus, si de colore similiter percunctetur quid est, atque dicente te quoniam ‘album’, post hec assumat percunctatus: ‘utrum candidum color est an color quidam?’, diceres nempe quatenus color quidam, nam et alia contingunt entia?

SO. Quin etiam si de colore similiter quid sit quærat, et tu quod albedo sit dicas, ac ille sic deinde roget, utrum albedo color sit, an color quidam, inferres ne colorem quendam ob hoc esse, quod alii quoque colores reperiantur?

SOCRATES: And if he similarly asked what colour is, and you answered whiteness, and the questioner rejoined, Would you say that whiteness is colour or a colour? you would reply, A colour, because there are other colours as well.

Μένων
ἔγωγε.

MENON. Ego certe.

ME. Maxime.

MENO: I should.

Σωκράτης
καὶ εἴ γέ σε ἐκέλευε λέγειν ἄλλα χρώματα, ἔλεγες (74d) ἂν ἄλλα, ἃ οὐδὲν ἧττον τυγχάνει ὄντα χρώματα τοῦ λευκοῦ;

SOCRATES. Et si tibi imperaret dicere ceteros colores, diceres utique alios, quos haud minus accidit esse colores quam candidum?

SO. Si iterum colores cæteros referre iusserit narrabis utique et alios multos, qui nihilo minus atque albedo colores sint?

SOCRATES: And if he had said, Tell me what they are?--you would have told him of other colours which are colours just as much as whiteness.

Μένων
ναί.

MENON. Sic.

ME. Narrabo.

MENO: Yes.

Σωκράτης
εἰ οὖν ὥσπερ ἐγὼ μετῄει τὸν λόγον, καὶ ἔλεγεν ὅτι ‘ἀεὶ εἰς πολλὰ ἀφικνούμεθα, ἀλλὰ μή μοι οὕτως, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ἑνί τινι προσαγορεύεις ὀνόματι, καὶ φῂς οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ὅτι οὐ σχῆμα εἶναι, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐναντία ὄντα ἀλλήλοις, ὅτι ἐστὶν τοῦτο ὃ οὐδὲν ἧττον κατέχει τὸ στρογγύλον ἢ τὸ εὐθύ, ὃ δὴ ὀνομάζεις σχῆμα (74e) καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φῂς τὸ στρογγύλον σχῆμα εἶναι ἢ τὸ εὐθύ;’ ἢ οὐχ οὕτω λέγεις;

SOCRATES. Si ergo velut ego pertransiret sermonem ac diceret quoniam: “semper in multa devenimus, atque minime michi sic. Immo quoniam quidem multa hoc uno appellabas vocabulo, atque ais nullum horum quod non figura esse, et eadem et contraria cum sint ad invicem, quoniam est istud nichilominus continet decusatum quam rectum, quod nominat scema, et nichilomagis inquis decusatum scema esse quam directum?” Nonne ita dicis?

SO. Quod si ille sic, ut ego nunc, sermone progrediatur, dicatque quod in multa semper residamus, quod ille fieri nequaquam permittat; cumque hæc multa uno nomine nuncupes, dicasque omnia figuram esse, inter se contraria sint licet; hoc autem quod non minus rotundum contineat quidem rectum, quam quidem figuram nominas, et nihilo magis rectum quam rotundum esse dicis?

SOCRATES: And suppose that he were to pursue the matter in my way, he would say: Ever and anon we are landed in particulars, but this is not what I want; tell me then, since you call them by a common name, and say that they are all figures, even when opposed to one another, what is that common nature which you designate as figure--which contains straight as well as round, and is no more one than the other--that would be your mode of speaking?

Μένων
ἔγωγε.

MENON. Ego utique.

ME. Sic Plane.

MENO: Yes.

Σωκράτης
ἆρ᾽ οὖν, ὅταν οὕτω λέγῃς, τότε οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φῂς τὸ στρογγύλον εἶναι στρογγύλον ἢ εὐθύ, οὐδὲ τὸ εὐθὺ εὐθὺ ἢ στρογγύλον;

SOCRATES. Ergo igitur cum ita dicas, tunc non magis ais rotundum esse orbiculatum quam directum, neque rectum quam circulare?

SO. Cum ita dicas, inquam, nunquid rotundum magis rotundum quam rectum, aut rectum magis rectum quam rotundum esse dicis.

SOCRATES: And in speaking thus, you do not mean to say that the round is round any more than straight, or the straight any more straight than round?

Μένων
οὐ δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.

MENON. Nullo modo, o Socrates.

ME. Non certe o Socrates.

MENO: Certainly not.

Σωκράτης
ἀλλὰ μὴν σχῆμά γε οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φῂς εἶναι τὸ στρογγύλον τοῦ εὐθέος, οὐδὲ τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου.

SOCRATES. Verum figuram haud magis inquis esse decusatum quam rectum, neque alterum quam alterum.

SO. Verumtamen afferis rotundum nihil magis figuram esse quam rectum, neque rectum magis quam rotundum.

SOCRATES: You only assert that the round figure is not more a figure than the straight, or the straight than the round?

Μένων
ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

MENON. Vera dicis.

ME. Vera narras.

MENO: Very true.

Σωκράτης
τί ποτε οὖν τοῦτο οὗ τοῦτο ὄνομά ἐστιν, τὸ σχῆμα; (75a) πειρῶ λέγειν. εἰ οὖν τῷ ἐρωτῶντι οὕτως ἢ περὶ σχήματος ἢ χρώματος εἶπες ὅτι ‘ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ μανθάνω ἔγωγε ὅτι βούλει, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, οὐδὲ οἶδα ὅτι λέγεις,’ ἴσως ἂν ἐθαύμασε καὶ εἶπεν: ‘οὐ μανθάνεις ὅτι ζητῶ τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν τούτοις ταὐτόν;’ ἢ οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τούτοις, ὦ Μένων, ἔχοις ἂν εἰπεῖν, εἴ τίς σε ἐρωτῴη: ‘τί ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῷ στρογγύλῳ καὶ εὐθεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἃ δὴ σχήματα καλεῖς, ταὐτὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν;’ πειρῶ εἰπεῖν, ἵνα καὶ γένηταί σοι μελέτη πρὸς τὴν περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀπόκρισιν.

SOCRATES. Quid igitur istud cuius hoc nomen ‘scema’? Experiar dicere. Si ergo querenti sic seu de colore seu de figura dixisses: ‘immo minime adverto ego quid velis, o homo, neque novi quid dicis’, fortassis autem admiraretur et diceret: ‘nonne perpendis quoniam investigo quid in cunctis hiis idem?’ An non in hiis, o Menon, habes dicere, si quis inquireret: ‘quid est in tereti et recto et in reliquis, que quidem figuras vocas, idem in cunctis?’ Temptabo dicere, quatenus et fiat meditatio tibi ad eam que de virtute responsio.

SO. Quid igitur est, cui figura competit; declarare enitere. Si itaque sic percontanti de figura sive colore, te nequaquam intelligere quid ipse velit respondeas, vehementer admiretur arbitror, ac dicat an non intelligis quod in iis omnibus quæro? Non habeas o Meno qod dicas, siquis quærat quid in rotundo sit ac recto, et cæteris quas figuras apellas in omnibus idem? Explica quæso, ut hoc pacto ad disputationem virtutis te pares.

SOCRATES: To what then do we give the name of figure? Try and answer. Suppose that when a person asked you this question either about figure or colour, you were to reply, Man, I do not understand what you want, or know what you are saying; he would look rather astonished and say: Do you not understand that I am looking for the ‘simile in multis’? And then he might put the question in another form: Meno, he might say, what is that ‘simile in multis’ which you call figure, and which includes not only round and straight figures, but all? Could you not answer that question, Meno? I wish that you would try; the attempt will be good practice with a view to the answer about virtue.

(75b) Μένων
μή, ἀλλὰ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπέ.

MENON. Minime, sed tu, o Socrate, dic.

ME. Nequaquam, sed ipse o Socrates edissere.

MENO: I would rather that you should answer, Socrates.

Σωκράτης
βούλει σοι χαρίσωμαι;

SOCRATES. Vis tibi gratus sim?

SO. Visne tibi gratificer?

SOCRATES: Shall I indulge you?

Μένων
πάνυ γε.

MENON. Funditus.

ME. Omnino.

MENO: By all means.

Σωκράτης
ἐθελήσεις οὖν καὶ σὺ ἐμοὶ εἰπεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς;

SOCRATES. Velis itaque michi dicere super virtute?

Vis tu contra virtutis quęstionis deinde solvere?

SOCRATES: And then you will tell me about virtue?

Μένων
ἔγωγε.

MENON. Ego sane.

ME. Equidem.

MENO: I will.

Σωκράτης
προθυμητέον τοίνυν: ἄξιον γάρ.

SOCRATES. Nitendum ergo; dignum namque.

SO. Expediendum iam est, decet enim.

SOCRATES: Then I must do my best, for there is a prize to be won.

Μένων
πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

MENON. Omnino quoque.

ME. Et maxime quidem.

MENO: Certainly.

Σωκράτης
φέρε δή, πειρώμεθά σοι εἰπεῖν τί ἐστιν σχῆμα. σκόπει οὖν εἰ τόδε ἀποδέχῃ αὐτὸ εἶναι: ἔστω γὰρ δὴ ἡμῖν τοῦτο σχῆμα, ὃ μόνον τῶν ὄντων τυγχάνει χρώματι ἀεὶ ἑπόμενον. ἱκανῶς σοι, ἢ ἄλλως πως ζητεῖς; ἐγὼ γὰρ κἂν (75c) οὕτως ἀγαπῴην εἴ μοι ἀρετὴν εἴποις.

SOCRATES. Age certe, temptabimus tibi dicere quid est figura. Intuere igitur, an hoc recipias ipsam esse: esto namque nobis hoc figura, quod solum eorum, que sunt, est colori semper comitans. Satis tibi, an aliter quocumque modo queris? Ego quippe licet ita gratum habeo quam michi virtutem dicas.

SO. Age experiamur quid figura sit exprimere, et vide utrum istud admittas. Esto itaque id nobis figura, quod solum ex omnibus semper colorem sequitur. Satisne tibi hoc est, an forte aliud exigis? Ego enim sat habeam, si mihi posthac virtutem ipsam ostendas.

SOCRATES: Well, I will try and explain to you what figure is. What do you say to this answer? --Figure is the only thing which always follows colour. Will you be satisfied with it, as I am sure that I should be, if you would let me have a similar definition of virtue?

Μένων
ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε εὔηθες, ὦ Σώκρατες.

MENON. Immo istud stolidum, o Socrates.

ME. At istud absurdum quidem est o Socrates.

MENO: But, Socrates, it is such a simple answer.

Σωκράτης
πῶς λέγεις;

SOCRATES. Quid dicis?

SO. Quamobrem?

SOCRATES: Why simple?

Μένων
ὅτι σχῆμά πού ἐστιν κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον ὃ ἀεὶ χρόᾳ ἕπεται. εἶεν: εἰ δὲ δὴ τὴν χρόαν τις μὴ φαίη εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ ὡσαύτως ἀποροῖ ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ σχήματος, τί ἂν οἴει σοι ἀποκεκρίσθαι;

MENON. Quoniam scema est iuxta tuum dictum, quod semper colorem comitatur, esto. Si autem colorem minime dicat nosse, verum eodem modo ambigat quemadmodum de scemate, quid utique putas tibi respondere?

ME. Quoniam figura secundum rationem tuam est quæ semper colorem sequitur. Si ergo colorem quis nosse negaret, eodem modo quo circa figuram dubitans, quid illi potissimum responderes?

MENO: Because, according to you, figure is that which always follows colour.

(SOCRATES: Granted.)

MENO: But if a person were to say that he does not know what colour is, any more than what figure is--what sort of answer would you have given him?

Σωκράτης
τἀληθῆ ἔγωγε: καὶ εἰ μέν γε τῶν σοφῶν τις εἴη καὶ ἐριστικῶν τε καὶ ἀγωνιστικῶν ὁ ἐρόμενος, εἴποιμ᾽ ἂν (75d) αὐτῷ ὅτι ‘ἐμοὶ μὲν εἴρηται: εἰ δὲ μὴ ὀρθῶς λέγω, σὸν ἔργον λαμβάνειν λόγον καὶ ἐλέγχειν.’ εἰ δὲ ὥσπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ νυνὶ φίλοι ὄντες βούλοιντο ἀλλήλοις διαλέγεσθαι, δεῖ δὴ πρᾳότερόν πως καὶ διαλεκτικώτερον ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἔστι δὲ ἴσως τὸ διαλεκτικώτερον μὴ μόνον τἀληθῆ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ δι᾽ ἐκείνων ὧν ἂν προσομολογῇ εἰδέναι ὁ ἐρωτώμενος. πειράσομαι δὴ καὶ ἐγώ σοι οὕτως εἰπεῖν. (75e) λέγε γάρ μοι: τελευτὴν καλεῖς τι; τοιόνδε λέγω οἷον πέρας καὶ ἔσχατον —πάντα ταῦτα ταὐτόν τι λέγω: ἴσως δ᾽ ἂν ἡμῖν Πρόδικος διαφέροιτο, ἀλλὰ σύ γέ που καλεῖς πεπεράνθαι τι καὶ τετελευτηκέναι—τὸ τοιοῦτον βούλομαι λέγειν, οὐδὲν ποικίλον.

SOCRATES. Que vera sunt ego certe. Atque si sapientum quis esset et litigiosorum et certatorum qui quereret, dicerem equidem ei, quoniam ‘michi sane dictum est; si vero minus recte dico, tuum opus assumere, verbum et redarguere’. Si autem ut ego et tu nunc amici existentes velint alternatim disputare, oportet modestius aliquo modo et magis dialetice respondere. Est profecto forsan dialetice non solum vera respondere, sed et per illa, quecumque confitetur scire respondens. Temptabo tibi ad hoc modum dicere. Dic siquidem michi: finem vocas quid? Tale quid dico quale terminus et extremitas - cuncta hec idem quid dico. Fors autem nobis Prodicus dissidebit, ceterum tu aliquo modo vocas terminari quid et finiri - hoc modo volo dicere, nichil varium.

SO. Vera equidem. Nam si quis rogat sapientum illorum et contentiosorum ac litigantium aliquis fit, respondeam utique me dixisse. quod si minus recte dixi, ad te nunc attinet respondere, ac mea dicta refutare. Sin autem quemadmodum nos sumus illi amici sint, velintque tantum disputare, decet profecto mitius, et magis dialectico more respondere. est autem dialecticum magis non modo verum proferre, sed iis illud rationibus approbare, quas et ille qui rogat, plane se nosse fateatur. Hoc itaque more nunc te cum differendo uti conabor. Dic ergo, num finem appellas terminum quendam, atque extremum? Hæc enim omnia velut idem profero, forte vero Prodicus iis tanquam differentibus uteretur. Tu autem nun dicis terminari aliquid atque finiri? nihil quippe diversum iis verbis intelligo.

SOCRATES: I should have told him the truth. And if he were a philosopher of the eristic and antagonistic sort, I should say to him: You have my answer, and if I am wrong, your business is to take up the argument and refute me. But if we were friends, and were talking as you and I are now, I should reply in a milder strain and more in the dialectician’s vein; that is to say, I should not only speak the truth, but I should make use of premises which the person interrogated would be willing to admit. And this is the way in which I shall endeavour to approach you. You will acknowledge, will you not, that there is such a thing as an end, or termination, or extremity? --all which words I use in the same sense, although I am aware that Prodicus might draw distinctions about them: but still you, I am sure, would speak of a thing as ended or terminated--that is all which I am saying--not anything very difficult.

Μένων
ἀλλὰ καλῶ, καὶ οἶμαι μανθάνειν ὃ λέγεις.

MENON. Immo voco, et autumo perpendere que dicis.

ME. Dico sane, et quod ais, intelligere arbitror.

MENO: Yes, I should; and I believe that I understand your meaning.

(76a) Σωκράτης
τί δ᾽; ἐπίπεδον καλεῖς τι, καὶ ἕτερον αὖ στερεόν, οἷον ταῦτα τὰ ἐν ταῖς γεωμετρίαις;

SOCRATES. Quid vero? Epipedum vocas quid, et alterum item solidum, velut hec que in geometricis?

SO. Et planum aliquid vocas, et solidum aliud, cuiusmodi quæ in Geometria tractantur?

SOCRATES: And you would speak of a surface and also of a solid, as for example in geometry.

Μένων
ἔγωγε καλῶ.

MENON. Ego utique voco.

ME. Voco equidem.

MENO: Yes.

Σωκράτης
ἤδη τοίνυν ἂν μάθοις μου ἐκ τούτων σχῆμα ὃ λέγω. κατὰ γὰρ παντὸς σχήματος τοῦτο λέγω, εἰς ὃ τὸ στερεὸν περαίνει, τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι σχῆμα: ὅπερ ἂν συλλαβὼν εἴποιμι στερεοῦ πέρας σχῆμα εἶναι.

SOCRATES. Iam ergo iterum percipis michi ex hiis scema quod dico. Nam de omni figura hoc aio, in quod solidum desinit, hoc esse figuram; quod equidem comprehendens dicam solidi terminum scema esse.

SO. Iam igitur quid figuram esse dicam, ex iis percipies; in omni quippe figura id affero, figuram esse id in quod solidum definit. Atque ut summatim dicam, figuram appello solidi terminum.

SOCRATES: Well then, you are now in a condition to understand my definition of figure. I define figure to be that in which the solid ends; or, more concisely, the limit of solid.

Μένων
τὸ δὲ χρῶμα τί λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

MENON. Colorem profecto quid dicis, o Socrates?

ME. Colorem vero quid vocas o Socrates?

MENO: And now, Socrates, what is colour?

Σωκράτης
ὑβριστής γ᾽ εἶ, ὦ Μένων: ἀνδρὶ πρεσβύτῃ πράγματα προστάττεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλεις (76b) ἀναμνησθεὶς εἰπεῖν ὅτι ποτε λέγει Γοργίας ἀρετὴν εἶναι.

SOCRATES. Contumeliosus es, o Menon, viro seni questionum impedimenta precipis respondere, ipse vero non vis recordatus dicere, quid utique dicat Gorgias virtutem esse.

SO. Procax nimium es o Meno; homini iam seni onus imponis, ac respondere tibi iubes; ipse autem memor quid Gorgias virtutem esse dixerit, definire minime vis.

SOCRATES: You are outrageous, Meno, in thus plaguing a poor old man to give you an answer, when you will not take the trouble of remembering what is Gorgias’ definition of virtue.

Μένων
ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδάν μοι σὺ τοῦτ᾽ εἴπῃς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐρῶ σοι.

MENON. Ast ubi michi tu hoc dixeris, o Socrates, dicam tibi.

ME. At postquam tu mihi hoc declaraveris o Socrates tibi illud referam.

MENO: When you have told me what I ask, I will tell you, Socrates.

Σωκράτης
κἂν κατακεκαλυμμένος τις γνοίη, ὦ Μένων, διαλεγομένου σου, ὅτι καλὸς εἶ καὶ ἐρασταί σοι ἔτι εἰσίν.

SOCRATES. Quamvis velatus quis agnoscat, o Menon, disputante te, quoniam bonus es et amatores tibi adhuc sunt.

SO. Etiam absconditus hic aliquis, et loquentem tantummodo te audiens, intelligat, pulchrum esse te et amatoribus non carentem.

SOCRATES: A man who was blindfolded has only to hear you talking, and he would know that you are a fair creature and have still many lovers.

Μένων
τί δή;

MENON. Qud vero?

ME. Quid ita?

MENO: Why do you think so?

Σωκράτης
ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἐπιτάττεις ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ τρυφῶντες, ἅτε τυραννεύοντες ἕως ἂν ἐν ὥρᾳ (76c) ὦσιν, καὶ ἅμα ἐμοῦ ἴσως κατέγνωκας ὅτι εἰμὶ ἥττων τῶν καλῶν: χαριοῦμαι οὖν σοι καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαι.

SOCRATES. Quia nichil nisi iubes in disceptationibus, quod equidem faciunt deliciantes tamquam tyrannizantes, quamdiu in hora fuerint; et simul me forsitan contempsisti, quia sum minus bonus. Deferam igitur tibi et respondebo.

SO. Quod nihil quam continuo in sermone imperitas, quod facere delicati isti et formæ fiducia adhuc tyrranidem exercentes solent. Simul ita de me statuis forsitan, inferiorem elegantibus illis esse; gratificabor itaque tibi et respondebo?

SOCRATES: Why, because you always speak in imperatives: like all beauties when they are in their prime, you are tyrannical; and also, as I suspect, you have found out that I have weakness for the fair, and therefore to humour you I must answer.

Μένων
πάνυ μὲν οὖν χάρισαι.

MENON. Omnino itaque defer.

ME. Gratificare obsecro.

MENO: Please do.

Σωκράτης
βούλει οὖν σοι κατὰ Γοργίαν ἀποκρίνωμαι, ᾗ ἂν σὺ μάλιστα ἀκολουθήσαις;

SOCRATES. Vis ergo tibi secundum Gorgiam respondeam, qualiter nempe tu precipue consequeris?

SO. Vis ne tibi secundum Gorgiam respondeam? Sic maxime assentieris?

SOCRATES: Would you like me to answer you after the manner of Gorgias, which is familiar to you?

Μένων
βούλομαι: πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

MENON. Volo; quomodo enim minime?

ME. Quod nivelim?

MENO: I should like nothing better.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν λέγετε ἀπορροάς τινας τῶν ὄντων κατὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέα;

SOCRATES. Igitur dicitis effluxiones quasdam eorum, que sunt, iuxta Empedoclem?

SO. Nonne defluxus quidam secundum Empedoclem a rebus manare dicuntur?

SOCRATES: Do not he and you and Empedocles say that there are certain effluences of existence?

Μένων
σφόδρα γε.

MENON. Firmiter equidem.

ME. Et maxime quidem.

MENO: Certainly.

Σωκράτης
καὶ πόρους εἰς οὓς καὶ δι᾽ ὧν αἱ ἀπορροαὶ πορεύονται;

SOCRATES. Necnon poros in quos et per quos effluxiones cedunt?

SO. Ac pori, id est meatus in quos et per quos etiam defluxus huiusmodi manant?

SOCRATES: And passages into which and through which the effluences pass?

Μένων
πάνυ γε.

MENON. Penitus.

ME. Omnino.

MENO: Exactly.

Σωκράτης
καὶ τῶν ἀπορροῶν τὰς μὲν ἁρμόττειν ἐνίοις τῶν (76d) πόρων, τὰς δὲ ἐλάττους ἢ μείζους εἶναι;

SOCRATES. Et effluxionum has quoque competere aliquibus pororum, illas certe minores seu maiores esse?

SO. Ex defluxibus autem quosdam poris quibusdam congruere, quosdam minores, aut maiores esse?

SOCRATES: And some of the effluences fit into the passages, and some of them are too small or too large?

Μένων
ἔστι ταῦτα.

MENON. Sunt ista.

ME. Sic est.

MENO: True.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν καὶ ὄψιν καλεῖς τι;

SOCRATES. Ergo et visum nuncupas quid?

SO. Nunquid et visum aliquid vocas?

SOCRATES: And there is such a thing as sight?

Μένων
ἔγωγε.

MENON. Ego sane.

ME. Voco.

MENO: Yes.

Σωκράτης
ἐκ τούτων δὴ ‘σύνες ὅ τοι λέγω,’ ἔφη Πίνδαρος. ἔστιν γὰρ χρόα ἀπορροὴ σχημάτων ὄψει σύμμετρος καὶ αἰσθητός.

SOCRATES. Ex istis utique ‘intellige quid aio’, infit Pindarus. Est namque color effluxio figurarum visui commetibilis et sensibilis.

SO. Ex iis quid velim, ut ait Pindarus, accipe. Est enim color defluxus quidam rerum, visui congruens, atque sensibilis.

SOCRATES: And now, as Pindar says, ‘read my meaning:’--colour is an effluence of form, commensurate with sight, and palpable to sense.

Μένων
ἄριστά μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταύτην τὴν ἀπόκρισιν εἰρηκέναι.

MENON. Optime michi videris, o Socrates, hanc responsionem dixisse.

ME. Optime mihi o Socrates respondisse videris.

MENO: That, Socrates, appears to me to be an admirable answer.

Σωκράτης
ἴσως γάρ σοι κατὰ συνήθειαν εἴρηται: καὶ ἅμα οἶμαι ἐννοεῖς ὅτι ἔχοις ἂν ἐξ αὐτῆς εἰπεῖν καὶ φωνὴν ὃ ἔστι, (76e) καὶ ὀσμὴν καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων.

Fortassis enim tibi de ritu dictum est; et pariter arbitror intelligis, quod habeas ex eo dicere, et vocem quid est, et odorem et alia plurima talium.

SO. Forte quia quæ solitus es audire nunc responsum est tibi, et simul advertis, quod ex hac responsione facile etiam definire queas, quid sapor, quid vox, quid odor sit, cæteraque huiusmodi plurima.

SOCRATES: Why, yes, because it happens to be one which you have been in the habit of hearing: and your wit will have discovered, I suspect, that you may explain in the same way the nature of sound and smell, and of many other similar phenomena.

Μένων
πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

SOCRATES. Prorsus quidem.

ME. Prorsus.

MENO: Quite true.

Σωκράτης
τραγικὴ γάρ ἐστιν, ὦ Μένων, ἡ ἀπόκρισις, ὥστε ἀρέσκει σοι μᾶλλον ἢ ἡ περὶ τοῦ σχήματος.

Tragica quippe est, o Menon, responsio, unde placet tibi magis quam que de figura.

SO. Atqui tragica o Meno ista responsio est; ideoque tibi magis atque figuræ definitio placet.

SOCRATES: The answer, Meno, was in the orthodox solemn vein, and therefore was more acceptable to you than the other answer about figure.

Μένων
ἔμοιγε.

MENON. Michi profecto.

ME. Mihi vero.

MENO: Yes.

Σωκράτης
ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ παῖ Ἀλεξιδήμου, ὡς ἐγὼ ἐμαυτὸν πείθω, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνη βελτίων: οἶμαι δὲ οὐδ᾽ ἂν σοὶ δόξαι, εἰ μή, ὥσπερ χθὲς ἔλεγες, ἀναγκαῖόν σοι ἀπιέναι πρὸ τῶν μυστηρίων, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ περιμείναις τε καὶ μυηθείης.

SOCRATES. Verum non est, o puer Alexidimi, ut ego michi ipsi persuadeo, at illa potior. Reor autem nullatenus tibi videri, nisi, velut heri dixisti, necessarium tibi abire ante misteria, sed si mansisses et docereris.

SO. At mihi quidem o Alexidemi fili minime persuadeo; est enim illa altera melior, ac puto neque tibi ita placebit, nisi forsan quod heri dicebas, mysteriis nondum absolutis abire vis; sed mane, atque hic mysteriis initiare.

SOCRATES: And yet, O son of Alexidemus, I cannot help thinking that the other was the better; and I am sure that you would be of the same opinion, if you would only stay and be initiated, and were not compelled, as you said yesterday, to go away before the mysteries.

(77a) Μένων
ἀλλὰ περιμένοιμ᾽ ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴ μοι πολλὰ τοιαῦτα λέγοις.

MENON. Immo manebo, o Socrates, si michi multa huiusmodi dixeris.

ME. Manerem o Socrates, si huiusmodi multa inculcares.

MENO: But I will stay, Socrates, if you will give me many such answers.

Σωκράτης
ἀλλὰ μὴν προθυμίας γε οὐδὲν ἀπολείψω, καὶ σοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ ἐμαυτοῦ, λέγων τοιαῦτα: ἀλλ᾽ ὅπως μὴ οὐχ οἷός τ᾽ ἔσομαι πολλὰ τοιαῦτα λέγειν. ἀλλ᾽ ἴθι δὴ πειρῶ καὶ σὺ ἐμοὶ τὴν ὑπόσχεσιν ἀποδοῦναι, κατὰ ὅλου εἰπὼν ἀρετῆς πέρι ὅτι ἐστίν, καὶ παῦσαι πολλὰ ποιῶν ἐκ τοῦ ἑνός, ὅπερ φασὶ τοὺς συντρίβοντάς τι ἑκάστοτε οἱ σκώπτοντες, ἀλλὰ ἐάσας ὅλην καὶ ὑγιῆ εἰπὲ τί ἐστιν ἀρετή. τὰ δέ γε παραδείγματα (77b) παρ᾽ ἐμοῦ εἴληφας.

SOCRATES. Atqui attentionis nichil pretermittam, et tui gratia ac mei ipsius inquiens talia. Sed uti minus non sufficiens ero plurima talia dicere! Ceterum tempta et tu michi pollicitum reddere, de toto dicens de virtute quid est; et desine multa facere ex uno, quod quidem dicunt eos, qui conterunt quid undique, qui contumeliis afficiunt; verum dimittens totam et integram, dic quid est virtus. Exempla profecto a me cepisti.

SO. Nihil utique prætermittam, quin talia quædam et tui simul et mei gratia dicam. Vereor tamen ne minus possim huiusmodi talia dicere. Cæterum iam ad promissa servanda nobis accingere, ac in commune quid virtus sit exprime nec ut fecisti hactenus, unum in multa discerpas, quod iaci in eos solet, qui idem ubique inculcant; sed integram atqui sanam, dic tandem quid virtus sit. exempla vero loquendi a me accepisti.

SOCRATES: Well then, for my own sake as well as for yours, I will do my very best; but I am afraid that I shall not be able to give you very many as good: and now, in your turn, you are to fulfil your promise, and tell me what virtue is in the universal; and do not make a singular into a plural, as the facetious say of those who break a thing, but deliver virtue to me whole and sound, and not broken into a number of pieces: I have given you the pattern.

Μένων
δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀρετὴ εἶναι, καθάπερ ὁ ποιητὴς λέγει,
‘χαίρειν τε καλοῖσι καὶ δύνασθαι’:
καὶ ἐγὼ τοῦτο λέγω ἀρετήν, ἐπιθυμοῦντα τῶν καλῶν δυνατὸν εἶναι πορίζεσθαι.

MENON. Videtur itaque michi, o Socrates, virtus ceu poeta ait: “gaudere quidem bonis et valere.” Et ego hoc dico virtutem, desiderantem bonorum honestorum possibilem esse habundare.

ME. Videt mihi o Socrates virtus esse, ut Poeta inquit, gaudere honestis ac posse. Atque ego idipsum virtutem voco, honesta quidem appetere, aeque consequi posse.

MENO: Well then, Socrates, virtue, as I take it, is when he, who desires the honourable, is able to provide it for himself; so the poet says, and I say too--

‘Virtue is the desire of things honourable and the power of attaining them.’

Σωκράτης
ἆρα λέγεις τὸν τῶν καλῶν ἐπιθυμοῦντα ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμητὴν εἶναι;

SOCRATES. Ergo dicis honestorum desiderantem bonorum appetitorem esse?

SO. Num honesta cupientem, bona cupere dicis?

SOCRATES: And does he who desires the honourable also desire the good?

Μένων
μάλιστά γε.

MENON. Precipue autem.

ME. Omnino.

MENO: Certainly.

Σωκράτης
ἆρα ὡς ὄντων τινῶν οἳ τῶν κακῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, ἑτέρων δὲ οἳ τῶν (77c) ἀγαθῶν; οὐ πάντες, ὤριστε, δοκοῦσί σοι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμεῖν;

SOCRATES. An vero existentibus aliquibus qui mala desiderent, aliis autem qui bona? Non universi, o optime, videntur tibi bona appetere?

SO. Nun quid ita loqueris quasi sint nonnulli qui bona cupiant, quidam vero qui mala?

ME. Imo.

SO. SO. Non omnes igiter o optime vir bona tibi appetere videntur?

SOCRATES: Then are there some who desire the evil and others who desire the good? Do not all men, my dear sir, desire good?

Μένων
οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

MENON. Nequaquam michi.

ME. Mihi nequaquam.

MENO: I think not.

Σωκράτης
ἀλλά τινες τῶν κακῶν;

SOCRATES. Ceterum quidam mala?

SO. Quidam itaque mala?

SOCRATES: There are some who desire evil?

Μένων
ναί.

MENON. Ita.

ME. Ita.

MENO: Yes.

Σωκράτης
οἰόμενοι τὰ κακὰ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, λέγεις, ἢ καὶ γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι κακά ἐστιν ὅμως ἐπιθυμοῦσιν αὐτῶν;

SOCRATES. Arbitrantes mala bona esse, ais, sive etiam cognoscentes quia mala sunt, tamen appetunt ea?

SO. An ita dicis quasi quę mala sint, bona esse opinenteur, aut etaim noscentes quod mala sint, nihilomninus illa cupiant?

SOCRATES: Do you mean that they think the evils which they desire, to be good; or do they know that they are evil and yet desire them?

Μένων
ἀμφότερα ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν.

MENON. Ambo michi videntur.

ME. Utrunque.

MENO: Both, I think.

Σωκράτης
ἦ γὰρ δοκεῖ τίς σοι, ὦ Μένων, γιγνώσκων τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακά ἐστιν ὅμως ἐπιθυμεῖν αὐτῶν;

SOCRATES. Prout enim videtur quis tibi, o Menon, cognoscens mala quoniam sunt, tamen appetere ipsa?

SO. An senses aliquem cognoscentem mala quod mala sint, illa tamen appeterem?

SOCRATES: And do you really imagine, Meno, that a man knows evils to be evils and desires them notwithstanding?

Μένων
μάλιστα.

MENON. Maxime.

ME. Arbitror.

MENO: Certainly I do.

Σωκράτης
τί ἐπιθυμεῖν λέγεις; ἦ γενέσθαι αὐτῷ;

SOCRATES. Quid appetere dicis quam fieri sibi?

SO. Quid autem exoptare hunc dicis? Num hac sibi adesse?

SOCRATES: And desire is of possession?

Μένων
γενέσθαι: τί γὰρ (77d) ἄλλο;

MENON. Fieri; quid enim aliud?

ME. Adesse sane. nam quid aliud optet?

MENO: Yes, of possession.

Σωκράτης
πότερον ἡγούμενος τὰ κακὰ ὠφελεῖν ἐκεῖνον ᾧ ἂν γένηται, ἢ γιγνώσκων τὰ κακὰ ὅτι βλάπτει ᾧ ἂν παρῇ;

SOCRATES. Utrum ratus mala prodesse illi cuicumque fit, an agnoscens mala quod ledunt cuicumque assunt?

SO. Utrum qui mala desiderat, mala esse cognoscens, prodesse cum adsint existimat? an unumquodque potius sua præsentia lædere?

SOCRATES: And does he think that the evils will do good to him who possesses them, or does he know that they will do him harm?

Μένων
εἰσὶ μὲν οἳ ἡγούμενοι τὰ κακὰ ὠφελεῖν, εἰσὶν δὲ καὶ οἳ γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι βλάπτει.

MENON. Sunt autem qui arbitrentur mala prodesse, sunt vero qui cognoscunt quoniam ledunt.

ME. Sunt certe qui mala prodesse putent, nec desunt qui obesse cognoscant.

MENO: There are some who think that the evils will do them good, and others who know that they will do them harm.

Σωκράτης
ἦ καὶ δοκοῦσί σοι γιγνώσκειν τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακά ἐστιν οἱ ἡγούμενοι τὰ κακὰ ὠφελεῖν;

SOCRATES. An etiam videntur tibi agnoscere mala quoniam mala sunt, qui arbitrantur mala prodesse?

SO. Videntur tibi mala nosse quod mala sint, qui mala prodesse cuiquam opinantur?

SOCRATES: And, in your opinion, do those who think that they will do them good know that they are evils?

Μένων
οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτό γε.

MENON. Haud omnino videtur istud michi.

ME. Haud sane id mihi videtur.

MENO: Certainly not.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν δῆλον ὅτι οὗτοι μὲν οὐ τῶν κακῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, (77e) οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες αὐτά, ἀλλὰ ἐκείνων ἃ ᾤοντο ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, ἔστιν δὲ ταῦτά γε κακά: ὥστε οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες αὐτὰ καὶ οἰόμενοι ἀγαθὰ εἶναι δῆλον ὅτι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. ἢ οὔ;

SOCRATES. Eapropter perspicuum quod hii quidem mala non appetunt, qui ignorant ea, immo ea que estimabant bona esse; sunt autem hec mala. Quas ob res qui ignorant ea et rati bona esse, liquidum quoniam bona appetunt, an non?

SO. Ex iis igitur patet eos non appetere mala, qui illa minime norint, sed illa potius, quæ bona esse putaverint cum tamen mala sint. Quapropter ignarantes illa, bonaque existimantes, perspicuum est boan potius exoptare. An non?

SOCRATES: Is it not obvious that those who are ignorant of their nature do not desire them; but they desire what they suppose to be goods although they are really evils; and if they are mistaken and suppose the evils to be goods they really desire goods?

Μένων
κινδυνεύουσιν οὗτοί γε.

MENON. Nituntur hii vero.

ME. Sic isti se habere videntur.

MENO: Yes, in that case.

Σωκράτης
τί δέ; οἱ τῶν κακῶν μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦντες, ὡς φῂς σύ, ἡγούμενοι δὲ τὰ κακὰ βλάπτειν ἐκεῖνον ᾧ ἂν γίγνηται, γιγνώσκουσιν δήπου ὅτι βλαβήσονται ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν;

SOCRATES. Quid sane? Bonorum desiderantes, uti dicis tu, autumantes quoque mala ledere ilium cuicumque assunt, agnoscunt quolibet modo, quoniam ledentur ab eis?

SO. At vero qui mala quidem affectant, ut ipse inquis; eaque cuiqunque accidunt, obesse censent; norunt ne quod illorum præsentia lędentur?

SOCRATES: Well, and do those who, as you say, desire evils, and think that evils are hurtful to the possessor of them, know that they will be hurt by them?

Μένων
(78a) ἀνάγκη.

MENON. Necesse.

ME. Necessario sequitur.

MENO: They must know it.

Σωκράτης
ἀλλὰ τοὺς βλαπτομένους οὗτοι οὐκ οἴονται ἀθλίους εἶναι καθ᾽ ὅσον βλάπτονται;

SOCRATES. Verum lesos isti nonne putant miseros esse secundum quantum leduntur?

SO. Quid vero læsos homines, nonne isti miseros esse quatenus læsi sunt, opinantur?

SOCRATES: And must they not suppose that those who are hurt are miserable in proportion to the hurt which is inflicted upon them?

Μένων
καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη.

MENON. Et hoc necesse.

ME. Hoc quoque necessarium.

MENO: How can it be otherwise?

Σωκράτης
τοὺς δὲ ἀθλίους οὐ κακοδαίμονας;

SOCRATES. Miseros certe numquid non infelices esse?

SO. Miseros autem nonne infelices?

SOCRATES: But are not the miserable ill-fated?

Μένων
οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

MENON. Existimo ego.

ME. Reor equidem.

MENO: Yes, indeed.

Σωκράτης
ἔστιν οὖν ὅστις βούλεται ἄθλιος καὶ κακοδαίμων εἶναι;

SOCRATES. Est igitur qui velit miser et infelix esse?

SO. Est ne aliquis, qui miser et infelix esse velit?

SOCRATES: And does any one desire to be miserable and ill-fated?

Μένων
οὔ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

MENON. Neutiquam michi videtur, o Socrates.

ME. Non videtur.

MENO: I should say not, Socrates.

Σωκράτης
οὐκ ἄρα βούλεται, ὦ Μένων, τὰ κακὰ οὐδείς, εἴπερ μὴ βούλεται τοιοῦτος εἶναι. τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἄθλιον εἶναι ἢ ἐπιθυμεῖν τε τῶν κακῶν καὶ κτᾶσθαι;

SOCRATES. Non igitur vult, o Menon, mala quispiam, siquidem noluerit talis esse. Quid enim aliud est miserum esse quam desiderare mala et habere?

SO. Nemo igitur mala vult, si quidem talis esse minime velit. Nam quid aliud est esse miserum, atque cupere mala, in eaque incurrere?

SOCRATES: But if there is no one who desires to be miserable, there is no one, Meno, who desires evil; for what is misery but the desire and possession of evil?

Μένων
κινδυνεύεις (78b) ἀληθῆ λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες: καὶ οὐδεὶς βούλεσθαι τὰ κακά.

MENON. Laboras vera dicere, o Socrates; et nullus vult mala.

ME. Vera loqui videris o Socrates; nemo enim vult mala.

MENO: That appears to be the truth, Socrates, and I admit that nobody desires evil.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν νυνδὴ ἔλεγες ὅτι ἔστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ βούλεσθαί τε τἀγαθὰ καὶ δύνασθαι;

SOCRATES. Non itaque modo dicebas, quia est virtus bona velle quidem et posse?

SO. Nonne paulo ante dixisti virtutem esse bona velle, ac posse?

SOCRATES: And yet, were you not saying just now that virtue is the desire and power of attaining good?

Μένων
εἶπον γάρ.

MENON. Dixi enim.

ME. Dixi equidem.

MENO: Yes, I did say so.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν τοῦ λεχθέντος τὸ μὲν βούλεσθαι πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει, καὶ ταύτῃ γε οὐδὲν ὁ ἕτερος τοῦ ἑτέρου βελτίων;

SOCRATES. Non igitur hoc dicto velle quidem omnibus inest, et ita utique minime alter altero melior?

SO. An non ex eo quod dictum est, voluntas quidem ipsa omnibus adest, atque hac ratione alius alio melior non est?

SOCRATES: But if this be affirmed, then the desire of good is common to all, and one man is no better than another in that respect?

Μένων
φαίνεται.

MENON. Apparet.

ME. Apparet.

MENO: True.

Σωκράτης
ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι εἴπερ ἐστὶ βελτίων ἄλλος ἄλλου, κατὰ τὸ δύνασθαι ἂν εἴη ἀμείνων.

SOCRATES. Ceterum patet quoniam, si est potior alius alio, secundum posse sane erit melior.

SO. Ergo si quidem est alius alio melior, nec id secundum voluntatem, sequitur ut secundum potdntiam fit melior.

SOCRATES: And if one man is not better than another in desiring good, he must be better in the power of attaining it?

Μένων
πάνυ γε.

MENON. Prorsus.

ME. Sequitur.

MENO: Exactly.

Σωκράτης
τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον ἀρετή, (78c) δύναμις τοῦ πορίζεσθαι τἀγαθά.

SOCRATES. Hoc est igitur, ut videtur, iuxta tuam sententiam virtus: potentia acquirendi bona.

SO. Secundum igitur rationem tuam hoc est virtus, bonorum comparandorum potestas.

SOCRATES: Then, according to your definition, virtue would appear to be the power of attaining good?

Μένων
παντάπασί μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς σὺ νῦν ὑπολαμβάνεις.

MENON. Omnifariam michi videtur, o Socrates, ita se habere, ceu tu nunc suspicaris.

ME. Sic prorsus se habere videtur, ut nunc accipis.

MENO: I entirely approve, Socrates, of the manner in which you now view this matter.

Σωκράτης
ἴδωμεν δὴ καὶ τοῦτο εἰ ἀληθὲς λέγεις: ἴσως γὰρ ἂν εὖ λέγοις. τἀγαθὰ φῂς οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι πορίζεσθαι ἀρετὴν εἶναι;

SOCRATES. Inspiciamus autem et hoc an verum dicis, fors etenim bene ais. Bona inquis sufficientem esse vendicare, virtutem esse?

SO. Animadvertamus posthac, utrum id vere afferas necne; forte enim bene loqueris. Dic igitur, bona vendicare posse virtutem esse dicis?

SOCRATES: Then let us see whether what you say is true from another point of view; for very likely you may be right:--You affirm virtue to be the power of attaining goods?

Μένων
ἔγωγε.

MENON. Ego sane.

ME. Isthuc ipsum.

MENO: Yes.

Σωκράτης
ἀγαθὰ δὲ καλεῖς οὐχὶ οἷον ὑγίειάν τε καὶ πλοῦτον;

SOCRATES. Bona certe vocas haud quemadmodum valitudinemque et divitias?

SO. Bona vero nonne hæc vocas, ceu sanitatem, divitias,

SOCRATES: And the goods which you mean are such as health and wealth and the possession of gold and silver,

Μένων
καὶ χρυσίον λέγω καὶ ἀργύριον κτᾶσθαι καὶ τιμὰς ἐν πόλει καὶ ἀρχάς.

Et aurum inquam et argentum vendicare, et honores in civitate et magistratus.

aurum atque et argentum plurimum possidere, honoribus præterea et magistratibus in Repub. fungi?

and having office and honour in the state--

Σωκράτης
μὴ ἄλλ᾽ ἄττα λέγεις τἀγαθὰ ἢ τὰ τοιαῦτα;

Numquid alia quedam dicis bona quam talia?

num alia quædam præter ista bona nuncupas?

those are what you would call goods?

Μένων
οὔκ, ἀλλὰ (78d) πάντα λέγω τὰ τοιαῦτα.

MENON. Neutiquam, immo universa dico huiuscemodi.

ME. Nequaquam, sed omnia bona huiusmodi esse dico.

MENO: Yes, I should include all those.

Σωκράτης
εἶεν: χρυσίον δὲ δὴ καὶ ἀργύριον πορίζεσθαι ἀρετή ἐστιν, ὥς φησι Μένων ὁ τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως πατρικὸς ξένος. πότερον προστιθεῖς τούτῳ τῷ πόρῳ, ὦ Μένων, τὸ δικαίως καὶ ὁσίως, ἢ οὐδέν σοι διαφέρει, ἀλλὰ κἂν ἀδίκως τις αὐτὰ πορίζηται, ὁμοίως σὺ αὐτὰ ἀρετὴν καλεῖς;

SOCRATES. Esto; aurum revera et argentum acquirere virtus est, vel ut ait Menon, magni regis paternus amicus. Utrum apponis quid huic questui, o Menon, videlicet ‘iuste et sancte’, an nichil penes te differt; sed quamvis iniuste quis ipsa vendicet, similiter tu ea virtutem vocas?

SO. Eia aurum atque argentum acquirire virtus est, ut inquit Meno magni regis patrius hospes. Utrum vero addis huic lucro o Meno, iuste ac sancte lucrari? an nihil interest, sed et si iniuste quis ista possidet, nihilominus quęstum huiusmodi virtutem vocas?

SOCRATES: Then, according to Meno, who is the hereditary friend of the great king, virtue is the power of getting silver and gold; and would you add that they must be gained piously, justly, or do you deem this to be of no consequence? And is any mode of acquisition, even if unjust and dishonest, equally to be deemed virtue?

Μένων
οὐ δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.

MENON. Nequaquam, o Socrates,

ME. Nequaquam o Socrates,

MENO: Not virtue,

Σωκράτης
ἀλλὰ κακίαν.

at vitium.

sed vitium.

Socrates, but vice.

Μένων
πάντως δήπου.

SO. Omnino igitur,

Σωκράτης
δεῖ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τούτῳ τῷ πόρῳ δικαιοσύνην ἢ σωφροσύνην ἢ (78e) ὁσιότητα προσεῖναι, ἢ ἄλλο τι μόριον ἀρετῆς: εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἔσται ἀρετή, καίπερ ἐκπορίζουσα τἀγαθά.

tamquam videtur, huic questui iustitiam seu sobrietatem sive sanctimoniam adesse, vel aliam aliquam particulam virtutis; sin autem, non erit ei virtus, et quidem lucrifaciens bona.

ut vident, huic possessioni, iustitiæ, vel temperantiæ, vel sanitatis, aut alterius virtutis præsentia opus est. Alioquin virtus minime erit, quamvis bona sibi vendicet.

SOCRATES: Then justice or temperance or holiness, or some other part of virtue, as would appear, must accompany the acquisition, and without them the mere acquisition of good will not be virtue.

Μένων
πῶς γὰρ ἄνευ τούτων ἀρετὴ γένοιτ᾽ ἄν;

Quo pacto enim sine hiis virtus fiat unquam?

ME. Qui enim sine iis virtus existat?

MENO: Why, how can there be virtue without these?

Σωκράτης
τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐκπορίζειν χρυσίον καὶ ἀργύριον, ὅταν μὴ δίκαιον ᾖ, μήτε αὑτῷ μήτε ἄλλῳ, οὐκ ἀρετὴ καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπορία;

At non lucrifacere aurum et argentum, cum non iustum fuerit, neque ipsi neque alii, nullatenus virtus, et hec erit penuria?

SO. At non suppeditare arum et argentum, quando minime iustum sit, aut sibi, aut alteri neque etiam virtus est hæc egestas?

SOCRATES: And the non-acquisition of gold and silver in a dishonest manner for oneself or another, or in other words the want of them, may be equally virtue?

Μένων
φαίνεται.

MENON. Patet.

ME. Videtur.

MENO: True.

Σωκράτης
οὐδὲν ἄρα μᾶλλον ὁ πόρος τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθῶν ἢ ἡ ἀπορία ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη, ἀλλά, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὃ μὲν ἂν μετὰ δικαιοσύνης γίγνηται, ἀρετὴ ἔσται, ὃ δ᾽ (79a) ἂν ἄνευ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων, κακία.

SOCRATES. Nichilo igitur magis questus huiuscemodi bonorum quam penuria virtus utique erit. Atqui ut videtur, quicquid cum iustitia fit, virtus est, quicquid autem sine omnibus huiuscemodi, vitium.

SO. Ninilo magis igint horum bonorum copia virtus erit atque inopia. Verum ut videntur, quodqunque cum uistitia sit, virtus est. quod autem absque illa, eiusque similibus, pravitas.

SOCRATES: Then the acquisition of such goods is no more virtue than the non-acquisition and want of them, but whatever is accompanied by justice or honesty is virtue, and whatever is devoid of justice is vice.

Μένων
δοκεῖ μοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ὡς λέγεις.

MENON. Videtur michi necessarium esse veluti dicis.

ME. Videt mihi neccessarium esse quod dicis.

MENO: It cannot be otherwise, in my judgment.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν τούτων ἕκαστον ὀλίγον πρότερον μόριον ἀρετῆς ἔφαμεν εἶναι, τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα;

SOCRATES. Nonne igitur horum singulum paulo prius particulam virtutis dicebas esse, iustitiam ac sobrietatem ac cuncta talia?

SO. Nonne unum quodque horum paulo ante virtutis partem esse diximus, iustitiam et temerantiam, cæteraque huiusmodi.

SOCRATES: And were we not saying just now that justice, temperance, and the like, were each of them a part of virtue?

Μένων
ναί.

MENON. Ne.

ME. Diximus plane.

MENO: Yes.

Σωκράτης
εἶτα, ὦ Μένων, παίζεις πρός με;

SOCRATES. Dehinc, o Menon, ludis ad me?

SO. Siccine o Meno me deludis?

SOCRATES: And so, Meno, this is the way in which you mock me.

Μένων
τί δή, ὦ Σώκρατες;

MENON. Quid nempe, o Socrates?

ME. Quorsum hæc o Socrates?

MENO: Why do you say that, Socrates?

Σωκράτης
ὅτι ἄρτι ἐμοῦ δεηθέντος σου μὴ καταγνύναι μηδὲ κερματίζειν τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ δόντος παραδείγματα καθ᾽ ἃ δέοι ἀποκρίνεσθαι, τούτου μὲν ἠμέλησας, λέγεις δέ μοι ὅτι ἀρετή (79b) ἐστιν οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι τἀγαθὰ πορίζεσθαι μετὰ δικαιοσύνης: τοῦτο δὲ φῂς μόριον ἀρετῆς εἶναι;

SOCRATES. Quoniam me modo orante te, non conterere neque dispergere virtutem, atque dante exempla iuxta que oporteat respondere, hoc certe neglexisti, dicisque michi quia virtus est possibilem esse bona vendicare cum iustitia; id autem ais particulam virtutis esse?

SO. Quoniam cum te orssem ne amplius virtutem discerperes, et exempla respondendi dedissem, hoc neglecto virtutem esse dicis, bona cum iustitia comparare posse, iustitiam vero virtutis partem esse consessus es.

SOCRATES: Why, because I asked you to deliver virtue into my hands whole and unbroken, and I gave you a pattern according to which you were to frame your answer; and you have forgotten already, and tell me that virtue is the power of attaining good justly, or with justice; and justice you acknowledge to be a part of virtue.

Μένων
ἔγωγε.

MENON. Ego sane.

ME. Sic est.

MENO: Yes.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν συμβαίνει ἐξ ὧν σὺ ὁμολογεῖς, τὸ μετὰ μορίου ἀρετῆς πράττειν ὅτι ἂν πράττῃ, τοῦτο ἀρετὴν εἶναι: τὴν γὰρ δικαιοσύνην μόριον φῂς ἀρετῆς εἶναι, καὶ ἕκαστα τούτων. τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο λέγω; ὅτι ἐμοῦ δεηθέντος ὅλον εἰπεῖν τὴν ἀρετήν, αὐτὴν μὲν πολλοῦ δεῖς εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἐστίν, πᾶσαν δὲ φῂς πρᾶξιν ἀρετὴν εἶναι, ἐάνπερ μετὰ μορίου (79c) ἀρετῆς πράττηται, ὥσπερ εἰρηκὼς ὅτι ἀρετή ἐστιν τὸ ὅλον καὶ ἤδη γνωσομένου ἐμοῦ, καὶ ἐὰν σὺ κατακερματίζῃς αὐτὴν κατὰ μόρια. δεῖται οὖν σοι πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τῆς αὐτῆς ἐρωτήσεως, ὦ φίλε Μένων, τί ἐστιν ἀρετή, εἰ μετὰ μορίου ἀρετῆς πᾶσα πρᾶξις ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη; τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν λέγειν, ὅταν λέγῃ τις, ὅτι πᾶσα ἡ μετὰ δικαιοσύνης πρᾶξις ἀρετή ἐστιν. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι πάλιν δεῖσθαι τῆς αὐτῆς ἐρωτήσεως, ἀλλ᾽ οἴει τινὰ εἰδέναι μόριον ἀρετῆς ὅτι ἐστίν, αὐτὴν μὴ εἰδότα;

SOCRATES. Nonne contingit ex quibus tu confiteris cum particula virtutis agere quicquid agat, [id est] istud virtutem esse. Nam iustitiam particulam ais virtutis esse, et singula horum. Quid ergo dico hoc? Quoniam me rogante in toto dicere virtutem, ipsam autem multo deficis dicere quid est, omnemque actum inquis virtutem esse, siquidem cum particula virtutis agatur, ac si dixeris quid virtus est in toto, et iam non cognoscente me, atque si tu dispergeres eam per particulas. Opus est itaque tibi iterato a principio, ceu michi videtur, eadem questione, o amice Menon, quid est virtus, si cum particula virtutis omnis actus virtus quoque sit. Hoc enim est dicere, cum inquiat quidam: omnis cum iustitia actus virtus est. An non videtur tibi denuo opus esse eadem questione, sed autumas quempiam nosse particulam virtutis quid est, ipsam nescientem?

SO. Nonne efficitur ex iis quæ iam concessisti, virtutem esse agere cum parte virtutis quicquid agitur? Iustitiam enim huiusmodi singuala virtutis particulas confiteris. ME. Quid tum? SO. Quia cum rogassem ut totam ipsam virtutem ostenderes, quid ipsa fit, nullo modo explicuisti; omnem vero actionem quæcunque cum parte virtutis sit, vistutem esse dixisti, quasi quid tota virtus sit summatim prædixeris, atque ipse intelligere tum queam, si abs te in particulas dividant. Eadem igitur quæstio rursus o Meno tibi suboritur, quid virtus sit, si quidem omnis actio cum virtutis parte fit virtus. Id nanque tunc dicitur, cum omnis actio cum iustitia virtus esse definint. An non eadem iterum quæstione opus esse vides? Num putas quempiam virtutis partem aliquam nosse, qui totius naturam minime norit?

SOCRATES: Then it follows from your own admissions, that virtue is doing what you do with a part of virtue; for justice and the like are said by you to be parts of virtue.

MENO: What of that?

SOCRATES: What of that! Why, did not I ask you to tell me the nature of virtue as a whole? And you are very far from telling me this; but declare every action to be virtue which is done with a part of virtue; as though you had told me and I must already know the whole of virtue, and this too when frittered away into little pieces. And, therefore, my dear Meno, I fear that I must begin again and repeat the same question: What is virtue? for otherwise, I can only say, that every action done with a part of virtue is virtue; what else is the meaning of saying that every action done with justice is virtue? Ought I not to ask the question over again; for can any one who does not know virtue know a part of virtue?

Μένων
οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

MENON. Non michi equidem videtur.

ME. Non videtur.

MENO: No; I do not say that he can.

(79d) Σωκράτης
εἰ γὰρ καὶ μέμνησαι, ὅτ᾽ ἐγώ σοι ἄρτι ἀπεκρινάμην περὶ τοῦ σχήματος, ἀπεβάλλομέν που τὴν τοιαύτην ἀπόκρισιν τὴν διὰ τῶν ἔτι ζητουμένων καὶ μήπω ὡμολογημένων ἐπιχειροῦσαν ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

SOCRATES. Si enim et reminisceris, quid ego tibi nunc respondi de figura, abiciemus talem responsionem, que per adhuc quesita et nondum concessa articulatur responsum dare.

SO. Si enim memineris quæ in superioribus de figura tibi respondi, reiecimus utique responsionem illam quæ per ea fit quibus ulteriori probatione opus est, nec dum rata habentur.

SOCRATES: Do you remember how, in the example of figure, we rejected any answer given in terms which were as yet unexplained or unadmitted?

Μένων
καὶ ὀρθῶς γε ἀπεβάλλομεν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

MENON. Et recte quidem abiciemus, o Socrates.

ME. Et merito quidem reiecimus.

MENO: Yes, Socrates; and we were quite right in doing so.

Σωκράτης
μὴ τοίνυν, ὦ ἄριστε, μηδὲ σὺ ἔτι ζητουμένης ἀρετῆς ὅλης ὅτι ἐστὶν οἴου διὰ τῶν ταύτης μορίων ἀποκρινόμενος δηλώσειν αὐτὴν ὁτῳοῦν, ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τούτῳ τῷ αὐτῷ (79e) τρόπῳ λέγων, ἀλλὰ πάλιν τῆς αὐτῆς δεήσεσθαι ἐρωτήσεως, τίνος ὄντος ἀρετῆς λέγεις ἃ λέγεις: ἢ οὐδέν σοι δοκῶ λέγειν;

SOCRATES. Neque igitur, o optime, neque tu adhuc quesita virtute tota quid est, neu per ipsius particulas respondens enucleatum ire ipsam cuilibet, aut aliud quicquam hoc eodem modo dicens. Verum rursus eadem opus est interrogatione, qua existente virtute dicis que dicis, anne nichil tibi videor dicere?

SO. Neque tu igitur o vir optime, cum quæritur, quid ipsa in universum, ac tota sit virtus, partes respondens eam quærentibus patefacias, neque aliud quiquamque eodem modo respondens, sed rursus eadem interrogatione opus erit, quidnam virtus sit, qua subiecta ista dicis. Num aliquid tibi dicere videor?

SOCRATES: But then, my friend, do not suppose that we can explain to any one the nature of virtue as a whole through some unexplained portion of virtue, or anything at all in that fashion; we should only have to ask over again the old question, What is virtue? Am I not right?

Μένων
ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς ὀρθῶς λέγειν.

MENON. Michi quoque videris recte dicere.

ME. Mihi quidem probe loqui videris.

MENO: I believe that you are.

Σωκράτης
ἀπόκριναι τοίνυν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς: τί φῂς ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ σὺ καὶ ὁ ἑταῖρός σου;

SOCRATES. Responde itaque rursus a principio, quidnam ais virtutem esse et tu et amicus tuus?

SO. Responde itaque iterum a principio, quid esse virtutem et tu et amicus ille tuus afferitis.

SOCRATES: Then begin again, and answer me, What, according to you and your friend Gorgias, is the definition of virtue?

Μένων
ὦ Σώκρατες, ἤκουον μὲν ἔγωγε πρὶν καὶ συγγενέσθαι (80a) σοι ὅτι σὺ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ αὐτός τε ἀπορεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖς ἀπορεῖν: καὶ νῦν, ὥς γέ μοι δοκεῖς, γοητεύεις με καὶ φαρμάττεις καὶ ἀτεχνῶς κατεπᾴδεις, ὥστε μεστὸν ἀπορίας γεγονέναι. καὶ δοκεῖς μοι παντελῶς, εἰ δεῖ τι καὶ σκῶψαι, ὁμοιότατος εἶναι τό τε εἶδος καὶ τἆλλα ταύτῃ τῇ πλατείᾳ νάρκῃ τῇ θαλαττίᾳ: καὶ γὰρ αὕτη τὸν ἀεὶ πλησιάζοντα καὶ ἁπτόμενον ναρκᾶν ποιεῖ, καὶ σὺ δοκεῖς μοι νῦν ἐμὲ τοιοῦτόν τι πεποιηκέναι, ναρκᾶν: ἀληθῶς γὰρ ἔγωγε καὶ (80b) τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ στόμα ναρκῶ, καὶ οὐκ ἔχω ὅτι ἀποκρίνωμαί σοι. καίτοι μυριάκις γε περὶ ἀρετῆς παμπόλλους λόγους εἴρηκα καὶ πρὸς πολλούς, καὶ πάνυ εὖ, ὥς γε ἐμαυτῷ ἐδόκουν: νῦν δὲ οὐδ᾽ ὅτι ἐστὶν τὸ παράπαν ἔχω εἰπεῖν. καί μοι δοκεῖς εὖ βουλεύεσθαι οὐκ ἐκπλέων ἐνθένδε οὐδ᾽ ἀποδημῶν: εἰ γὰρ ξένος ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει τοιαῦτα ποιοῖς, τάχ᾽ ἂν ὡς γόης ἀπαχθείης.

MENON. O Socrates, audivi nempe ego, priusquam etiam convenirem te, quoniam tu nichil aliud quam ipsemet dubitas et alios dubitare facis; atque nunc, uti michi videris, blandiris michi et attonitum reddis atque mirabiliter incantas, ut plenus dubietate fiam. Necnon videris michi omnifariam, si decet in aliquo contumeliis afficere, simillimus esse et in specie et in aliis huic late narce equoree. Etenim ipsa semper appropriantem et tangentem sopit et narcissare facit, atque tu michi videris nunc me talem secundum quid fecisse obstupefieri et narcissare. Vere enim ego et anima et ore obstupesco, et non habeo quid respondeam tibi. Etiam decies milies de virtute quam plurimos sermones dixi et ad plures et prorsus bene, ceu michi ipsi videbar; nunc nimirum neque quid est funditus habeo dicere. Et michi videris bene deliberasse haud abnavigans hinc neque peregre recedens. Si enim advena in alia civitate huiusmodi facias, fortassis utique tamquam seductor abigeris.

ME. Audieram equidem o Socrates antequam te alloquerer, morem esse tuum nihil aliud atque dubitare, et aliis scrupulos dubitationum iniicere. Et nunc quidem ut mihi videris, me præstigiis, et veneficiis incantationibusque perturbas, adeo ut ambiguitatis sim plenus. Ac mihi videris omnino, si tamen te iocando mordere aliqamtulum decet, quam simillimus esse tum forma, tum cæteris omnibus latissimo illi pisci marino qui Torpedo dicitur; ille siquidem hominem sibi propinquantem, tangentemque stupidum reddit. Tu quoque nunc me stupfacis. Revera enim et animum simul et os stupidum habeo, hæsitoque, nec quid tibi respondeam invenio, quanquam decies milies iam de virtute et multa et adversus quamplusrimos, ut mihi visus sum quamoptime disputavi. At in præsentia nec etiam quid ipsa sit virtus proferre ullo pacto valeo. Itaque caute tibi consuluisse te censo, quod nunquam alio peregrinaris. Nam si advena in aliena urbe hæc ageres, utpote præstigiator quidam, atque veneficus, supplicio forsitan afficereris.

MENO: O Socrates, I used to be told, before I knew you, that you were always doubting yourself and making others doubt; and now you are casting your spells over me, and I am simply getting bewitched and enchanted, and am at my wits’ end. And if I may venture to make a jest upon you, you seem to me both in your appearance and in your power over others to be very like the flat torpedo fish, who torpifies those who come near him and touch him, as you have now torpified me, I think. For my soul and my tongue are really torpid, and I do not know how to answer you; and though I have been delivered of an infinite variety of speeches about virtue before now, and to many persons--and very good ones they were, as I thought--at this moment I cannot even say what virtue is. And I think that you are very wise in not voyaging and going away from home, for if you did in other places as you do in Athens, you would be cast into prison as a magician.

Σωκράτης
πανοῦργος εἶ, ὦ Μένων, καὶ ὀλίγου ἐξηπάτησάς με.

SOCRATES. Versutus es, o Menon, et ferme fefellisti me.

SO. Callidus es, o Meno, ac me propemodum nunc decepisti.

SOCRATES: You are a rogue, Meno, and had all but caught me.

Μένων
τί μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες;

MENON. Quid maxime, o Socrates?

ME. Quamobrem o Socrate?

MENO: What do you mean, Socrates?

(80c) Σωκράτης
γιγνώσκω οὗ ἕνεκά με ᾔκασας.

SOCRATES. Agnosco et cuius ergo comparasti me.

SO. Video enim iam quam ob causam hac imagine me depingas;

SOCRATES: I can tell why you made a simile about me.

Μένων
τίνος δὴ οἴει;

MENON. Cuius reris?

qua alia de causa,

MENO: Why?

Σωκράτης
ἵνα σε ἀντεικάσω. ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτο οἶδα περὶ πάντων τῶν καλῶν, ὅτι χαίρουσιν εἰκαζόμενοι—λυσιτελεῖ γὰρ αὐτοῖς: καλαὶ γὰρ οἶμαι τῶν καλῶν καὶ αἱ εἰκόνες—ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἀντεικάσομαί σε. ἐγὼ δέ, εἰ μὲν ἡ νάρκη αὐτὴ ναρκῶσα οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖ ναρκᾶν, ἔοικα αὐτῇ: εἰ δὲ μή, οὔ. οὐ γὰρ εὐπορῶν αὐτὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ποιῶ ἀπορεῖν, ἀλλὰ παντὸς μᾶλλον αὐτὸς ἀπορῶν οὕτως καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιῶ (80d) ἀπορεῖν. καὶ νῦν περὶ ἀρετῆς ὃ ἔστιν ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ οἶδα, σὺ μέντοι ἴσως πρότερον μὲν ᾔδησθα πρὶν ἐμοῦ ἅψασθαι, νῦν μέντοι ὅμοιος εἶ οὐκ εἰδότι. ὅμως δὲ ἐθέλω μετὰ σοῦ σκέψασθαι καὶ συζητῆσαι ὅτι ποτέ ἐστιν.

SOCRATES. Quatenus te recomparem. Ego nimirum hoc novi de omnibus bonis, quoniam gratulantur comparati - expedit enim eis: bone nimirum autumo bonorum etiam ymagines - sed neque comparabo te. Ego vero si narca ipsa narcissans ita et alios facit narcissare, similis sum ei; sin autem, minime. Non enim scientia habundans ipse alios facio hesitare, sed universis magis ipse ambigens, ita et ceteros facio dubitare. Et nunc quidem de virtute quid est ego quidem non novi, tu sane forsitan prius nosti, antequam me convenisses, nunc autem similis es ignoranti. Verumptamen volo tecum considerate ac simul vestigare quid est.

nisi ut ipse quoque te contra depingam? Viri enim honesto habitu præditi cum effinguntur, delectari solent. illud quippe conducit. honestorum honestæ sunt et imagines. At ego personam tuam minime effingam. Equidem si piscis ille stupidus ipse alios reddit stupidos, ei sum persimilis, secus autem minime. Neque enim sæcundus ipse, cæteros titubare compello, sed maxime omnium dubitans ego, dubitare alios quoque facio. Etenim in præsentia, quid virtus fit, haud certe novi, tu tamen forte priusquam mihi occurrbas, noveras, nunc vero stupido mihi similis evasisti. Verumtamen una tecum rem discutere hanc institui, quid ue sit virtus investigare.

SOCRATES: In order that I might make another simile about you. For I know that all pretty young gentlemen like to have pretty similes made about them--as well they may--but I shall not return the compliment. As to my being a torpedo, if the torpedo is torpid as well as the cause of torpidity in others, then indeed I am a torpedo, but not otherwise; for I perplex others, not because I am clear, but because I am utterly perplexed myself. And now I know not what virtue is, and you seem to be in the same case, although you did once perhaps know before you touched me. However, I have no objection to join with you in the enquiry.

Μένων
καὶ τίνα τρόπον ζητήσεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο ὃ μὴ οἶσθα τὸ παράπαν ὅτι ἐστίν; ποῖον γὰρ ὧν οὐκ οἶσθα προθέμενος ζητήσεις; ἢ εἰ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα ἐντύχοις αὐτῷ, πῶς εἴσῃ ὅτι τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ σὺ οὐκ ᾔδησθα;

MENON. Et quomodo queres, o Socrates, hoc quod non nosti ad totum quid sit? Quale enim eorum que nescis proponens queres? Si etiam quam certissime inveneris ipsum, qualiter scies, quoniam hoc est to quod tu nescis?

ME. At quo tramite id investigabis o Socrates, quod quidem omnino quid sit ignoras? Quale enim tibi proponens id quod ignoras inquires? Aut etiam si in illud incidas, quonam signo id quoque ignoraveras esse illud agnosces?

MENO: And how will you enquire, Socrates, into that which you do not know? What will you put forth as the subject of enquiry? And if you find what you want, how will you ever know that this is the thing which you did not know?

(80e) Σωκράτης
μανθάνω οἷον βούλει λέγειν, ὦ Μένων. ὁρᾷς τοῦτον ὡς ἐριστικὸν λόγον κατάγεις, ὡς οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν ζητεῖν ἀνθρώπῳ οὔτε ὃ οἶδε οὔτε ὃ μὴ οἶδε; οὔτε γὰρ ἂν ὅ γε οἶδεν ζητοῖ—οἶδεν γάρ, καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖ τῷ γε τοιούτῳ ζητήσεως—οὔτε ὃ μὴ οἶδεν—οὐδὲ γὰρ οἶδεν ὅτι ζητήσει.

SOCRATES. Adverto quid tu velis dicere, o Menon. Vides hoc ut litigiosum argumentum adducis, quoniam non igitur est querendum homini neque quod novit, neque quod non novit? Neque enim quod novit querat - novit quippe et non est opus tall cuilibet questione - neque quod non novit, minime siquidem novit quod querat.

SO. Intelligo quid velis o Meno. At tu animadvertis me, quam pervicacem argumentationem in medium adduxisti? quod videlicet homo, neque quod novit, neque quod ignorat inquirit. Nam si noscit nulla inquisitione opus est. Sed eque quod nescit investigabit; non enim novit quid quærat.

SOCRATES: I know, Meno, what you mean; but just see what a tiresome dispute you are introducing. You argue that a man cannot enquire either about that which he knows, or about that which he does not know; for if he knows, he has no need to enquire; and if not, he cannot; for he does not know the very subject about which he is to enquire (Compare Aristot. Post. Anal.).

(81a) Μένων
οὐκοῦν καλῶς σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὁ λόγος οὗτος, ὦ Σώκρατες;

MENON. Non revera bene tibi videtur did argumentum hoc, o Socrates?

ME. Nonne recte induci o Socrates hanc rationem existimas?

MENO: Well, Socrates, and is not the argument sound?

Σωκράτης
οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

SOCRATES. Non michi utique.

SO. Nequaquam.

SOCRATES: I think not.

Μένων
ἔχεις λέγειν ὅπῃ;

MENON. Habes dicere quomodo?

ME. Potes dicere cur tibi non placeat?

MENO: Why not?

Σωκράτης
ἔγωγε: ἀκήκοα γὰρ ἀνδρῶν τε καὶ γυναικῶν σοφῶν περὶ τὰ θεῖα πράγματα—

SOCRATES. Ego sane. Audivi enim a virisque et mulieribus sapientibus circa divinas res

SO. Possum. id enim a viris ac mulieribus divinarum rerum peritis quandoque percipi.

SOCRATES: I will tell you why: I have heard from certain wise men and women who spoke of things divine that--

Μένων
τίνα λόγον λεγόντων;

quendam sermonem dicentibus verum,

ME. Quis istorum sermo?

MENO: What did they say?

Σωκράτης
ἀληθῆ, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖν, καὶ καλόν.

michi quoque videri, ac bonum.

SO. Verus, it mihi videtur, atque præclarus.

SOCRATES: They spoke of a glorious truth, as I conceive.

Μένων
τίνα τοῦτον, καὶ τίνες οἱ λέγοντες;

MENON. Quem hunc et qui dicentes?

ME. Quis inquam iste? et quinam testantur?

MENO: What was it? and who were they?

Σωκράτης
οἱ μὲν λέγοντές εἰσι τῶν ἱερέων τε καὶ τῶν ἱερειῶν ὅσοις μεμέληκε περὶ ὧν μεταχειρίζονται λόγον οἵοις τ᾽ εἶναι (81b) διδόναι: λέγει δὲ καὶ Πίνδαρος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ὅσοι θεῖοί εἰσιν. ἃ δὲ λέγουσιν, ταυτί ἐστιν: ἀλλὰ σκόπει εἴ σοι δοκοῦσιν ἀληθῆ λέγειν. φασὶ γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι ἀθάνατον, καὶ τοτὲ μὲν τελευτᾶν—ὃ δὴ ἀποθνῄσκειν καλοῦσι—τοτὲ δὲ πάλιν γίγνεσθαι, ἀπόλλυσθαι δ᾽ οὐδέποτε: δεῖν δὴ διὰ ταῦτα ὡς ὁσιώτατα διαβιῶναι τὸν βίον: οἷσιν γὰρ ἂν—

SOCRATES. Dicentes quidem sunt ex sacerdotibus et sacerdotissis, quibuscunque cure fuit, de quibus meditabantur, rationem possibiles esse dare. Dicitque et Pindarus et alii multi poetarum quicunque divini sunt. Que vero inquiunt hec sunt. Ceterum attende si tibi videntur vera proferre. Aiunt quippe animam hominis esse immortalem, et aliquotiens autem obire - quod mori vocant - interdum quoque iterum generari, interire vero nunquam. Oportere profecto propter ista quam sanctissime degendo agere vitam. ‘Quibus’ enim

SO. Qui hoc afferunt, sancti viri sunt, ac santæ etiam mulieres, quibuscunque cura existit, ut eorum quæ profitentur rationem reddere possent. Tradit præterea Pindarus, et cæteri quicunque Poëtarum divini sunt, talia quædam; quæ adverte quæso, num vera tibi videantur. Ferunt enim hominis animum immortalem esse, eumque tum decedere, quod quidem mori vocant, tum iterum redire, interire vero nunquam. Quam ob causam vita quoque sanctissime agere monent. Quicunque enim

SOCRATES: Some of them were priests and priestesses, who had studied how they might be able to give a reason of their profession: there have been poets also, who spoke of these things by inspiration, like Pindar, and many others who were inspired. And they say--mark, now, and see whether their words are true-- they say that the soul of man is immortal, and at one time has an end, which is termed dying, and at another time is born again, but is never destroyed. And the moral is, that a man ought to live always in perfect holiness.

“Φερσεφόνα ποινὰν παλαιοῦ πένθεος
δέξεται, εἰς τὸν ὕπερθεν ἅλιον κείνων ἐνάτῳ ἔτεϊ
ἀνδιδοῖ ψυχὰς πάλιν,”

(81c) “ἐκ τᾶν βασιλῆες ἀγαυοὶ
καὶ σθένει κραιπνοὶ σοφίᾳ τε μέγιστοι
ἄνδρες αὔξοντ᾽: ἐς δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἥρωες ἁγνοὶ
πρὸς ἀνθρώπων καλεῦνται.” (Pind. Fr. 133 Bergk)

‘Persefone penam veteris luctus
acceperit, in superam maritimam illorum nono anno
reddat animam iterum,

ex quibus reges clari
et robore fortes sapientiaque maximi
viri crescent. In reliquo vero tempore heroes pudici
ab hominibus vocantur’.

pœnas antiquæ miseriæ, Proserpinæ iam dederunt, iis illa ad supernum solem nono anno rursus animam reddit, quousque in reges glorai sagacitate, sapientiaque præstantes evadant. Reliquum atem tempus sncti heroës inter homines vocantur.

‘For in the ninth year Persephone sends the souls of those from whom she has received the penalty of ancient crime back again from beneath into the light of the sun above,

and these are they who become noble kings and mighty men and great in wisdom and are called saintly heroes in after ages.’

ἅτε οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός τε οὖσα καὶ πολλάκις γεγονυῖα, καὶ ἑωρακυῖα καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε καὶ τὰ ἐν Ἅιδου καὶ πάντα χρήματα, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτι οὐ μεμάθηκεν: ὥστε οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ ἄλλων οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι αὐτὴν ἀναμνησθῆναι, ἅ γε καὶ πρότερον ἠπίστατο. ἅτε γὰρ τῆς φύσεως (81d) ἁπάσης συγγενοῦς οὔσης, καὶ μεμαθηκυίας τῆς ψυχῆς ἅπαντα, οὐδὲν κωλύει ἓν μόνον ἀναμνησθέντα—ὃ δὴ μάθησιν καλοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι—τἆλλα πάντα αὐτὸν ἀνευρεῖν, ἐάν τις ἀνδρεῖος ᾖ καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνῃ ζητῶν: τὸ γὰρ ζητεῖν ἄρα καὶ τὸ μανθάνειν ἀνάμνησις ὅλον ἐστίν. οὔκουν δεῖ πείθεσθαι τούτῳ τῷ ἐριστικῷ λόγῳ: οὗτος μὲν γὰρ ἂν ἡμᾶς ἀργοὺς ποιήσειεν καὶ ἔστιν τοῖς μαλακοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἡδὺς ἀκοῦσαι, ὅδε (81e) δὲ ἐργατικούς τε καὶ ζητητικοὺς ποιεῖ: ᾧ ἐγὼ πιστεύων ἀληθεῖ εἶναι ἐθέλω μετὰ σοῦ ζητεῖν ἀρετὴ ὅτι ἐστίν.

Tamquam ergo anima immortalisque existens et que frequenter nata sit et perspexerit et que hic et que in Averno et universas res, non est quod non didicerit. Qua de re non mirum et de virtute et de aliis possibile esse ipsam reminisci, que et prius scivit. Quasi enim nature totius cognata existente anima et que didicerit universa, nichil prohibet unum dumtaxat recordatum - quod vero disciplinam vocant homines - alia cuncta ipsum ad(in)veniente(m), si quis virilis fuerit et minime pre labore desistat querens. Nam querere igitur et discere monumentum totum est. Nullatenus ergo decet persuaderi huic litigioso argumento. Hoc namque nos segnes faciet et es. mollibus hominum dulce auditu, illud sane operativos et inquisitivos efficit. Cui ego credens verum esse, volo tecum scrutari virtus quid est.

. Quamobrem nihil mirum est, si eorum quæ ad virtutem et ad alia pertinent, reminisci possit; quippe cum olim illa cognoverit. Cum enim tota natura cognata sit, ac sibimet consona, et animus cuncta didicerit, nihil prohibet hominem unius quiusdam reminiscentem, quam disciplinam vocant, reliqua omnia recupe rare, siquis adeo constans sit, ut quæreno minime fatigetur.Quærere igitur ac dicere reminiscentia est. Quapropter litigiosæ illi argumntationi nequaquam credere decet, pigros enim nos quodammodo redderet. Ea quoque mollioribus hominibus mirifice placet. Ratio autem nostra solertes rerum investiagatores efficit, qua ipse utpote vera fretus, una tecum quid sit virtus perscrutari desidero.

The soul, then, as being immortal, and having been born again many times, and having seen all things that exist, whether in this world or in the world below, has knowledge of them all; and it is no wonder that she should be able to call to remembrance all that she ever knew about virtue, and about everything; for as all nature is akin, and the soul has learned all things; there is no difficulty in her eliciting or as men say learning, out of a single recollection all the rest, if a man is strenuous and does not faint; for all enquiry and all learning is but recollection. And therefore we ought not to listen to this sophistical argument about the impossibility of enquiry: for it will make us idle; and is sweet only to the sluggard; but the other saying will make us active and inquisitive. In that confiding, I will gladly enquire with you into the nature of virtue.

Μένων
ναί, ὦ Σώκρατες: ἀλλὰ πῶς λέγεις τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ μανθάνομεν, ἀλλὰ ἣν καλοῦμεν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησίς ἐστιν; ἔχεις με τοῦτο διδάξαι ὡς οὕτως ἔχει;

MENON. Ne, o Socrates; verum simpliciter dicis hoc, quia non addiscimus, immo quam vocamus disciplinam monumentum est? Habes me istud docere quoniam sic se habet?

ME. Imo o Socrates. sed num absolute id afferis nos minime discere? quam disciplinam vocamus reminiscentiam esse? potesne hoc is esse me docere?

MENO: Yes, Socrates; but what do you mean by saying that we do not learn, and that what we call learning is only a process of recollection? Can you teach me how this is?

Σωκράτης
καὶ ἄρτι εἶπον, ὦ Μένων, ὅτι πανοῦργος εἶ, καὶ (82a) νῦν ἐρωτᾷς εἰ ἔχω σε διδάξαι, ὃς οὔ φημι διδαχὴν εἶναι ἀλλ᾽ ἀνάμνησιν, ἵνα δὴ εὐθὺς φαίνωμαι αὐτὸς ἐμαυτῷ τἀναντία λέγων.

SOCRATES. Et modo dicebam, o Menon, quoniam versipellis es, et nunc rogas, an habeam te docere, qui non dicam doctrinam esse sed recordationem, quatenus statim appaream ipse michi ipsi contraria dicens.

SO. In superioribus quoque o Meno te callidum esse dixi, et nunc rogas utrum docere te possim, cum ante nullam esse disciplinam, sed reminiscentiam afferuerim, ut evestigio mihi ipsi repugnare videar.

SOCRATES: I told you, Meno, just now that you were a rogue, and now you ask whether I can teach you, when I am saying that there is no teaching, but only recollection; and thus you imagine that you will involve me in a contradiction.

Μένων
οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ πρὸς τοῦτο βλέψας εἶπον, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔθους: ἀλλ᾽ εἴ πώς μοι ἔχεις ἐνδείξασθαι ὅτι ἔχει ὥσπερ λέγεις, ἔνδειξαι.

MENON. Nequaquam per Iovem, o Socrates, non ad hoc respiciens dicebam, sed consuetudine. Verum si quo pacto michi habes ostendere, quoniam ita se habet ut dicis, ostende.

ME. Per Iovem o Socrates non hoc instituebam, sed consuetudine potius quadam ita locutus sum. Quod si qua ratione illud mihi ostendere potes, ostende obsecro.

MENO: Indeed, Socrates, I protest that I had no such intention. I only asked the question from habit; but if you can prove to me that what you say is true, I wish that you would.

Σωκράτης
ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι μὲν οὐ ῥᾴδιον, ὅμως δὲ ἐθέλω προθυμηθῆναι σοῦ ἕνεκα. ἀλλά μοι προσκάλεσον τῶν πολλῶν (82b) ἀκολούθων τουτωνὶ τῶν σαυτοῦ ἕνα, ὅντινα βούλει, ἵνα ἐν τούτῳ σοι ἐπιδείξωμαι.

SOCRATES. Sed est equidem non facile, attamen volo animum adhibere tui ergo. Atqui michi advoca multorum acolitorum horum tui ipsius unum quem velis, quatenus in hoc tibi demonstrem.

SO. Haudquaquam facile est, tui tamen gratia conabor. Verum huc ad me unim aliquem istorum qui te sequuntur, accerse, ut in eam demonstrationem hanc experiamur.

SOCRATES: It will be no easy matter, but I will try to please you to the utmost of my power. Suppose that you call one of your numerous attendants, that I may demonstrate on him.

Μένων
πάνυ γε. δεῦρο πρόσελθε.

MENON. Prorsus utique huc accede.

ME. Libenter. heus tu huc ades.

MENO: Certainly. Come hither, boy.

Σωκράτης
Ἕλλην μέν ἐστι καὶ ἑλληνίζει;

Grecus autem est et grecissat,

SO. Græcus ne est? et Græce loquitur?

SOCRATES: He is Greek, and speaks Greek, does he not?

Μένων
πάνυ γε σφόδρα, οἰκογενής γε.

omnino certe servus domi genitus.

ME. Et Græcus est, et in domo mea genitus atque educatus.

MENO: Yes, indeed; he was born in the house.

Σωκράτης
πρόσεχε δὴ τὸν νοῦν ὁπότερ᾽ ἄν σοι φαίνηται, ἢ ἀναμιμνῃσκόμενος ἢ μανθάνων παρ᾽ ἐμοῦ.

SOCRATES. Applica sane mentem, utrum tibi videatur, an in memoriam reductus an addiscens a me.

SO. Attende igitur num illi in memoriam reducam, an doceam.

SOCRATES: Attend now to the questions which I ask him, and observe whether he learns of me or only remembers.

Μένων
ἀλλὰ προσέξω.

MENON. Immo attendam.

ME. Attendam certe.

MENO: I will.

Σωκράτης
εἰπὲ δή μοι, ὦ παῖ, γιγνώσκεις τετράγωνον χωρίον ὅτι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν;

SOCRATES. Dic quoque michi, o puer,

SO. Dic age o puer, cognoscis ne hoc tale spatium quadrangulum esse?

SOCRATES: Tell me, boy, do you know that a figure like this is a square?

Παῖς
ἔγωγε.

PU. Equidem.

BOY: I do.

Σωκράτης
ἔστιν οὖν (82c) τετράγωνον χωρίον ἴσας ἔχον τὰς γραμμὰς ταύτας πάσας, τέτταρας οὔσας;

agnoscis quadrangulum spatium equales habens lineas has omnes, quatuor cum sint?

SO. Habet ne quadrangulus has omnes quatuor limneas æquales?

SOCRATES: And you know that a square figure has these four lines equal?

Παῖς
πάνυ γε.

ACOLITUS. Penitus.

PU. Habet.

BOY: Certainly.

Σωκράτης
οὐ καὶ ταυτασὶ τὰς διὰ μέσου ἐστὶν ἴσας ἔχον;

SOCRATES. Nonne et istas, que per medium, est equales habens?

SO. An non et isbas quæ per medium protrahuntur, æquales habet?

SOCRATES: And these lines which I have drawn through the middle of the square are also equal?

Παῖς
ναί.

ACOLITUS. Etiam.

PU. Et istas.

BOY: Yes.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν εἴη ἂν τοιοῦτον χωρίον καὶ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον;

SOCRATES. Igitur esto utique huiuscemodi spatium maius ac minus?

SO. Nonne et maior et minor esse potest?

SOCRATES: A square may be of any size?

Παῖς
πάνυ γε.

ACOLITUS. Omnino.

PU. Potest.

BOY: Certainly.

Σωκράτης
εἰ οὖν εἴη αὕτη ἡ πλευρὰ δυοῖν ποδοῖν καὶ αὕτη δυοῖν, πόσων ἂν εἴη ποδῶν τὸ ὅλον; ὧδε δὲ σκόπει: εἰ ἦν ταύτῃ δυοῖν ποδοῖν, ταύτῃ δὲ ἑνὸς ποδὸς μόνον, ἄλλο τι ἅπαξ ἂν ἦν δυοῖν ποδοῖν τὸ χωρίον;

SOCRATES. Si ergo fuerit hoc latus duorum pedum et hoc duorum, quot nempe erit pedum totum? Sic autem examina: esto hoc duorum pedum, hoc vero unius pedis dumtaxat, aliud quid quam semel nempe erit duorum pedum spatium?

SO. Si ergo sit hoc latus duorum pedum, et istud quoque duorum, quot pedum totum ipsum erit? Sic autem considera, si latus hoc duorum esset pedum, ullud vero unius, esset ne plusquam semel duorum pedum hoc spatium?

SOCRATES: And if one side of the figure be of two feet, and the other side be of two feet, how much will the whole be? Let me explain: if in one direction the space was of two feet, and in the other direction of one foot, the whole would be of two feet taken once?

Παῖς
(82d) ναί.

ACOLITUS. Ita.

PU. Semel.

BOY: Yes.

Σωκράτης
ἐπειδὴ δὲ δυοῖν ποδοῖν καὶ ταύτῃ, ἄλλο τι ἢ δὶς δυοῖν γίγνεται;

SOCRATES. Quando quidem certe duorum et hoc, aliud quid quam bis efficitur?

SO. Quoniam verum alterumquoque latus duorum pedum est, num aliud quam bis duorum pedum sit?

SOCRATES: But since this side is also of two feet, there are twice two feet?

Παῖς
γίγνεται.

ACOLITUS. Efficitur.

PU. Istuc ipsum.

BOY: There are.

Σωκράτης
δυοῖν ἄρα δὶς γίγνεται ποδῶν;

SOCRATES. Duorum itaque bis fit pedum?

SO. Duorum ergo bis pedum efficiuntur.

SOCRATES: Then the square is of twice two feet?

Παῖς
ναί.

ACOLITUS. Ne.

PU. Ita.

BOY: Yes.

Σωκράτης
πόσοι οὖν εἰσιν οἱ δύο δὶς πόδες; λογισάμενος εἰπέ.

SOCRATES. Quot igitur sunt duo bis pedes? Ratiocinatus dic.

SO. Quotnam sunt bis duo pedes? computa.

SOCRATES: And how many are twice two feet? count and tell me.

Παῖς
τέτταρες, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ACOLITUS. Quatuor, o Socrates.

PU. Quatuor.

BOY: Four, Socrates.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν γένοιτ᾽ ἂν τούτου τοῦ χωρίου ἕτερον διπλάσιον, τοιοῦτον δέ, ἴσας ἔχον πάσας τὰς γραμμὰς ὥσπερ τοῦτο;

SOCRATES. Igitur fiat utique huius spatii alterum duplum, tale nempe, equales habens cunctas lineas tamquam istud?

SO. An non fieri potest spatium aliud ad hoc duplum, habens similiter omnes æquales lineas quemadmodum istud habere vides?

SOCRATES: And might there not be another square twice as large as this, and having like this the lines equal?

Παῖς
ναί.

ACOLITUS. Sic.

PU. Prorsus.

BOY: Yes.

Σωκράτης
πόσων οὖν ἔσται ποδῶν;

SOCRATES. Quot ergo erit pedum?

SO. Quot pedum erit?

SOCRATES: And of how many feet will that be?

Παῖς
ὀκτώ.

ACOLITUS. Octo.

PU. Octo.

BOY: Of eight feet.

Σωκράτης
φέρε δή, πειρῶ μοι εἰπεῖν πηλίκη τις ἔσται (82e) ἐκείνου ἡ γραμμὴ ἑκάστη. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦδε δυοῖν ποδοῖν: τί δὲ ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ διπλασίου;

SOCRATES. Eya vero, experire michi dicere, quantum quid erit illius linea unaqueque. Nam huius duorum pedum; quid autem illius dupli?

SO. Age iam conare mihi dicere, qualis est quælibet illius linea; huius siquidem duorum pedum. linea vero illius dupli, qualis?

SOCRATES: And now try and tell me the length of the line which forms the side of that double square: this is two feet--what will that be?

Παῖς
δῆλον δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι διπλασία.

ACOLITUS. Liquet, o Socrates, quoniam dupla.

PU. Patet o Socrates esse duplam.

BOY: Clearly, Socrates, it will be double.

Σωκράτης
ὁρᾷς, ὦ Μένων, ὡς ἐγὼ τοῦτον οὐδὲν διδάσκω, ἀλλ᾽ ἐρωτῶ πάντα; καὶ νῦν οὗτος οἴεται εἰδέναι ὁποία ἐστὶν ἀφ᾽ ἧς τὸ ὀκτώπουν χωρίον γενήσεται: ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι;

SOCRATES. Vides, o Menon, quoniam ego hunc nichil doceo, sed interrogo universa? Et nunc iste autumat scire, qualis est qua octopedale spatium fiat; an non videtur tibi?

SO. Cernis o Meno, me nihil ex his docere, sed singula potius interrogare? Et nunc iste nosse se putat, qualis ea sit a qua spatium octo pedum conficitur. An non tibi videtur?

SOCRATES: Do you observe, Meno, that I am not teaching the boy anything, but only asking him questions; and now he fancies that he knows how long a line is necessary in order to produce a figure of eight square feet; does he not?

Μένων
ἔμοιγε.

MENON. Michi profecto.

ME. Mihi quidem.

MENO: Yes.

Σωκράτης
οἶδεν οὖν;

SOCRATES. Novit igitur?

SO. Novit igitur?

SOCRATES: And does he really know?

Μένων
οὐ δῆτα.

MENON. Neutiquam.

ME. Minime.

MENO: Certainly not.

Σωκράτης
οἴεται δέ γε ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας;

SOCRATES. Existimat certe a dupla?

SO. Putat autem a dupla?

SOCRATES: He only guesses that because the square is double, the line is double.

Μένων
ναί.

MENON. Ita.

ME. Ita.

MENO: True.

Σωκράτης
θεῶ δὴ αὐτὸν ἀναμιμνῃσκόμενον ἐφεξῆς, ὡς δεῖ ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι. σὺ δέ μοι λέγε: ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας γραμμῆς φῂς τὸ (83a) διπλάσιον χωρίον γίγνεσθαι; τοιόνδε λέγω, μὴ ταύτῃ μὲν μακρόν, τῇ δὲ βραχύ, ἀλλὰ ἴσον πανταχῇ ἔστω ὥσπερ τουτί, διπλάσιον δὲ τούτου, ὀκτώπουν: ἀλλ᾽ ὅρα εἰ ἔτι σοι ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας δοκεῖ ἔσεσθαι.

SOCRATES. Vide autem ipsum recordatum deinceps, ut oportet reminisci. Tu veto dic: a dupla linea dicis duplum spatium fieri? Tale quidem dico: non hac quoque longum, hac veto breve, sed equale undique esto quemadmodum istud, duplum sane huic, octopedale. Verum vide an adhuc a dupla videtur fore.

SO. Aspice deinceps hunc per ordinem ut oportet reminiscentem. Tu autem dic amabo a dupla limmea duplum spatium nasci fateris? tale profecto dico, quod non hac lingua, illa breve, sed quale inique quemadmodum istud; duplum vero istius, octo pedum. sed inspice an tibi adhuc a dupla fieri videant.

SOCRATES: Observe him while he recalls the steps in regular order. (To the Boy:) Tell me, boy, do you assert that a double space comes from a double line? Remember that I am not speaking of an oblong, but of a figure equal every way, and twice the size of this--that is to say of eight feet; and I want to know whether you still say that a double square comes from double line?

Παῖς
ἔμοιγε.

ACOLITUS. Michi nempe.

PU. Mihi plane.

BOY: Yes.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν διπλασία αὕτη ταύτης γίγνεται, ἂν ἑτέραν τοσαύτην προσθῶμεν ἐνθένδε;

SOCRATES. Igitur dupla ipsa huius efficitur, si alteram tantam apponamus hinc quoque?

SO. Nonne huius dupla hæc sit, si aliam æqualem huic adiiciamus?

SOCRATES: But does not this line become doubled if we add another such line here?

Παῖς
πάνυ γε.

ACOLITUS. Funditus utique.

PU. Prorsus.

BOY: Certainly.

Σωκράτης
ἀπὸ ταύτης δή, φῄς, ἔσται τὸ ὀκτώπουν χωρίον, ἂν τέτταρες τοσαῦται (83b) γένωνται;

SOCRATES. Ab ista, dicis, erit octopedale spatium, si quatuor tante fiant?

SO. Ab hac fore dicis octo pedum spatium, si quidem quatuor huic ęquales efficiantur?

SOCRATES: And four such lines will make a space containing eight feet?

Παῖς
ναί.

ACOLITUS. Etiam.

PU. Aio.

BOY: Yes.

Σωκράτης
ἀναγραψώμεθα δὴ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς ἴσας τέτταρας. ἄλλο τι ἢ τουτὶ ἂν εἴη ὃ φῂς τὸ ὀκτώπουν εἶναι;

SOCRATES. Describamus autem ab ea equales quatuor. Aliud quicquid istud nempe erit, quod ais octopedale esse?

SO. Describamus iterum igitur ab hac æquales quatuor, aliud ne quoque quod octo pedum vocas, suborient?

SOCRATES: Let us describe such a figure: Would you not say that this is the figure of eight feet?

Παῖς
πάνυ γε.

ACOLITUS. Omnino.

PU. Hoc ipsum.

BOY: Yes.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστιν ταυτὶ τέτταρα, ὧν ἕκαστον ἴσον τούτῳ ἐστὶν τῷ τετράποδι;

SOCRATES. Itaque in ipso erunt hec quatuor, quorum singulum equa!e erit huic quadrupedali?

SO. Nonne in ipso sunt hæc quatuor, quorum quodlibet isti quadrupedali æquale est?

SOCRATES: And are there not these four divisions in the figure, each of which is equal to the figure of four feet?

Παῖς
ναί.

ACOLITUS. Ne.

PU. Certe.

BOY: True.

Σωκράτης
πόσον οὖν γίγνεται; οὐ τετράκις τοσοῦτον;

SOCRATES. Quantum ergo efficitur? Quater tantum?

SO. Quantum itaque sit? an non quater tantum?

SOCRATES: And is not that four times four?

Παῖς
πῶς δ᾽ οὔ;

ACOLITUS. Qui vero minime?

PU. Quid ni?

BOY: Certainly.

Σωκράτης
διπλάσιον οὖν ἐστιν τὸ τετράκις τοσοῦτον;

SOCRATES. Duplum igitur est quater tantum?

SO. Num duplum est id quod quater tantum?

SOCRATES: And four times is not double?

Παῖς
οὐ μὰ Δία.

ACOLITUS. Non per Iovem.

PU. Non perIovem.

BOY: No, indeed.

Σωκράτης
ἀλλὰ ποσαπλάσιον;

SOCRATES. At quantuplum?

SO. At quotuplum?

SOCRATES: But how much?

Παῖς
τετραπλάσιον.

ACOLITUS. Quadruplum.

PU. Quadruplum.

BOY: Four times as much.

Σωκράτης
ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας (83c) ἄρα, ὦ παῖ, οὐ διπλάσιον ἀλλὰ τετραπλάσιον γίγνεται χωρίον.

SOCRATES. A dupla igitur, o puer, haud duplum immo quadruplum efficitur spatium.

SO. A dupla ergo o Puer non duplum, sed quadruplumspatium procreant?

SOCRATES: Therefore the double line, boy, has given a space, not twice, but four times as much.

Παῖς
ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ACOLITUS. Verum inquis.

PU. Vera loqueris.

BOY: True.

Σωκράτης
τεττάρων γὰρ τετράκις ἐστὶν ἑκκαίδεκα. οὐχί;

SOCRATES. Ex quatuor nimirum quater est sedecim, nonne?

SO. Quater enim quatuor sex et decem complent, nonne?

SOCRATES: Four times four are sixteen--are they not?

Παῖς
ναί.

ACOLITUS. Ne.

PU. Sic est.

BOY: Yes.

Σωκράτης
ὀκτώπουν δ᾽ ἀπὸ ποίας γραμμῆς; οὐχὶ ἀπὸ μὲν ταύτης τετραπλάσιον;

SOCRATES. Octopedale revera a qua linea non ab ista vero quadruplum?

SO. Octo pedum autem spatium a qua linea? nonne ab hac quadruplum?

SOCRATES: What line would give you a space of eight feet, as this gives one of sixteen feet;--do you see?

Παῖς
φημί.

ACOLITUS. Inquam.

PU. Fateor.

BOY: Yes.

Σωκράτης
τετράπουν δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμισέας ταυτησὶ τουτί;

SOCRATES. Quadrupedale revera a dimidia ista hec?

SO. Quartum vero hoc ab hac dimidia?

SOCRATES: And the space of four feet is made from this half line?

Παῖς
ναί.

ACOLITUS. Sic.

PU. Ita.

BOY: Yes.

Σωκράτης
εἶεν: τὸ δὲ ὀκτώπουν οὐ τοῦδε μὲν διπλάσιόν ἐστιν, τούτου δὲ ἥμισυ;

SOCRATES. Octopedale num illius duplum est, huius vero dimidium?

SO. Age igitur octo pedum nonne huius duplum est, illius vero dimidium?

SOCRATES: Good; and is not a space of eight feet twice the size of this, and half the size of the other?

Παῖς
ναί.

PU. Imo.

BOY: Certainly.

Σωκράτης
οὐκ ἀπὸ μὲν μείζονος ἔσται ἢ τοσαύτης γραμμῆς, ἀπὸ ἐλάττονος δὲ ἢ (83d) τοσησδί; ἢ οὔ;

Numquid a maiore erit sive tanta linea, a minore quoque quam tanta, nonne?

SO. An non edit ergo a maiori linea quam hæc tanta, et a minori atque illa tanta?

SOCRATES: Such a space, then, will be made out of a line greater than this one, and less than that one?

Παῖς
ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτω.

ACOLITUS. Michi revera videtur ita.

PU. Mihi quidem videtur.

BOY: Yes; I think so.

Σωκράτης
καλῶς: τὸ γάρ σοι δοκοῦν τοῦτο ἀποκρίνου. καί μοι λέγε: οὐχ ἥδε μὲν δυοῖν ποδοῖν ἦν, ἡ δὲ τεττάρων;

SOCRATES. Bene; quid enim tibi videtur, hoc responde. Et michi dic: nonne hec quidem duorum pedum erat, illa vero quatuor?

SO. Sic utique reecte loqueris. quod enim tibi videtur, id responde; ac mihi dicas, hæc ne duorum pedum, illa quatuor?

SOCRATES: Very good; I like to hear you say what you think. And now tell me, is not this a line of two feet and that of four?

Παῖς
ναί.

ACOLITUS. Ne.

PU. Ita.

BOY: Yes.

Σωκράτης
δεῖ ἄρα τὴν τοῦ ὀκτώποδος χωρίου γραμμὴν μείζω μὲν εἶναι τῆσδε τῆς δίποδος, ἐλάττω δὲ τῆς τετράποδος.

SOCRATES. Oportet igitur octopedis spatii lineam maiorem esse ista dipode, minorem revera tetrapode.

SO. Oportet itaque octo pedum spatii lineam maiorem esse linea spatii bipedalis, minorem vero quadrupedalis linea.

SOCRATES: Then the line which forms the side of eight feet ought to be more than this line of two feet, and less than the other of four feet?

Παῖς
δεῖ.

ACOLITUS. Oportet.

PU. Oportet.

BOY: It ought.

(83e) Σωκράτης
πειρῶ δὴ λέγειν πηλίκην τινὰ φῂς αὐτὴν εἶναι.

SOCRATES. Tempta dicere, quantam ais ipsam esse.

SO. Annitere ut nobis qualis sit dicas.

SOCRATES: Try and see if you can tell me how much it will be.

Παῖς
τρίποδα.

ACOLITUS. Tripedalem.

PU. Tripedalis.

BOY: Three feet.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν ἄνπερ τρίπους ᾖ, τὸ ἥμισυ ταύτης προσληψόμεθα καὶ ἔσται τρίπους; δύο μὲν γὰρ οἵδε, ὁ δὲ εἷς: καὶ ἐνθένδε ὡσαύτως δύο μὲν οἵδε, ὁ δὲ εἷς: καὶ γίγνεται τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον ὃ φῄς.

SOCRATES. Ergo si tripedalis fuerit, dimidium huius assumemus et erit tripedalis? Duo quippe illi hic autem unus. Et ex hac parte similiter duo quidem illi, hic autem unus. Atque fit hoc spatium quod ais?

SO. Nonne si tripedalis est, dimidium huius assumemus, eritqu tripedalis? Duo nanque ii, is autem unus; et hinc eodem modo, duo quidem isti, iste autem unus; sitque hoc quod ais spatium.

SOCRATES: Then if we add a half to this line of two, that will be the line of three. Here are two and there is one; and on the other side, here are two also and there is one: and that makes the figure of which you speak?

Παῖς
ναί.

ACOLITUS. Ita.

PU. Ita.

BOY: Yes.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν ἂν ᾖ τῇδε τριῶν καὶ τῇδε τριῶν, τὸ ὅλον χωρίον τριῶν τρὶς ποδῶν γίγνεται;

SOCRATES. Igitur si fuerit hac vero trium et hac quoque trium, totum spatium trium tripedum efficitur?

SO. Nonne si hæc trium est et illa trium, totum utique spatium ter trium pedum conficutur?

SOCRATES: But if there are three feet this way and three feet that way, the whole space will be three times three feet?

Παῖς
φαίνεται.

ACOLITUS. Patet.

PU. Apparet.

BOY: That is evident.

Σωκράτης
τρεῖς δὲ τρὶς πόσοι εἰσὶ πόδες;

SOCRATES. Tres autem ter quot sunt pedes?

SO. Ter vero tres, quot pedes sunt?

SOCRATES: And how much are three times three feet?

Παῖς
ἐννέα.

ACOLITUS. Novem.

PU. Novem.

BOY: Nine.

Σωκράτης
ἔδει δὲ τὸ διπλάσιον πόσων εἶναι ποδῶν;

SOCRATES. Oportuit profecto duplum quot esse pedum?

SO. Duplum autem quot pedum esse supra oportuit?

SOCRATES: And how much is the double of four?

Παῖς
ὀκτώ.

ACOLITUS. Octo.

PU. Octo.

BOY: Eight.

Σωκράτης
οὐδ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἀπὸ τῆς τρίποδός πω τὸ ὀκτώπουν χωρίον γίγνεται.

SOCRATES. Haud igitur a tripedali octopedale spatium efficitur.

SO. Non ergo a tripedali spatium octo pedum exoritur.

SOCRATES: Then the figure of eight is not made out of a line of three?

Παῖς
οὐ δῆτα.

ACOLITUS. Nullatenus.

PU. Non profecto.

BOY: No.

Σωκράτης
ἀλλ᾽ ἀπὸ ποίας; πειρῶ ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν ἀκριβῶς: καὶ (84a) εἰ μὴ βούλει ἀριθμεῖν, ἀλλὰ δεῖξον ἀπὸ ποίας.

SOCRATES. Immo a qua? Experire nobis dicere diligenter; et si non vis numerate, at ostende a qua.

SO. A quali igitur conare nobis liquido exprimere; quod nisi numerare velis, saltem a quali demonstra.

SOCRATES: But from what line?--tell me exactly; and if you would rather not reckon, try and show me the line.

Παῖς
ἀλλὰ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε οὐκ οἶδα.

ACOLITUS. Atqui per Iovem, o Socrates, ego nescio.

PU. Per Iovem o SOcrates haud novi.

BOY: Indeed, Socrates, I do not know.

Σωκράτης
ἐννοεῖς αὖ, ὦ Μένων, οὗ ἐστιν ἤδη βαδίζων ὅδε τοῦ ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι; ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ᾔδει μὲν οὔ, ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ ὀκτώποδος χωρίου γραμμή, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ νῦν πω οἶδεν, ἀλλ᾽ οὖν ᾤετό γ᾽ αὐτὴν τότε εἰδέναι, καὶ θαρραλέως ἀπεκρίνετο ὡς εἰδώς, καὶ οὐχ ἡγεῖτο ἀπορεῖν: νῦν δὲ ἡγεῖται (84b) ἀπορεῖν ἤδη, καὶ ὥσπερ οὐκ οἶδεν, οὐδ᾽ οἴεται εἰδέναι.

SOCRATES. Advertis item, o Menon, quo iam venit ille reminiscendi? Quoniam primo scivit equidem minime, que sit octopedalis spatii linea, quemadmodum neque novit; sed existimabat istam tunc scire et audacter respondebat quasi noscens, et non arbitrabatur hesitate. Nunc autem arbitratur ambigere iam, et, velut non novit, neque noscere.

SO. Advertis iterum o Meno quo fit reminiscendo iam progressus. Nam ad ipso principio disputandi nequaquam noverat quæ sit octo pedum spatii linea, quemadmodum nec in pręsentia novit; verum tunc se nosse illam opinabatur, et audacter nimium quasi sciens respondebat, nec deesse sibi quicquam putabat; nunc autem egere se iam existimat, et ut ignorat, sic se ignorare fatetur.

SOCRATES: Do you see, Meno, what advances he has made in his power of recollection He did not know at first, and he does not know now, what is the side of a figure of eight feet: but then he thought that he knew, and answered confidently as if he knew, and had no difficulty; now he has a difficulty, and neither knows nor fancies that he knows.

Μένων
ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

MENON. Verum ais.

ME. Vera dicis.

MENO: True.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν νῦν βέλτιον ἔχει περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα ὃ οὐκ ᾔδει;

SOCRATES. Nonne igitur melius se habet circa rem quam non novit?

SO. None rectius nunc ad id quod ignorat affectus est?

SOCRATES: Is he not better off in knowing his ignorance?

Μένων
καὶ τοῦτό μοι δοκεῖ.

MENON. Etiam hoc michi videtur.

ME. Hoc quoque arbitror.

MENO: I think that he is.

Σωκράτης
ἀπορεῖν οὖν αὐτὸν ποιήσαντες καὶ ναρκᾶν ὥσπερ ἡ νάρκη, μῶν τι ἐβλάψαμεν;

SOCRATES. Dubitare itaque eum facientes et narcissare tamquam narca, ergo quid obfuimus?

SO. Cum ergo ambigere ipsum compulerim, et piscis illius more stupidum fecerim, num aliquid obfuit?

SOCRATES: If we have made him doubt, and given him the ‘torpedo’s shock,’ have we done him any harm?

Μένων
οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

MENON. Minime michi videtur.

ME. Non ut mihi videtur.

MENO: I think not.

Σωκράτης
προὔργου γοῦν τι πεποιήκαμεν, ὡς ἔοικε, πρὸς τὸ ἐξευρεῖν ὅπῃ ἔχει: νῦν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ζητήσειεν ἂν ἡδέως οὐκ εἰδώς, τότε δὲ ῥᾳδίως ἂν καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς καὶ πολλάκις (84c) ᾤετ᾽ ἂν εὖ λέγειν περὶ τοῦ διπλασίου χωρίου, ὡς δεῖ διπλασίαν τὴν γραμμὴν ἔχειν μήκει.

SOCRATES. Operosum igitur aliquo modo efficimus, ut videtur, ad inveniendum qualiter se habeat. Modo nimirum et investigabit utique libenter non agnoscens, tunc vero leviter ad multos et multotiens putabat certe bene dicere de duplo spatio, quod oportet duplam lineam habere longitudinem.

SO. Operepręcium itaque fecimus ad veritatem inveniendam; nunc enim utpote ignorantiæ suæ conscius libenter et sponte perquierere; at tunc sine controversia, et sæpe, et adversus quamplurimos loqui se recte arbitrabatur dum spatium duplum, duplam longitudine lineam habere oportet profiteretur.

SOCRATES: We have certainly, as would seem, assisted him in some degree to the discovery of the truth; and now he will wish to remedy his ignorance, but then he would have been ready to tell all the world again and again that the double space should have a double side.

Μένων
ἔοικεν.

MENON. Videtur.

ME. Videntur.

MENO: True.

Σωκράτης
οἴει οὖν ἂν αὐτὸν πρότερον ἐπιχειρῆσαι ζητεῖν ἢ μανθάνειν τοῦτο ὃ ᾤετο εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς, πρὶν εἰς ἀπορίαν κατέπεσεν ἡγησάμενος μὴ εἰδέναι, καὶ ἐπόθησεν τὸ εἰδέναι;

SOCRATES. Putas igitur ipsum prius niti querere ac discere hoc, quod rebatur scire cum nescivisset, antequam in hesitationem dilapsus esset arbitratus non scire, ac affectabat scire?

SO. Num censes ipsum studuisse unquam, ut id vel inveniret, qua et suam ignorantiam re deprehendit, et scientia appetere cœpit?

SOCRATES: But do you suppose that he would ever have enquired into or learned what he fancied that he knew, though he was really ignorant of it, until he had fallen into perplexity under the idea that he did not know, and had desired to know?

Μένων
οὔ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

MENON. Neutiquam michi videtur, o Socrates.

ME. Nequaquam o Socrate.

MENO: I think not, Socrates.

Σωκράτης
ὤνητο ἄρα ναρκήσας;

SOCRATES. Lucratus est ergo narcissans?

SO. Profuit igitur sibi stupor eiusmodi.

SOCRATES: Then he was the better for the torpedo’s touch?

Μένων
δοκεῖ μοι.

MENON. Videtur michi.

ME. Videtur.

MENO: I think so.

Σωκράτης
σκέψαι δὴ ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας ὅτι καὶ ἀνευρήσει ζητῶν μετ᾽ ἐμοῦ, οὐδὲν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἐρωτῶντος ἐμοῦ καὶ οὐ διδάσκοντος: (84d) φύλαττε δὲ ἄν που εὕρῃς με διδάσκοντα καὶ διεξιόντα αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰς τούτου δόξας ἀνερωτῶντα. λέγε γάρ μοι σύ: οὐ τὸ μὲν τετράπουν τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἐστι χωρίον; μανθάνεις;

SOCRATES. Intuere sane ex hac dubitatione quoniam et [si] adinveniet querens mecum nichil nisi percunctante me et non docente. Observa sicubi invenias me docentem et exponentem ipsi, sed non istorum opiniones requirentem. Dic namque michi tu: nonne vero quadrupedale hoc nobis existit spatium? Perpendis?

SO. Considera itaque ex hac ambiguitate, quod iste una mecum investigans nihil me docente, sed potius interrogante reperiet. Obseva obsecro diligenter, num hunc docere aut ei demonstrare quicquam videar potius atque eiusmodi opiniones per singula elicere. Tu enim dic, hoc ne spatium quadrupedale est? Intellextin?

SOCRATES: Mark now the farther development. I shall only ask him, and not teach him, and he shall share the enquiry with me: and do you watch and see if you find me telling or explaining anything to him, instead of eliciting his opinion. Tell me, boy, is not this a square of four feet which I have drawn?

Παῖς
ἔγωγε.

ACOLITUS. Ego utique.

PU. Equidem.

BOY: Yes.

Σωκράτης
ἕτερον δὲ αὐτῷ προσθεῖμεν ἂν τουτὶ ἴσον;

SOCRATES. Alterum ipsi addamus istud equale?

SO. Num et hoc aliud æquale isti apponere licet?

SOCRATES: And now I add another square equal to the former one?

Παῖς
ναί.

ACOLITUS. Quidni.

PU. Licet.

BOY: Yes.

Σωκράτης
καὶ τρίτον τόδε ἴσον ἑκατέρῳ τούτων;

SO. Et tertium istud utrique istorum æquale?

SOCRATES: And a third, which is equal to either of them?

Παῖς
ναί.

PU. Et istud.

BOY: Yes.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν προσαναπληρωσαίμεθ᾽ ἂν τὸ ἐν τῇ γωνίᾳ τόδε;

SOCRATES. Igitur adimpleamus utique quod in angulo illud?

SO. Nonne hoc quod in angulo est complere licet?

SOCRATES: Suppose that we fill up the vacant corner?

Παῖς
πάνυ γε.

ACOLITUS. Penitus.

PU. Prorsus.

BOY: Very good.

Σωκράτης
ἄλλο τι οὖν γένοιτ᾽ ἂν τέτταρα ἴσα χωρία (84e) τάδε;

SOCRATES. Aliud quid ergo fiant quatuor equalia spatia hec?

SO. Hæc inde æqualia spatia quatuor nascerentur?

SOCRATES: Here, then, there are four equal spaces?

Παῖς
ναί.

ACOLITUS. Quidni.

PU. Ita.

BOY: Yes.

Σωκράτης
τί οὖν; τὸ ὅλον τόδε ποσαπλάσιον τοῦδε γίγνεται;

SOCRATES. Ergo totum hoc quantuplum huius efficitur?

SO. Totum igitur hoc quotuplum ad istud efficitur?

SOCRATES: And how many times larger is this space than this other?

Παῖς
τετραπλάσιον.

ACOLITUS. Quadruplum.

PU. Quadruplum.

BOY: Four times.

Σωκράτης
ἔδει δέ γε διπλάσιον ἡμῖν γενέσθαι: ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι;

SOCRATES. Oportuit quoque duplum nobis fieri; an non reminisceris?

SO. Oportebat autem duplum nobis contingere, num recordaris?

SOCRATES: But it ought to have been twice only, as you will remember.

Παῖς
πάνυ γε.

ACOLITUS. Omnifariam.

PU. Maxime.

BOY: True.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν ἐστιν αὕτη γραμμὴ ἐκ γωνίας εἰς γωνίαν (85a) τινὰ τέμνουσα δίχα ἕκαστον τούτων τῶν χωρίων;

SOCRATES. Ergo est ipsa linea ab angulo in angulum quendam dirimens bifariam unumquodque istorum spatiorum?

SO. Nonne hæc linea ab angulo in angulum aliquem porrecta, in duo utrumque spatium dividit?

SOCRATES: And does not this line, reaching from corner to corner, bisect each of these spaces?

Παῖς
ναί.

ACOLITUS. Ne.

PU. Ita.

BOY: Yes.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν τέτταρες αὗται γίγνονται γραμμαὶ ἴσαι, περιέχουσαι τουτὶ τὸ χωρίον;

SOCRATES. Itaque quatuor ipse fiunt linee equales, continentes hoc spatium?

SO. Ergo hæ lineæ æquales fiunt, id spatium comprehendentes?

SOCRATES: And are there not here four equal lines which contain this space?

Παῖς
γίγνονται γάρ.

ACOLITUS. Fiunt.

PU. Fiunt

BOY: There are.

Σωκράτης
σκόπει δή: πηλίκον τί ἐστιν τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον;

SOCRATES. Considera quoque: quantum quid est hoc spatium?

SO. Considera itaque quale est spatium.

SOCRATES: Look and see how much this space is.

Παῖς
οὐ μανθάνω.

ACOLITUS. Minime adverto.

PU. Haud intellego.

BOY: I do not understand.

Σωκράτης
οὐχὶ τεττάρων ὄντων τούτων ἥμισυ ἑκάστου ἑκάστη ἡ γραμμὴ ἀποτέτμηκεν ἐντός; ἢ οὔ;

SOCRATES. Nonne quatuor cum sint ista, dimidium cuiusque queque linea dirimit interius, necne?

SO. Nonne cum hæc quatuor sint, dimidium quiusque linea quæque secat intrinsecus?

SOCRATES: Has not each interior line cut off half of the four spaces?

Παῖς
ναί.

ACOLITUS. Quidni.

PU. Secat.

BOY: Yes.

Σωκράτης
πόσα οὖν τηλικαῦτα ἐν τούτῳ ἔνεστιν;

SOCRATES. Quot ergo tanta in hoc insunt?

SO. Quot igitur tanta in hoc sunt?

SOCRATES: And how many spaces are there in this section?

Παῖς
τέτταρα.

ACOLITUS. Quatuor.

PU. Quatuor.

BOY: Four.

Σωκράτης
πόσα δὲ ἐν τῷδε;

SOCRATES. Quot vero in illo?

SO. Quot autem in isto?

SOCRATES: And how many in this?

Παῖς
δύο.

ACOLITUS. Duo.

PU. Duo.

BOY: Two.

Σωκράτης
τὰ δὲ τέτταρα τοῖν δυοῖν τί ἐστιν;

SOCRATES. Quatuor sane duobus quid sunt?

SO. At quatuor ad duo quotupla sunt?

SOCRATES: And four is how many times two?

Παῖς
διπλάσια.

ACOLITUS. Dupla.

PU. Dupla.

BOY: Twice.

Σωκράτης
τόδε οὖν (85b) ποσάπουν γίγνεται;

SOCRATES. Illud profecto quot pedum fit?

SO. Hoc itaque quot pedum fit?

SOCRATES: And this space is of how many feet?

Παῖς
ὀκτώπουν.

ACOLITUS. Octo pedum.

PU. Octo.

BOY: Of eight feet.

Σωκράτης
ἀπὸ ποίας γραμμῆς;

SOCRATES. A qua linea?

SO. A qua potissimum linea?

SOCRATES: And from what line do you get this figure?

Παῖς
ἀπὸ ταύτης.

ACOLITUS. Ab hac.

PU. Ab hac.

BOY: From this.

Σωκράτης
ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκ γωνίας εἰς γωνίαν τεινούσης τοῦ τετράποδος;

SOCRATES. Ab ea que ab angulo in angulum tendit quadrupedis?

SO. Ab ea ne, quæ quatuor pedum est, ab angulo protracta in angulum?

SOCRATES: That is, from the line which extends from corner to corner of the figure of four feet?

Παῖς
ναί.

ACOLITUS. Quidni.

PU. Ita.

BOY: Yes.

Σωκράτης
καλοῦσιν δέ γε ταύτην διάμετρον οἱ σοφισταί: ὥστ᾽ εἰ ταύτῃ διάμετρος ὄνομα, ἀπὸ τῆς διαμέτρου ἄν, ὡς σὺ φῄς, ὦ παῖ Μένωνος, γίγνοιτ᾽ ἂν τὸ διπλάσιον χωρίον.

SOCRATES. Vocantque istam sophiste dyametrum. Qua de causa si huic dyametros nomen, a dyametro utique, ut tu dicis, o puer Menonis, fiet duplum spatium.

SO. Hanc vero diametrum sophistae nuncupant; et si huic nomen est diametrus, a diametro, ut ipse ais o Puer, duplum spatium nasceretur.

SOCRATES: And that is the line which the learned call the diagonal. And if this is the proper name, then you, Meno’s slave, are prepared to affirm that the double space is the square of the diagonal?

Παῖς
πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ACOLITUS. Omni modo, o Socrates.

PU. Prorsus o Socrates.

BOY: Certainly, Socrates.

Σωκράτης
τί σοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Μένων; ἔστιν ἥντινα δόξαν οὐχ αὑτοῦ οὗτος ἀπεκρίνατο;

SOCRATES. Quid tibi videtur, o Menon? Est quam doxam non sui ipse responderet?

SO. Quid tibi Meno videt? respondit ne hic umquam ex alterius quam suiipsius opinione?

SOCRATES: What do you say of him, Meno? Were not all these answers given out of his own head?

(85c) Μένων
οὔκ, ἀλλ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ.

MENON. Nequaquam, sed sui ipsius.

ME. Nunquam, sed ex propria semper.

MENO: Yes, they were all his own.

Σωκράτης
καὶ μὴν οὐκ ᾔδει γε, ὡς ἔφαμεν ὀλίγον πρότερον.

SOCRATES. Necnon non novit, ut diximus paulo prius.

SO. Veruntamen haud novit, ut pauloante consessi sumus.

SOCRATES: And yet, as we were just now saying, he did not know?

Μένων
ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

MENON. Vera ais.

ME. Vero loqueris.

MENO: True.

Σωκράτης
ἐνῆσαν δέ γε αὐτῷ αὗται αἱ δόξαι: ἢ οὔ;

SOCRATES. Inerantque ipsi opiniones, necne?

SO. Inerant igitur huic opiniones huiusmodi.

SOCRATES: But still he had in him those notions of his--had he not?

Μένων
ναί.

MENON. Etiam.

ME. Inerant.

MENO: Yes.

Σωκράτης
τῷ οὐκ εἰδότι ἄρα περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ ἔνεισιν ἀληθεῖς δόξαι περὶ τούτων ὧν οὐκ οἶδε;

SOCRATES. Nescienti ergo de quibus non novit, insunt vere opiniones de hiis, que ignoravit?

SO. Huic igitur ignoranti opiniones de iis quæ ignorat verę insunt.

SOCRATES: Then he who does not know may still have true notions of that which he does not know?

Μένων
φαίνεται.

MENON. Claret.

ME. Apparet.

MENO: He has.

Σωκράτης
καὶ νῦν μέν γε αὐτῷ ὥσπερ ὄναρ ἄρτι ἀνακεκίνηνται αἱ δόξαι αὗται: εἰ δὲ αὐτόν τις ἀνερήσεται πολλάκις τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ πολλαχῇ, οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι τελευτῶν οὐδενὸς ἧττον ἀκριβῶς (85d) ἐπιστήσεται περὶ τούτων.

SOCRATES. Et nunc equidem ipsi quasi sompnium modo renovantur opiniones iste. Si vero quis eum interroget pluries eadem hec et pluribus modis, nosti quod ad ultimum nullo minus diligenter sciet de istis.

SO. Nunc igitur huic opiniones tales quasi per somnium suscitatæ sunt. quod si quis interroget hunc talia quædam sæpe et multa, certo scies hunc ista, siquis alius novit, perfecte cogniturum.

SOCRATES: And at present these notions have just been stirred up in him, as in a dream; but if he were frequently asked the same questions, in different forms, he would know as well as any one at last?

Μένων
ἔοικεν.

MENON. Videtur.

ME. Videtur.

MENO: I dare say.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν οὐδενὸς διδάξαντος ἀλλ᾽ ἐρωτήσαντος ἐπιστήσεται, ἀναλαβὼν αὐτὸς ἐξ αὑτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην;

SOCRATES. Igitur nemine docente sed percunctante sciet, resumens ipse ex se scientiam?

SO. Nonne igitur nemine prorsus docente, sed interrogante potius ista sciet ex seipso scientiam ad se revocans?

SOCRATES: Without any one teaching him he will recover his knowledge for himself, if he is only asked questions?

Μένων
ναί.

MENON. Quidni.

ME. Sic est.

MENO: Yes.

Σωκράτης
τὸ δὲ ἀναλαμβάνειν αὐτὸν ἐν αὑτῷ ἐπιστήμην οὐκ ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαί ἐστιν;

SOCRATES. Resumere ipsum in se scientiam non reminisci est?

SO. Recuperare vero scientiam in seipso, an non reminisci dicit?

SOCRATES: And this spontaneous recovery of knowledge in him is recollection?

Μένων
πάνυ γε.

MENON. Funditus.

ME. Prorsus

MENO: True.

Σωκράτης
ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὐ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἣν νῦν οὗτος ἔχει, ἤτοι ἔλαβέν ποτε ἢ ἀεὶ εἶχεν;

SOCRATES. Ergo igitur nonne scientiam, quam nunc iste habet, aut accepit aliquando aut semper habuit?

SO. At vero scientiam quam hic nunc habet, aut accipit aliquando, aut semper habuit.

SOCRATES: And this knowledge which he now has must he not either have acquired or always possessed?

Μένων
ναί.

MENON. Ita.

ME. Verum.

MENO: Yes.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν ἀεὶ εἶχεν, ἀεὶ καὶ ἦν ἐπιστήμων: εἰ δὲ ἔλαβέν ποτε, οὐκ ἂν ἔν γε τῷ νῦν βίῳ εἰληφὼς εἴη. ἢ (85e) δεδίδαχέν τις τοῦτον γεωμετρεῖν; οὗτος γὰρ ποιήσει περὶ πάσης γεωμετρίας ταὐτὰ ταῦτα, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μαθημάτων ἁπάντων. ἔστιν οὖν ὅστις τοῦτον πάντα δεδίδαχεν; δίκαιος γάρ που εἶ εἰδέναι, ἄλλως τε ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῇ σῇ οἰκίᾳ γέγονεν καὶ τέθραπται.

SOCRATES. Igitur si semper habuit, semper erat etiam sciens. Si vero recepit aliquando, non uti que in presenti vita accepit; aut docuit quis hunc geometricare? Hic namque faciet de omni geometria eadem ista et ceteris doctrinis universis. Est itaque qui hunc omnia docuerit? Iustus nimirum es scire, aliterque et quoniam in tua domo genitus est et educatus.

SO. Et si habuit semper, sciens semper extitit. sin quandoque percipit, hac in vita nequaquam. nemo enim hunc geometrica docuit, cum in cæteris omnibus quæcumque vel ad geometriam, vel alias disciplinas pertinent, hæc eadem sit facturus. Ast ne aliquis a quo hic illa omnia didicerit? Verisimile est te illum cognoscere, pręsertim cum penes te et natus et nutritus fuerit.

SOCRATES: But if he always possessed this knowledge he would always have known; or if he has acquired the knowledge he could not have acquired it in this life, unless he has been taught geometry; for he may be made to do the same with all geometry and every other branch of knowledge. Now, has any one ever taught him all this? You must know about him, if, as you say, he was born and bred in your house.

Μένων
ἀλλ᾽ οἶδα ἔγωγε ὅτι οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἐδίδαξεν.

MENON. Immo novi ego revera, quia nullus unquam docuit.

ME. Ego vero certus sum quod hunc quidem nemo docuit unquam.

MENO: And I am certain that no one ever did teach him.

Σωκράτης
ἔχει δὲ ταύτας τὰς δόξας, ἢ οὐχί;

SOCRATES. Habetque has opiniones seu non?

SO. Has ne opiniones habet?

SOCRATES: And yet he has the knowledge?

Μένων
ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαίνεται.

MENON. Necesse, o Socrates, videtur.

ME. Necessarium o Socrates id apparet.

MENO: The fact, Socrates, is undeniable.

Σωκράτης
εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ λαβών, οὐκ ἤδη τοῦτο (86a) δῆλον, ὅτι ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ χρόνῳ εἶχε καὶ ἐμεμαθήκει;

SOCRATES. Sin autem non in presenti vita accipiens non novit, hoc clarum, quoniam in alio aliquo tempore habuit et addidicit.

SO. Sin autem utpote in præsenti vita minime adeptus, haud novit, patet eum alio quodam in tempore habuisse atque didicisse.

SOCRATES: But if he did not acquire the knowledge in this life, then he must have had and learned it at some other time?

Μένων
φαίνεται.

MENON. Apparet.

ME. Apparet.

MENO: Clearly he must.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν οὗτός γέ ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος ὅτ᾽ οὐκ ἦν ἄνθρωπος;

SOCRATES. Itaque hoc quidem est tempus, quando non erat homo.

SO. An non tempos iam fuit, cum nondum homo hic erat?

SOCRATES: Which must have been the time when he was not a man?

Μένων
ναί.

MENON. Quidni.

ME. Istuc ipsum.

MENO: Yes.

Σωκράτης
εἰ οὖν ὅν τ᾽ ἂν ᾖ χρόνον καὶ ὃν ἂν μὴ ᾖ ἄνθρωπος, ἐνέσονται αὐτῷ ἀληθεῖς δόξαι, αἳ ἐρωτήσει ἐπεγερθεῖσαι ἐπιστῆμαι γίγνονται, ἆρ᾽ οὖν τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον μεμαθηκυῖα ἔσται ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτοῦ; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τὸν πάντα χρόνον ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος.

SOCRATES. Si igitur, quando fuerit tempore et quocumque non homo fuerit, inerunt ipsi vere opiniones, questiones excitate scientie fiunt. Ergo igitur semper tempore erudita fuerit anima eius? Liquidest quippe quoniam omni tempore est vel non est homo.

SO. Ergo siquando tempus sin in quo homo non fuit, inerunt tamen ipsi opiniones veræ, quæ sciscitando expergefactæ, scientiæ fiunt, certe per omne tempus hæc hominis animus sciet. nam omne per tempus, aut est, aut non est homo.

SOCRATES: And if there have been always true thoughts in him, both at the time when he was and was not a man, which only need to be awakened into knowledge by putting questions to him, his soul must have always possessed this knowledge, for he always either was or was not a man?

Μένων
φαίνεται.

MENON. Constat.

ME. Videt.

MENO: Obviously.

(86b) Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν εἰ ἀεὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια ἡμῖν τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀθάνατος ἂν ἡ ψυχὴ εἴη, ὥστε θαρροῦντα χρὴ ὃ μὴ τυγχάνεις ἐπιστάμενος νῦν—τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὃ μὴ μεμνημένος—ἐπιχειρεῖν ζητεῖν καὶ ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι;

SOCRATES. Igitur si semper veritas nobis eorum, queque sunt, est in anima, immortalis utique erit anima. Eapropter confidentem oportet, quod minus est sciens modo - hoc autem est quod non reminiscens - aggredi querere et recordari.

SO. Nonne igitur si semper rerum omnium veritas in animo est, immortalis extitit? Quamobrem audacter et magna cum fiducia oportet, quæ in præsentia minime scimus, hoc et minime recordamur, ut reminiscamur inquirere.

SOCRATES: And if the truth of all things always existed in the soul, then the soul is immortal. Wherefore be of good cheer, and try to recollect what you do not know, or rather what you do not remember.

Μένων
εὖ μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ οἶδ᾽ ὅπως.

MENON. Bene michi videris dicere, o Socrates.

ME. Bene mihi hescio quam modo o Socrates loqui videris.

MENO: I feel, somehow, that I like what you are saying.

Σωκράτης
καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἐμοί, ὦ Μένων. καὶ τὰ μέν γε ἄλλα οὐκ ἂν πάνυ ὑπὲρ τοῦ λόγου διισχυρισαίμην: ὅτι δ᾽ οἰόμενοι δεῖν ζητεῖν ἃ μή τις οἶδεν βελτίους ἂν εἶμεν καὶ ἀνδρικώτεροι καὶ ἧττον ἀργοὶ ἢ εἰ οἰοίμεθα ἃ μὴ ἐπιστάμεθα μηδὲ (86c) δυνατὸν εἶναι εὑρεῖν μηδὲ δεῖν ζητεῖν, περὶ τούτου πάνυ ἂν διαμαχοίμην, εἰ οἷός τε εἴην, καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ.

SOCRATES. Nescio quomodo, etenim ego michi, o Menon. Et equidem alia non utique pro hac sententia instarem. Quoniam autumantes oportere querere que minime quis novit, potiores uti que simus et viriliores et minus desidiosi, quam si arbitremur, que nequaquam scimus, non possibile esse invenire nec oportere querere: super hoc omnino decertarem, si possibilis essem, et verbo et opere.

SO. Mihi quoque o Meno. atque cætera non admodum contendo, quod autem qui quæ nesciunt inquirenda putant, meliores arrectioresque, et pigri ad vestigandum minus sint, quam qui quæ nesciunt, etiam non quæri posse putant, isthuc vero et verbis, et si queam, re ipsa contendam.

SOCRATES: And I, Meno, like what I am saying. Some things I have said of which I am not altogether confident. But that we shall be better and braver and less helpless if we think that we ought to enquire, than we should have been if we indulged in the idle fancy that there was no knowing and no use in seeking to know what we do not know; --that is a theme upon which I am ready to fight, in word and deed, to the utmost of my power.

Μένων
καὶ τοῦτο μέν γε δοκεῖς μοι εὖ λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

MENON. Et istud equidem videris michi bene dicere, o Socrates.

ME. Hoc quoque recte dicere videris o Socrates.

MENO: There again, Socrates, your words seem to me excellent.

Σωκράτης
βούλει οὖν, ἐπειδὴ ὁμονοοῦμεν ὅτι ζητητέον περὶ οὗ μή τις οἶδεν, ἐπιχειρήσωμεν κοινῇ ζητεῖν τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἀρετή;

SOCRATES. Vis ergo, quandoquidem consentimus, quoniam querendum de quo minime quis novit, conemur communiter querere, quid sit virtus?

SO. Vis ne igitur postque confessi sumus ignota perscrutari licerer, quid virtus sit, communiter vestigemus?

SOCRATES: Then, as we are agreed that a man should enquire about that which he does not know, shall you and I make an effort to enquire together into the nature of virtue?

Μένων
πάνυ μὲν οὖν. οὐ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ᾽ ἔγωγε ἐκεῖνο ἂν ἥδιστα, ὅπερ ἠρόμην τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ σκεψαίμην καὶ ἀκούσαιμι, πότερον ὡς διδακτῷ ὄντι αὐτῷ δεῖ ἐπιχειρεῖν, (86d) ἢ ὡς φύσει ἢ ὡς τίνι ποτὲ τρόπῳ παραγιγνομένης τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἀρετῆς.

MENON. Penitus revera. Necnon, o Socrates, sed ego quidem illud libentissime, quod indagavi primum et contemplatus sum, audirem itaque: utrum tamquam docibili existenti ei deceat intendere, an quasi natura sive velut aliquocumque modo adveniente hominibus virtute.

ME. Quam maxime; gratius tamen mihi esset audire prius, quod in principio disputationis interrogavi, quomodo virtuti incumbendum sit, velut ei quæ doctrina percipiatur, vel quę natura potius insit, vel quę alio quopiam pacto hominibus parant.

MENO: By all means, Socrates. And yet I would much rather return to my original question, Whether in seeking to acquire virtue we should regard it as a thing to be taught, or as a gift of nature, or as coming to men in some other way?

Σωκράτης
ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μὲν ἐγὼ ἦρχον, ὦ Μένων, μὴ μόνον ἐμαυτοῦ ἀλλὰ καὶ σοῦ, οὐκ ἂν ἐσκεψάμεθα πρότερον εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε οὐ διδακτὸν ἡ ἀρετή, πρὶν ὅτι ἐστὶν πρῶτον ἐζητήσαμεν αὐτό: ἐπειδὴ δὲ σὺ σαυτοῦ μὲν οὐδ᾽ ἐπιχειρεῖς ἄρχειν, ἵνα δὴ ἐλεύθερος ᾖς, ἐμοῦ δὲ ἐπιχειρεῖς τε ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεις, συγχωρήσομαί σοι—τί γὰρ χρὴ ποιεῖν; —ἔοικεν οὖν σκεπτέον (86e) εἶναι ποῖόν τί ἐστιν ὃ μήπω ἴσμεν ὅτι ἐστίν. εἰ μή τι οὖν ἀλλὰ σμικρόν γέ μοι τῆς ἀρχῆς χάλασον, καὶ συγχώρησον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως αὐτὸ σκοπεῖσθαι, εἴτε διδακτόν ἐστιν εἴτε ὁπωσοῦν. λέγω δὲ τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ὧδε, ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι πολλάκις σκοποῦνται, ἐπειδάν τις ἔρηται αὐτούς, οἷον περὶ χωρίου, εἰ οἷόν τε ἐς τόνδε τὸν κύκλον τόδε τὸ χωρίον (87a) τρίγωνον ἐνταθῆναι, εἴποι ἄν τις ὅτι ‘οὔπω οἶδα εἰ ἔστιν τοῦτο τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ μέν τινα ὑπόθεσιν προὔργου οἶμαι ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα τοιάνδε: εἰ μέν ἐστιν τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον τοιοῦτον οἷον παρὰ τὴν δοθεῖσαν αὐτοῦ γραμμὴν παρατείναντα ἐλλείπειν τοιούτῳ χωρίῳ οἷον ἂν αὐτὸ τὸ παρατεταμένον ᾖ, ἄλλο τι συμβαίνειν μοι δοκεῖ, καὶ ἄλλο αὖ, εἰ ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ταῦτα παθεῖν. ὑποθέμενος οὖν ἐθέλω (87b) εἰπεῖν σοι τὸ συμβαῖνον περὶ τῆς ἐντάσεως αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸν κύκλον, εἴτε ἀδύνατον εἴτε μή.’ οὕτω δὴ καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἡμεῖς, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἴσμεν οὔθ᾽ ὅτι ἐστὶν οὔθ᾽ ὁποῖόν τι, ὑποθέμενοι αὐτὸ σκοπῶμεν εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε οὐ διδακτόν ἐστιν, ὧδε λέγοντες: εἰ ποῖόν τί ἐστιν τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντων ἀρετή, διδακτὸν ἂν εἴη ἢ οὐ διδακτόν; πρῶτον μὲν δὴ εἰ ἔστιν ἀλλοῖον ἢ οἷον ἐπιστήμη, ἆρα διδακτὸν ἢ οὔ, ἢ ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀναμνηστόν —διαφερέτω δὲ μηδὲν ἡμῖν (87c) ὁποτέρῳ ἂν τῷ ὀνόματι χρώμεθα—ἀλλ᾽ ἆρα διδακτόν; ἢ τοῦτό γε παντὶ δῆλον, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο διδάσκεται ἄνθρωπος ἢ ἐπιστήμην;

SOCRATES. Sed si ego imperarem, o Menon, non solum michi ipsi sed et tibi, non utique indagaremus prius, sive docibile sive non docibile virtus, antequam quid sit primo scrutati essemus ipsum. Quoniam vero tui ipsius non conaris imperare, ut nempe liber (sis), michique intendis imperare atque imperas, indulgebo tibi; quid namque con venit facere? Videtur igitur considerandum esse, quale quid sit quod nondum novimus quid sit. Sin autem quid ergo immo modicum michi imperium laxa, et permitte ex ypotesi hoc contemplari, sive docibile est sive qualitercumque. Dico utique ex ypotesi hoc modo, quemadmodum geometre frequenter speculantur, quotienscumque quis interrogaverit eos, velut de superficie, an possibile in hunc equidem circulum hanc superficiem triangulam collocare. Dicat autem quis quoniam: “Nondum novi, utrum sit istud tale, sed quasi quandam ypotesim opere pretium reor habere ad rem talem quoque: Si est hec superficies huiusmodi, ut ad datam eius lineam extendentem relinqui tali superficiei, qualis uti que ipsa proposita fuerit, aliud quid michi acciderit; videtur et aliud item, si (im)possibile est hoc pati. Ponens ergo volo dicere tibi, quid accidit de collocatione in circulo, sive impossibile sive minime.” Sic autem et de virtute nos, quoniam quidem nescimus neque quid sit neque quale quid, ponentes ipsum consideremus, sive docibile sit an non docibile, sic dicentes: “Si quale quid est eorum, qui circa animam sunt, virtus, docibile utique sit vel non docibile? Primum equidem si est alteriusmodi quam quale scientia, igitur docibile vel non - seu quod nunc diximus recordabile, differat sane nichil nobis utrocumque nomine utamur - sed putas docibile? An hoc equidem omni constans, quia nichil aliud docetur homo quam scientiam?”

SO. Atque si tibi o Meno quemadmodum mihi ipsi imperarem, haud prius utrum doceant nec ne virtus perscrutaremur, atque quid ipsa sit indagassemus. Postque vero nec tu te tibi dominari contendis ut liber vivas, ac me ut tuo arbitratu respondeam obsecras, iam utique respondebo. Vident igitur considerandum esse quale sit quod nondum quid est cognovimus. Attamen paulisper a proposito tuo declina, idque ex suppositio ne considerare permitte, doctrinane an alio pacto virtus possideant. Ex permisso autem sic dico, quamadmodum geometræ sępe discuntur, postque illos quis inter rogavit; veluti de spatio, ut possit ne in hoc circulo triquentrum hoc spacium expandi ubi si quis dixerit, nondum se nosse an hoc huiusmodi sit, permissionem arbitror talem conducere. Si enim est hoc spatio deficiat, quantum ipsum est protensum, aluid quiddam eventurum puto; et aliud item, si talia quędam pati nequeat. Ex permissione igitur disputare decrevi de iis quem contingunt circa expansionem illius in circulum, an fieri possit nec ne. Sic et nos de virtute, quonima nec quid, nec quale sit novimus, permisso hoc, utrum doceri possit in hunc modum quæremus. Si virtus est aliquid eorum quæ circa animum versantur, doceri potest, an non. Principio si aliud est quam scientia, num doceri poterit an non? vel potius, ut modo diximus, memoria revocari? nihil referat apud nos utro nomine utamur. sed an doceri poterit? an id ominbus manifestum, quod peter scientiam nihil homo docentur?

SOCRATES: Had I the command of you as well as of myself, Meno, I would not have enquired whether virtue is given by instruction or not, until we had first ascertained ‘what it is.’ But as you think only of controlling me who am your slave, and never of controlling yourself,--such being your notion of freedom, I must yield to you, for you are irresistible. And therefore I have now to enquire into the qualities of a thing of which I do not as yet know the nature. At any rate, will you condescend a little, and allow the question ‘Whether virtue is given by instruction, or in any other way,’ to be argued upon hypothesis? As the geometrician, when he is asked whether a certain triangle is capable being inscribed in a certain circle (Or, whether a certain area is capable of being inscribed as a triangle in a certain circle.), will reply: ‘I cannot tell you as yet; but I will offer a hypothesis which may assist us in forming a conclusion: If the figure be such that when you have produced a given side of it (Or, when you apply it to the given line, i.e. the diameter of the circle (autou).), the given area of the triangle falls short by an area corresponding to the part produced (Or, similar to the area so applied.), then one consequence follows, and if this is impossible then some other; and therefore I wish to assume a hypothesis before I tell you whether this triangle is capable of being inscribed in the circle’: --that is a geometrical hypothesis. And we too, as we know not the nature and qualities of virtue, must ask, whether virtue is or is not taught, under a hypothesis: as thus, if virtue is of such a class of mental goods, will it be taught or not? Let the first hypothesis be that virtue is or is not knowledge,--in that case will it be taught or not? or, as we were just now saying, ‘remembered’? For there is no use in disputing about the name. But is virtue taught or not? or rather, does not every one see that knowledge alone is taught?

Μένων
ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

MENON. Michi vero videtur.

ME. Mihi sane vidtur.

MENO: I agree.

Σωκράτης
εἰ δέ γ᾽ ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη τις ἡ ἀρετή, δῆλον ὅτι διδακτὸν ἂν εἴη.

SOCRATES. Si autem scientia quedam virtus, manifestum quoniam docibile quoque erit.

SO. Sin autem scientia quædam virtus est, doctrinæ percipint?

SOCRATES: Then if virtue is knowledge, virtue will be taught?

Μένων
πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

MENON. Qui enim minime?

ME. Quid ni?

MENO: Certainly.

Σωκράτης
τούτου μὲν ἄρα ταχὺ ἀπηλλάγμεθα, ὅτι τοιοῦδε μὲν ὄντος διδακτόν, τοιοῦδε δ᾽ οὔ.

SOCRATES. Ab hoc igitur Statim recessimus, quoruam tali quidem existente docibile, tali vero minime.

SO. Hoc ergo statim expedivimus; nam si talis sit, docetur; si non talis nequaqaum.

SOCRATES: Then now we have made a quick end of this question: if virtue is of such a nature, it will be taught; and if not, not?

Μένων
πάνυ γε.

MENON. Prorsus.

ME. Prorsus.

MENO: Certainly.

Σωκράτης
τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικε, δεῖ σκέψασθαι πότερόν ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη ἡ ἀρετὴ ἢ ἀλλοῖον ἐπιστήμης.

SOCRATES. Istud autem post hoc, ut videtur, perspici oportet, utrum sit scientia virtus, seu alteriusmodi a scientia.

SO. Posthac investigandum censeo utrum virtus scientia, aut alium quiddam sit.

SOCRATES: The next question is, whether virtue is knowledge or of another species?

(87d) Μένων
ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο σκεπτέον εἶναι.

MENON. Michi sane videtur hoc post illud considerandum esse.

ME. Mihi quoque idem quęrendum esse videtur.

MENO: Yes, that appears to be the question which comes next in order.

Σωκράτης
τί δὲ δή; ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀγαθὸν αὐτό φαμεν εἶναι τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ αὕτη ἡ ὑπόθεσις μένει ἡμῖν, ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι;

SOCRATES. Quid vero? Aliud quid quam bonum ipsum dicimus esse?

SO. An virtutem aliud quoque bonum esse dicimus? Et hæc nobis positio stabilis permanet, virtutem scilicet esse bonum?

SOCRATES: Do we not say that virtue is a good?--This is a hypothesis which is not set aside.

Μένων
πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

MENON. Omnifariam utique.

ME. Valde.

MENO: Certainly.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν εἰ μέν τί ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἄλλο χωριζόμενον ἐπιστήμης, τάχ᾽ ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη τις: εἰ δὲ μηδέν ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν ὃ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη περιέχει, ἐπιστήμην ἄν τιν᾽ αὐτὸ ὑποπτεύοντες εἶναι ὀρθῶς ὑποπτεύοιμεν.

SOCRATES. Itaque si quid est bonum et illud disparatum a scientia, fors utique erit virtus non scientia quedam. Si vero nichil est bonum, quod non scientia contineat scientiam sane quid ipsum suspicantes esse recte suspicamur.

SO. Si quidem est aliquod seorsum a scientia bonum, nonne virtus forsitan scientia nulla erit? sin autem nullum bonum est quin scientia comprehendatur, scientiam esse virtutem suspicantes, recte utique suspicabimur?

SOCRATES: Now, if there be any sort of good which is distinct from knowledge, virtue may be that good; but if knowledge embraces all good, then we shall be right in thinking that virtue is knowledge?

Μένων
ἔστι ταῦτα.

MENON. Sunt hec.

ME. Sunt hæc vera.

MENO: True.

Σωκράτης
καὶ μὴν (87e) ἀρετῇ γ᾽ ἐσμὲν ἀγαθοί;

SOCRATES. Et certe virtute sumus boni?

SO. Quinetiam virtute boni sumus?

SOCRATES: And virtue makes us good?

Μένων
ναί.

MENON. Quidni.

ME. Sumus.

MENO: Yes.

Σωκράτης
εἰ δὲ ἀγαθοί, ὠφέλιμοι: πάντα γὰρ τἀγαθὰ ὠφέλιμα. οὐχί;

SOCRATES. Si vero boni, commodi; universa quippe bona commoda, nonne?

SO. Et si boni, utiles? omnia quippe bona, utilia.

SOCRATES: And if we are good, then we are profitable; for all good things are profitable?

Μένων
ναί.

MENON. Etiam.

ME. Sic est.

MENO: Yes.

Σωκράτης
καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ δὴ ὠφέλιμόν ἐστιν;

SOCRATES. Et virtus profecto commodum est?

SO. Exago et virtus utile quiddam.

SOCRATES: Then virtue is profitable?

Μένων
ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων.

MENON. Necesse ex concessis.

ME. Ex iis confessi sumus, necessario sequitur.

MENO: That is the only inference.

Σωκράτης
σκεψώμεθα δὴ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἀναλαμβάνοντες ποῖά ἐστιν ἃ ἡμᾶς ὠφελεῖ. ὑγίεια, φαμέν, καὶ ἰσχὺς καὶ κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος δή: ταῦτα λέγομεν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὠφέλιμα. (88a) οὐχί;

SOCRATES. Speculemur autem singulum assumentes, qualia sunt que nobis prosunt. Sanitas dicimus et robur et pulchritudo atque divitie utique, hec dicimus et huiusmodi commoda, nonne?

SO. Consideremus rursus in singulis qualia sint quæ nobis prosunt; sanitas ne et robur, foramque atque divitiæ, cæteraque huiusmodi conferre dicuntur?

SOCRATES: Then now let us see what are the things which severally profit us. Health and strength, and beauty and wealth--these, and the like of these, we call profitable?

Μένων
ναί.

MENON. Ita.

ME. Ita.

MENO: True.

Σωκράτης
ταὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτά φαμεν ἐνίοτε καὶ βλάπτειν: ἢ σὺ ἄλλως φῂς ἢ οὕτως;

SOCRATES. Eadem nempe ista dicimus aliquotiens et obesse; an tu aliter ais sive ita?

SO. Eadem hæc aliquando nocere fatemur. An tu aliter sentis?

SOCRATES: And yet these things may also sometimes do us harm: would you not think so?

Μένων
οὐκ, ἀλλ᾽ οὕτως.

MENON. Neutique, verum ita.

ME. Sic certe sentio.

MENO: Yes.

Σωκράτης
σκόπει δή, ὅταν τί ἑκάστου τούτων ἡγῆται, ὠφελεῖ ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὅταν τί, βλάπτει; ἆρ᾽ οὐχ ὅταν μὲν ὀρθὴ χρῆσις, ὠφελεῖ, ὅταν δὲ μή, βλάπτει;

SOCRATES. Intuere vero, quando quid unicuique horum precedat, prodest nobis, et quando quid, obest. Igitur nonne quotiens rectus usus, prodest; quotiens autem minime, obest?

SO. Vide itaque quo duce hæc obsint, quove prosint. nonne cum rectus usus præest, iuvant, contra vero nocent?

SOCRATES: And what is the guiding principle which makes them profitable or the reverse? Are they not profitable when they are rightly used, and hurtful when they are not rightly used?

Μένων
πάνυ γε.

MENON. Funditus.

ME. Prorsus.

MENO: Certainly.

Σωκράτης
ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν σκεψώμεθα. σωφροσύνην τι καλεῖς καὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ εὐμαθίαν καὶ μνήμην καὶ μεγαλοπρέπειαν καὶ πάντα τὰ (88b) τοιαῦτα;

SOCRATES. Amplius sane et secundum animam consideremus. Sobrietatem quid vocas et iustitiam et fortitudinem et discibilitatem et memoriam atque magnidecentiam et cuncta huiusmodi?

SO. Præterea quæ circa animum versantur consideremus. Temperantiam aliquid vocas, et iustitiam, et fortitudinem, docilitatemque, et memoriam, et magnificentiam, et huiusmodi reliquam?

SOCRATES: Next, let us consider the goods of the soul: they are temperance, justice, courage, quickness of apprehension, memory, magnanimity, and the like?

Μένων
ἔγωγε.

MENON. Ego vero.

ME. Equidem.

MENO: Surely.

Σωκράτης
σκόπει δή, τούτων ἅττα σοι δοκεῖ μὴ ἐπιστήμη εἶναι ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλο ἐπιστήμης, εἰ οὐχὶ τοτὲ μὲν βλάπτει, τοτὲ δὲ ὠφελεῖ; οἷον ἀνδρεία, εἰ μὴ ἔστι φρόνησις ἡ ἀνδρεία ἀλλ᾽ οἷον θάρρος τι: οὐχ ὅταν μὲν ἄνευ νοῦ θαρρῇ ἄνθρωπος, βλάπτεται, ὅταν δὲ σὺν νῷ, ὠφελεῖται;

SOCRATES. Speculate sane horum, que tibi videntur haud (scientia) esse, verum aliud a scientia; seu nonne interdum obsunt interdumque proficiunt? Veluti fortitudo, si non sit prudentia fortitudo atqui qualis ausus quidam; nonne quotiens absque mente audeat homo, leditur; quotiens vero cum mente, proficitur?

SO. Adverte quæso. quæqunque ex iis scinetiæ nequaquam esse videntur, sed aliud quiddam præter scientiam, nonne interdum iuvant, interdum lædunt, veluti fortitudo remota prudentia? num fortitudo alium est quam audacia quædam; cum ratione quiquam audet, iuvatur, cum absque ratione, læditur?

SOCRATES: And such of these as are not knowledge, but of another sort, are sometimes profitable and sometimes hurtful; as, for example, courage wanting prudence, which is only a sort of confidence? When a man has no sense he is harmed by courage, but when he has sense he is profited?

Μένων
ναί.

MENON. Sic.

ME. Sic est.

MENO: True.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν καὶ σωφροσύνη ὡσαύτως καὶ εὐμαθία: μετὰ μὲν νοῦ καὶ μανθανόμενα καὶ καταρτυόμενα ὠφέλιμα, ἄνευ δὲ νοῦ βλαβερά;

SOCRATES. Nonne et sobrietas similiter et discibilitas; cum mente quoque discendo perquisita et preparata, utilia; absque vero mente noxia?

SO. Temperantia quoque et docilitas eodem modo, cum ratione quidem percepta atque condita emolumento sunt, contra autem detrimento?

SOCRATES: And the same may be said of temperance and quickness of apprehension; whatever things are learned or done with sense are profitable, but when done without sense they are hurtful?

Μένων
πάνυ (88c) σφόδρα.

MENON. Omnino certe.

ME. Quammaxime.

MENO: Very true.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν συλλήβδην πάντα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιχειρήματα καὶ καρτερήματα ἡγουμένης μὲν φρονήσεως εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν τελευτᾷ, ἀφροσύνης δ᾽ εἰς τοὐναντίον;

SOCRATES. Nonne igitur una cuncta anime argumenta et perseverantie ducente quoque prudentia in bonitatem consummantur, imprudentia nempe in contrarium?

SO. Ut ergo summatim dicam, omnes animæ impetus, atque omnes declinationes ducente prudentia ad beatudinem tendunt, imprudentia vero ad conrarium.

SOCRATES: And in general, all that the soul attempts or endures, when under the guidance of wisdom, ends in happiness; but when she is under the guidance of folly, in the opposite?

Μένων
ἔοικεν.

MENON. Videtur.

ME. Videtur.

MENO: That appears to be true.

Σωκράτης
εἰ ἄρα ἀρετὴ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τί ἐστιν καὶ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ ὠφελίμῳ εἶναι, φρόνησιν αὐτὸ δεῖ εἶναι, ἐπειδήπερ πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτὰ μὲν καθ᾽ αὑτὰ οὔτε ὠφέλιμα οὔτε βλαβερά ἐστιν, προσγενομένης δὲ φρονήσεως (88d) ἢ ἀφροσύνης βλαβερά τε καὶ ὠφέλιμα γίγνεται. κατὰ δὴ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ὠφέλιμόν γε οὖσαν τὴν ἀρετὴν φρόνησιν δεῖ τιν᾽ εἶναι.

SOCRATES. Si ergo virtus eorum que in anima quid est et necessarium ipsum commodum esse, prudentiam oportet ipsum esse, quandoquidem omnia, que secundum animam ipsa quidem secundum seipsa neque commoda nec noxia sunt, accedente profecto prudentia vel imprudentia nocivaque et utilia fiunt. Secundum autem hanc rationem commodam existentem virtutem prudentiam quandam esse oportet.

SO. Quapropter si virtus aliquid est eorum quę consistunt in animo, necessariosque utilis est, prudentiam hanc esse oportet; quippe cum omnia quę sunt circa animum, ipsa quidem secundum seipsa, nec commoda, nec incommoda sint; adiuncta vero prudentia, velimprudentia, statim aut utilia, aut noxia fiant. Hac itaque ratione virtutem cum maxime omnium conferat, prudentiam quandam esse constat.

SOCRATES: If then virtue is a quality of the soul, and is admitted to be profitable, it must be wisdom or prudence, since none of the things of the soul are either profitable or hurtful in themselves, but they are all made profitable or hurtful by the addition of wisdom or of folly; and therefore if virtue is profitable, virtue must be a sort of wisdom or prudence?

Μένων
ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

MENON. Michi vero videtur.

ME. Mihi sane videtur.

MENO: I quite agree.

Σωκράτης
καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τἆλλα ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, πλοῦτόν τε καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τοτὲ μὲν ἀγαθὰ τοτὲ δὲ βλαβερὰ εἶναι, ἆρα οὐχ ὥσπερ τῇ ἄλλῃ ψυχῇ ἡ φρόνησις ἡγουμένη ὠφέλιμα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐποίει, ἡ δὲ ἀφροσύνη βλαβερά, οὕτως αὖ (88e) καὶ τούτοις ἡ ψυχὴ ὀρθῶς μὲν χρωμένη καὶ ἡγουμένη ὠφέλιμα αὐτὰ ποιεῖ, μὴ ὀρθῶς δὲ βλαβερά;

SOCRATES. Et quidem etiam cetera, que nunc diximus, divitiasque et similia, tunc vero bona tunc autem nociva esse, itaque non quasi alii anime prudentia ducens utilia ea que sunt anime effecit, necnon imprudentia noxia, ita rursus etiam hiis anima recte usa et ducens utilia ipsa reddit, non recte quoque nociva?

SO. Quinetiam in aliis quæ modo dicebamus, opulentiam atque similia tum utilia esse, tum noxia; nonne quem admodum prudentia cæteris animi viribus et officiis præsidens utilia reddit, imprudentia vero ontraria, sic et illis animus recte utens atque ducens boan efficit, non recte autem mala?

SOCRATES: And the other goods, such as wealth and the like, of which we were just now saying that they are sometimes good and sometimes evil, do not they also become profitable or hurtful, accordingly as the soul guides and uses them rightly or wrongly; just as the things of the soul herself are benefited when under the guidance of wisdom and harmed by folly?

Μένων
πάνυ γε.

MENON. Penitus.

ME. Prorsus.

MENO: True.

Σωκράτης
ὀρθῶς δέ γε ἡ ἔμφρων ἡγεῖται, ἡμαρτημένως δ᾽ ἡ ἄφρων;

SOCRATES. Recte quoque que prudens est ducit, fallaciter que imprudens?

SO. Recte autem ducit animus prudens, imprudens vero abducit.

SOCRATES: And the wise soul guides them rightly, and the foolish soul wrongly.

Μένων
ἔστι ταῦτα.

MENON. Sunt ista.

ME. Sunt hæc vera.

MENO: Yes.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν οὕτω δὴ κατὰ πάντων εἰπεῖν ἔστιν, τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνηρτῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς εἰς φρόνησιν, εἰ (89a) μέλλει ἀγαθὰ εἶναι: καὶ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ φρόνησις ἂν εἴη τὸ ὠφέλιμον: φαμὲν δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὠφέλιμον εἶναι;

SOCRATES. Ad hunc modum de cunctis dicere est: homini nempe universa reliqua ex anima dependere, ea vero que anime ex prudentia, si debeant bona fieri. Et hac ratione prudentia utique erit quod est commodum, dicimusque virtutem esse commodum?

SO. Quamobrem omnino afferendum est cætera quidem humana omnia referri ad animum; quæ vero in anima sunt, ad prudentiam, si modo bona futura sunt; eaque ratio ne prudentia ipsum utile erit, virtutem vero utilem esse dudum diximus.

SOCRATES: And is not this universally true of human nature? All other things hang upon the soul, and the things of the soul herself hang upon wisdom, if they are to be good; and so wisdom is inferred to be that which profits--and virtue, as we say, is profitable?

Μένων
πάνυ γε.

MENON. Omnifariam.

ME. Omnino.

MENO: Certainly.

Σωκράτης
φρόνησιν ἄρα φαμὲν ἀρετὴν εἶναι, ἤτοι σύμπασαν ἢ μέρος τι;

SOCRATES. Prudentiam igitur dicimus virtutem esse sive universam sive pattern aliquam?

SO. Ergo prudentia virtus est, aut universa, aut pars aliqua virtutis.

SOCRATES: And thus we arrive at the conclusion that virtue is either wholly or partly wisdom?

Μένων
δοκεῖ μοι καλῶς λέγεσθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὰ λεγόμενα.

MENON. Videntur michi bene dici, o Socrates, que dicta sunt.

ME. Recte mihi hæc omnia dici videntur.

MENO: I think that what you are saying, Socrates, is very true.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἂν εἶεν φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοί.

SOCRATES. Igitur si hec ita se habent, non utique natura boni.

SO. Nonne si hæc ita se habent, haud natura boni homines erunt?

SOCRATES: But if this is true, then the good are not by nature good?

Μένων
οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.

MENON. Non michi videtur.

ME. Haud mihi videntur.

MENO: I think not.

(89b) Σωκράτης
καὶ γὰρ ἄν που καὶ τόδ᾽ ἦν: εἰ φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἐγίγνοντο, ἦσάν που ἂν ἡμῖν οἳ ἐγίγνωσκον τῶν νέων τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τὰς φύσεις, οὓς ἡμεῖς ἂν παραλαβόντες ἐκείνων ἀποφηνάντων ἐφυλάττομεν ἂν ἐν ἀκροπόλει, κατασημηνάμενοι πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ χρυσίον, ἵνα μηδεὶς αὐτοὺς διέφθειρεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ ἀφίκοιντο εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν, χρήσιμοι γίγνοιντο ταῖς πόλεσι.

SOCRATES. Etenim et hoc esset: si natura efficerentur, essent aliqui qui agnoscerent iuvenum bonos naturis. Quos nos utique assumentes illis, demonstrantibus custodiremus utique in turre, designantes multo magis quam aurum, quatenus nullus eos corrumperet, sed cum pervenirent in etatem, utiles redderentur urbibus.

SO. Id præterea contingeret, si natura boni fierent; adessent profecto nobis qui filios nostros natura bonos dignosserent, eosque nos illorum indiciis selectos in arce quadam conservaremus, multo magis quam aurum custoditus, ne quis corrumpat, mox ubi adoleverit, utiles essent Reipub. cives.

SOCRATES: If they had been, there would assuredly have been discerners of characters among us who would have known our future great men; and on their showing we should have adopted them, and when we had got them, we should have kept them in the citadel out of the way of harm, and set a stamp upon them far rather than upon a piece of gold, in order that no one might tamper with them; and when they grew up they would have been useful to the state?

Μένων
εἰκός γέ τοι, ὦ Σώκρατες.

MENON. Congrue fortassis, o Socrates.

ME. Consentaneum hoc o Socrates.

MENO: Yes, Socrates, that would have been the right way.

Σωκράτης
ἆρ᾽ οὖν ἐπειδὴ οὐ φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται, (89c) ἆρα μαθήσει;

SOCRATES. Ergo igitur quandoquidem non natura boni boni fiunt, itaque disciplina?

SO. Cum vero natura boni minime sint, num forsitan disciplina?

SOCRATES: But if the good are not by nature good, are they made good by instruction?

Μένων
δοκεῖ μοι ἤδη ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι: καὶ δῆλον, ὦ Σώκρατες, κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἀρετή, ὅτι διδακτόν ἐστιν.

MENON. Videtur michi iam necessarium et clarum esse, o Socrates, secundum ypotesim, siquidem scientia est virtus, quoniam docibile est.

ME. Necessarium id apparet. Ac secundum sentiantiam nostram sequitur, ut si virtus est scientia, doctrina percipiant.

MENO: There appears to be no other alternative, Socrates. On the supposition that virtue is knowledge, there can be no doubt that virtue is taught.

Σωκράτης
ἴσως νὴ Δία: ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς ὡμολογήσαμεν;

SOCRATES. Forsan per Iovem. Sed non hoc minime bene fassi sumus.

SO. Fortassis Hercle. vereor tamen ne id temere confessi fuerimus.

SOCRATES: Yes, indeed; but what if the supposition is erroneous?

Μένων
καὶ μὴν ἐδόκει γε ἄρτι καλῶς λέγεσθαι.

Attamen videbatur modo bene dici.

ME. In superoribus plane id recte dici visum est.

MENO: I certainly thought just now that we were right.

Σωκράτης
ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἄρτι μόνον δέῃ αὐτὸ δοκεῖν καλῶς λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔπειτα, εἰ μέλλει τι αὐτοῦ ὑγιὲς εἶναι.

At non in presenti solum oporteat ipsum videri bene dici, immo et in presenti et in futuro, si debeat quid ipsius integrum esse.

SO. At non in pręterito solum, sed in pręsenti etiam et futuro tempore tale videri debet, siquid in eo synceri futurum est.

SOCRATES: Yes, Meno; but a principle which has any soundness should stand firm not only just now, but always.

(89d) Μένων
τί οὖν δή; πρὸς τί βλέπων δυσχεραίνεις αὐτὸ καὶ ἀπιστεῖς μὴ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη ᾖ ἡ ἀρετή;

MENON. Quid igitur? Ad quid respiciens graviter fers hoc et dubitas ne scientia sit virtus?

ME. Quidnam igitur est quod respiciens suspicaris ac diffidis, ne virtus scientia non sit?

MENO: Well; and why are you so slow of heart to believe that knowledge is virtue?

Σωκράτης
ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ, ὦ Μένων. τὸ μὲν γὰρ διδακτὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι, εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν, οὐκ ἀνατίθεμαι μὴ οὐ καλῶς λέγεσθαι: ὅτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, σκέψαι ἐάν σοι δοκῶ εἰκότως ἀπιστεῖν. τόδε γάρ μοι εἰπέ: εἰ ἔστιν διδακτὸν ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα, μὴ μόνον ἀρετή, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτοῦ καὶ διδασκάλους καὶ μαθητὰς εἶναι;

SOCRATES. Ego tibi dicam, o Menon. Nam docibile ipsum esse siquidem scientia est, haud contrapono ne non bene dici. Quod autem non sit scientia, intende si tibi videor competenter ambigere. Hoc enim michi dic: si est docibilis quelibet res - non solum virtus - num necesse ipsius et doctores et discipulos esse?

SO. Dicam tibi o Meno, virtutem quidem doceri posse, siquidem scientia est, nequaque reiicio quasi minus recte sit dictum; atque vero scientia sit, vide an non merito diffidam. Age, id mihi responde. Si quid doceri potest, non de virtute solum, sed quolibet alio loquor, an non illius præceptores, discipulosque esse aliquos necesse est.

SOCRATES: I will try and tell you why, Meno. I do not retract the assertion that if virtue is knowledge it may be taught; but I fear that I have some reason in doubting whether virtue is knowledge: for consider now and say whether virtue, and not only virtue but anything that is taught, must not have teachers and disciples?

Μένων
ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

MENON. Michi sane videtur.

ME. Mihi quidem videtur.

MENO: Surely.

(89e) Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν τοὐναντίον αὖ, οὗ μήτε διδάσκαλοι μήτε μαθηταὶ εἶεν, καλῶς ἂν αὐτὸ εἰκάζοντες εἰκάζοιμεν μὴ διδακτὸν εἶναι;

SOCRATES. Igitur econtrario item, cuius neque doctores neque discipuli fuerint, bene utrque ipsum ymaginati ymaginemur non docibile esse?

SO. Ac contra, cuius nec doctores extant, nec auditores, si id doceeri non posse coniiciamus, nonne probabiliter coniectabimus?

SOCRATES: And conversely, may not the art of which neither teachers nor disciples exist be assumed to be incapable of being taught?

Μένων
ἔστι ταῦτα: ἀλλ᾽ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλοι οὐ δοκοῦσί σοι εἶναι;

MENON. Sunt ista; verum virtutis doctores non videntur tibi esse?

ME. Sic est. sed num virtutis præceptores nullos esse censes?

MENO: True; but do you think that there are no teachers of virtue?

Σωκράτης
πολλάκις γοῦν ζητῶν εἴ τινες εἶεν αὐτῆς διδάσκαλοι, πάντα ποιῶν οὐ δύναμαι εὑρεῖν. καίτοι μετὰ πολλῶν γε ζητῶ, καὶ τούτων μάλιστα οὓς ἂν οἴωμαι ἐμπειροτάτους εἶναι τοῦ πράγματος. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν, ὦ Μένων, εἰς καλὸν ἡμῖν Ἄνυτος ὅδε παρεκαθέζετο, ᾧ μεταδῶμεν τῆς ζητήσεως. (90a) εἰκότως δ᾽ ἂν μεταδοῖμεν: Ἄνυτος γὰρ ὅδε πρῶτον μέν ἐστι πατρὸς πλουσίου τε καὶ σοφοῦ Ἀνθεμίωνος, ὃς ἐγένετο πλούσιος οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου οὐδὲ δόντος τινός, ὥσπερ ὁ νῦν νεωστὶ εἰληφὼς τὰ Πολυκράτους χρήματα Ἰσμηνίας ὁ Θηβαῖος, ἀλλὰ τῇ αὑτοῦ σοφίᾳ κτησάμενος καὶ ἐπιμελείᾳ, ἔπειτα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα οὐχ ὑπερήφανος δοκῶν εἶναι πολίτης οὐδὲ ὀγκώδης τε καὶ ἐπαχθής, ἀλλὰ κόσμιος καὶ εὐσταλὴς (90b) ἀνήρ: ἔπειτα τοῦτον εὖ ἔθρεψεν καὶ ἐπαίδευσεν, ὡς δοκεῖ Ἀθηναίων τῷ πλήθει: αἱροῦνται γοῦν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἀρχάς. δίκαιον δὴ μετὰ τοιούτων ζητεῖν ἀρετῆς πέρι διδασκάλους, εἴτ᾽ εἰσὶν εἴτε μή, καὶ οἵτινες. σὺ οὖν ἡμῖν, ὦ Ἄνυτε, συζήτησον, ἐμοί τε καὶ τῷ σαυτοῦ ξένῳ Μένωνι τῷδε, περὶ τούτου τοῦ πράγματος τίνες ἂν εἶεν διδάσκαλοι. ὧδε δὲ σκέψαι: εἰ βουλοίμεθα Μένωνα τόνδε ἀγαθὸν ἰατρὸν (90c) γενέσθαι, παρὰ τίνας ἂν αὐτὸν πέμποιμεν διδασκάλους; ἆρ᾽ οὐ παρὰ τοὺς ἰατρούς;

SOCRATES. Sepe utique indagans, an aliqui essent ipsius magistri, omnia faciens non valeo reperire. Etiam cum plurirnis perscrutor, et hiis precipue quoscumque reor peritissimos rei esse. Et utique etiam nunc, o Menon, in bonum nobis hic ipse assedit, cui communicemus questionem. Competenter quippe communicabimus: ipse enim hic primum est patris divitisque et sapientis Antemionis, qui factus est dives non ab ultroneo neque dante aliquo - quemadmodum qui nunc nuper recepit Policratis divitias Ismenyas Thebanus - verum sui ipsius sapientia lucratus atque cura; deinde et cetera non superbus visus esse civis neque onerosusque et molestus, atqui venustus et decens vir; dehinc istum bene educavit et erudivit, ut videtur Atheniorum multitudini: desiderant itaque eum in maximos principatus. Iustum vero cum talibus indagare de virtute doctores, sive sint sive minime, et qui. Tu igitur nobis, o Anite, coexamina michique et tui ipsius hospiti Menoni huic, de ista re, qui utique sunt doctores. Ita autem speculare: si voluerimus Menonem istum bonum medicum fieri, ad quos utique ipsum mittamus magistros? Igitur nonne ad medicos?

SO. Sæpenumero siqui huius magistri essent omni studio investigavi, nec unquam inveni, et si una cum cæteris pluribus, atque iis, ut videbatur, huius facultatis peritis id quæsui. Et nunc quidem opportune o Meno, iste nobis assedit quem disputationis huius participem faciamus. Ac merito ad id focium adhibemus. Est enim divite primum et sapiente parte Anthemione natus, qui profecto non casu quodam, aut numeribus opulentus evasit, quemadmodum nuper Thebanus Ismenias Polycratis pecunias nactus, sed prudentia, vigilantiaque sua rem auxit. Præterea nec superbus cuius, neque inflatus aut difficilis, vero modestus, et frugi, facilisque vir existit. Deinde hunc bene educavit erudivitque, cuius rei testis est omnis Atheniensis populus, qui ad summos hunc eligit magistratus. Nam cum viris huiusmodi sint ne virtutis magistri aliqui, et quae sint maxime decet. Ergo age o Anyte, quære mecum unaque cum hospite tuo Menone, quinam huius rei præceptores sint, et inhunc modum considera; si vellemus Menonem hunc optimum fieri medicum, ad quos potissimum doctores perduceremus? nonne ad medicos?

SOCRATES: I have certainly often enquired whether there were any, and taken great pains to find them, and have never succeeded; and many have assisted me in the search, and they were the persons whom I thought the most likely to know. Here at the moment when he is wanted we fortunately have sitting by us Anytus, the very person of whom we should make enquiry; to him then let us repair. In the first place, he is the son of a wealthy and wise father, Anthemion, who acquired his wealth, not by accident or gift, like Ismenias the Theban (who has recently made himself as rich as Polycrates), but by his own skill and industry, and who is a well-conditioned, modest man, not insolent, or overbearing, or annoying; moreover, this son of his has received a good education, as the Athenian people certainly appear to think, for they choose him to fill the highest offices. And these are the sort of men from whom you are likely to learn whether there are any teachers of virtue, and who they are. Please, Anytus, to help me and your friend Meno in answering our question, Who are the teachers? Consider the matter thus: If we wanted Meno to be a good physician, to whom should we send him? Should we not send him to the physicians?

Ἄνυτος
πάνυ γε.

ANITUS. Prorsus.

ANY. Prorsus.

ANYTUS: Certainly.

Σωκράτης
τί δ᾽ εἰ σκυτοτόμον ἀγαθὸν βουλοίμεθα γενέσθαι, ἆρ᾽ οὐ παρὰ τοὺς σκυτοτόμους;

SOCRATES. Quid autem si coriarium bonum voluerimus fieri, ergo non ad coriarios?

SO. Et si cerdonem optimum fieri cuperemus, an non ad cerdones?

SOCRATES: Or if we wanted him to be a good cobbler, should we not send him to the cobblers?

Ἄνυτος
ναί.

ANITUS. Quidni.

ANY. Ita.

ANYTUS: Yes.

Σωκράτης
καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως;

SOCRATES. Et reliqua non dissimiliter?

SO. Et in aliis edoem modo?

SOCRATES: And so forth?

Ἄνυτος
πάνυ γε.

ANITUS. Penitus equidem.

ANY. Omnino.

ANYTUS: Yes.

Σωκράτης
ὧδε δή μοι πάλιν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν εἰπέ. παρὰ τοὺς ἰατρούς, φαμέν, πέμποντες τόνδε καλῶς ἂν ἐπέμπομεν, βουλόμενοι ἰατρὸν γενέσθαι: ἆρ᾽ ὅταν τοῦτο λέγωμεν, τόδε (90d) λέγομεν, ὅτι παρὰ τούτους πέμποντες αὐτὸν σωφρονοῖμεν ἄν, τοὺς ἀντιποιουμένους τε τῆς τέχνης μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς μή, καὶ τοὺς μισθὸν πραττομένους ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ τούτῳ, ἀποφήναντας αὑτοὺς διδασκάλους τοῦ βουλομένου ἰέναι τε καὶ μανθάνειν; ἆρ᾽ οὐ πρὸς ταῦτα βλέψαντες καλῶς ἂν πέμποιμεν;

SOCRATES. Sic autem michi iterato de eisdem dic. Ad medicos dicimus mittentes hunc, bene nempe mitteremus volentes medicum fieri. Ergo cum hoc dicamus, illud dicimus: ad hos mittentes ipsum sobrie agamus utique, eos qui student arti magis quam qui minime, et mercedem operantur in ipso hoc pronuntiantes se magistros volentis venire quidem et discere? Itaque nonne ad hec respicientes bene utique mittamus?

SO. Sic iterum de medicis mihi dicas; cum diximus mittendum hunc esse ad medicos, si medicum fore velimus, an non id sentiebamus, ut sisti debeat apud eos duntaxat, qui artem illam prfitentur, ac mercedem pro ea palam ab auditoribus capiunt, hoc ipso se esse qui volentes docere possint ostendentes. nonne huius ratio habenda est, si modo illum prudenter locaturi simus?

SOCRATES: Let me trouble you with one more question. When we say that we should be right in sending him to the physicians if we wanted him to be a physician, do we mean that we should be right in sending him to those who profess the art, rather than to those who do not, and to those who demand payment for teaching the art, and profess to teach it to any one who will come and learn? And if these were our reasons, should we not be right in sending him?

Ἄνυτος
ναί.

ANITUS. Etiam.

ANY. Sic est.

ANYTUS: Yes.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ αὐλήσεως καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὰ αὐτὰ (90e) ταῦτα; πολλὴ ἄνοιά ἐστι βουλομένους αὐλητήν τινα ποιῆσαι παρὰ μὲν τοὺς ὑπισχνουμένους διδάξειν τὴν τέχνην καὶ μισθὸν πραττομένους μὴ ἐθέλειν πέμπειν, ἄλλοις δέ τισιν πράγματα παρέχειν, ζητοῦντα μανθάνειν παρὰ τούτων, οἳ μήτε προσποιοῦνται διδάσκαλοι εἶναι μήτ᾽ ἔστιν αὐτῶν μαθητὴς μηδεὶς τούτου τοῦ μαθήματος ὃ ἡμεῖς ἀξιοῦμεν μανθάνειν παρ᾽ αὐτῶν ὃν ἂν πέμπωμεν. οὐ πολλή σοι δοκεῖ ἀλογία εἶναι;

SOCRATES. Itaque nonne et de aulesi et de aliis eadem ista? Multa amentia sit volentes auletem quempiam facere ad eos profecto, qui profitentur doctum ire artem et mercedem operantur, nolle mittere, aliisque quibusdam impedimenta prebere, querentem discere apud hos, qui neque simulant magistri esse neque est eorum discipulus quisnam huius discipline, quam nos postulamus discere apud eos quemcumque utique mittamus. Nonne plurima tibi videtur irrationabilitas esse?

SO. Et de tibiarum sono, ac cæteris omnibus similiter iudicandum. Neque enim mediocris inscitia esset, dum studeremus quempiam tibicinem fieri, commendare iis nolle, qui facultatem hanc pollicentur, mercedemque reportant, sed hoc onus illis imponere, qui nec doctrinam sibi vendicant, nec habent ullum in hac arte discipulum, qua instrui hunc quem mittimus desideramus. An non isthuc procul a ratione sit?

SOCRATES: And might not the same be said of flute-playing, and of the other arts? Would a man who wanted to make another a flute-player refuse to send him to those who profess to teach the art for money, and be plaguing other persons to give him instruction, who are not professed teachers and who never had a single disciple in that branch of knowledge which he wishes him to acquire --would not such conduct be the height of folly?

Ἄνυτος
ναὶ μὰ Δία ἔμοιγε, καὶ ἀμαθία γε πρός.

ANITUS. Ita per Iovem, michi quoque indisciplinatio insuper.

ANY. Per Iovem non modo absque ratione, verumetiam dementia quædam.

ANYTUS: Yes, by Zeus, and of ignorance too.

Σωκράτης
καλῶς λέγεις. νῦν τοίνυν ἔξεστί σε μετ᾽ ἐμοῦ (91a) κοινῇ βουλεύεσθαι περὶ τοῦ ξένου τουτουῒ Μένωνος. οὗτος γάρ, ὦ Ἄνυτε, πάλαι λέγει πρός με ὅτι ἐπιθυμεῖ ταύτης τῆς σοφίας καὶ ἀρετῆς ᾗ οἱ ἄνθρωποι τάς τε οἰκίας καὶ τὰς πόλεις καλῶς διοικοῦσι, καὶ τοὺς γονέας τοὺς αὑτῶν θεραπεύουσι, καὶ πολίτας καὶ ξένους ὑποδέξασθαί τε καὶ ἀποπέμψαι ἐπίστανται ἀξίως ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ. ταύτην οὖν τὴν (91b) ἀρετὴν σκόπει παρὰ τίνας ἂν πέμποντες αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς πέμποιμεν. ἢ δῆλον δὴ κατὰ τὸν ἄρτι λόγον ὅτι παρὰ τούτους τοὺς ὑπισχνουμένους ἀρετῆς διδασκάλους εἶναι καὶ ἀποφήναντας αὑτοὺς κοινοὺς τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῷ βουλομένῳ μανθάνειν, μισθὸν τούτου ταξαμένους τε καὶ πραττομένους;

SOCRATES. Bene ais. Nunc sane licet tibi mecum communiter deliberare super advena hoc Menone. Hic siquidem, o Anite, dudum dicit ad me, quoniam conspicit hanc sapientiam atque virtutem, qua homines domosque et civitates bene disponunt et patentes suos placant et cives atque peregrinos recipere et remittere sciunt digne viro bono. Istam itaque virtutem intuere, ad quos utique mittentes eum bene mittamus. Aut patet iuxta presentem sermonem, quoniam ad hos, qui profitentur virtutis doctores esse, annuntiantes se publicos Grecorum volenti discere, mercedem huius taxantes et operantes?

SO. Probe loqueris. Nunc itaque licet tibi communiter una mecum de hoc hospite tuo Menone deliberare; hic enim o Anyte iampridem mihi dixit, se hanc sapientiam virtutemque appetere, qua civitates et domus recte gubernantur, liberi quam optime educantur, cives et hospites tum admittuntur, tum dimittuntur scite, et ut bono viro dignum est. Meditare igitur ad quem potissimum huius comparandæ virtutis gratia hunc mittere deceat. An ex his quæ modo diximus patet; committendum his ease, qui se doctors talia pollicentur; seque palm clique Græcorum disc ere violent semper exponunt, huius disciplinæ præscriptum precium capientes?

SOCRATES: Very good. And now you are in a position to advise with me about my friend Meno. He has been telling me, Anytus, that he desires to attain that kind of wisdom and virtue by which men order the state or the house, and honour their parents, and know when to receive and when to send away citizens and strangers, as a good man should. Now, to whom should he go in order that he may learn this virtue? Does not the previous argument imply clearly that we should send him to those who profess and avouch that they are the common teachers of all Hellas, and are ready to impart instruction to any one who likes, at a fixed price?

Ἄνυτος
καὶ τίνας λέγεις τούτους, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ANITUS. Et quos dicis istos, o Socrates?

ANY. At quod dicis o Socrates?

ANYTUS: Whom do you mean, Socrates?

Σωκράτης
οἶσθα δήπου καὶ σὺ ὅτι οὗτοί εἰσιν οὓς οἱ ἄνθρωποι καλοῦσι σοφιστάς.

SOCRATES. Nosti quoque etiam tu, quoniam hii sunt quos homines vacant sophistas.

SO. Nosti credo et ipse hos esse qui publice sophistæ vocantur.

SOCRATES: You surely know, do you not, Anytus, that these are the people whom mankind call Sophists?

(91c) Ἄνυτος
Ἡράκλεις, εὐφήμει, ὦ Σώκρατες. μηδένα τῶν γ᾽ ἐμῶν μήτε οἰκείων μήτε φίλων, μήτε ἀστὸν μήτε ξένον, τοιαύτη μανία λάβοι, ὥστε παρὰ τούτους ἐλθόντα λωβηθῆναι, ἐπεὶ οὗτοί γε φανερά ἐστι λώβη τε καὶ διαφθορὰ τῶν συγγιγνομένων.

ANITUS. Ercules, eufema, o Socrates. Neminem cognatorum, neminem domesticorum, neminem amicorum, neque civem neque advenam talis mania apprehendat, ut ad istos veniens ledatur; quoniam hiis quoque manifesta est noxaque et corruptio cohabitantium.

ANY. Hercle bona verba quæso o Socrates. Absit ut quisquam vel cognatorum, vel familiarium, vel amicorum, vel civium, vel hospitum in tantam insaniam incidat, ut istis adhærens, perdi se patiatur. eorum quippe consuetudo certa illorum qui sectantur, pestis est.

ANYTUS: By Heracles, Socrates, forbear! I only hope that no friend or kinsman or acquaintance of mine, whether citizen or stranger, will ever be so mad as to allow himself to be corrupted by them; for they are a manifest pest and corrupting influence to those who have to do with them.

Σωκράτης
πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Ἄνυτε; οὗτοι ἄρα μόνοι τῶν ἀντιποιουΜένων τι ἐπίστασθαι εὐεργετεῖν τοσοῦτον τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρουσιν, ὅσον οὐ μόνον οὐκ ὠφελοῦσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι, ὅτι ἄν τις αὐτοῖς παραδῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον διαφθείρουσιν; (91d) καὶ τούτων φανερῶς χρήματα ἀξιοῦσι πράττεσθαι; ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως σοι πιστεύσω: οἶδα γὰρ ἄνδρα ἕνα Πρωταγόραν πλείω χρήματα κτησάμενον ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς σοφίας ἢ Φειδίαν τε, ὃς οὕτω περιφανῶς καλὰ ἔργα ἠργάζετο, καὶ ἄλλους δέκα τῶν ἀνδριαντοποιῶν. καίτοι τέρας λέγεις εἰ οἱ μὲν τὰ ὑποδήματα ἐργαζόμενοι τὰ παλαιὰ καὶ τὰ ἱμάτια ἐξακούμενοι οὐκ ἂν δύναιντο λαθεῖν τριάκονθ᾽ (91e) ἡμέρας μοχθηρότερα ἀποδιδόντες ἢ παρέλαβον τὰ ἱμάτιά τε καὶ ὑποδήματα, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ τοιαῦτα ποιοῖεν, ταχὺ ἂν τῷ λιμῷ ἀποθάνοιεν, Πρωταγόρας δὲ ἄρα ὅλην τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλάνθανεν διαφθείρων τοὺς συγγιγνομένους καὶ μοχθηροτέρους ἀποπέμπων ἢ παρελάμβανεν πλέον ἢ τετταράκοντα ἔτη— οἶμαι γὰρ αὐτὸν ἀποθανεῖν ἐγγὺς καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα ἔτη γεγονότα, τετταράκοντα δὲ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ ὄντα—καὶ ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ ἔτι εἰς τὴν ἡμέραν ταυτηνὶ εὐδοκιμῶν οὐδὲν πέπαυται, καὶ οὐ μόνον Πρωταγόρας, ἀλλὰ καὶ (92a) ἄλλοι πάμπολλοι, οἱ μὲν πρότερον γεγονότες ἐκείνου, οἱ δὲ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ὄντες. πότερον δὴ οὖν φῶμεν κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον εἰδότας αὐτοὺς ἐξαπατᾶν καὶ λωβᾶσθαι τοὺς νέους, ἢ λεληθέναι καὶ ἑαυτούς; καὶ οὕτω μαίνεσθαι ἀξιώσομεν τούτους, οὓς ἔνιοί φασι σοφωτάτους ἀνθρώπων εἶναι;

SOCRATES. Quid dicis, o Anite? Hii ergo soli eorum qni sollicite intendunt quid scire benefacere, adeo ab aliis differunt, ut non solum non prosunt, quemadmodum alii quotiens quis eis tradatur, immo quod contrarium corrumpunt? Et horum manifeste pecunias probant lucrifacere? Ego igitur non habeo quid tibi credam: no vi quippe virum unum Protagoram plures pecunias lucratum ab hac sophia quam Fidiam quoque, qui tam splendide operabatur, et alios decem statuarum fabros. At monstrum dicis si hii, qui calceos. operantur veteres et vestimenta resarcientes, nequaquam valeant latere trtgmta dies deteriora reddentes quam receperint vestimenta et calceos, sed si talia fecerint, cito fame moriantur, Protagoras igitur totam Greciam latuit corrumpens cohabitantes et deteriores remittens quam receperit plus quam quadraginta annos - reor enim ipsum defunctum esse prope etiam septuaginta annos factum, quadraginta vera in arte manentem - atque universo tempore isto adhuc in diem hanc placens haud quievit; et non solum Protagoras, immo et alii perplurimi, hii nempe prius facti illo, hii utique etiam nunc superstites. Utrum igitur inquiemus iuxta tuum verbum scientes ipsos fallere et ledi iuvenes an latrusse illos? Et ita insanire asseremus istos, quos quidam aiunt sapientissimos hominum esse?

SO. Cur ita dicis Anyte? num ii soli ex omni hominum genere cum prodesse hominibus profiteantur, adeo cæteris deteriores sunt, ut non modo non iuvent, quemadmodum alii, quod ipsis traditum sit, verum contra corrumpant, atque huius gratia vulgo mercedem exigant? Equidem non video qua rationem fidem tibi adhibeam. Novi enim virum unum Protagoram, qui plures ob hanc sapientiam pecunias cumulavit, quam aut Phidias ille cuius tam conspicua pulchraqueopera extant, aut decem alii sculptores. Atque absurdum sit, si qui calceos veteres consuunt, veteresque resarciunt, latere non possint dies triginta, si vestes calceosque restituant detoriores redditos; sed si talia facerent brevi fame perirent; Protagoras autem universam Græciam annos plusquam quadraginta fefellit familiares suos pervertens, deterioresque quam accepit reddens. Nam reor illum vita decessisse natum annos pene septuaginta; quadraginta vero in hac arte versatum. Ac per omne illud tempus, usque in hanc diem clarus extitit. neque Protagoras tantum, sed alii quoque permulti, partim priores illo, partim etiam nunc vitiam agentes. Utrum enim iuxta sententiam tuam dicemus eos conscios decipere, et lædere iuvenes conari; an seipsos quoque fallunt, et insaniunt ex eo, quia nonnulli sunt, qui sapientissimos eos esse mortalium dicunt?

SOCRATES: What, Anytus? Of all the people who profess that they know how to do men good, do you mean to say that these are the only ones who not only do them no good, but positively corrupt those who are entrusted to them, and in return for this disservice have the face to demand money? Indeed, I cannot believe you; for I know of a single man, Protagoras, who made more out of his craft than the illustrious Pheidias, who created such noble works, or any ten other statuaries. How could that be? A mender of old shoes, or patcher up of clothes, who made the shoes or clothes worse than he received them, could not have remained thirty days undetected, and would very soon have starved; whereas during more than forty years, Protagoras was corrupting all Hellas, and sending his disciples from him worse than he received them, and he was never found out. For, if I am not mistaken, he was about seventy years old at his death, forty of which were spent in the practice of his profession; and during all that time he had a good reputation, which to this day he retains: and not only Protagoras, but many others are well spoken of; some who lived before him, and others who are still living. Now, when you say that they deceived and corrupted the youth, are they to be supposed to have corrupted them consciously or unconsciously? Can those who were deemed by many to be the wisest men of Hellas have been out of their minds?

Ἄνυτος
πολλοῦ γε δέουσι μαίνεσθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον οἱ τούτοις διδόντες ἀργύριον τῶν νέων, τούτων (92b) δ᾽ ἔτι μᾶλλον οἱ τούτοις ἐπιτρέποντες, οἱ προσήκοντες, πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα πάντων αἱ πόλεις, ἐῶσαι αὐτοὺς εἰσαφικνεῖσθαι καὶ οὐκ ἐξελαύνουσαι, εἴτε τις ξένος ἐπιχειρεῖ τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν εἴτε ἀστός.

ANITUS. Oppido quoque debent insanire, o Socrates, at multo magis qui hiis tribuunt census iuvenum, istisque amplius magis qui horum tutores affines, valde vera maximeque universorum urbes permittentes ipsos ingredi et non eicientes, sive quis peregrinus argumentetur huiusmodi quid agere sive ipse.

ANY. Lomge abest ut insanire dicantur o Socrates; sed multo magis iuvenes, qui illis argentum tradunt. Atque his etiam deteriores sunt siqui illos quorum ad se cura pertinet, iis committant. Omnium postremo insanissimę sunt Rempub. quæ illos recipiunt, neque expellunt, seu advena, seu civis talem rem conetur.

ANYTUS: Out of their minds! No, Socrates; the young men who gave their money to them were out of their minds, and their relations and guardians who entrusted their youth to the care of these men were still more out of their minds, and most of all, the cities who allowed them to come in, and did not drive them out, citizen and stranger alike.

Σωκράτης
πότερον δέ, ὦ Ἄνυτε, ἠδίκηκέ τίς σε τῶν σοφιστῶν, ἢ τί οὕτως αὐτοῖς χαλεπὸς εἶ;

SOCRATES. Utrum, o Anite, contumelia affecit te quis sophistarum, vel quid ita ipsis molestus es?

SO. Num aliquis te sophistarum o Anyte iniuria unquam affecit? vel quid illis ita succenses?

SOCRATES: Has any of the Sophists wronged you, Anytus? What makes you so angry with them?

Ἄνυτος
οὐδὲ μὰ Δία ἔγωγε συγγέγονα πώποτε αὐτῶν οὐδενί, οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἄλλον ἐάσαιμι τῶν ἐμῶν οὐδένα.

ANITUS. Neque per Iovem ego cohabitavi alicubi eorum nemini, neque alium sinerem meorum neminem.

ANY. Nulla mihi unquam cum aliquo illorum consuetudo fuit, neque meorum aliquem illis uti permitterem.

ANYTUS: No, indeed, neither I nor any of my belongings has ever had, nor would I suffer them to have, anything to do with them.

Σωκράτης
ἄπειρος ἄρ᾽ εἶ παντάπασι τῶν ἀνδρῶν;

SOCRATES. Inexpertus igitur es omnimode virorum?

SO. Nunquam ergo illorum mores expertus es.

SOCRATES: Then you are entirely unacquainted with them?

Ἄνυτος
καὶ εἴην γε.

ANITUS. Et sim utique.

ANY. Utinam vero ne experiar.

ANYTUS: And I have no wish to be acquainted.

(92c) Σωκράτης
πῶς οὖν ἄν, ὦ δαιμόνιε, εἰδείης περὶ τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, εἴτε τι ἀγαθὸν ἔχει ἐν αὑτῷ εἴτε φλαῦρον, οὗ παντάπασιν ἄπειρος εἴης;

SOCRATES. Quomodo ergo, o beate, noscas de hac re sive quid bonum habeat sibi ipsi sive malum, cuius prorsus in expertus sis?

SO. Quanam ratione dignosces bonum ne an malum fit cuius nullum fecisti periculum?

SOCRATES: Then, my dear friend, how can you know whether a thing is good or bad of which you are wholly ignorant?

Ἄνυτος
ῥᾳδίως: τούτους γοῦν οἶδα οἵ εἰσιν, εἴτ᾽ οὖν ἄπειρος αὐτῶν εἰμι εἴτε μή.

ANITUS. Ex facili quoque; hos novi qui sint, sive quid sive inexpertus horum sim sive minime.

ANY. Liquido istos novi quales sunt; sive expertus sim, sive non.

ANYTUS: Quite well; I am sure that I know what manner of men these are, whether I am acquainted with them or not.

Σωκράτης
μάντις εἶ ἴσως, ὦ Ἄνυτε: ἐπεὶ ὅπως γε ἄλλως οἶσθα τούτων πέρι, ἐξ ὧν αὐτὸς λέγεις θαυμάζοιμ᾽ ἄν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ τούτους ἐπιζητοῦμεν τίνες εἰσίν, παρ᾽ οὓς ἂν (92d) Μένων ἀφικόμενος μοχθηρὸς γένοιτο—οὗτοι μὲν γάρ, εἰ σὺ βούλει, ἔστων οἱ σοφισταί— ἀλλὰ δὴ ἐκείνους εἰπὲ ἡμῖν, καὶ τὸν πατρικὸν τόνδε ἑταῖρον εὐεργέτησον φράσας αὐτῷ παρὰ τίνας ἀφικόμενος ἐν τοσαύτῃ πόλει τὴν ἀρετὴν ἣν νυνδὴ ἐγὼ διῆλθον γένοιτ᾽ ἂν ἄξιος λόγου.

SOCRATES. Augur es fors, o Anite; quoniam quomodo aliter nosces super hiis, de quibus ipse dicis, mirarer utique. Sed enim non istos vestigavimus qui sunt, equidem ad quos Menon veniens nequam fiat - hii nimirum, si tu velis, sint sophiste - verum illos dic nobis, et paterno huic amica benefac exponens sibi, ad quos veniens in tanta urbe, virtute quam nunc ego pertransibam, fiat sane dignus verba.

SO. Vates forsitan es o Anyte; hoc enim te alia ratione novisse, ex iis quæ modo dixisti, mirum sit. Verum non eos quærimus, ad quos profectus Meno inficiatur; hi nanque si vis sophistę sint. Sed opem patrio feras amico; ostendesque cuinam adhærens eorum, qui tam amplam urbem colunt, eam quam narravimus virtutem adipiscatur.

SOCRATES: You must be a diviner, Anytus, for I really cannot make out, judging from your own words, how, if you are not acquainted with them, you know about them. But I am not enquiring of you who are the teachers who will corrupt Meno (let them be, if you please, the Sophists); I only ask you to tell him who there is in this great city who will teach him how to become eminent in the virtues which I was just now describing. He is the friend of your family, and you will oblige him.

Ἄνυτος
τί δὲ αὐτῷ οὐ σὺ ἔφρασας;

ANITUS. Quid ipsi nonne tu exposuisti?

ANY. Cur ipse non indicas?

ANYTUS: Why do you not tell him yourself?

Σωκράτης
ἀλλ᾽ οὓς μὲν ἐγὼ ᾤμην διδασκάλους τούτων εἶναι, εἶπον, ἀλλὰ τυγχάνω οὐδὲν λέγων, ὡς σὺ φῄς: καὶ ἴσως τὶ (92e) λέγεις. ἀλλὰ σὺ δὴ ἐν τῷ μέρει αὐτῷ εἰπὲ παρὰ τίνας ἔλθῃ Ἀθηναίων: εἰπὲ ὄνομα ὅτου βούλει.

SOCRATES. Atqui quos ego rebar magistros horum esse, dixi; sed sum nichil inquiens, ut tu ais.

ANITUS. Et forsan quid ais.

SOCRATES. Immo tu quidem in parte sibi dic, ad quos veruat Atheruensmm; dic nomen cuiuslibet velis.

SO. At quos ego magistros existimaveram, in medium iam produxi; verum iuxta sententiam tuam nihil omnino profeci. ac forte vera loqueris. Itaque tu quoque ima partem tuam huius muneris exple. Ostende ad quem Atheniensium profisciscatur. profer cuiusqunque vis nomen.

SOCRATES: I have told him whom I supposed to be the teachers of these things; but I learn from you that I am utterly at fault, and I dare say that you are right. And now I wish that you, on your part, would tell me to whom among the Athenians he should go. Whom would you name?

Ἄνυτος
τί δὲ ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου ὄνομα δεῖ ἀκοῦσαι; ὅτῳ γὰρ ἂν ἐντύχῃ Ἀθηναίων τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν, οὐδεὶς ἔστιν ὃς οὐ βελτίω αὐτὸν ποιήσει ἢ οἱ σοφισταί, ἐάνπερ ἐθέλῃ πείθεσθαι.

ANITUS. Quid autem unius hominis nomen oportet audire? Quemcumque enim conveniat honestorum et bonorum, nullus est qui non meliorem ipsum faciat quam sophiste, si quidem voluerit persuaderi.

ANY. Quid opus est hominis unius nomen audire? quemcunque Atheniensium nactus fuerit ex bonis clarisque hominibus, melior illius familiaritate, si modo paruerit, evadet quam consuetudine sophistarum.

ANYTUS: Why single out individuals? Any Athenian gentleman, taken at random, if he will mind him, will do far more good to him than the Sophists.

Σωκράτης
πότερον δὲ οὗτοι οἱ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἐγένοντο τοιοῦτοι, παρ᾽ οὐδενὸς μαθόντες ὅμως μέντοι ἄλλους διδάσκειν οἷοί τε ὄντες ταῦτα ἃ αὐτοὶ οὐκ (93a) ἔμαθον;

SOCRATES. Utrum hii honesti ac boni ab ultroneo facti sunt tales a nullo discentes, verumptamen alios docere possibiles existentes ea que ipsi non didicerunt?

SO. Utrum vero ii præclari bonique viri ex seipsis nullo instituente tales effecti sunt, eaque docere cæteros possunt, ipsi licet a nullo didicerint?

SOCRATES: And did those gentlemen grow of themselves; and without having been taught by any one, were they nevertheless able to teach others that which they had never learned themselves?

Ἄνυτος
καὶ τούτους ἔγωγε ἀξιῶ παρὰ τῶν προτέρων μαθεῖν, ὄντων καλῶν κἀγαθῶν: ἢ οὐ δοκοῦσί σοι πολλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ γεγονέναι ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει ἄνδρες;

ANITUS. Et istos ego assero a prioribus addiscere, cum essent honesti ac boni. An non videntur tibi et multi boni fuisse in hac civitate viri?

ANY. A senioribus viris præclaris atque bonis percepisse arbitror. An non tibi videntur in hac civitate multi insignes et optimi homines extitisse?

ANYTUS: I imagine that they learned of the previous generation of gentlemen. Have there not been many good men in this city?

Σωκράτης
ἔμοιγε, ὦ Ἄνυτε, καὶ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν ἐνθάδε ἀγαθοὶ τὰ πολιτικά, καὶ γεγονέναι ἔτι οὐχ ἧττον ἢ εἶναι: ἀλλὰ μῶν καὶ διδάσκαλοι ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν τῆς αὑτῶν ἀρετῆς; τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν τυγχάνει ὤν: οὐκ εἰ εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ ἢ μὴ ἄνδρες ἐνθάδε, οὐδ᾽ εἰ γεγόνασιν ἐν τῷ (93b) πρόσθεν, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ διδακτόν ἐστιν ἀρετὴ πάλαι σκοποῦμεν. τοῦτο δὲ σκοποῦντες τόδε σκοποῦμεν, ἆρα οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες καὶ τῶν νῦν καὶ τῶν προτέρων ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν ἣν αὐτοὶ ἀγαθοὶ ἦσαν ἠπίσταντο καὶ ἄλλῳ παραδοῦναι, ἢ οὐ παραδοτὸν τοῦτο ἀνθρώπῳ οὐδὲ παραληπτὸν ἄλλῳ παρ᾽ ἄλλου: τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν ὃ πάλαι ζητοῦμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ Μένων. ὧδε οὖν σκόπει ἐκ τοῦ σαυτοῦ λόγου: Θεμιστοκλέα οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ἂν (93c) φαίης ἄνδρα γεγονέναι;

SOCRATES. Michi profecto, o Anite, et esse videntur istic boni civilia, et fuisse iam non minus quam esse. Verum ergo et doctores boni fuerunt eorum virtutis? Hoc siquidem est de quo sermo nobis contingit esse; non si sint boni seu non viri istic, neque si fuerint in priori, ceterum an docibile sit virtus, pridem contemplamur. Illud autem speculati hoc examinamus: putas boni viri et modernorum et priscorum banc virtutem, quam ipsi boni extiterant, sciebant et alii tradere, an haud tradibile hoc homini neque relinquibile alii ab alio? Istud est quod pridem vestigamus egoque et Menon. Hactenus itaque attende ex tui ipsius verbo: Themistoclea numquid non bonum dicas virum fuisse?

SO. Mihi quidem o Anyte esse hic viros civilis administrationis peritos, nec pauciores olim fuisse videtur. Sed num præceptores idonei virtutis illius suæ fuere? hoc enim est de quo nunc differitur, non utrum sint aut fuerint hic viri boni, sed utrum virtus doceri possit; et ob hoc utrum viri boni sive veteres illi, sive qui nunc vivunt, virtutem eam qua præditi quique sunt ipsi tradere alteri norint; an forte, nec tradi alteri, nec recipi virtus possit. Id inquam est, quod dudum ego ac Meno inquirimus. Sic autem ex ipsa tua oratione rem considerato. Num Themistoclem virum bonum fuisse fateris?

SOCRATES: Yes, certainly, Anytus; and many good statesmen also there always have been and there are still, in the city of Athens. But the question is whether they were also good teachers of their own virtue; --not whether there are, or have been, good men in this part of the world, but whether virtue can be taught, is the question which we have been discussing. Now, do we mean to say that the good men of our own and of other times knew how to impart to others that virtue which they had themselves; or is virtue a thing incapable of being communicated or imparted by one man to another? That is the question which I and Meno have been arguing. Look at the matter in your own way: Would you not admit that Themistocles was a good man?

Ἄνυτος
ἔγωγε, πάντων γε μάλιστα.

ANITUS. Ego sane omniumque maxime.

ANY. Maxime omnium.

ANYTUS: Certainly; no man better.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν καὶ διδάσκαλον ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ τις ἄλλος τῆς αὑτοῦ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλος ἦν, κἀκεῖνον εἶναι;

SOCRATES. Nonne et doctorem bonum, siquidem quis alius proprie virtutis magister erat, et hunc esse?

SO. Et præceptorem virtutis suæ bonum, si quis omnino virtutis magister fuit, Themistoclem extitisse?

SOCRATES: And must not he then have been a good teacher, if any man ever was a good teacher, of his own virtue?

Ἄνυτος
οἶμαι ἔγωγε, εἴπερ ἐβούλετό γε.

ANITUS. Existimo ego quidem, si voluisset utique.

ANY. Reor equidem dummodo voluisset.

ANYTUS: Yes certainly,--if he wanted to be so.

Σωκράτης
ἀλλ᾽, οἴει, οὐκ ἂν ἐβουλήθη ἄλλους τέ τινας καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς γενέσθαι, μάλιστα δέ που τὸν ὑὸν τὸν αὑτοῦ; ἢ οἴει αὐτὸν φθονεῖν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐξεπίτηδες οὐ παραδιδόναι (93d) τὴν ἀρετὴν ἣν αὐτὸς ἀγαθὸς ἦν; ἢ οὐκ ἀκήκοας ὅτι Θεμιστοκλῆς Κλεόφαντον τὸν ὑὸν ἱππέα μὲν ἐδιδάξατο ἀγαθόν; ἐπέμενεν γοῦν ἐπὶ τῶν ἵππων ὀρθὸς ἑστηκώς, καὶ ἠκόντιζεν ἀπὸ τῶν ἵππων ὀρθός, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ θαυμαστὰ ἠργάζετο ἃ ἐκεῖνος αὐτὸν ἐπαιδεύσατο καὶ ἐποίησε σοφόν, ὅσα διδασκάλων ἀγαθῶν εἴχετο: ἢ ταῦτα οὐκ ἀκήκοας τῶν πρεσβυτέρων;

SOCRATES. At putas non, si voluerit alios aliquos honestos et bonos fieri, precipue autem filium suum? Aut arbitraris ipsum invidere illi atque accurate non tradere virtutem qua ipse bonus erat? An non audisti, quia Themistocles Cleofantum filium equitem nempe docuerat bonum? Manebat igitur in equis erectus Stans necnon iaculabatur ab equis erectus atque cetera multa et ammiranda operabatur, que ille ipsum erudierat et reddidit sapientem, quecumque a doctoribus bonis habebat; vel ista minime audisti a senioribus?

SO. Num censes voluisse alios quoque bonos fieri? filium suum præsertim? an putas invidisse filio, et de industria virtutem partem minime comunicasse? Audistin quod Themistocles filium Cleophantum in equestri facultate strenuum redidit, adeo ut equis ille rectus insisteret, rectusque ex equo iacularetur, cæteraque permulta stupenda faceret, in quibus illum diligenter parens erudivit, sapientemque in singulis, quæ pręceptoribus pręcipua sint, reddidit? hæc a maioribus accepisti?

SOCRATES: But would he not have wanted? He would, at any rate, have desired to make his own son a good man and a gentleman; he could not have been jealous of him, or have intentionally abstained from imparting to him his own virtue. Did you never hear that he made his son Cleophantus a famous horseman; and had him taught to stand upright on horseback and hurl a javelin, and to do many other marvellous things; and in anything which could be learned from a master he was well trained? Have you not heard from our elders of him?

Ἄνυτος
ἀκήκοα.

ANITUS. Audivi.

ANY. Accepi.

ANYTUS: I have.

Σωκράτης
οὐκ ἂν ἄρα τήν γε φύσιν τοῦ ὑέος αὐτοῦ ᾐτιάσατ᾽ ἄν τις εἶναι κακήν.

SOCRATES. Numquid igitur naturam filii sui calumpniabatur quis esse pravam.

SO. nemo igitur naturam filii utpote malam culpaverit.

SOCRATES: Then no one could say that his son showed any want of capacity?

(93e) Ἄνυτος
ἴσως οὐκ ἄν.

ANITUS. Forsan minime.

ANY. Nemo arbitror.

ANYTUS: Very likely not.

Σωκράτης
τί δὲ τόδε; ὡς Κλεόφαντος ὁ Θεμιστοκλέους ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς καὶ σοφὸς ἐγένετο ἅπερ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ, ἤδη του ἀκήκοας ἢ νεωτέρου ἢ πρεσβυτέρου;

SOCRATES. Quid autem illud? Quoniam Cleofantus Themistoclis vir bonus et sapiens factus est quemadmodum pater eius, iam istud audivisti seu a iuniore seu a seniore?

SO. Quid vero ad hoc? audisti ne ab aliquo seniore aut iuniore Cleophantum Themistoclis filium bonum ac sapientem in quibus pater fuerat, existisse?

SOCRATES: But did any one, old or young, ever say in your hearing that Cleophantus, son of Themistocles, was a wise or good man, as his father was?

Ἄνυτος
οὐ δῆτα.

ANITUS. Neutiquam.

ANY. Nunquam.

ANYTUS: I have certainly never heard any one say so.

Σωκράτης
ἆρ᾽ οὖν ταῦτα μὲν οἰόμεθα βούλεσθαι αὐτὸν τὸν αὑτοῦ ὑὸν παιδεῦσαι, ἣν δὲ αὐτὸς σοφίαν ἦν σοφός, οὐδὲν τῶν γειτόνων βελτίω ποιῆσαι, εἴπερ ἦν γε διδακτὸν ἡ ἀρετή;

SOCRATES. Igitur hec profecto autumamus: velle ipsum sui filium erudite, quaque ipse sapientia erat sapiens, nonne confinibus potiorem facere, siquidem erat docibile virtus?

SO. Num Themistoclem arbitramur alienis artibus imbuere filium voluisse, paterna vero virtute nihilo vicinis fuis præstantiorem reddere curavisse, siquidem doceri virtus ulla pacto posset?

SOCRATES: And if virtue could have been taught, would his father Themistocles have sought to train him in these minor accomplishments, and allowed him who, as you must remember, was his own son, to be no better than his neighbours in those qualities in which he himself excelled?

Ἄνυτος
ἴσως μὰ Δί᾽ οὔ.

ANITUS. Fortassis per Iovem minime.

ANY. Fortassis per Iovem minime.

ANYTUS: Indeed, indeed, I think not.

Σωκράτης
οὗτος μὲν δή σοι τοιοῦτος διδάσκαλος ἀρετῆς, ὃν καὶ σὺ ὁμολογεῖς ἐν τοῖς ἄριστον τῶν προτέρων εἶναι: ἄλλον (94a) δὲ δὴ σκεψώμεθα, Ἀριστείδην τὸν Λυσιμάχου: ἢ τοῦτον οὐχ ὁμολογεῖς ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι;

SOCRATES. Hic an tibi talis doctor virtutis, quem et tu fateris inter optimos pristinorum esse; aliumque consideremus Aristidem Lisimachi; an hunc non confiteris bonum fuisse?

SO. Talis igitur hic virtutis magister fuit, quem ipse unum ex antiquis optimum afferis. Consideramus iam et alium, Aristidem lychimachi filium. nonne hunc quoque bonum fuisse censes?

SOCRATES: Here was a teacher of virtue whom you admit to be among the best men of the past. Let us take another,--Aristides, the son of Lysimachus: would you not acknowledge that he was a good man?

Ἄνυτος
ἔγωγε, πάντως δήπου.

ANITUS. Ego autem revera.

ANY. Et maxime quidem.

ANYTUS: To be sure I should.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν καὶ οὗτος τὸν ὑὸν τὸν αὑτοῦ Λυσίμαχον, ὅσα μὲν διδασκάλων εἴχετο, κάλλιστα Ἀθηναίων ἐπαίδευσε, ἄνδρα δὲ βελτίω δοκεῖ σοι ὁτουοῦν πεποιηκέναι; τούτῳ γάρ που καὶ συγγέγονας καὶ ὁρᾷς οἷός ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ βούλει, (94b) Περικλέα, οὕτως μεγαλοπρεπῶς σοφὸν ἄνδρα, οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι δύο ὑεῖς ἔθρεψε, Πάραλον καὶ Ξάνθιππον;

SOCRATES. Nonne igitur et iste filium suum Lisimachum, quecumque a magistris habuit, optime Atheniensium erudivit, virum que potiorem videtur tibi quolibet effecisse? Huic quippe et cohabitasti et vides qualis est. Si autem velis Periclea, tam magnidecenter sapientem virum, nosti quoruam duos filios enutrivit, Paralum atque Xantippum?

SO. An non et site filium suum Lysimachum in omnibus quæ a præceptoribus percipiuntur, optime Atheniensium omnium eruditum evadere cum voluisset, num quoquam alio meliorem fecit? hunc etenim allocutus es, et qualis sit optime nosti. Præterea si vis Periclem virum magnopere sapientem considera; duos hic, quod te minime præterit, filios educavit, Paralum et Xanthippum.

SOCRATES: And did not he train his son Lysimachus better than any other Athenian in all that could be done for him by the help of masters? But what has been the result? Is he a bit better than any other mortal? He is an acquaintance of yours, and you see what he is like. There is Pericles, again, magnificent in his wisdom; and he, as you are aware, had two sons, Paralus and Xanthippus.

Ἄνυτος
ἔγωγε.

ANITUS. Ego sane.

ANY. Novi equidem.

ANYTUS: I know.

Σωκράτης
τούτους μέντοι, ὡς οἶσθα καὶ σύ, ἱππέας μὲν ἐδίδαξεν οὐδενὸς χείρους Ἀθηναίων, καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ ἀγωνίαν καὶ τἆλλα ἐπαίδευσεν ὅσα τέχνης ἔχεται οὐδενὸς χείρους: ἀγαθοὺς δὲ ἄρα ἄνδρας οὐκ ἐβούλετο ποιῆσαι; δοκῶ μέν, ἐβούλετο, ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ᾖ διδακτόν. ἵνα δὲ μὴ ὀλίγους οἴῃ καὶ τοὺς φαυλοτάτους Ἀθηναίων ἀδυνάτους γεγονέναι τοῦτο (94c) τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἐνθυμήθητι ὅτι Θουκυδίδης αὖ δύο ὑεῖς ἔθρεψεν, Μελησίαν καὶ Στέφανον, καὶ τούτους ἐπαίδευσεν τά τε ἄλλα εὖ καὶ ἐπάλαισαν κάλλιστα Ἀθηναίων — τὸν μὲν γὰρ Ξανθίᾳ ἔδωκε, τὸν δὲ Εὐδώρῳ: οὗτοι δέ που ἐδόκουν τῶν τότε κάλλιστα παλαίειν—ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι;

SOCRATES. Istos equidem, ut nosti et tu, equites docuit nemine deteriores Atheniensium, et musicam et agoniam et alia erudivit, quecumque artis habentur nullo deterius. Bonos igitur viros nolebat facere? Suspicor profecto volebat; atqui non iam docibile. Ut autem non paucos cogites et inertissimos Atheniensium impotentes fuisse, hanc autem rem animo volve, quoniam Thuquitides duos filios aluit, Melesiam et Stephanum, et hos erudivit cetera quidem bene, et palestizabant optime Atherniorum; hunc enim Xantie dedit, illumque Eudoro. Hii equidem putabantur eorum qui optime tunc palestizare; an non reminisceris?

SO. Hos ut nosti, tum arte equestri, et musica, tum etaim athletice præ cæteris Atheniensibus instruxit. Ac denique in nullo eorum quæ arte percipiuntur, inferiores aliis esse voluit, boni autem ut evaderent an cupiebat? cupivisse quidem existimo, sed id doceeri minime potuisse. Ne autem paucos putes quosdam ignobilissimosque Atheniensium id assequi non potuisse, Thucydidem vide; duos hic filios Melisiam atque Stephanum educavit, quos et cætera diligenter edocuit, et palæstram in primis, ut in ea Athenienses reliquos facile superarent, unum quidem Xanthiæ, Eudoro alterum commendans; atque hi quidem paæstra cæteris omnibus illis temporibus præcellere putabantur, nonne meministi?

SOCRATES: And you know, also, that he taught them to be unrivalled horsemen, and had them trained in music and gymnastics and all sorts of arts--in these respects they were on a level with the best--and had he no wish to make good men of them? Nay, he must have wished it. But virtue, as I suspect, could not be taught. And that you may not suppose the incompetent teachers to be only the meaner sort of Athenians and few in number, remember again that Thucydides had two sons, Melesias and Stephanus, whom, besides giving them a good education in other things, he trained in wrestling, and they were the best wrestlers in Athens: one of them he committed to the care of Xanthias, and the other of Eudorus, who had the reputation of being the most celebrated wrestlers of that day. Do you remember them?

Ἄνυτος
ἔγωγε, ἀκοῇ.

ANITUS. Ego quidem auditu.

AN (sic). Audivi equidem.

ANYTUS: I have heard of them.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν δῆλον ὅτι οὗτος οὐκ ἄν ποτε, οὗ μὲν ἔδει (94d) δαπανώμενον διδάσκειν, ταῦτα μὲν ἐδίδαξε τοὺς παῖδας τοὺς αὑτοῦ, οὗ δὲ οὐδὲν ἔδει ἀναλώσαντα ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ποιῆσαι, ταῦτα δὲ οὐκ ἐδίδαξεν, εἰ διδακτὸν ἦν; ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἴσως ὁ Θουκυδίδης φαῦλος ἦν, καὶ οὐκ ἦσαν αὐτῷ πλεῖστοι φίλοι Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων; καὶ οἰκίας μεγάλης ἦν καὶ ἐδύνατο μέγα ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησιν, ὥστε εἴπερ ἦν τοῦτο διδακτόν, ἐξευρεῖν ἂν ὅστις ἔμελλεν αὐτοῦ τοὺς ὑεῖς ἀγαθοὺς ποιήσειν, ἢ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων τις ἢ τῶν (94e) ξένων, εἰ αὐτὸς μὴ ἐσχόλαζεν διὰ τὴν τῆς πόλεως ἐπιμέλειαν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε Ἄνυτε, μὴ οὐκ ᾖ διδακτὸν ἀρετή.

SOCRATES. Nonne igitur manifestum quoniam hic nunquam - de quo quidem oportuit sumptus facientem docere, hoc utique docuit filios suos, pro quo nichil oportuit consumentem bonos viros facere, hoc nempe non doceret, si docibile esset? Atqui fors Thuquitides malignus erat et non erant ipsi plurimi amici Atheniensium et adiutorum? Et domus magne erat et poterat plurimum in urbe et in aliis Grecis, quare siquidem esset hoc docibile, reperiret profecto qui deberet sui filios bonos efficere, aut indigenarum quis vel alienigenarum, an ipse haud vacabat propter civitatis curam. Immo enim, o dilecte Anite, haud iam docibile erat.

SO. Neque vero iste cum quæ sumptu maximo discebantur, filios callere voluerit, virtutem solam quam absque pecuniis tradere potuit, si modo doceri potuisset, doceri noluisse putandus est. An forte Thucydides ignobilis vir erat, nec amicos plurimos tam cives quam commilitones et focios habebat? Quinnimo et ampla familia ortus, et summæ cuiusdam autoritatis tum apud concives suos, tum etaim apud omnes cæteros Græcos erat. Ideoque si per doctrinam comparari bonitas posuisset, invenisset saltem vel civem aliquem vel peregrinum, qui filios eius bonos effecisset, si ipsi ad id docendum a reip. negotiis ocium deerat. Se vide o amice Anyte, ne forte virtus doceri nequeat.

SOCRATES: Now, can there be a doubt that Thucydides, whose children were taught things for which he had to spend money, would have taught them to be good men, which would have cost him nothing, if virtue could have been taught? Will you reply that he was a mean man, and had not many friends among the Athenians and allies? Nay, but he was of a great family, and a man of influence at Athens and in all Hellas, and, if virtue could have been taught, he would have found out some Athenian or foreigner who would have made good men of his sons, if he could not himself spare the time from cares of state. Once more, I suspect, friend Anytus, that virtue is not a thing which can be taught?

Ἄνυτος
ὦ Σώκρατες, ῥᾳδίως μοι δοκεῖς κακῶς λέγειν ἀνθρώπους. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἄν σοι συμβουλεύσαιμι, εἰ ἐθέλεις ἐμοὶ πείθεσθαι, εὐλαβεῖσθαι: ὡς ἴσως μὲν καὶ ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει ῥᾷόν ἐστιν κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους ἢ εὖ, ἐν τῇδε δὲ καὶ (95a) πάνυ: οἶμαι δὲ σὲ καὶ αὐτὸν εἰδέναι.

ANITUS. O Socrates, ex levi michi videris vituperare homines. Ego veto tibi consulerem, si velis michi acquiescere, vereri; quia forsan et in alia civitate facilius est malefacere horuinibus quam bene, in ista sane etiam plurimum, reorque te ipsum cognoscere.

ANY. O Socrates liberius atque decet, homines mihi vituperare videris. Itaque tibi consulo si modo parere vis, ut tibi caveas; forte eni alia in urbe leve est, vel iniuria, vel beneficio cives afficere, in hac autem grave nimium ac periculosum, neque id te fugere arbitror.

ANYTUS: Socrates, I think that you are too ready to speak evil of men: and, if you will take my advice, I would recommend you to be careful. Perhaps there is no city in which it is not easier to do men harm than to do them good, and this is certainly the case at Athens, as I believe that you know.

Σωκράτης
ὦ Μένων, Ἄνυτος μέν μοι δοκεῖ χαλεπαίνειν, καὶ οὐδὲν θαυμάζω: οἴεται γάρ με πρῶτον μὲν κακηγορεῖν τούτους τοὺς ἄνδρας, ἔπειτα ἡγεῖται καὶ αὐτὸς εἶναι εἷς τούτων. ἀλλ᾽ οὗτος μὲν ἐάν ποτε γνῷ οἷόν ἐστιν τὸ κακῶς λέγειν, παύσεται χαλεπαίνων, νῦν δὲ ἀγνοεῖ: σὺ δέ μοι εἰπέ, οὐ καὶ παρ᾽ ὑμῖν εἰσιν καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες;

SOCRATES. O Menon, Anitus nempe michi videtur irasci, et non admiror: putat namque me primo utique convitiare hos viros, dehinc arbitratur et ipse esse unus istorum. Verum hic utique, si quando noscet quale sit contumeliare, desineret irasci; nunc autem ignorat. Tu autem michi dic, nonne apud nos sunt honesti et boni viri?

SO. O Meno Anytus hic succensere mihi videtur, neque id miror. primum quia hos me viros vituperare censet, deinde se unum ex iis arbitrantur. Verum hic si quando didicerit quid sit hominibus detrahere, haud ulterius succensebit, in åræsentia vero ignorat. At ipse mihi dicas utrum apud nos clari, ac boni viri sint?

SOCRATES: O Meno, think that Anytus is in a rage. And he may well be in a rage, for he thinks, in the first place, that I am defaming these gentlemen; and in the second place, he is of opinion that he is one of them himself. But some day he will know what is the meaning of defamation, and if he ever does, he will forgive me. Meanwhile I will return to you, Meno; for I suppose that there are gentlemen in your region too?

Μένων
πάνυ γε.

MENON. Penitus.

ME. Sunt certe.

MENO: Certainly there are.

(95b) Σωκράτης
τί οὖν; ἐθέλουσιν οὗτοι παρέχειν αὑτοὺς διδασκάλους τοῖς νέοις, καὶ ὁμολογεῖν διδάσκαλοί τε εἶναι καὶ διδακτὸν ἀρετήν;

SOCRATES. Quid igitur? Volunt isti exhibere ipsos magistros iuvenibus atque fateri doctores quidem esse, si docibile virtus?

SO. Volunt ne isti iuvenibus seipsos præceptores exponere? atque id profiteri? vel virtutem doceri posse fatentur?

SOCRATES: And are they willing to teach the young? and do they profess to be teachers? and do they agree that virtue is taught?

Μένων
οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ τοτὲ μὲν ἂν αὐτῶν ἀκούσαις ὡς διδακτόν, τοτὲ δὲ ὡς οὔ.

MENON. Minime per Iovem, o Socrates, immo tunc equidem ab ipsis audies quia docibile, tunc veto nequaquam.

ME. Non per Iovem o Socrates, sed nunc ab illis doceri posse virtutem, nunc non posse audies.

MENO: No indeed, Socrates, they are anything but agreed; you may hear them saying at one time that virtue can be taught, and then again the reverse.

Σωκράτης
φῶμεν οὖν τούτους διδασκάλους εἶναι τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, οἷς μηδὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖται;

SOCRATES. Dicemus igitur istos doctores esse huius rei, quibus neque ipsum hoc confitendo promittitur?

SO. An hos dicimus huius rei magistros, inter quos nondum id convenit?

SOCRATES: Can we call those teachers who do not acknowledge the possibility of their own vocation?

Μένων
οὔ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

MENON. Non michi videtur, o Socrates.

ME. Ne quaquam mihi videtur o Socrates.

MENO: I think not, Socrates.

Σωκράτης
τί δὲ δή; οἱ σοφισταί σοι οὗτοι, οἵπερ μόνοι ἐπαγγέλλονται, δοκοῦσι διδάσκαλοι εἶναι ἀρετῆς;

SOCRATES. Quid autem? Sophiste tibi isti, qui soli spondent, videntur doctores esse virtutis?

SO. Quid vero, num sophistas, siquidem ii foli id prędicant, magistros virtutis existimas?

SOCRATES: And what do you think of these Sophists, who are the only professors? Do they seem to you to be teachers of virtue?

(95c) Μένων
καὶ Γοργίου μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα ἄγαμαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἄν ποτε αὐτοῦ τοῦτο ἀκούσαις ὑπισχνουμένου, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καταγελᾷ, ὅταν ἀκούσῃ ὑπισχνουμένων: ἀλλὰ λέγειν οἴεται δεῖν ποιεῖν δεινούς.

MENON. Et de Gorgia precipue, o Socrates, hoc admiror, quod nunquam ab ipso hoc audies pollicente, sed alios ridet, quotiens audiat promittentes. Atqui dicere putat oportere facere versutos.

ME. Gorgiam in hoc vehementer admiror et amo, quenunquam illum hoc pollicentem audias. Imo et alios ridet, quoties polliceri sentit; putat autem hoc duntaxat promittendum esse, eloquentes posse scilicet vehementesque dicendo homines reddi.

MENO: I often wonder, Socrates, that Gorgias is never heard promising to teach virtue: and when he hears others promising he only laughs at them; but he thinks that men should be taught to speak.

Σωκράτης
οὐδ᾽ ἄρα σοὶ δοκοῦσιν οἱ σοφισταὶ διδάσκαλοι εἶναι;

SOCRATES. Non itaque tibi videntur sophiste magistri esse?

SO. Non ergo sophistæ huius rei præceptores esse tibi videntur.

SOCRATES: Then do you not think that the Sophists are teachers?

Μένων
οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὅπερ οἱ πολλοὶ πέπονθα: τοτὲ μέν μοι δοκοῦσιν, τοτὲ δὲ οὔ.

MENON. Non habeo dicere, o Socrates. Etenim ipse quod non pauci passus sum: tunc equidem michi videntur, tunc vero minime.

ME. Ne scio quid dicam o Socrates. Nam mihi quoque idem quod plurimus accidit; nunc posse puto, nunc posse nego.

MENO: I cannot tell you, Socrates; like the rest of the world, I am in doubt, and sometimes I think that they are teachers and sometimes not.

Σωκράτης
οἶσθα δὲ ὅτι οὐ μόνον σοί τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς πολιτικοῖς τοῦτο δοκεῖ τοτὲ μὲν εἶναι διδακτόν, τοτὲ δ᾽ οὔ, (95d) ἀλλὰ καὶ Θέογνιν τὸν ποιητὴν οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι ταὐτὰ ταῦτα λέγει;

At et Theognem poetam nosti, quoniam ipsa hec dicit?

SO. Nec soli tibi, cæterisque civibus evenit, ut interdum doceri virtutem credatis, interdum vero negetis, verum etiam poetæ Thognidi, eadem enim omnino dicit.

SOCRATES: And are you aware that not you only and other politicians have doubts whether virtue can be taught or not, but that Theognis the poet says the very same thing?

Μένων
ἐν ποίοις ἔπεσιν;

SOCRATES. In quibus carminibus?

ME. Cuibusnam carminibus?

MENO: Where does he say so?

Σωκράτης
ἐν τοῖς ἐλεγείοις, οὗ λέγει—

“καὶ παρὰ τοῖσιν πῖνε καὶ ἔσθιε,
καὶ μετὰ τοῖσιν ἵζε, καὶ ἅνδανε τοῖς, ὧν μεγάλη δύναμις.
ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄπ᾽ ἐσθλὰ διδάξεαι:
ἢν δὲ κακοῖσιν (95e) συμμίσγῃς,
ἀπολεῖς καὶ τὸν ἐόντα νόον.” (Theognis 33-36 Bergk)

MENON. In elegiis, ubi dicit:

‘Et penes hos bibe ac comede, et cum istis
sede, atque operate hiis, quorum magna virtus.
A bonis quippe bona doceberis; si vero malls
e commiscearis, perdes et inherentem intellectum.’

Scis quoniam in hiis nempe quasi docibili existente virtute dicit?

SO. Elegis in hunc modum. Hos prope bibe et comede, cum iis una fedeto, iis obsequere, quorum magna potestas. a bonis enim bona perdisces. Quod si malis adhæseris, quam habes mentem proculdubio perdes. Vides iam quod in iis ata loquitur, quasi virtus disci possit?

SOCRATES: In these elegiac verses (Theog.):
‘Eat and drink and sit with the mighty, and make yourself agreeable to them; for from the good you will learn what is good, but if you mix with the bad you will lose the intelligence which you already have.’
Do you observe that here he seems to imply that virtue can be taught?

Μένων
φαίνεταί γε.

SOCRATES. Claret utique.

ME. Apparet.

MENO: Clearly.

Σωκράτης
ἐν ἄλλοις δέ γε ὀλίγον μεταβάς,—

“εἰ δ᾽ ἦν ποιητόν, φησί, καὶ ἔνθετον ἀνδρὶ νόημα,”
λέγει πως ὅτι—
“πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους ἔφερον”

MENON. Et in aliis profecto paulum transiens.

‘Si vero esset factibilis’, in quit, ‘et imponi aptus viro intellectus’,
dicit quocumque modo quoniam
‘multa preruia et magna ferrent’

SO. At vero paulo post sic inquit. Si fana mens homini tradi posset, multam sane magnamque mercedem qui id efficerent reportarent,

SOCRATES: But in some other verses he shifts about and says (Theog.): ‘If understanding could be created and put into a man, then they’ (who were able to perform this feat) ‘would have obtained great rewards.’

“οὔ ποτ᾽ ἂν ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ πατρὸς ἔγεντο κακός,
(96a) πειθόμενος μύθοισι σαόφροσιν. ἀλλὰ διδάσκων
οὔ ποτε ποιήσεις τὸν κακὸν ἄνδρ᾽ ἀγαθόν.” (Theognis 434-438 Bergk)

queuntes hoc efficere, et

‘non unquam ex bono patre genitus est malus,
credens fabulis sobriis. Verum docens
numquam facies malignum virum bonum.’

Perpendis quoniam ipse sibi iterum de eisdem contraria dicit?

neque bono ex patre filius malus esset prudentibus monitis imbutus; verum docendo nunquam ex malo bonum hominem facies. Cernis hunc circa eadem contraria sibiipsi statuere?

And again:--‘Never would a bad son have sprung from a good sire, for he would have heard the voice of instruction; but not by teaching will you ever make a bad man into a good one.’ And this, as you may remark, is a contradiction of the other.

Μένων
φαίνεται.

SOCRATES. Patet.

ME. Videtur.

MENO: Clearly.

Σωκράτης
ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν πράγματος, οὗ οἱ μὲν φάσκοντες διδάσκαλοι εἶναι οὐχ ὅπως ἄλλων διδάσκαλοι ὁμολογοῦνται, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ αὐτοὶ ἐπίστασθαι, ἀλλὰ πονηροὶ (96b) εἶναι περὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα οὗ φασι διδάσκαλοι εἶναι, οἱ δὲ ὁμολογούμενοι αὐτοὶ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ τοτὲ μέν φασιν αὐτὸ διδακτὸν εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ οὔ; τοὺς οὖν οὕτω τεταραγμένους περὶ ὁτουοῦν φαίης ἂν σὺ κυρίως διδασκάλους εἶναι;

MENON. Habes ergo dicere alterius cuiusque rei, cuius qui dicunt doctores esse non quomodo aliorum doctores confitentur, sed neque ipsi scire, verum mali esse circa ipsam hanc rem cui us dicunt doctores esse; neque confessi ipsi honesti et boni, nunc equidem aiunt ipsum docibile esse, nunc autem minime?

SOCRATES. Igitur sic attonitos super quolibet, dicas utique tu proprie doctores esse?

SO. Potes igitur indicare mihi rem, quancunque tandem, cuius qui se doctores scribunt, haud aliarum tamen doctores esse, aut eam rem tenere, sed prauos nullosque in eo cuius professores sunt, esse se fateantur; aut si se fateantur esse aliquos, rem tamen eam percipi posse, nunc quidem affirment, nunc negent; an tu, qui qua cunque in re ita ancipites sunt, eius rei doctores recte voces?

SOCRATES: And is there anything else of which the professors are affirmed not only not to be teachers of others, but to be ignorant themselves, and bad at the knowledge of that which they are professing to teach? or is there anything about which even the acknowledged ‘gentlemen’ are sometimes saying that ‘this thing can be taught,’ and sometimes the opposite? Can you say that they are teachers in any true sense whose ideas are in such confusion?

Μένων
μὰ Δί᾽ οὐκ ἔγωγε.

MENON. Per Iovem non ego.

ME. Minime.

MENO: I should say, certainly not.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν εἰ μήτε οἱ σοφισταὶ μήτε οἱ αὐτοὶ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ὄντες διδάσκαλοί εἰσι τοῦ πράγματος, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλοι γε;

SOCRATES. Igitur si neque sophiste, neque ipsi honesti ac boni cum sint, doctores sunt rei, liquet quoniam non alii?

SO. Ergo si neque sophistæ, neque boni clarique viri huius rei doctores sunt, multo minus cæteri erunt.

SOCRATES: But if neither the Sophists nor the gentlemen are teachers, clearly there can be no other teachers?

Μένων
οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.

MENON. Minime michi videtur.

ME. Certe.

MENO: No.

(96c) Σωκράτης
εἰ δέ γε μὴ διδάσκαλοι, οὐδὲ μαθηταί;

SOCRATES. Si minus doctores, neque discipuli?

SO. Si non sun preceptors, neque disciple etiam.

SOCRATES: And if there are no teachers, neither are there disciples?

Μένων
δοκεῖ μοι ἔχειν ὡς λέγεις.

MENON. Videtur michi sic se habere quemadmodum dicis.

ME. Sic ut ais mihi videtur.

MENO: Agreed.

Σωκράτης
ὡμολογήκαμεν δέ γε, πράγματος οὗ μήτε διδάσκαλοι μήτε μαθηταὶ εἶεν, τοῦτο μηδὲ διδακτὸν εἶναι;

SOCRATES. Confessi sumus quoque rei cuius neque magistri neque discipuli fuerint, hoc neque docibile esse.

SO. An non confessi sumus, illud cuius nec magistri neque discipuli sunt, doceri minime posse?

SOCRATES: And we have admitted that a thing cannot be taught of which there are neither teachers nor disciples?

Μένων
ὡμολογήκαμεν.

Fassi sumus.

ME. Confessi sumus.

MENO: We have.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν ἀρετῆς οὐδαμοῦ φαίνονται διδάσκαλοι;

Igitur virtutis nullatenus apparent magistri?

SO. Et virtutis nusquam præceptores reperiuntur?

SOCRATES: And there are no teachers of virtue to be found anywhere?

Μένων
ἔστι ταῦτα.

MENON. Sunt ista.

ME. Nusquam.

MENO: There are not.

Σωκράτης
εἰ δέ γε μὴ διδάσκαλοι, οὐδὲ μαθηταί;

SOCRATES. Sin autem doctores, neque discipuli?

SO. Si non præceptores neque discipuli etiam.

SOCRATES: And if there are no teachers, neither are there scholars?

Μένων
φαίνεται οὕτως.

MENON. Clarum.

ME. Sic apparet.

MENO: That, I think, is true.

Σωκράτης
ἀρετὴ ἄρα οὐκ ἂν εἴη διδακτόν;

SOCRATES. Virtus non itaque erit docibile?

SO. Virtus ergo doceri nequit.

SOCRATES: Then virtue cannot be taught?

(96d) Μένων
οὐκ ἔοικεν, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς ἡμεῖς ἐσκέμμεθα. ὥστε καὶ θαυμάζω δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, πότερόν ποτε οὐδ᾽ εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες, ἢ τίς ἂν εἴη τρόπος τῆς γενέσεως τῶν ἀγαθῶν γιγνομένων.

MENON. Non videtur, si recte nos examinavimus. Unde et miror equidem, o Socrates, utrum unquam neque sint boni viri, vel quis utique erit modus notitie bonorum factotum.

ME. Sic videtur, si quidem nos recte diiudicavimus. Quam ob rem vehementer admiror o Socrates bonos ullos inter homines reperiri, et quæ sit ration qua boni fiunt, ambigo.

MENO: Not if we are right in our view. But I cannot believe, Socrates, that there are no good men: And if there are, how did they come into existence?

Σωκράτης
κινδυνεύομεν, ὦ Μένων, ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ φαῦλοί τινες εἶναι ἄνδρες, καὶ σέ τε Γοργίας οὐχ ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευκέναι καὶ ἐμὲ Πρόδικος. παντὸς μᾶλλον οὖν προσεκτέον τὸν νοῦν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς, καὶ ζητητέον ὅστις ἡμᾶς ἑνί γέ τῳ τρόπῳ βελτίους (96e) ποιήσει: λέγω δὲ ταῦτα ἀποβλέψας πρὸς τὴν ἄρτι ζήτησιν, ὡς ἡμᾶς ἔλαθεν καταγελάστως ὅτι οὐ μόνον ἐπιστήμης ἡγουμένης ὀρθῶς τε καὶ εὖ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πράττεται τὰ πράγματα, ᾗ ἴσως καὶ διαφεύγει ἡμᾶς τὸ γνῶναι τίνα ποτὲ τρόπον γίγνονται οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες.

SOCRATES. Articulamur, o Menon, egoque et tu nequam quidam esse viri, et te quoque Gorgias minus sufficienter erudiisse atque me Prodicus. Universo magis igitur applicandum est animum nobis ipsis et indagandum, qui nos uno modo potiores fecerit. Aio sane ista respiciens ad presentem questionem, quoniam nos latuit ridicule, quia non solum scientia ducent recteque et bene hominibus fiunt (res), aut fortassis etiam subterfugisse nos agnoscere, quo unquam modo fiant boni viri.

SO. Videmur o Meno ego simul et tu mali esse. videtur Gorgias quoque te, ac me Prodicus haud satis erudisse. Itaque maxime omnium revocanda nobis mens est nostra, quærendusque aliquis qui hoc uno modo meliores nos efficiat. Hæc autem dico ad superiorem inquisitionem respiciens. Num isthuc perridicule a nobis præteritum est, quod non solum scientia duce, recte negotia hominibus procedunt, quod quidem nisi concedatur, esse scilicet præter illam aliud quiddam, fortasse nualla extet ratio, qua viri boni fiant.

SOCRATES: I am afraid, Meno, that you and I are not good for much, and that Gorgias has been as poor an educator of you as Prodicus has been of me. Certainly we shall have to look to ourselves, and try to find some one who will help in some way or other to improve us. This I say, because I observe that in the previous discussion none of us remarked that right and good action is possible to man under other guidance than that of knowledge (episteme); --and indeed if this be denied, there is no seeing how there can be any good men at all.

Μένων
πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

MENON. Quid dicis istud, o Socrates?

ME. Quo pacto id (26) ais o Socrates.

MENO: How do you mean, Socrates?

Σωκράτης
ὧδε: ὅτι μὲν τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας δεῖ ὠφελίμους εἶναι, (97a) ὀρθῶς ὡμολογήκαμεν τοῦτό γε ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἔχοι: ἦ γάρ;

SOCRATES. Ita: quia bonos viros decet commodos esse, recte fassi sum us hoc quoque; quoniam non aliter se ha beat, vel enim?

SO. Sic quod quidem bonos viros utiles esse oporteat, probe confessi sumus, cum nunquam se res aliter habeat, nonne?

SOCRATES: I mean that good men are necessarily useful or profitable. Were we not right in admitting this? It must be so.

Μένων
ναί.

MENON. Ne.

ME. Ita.

MENO: Yes.

Σωκράτης
καὶ ὅτι γε ὠφέλιμοι ἔσονται, ἂν ὀρθῶς ἡμῖν ἡγῶνται τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ τοῦτό που καλῶς ὡμολογοῦμεν;

SOCRATES. Et quoniam commodi erunt, si recte nobis digerant res; et hoc bene fatemur?

SO. Et quod utiles futuri sint, si recte agendis rebus præsint etiam probe inter nos convenit.

SOCRATES: And in supposing that they will be useful only if they are true guides to us of action--there we were also right?

Μένων
ναί.

MENON. Etiam.

ME. Probe.

MENO: Yes.

Σωκράτης
ὅτι δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρθῶς ἡγεῖσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ φρόνιμος ᾖ, τοῦτο ὅμοιοί ἐσμεν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὡμολογηκόσιν.

SOCRATES. Quod vero non sit recte duci, nisi prudens fuerit; hoc similes sumus non recte fassis.

SO. Quod vero nullus recte præesse possit, nisi sit prudens, haud satis recte ab utroque asseveratum esse constat.

SOCRATES: But when we said that a man cannot be a good guide unless he have knowledge (phrhonesis), this we were wrong.

Μένων
πῶς δὴ ὀρθῶς λέγεις;

MENON. Qui vero recte dicis?

ME. Quomodo recte dicis?

MENO: What do you mean by the word ‘right’?

Σωκράτης
ἐγὼ ἐρῶ. εἰ εἰδὼς τὴν ὁδὸν τὴν εἰς Λάρισαν ἢ ὅποι βούλει ἄλλοσε βαδίζοι καὶ ἄλλοις ἡγοῖτο, ἄλλο τι ὀρθῶς ἂν καὶ εὖ ἡγοῖτο;

SOCRATES. Ego dico. Qt!is sciens viam in Larissam, sive quo velis aliorsum vadere - et alius opinetur aliud quid - recte utique et bene ducat?

SO. Dicam. qui iter vel Larissam, vel alio quovis novit, et eo vel ipse proficiscatur, vel alios ducat, nonne recte atque bene perduceret?

SOCRATES: I will explain. If a man knew the way to Larisa, or anywhere else, and went to the place and led others thither, would he not be a right and good guide?

Μένων
πάνυ γε.

MENON. Omnifariam.

ME. Prorsus.

MENO: Certainly.

(97b) Σωκράτης
τί δ᾽ εἴ τις ὀρθῶς μὲν δοξάζων ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ ὁδός, ἐληλυθὼς δὲ μὴ μηδ᾽ ἐπιστάμενος, οὐ καὶ οὗτος ἂν ὀρθῶς ἡγοῖτο;

SOCRATES. Quid: si quis recte quidem opinans que est via - veniensque minime neque sciens - nonne et iste quoque recte ducat?

SO. Quid vero si quis recte opinatur quæ via ferat Larissam, nunquam temen profectus sit neque sciverit, nonne iste quoque recte duceret?

SOCRATES: And a person who had a right opinion about the way, but had never been and did not know, might be a good guide also, might he not?

Μένων
πάνυ γε.

MENON. Prorsus.

ME. Valde.

MENO: Certainly.

Σωκράτης
καὶ ἕως γ᾽ ἄν που ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἔχῃ περὶ ὧν ὁ ἕτερος ἐπιστήμην, οὐδὲν χείρων ἡγεμὼν ἔσται, οἰόμενος μὲν ἀληθῆ, φρονῶν δὲ μή, τοῦ τοῦτο φρονοῦντος.

SOCRATES. Et quamdiu rectam opinionem habeat, de quibus alter scientiam, minime deterior dux erit, opinatus autem verum sentiensque minime, illo id sentiente.

SO. Et donec rectam de iisdem rebus opinionem habet, de quibus alter scientiam, dux erit nihilo deterior existimans quidem vera, sciens vero minime, quam is qui ista pernovit?

SOCRATES: And while he has true opinion about that which the other knows, he will be just as good a guide if he thinks the truth, as he who knows the truth?

Μένων
οὐδὲν γάρ.

MENON. Minime enim.

ME. Nihilo ceret.

MENO: Exactly.

Σωκράτης
δόξα ἄρα ἀληθὴς πρὸς ὀρθότητα πράξεως οὐδὲν χείρων ἡγεμὼν φρονήσεως: καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ νυνδὴ παρελείπομεν ἐν τῇ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς σκέψει ὁποῖόν τι εἴη, λέγοντες (97c) ὅτι φρόνησις μόνον ἡγεῖται τοῦ ὀρθῶς πράττειν: τὸ δὲ ἄρα καὶ δόξα ἦν ἀληθής.

SOCRATES. Opinio igitur vera ad rectitudinem actus haud deterior dux prudentia; et hoc est quod nunc intermisimus in ea quidem que de virtute speculatione, quale quid sit; dicentes quoniam prudentia dumtaxat precedit et docet recte agere. Id igitur et opinio erat vera.

SO. Vera ergo opinio ad recte agendum nihilo minus quam prudentia valet. Atque id est quod in consideratione virtutis in superioribus prætermisimus, dum solam prudentiam recte agendi ducem affereremus. hæc autem erat opinio vera.

SOCRATES: Then true opinion is as good a guide to correct action as knowledge; and that was the point which we omitted in our speculation about the nature of virtue, when we said that knowledge only is the guide of right action; whereas there is also right opinion.

Μένων
ἔοικέ γε.

MENON. Videturque.

ME. Videtur.

MENO: True.

Σωκράτης
οὐδὲν ἄρα ἧττον ὠφέλιμόν ἐστιν ὀρθὴ δόξα ἐπιστήμης.

SOCRATES. Non ergo minus commodum erit recta opinio scientia.

SO. Num igitur nihilo minus recta opinio, quam scientia confert?

SOCRATES: Then right opinion is not less useful than knowledge?

Μένων
τοσούτῳ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ὁ μὲν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχων ἀεὶ ἂν ἐπιτυγχάνοι, ὁ δὲ τὴν ὀρθὴν δόξαν τοτὲ μὲν ἂν τυγχάνοι, τοτὲ δ᾽ οὔ.

MENON. Adeo sane, o Socrates, quoniam scientiam habens semper in venit, rectam profecto opinionem modo uti que attingit, modo vero minime.

ME. Hoc utique minus confert o Socrates, quod quiqunque scinetiam habet semper assequitur; qui vero rectam opinionem, interdum quidem consequitur, nonnunquam vero fallitur.

MENO: The difference, Socrates, is only that he who has knowledge will always be right; but he who has right opinion will sometimes be right, and sometimes not.

Σωκράτης
πῶς λέγεις; ὁ ἀεὶ ἔχων ὀρθὴν δόξαν οὐκ ἀεὶ ἂν τυγχάνοι, ἕωσπερ ὀρθὰ δοξάζοι;

SOCRATES. Quid dicis? Semper habens rectam opinionem, non semper consequitur, donee recta opinetur?

SO. Quid ais? qui recta opinione incedit, nonne quamdiu opinatur recte, semper voti compos efficitur?

SOCRATES: What do you mean? Can he be wrong who has right opinion, so long as he has right opinion?

Μένων
ἀνάγκη μοι φαίνεται: ὥστε θαυμάζω, ὦ Σώκρατες, (97d) τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος, ὅτι δή ποτε πολὺ τιμιωτέρα ἡ ἐπιστήμη τῆς ὀρθῆς δόξης, καὶ δι᾽ ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἕτερον, τὸ δὲ ἕτερόν ἐστιν αὐτῶν.

MENON. Necesse michi videtur. Quas ob res miror, o Socrates, hoc ita se habente, quia certe multo pretiosior scientia recta opinione, et quia hoc utique alterum, illud vero alterum est ipsorum.

ME. Necessarium apparet. Quam ob rem miror, quare cum ita fit, scientia tamen longe admodum præstantior habeatur atque recta opinio; et cur utraque illarum aliud quiddam fit, dubito.

MENO: I admit the cogency of your argument, and therefore, Socrates, I wonder that knowledge should be preferred to right opinion--or why they should ever differ.

Σωκράτης
οἶσθα οὖν δι᾽ ὅτι θαυμάζεις, ἢ ἐγώ σοι εἴπω;

SOCRATES. Nosti igitur quare miraris, an ego tibi dicam?

SO. Nostin quam ob causam id mirereris? an ipse vis tibi dicam?

SOCRATES: And shall I explain this wonder to you?

Μένων
πάνυ γ᾽ εἰπέ.

MENON. Penitus dic.

ME. Dic prorsus.

MENO: Do tell me.

Σωκράτης
ὅτι τοῖς Δαιδάλου ἀγάλμασιν οὐ προσέσχηκας τὸν νοῦν: ἴσως δὲ οὐδ᾽ ἔστιν παρ᾽ ὑμῖν.

SOCRATES. Quia Dedali Statuis minime attendisti; fors autem non est penes vos.

SO. Quia Dædali statuas nunquam considerasti, forte vero neque apud vos extant.

SOCRATES: You would not wonder if you had ever observed the images of Daedalus (Compare Euthyphro); but perhaps you have not got them in your country?

Μένων
πρὸς τί δὲ δὴ τοῦτο λέγεις;

MENON. Ad quid sane hoc dicis?

ME. Quorsum hæc?

MENO: What have they to do with the question?

Σωκράτης
ὅτι καὶ ταῦτα, ἐὰν μὲν μὴ δεδεμένα ᾖ, ἀποδιδράσκει καὶ δραπετεύει, ἐὰν δὲ δεδεμένα, παραμένει.

SOCRATES. Quoniam hec nisi vincta fuerinf, abfugiunt et abscedunt, si vero colligata, permanent.

SO. Quoniam hæ nisi ligentur, discedunt atque aufugiunt, ligatæ permanent.

SOCRATES: Because they require to be fastened in order to keep them, and if they are not fastened they will play truant and run away.

(97e) Μένων
τί οὖν δή;

MENON. Quid igitur?

ME. Quid tum?

MENO: Well, what of that?

Σωκράτης
τῶν ἐκείνου ποιημάτων λελυμένον μὲν ἐκτῆσθαι οὐ πολλῆς τινος ἄξιόν ἐστι τιμῆς, ὥσπερ δραπέτην ἄνθρωπον —οὐ γὰρ παραμένει—δεδεμένον δὲ πολλοῦ ἄξιον: πάνυ γὰρ καλὰ τὰ ἔργα ἐστίν. πρὸς τί οὖν δὴ λέγω ταῦτα; πρὸς τὰς δόξας τὰς ἀληθεῖς. καὶ γὰρ αἱ δόξαι αἱ ἀληθεῖς, ὅσον μὲν ἂν χρόνον παραμένωσιν, καλὸν τὸ χρῆμα καὶ πάντ᾽ (98a) ἀγαθὰ ἐργάζονται: πολὺν δὲ χρόνον οὐκ ἐθέλουσι παραμένειν, ἀλλὰ δραπετεύουσιν ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὥστε οὐ πολλοῦ ἄξιαί εἰσιν, ἕως ἄν τις αὐτὰς δήσῃ αἰτίας λογισμῷ. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστίν, ὦ Μένων ἑταῖρε, ἀνάμνησις, ὡς ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἡμῖν ὡμολόγηται. ἐπειδὰν δὲ δεθῶσιν, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιστῆμαι γίγνονται, ἔπειτα μόνιμοι: καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ τιμιώτερον ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης ἐστίν, καὶ διαφέρει δεσμῷ ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης.

SOCRATES. Eius formationum solutum possidere non multi alicuius dignum est pretia, quemadmodum transfugam hominem - haud enim permanebit - vinttum sane multo dignum. Prorsus quippe bona opera sunt. Ad quid igitur dico ista? Ad opiniones veras. Etenim opiniones vere, quanta vero tempore permanserunt, bona res et cuncta bona operantur; multo tempore nolentes permanere, at affugiunt ex anima hominis. Quare non multo digne sunt, donee quis eas vinxerit cause cogitatione. Hoc autem est, Menon dilecte, monumentum, velut in prioribus nobis concessum est. Cum vero colligentur, primum equidem scientie fiunt, deinceps manentes. Et propter hoc pretiosius scientia recta opinione.

SO. Ex eius operibus quod solutum est, haud magni fit, instar fugitivi hominis. neque enim permanet. ligatum vero admiratione dignum. pulcherrima enim opera sunt. Cuius hæc gratia dico? Verarum opinionum gratia; hæ quippe quosque stabiles perseverant, pulchra quædam opera sunt, omniaque bona perficiunt. Attamen diu consistere nolunt, sed ex hominis animo confestim aufugiunt, quapropter non multi precii sunt donec quis illas ratiotinatione a causis ducta liget. Hæc vero amice Meno reminiscentia est, ut supra inter nos convenit. Postque vero ligatæ sunt, primo quidem scientiæ fiunt, deinde perseverantes. proptereaque scientia recta opinione præstantior est, ab eaque vinculo quodam discrepat.

SOCRATES: I mean to say that they are not very valuable possessions if they are at liberty, for they will walk off like runaway slaves; but when fastened, they are of great value, for they are really beautiful works of art. Now this is an illustration of the nature of true opinions: while they abide with us they are beautiful and fruitful, but they run away out of the human soul, and do not remain long, and therefore they are not of much value until they are fastened by the tie of the cause; and this fastening of them, friend Meno, is recollection, as you and I have agreed to call it. But when they are bound, in the first place, they have the nature of knowledge; and, in the second place, they are abiding. And this is why knowledge is more honourable and excellent than true opinion, because fastened by a chain.

Μένων
νὴ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔοικεν τοιούτῳ τινί.

MENON. Per Iovem, o Socrates, simile est huiusmodi cuidam.

ME. Per Iovem o Socrates congrua comparatio.

MENO: What you are saying, Socrates, seems to be very like the truth.

(98b) Σωκράτης
καὶ μὴν καὶ ἐγὼ ὡς οὐκ εἰδὼς λέγω, ἀλλὰ εἰκάζων: ὅτι δέ ἐστίν τι ἀλλοῖον ὀρθὴ δόξα καὶ ἐπιστήμη, οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκῶ τοῦτο εἰκάζειν, ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ τι ἄλλο φαίην ἂν εἰδέναι—ὀλίγα δ᾽ ἂν φαίην—ἓν δ᾽ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο ἐκείνων θείην ἂν ὧν οἶδα.

SOCRATES. Necnon et ego ut nesciens dico, verum ymaginans. Quoniam vero est alteriusmodi recta opinio et scientia, penitus michi videor istud ymaginari, - immo si quid aliud dicam scire, pauca vero dicam - unum ergo et hoc ex illis ponam que nescio.

SO. Quinetiam ipse non tanquam sciens, sed ut coniectans ita loquor. Quod vera est aliud quiddam vera opinio atque scientia haud omnino plane mihi coniicere videor. Sed et si quicquam aliud me scire faterer, quæ sane pauca sunt, unum hoc iis quæ scio adnumerem.

SOCRATES: I too speak rather in ignorance; I only conjecture. And yet that knowledge differs from true opinion is no matter of conjecture with me. There are not many things which I profess to know, but this is most certainly one of them.

Μένων
καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεις.

MENON. Et recte, o Socrates, dicis.

ME. Probe o Socrates loqueris.

MENO: Yes, Socrates; and you are quite right in saying so.

Σωκράτης
τί δέ; τόδε οὐκ ὀρθῶς, ὅτι ἀληθὴς δόξα ἡγουμένη τὸ ἔργον ἑκάστης τῆς πράξεως οὐδὲν χεῖρον ἀπεργάζεται ἢ ἐπιστήμη;

SOCRATES. Quid, hoc non recte, quoniam vera opm10 ducens opus cuiusque actionis non deterius operatur quam scientia?

SO. Quid vero? nonne hoc quoque recte, quod vara opinio opus quodlibet ducens nihilo peius quam scientia illud affequitur.

SOCRATES: And am I not also right in saying that true opinion leading the way perfects action quite as well as knowledge?

Μένων
καὶ τοῦτο δοκεῖς μοι ἀληθῆ λέγειν.

MENON. Et hoc videris michi verum dicere.

ME. Hoc quoque verum.

MENO: There again, Socrates, I think you are right.

(98c) Σωκράτης
οὐδὲν ἄρα ὀρθὴ δόξα ἐπιστήμης χεῖρον οὐδὲ ἧττον ὠφελίμη ἔσται εἰς τὰς πράξεις, οὐδὲ ἁνὴρ ὁ ἔχων ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἢ ὁ ἐπιστήμην.

SOCRATES. Non ergo recta opinio scientia deterius, neque minus utilis erit ad actiones, neque vir habens rectam opinionem quam qui scientiam.

SO. Nihil igitur vera opinio quam scientia deterior, nec minus ad actiones utilis est, ut neque vir veram opinionem habens atque scientia præditus.

SOCRATES: Then right opinion is not a whit inferior to knowledge, or less useful in action; nor is the man who has right opinion inferior to him who has knowledge?

Μένων
ἔστι ταῦτα.

MENON. Sunt hec.

ME. Ita est.

MENO: True.

Σωκράτης
καὶ μὴν ὅ γε ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ ὠφέλιμος ἡμῖν ὡμολόγηται εἶναι.

SOCRATES. Necnon bonus vir utilis nobis concessus est esse?

SO. Quinetiam virum bonum utilem esse conveniebat?

SOCRATES: And surely the good man has been acknowledged by us to be useful?

Μένων
ναί.

MENON. Ne.

ME. Convenit.

MENO: Yes.

Σωκράτης
ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν οὐ μόνον δι᾽ ἐπιστήμην ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες ἂν εἶεν καὶ ὠφέλιμοι ταῖς πόλεσιν, εἴπερ εἶεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δι᾽ ὀρθὴν δόξαν, τούτοιν δὲ οὐδέτερον φύσει ἐστὶν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, (98d) οὔτε ἐπιστήμη οὔτε δόξα ἀληθής, †οὔτ᾽ ἐπίκτητα—ἢ δοκεῖ σοι φύσει ὁποτερονοῦν αὐτοῖν εἶναι;

SOCRATES. Quoniam igitur haud solum per scientiam boni viri utique erunt et commodi urbibus, si fuerint, sed et per rectam opinionem, horumque neutrum natura est hominibus, neque est scientia neque opinio vera neque acquisitiva - an videtur tibi natura utrumlibet horum esse?

SO. Si igitur homines non per ipsam scientiam solum boni atque utiles civitatibus essent, si modo invenirentur, sed etiam per opinionem rectam; horum vero neutrum natura hominibus inest, neque scientia, neque vera opinio, neque etiam adventicia hæc sunt; num videtur istorum aliquod natura inesse?

SOCRATES: Seeing then that men become good and useful to states, not only because they have knowledge, but because they have right opinion, and that neither knowledge nor right opinion is given to man by nature or acquired by him--(do you imagine either of them to be given by nature?

Μένων
οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

MENON. Haud michi.

ME. Mihi nequaquam.

MENO: Not I.)

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ οὐ φύσει, οὐδὲ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ φύσει εἶεν ἄν.

SOCRATES. Itaque quandoquidem non natura, neque boni natura erunt quidem.

SO. Nonne postquam natura non insunt, neque boni etiam viri natura erunt?

SOCRATES: Then if they are not given by nature, neither are the good by nature good?

Μένων
οὐ δῆτα.

MENON. Nullatenus. -

ME. Non sane.

MENO: Certainly not.

Σωκράτης
ἐπειδὴ δέ γε οὐ φύσει, ἐσκοποῦμεν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο εἰ διδακτόν ἐστιν.

SOCRATES. Quoniam que non natura, consideramus post hoc an docibile est.

SO. Quoniam vero nequaquam natura, utrum doctrina considerabamus?

SOCRATES: And nature being excluded, then came the question whether virtue is acquired by teaching?

Μένων
ναί.

MENON. Etiam.

ME. Ita.

MENO: Yes.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν διδακτὸν ἔδοξεν εἶναι, εἰ φρόνησις ἡ ἀρετή;

SOCRATES. Docibile itaque visum est esse, vel prudentia vel virtus?

SO. Et doctrina comparabilis visa est si sit prudentia virtus?

SOCRATES: If virtue was wisdom (or knowledge), then, as we thought, it was taught?

Μένων
ναί.

MENON. Sic.

ME. Est.

MENO: Yes.

Σωκράτης
κἂν εἴ γε διδακτὸν εἴη, φρόνησις ἂν εἶναι;

SOCRATES. Licet si docibile esset, prudentia utique esse?

SO. Et si comparabilis per doctrinam, prudentia quoque visa est?

SOCRATES: And if it was taught it was wisdom?

Μένων
πάνυ γε.

MENON. Funditus.

ME. Prorsus.

MENO: Certainly.

(98e) Σωκράτης
καὶ εἰ μέν γε διδάσκαλοι εἶεν, διδακτὸν ἂν εἶναι, μὴ ὄντων δὲ οὐ διδακτόν;

SOCRATES. Et si quidem doctores fuerint, docibile quoque esse; cum vero non sint, (non) docibile?

SO. Ac si præceptores essnt, doceri posse; si non, minime?

SOCRATES: And if there were teachers, it might be taught; and if there were no teachers, not?

Μένων
οὕτω.

MENON. Itaque.

ME. Sic est.

MENO: True.

Σωκράτης
ἀλλὰ μὴν ὡμολογήκαμεν μὴ εἶναι αὐτοῦ διδασκάλους;

SOCRATES. At vero fassi sumus non esse illius doctores?

SO. Et præceptores eius esse communi consensu negavimus?

SOCRATES: But surely we acknowledged that there were no teachers of virtue?

Μένων
ἔστι ταῦτα.

MENON. Sunt ista.

ME. Negavimus.

MENO: Yes.

Σωκράτης
ὡμολογήκαμεν ἄρα μήτε διδακτὸν αὐτὸ μήτε φρόνησιν εἶναι;

SOCRATES. Concessimus igitur neque docibile ipsum neque prudentiam esse?

SO. Conclusimus itaque, neque doceri illam, meque prudentiam esse.

SOCRATES: Then we acknowledged that it was not taught, and was not wisdom?

Μένων
πάνυ γε.

MENON. Penitus.

ME. Concluimus.

MENO: Certainly.

Σωκράτης
ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθόν γε αὐτὸ ὁμολογοῦμεν εἶναι;

SOCRATES. Atqui bonum ipsum confessi sumus esse?

SO. Præterea bonum ipsum esse concessimus.

SOCRATES: And yet we admitted that it was a good?

Μένων
ναί.

MENON. Ne.

ME. Concessimus.

MENO: Yes.

Σωκράτης
ὠφέλιμον δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸ ὀρθῶς ἡγούμενον;

SOCRATES. Commodumque et bonum esse quod recte ducit? -

SO. Bonum autem et utile esse quod recte ducit.

SOCRATES: And the right guide is useful and good?

Μένων
πάνυ γε.

MENON. Prorsus.

ME. Maxime.

MENO: Certainly.

(99a) Σωκράτης
ὀρθῶς δέ γε ἡγεῖσθαι δύο ὄντα ταῦτα μόνα, δόξαν τε ἀληθῆ καὶ ἐπιστήμην, ἃ ἔχων ἄνθρωπος ὀρθῶς ἡγεῖται— τὰ γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης τινὸς ὀρθῶς γιγνόμενα οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνῃ ἡγεμονίᾳ γίγνεται—ὧν δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἡγεμών ἐστιν ἐπὶ τὸ ὀρθόν, δύο ταῦτα, δόξα ἀληθὴς καὶ ἐπιστήμη.

SOCRATES. Recteque ducere duo existentia hec sola: opinionemque veram et scientiam, que habens homo recte ducit. Que enim a casu fiunt, non humanus ducatus fit. Quo sane homo dux est ad rectum, duo ista, opinio vera et scientia.

SO. Recte denique ducunt duo hæ sola, vera opinio atque scientia, quibus homo præditus dux esse aliis vere potest. Quaæenim fortuna contingunt, imperio hominis nequaquam fiunt; quibus autem homo ad rectum dux est, duo hæc sunt, opinio vera, atque scientia.

SOCRATES: And the only right guides are knowledge and true opinion--these are the guides of man; for things which happen by chance are not under the guidance of man: but the guides of man are true opinion and knowledge.

Μένων
δοκεῖ μοι οὕτω.

MENON. Videtur michi sic.

ME. Idem mihi videtur.

MENO: I think so too.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ οὐ διδακτόν ἐστιν, οὐδ᾽ ἐπιστήμη δὴ ἔτι γίγνεται ἡ ἀρετή;

SOCRATES. Ergo quandoquidem minime docibile est, neque scientia adhuc fit virtus.

SO. Igitur cum virtus doctrina perci(27)pi nequat, nequaquam scientia est.

SOCRATES: But if virtue is not taught, neither is virtue knowledge.

Μένων
οὐ φαίνεται.

MENON. Non apparet.

ME. Non apparet.

MENO: Clearly not.

(99b) Σωκράτης
δυοῖν ἄρα ὄντοιν ἀγαθοῖν καὶ ὠφελίμοιν τὸ μὲν ἕτερον ἀπολέλυται, καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐν πολιτικῇ πράξει ἐπιστήμη ἡγεμών.

SOCRATES. Duo bus existentibus bonis et commodis alterum absolvitur, et non erit in civili actione scientia dux.

SO. Cum ergo duo sint bona atque utilia, alterum illorum reiicitur, scientia scilicet, neque illa in actioine civili principatum tenet.

SOCRATES: Then of two good and useful things, one, which is knowledge, has been set aside, and cannot be supposed to be our guide in political life.

Μένων
οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.

MENON. Neutiquam michi videtur.

ME. Non ut mihi videtur.

MENO: I think not.

Σωκράτης
οὐκ ἄρα σοφίᾳ τινὶ οὐδὲ σοφοὶ ὄντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες ἡγοῦντο ταῖς πόλεσιν, οἱ ἀμφὶ Θεμιστοκλέα τε καὶ οὓς ἄρτι Ἄνυτος ὅδε ἔλεγεν: διὸ δὴ καὶ οὐχ οἷοί τε ἄλλους ποιεῖν τοιούτους οἷοι αὐτοί εἰσι, ἅτε οὐ δι᾽ ἐπιστήμην ὄντες τοιοῦτοι.

SOCRATES. Non ergo sapientia aliqua neque sapientes existentes tales viri regebant civitates, qui circiter Themistoclem, et quos nunc Anitus iste dixit. Ideoque nequibant alios facere tales quales ipsi erant, quemadmodum neque per scientiam existentes tales.

SO. Non ergo sapientia quadam, neque ut sapientes civiles isti himines rempublicam administrant; cuiuimodi qui Themistoclis temporibus, et quos pauloante Anytus retulit, extiterunt. Unde nec cæteros tales quales ipsi sunt, reddere possunt, quippe qui scientia nulla huiusmodi sint præditi.

SOCRATES: And therefore not by any wisdom, and not because they were wise, did Themistocles and those others of whom Anytus spoke govern states. This was the reason why they were unable to make others like themselves--because their virtue was not grounded on knowledge.

Μένων
ἔοικεν οὕτως ἔχειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς λέγεις.

MENON. Videtur ita se habere, o Socrates, velut dicis.

ME. Ita ut ais esse videtur o Socrates.

MENO: That is probably true, Socrates.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ ἐπιστήμῃ, εὐδοξίᾳ δὴ τὸ λοιπὸν (99c) γίγνεται: ᾗ οἱ πολιτικοὶ ἄνδρες χρώμενοι τὰς πόλεις ὀρθοῦσιν, οὐδὲν διαφερόντως ἔχοντες πρὸς τὸ φρονεῖν ἢ οἱ χρησμῳδοί τε καὶ οἱ θεομάντεις: καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι ἐνθουσιῶντες λέγουσιν μὲν ἀληθῆ καὶ πολλά, ἴσασι δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσιν.

SOCRATES. Ergo si non scientia, eudoxia reliquum fit. Qua politici viri freti civitates dirigunt non differentius se habentes ad sapere quam responsa[bi]lesque et divini augures; etenim isti inquiunt equidem vera et multa, sciunt profecto nichil eorum que aiunt.

SO. Si non scientia, restat ut opinione recta etnetes civiles viri civitates gubernet, ac haud secus ad prudentiam se habeant atque vates divinoque furore correpti. Etenim hi vera atque pluriam nunciant, nihil tamen eorum quæ intelligunt loquuntur.

SOCRATES: But if not by knowledge, the only alternative which remains is that statesmen must have guided states by right opinion, which is in politics what divination is in religion; for diviners and also prophets say many things truly, but they know not what they say.

Μένων
κινδυνεύει οὕτως ἔχειν.

MENON. Laborat sic se habere.

ME. Sic esse videtur.

MENO: So I believe.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν, ὦ Μένων, ἄξιον τούτους θείους καλεῖν τοὺς ἄνδρας, οἵτινες νοῦν μὴ ἔχοντες πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα κατορθοῦσιν ὧν πράττουσι καὶ λέγουσι;

SOCRATES. Nonne ergo, o Menon, dignum istos divos vocare viros, qui animum non habentes, plurima et maxima dirigunt eo rum que agunt et dicunt?

SO. Nonne igitur o Meno divinos huiusmodi viros appellare decet, qui mente nequaquam utentes multa tamen ac magna faciunt, et agendo et dicendo disponunt?

SOCRATES: And may we not, Meno, truly call those men ‘divine’ who, having no understanding, yet succeed in many a grand deed and word?

Μένων
πάνυ γε.

MENON. Omnino.

ME. Prorsus.

MENO: Certainly.

Σωκράτης
ὀρθῶς ἄρ᾽ ἂν καλοῖμεν θείους τε οὓς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν (99d) χρησμῳδοὺς καὶ μάντεις καὶ τοὺς ποιητικοὺς ἅπαντας: καὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς οὐχ ἥκιστα τούτων φαῖμεν ἂν θείους τε εἶναι καὶ ἐνθουσιάζειν, ἐπίπνους ὄντας καὶ κατεχομένους ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅταν κατορθῶσι λέγοντες πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα πράγματα, μηδὲν εἰδότες ὧν λέγουσιν.

SOCRATES. Recte utique nuncupabimus divos quos nunc diximus et augures et poeticos universos; et politicos non minus hiis dicemus quoque divos esse et deificari, inspiratos existentes et occupatos a deo, quotiens dirigunt dicentes multas et magnas res, nil scientes eorum que dicunt.

SO. Quam ob rem merito divinos vocabimus, quos modo prædiximus vates furentesque ac poeticos homines universos, civilesque homines non minus atque reliquos divinos existimabimus divino afflatos numine deosque penitus occupatos, quandoquidem remp. dirigunt, multa maximaque dicentes, quæ nequaquam intelligunt.

SOCRATES: Then we shall also be right in calling divine those whom we were just now speaking of as diviners and prophets, including the whole tribe of poets. Yes, and statesmen above all may be said to be divine and illumined, being inspired and possessed of God, in which condition they say many grand things, not knowing what they say.

Μένων
πάνυ γε.

MENON. Omnifariam.

ME. Maxime.

MENO: Yes.

Σωκράτης
καὶ αἵ γε γυναῖκες δήπου, ὦ Μένων, τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας θείους καλοῦσι: καὶ οἱ Λάκωνες ὅταν τινὰ ἐγκωμιάζωσιν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα, ‘θεῖος ἀνήρ,’ φασίν, ‘οὗτος.’

SOCRATES. Atque mulieres, o Menon, bonos viros divos vocant; necnon Lacones quotiens quempiam preconio extollunt bonum virum: ‘tios vir,’ inquiunt, ‘iste.’

SO. Mulieres quoque o Meno bonos viros divinos nuncupant. Et Laconici quoties bonum quendam virum commendare volunt, Divinus hic vir aiunt.

SOCRATES: And the women too, Meno, call good men divine--do they not? and the Spartans, when they praise a good man, say ‘that he is a divine man.’

(99e) Μένων
καὶ φαίνονταί γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀρθῶς λέγειν. καίτοι ἴσως Ἄνυτος ὅδε σοι ἄχθεται λέγοντι.

MENON. Videntur, o Socrates, recte dicere.

SOCRATES. At forsan Anitus hic tibi molestatur dicenti.

ME. Et recte quidem loqui videntur o Socrates, quanquam Anytus hic tibi forte talia loquenti succenset.

MENO: And I think, Socrates, that they are right; although very likely our friend Anytus may take offence at the word.

Σωκράτης
οὐδὲν μέλει ἔμοιγε. τούτῳ μέν, ὦ Μένων, καὶ αὖθις διαλεξόμεθα: εἰ δὲ νῦν ἡμεῖς ἐν παντὶ τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ καλῶς ἐζητήσαμέν τε καὶ ἐλέγομεν, ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη οὔτε φύσει οὔτε διδακτόν, ἀλλὰ θείᾳ μοίρᾳ παραγιγνομένη ἄνευ νοῦ οἷς ἂν (100a1) παραγίγνηται, εἰ μή τις εἴη τοιοῦτος τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν οἷος καὶ ἄλλον ποιῆσαι πολιτικόν. εἰ δὲ εἴη, σχεδὸν ἄν τι οὗτος λέγοιτο τοιοῦτος ἐν τοῖς ζῶσιν οἷον ἔφη Ὅμηρος ἐν τοῖς τεθνεῶσιν τὸν Τειρεσίαν εἶναι, λέγων περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι οἶος πέπνυται τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου, τοὶ δὲ σκιαὶ ἀίσσουσι. ταὐτὸν ἂν καὶ ἐνθάδε ὁ τοιοῦτος ὥσπερ παρὰ σκιὰς ἀληθὲς ἂν πρᾶγμα εἴη πρὸς ἀρετήν.

MENON. Nichil cura est michi.

SOCRATES. Super hoc, o Menon, et iterum disputabimus. Si autem nunc nos in omni sermone (bene) inquisivimus et diximus, virtus utique erit neque natura neque docibile, immo divina sorte inens sine mente qui bus in est, nisi quis fuerit talis civilium virorum potens etiam alium facere politicum. Si vera fuerit, ferme quid hic dicatur talis in viventibus qualem dixit Homerus in mortuis Tiresiam esse, dicens de illo, quoniam ‘Solus eruditus est ea que in Orco, atque umbre saliunt’. Idem quoque et Statim talis, quemadmodum ad umbras vera quoque res, erit ad virtutem.

SO. Haudquaquam mihi curæ est; cum hoc enim o Meno rursus differemus. Si autem nos in omnia hac disputatione recte perscrutati sumus, virtus utique nec doctrina neque natura nobis aderit, verum divina forte absque mente in eum qui illam fortitus fuerit, influet; nisi forte quis ex civilibus talis existat, ut alium quoque civilem efficere possit. Quod si extiterit, talis hic inter viventes erit, qualem Homerus ait Tiresiam inter mortuos esse, sic dicens. Inter eos qui apud inferos sunt solus sapit, cæteri vero umbræ volitant. Similiter et cuius hic ad alios tanquam ad umbras se haberet. Vera enim res, si virtutem species, esset.

SOCRATES: I do not care; as for Anytus, there will be another opportunity of talking with him. To sum up our enquiry--the result seems to be, if we are at all right in our view, that virtue is neither natural nor acquired, but an instinct given by God to the virtuous. Nor is the instinct accompanied by reason, unless there may be supposed to be among statesmen some one who is capable of educating statesmen. And if there be such an one, he may be said to be among the living what Homer says that Tiresias was among the dead, ‘he alone has understanding; but the rest are flitting shades’; and he and his virtue in like manner will be a reality among shadows.

(100b1) Μένων
κάλλιστα δοκεῖς μοι λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

MENON. Optime videris michi dicere, o Socrates.

ME. Optime mihi dicere videris o Socrates.

MENO: That is excellent, Socrates.

Σωκράτης
ἐκ μὲν τοίνυν τούτου τοῦ λογισμοῦ, ὦ Μένων, θείᾳ μοίρᾳ ἡμῖν φαίνεται παραγιγνομένη ἡ ἀρετὴ οἷς ἂν παραγίγνηται: τὸ δὲ σαφὲς περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰσόμεθα τότε, ὅταν πρὶν ᾧτινι τρόπῳ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις παραγίγνεται ἀρετή, πρότερον ἐπιχειρήσωμεν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ζητεῖν τί ποτ᾽ ἔστιν ἀρετή. νῦν δ᾽ ἐμοὶ μὲν ὥρα ποι ἰέναι, σὺ δὲ ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ἅπερ αὐτὸς πέπεισαι πεῖθε καὶ τὸν ξένον τόνδε Ἄνυτον, ἵνα (100c1) πρᾳότερος ᾖ: ὡς ἐὰν πείσῃς τοῦτον, ἔστιν ὅτι καὶ Ἀθηναίους ὀνήσεις.

SOCRATES. Igitur ex hac ratione, o Menon, divina sorte nobis apparet inens virtus quibus inest. Certum sane de ipso sciemus tunc, quando, antequam quo pacto hominibus adest virtus, prius investigaverimus ipsum secundum se ipsum querere, quid est virtus. Nunc autem michi utique hora aliquo ire, tu autem hec que ipse persuasus es, persuade etiam peregrinum istum Anitum, uti mitior fiat; quia si persuaseris huic, est quoniam et Atheniensibus proderis.

SO. Ex hac itaque ratione o Meno divina forte virtus adesse cuiqunque adsit apparet. Veritatem tamen de hoc perspicuam tum denique comprehendemus, cum antequam quo pacto virtus adsit quæratur, quid ipsa secundum seipsam sit, investigare tentemus. Nunc autem hora ima est, ut hinc alio abeam Ipse vero quod tibi persuasum est, Anyto huic hospiti tuo vicissim persuade quo mitior sit. Nam si ei hoc persuaseris, Athenienses quoque iuvabis.

SOCRATES: Then, Meno, the conclusion is that virtue comes to the virtuous by the gift of God. But we shall never know the certain truth until, before asking how virtue is given, we enquire into the actual nature of virtue. I fear that I must go away, but do you, now that you are persuaded yourself, persuade our friend Anytus. And do not let him be so exasperated; if you can conciliate him, you will have done good service to the Athenian people.

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