Now, concerning the sixth resolve, it was explained:

On Presence, with their minds now placed in equipoise,
They’re in the presence of the traits of buddhahood.
Dependent rising is the fact they now perceive –
And reach cessation, resting in intelligence. (6.1)

Having genuinely actualised the perfection of meditative absorption on the fifth bodhisattva ground, on the sixth ground the bodhisattvas place the mind in equipoise and see the reality of profound interdependence. Through genuine actualisation of the perfection of intelligence (prajñā) they now achieve cessation, unlike before. Lacking superior intelligence they were previously unable to reach this cessation through the genuine perfections of generosity and so on. Fully understanding the true nature of reflection-like things, the bodhisattvas have focussed on the truth of the path on the five bodhisattva grounds, and are now in the presence (abhimukha) of the traits of buddhahood. Therefore this ground is called Presence (abhimukhī).¹

To explain how all other stores of qualities depend on the perfection of great intelligence, it was said:

A single sighted person may with ease escort
The blind in scores wherever they should need to go.
And likewise, for these virtues that possess no sight,
It’s insight that can shepherd them to victorhood. (6.2)

Just one sighted person with ease can lead great multitudes of blind people to their destination, when the other perfections are led by the perfection of great intelligence, they will reach the ground of the sugatas, Universal Illumination (samantaprabhā), because of its ability to discern correct and incorrect paths.

Some may inquire, when it was said here that, ‘… dependent rising is the fact they now perceive, and reach cessation, resting in intelligence,’ how it is that bodhisattvas upon seeing the dependent origination of dharmas come to see the actual reality of interdependence. To this we reply that the real essence of this is not something we can access as long as our mind’s eye is completely veiled by the thick cataracts of ignorance. But it is accessible to the bodhisattvas dwelling on the higher levels, the sixth and so forth, and therefore should not be inquired of us, but rather addressed to the stainless bodhisattvas and illustrious buddhas whose eyes are free from the blurring cataracts of ignorance, as they have applied the ointment that overcomes the blurring cataracts of ignorance and allows one to see emptiness unmistakably.

One may then ask: ‘Are not statements of how bodhisattvas, practicing the perfection of great intelligence, and thus seeing the reality of interdependent origination, recounted in such sutras as the noble Perfection of Intelligence (prajñāpāramitā) and the noble Ten Grounds (daśabhūmika)? Would it not then suffice to explain by quoting from such scriptures?’

This will also not do, because it is hard to ascertain their intent. One such as myself is not able to teach the actual reality from scriptures, or based on my own independent judgement explain what is stated there. But, by utilising treatises written by trustworthy individuals containing their infallible explanations, the intent of the scriptures may be ascertained:

As he was one who reached the deepest dharmic truths
Relying on the scriptures and through reasoning,
By following the system of Nāgārjuna,
As found within his works, I shall proceed to speak. (6.3)

Just like a bodhisattva practicing the perfection of great intelligence sees the nature of dharmas just as it is, the noble Nāgārjuna had an unmistaken understanding of the scriptures, and through the reasoning and scriptural citations in his Middle Way Treatise he explained in lucid detail how all dharmas are in actuality without any intrinsic nature (niḥsvabhāva). Thus, just as the noble Nāgārjuna explained the actual reality of all dharmas using reasoning and scripture, what I shall now say will be in accord with his manner of instruction.

‘But how,’ some might say, ‘can we be sure that Nāgārjuna unmistakenly ascertained the scriptures?’ This can be gathered from the scriptures. As stated in the noble Descent Onto Langka:

In the south, in the land of Veta,
A mendicant renowned as Śrīmat,
Referred to by the name ‘Nāga’,
Crushing the views of existence and non-existence,

Will teach my vehicle in the world,
The unsurpassed Greater Vehicle,
And accomplishing the Joyous Ground,
He will venture to Sukhavatī.²

And from the noble Great Cloud Twelve Thousand Lines:

Ānanda. Four hundred years after I have passed into transcendence, this young Licchavi named Sarvasattva Priyadarśana³ will become a bhikṣu named Nāga and spread my teachings widely; and eventually, in the world realm called Pure Illumination (prasādābhā), he will become a tathāgata, arhat, true and complete buddha by the name Jñānākaraprabhā.⁴

Hence, he unmistakenly ascertained the scriptures.

The treatises which contain the complete teachings of interdependent origination exactly as it is, should only be taught to those who have the seed of emptiness within their being from prior acquaintance, not to others. This is because when they hear about emptiness, some may develop mistaken ideas which can lead to very unfortunate results. They may give rise to the perverted conviction that emptiness means ‘non-existence’, and end up entertaining and perpetuating mistaken views of denying all entities. The teacher must therefore determine whether they have a good motivation before explaining the view of emptiness to the student.

It is difficult to determine, so how can one be certain that they are a suitable recipient for the teachings on emptiness and should be taught emptiness? One can reach certainty through external indications, and to describe what these signs are it was said:

Some common people, when they hear of emptiness,
Will find that great delight comes surging from within,
A joy so fervent, filling up their eyes with tears,
And causing every single hair to stand on end. (6.4)

Such ones possess the seed of the awakened mind,
Are vessels for the teachings on reality.
They should …

as they are qualified to receive teachings,

… receive instructions on the ultimate truth,

If one teaches these kinds of students the actual reality, one’s efforts will not be fruitless. Why is that? Since,

As they will see related qualities emerge. (6.5)

Not only will these students not give rise to any negative perverted ideas about emptiness, they will also gain the qualities that come from learning the view of emptiness. How so? They will relate to learning about the view of emptiness like finding a treasure, and in order that it may not be lost:

A person who will always live by discipline,
Who gives in generosity and cultivates
Compassion, trains in tolerance, and dedicates
His virtue to awakening for beings’ sake; (6.6)

Who for the bodhisattvas shows sincere respect,

They understand that, ‘If I transgress the moral discipline I will fall into lower realms and the view of emptiness will be interrupted,’ and thus will continuously and correctly uphold moral discipline. With the thought, ‘Even though I will be born in the higher realms through keeping moral discipline, if I am poor I will have to work very hard to get the basic necessities such as food, medicine and dharma robes, and the view of emptiness will be interrupted,’ they give generously. Thinking, ‘It is when the view of emptiness is encompassed by compassion that it will lead to buddhahood, and not otherwise,’ they cultivate compassion. With the thought, ‘Anger leads to the lower states and gives one a poor complexion, which will displease the noble ones,’ they train in tolerance. Since there will not be an immeasurable and uninterrupted causal and resultant link for the attainment of buddhahood if the practices of moral discipline and so forth have not been dedicated towards the state of omniscience, they dedicate these roots of virtue to awakening for the sake of liberating beings. And thinking, ‘Apart from bodhisattvas nobody else is able to genuinely teach the nature of interdependent origination,’ they have respect for the perfect bodhisattvas.

In this way they will without doubt accumulate an uninterrupted store of virtue for a long time, and then:

And is insightful in the ways profound and vast;
In due course such a person gains the Joyous ground.
If this is your objective, hearken to this path. (6.7)

The last line is saying that, ‘If the Joyous ground is your objective, then ….’ This indicates what is about to be explained.

A quote from the scriptures will serve to illustrate the genuine state of all dharmas. The noble Ten Grounds states:

O victor heirs. The bodhisattvas who have fully completed the path on the fifth bodhisattva ground, enter the sixth bodhisattva ground engaging with the ten equalities of dharmas. Which ten? They are all dharmas’ equality as featureless; all dharmas’ equality as without characteristics; and in the same way their equality in being without arising, unproduced, detached, pure from the outset, unelaborate, without adoption and without rejection; all dharmas’ equality in being like illusions, dreams, optical distortions, echoes, a moon in the water, reflections and apparitions; and all dharmas’ equality in the non-duality of things and non-things. When they realise the nature of all dharmas to be in this way, through their acumen and resultant tolerance they attain the sixth bodhisattva ground, Presence.⁵

Thus, here only the reasoning of the equality of dharmas in being without production⁶ is explained. The intention being that, by virtue of that, the other types of equality will be easily understood. As master Nāgārjuna sets forth in the beginning of the Middle Way Treatise:

Not from self, not from other,
Not from both, nor without a cause
Are entities ever produced
At any point as anything.⁷

Ever (jātu) means at any time. The term at any point (kecana) is a locative relative pronoun (‘support’-word) and synonym for somewhere (kvacid), and can indicate location, time, or tenet-system. The word anything is a relative pronoun (‘supported’-word) expressing outer or inner entities. Thus, one could here elaborate the sentence and say, ‘Outer and inner entities are not produced from self with respect to any place, time or tenet-system.’ Here, when it says not (na), this relates to production from self as an argument for existence, and not to being existent, since the refutation of that is implicit. This should likewise be applied to the other three assertions.

Having thus reiterated this fourfold thesis, in order to prove it through reasoning, it was stated:

It can’t come from itself, and how from other things?
Can’t come from both, how could it be without a cause?

The sense of the statement, ‘Not produced from self …’ is as is stated here: ‘It can’t come from self ….’ The remaining statements should be similarly linked.

How can we be certain of this? As:

If it came from itself there would be nothing gained.
What is produced, produced once more – that makes no sense. (6.8)

It refers to the production, the actor in the act of production, meaning the sprout. From itself means that the production comes from its very own self-identity. Thus, the assertion here is that the sprout’s own identity cannot produce that very sprout’s identity. Why? If that very identity already gained was to come from the same existing identity of that itself, there would be no additional quality achieved at all, since it was existent already.⁸

To explain how the position of self-production conflicts with reason, it was said, ‘What is produced, produced once more – that makes no sense.’

Immediately following this assertion, logical reasoning is supplied:

To think that what’s produced is then produced again
Would mean that sprouts and such could never be procured.

If one claims that seeds already produced are reproduced, does that imply that its production must stop for the sprout to be produced? What is there to prevent it being produced yet again? The consequence would be that sprouts, stalks, buds and so on would never be produced. Furthermore,

The seed would be produced until the end of time –

… for the very reason already given. If one then thinks, ‘When the conducive conditions such as water, time and so on, are present for the production of a sprout, the seed will transform and the sprout be produced; and since the presence of that agent, the sprout, opposes it, the seed will then be destroyed. Therefore, the mentioned faults do not apply here. And since the seed and the sprout are not really different, it is not the case that it is not produced from self.’ This is untenable, because

How could what will destroy it ever come to be? (6.9)

Since seed and sprout are not really different, it is illogical that the sprout could destroy it – they are thought to be ‘alike in own identity’.

Furthermore,

A sprout distinct in shape, hue, taste, strength, ripening,
And different from its cause, could not exist for you.

Shape refers to being long, round and so on; colour to yellow and so on; taste to sweetness and so on; and potential refers to special powers or particular abilities, such as being a remedy for haemorrhoids which makes haemorrhoids disappear when applied to the body, or the oṣadhi-herb which enables one to travel in the sky by merely holding it. Maturation refers to a substance’s special feature acquired as it transforms, such as the pepper-plant (pippalī) becoming sweet. If the seed and the sprout are indeed indistinct, that which is the identity of seed should likewise be observed without difference as the shape and so forth of the sprout. Since this is not observed, just as seeds from for example garlic, are different from sprouts of for example plantain trees, it is untenable that they are not different.

One may think that, ‘Since it abandons the seed-phase and attains another phase, the seed can turn into a sprout.’ In that case:

Its former likeness left behind as it adopts
Another form, what’s left of its identity? (6.10)

Its entity means the thing itself and not something other. But since with this way of thinking the non-otherness of the sprout would be an impossibility, its non-otherness is impaired. They may think that, ‘Although the shape and so forth of the seed and sprout are different, the substance is the same.’ But that cannot be so. If one does not perceive their shape and so forth, one cannot perceive their substance.

Furthermore,

And if, for you, the seed and sprout are indistinct,
The so-called sprout should like the seed not be observed.
Or, since they are the very same, just as the sprout
They both should then be seen – thus do not make such claims. (6.11)

When the sprout is present the identity of seed cannot be perceived with its own essence, and likewise since it is not distinct from the seed the identity of sprout should just like the identity of seed not be perceived. Alternatively, when the sprout is perceived, being of the very identity of the sprout the seed should likewise be perceived, since it is not anything other than sprout and so forth. Wanting to avoid the faults of these consequences, one should not assert that the seed and the sprout are indistinct.

Having thus refuted production from self imputed in other traditions claiming to understand reality, in order to shown how these ideas are not even tenable when considered in terms of the conventions of worldly people not trained in other traditions, it is said:

It’s when the cause has ceased that its result is seen,
And thus that they’re the same is not the worldly view.

Since it is when the causal seed has disappeared that the resultant sprout is seen, even worldly people do not see seed and sprout as indistinct. If they were the same, then just like the cause one should not be able to see the result, but it is seen. Therefore, it is not the case that they are indistinct.

Since production from self is in conflict with reason for both sides:

So, neither in reality nor in the world
Is this imagined self-production reasonable. (6.12)

For this reason, the master did not make any distinctions, but refuted production overall when saying, ‘Not from self….’ Some say that, ‘Entities are ultimately not produced from self since they exist, like a sentient being,’ but making such a distinction by adding ultimately should be considered utterly meaningless.

Furthermore,

If one accepts self-rising, maker and the made,
As well as act and actor, these would be the same.
They’re not, so self-arising I cannot accept –
The faults entailed have been elaborately explained. (6.13)

As stated:

It would never make sense
That cause and result are identical.
If cause and result were identical,
The produced and the producer would be the same.⁹

They cannot be identical, since it would follow that father and son, or the eye and consciousness, would be identical. And thus it was stated:

If the wood were the fire,
Doer and act would be the same.¹⁰

Thus, fearing these and other unwanted consequences, and wishing to reach an unmistaken realisation of the two truths, one should not hold that things can be produced from self.

‘That entities do not arise from themselves is certainly the case. This position is indeed reasonable. But the words how could it arise from other? do not make sense. Based on the scriptures which state, “The four external conditions are: the causal, the object, the immediately preceding and the dominant; conditions are the creators of entities,” although undesirable, production from other must be upheld.’

Some say: ‘The causal conditions are five excepting the enabling cause. The object condition is any dharma suitable to be an object of the six consciousnesses perceived as an object. The immediately preceding condition is the mind and mental states other than the mind which has entered transcendence without remaining aggregates. The dominant condition is the enabling cause.’ ¹¹

Others say: ‘From the definition which states, “The cause is what accomplishes,” its causal condition is that which is something’s producer, constituting a seed; while the object condition is the object that causes production, similar to a supporting cane, of the causally arisen mind and mental factors, similar to the old person getting up, which is the sense of the statement, “It is the support of the generated dharmas.” That which is like an immediately preceding condition is that as soon as the cause has ceased the condition is there for the production of the result, just as a sprout immediately succeeds the disappearance of the seed. The dominant condition is that which by its presence makes something arise.¹²

‘Any other conditions, such as the simultaneously produced or subsequently produced, are included within these. Since an almighty god (īśvara) and so on are not conditions, it is ascertained that “There is no fifth condition.”’¹³

This cannot be upheld, since it contradicts reasoning and scripture. To explain this in terms of reasoning:

If something different could give rise to something else,
Then utter darkness should emerge from tongues of flame.

This is neither observed nor logical, and thus not the case. Hence, it is stated:

That cause and result are different
Would never be tenable.
If cause and result were different,
A cause and a non-cause would be identical.¹⁴

Furthermore:

And anything could be produced from everything,

… as any cause and non-cause could lead to the production of any result and non-result. Why is that?

Since in their difference all non-makers are the same. (6.14)

The productive rice seed is just as different from its resultant rice sprout as non-productive fire, charcoal, barley seeds and so on are; and just as the rice sprout is produced from the rice seed that is other, the same could then happen from fire, charcoal, barley seeds and so forth. Also, just as a separate rice sprout arises from a rice seed, so should a pot, a piece of cloth and so forth. This however is not what we see. Hence, this cannot be the case.

To this they reply, ‘Although the cause and effect are indeed different, a consequence of this is not that everything may arise from everything, since one may observe that there is a specific order (niyata) to things. This specific order is such that,

‘What has potential to be made defines result.
What can produce it is the cause, though something else.
In one continuum, from makers, things arise,
And rice sprouts won’t therefore produce barley and such.’ (6.15)

Here, result has a kṛtya-affix¹⁵ indicating the sense of potential. ‘That which has the potential to be produced by something is its result, while that which can produce that result, although it is other, is the cause. Therefore, it is only through a specific sense of otherness that entities are related as cause and result, and not a general type of otherness. They are of one continuum, and the producer yields produced – it is not the case that it belongs to a separate continuum, such as for instance a barley seed, nor that it belongs to the same continuum but is not the producer, as is the case for a former instance that cannot come after a latter instance – and therefore it does not follow that everything can arise from everything.’

This too is inadequate. What is it that makes for this specific order? Where does this come from when saying that, ‘The cause of the rice sprout is only the rice seed and nothing other, and the result of the rice seed is only the rice sprout and nothing other’? This is the question that may be asked of those who claim cause and result. If they say, ‘Because we observe a specific order,’ and when further questioned they reply, ‘A specific order is observed,’ that is non-sensical; because by just saying that, ‘Because of observing a specific order, a specific order is observed,’ they provide no reason for the specific order and are not able to even slightly avoid the faults that have been stated.

Furthermore, to illustrate that the general agreement that there is no separation between common and specific otherness disproves this exact claim, it was said:

Take species such as barley, ironwood or dhak:
These can’t produce a rice-sprout, lack that potency,
Don’t share continuum, lack similarity.
With otherness, a rice seed too lacks in these ways. (6.16)

Just as barley, ironwood¹⁶ , dhak tree¹⁷ and so forth are other, and are therefore not held to be producers of the rice sprout, and do not have the ability to produce a rice sprout, are not part of the same continuum and have no likeness, the rice seed as well is not special in any of the particular ways just mentioned, because it is just something other. Hence, in this context the refutation is done by reiterating as if established, the otherness that others accept to be established.

Now, to explain how cause and result cannot possibly be different:

The sprout is never there the same time as the seed,
So how can seed be other without otherness?
Thus since one cannot prove that seeds give rise to sprouts,
Give up this view that things arise from something else. (6.17)

One can only see a difference between Maitreya and Upagupta based on their correlation, but seed and sprout are not simultaneous objects like that, since without the seed transforming there will be no sprout. Because there is no existence of sprout at the same time as the seed is present, the seed has no otherness in relation to the sprout. And in the absence of otherness one cannot say that, ‘The sprout is produced from something other.’ Therefore, abandon this position of production from other.

The meaning of this is as explained:

The nature of existents
Is not in their conditions and the like.
If there is no self-existence,
How can there be other-existence?¹⁸

Here, conditions and the like may be causes or conditions, the gathering of causes and conditions, or something different. If their nature does not transform, the nature of results will not exist, since these will not have been produced. When they are non-existent, there can be no sense of difference in relation to the conditions and so forth. The seventh case implies, ‘The existence of which indicates existence.’ In terms of location, the nature of results do not exist in the conditions and so forth, like a vessel and a juniper tree. When something does not exist in something, it cannot be produced from that, like the example of sand and sesame oil. As stated:

If it is non-existent
And arises from those conditions,
Then why can it not arise
Also from non-conditions?¹⁹

Thus, this position of support does not hold true when scrutinised in light of this verse of the master.

‘When you here say, “the sprout cannot exist as the same time as the seed,” this is not reasonable: just as one can see the pans of a balance scale ascending and descending at the same time, the sprout is produced as the seed is being destroyed. Thus, at exactly the same time as the seed is destroyed the sprout is produced, and therefore the destruction of the seed and the production of the sprout are simultaneous, and the seed and sprout are present at the same time. Hence, there is otherness.’ To present this, they say:

‘As when you see the levers of a balance scale
Ascending and descending simultaneously;
Just so producers cease as what’s produced appears.’

‘Hence,’ they claim, ‘we are not at fault.’

If it was like that:

If coinciding, yes – they don’t, so this can’t be. (6.18)

It is unsuitable to think of the arising and destruction of produced and producer as simultaneous as in the example of a balance scale. Why? Even though the ascending and descending are simultaneous in the example of the scale, there is no such simultaneity in the actual case that example is being linked to, thus it does not make sense.

To indicate why it is not so, it was said:

While made it faces its production, isn’t yet.
While ceasing it still is, but tends towards its end.
So how can this be similar to a balance scale?

When we say being produced, it is approaching production and is therefore in the future, and when saying ceasing, it is approaching cessation and is present now. Thus, one is not existent since it has not been produced but will be produced, while one is existent now and can therefore cease. How can this instance be similar to a balance scale? Since the two pans of a balance scale both are in the present, the acts of ascending and descending are simultaneous, but as the seed is in the present and the sprout in the future they are not simultaneous, so this is not similar to a balance scale.

One might then think, ‘Even though they are not simultaneous, there is still simultaneity with respect to the processes.’ But this too is unacceptable, since you would not accept that there is a separation between phenomena and their processes. So, furthermore,

Arising with no subject doesn’t make much sense. (6.19)

Since the sprout, the subject in the process of production, is in the future, it does not exist. Without the existence of that, the unsupported cannot exist; how can that which does not exist be simultaneous with the cessation? Hence, it is certainly illogical that the processes can be simultaneous. As stated:

If an unproduced entity existed somewhere,
It could be under production.
But such an entity being nonexistent,
How can there be production?²⁰

This means that, if the unproduced entity we call ‘sprout’ were to exist somewhere before being produced, it could be said to have production, but one cannot establish this in any way prior to the actual production, because it has as yet not been produced. Hence, since the entity that supports the process of production does not exist before its production, it cannot be endowed with it; so, ‘How is there production?’ Since the word that (tasmin) is referring to the entity (bhāve), they are in case-agreement; entity (bhāve) is in the seventh case, and nonexistent (asati) is a further specification of the entity. The word how (kim) is to be joined with be produced (utpadyate). Hence, the meaning becomes, ‘When that entity is a nonexistent, how can there be production? Not even the slightest thing is being produced.’

If one then asks: ‘But isn’t the example of the balance scale presented in the noble Rice Seedling Sutra, where it says, “In the way that the arms of a pair of scales ascend and descend simultaneously, the sprout is produced just as the seed ceases.”?’²¹ Yes, that is certainly presented there, but not in order to indicate production from other, nor in order to indicate production of inherent characteristics. Why then? It was done in order to clarify how instantaneous dependent arising is like an illusion when left unexamined. As has been explained:

Since sprouts do not originate
From destruction or non-destruction of seeds,
You stated that any production
Is like the appearance of illusions.²²

To this it may be said: ‘Since seed and sprout are not simultaneous and therefore cannot be other, making production nonsensical, production should then be possible when we have simultaneity since there is then otherness, as is the case with eye consciousness and sensations and so forth that are simultaneous with it. Just as the simultaneous occurrence of eye, form and so on, and sensations and so on, produce a coinciding eye consciousness, the eye and so on, and the mind are also the very conditions for the coinciding sensations and so forth.’

That is not the case. Why?

Were eye-mentation separate from what’s making it,
Like co-occurring eyes, perceptions and so forth,
What purpose would production serve for what exists?
The problems faced if it does not have been explained. (6.20)

If you claim that eyes and so forth, and the simultaneous perceptions and so forth, are the very conditions for such an eye consciousness, then being existent at that time it would be an ‘other’ relying on them, but for something existent to be produced serves no purpose at all, hence it would not be produced. Then, if wishing to avoid its non-production, you do not accept that it is existing, saying, ‘At the time in question there is no otherness of the eye and so forth in relation to the non-existent consciousness,’ the faults of such a position have already been explained. Therefore, if you claim such other-production, even if otherness was a possibility, production would be impossible, and since that is impossible both are impossible. Even if production was possible, otherness would be impossible, and since that is impossible both are impossible. Hence, external objects do not exist in any way whatsoever, and with the emptiness of external objects one is left with nothing but mere words, which shows that this way of understanding it is unacceptable.

Now, to explain how from among cause and effect there is no time when there is reliance on a cause, it was said:

If separate things are made by a productive cause,
Do they exist or not? Both? Neither of these two?
Why need producing if they do? What’s done if not?
What’s done if both? What’s done if neither of the two? (6.21)

A producing cause is not the producer of an existent product, because of the faults that have already been explained in such statements as, ‘That the produced is produced once more is senseless;’ there would not then be the slightest purpose to it having conditions. When the produced does not exist, what would the producers do? It is just as non-existent as the horns of a donkey. As stated:

For you who assert the existence of results,
And you who assert their non-existence,²³
There would be no point in embellishing
Your house with pillars and such.²⁴

And from the Middle Way Treatise:

If a result has an intrinsic essence,
How can a cause produce it?
If a result does not have an intrinsic essence,
How can a cause produce it?

If there is no production,
Causation becomes unfeasible.
If causation is unfeasible,
What becomes of the result?²⁵

For that which is both, what would conditions do for it? The faults that follow from this are those that have already been explained. A dual entity is both, and when it is both it is in fact two. But since having an essence of existence and non-existent in one thing at the same time is impossible, something having that sort of nature cannot occur. And since it cannot occur, what could producing conditions do for it? As the Treatise states:

How can nirvāṇa be both
An existent and a non-existent?
These two cannot coexist,
Just like light and darkness.²⁶

Likewise,

What both is and is not an agent
Cannot make what both is and is not.
Since they are mutually exclusive,
How could one thing both be and not be?²⁷

If a result could be neither existent nor non-existent, what would be the function of conditions in relation to something which is neither, since a result that defies both existence and non-existence cannot exist? When both existence and non-existence are impossible, to refute them by saying neither existent nor non-existent doesn’t make the slightest difference. When neither are established, to have what is neither existent nor non-existent is impossible. As stated:

Nirvāṇa is taught to be neither
An existent nor a non-existent.
If non-existents and existents were established,
This would be established.²⁸

If they say, ’Since any sort of reasoning we put forth in order to establish production is completely incinerated by the fire of your intellect, like firewood soaked in oil, we will no longer encourage the blazing fire of your intelligence with any more logical fuel. You may ask, “Will not your theory fail without backing it up with logical reasoning?” It will not. This is something established from the point of view of the world, hence there is no use at all for reasoning, since worldly perception is very powerful.’

‘What is the point of all these reasoned arguments
When it’s the normal view the world gives credence to.
The world indeed agrees things come from other things,
Which means other-production – what is there to prove?’ (6.22)

‘When all worldly people maintain a certain view, that is something very influential, and it is certainly other-production that is this view. When reasoning finds faults with something, it is only relevant when it comes to what is not directly perceived, and not what is within the scope of direct perception. Therefore, even though it is not reasonable, things are still produced from other.’

Those who lack an unmistaken realisation of the sense of the treatise, and are faced with the maturation of habitual tendencies for real existence developed since beginningless cyclic existence, cannot bear to hear about what separates them from their cherished fixation for existence, and therefore resort to nonsense about how the world will invalidate this. Since one cannot counteract their ravings about worldly invalidation without explaining to them the many and vast ways of origination in the world, an explanation is at this point given about the principles of the two truths, in order to clarify the particular cases of worldly invalidation:

The things perceived may either be correct or false.
As such all things convey a dual character.
Correctly seen, the object is reality;
As taught, the truth is relative when falsely seen. (6.23)

In this context, the illustrious buddhas knowing unmistakenly the reality of the two truths taught that all external and internal existent things – compounded phenomena, sprouts and so forth – have a dual nature, namely the relative (saṃvṛti) and the ultimate (paramārtha). The ultimate is the actual nature accessible in the domain of superior wisdom for those with genuine vision, but which is not something established in and of itself – this is one nature. The other is the independent existence perceived owing to the false perception of ordinary beings whose mind’s eye is completely covered by the blurring cataracts of ignorance. The objects that the infantile perceive in this manner are not intrinsically established. All existent things are thereby perceived with these two natures. And with respect to these two natures, that which is the object of genuine seeing is the actual reality, which is the meaning of the term ultimate truth. Its nature will be further explained. That which is the object of false seeing is the relative truth.

Then, having in this way presented the principle of two truths, to now demonstrate that in relation to those who see falsely there are two ways of seeing, genuine and false, and hence also a duality in relation to the object and consciousness when perceiving, it was said:

As faculties may function well or be at fault,
One further reckons two types of the falsely seen.
Compared to knowledge stemming from sound faculties,
What’s known through faulty faculties is held as false. (6.24)

Those with clear faculties, free of cataracts and unimpaired by jaundice and so forth, unmistakenly apprehend external objects the way they are. The opposite is the case for those with impaired faculties. Compared to the understanding of those with sound faculties, the understanding of those with impaired faculties is considered mistaken.

In order to illustrate that, ‘Just as their understanding may be of two types, either mistaken or unmistaken, the same is the case with objects,’ it was explained:

Perceptions of the world that happens when
Six faculties have not been compromised
Are true within the world, the rest are all
Considered false according to the world. (6.25)

Internal conditions that impair the faculties are such things as cataracts, jaundice and so on, and ingesting datura and the like. External conditions that distort the faculties are oil, water and mirrors, sounds and so on made inside a cave and the like, and sunlight under particular conditions of location or time, and so on. These impair the faculties without being internal, causing perceptions such as reflections, echoes and mirages of water. Magical formulas, potions and so on, employed for instance by illusionists, should likewise be included within this category. What impairs the mind are these things, as well as mistaken philosophical systems and so on, and apparently sound inferences. These are explained in terms of the principles of dreams and so on. Therefore, the understanding that the world gains through the sixfold faculties, when none of the mentioned conditions impairing one’s faculties are present, is considered true from the worldly perspective, but not for a noble one. Reflections and so forth, appearing with the nature of objects when the faculties are compromised in a certain way, are mistaken from the worldly point of view.

To provide some examples to illustrate the sense of what has just been explained, it was said:

Ideas diverse misguided thinkers have made up
When tossed around within the sleep of ignorance,
And notions from illusions, mirages and such,
Not even worldly folk will think that these are real. (6.26)

The misguided (tīrthika), in their quest to reach the actual reality, fail to properly and unmistakenly comprehend the way of production, cessation and so on of entities well-known even to such uneducated individuals as cowherds, women and so forth. Their search for perfection resembles letting go of the lower branch before having taken hold of the higher branch when climbing a tree: their grave mistakes will send them plummeting into the ravine of faulty views. Not seeing the two truths they fail to reach their goal. Thus, the three properties (guṇa)²⁹ and so on that they conceive of do not exist even in the worldly relative sense.

This being the case:

Perceptions of the ones impaired by eye disease
Cannot invalidate what’s known by healthy ones.
Just so, a mind which lacks the wisdom beyond taint
Cannot invalidate a flawless intellect. (6.27)

The refutation of other-production demonstrated here is not a mere worldly viewpoint. What then? It is the accepted vision of noble ones. This refutation of production being extraordinary, just as an undistorted apprehension cannot be invalidated by someone with cataracts disease who perceives hair-strands and the like, undefiled vision cannot be invalidated by the understanding of ordinary beings lacking undefiled wisdom, and worldly ones cannot therefore invalidate that which falls within this sort of domain. They are truly laughable opponents for a noble one. We therefore have two truths, and by distinguishing between a relative and an ultimate, entities are said to have a dual essence.

In order to describe the worldly relative truth, it was said:

It’s relative, delusion, when the real is masked.
Regarding as the truth what is in fact contrived
Is relative truth, this is what the sage expressed –
And that which is contrived is simply relative. (6.28)

As it obscures sentient beings’ ability to see things for what they are, it is confusion; and this condition of ignorance superimposing non-factual inherent characteristics to things, concealing the perception of the actual, is the relative (saṃvṛti). This relative causes things to be experienced as real, and that which lacks inherent nature is seen as inherently distinct. As this is relatively true for the mistaken world, it is the worldly relative truth. It is contrived interdependence.

Certain dependently arisen things, like reflections, echoes and so forth, appear as false also to the ignorant, while certain things like blueness and the like, and such things as material form, mind and feelings, appear as true. The actual does not appear in any way whatsoever to the ignorant. The latter, as well those things that also relatively are false, are therefore not the relative truth. As such, the relative truth is a principle relevant as long as one has the afflicted ignorance involved in the links of existence.

The hearers, solitary buddhas and bodhisattvas have relinquished afflicted vision, and not entertaining assumptions about truth they experience conditioned things as similar to reflections and such, contrived in nature but not real. For the immature these things are deceptive, while for the others they are dependently originated, like illusions and so forth, and therefore merely relative. Since they relate to this with only cognitively obscured ignorance, it does appear to noble ones in the appearance-associated domain, but not while in the appearance-free domain. Buddhas have fully and perfectly realised phenomena in all their aspects, and it is therefore held that they have arrested the movement of mind and mental factors for good. The Illustrious One thus taught that there is the relative truth and the merely relative.
What is ultimate for ordinary beings is merely relative in the appearance-associated domain of noble ones, while the ultimate for the latter is its emptiness-nature. The buddhas’ ultimate is the very nature itself. As this is undeceiving it is the ultimate truth, and something they have a direct personal experience with. Since the relative truth is deceptive it is not an ultimate truth.

Having covered the relative truth, the ultimate truth should be described. That, however, is impossible to explicitly indicate because it is ineffable and not a knowable object. To elucidate its nature to those who are interested with something they are familiar with, an example is therefore employed:

That faulty image one presumes – those falling hairs
Which come when one is suffering from an eye disease –
Is seen for what it is by one with proper sight;
At present we may thus deduce reality. (6.29)

Witnessing how someone suffering from cataracts, through the influence of that ailment sees such things as accumulating strands of hair filling for instance the rhinoceros-bowl he is holding, and his struggle to get rid of them by repeatedly upending the bowl, the one without cataracts might wonder, ‘What is he doing?’ and approach him. And even though she directs her eyes to the area of the supposed hair she does not perceive any hairs, and will also not entertain concepts of particular attributes related to these hairs, such as being things or non-things, hairs or not, dark blue and so forth. So, when the cataract-ridden individual relates his thinking to the one without cataracts, saying, ‘I see hairs,’ the other will want to clear away these concepts. And although she will certainly reject the perspective of the one with cataracts, and say, ‘There are no hairs,’ she isn’t actually denying them. The healthy one sees the actual reality of the hair-strands; the other doesn’t.
Similarly, the nature of the aggregates, elements, sense fields and so forth perceived by those impaired by the cataracts of ignorance and unable to see the actual reality, is the relative nature of these things. But like the cataract-free individual looking at the hair-strands, when the illustrious buddhas who are free from the habitual patterns of ignorance view those very aggregates and so forth, they see their real nature, and this is their ultimate truth.

‘But there couldn’t be any seeing of such a nature, could there? So how do they then see?’ Though that is true, it is said that, ‘It’s by not seeing it that they see.’ As indicated at length in the noble Accessing the Two Truths:

Devaputra. If ultimately the ultimate truth was a physical, verbal or mental object, it couldn’t be considered the ultimate truth; it would be the relative truth. Ultimately, Devaputra, the ultimate truth is beyond all conventions, undifferentiated, unproduced, unceasing, and beyond something expressed and an expressing, something known and a knowing. The ultimate truth, Devaputra, transcends being an object of the omniscient wisdom of those endowed with the most supreme of all aspects, and isn’t expressed by words such as ultimate truth. All phenomena are false; they are deceptive phenomena. The ultimate truth cannot be described, Devaputra. Why? No such phenomena as someone showing, something shown and someone shown to can appear ultimately. And non-apparent phenomena cannot explain non-apparent phenomena.³⁰

Thus, distinctions such as objective entity and non-entity, own-entity and other-entity, truth and non-truth, durability and termination, permanence and impermanence, happiness and suffering, pure and impure, self and non-self, empty and non-empty, characteristics and characterised, oneness and difference, arising and ceasing and so forth cannot be found in the actual reality, because it has no observable nature. Only noble beings therefore have a valid consideration of actual reality – those who are not noble beings do not.

If one insists that the world can invalidate it, and professes that the worldly perspective is a valid way of analysing actual reality, then:

If worldly standards were correct the world would see
Reality; what need for other noble ones?
Would there be reason to traverse the noble path?
It’s senseless that the standards of a fool are sound. (6.30)

If one were to accept that the worldly perspective is valid knowledge, and that the actual reality is seen by them, one would have to accept that they have relinquished ignorance, because a fool having valid knowledge is unreasonable. Someone who lacks understanding of a certain object is considered unreliable in relation to that thing, such as someone who lacks knowledge of how to examine precious stones. If the eyes and so forth could ascertain the actual reality, then endeavouring in moral discipline, learning, contemplation, meditation and so forth in order to actualise the noble path would be pointless. Hence this cannot be the case.

Therefore,

Since worldly standards are not valid all the way,
The world cannot disprove what is reality.

As was explained above, at the level of actual reality the worldly perspective is in every respect invalid. Thus, when the context is actual reality, the worldly cannot invalidate it.What can the worldly perspective invalidate? To explain:

But worldly objects are agreed on in the world,
So they’ll disprove you if you do reject these things. (6.31)

For instance, if someone were to say, ‘Something of mine has been stolen,’ and another poses the question, ‘What thing was it?’, and they reply, ‘A vase,’ and the other refutes it, saying, ‘A vase is not a thing, because it is a cognitive object, like a dream-vase;’ denials of objects like this the world can invalidate, since there is worldly consensus about mundane things. But when it comes to the level of the noble ones’ vision and learned individuals making valid analyses, the worldly cannot invalidate these. Learned ones may apply this position also when examining other things.³¹

With this, worldly invalidation has been avoided even if it was the case that worldly convention accepted other-production. However, since there is no other-production even from the worldly perspective, also when resorting to the worldly perspective one will not be able to invalidate the refutation of other-production using their view. To show this, it was said:

A worldly person may just sow a seed
But later say, ‘I have produced this child,’
Or else believe that he, ‘did plant this tree.’
No other-rising hence within the world. (6.32)

When it becomes evident that the child is male, a man will say, ‘I produced this boy.’ However, it is not as though a boy having those features is ejected from his body and put into the mother. There is merely an excretion in the form of a seed. But it is clearly the worldly opinion that, since it was due to his depositing the cause that a child then emerged, semen and child are not separate. If they were separate it would be as if they were distinct entities, and one wouldn’t then express it like that. The same may be applied to the seed and the tree.

Thus, to indicate the virtues of interdependence in terms of avoiding permanence and nihilism when explained in the above manner, it was said:

Because the sprout and seed are not distinct,
Seeds haven’t been destroyed when sprouts are there.
And since they neither are the very same,
We wouldn’t say the seeds exist with sprouts. (6.33)

If the sprout was other than the seed, the sprout’s presence would unequivocally mean that the seed was terminated – since the presence of wild oxen does not prevent dead cattle from ceasing to exist, and the presence of ordinary beings does nothing to the transcendence (nirvāṇa) of noble ones. But because they are not distinct, the identity of being a sprout does not terminate the seed, and in this way nihilism is avoided. And because they are not identical the very thing which is seed is not the sprout, and since this prevents imperishability, permanence is avoided.

As taught:

If seed exists, so does sprout;
But seed is not the sprout itself.
It is not other, it is not it – hence,
Dharmatā is neither permanence nor nihilism.³²

If seed exists… means that, ‘When there is an existence of seed, then….’ If it is suggested that, ‘A sprout arising with the seed as its cause cannot really be different from the seed,’ it states here: But seed is not the sprout itself. If asking, ‘Doesn’t the seed turn into the sprout?’ Then we have the statement: It is not other, it is not it – …. Since both the positions of sameness and otherness are impossible, neither that it is distinct and nor that it is not distinct will be reasonable. Hence, with both options refuted, that the nature of things (dharmatā) is beyond permanence and nihilism becomes manifestly apparent.

The essential point to be understood here is this: If seed and sprout were endowed with any sense of inherent existence (svabhāva), they would have to be either the same or different. But when they have no such inherent existence, being just like seeds and sprouts appearing in a dream, how can there then be actual oneness or difference. This is the very sense of the following explanation:

Formations are the consequence of ignorance,
But those formations are not present in that itself
Formations and ignorance are empty
By nature, free from fluctuation.³³

And as stated in the Treatise:

Whatever is dependently arisen from something
Is not then that exact same thing,
Nor is it other than it –
Hence, no permanence, no annihilation.³⁴

That, ‘There is no inherent production whatsoever,’ is something one absolutely must accept. If it wasn’t so:

If things existed with their own identity,
Rejecting this would mean the ruin of these things,
And emptiness would be destroying entities.
This makes no sense, and therefore things do not exist. (6.34)

If things such as material form and sensation were produced from causes and conditions with inherent characteristics, with their own essence and nature, when the yogi then sees entities as empty of inherent nature and realises that all dharmas lack inherent nature, his realisation of emptiness would occur through a rejection of an inherent nature that was actually produced like that. Then, just as such things as hammers can cause the destruction of vases and so forth, this emptiness would discard the intrinsic nature of things, which would not be justified. Therefore, that things have inherent characteristics would never be acceptable.

As taught at length in the noble Heap of Jewels Sutra:

Furthermore, Kāśyapa, the correct middle way approach to analysing dharmas is the following: It is not emptiness that makes dharmas empty; dharmas themselves are empty. It is not characterlessness that makes dharmas characterless; dharmas themselves are characterless. It is not aimlessness that makes dharmas aimless; dharmas themselves are aimless. It is not fabricationlessness that makes dharmas fabricationless; dharmas themselves are fabricationless. It is not productionlessness that makes dharmas productionless; dharmas themselves are productionless. It is not originationlessness that makes dharmas originationless; dharmas themselves are originationless.³⁵

Some assert a dependent nature, and thinking that its contingent emptiness characterised by a lack of apprehender and apprehended can neither be expressed as same nor different – just as with impermanence and so forth – they are saying that, ‘It is only through emptiness itself that all things are empty, and not by their very nature.’³⁶ As the Four Hundred Verses explains:

One cannot regard the non-empty as empty,
And then think, ‘I shall reach nirvana.’
Mistaken ideas do not lead to nirvana –
That is what the tathāgatas have declared.³⁷

And, as the Treatise states:

The victorious ones spoke of emptiness
As the relinquishment of every view,
And stated that those who take emptiness
As a view accomplish nothing.³⁸

Here, some say: ‘Indeed there is no production ultimately, based on the refutation of production from self and other. But direct perception and inference shows us that the nature of material form, sensation and so forth are undoubtedly other-produced. If this is not maintained, why say there are two truths? One would end up with just a single truth. And then other-production would be entirely non-existent.’

To this we reply: That is indeed true, and ultimately there aren’t two truths as seen in statements such as, ‘Mendicants. The highest truth is only one, namely: the undeceiving objective is transcendence. All composite phenomena are deceptive false objects.’³⁹ Accordingly, since the relative truth is the means for accessing the ultimate truth, when production from self and other is left unanalysed, the worldly perspective is acknowledged.

Thus:

When analysed there’s nothing that remains of things
Except the very nature of reality.
And thus the things which are conventions of the world
Are not to be subjected to analysis. (6.35)

And so, when material form, sensation and so forth are scrutinised in this manner, asking, ‘Are they produced from self, or are they produced from other?’, since there is ultimately neither production nor cessation, apart from the essential nature nothing other by way of production and so forth remains. Therefore, dispensing with thorough analysis of these things, such as asking, ‘Is it from self or other…?’, one should merely take one’s cue from the other and acknowledge what is observed by the worldly when they say, ‘If this is present, this arises.’ 

As Āryadeva explained:

Just as through a foreign tongue
Barbarians cannot be brought to understanding,
One will not make the world understand
Unless using the worldly perspective.⁴⁰

And as stated in the Treatise:

Without relying on the conventional
One cannot realise the ultimate.
Without realising the ultimate
One cannot reach transcendence.⁴¹

Worldly conventions collapse when subjected to analysis. As taught at length in the sutras:

If for instance three things are combined,
Some wood, some string and a practiced hand,
Pleasant sounds will issue from
The tūṇa, vīnā, sughoṣaka and such.⁴²

But though a learned person were to explore
Where they are going and whence they came,
Searching the four directions and in-between,
He will fail to find the sounds’ coming and going.

Likewise, from causes and conditions
All composite phenomena are produced;
But the yogi endowed with authentic vision
Sees these composites as empty and fickle.

The aggregates, elements and sensory fields
Are empty within and empty without;
The sentient lacking selfhood have no abode –
Space-like nature is the hallmark of dharmas.⁴³

One may interject: ‘If every type of adherence to things is to be eliminated, we are perplexed as to what to do with this adherence to a conventional truth; there has to be some sort of substantial nature produced which acts as the cause for thoroughly afflicted and completely purified states.’ This way of expressing it too though is nothing but mere words. Why?

No reasoning permits production from itself
Or other at the level of reality.
It can’t be justified even conventionally.
So then, by what can your production be sustained? (6.36)

Just as on the ultimate level the above explained reasoning does not allow for production from self or other, also conventionally it renders production illogical – how then can your production of entities be maintained? Therefore, though unwilling, one must by necessity accept the statement, ‘In neither of the two truths does production with distinct characteristics (svalakṣaṇa) occur.’

Some look at the statement, ‘Not from self …,’ and think that master Nāgārjuna is only refuting the imputed nature (parikalpitasvabhāva) and not the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhāva). This assertion of theirs is unreasonable and cannot be maintained, and those who speak like this will certainly be disproved.⁴⁴

‘But if there is no production with distinct identities in either of the truths, how is it that their distinct natures are observed in the world?’ To explain:

Such empty objects as reflections and the like
Are not unheard of when conditions do convene.
And just as from reflections and such empty things
Cognitions with their aspects are indeed produced, (6.37)

It is the same with every empty entity,
As from these very empty things, things do emerge.

All phenomena remain inseparable from the workings of cause and effect. So, what learned individual, when considering the causality involved in the appearance of an insubstantial reflection, would perceive this mere existence of nothing other than a causal process involving material form, sensation and so forth, and become convinced of it having a truly existent nature? Therefore, although its existence is perceived, there is no intrinsic production taking place. As stated:

O Druma, though it has no true nature,
A reflection may still appear to be
Within a spotless mirror. This is how
You should come to understand phenomena.⁴⁵

Hence,

And since true character exists in neither truth,
There’s nothing that’s eternal or that terminates. (6.38)

Because things are empty of an inherent nature, like the appearance of reflections, they are in nature essenceless both in the ultimate and relative truths, and both permanence and nihilism are therefore avoided. As the Treatise for instance states:

‘It is not so that what intrinsically exists
Is non-existent’ – this is eternalism.
To say, ‘It was before, but now is no more,’
Implies that one professes nihilism.⁴⁶

Likewise:

With the acceptance of existent things
The views of eternalism and nihilism follow,
Because an existent thing must be
Either permanent or impermanent.⁴⁷

And similarly:

Through mastery of magical emanation
The Teacher can make an emanation appear,
And that emanated emanation again
Can make further emanations appear.

The actor and enacted karmic act
Are similarly a display of emanations –
Like an emanation that emanates
Yet another emanation.

The afflictions, actions, bodies,
Karmic agents and results
Are like the city of gandharvas,
Similar to dreams and mirages.⁴⁸

This example of magical emanations demonstrates how things lacking inherence produce things lacking inherence.

Since there is therefore no intrinsic nature in either truth, the views of eternalism and nihilism are thoroughly abandoned. In addition, there will be no need to justify the link between the result and the karmic act, even when a long time has passed since the act took place, by resorting to such ideas as a substrate consciousness, karmic indelibility and obtention. How so?

Because it doesn’t really cease to be,
Though there’s no substrate, still the potency
Of karma stays long after it has ceased,
And will produce effects – this you should know. (6.39)

Those for whom karmic acts cease will in response to the critical remark, ‘How can a karmic act that has ceased to be give rise to a result?’, venture to confirm the potential of ceased karmic acts by maintaining a substrate consciousness, a separate indelible dharma similar to a promissory note, obtention, or that there is a continuum of consciousness that takes on the karmic imprints.⁴⁹ But for those for whom karmic acts are not inherently produced, they also do not cease; and since it is not impossible for a result to manifest from what has not been destroyed, when the karmic acts do not perish the link between the karmic act and its result becomes perfectly tenable. As the Treatise states:

Karma is not produced because
It has no inherent nature at all.
And since it is unproduced,
It also does not cease to be.⁵⁰

And from the sutras:

A human lifespan is a hundred years,
Thus we call that a lifetime.
But one cannot gather years in a heap.
This is established in a similar way.

When we say, ‘It is not exhausted,’
And when we say, ‘Karma is exhausted,’
The empty aspect is its non-exhaustion,
Conventionally its exhaustion is taught.⁵¹

To explain through simile the sense of what was just related:

The foolish man who has a pleasant dream
Is still desirous when waking up.
And likewise, though the karmic act has ceased
And lacks reality, it has results. (6.40)

As stated in the Transmigration Sutra:

Great King. Take for instance a man who is asleep and dreams of having intercourse with a beautiful lady, and on waking keeps yearning for her. What’s your opinion, Great King? Would such a man as this, who first dreams that he has intercourse with a beautiful lady and then having awoken still yearns for her, be a wise man?

He replied: No, Illustrious One, he would not. And why? Illustrious One, that dream-woman is non-existent; she cannot be perceived, let alone be a partner in intercourse. That man has nothing in store for him but misery and fatigue.

The Illustrious One said: It is similar, Great King, for immature and uninformed ordinary beings who on seeing material things crave material enjoyment. Craving these things they become attached. With attachment they bring about physical, verbal and mental karmic actions through desire, anger and confusion. When those karmic acts have been consummated, they cease. Having ceased they do not remain in the east … (and so forth), or in the intermediate directions. At a later time, when the moment of death arrives, the associated karma is activated as the final moment of consciousness ceases. At that time, it is just as in the example of the beautiful lady of he who awoke from sleep: one will tend towards that very mental karma. Thus, Great King, as that final moment of consciousness ceases, the first moment of consciousness belonging to the next birth determines whether one appears among the gods … (and so forth), or among the deprived spirits. As soon as that first moment of consciousness ceases, Great King, a mindstream that accords with the resultant manifest experience arises. While there are no phenomena whatsoever, Great King, that are transferred from this world to the next, death and rebirth are still evident. Great King, the ceasing of the final moment of consciousness is what we call ‘death’, while the initial moment of consciousness belonging to the next birth is what we call ‘rebirth’. But, Great King, as the final moment of consciousness ceases it doesn’t go anywhere. And the initial moment of consciousness belonging to the next birth doesn’t come from anywhere either. How can that be so? Because it is devoid of inherent existence. That final moment of consciousness Great King, is empty of a final moment of consciousness; death is empty of death; karma is empty of karma; the initial moment of consciousness is empty of an initial moment of consciousness; rebirth is empty of rebirth; and karmas do not disappear.⁵²

Some might think: ‘Say one accepts that not being inherently produced it is not spent,⁵³ and this is why there can be a ripening result. In that case, since the ripening manifests without it having ceased, there will likewise be another ripening after the initial ripening has taken place because it hasn’t been spent. And, since after that ripening there will be yet another ripening, this leads to the fault of infinite regress.’ This will not be the case:

Just as with cataracts one will see hairs
And not just any other random thing,
Although as non-existents they’re the same
The ripened won’t be ripening again. (6.41)

As an example, take objects that are similar in that they are nonexistent: someone with cataracts will see nonexistent objects such as strands of hair, but not the appearance of other types of things, such as a donkey’s horns and a barren woman’s child. Likewise, while the natures of karmas are equal in their non-cessation, they have specific ripening results.

This example not only shows that karma isn’t unspecific, but also that its maturation is specific. To explain:

The negative will therefore further woe,
While virtues lead to what is fortunate.
It’s freedom to see neither good nor bad.
To question karmic links was still deterred. (6.42)

Though virtuous and non-virtuous karmas lack intrinsic essence, still, just as there is a sense of certainty for the one seeing hair strands, non-virtue will not have have a pleasant outcome while virtue will not have an unpleasant outcome. When not apprehending karma as virtuous and non-virtuous one is liberated. The Illustrious One saw that if ordinary beings were to enter into very detailed analyses of it, they could end up denying karmic consequences and demolishing the relative. Stating that, ‘The workings of karmic consequences are inconceivable,’ he thus discouraged speculation about the workings of karmic actions and results.

‘If this is how the relationship between karmic actions and results is posited, when it is stated in the Descent Onto Lanka⁵⁴ that the substrate consciousness is the basis of all the unlimited particular potentials, containing the seeds that cause the production of all things, like the ocean is for the waves, can this then be something utterly unproduced in every respect?’

That is not how it is, because the statements presenting this as something existent were given in order to instruct disciples. It should be understood that it is as an approximation of the nature of all things that what is in fact emptiness is described with the term substrate consciousness. Not only is the substrate consciousness then existent, but the person too exists – such statements of their existence are given in order to nurture individuals who need to be trained. It was for instance stated:

O mendicants. The five aggregates are the burden. The carrier of the burden is the person.⁵⁵

To some it was taught that there are only the aggregates; and terms such as mind, mentation and consciousness were used when explaining that, ‘By immersing oneself with faith, moral discipline and so forth, one will improve, and in future lives take rebirth in the higher realms.’ But all such teachings were given with intentional ambiguity.

If one wonders what the intention behind them was, it is said:

And so, for those who are not able to
Accommodate the most profound of views,
He taught a substrate, that the person does
Exist, that aggregates alone exist. (6.43)

The kinds of students who have previously had prolonged exposure to misguided (tīrthika) views will struggle to assimilate the profound nature of things (dharmatā), and become frightened when hearing statements such as, ‘I am not, nor will I be ….’⁵⁶ When from the very outset they relate to the instructions of the Teacher like they would the edge of a precipice, backing away from it, they will not accomplish the supreme goal. By initially presenting them with such topics as the substrate consciousness, their misguided beliefs are counteracted as they are steered towards the greater purpose of these instructions. Since they will later, when gaining an unmistaken understanding of the teachings, naturally abandon these, it is definitely a beneficial approach and in no way mistaken. As Āryadeva explained:

One should first of all assess
Their particular inclinations.
If estranged they will never become
Vessels for the sacred Dharma.⁵⁷

For didactic reasons not only did he teach topics such as the substrate consciousness, but also:

He taught by saying I and mine, although
Free from the view of an identity.
And likewise, though things lack inherent truth,
He taught provisionally that they exist. (6.44)

Although he had relinquished any ego and mine by leaving behind the identity view in its entirety, as worldly convention uses terms such as I and mine as a means of communication, the Illustrious One taught using the expressions I and mine. Similarly, although things do not have an intrinsic nature, teaching that they exist can be a means for leading the worldly to understanding, and thus he taught their existence.

As stated at length in the Verses Agreeing with the Pūrvaśaila School:

If the guides of the world
Did not conform with the world,
Nobody would know about Buddha
Or the Buddhist teachings.

While knowing that the aggregates,
Elements and sense fields are of one nature,
He taught about the three realms
To accord with the world.

Though phenomena are unnameable,
He expressed himself to beings
Using an inconceivable variety of terms
To accord with the world.

He taught the non-existence of things,
While dwelling in the nature of awakening
Where there is no non-existence at all,
To accord with the world.

Though seeing no objects nor non-objects,
The supreme of speakers professed
Cessation and the ultimate truth
To accord with the world.

Though being without destruction and creation
Things are equal in the realm of phenomena,
He taught about the inferno of the aeon
To accord with the world.

Although the nature of sentient beings
Is not observed throughout the three times,
He taught about the characters of beings
To accord with the world.⁵⁸

The proponents of consciousness cannot accept the teachings of the Middle Way, and therefore express the tradition they themselves have conceptually fashioned regarding how to regard objects in order to dispel what has been explained here, saying:

When bodhisattvas dwell within intelligence
They know reality to be just consciousness;
No subject can be seen without the object, thus
They find the triple realm to be the mind alone. (6.45)

The word established means to dwell. To be established in intelligence is to dwell in intelligence (prajñā); and the one who is there is established in intelligence, is practicing intelligence. The bodhisattvas refers to those who have reached Present. Those who unmistakenly and without any superimposition whatsoever know, see and fully comprehend the actual reality, know reality. This then forms part of the phrase … know reality to be simply consciousness. Since they realise that in the absence of material form the mind and mental states are merely dependently arisen entities, they know reality to be simply consciousness.

One may ask how they know the actual reality to be simply consciousness. That is why it is said, ‘Seeing no subject in the absence of objects, and realising the three realms as mere consciousness….’ Through the presented reasoning the bodhisattvas come to see that, as there are no apprehended objects, there is also no apprehending subject, and then cultivate the thought, ‘…the three realms are mere consciousness…,’ over an extended period of time. Through this cultivation they come to see mere inexpressible entities through self-cognition, and gradually realise the actual reality as mere consciousness.

‘If they are simply consciousness; in the absence of external objects how can a consciousness bearing their aspects arise?’ To this they say:

It is just like the waves that will appear
Upon the ocean as by wind it’s stirred,
When from the substrate, seed of all, appears
Just consciousness by self-potential spurred. (6.46)

When a stretch of water in the ocean, the supporter of waves, is agitated by the wind, through the conditioning wind’s stirrings one can discern the movements of rising waves previously dormant, as if they are competing to assume a physical identity.

Similarly, the continuum of consciousness has been ongoing since beginningless time, and as tendencies for grasping at subject and object ripen things assume particular identities. When these cease they leave particular imprints in the substrate consciousness that serve as causes for later occurrences of consciousnesses with similar features. Eventually the conditions for them to ripen stir, and they reach ripening. It is in relation to these impure merely dependent occurrences that immature beings then impute concepts of subject and object where there are in fact no objects whatsoever apart from consciousness.

As the proponents of an almighty god (īśvara) and so forth will say:

Just as the spider is the cause of the spiderweb,
The water-crystal is for water,
And the fig-tree for its branches,
He is the cause for all things embodied.⁵⁹

Just as those who profess such things as an almighty god as the creator of the world, the proponents of a substrate consciousness claim that the substrate consciousness is the omnific source (sarvabījaka), since it is the fundamental seed of all things perceived. The only difference between them is that the almighty god is said to be permanent while the substrate consciousness is impermanent.

‘Since this is the way it is clearly presented in the scriptures:

And this dependent nature is the source
From whence ideas of real things then appear –
Appears without external things, exists,
In nature free from all abstracting thought. (6.47)

‘The dependent nature must unquestionably be accepted, since it is held to be the basis for the entire interlacing matrix of thought. One cannot mistake a rope for a snake without the rope as a contingent cause, and one cannot mistake earth and so forth for a vase without the contingent causes of earth and so forth; the latter would not happen in relation to the element of space. Likewise, in the absence of external objects, what would be the rationale for such thoughts as blue and so forth to occur? Hence, one must inevitably accept that the dependent nature is the cause of thoughts; it is the cause for the conditions of thorough affliction and complete purification. In this way, emptiness may be properly understood through statements such as:

“What lacks a certain thing is found to be empty of that, while that which remains is what actually exists.” This is the authentic and precise understanding granting unmistaken access to emptiness.⁶⁰

‘It is by nature beyond the scope of all elaboration, and since verbal expression relies on designations there is no way to communicate it through the medium of words. Thus, to summarise, the dependent nature is here presented as threefold: (1) it arises solely from its own imprints without knowable objects; (2) it has existence; and (3) it is not within the scope of any mental elaboration. That it is the cause for things having imputed existence is established by the fact of its existence, and this is therefore not a point apart from the aforementioned three.’

To this we say:

But how can mind be there without external things?

This should be investigated. They might reply:

‘It’s like a dream,’ you say. …

‘Someone asleep inside a tiny room might dream that the room is filled with a herd of mad elephants, which is not at all the case. That there can be consciousness in the absence of external objects must therefore necessarily be acknowledged.’

To show that this is completely unfounded, it is said:

… Well, let’s consider that:

How? Well,

For me, in dreams as well my mind does not exist,
Which means that your example is not relevant. (6.48)

The cognition appearing as a herd of mad elephants⁶¹ is for us as non-existent as the object itself, because it is unproduced. And when consciousness is non-existent, this example will not be applicable for both of us, and therefore there is no existent consciousness in the absence of external things.

They might think, ’But if the mistaken cognition of the dream does not exist, one shouldn’t then be able to remember one’s dream-experiences when waking up.’ This too is unsound, in that

If mind exists since dreams can be recalled
When waking, then external things should too,

Why?

Since just as you recall the thought ‘I saw,’
You do remember these external things. (6.49)

If the memory of the dream-experience meant that mind exists, the object too would then exist since the experience of the object is also remembered. The unavoidable alternative is to say that consciousness does not exist.

To this they reply: ‘If appearances of such things as elephants in dreams did exist, the eye-consciousness should also be operative then since they are being apprehended; but it is not, since the fivefold collection of consciousness is interrupted by sleep and hence not present.’ Thus,

You claim, ‘It’s not there when one is asleep, because
There is no visual consciousness, just conscious mind,
Its images believed to be external things.
And as in dreams, the same is taking place right now.’ (6.50)

‘When dreaming the eye-consciousness is in every way absent, and with that absent there cannot be an eye sense field (āyatana) apprehending the appearances of such things as elephants; but the mental consciousness is operative. Therefore, it cannot be denied that external forms are absent, and that it is the features of one’s own consciousness that are taken to be external. And just as it is only consciousness appearing in dreams without external things, the same is the case now.’

That is not so, since it is impossible for the mental consciousness to arise in dreams. So,

Just like for you externals are not there
In dreams, the mind as well is not produced.

Hence,

All three, the eye, the object seen, the mind
Which they engender, each of these are false. (6.51)

The perception of forms happens when the eye, the form and the mind are in proximity. Likewise, when objects are distinguished in dreams, a coming together of these three is observed. And just as in that context eyes and form are found to be non-existent, eye-consciousness too has no existence. And just as with these three, the same is the case for the rest:

The rest, with ears and such, are unproduced.

The words ears and so forth include the rest, from sound and ear consciousness up to and including mentation, mental phenomena and mental consciousness. Thus, since all of these triads are false within the dream, it makes no sense to say that the mental consciousness exists in dreams.
Some think that, ‘The form apprehended by the mental consciousness belongs to the sense field of mental phenomena, and does exist in the dream. Hence, it is not at all the case that consciousness exists without objects.’ But this sentiment is also unreasonable, since the three are utterly unfeasible in dreams. If they say they have accepted this in order disprove the scriptural tradition of the others, the dream example becomes meaningless, because what is deemed not false cannot serve to illustrate things that are considered false.

To explain that, since the three are unreal in dreams, this may be used as a proof to confirm unsubstantiality, and that therefore in the waking state as well all phenomena are shown to be without intrinsic nature, it was said:

The same holds true awake as when you dream
Since all things are deceptive; there’s no mind,
There are no objects and no faculties. (6.52)

It should be acknowledged that, just as in dreams objects, faculties and consciousness are false, the same is the case in the waking state. Hence:

As when perceiving illusory beings
That appear while not really there,
The Sugata taught that these phenomena
Are like illusions, similar to dreams.⁶²

Similarly,

Existence as a being is like a dream –
None are born, there are none who die.
The labels and lives of beings are not found;
These dharmas are like bubbles and plantain trees.⁶³

These and similar statements clearly express this.

Thus, these three are explained to be unproduced both with regard to the cognition of waking life and the dream state:

But just as one may see them when asleep,
The three are still here now when we’re awake.

While the sleep of unknowing remains, for those who have emerged from the sleep state and are awake, these three parts continue to be present – even though not produced in and of themselves – as dream perceptions caused by the sleep of ignorance. The same is the case for those who are asleep and have not emerged from the state of dreaming; this triad exists with the same type of nature also then.

And just as when awake the three are gone,
They’re gone when from delusion’s sleep we wake. (6.53)

When sleep ends and one is awake, the dream perceptions involving the three do not persist. Likewise, for those who have fully eradicated the sleep of ignorance and directly perceive the dharma expanse (dharmadhātu), these three do not exist. Hence, consciousness does not exist in the absence of external phenomena.

They might argue: ’Someone with cataracts does perceive things that are non-existent, such as hairs. Therefore consciousness must exist without external things.’ This is also untenable. Why?

The hairs an eye disease will make appear;
The mind which the afflicted sense affects;
His intellect will see them both as real.
With healthy sight they are both seen as false. (6.54)

This is to be regarded exactly as with dreams. From the perspective of the one with cataracts the appearance of hairs exists, while from the perspective of the one without cataracts both are unproduced, since one can hardly confirm consciousness in the absence of objects.

This must necessarily be agreed to. Otherwise,

If there could be cognition without something known,
One would expect that healthy vision too should know
These hairs when gazing at the spot where hairs appear.
This doesn’t happen, hence this cannot be the case. (6.55)

If a cognition having the features of hair strands could arise for the one with cataracts without existing hair strands, then someone without cataracts directing their gaze to the same place where the one with cataracts is seeing hairs should also have a mental experience of them, since they are equally non-existent for both. Hence it is illogical to say that consciousness arises in the absence of objects.

They might say: ’This would be the case if an existent object was the cause for the arising of consciousness. So how is it? It is the ripening or non-ripening of former imprints deposited in the consciousness that determines whether a particular consciousness arises or not. Hence, only when an imprint of another cognition in the form of hair strands left there ripens, does a cognition having these features occur; otherwise not.’ To then explain how this too is unfeasible:

‘There is no ripe potential for the healthy one,
And therefore he does not have this experience;
It’s not because there’s nothing there that can be known.’
But since potential is unreal this doesn’t work. (6.56)

… such a knowable object is lacking means that the knowable thing does not exist. Only if a so-called potential was something existent would there be the occurrence or non-occurrence of consciousness related to its ripening or non-ripening. Therefore this doesn’t prove it.

So why can’t potential exist? To explain:

Potential for what has arisen cannot be,
Nor can it be for what in fact is unproduced.

Is this assumed potential something connected with a present consciousness, or with a past or future consciousness? In the case of a produced present consciousness, there cannot be potential. When we talk of the potential’s we are using the sixth case,⁶⁴ and to say that the essentially resultant consciousness is itself the very cause is illogical. If it were, we would have a causeless result, and once the sprout is produced the seed would also not be destroyed. Therefore it is impossible for a produced consciousness to have potential.

When we say from the potential we are using the fifth case,⁶⁵ and as has already been explained, since it is existent it would be illogical for a produced consciousness to then originate from a potential. Hence there cannot be potential for that which is already a product.

Nor can that consciousness, when by nature unproduced, have potential. Because

With no distinction one cannot distinguish it,
Or else the barren woman’s son would be a fact. (6.57)

Without something distinct one cannot make distinctions. How so? When referring to consciousness potential, consciousness distinguishes the potential, and potential is the basis distinguished. But a thing yet to be produced cannot be used to indicate negation or affirmation in relation to something, saying it is a consciousness such-and-such or non-consciousness such-and-such. That being the case, what sort of distinction would one then actually be making by saying it is the potential for that? And when it can’t be distinguished as such, to say that will come from it won’t serve to identify it, and one isn’t actually indicating anything at all.

If one still insists that something unproduced can have potential, one would have to agree that a barren woman can have a son. Therefore, potential for something unproduced cannot exist.

They might then think: ‘The consciousness in question is an anticipated consciousness that will arise by virtue of this potential, and as it is the potential for that consciousness we can say, “It arises from this.” In this way the entities of distinguisher and basis distinguished are established, just as in everyday language one might say, “Please make some boiled rice,” or “Please weave a garment from this yarn.” This is explained in a treatise as well:’

‘There are three that enter the womb,
The cakravartin and the two self-manifest ones,
….’⁶⁶

To explain how this is empty rhetorics:

You may suggest that in the future it will be.
But lacking in potential it cannot spring forth.

Things that may occur at certain times can arise, but what is certain never to arise – such as a barren woman’s son or things such as space – will not. Thus in this context, if the potential did exist, consciousness could certainly come into being. But when the future consciousness does not exist, and its potential therefore doesn’t exist, as is the case for such things as a barren woman’s son, the absence of its potential means that it certainly can’t arise. This also applies when explaining boiled rice and so forth.

And although it is indeed the case that consciousness and potential are mutually reliant, a thing that is dependent does not in fact have existence. Thus,

And mutual dependence used to prove something,
The wise will say this fails to prove establishment. (6.58)

To say, ‘When consciousness exists, its potential is a fact; and consciousness arises from that,’ describes a case of mutual dependence. If they say, ‘That is exactly the way of things,’ they are effectively saying that consciousness does not inherently exist. For example, only when there is long can there be short, and when there is short can there be long; only when there is there can here exist, and when there is here can there exist. These are all nominal imputations lacking any intrinsic establishment. So if that is the case, they are in fact agreeing with us. As explained:

A cause in the absence of an effect
Has no existence as a cause.
Hence, it necessarily follows
That every effect is also a cause.⁶⁷

And from the Treatise:

If a thing is dependently established,
And that upon which it depends
Is established only in dependence on it,
What is then established in dependence on what?⁶⁸

Meaning that, if a thing such as consciousness were established in dependence on a particular potential, and that particular potential the consciousness relies on to establish its nature in turn depends on it; in establishing these two it must then be asked which is established in dependence on which? It continues:

How can a dependently established entity
Depend when it is not established?
And if you say the established depends,
Its dependence makes no sense.⁶⁹

Meaning that, if consciousness is established in dependence on a potential, is it established or not as it depends on that potential? If it is not established it can’t rely on that potential, because it is as unestablished as the horns of a donkey. On the other hand, if it is established while depending, its establishment would mean that it cannot be dependent.

The wise have thus stated that, ‘Things that are established in mutual dependence are not established.’ A future phenomenon cannot therefore have potential.

To explain that past potential likewise cannot be, it was said:

If it comes from a ceased potential’s ripening,
A separate potential then brings forth something.

If it is so that, as a result of a produced consciousness having ceased a particular potential is left in the substrate consciousness, and through the ripening of this ceased consciousness’s potential a consciousness arises, this would be an instance of something other arising from an extraneous potential. How so? Because:

As parts of a continuum must be distinct …,

‘Tan- means to extend’.⁷⁰ Accordingly, a continuum (saṃtāna) implies a succession, like the continuum of a river, and means that there is a continuous flow, a continuous transmission, with a connection between cause and result. In its usage in the case of the succession of birth and death, there is a sense of a sustaining of the conditioned moments of the three times in a continuous and unbroken sequential state, and as the parts of this continuum exist in substantial instances, the branches of the continuum being instances of substance are what is spoken of as the continuity. These are mutually other and separate things, and our opponents accept their otherness. Hence, when caused by these imprints a latter resultant moment occurs, it is different from the causal moment during which the imprints were set in place, and as such this will be a case of something distinct coming from a separate potential. If they think, ‘This is what we assert, and it is unmistaken,’ that is not so. What one is in fact saying by this assertion is that anything can be produced from anything, as explained in the line:

One could have everything come from just anything. (6.59)

The refutation of other-production has already been covered, and will not be reiterated here.⁷¹

To this they reply:

‘The parts of a continuum are separate,
But their continuum is an unbroken whole,
Hence there’s no fault.’ …

‘The substantial moments of the sequence are indeed mutually distinct but the continuum is a singular thing, so it does not follow that everything can be produced from everything.’

If there was such a thing there would be no fault. But being unsubstantiated,

… Well that will be a feat to prove:

Why?

Inseparable continua make little sense. (6.60)

Possible means that something is feasible. It is not credible that mutually distinct existent identities constitute an inseparable continuum, because they are different, just like things that are separate. To show this, it was said:

What makes for Upagupta’s and Maitreya’s traits
Are different, and not part of one continuum.
And when distinct things keep their separate character,
It’s nonsense to believe they’re one continuum. (6.61)

The idea is similar here: that a singular continuum does not hold up to reason.

It was suggested that, ‘It is the fact of a potential ripening or not that determines whether there will be a consciousness of something or not, and not whether a knowable object is present or not.’⁷² This has hereby been refuted by explaining how potential is an impossibility; and we are therefore left with the position that, ‘Without a knowable object there can be no consciousness.’

Having given this explanation, the proponents of consciousness will still insist that their own presentation is sound, and say:

‘Promoted by its own potential there appears
A ceaseless rising of the visual consciousness,
And this potential which supports its consciousness
Is taken as the physical eye faculty.’ (6.62)

‘An imprint of eye-consciousness is deposited in the substrate consciousness by another moment of consciousness, and as this later ripens, a consciousness with corresponding features is created. The uninterrupted instants of potential that have the uninterrupted potential to produce this consciousness, acting as its support, are what through ignorance is taken by the world to be the physical eye faculty; but there is in fact no eye faculty present apart from consciousness. The same applies to the other faculties.’

Thus, having explained how there is no eye-faculty apart from consciousness, they proceed to assert that material form is not something apart from consciousness either, saying:

‘But people cannot see that without outer forms
These sense-produced cognitions clearly manifest
As blue and such, originating from their seeds,
Instead they take the mind to be external things.’ (6.63)

‘When the bandhujivaka⁷³ and kiṅśuka flowers appear with a reddish hue, like gems they do not need to adopt their colour from something external. Nevertheless, the continua of sprouts and so forth are perceived as arising with their particular aspects in connection with the propelling potential of their own seeds. Similarly, colours such as blue appear as experiences of consciousnesses of blue and so forth without any external physical forms, and in relation to their appearance as blue and such, worldly people become convinced that they are external things. For example, say that on the branches of the trees surrounding a lake of clear water one were to hang red rubies (padmarāga) that would then be reflected in the water. Although there are external appearances of gems perceived in the water, it is not as if they are actually in there. This example may then be applied to consciousness. As such, there are no objects external to consciousness.’

‘Or, said differently:

‘The images in dreams are not external things
But mind that is assuming shapes resulting from
Potentials present. When awake it is the same:
There’s nothing on the outside, just the thinking mind.’ (6.64)

That is not how it is. How so?

If in the dream such blueness may present itself
To mind even without the function of the eyes,
Then why do these things not appear now to the blind
From seeds that ripen though they cannot use their eyes? (6.65)

Now, while we are awake, a clear visual consciousness comes about through the visual perception of forms. If this is exactly the same as what happens in a dream – and without the eyes being active the mental consciousness itself appears from the ripening of its imprint and takes on concordant features as an eye-consciousness – then why cannot a blind person see the same features when awake as someone who is not blind, when these are supposed to appear as such when their imprints ripen? In as much as the eyes are not operating, these two cases are exactly the same.

They might then think: ‘That the eye is inoperative is not the reason the mental consciousness appears in that manner; rather it is the ripening of a potential that mental consciousness has for those features. Hence, when that potential is ready to ripen, the mental consciousness appears with those features, but this only happens in dreams on the condition of sleep, and not while one is awake.’
This does not make sense. How so?

And if you say it is when sleeping that the sixth’s
Potential ripens, and not while one is awake,
Then why not say that just as now it isn’t ripe,
The sixth’s potential neither ripens in the dream? (6.66)

Sixth refers to the mental consciousness. If words are all it takes to claim that the mental consciousness potential ripens in that manner in dreams but not in the waking state, then we might as well verbally claim that, just as in the waking state the consciousness potential does not ripen in that manner, it will likewise not ripen in dreams.

This enables us to say:

For just as lack of eyesight cannot be its cause,
When dreaming it is not the sleep that is the cause.

Dream perceptions are, like the waking state of a blind person, a instance where an operative consciousness-supporting faculty is lacking, and therefore it is not so that a mental eye faculty named potential is there to act as a support for the features the mental faculty takes on as its mental faculty potential ripens. Thus, just as lacking eyes is not its cause for a waking blind man, neither should sleep be the cause for the ripening of imprints of consciousness in dreams.

Therefore, since that is the case,

We therefore grant that there are things as well as eyes
That cause our false perceptions seen when in a dream. (6.67)

Therefore one must accept that in dreams as well there are such objects that are known in such a such a way and there is such a support for the eye-consciousness.

As this is so,

It seems that every counterargument they have
Is nothing more than repetition of their claim.
Their case is thus rejected – …

It is shown that, this triad taking place in the waking state is empty of inherent existence, because it too is a perception, as in a dream. Our opponents then claim that, ‘Waking consciousness is empty of sense objects, because they are consciousness, like the experience of dream appearances;’ ‘The object apprehended while awake is by nature false, because it is an object, like dream objects;’ and also, ‘Without a dependent nature the thoroughly afflicted and fully purified states could not exist, because they would be as unfounded tortoise fur.’ They also use the example of cataracts to this effect. In these and other ways, the proponents of consciousness give various replies which the competent middle way proponent sees through as mere claims, the arguments of the proponents of consciousness are discredited.

Being at odds with scripture and so forth, it is similarly inadmissible; since,

… nowhere will one find
The Buddha stating that there are existent things. (6.68)

As stated:

The threefold world is mere imputation,
Not something essentially existent.
Theoreticians, however, believe that
This imputation is the essence of things.⁷⁴

There is no nature, no cognition,
There is no substrate, no entities;
But the base and immature theoreticians,
Like corpses, imagine these to be.⁷⁵

To take entitylessness as the emptiness of one thing in another is senseless, as the scriptures also state:

Mahāmati. The emptiness of one thing in another is the crudest form of emptiness.⁷⁶

To this one may say, ‘That a cow does not exist because it is not a horse makes no sense, because they have their own identity,’ and so forth.

Likewise,

O Illustrious One. They access the dharmadhātu by using their faculties. The twenty-two faculties are: the eye faculty, ear faculty, nose faculty, tongue faculty, body faculty, mind faculty, female faculty, male faculty, life force faculty, the faculty of happiness, faculty of suffering, faculty of pleasure, faculty of displeasure, faculty of neutrality, faculty of faith, faculty of diligence, faculty of attention, faculty of concentration, faculty of intelligence, the faculty of making the unknown known, the faculty of full knowing, and the faculty of possessing full knowledge.

Regarding these, the eye faculty can’t ever be determined throughout the three times. Not being determinable throughout the three times, there is no such eye faculty. The eye faculty being non-existent, how can there be a conventionally designated eye faculty? It is similar to a hollow fist; a falsehood, inauthentic, there is nothing there.⁷⁷ It may be nominally indicated, but ultimately neither hollow nor fist can be ascertained. The eye faculty is just like a hollow fist; a falsehood, nothing there, something inauthentic. A feigned, deceptive phenomenon that can fool a child. There is nothing there, it is inauthentic. It may, in the same way, be nominally indicated, but ultimately neither an eye nor a faculty can be observed.

The Illustrious One gained the wisdom of omniscience and used the designation eye faculty in order to communicate with the many beings who remain perverted, but ultimately there is no such thing. The faculty is without inherent existence; it is devoid of facultyness. The eye does not exist as eyeness; the faculty does not exist as facultyness. How so? The eye does not have an eye nature; and a phenomenon that has no nature is not an existent thing. Not being an existent thing it is not established. It is unproduced and unceasing. It cannot be designated as something past or future.

Illustrious One, it is just like someone having a dream where he is laughing, joyous and playing, who remembers this when waking up. Even though he is able to bring it to mind, it is not something that can be ascertained. How is that so? These things can’t even be found in the dream, not to mention when waking up – they are nowhere. The faculties are just like this dream; one cannot determine an essence to any phenomenon whatsoever. Hence they are said to be inexpressible.⁷⁸

The aggregates, elements, sense fields, interdependence and so forth are all explained to be like the faculties. How could these ever then have any inherent nature? The proponents of consciousness who haven’t properly explored the intent of the Teacher’s words are therefore unable to apply their intelligence to good ends, and will surely be defeated.

‘But,’ they may say, ‘if in the absence of objects there is no consciousness, how can one then explain that yogis following their guru’s instructions perceive the ground completely covered in skeletons?’

When yogis train according to their guru’s words
And see that skeletons are covering the earth,
The three are still considered unproduced, because …

… that is to say, the object, faculty and consciousness. Why? It is a meditative concentration:

It’s guidance utilising false mind images. (6.69)

The reason is that it is described as a mental exercise involving non-reality.

One must necessarily accept that this is the case. Otherwise,

And if you think that these repulsive images
Are just like any object that the mind conceives,
When other people turn their minds towards such things
They should discern them, and these wouldn’t then be false. (6.70)

When you witness such things as a theatrical performance, among those who are watching, the image present to the eye consciousness of one will similarly be so also for others. If the present case was similar, then non-yogis should be able to perceive exactly the same images as the yogi when directing their gaze towards objects such as these skeletons, their being the same as consciousness of blue and so forth. This meditative concentration would then no longer be a mental application involving non-reality.

Similarly, one should understand that

It’s similar to cataract-inflicted eyes
When spirits see a river’s water being pus.

It was previously explained that, ‘The mind sees hairs through the influence of this disease …,’⁷⁹ and any other similar cases may be considered along the same lines; but we shall desist from elaborating more for now.

In short, please understand that, just as what you know
Has no existence, neither does the mind itself. (6.71)

One should come to recognise that just as knowable objects have no inherent existence, the mind too that entertains images of knowable objects is in and of itself un-produced. As stated:

Without a knowing there’s no known;
And lacking that, no consciousness.
Hence you declared that knowing and
The known lack inherent existence.⁸⁰

Similarly,

Consciousness is like an illusion –
Thus spoke The Sun’s Kinsman.
And what it perceives is likewise
Certainly like illusory things.⁸¹

Those who are seized by this consciousness-claiming madness⁸² and deny external objects, are sure to plunge into the ravine of self-hood, and must therefore be treated by noble compassionate practitioners with an excellent and harsh mantric cure of scripture and reasoning.

Thus, having shown how there cannot be consciousness without external objects, in order to reject the position that it simply must exist, it is said:

And if detached from subject-object there could be
Dependent nature, empty of duality,
Then who would know of its existence? Just to say,
‘It’s there but not perceived,’ is quite unreasonable. (6.72)

If a dependent nature empty of so-called apprehended and apprehender exists, through what cognition do you apprehend its existence? It is untenable that it apprehends itself, since it is contradictory for something to direct its act upon itself: the blade of a sword cannot cut itself; the tip of a finger cannot touch itself; even the strongest and most dextrous athlete isn’t able to climb onto his own shoulders; fire cannot burn itself; and an eye cannot look at itself. Another cognition cannot be apprehending it since that would conflict with your own tenets; if cognition was the object of another cognition, one could then say that this undermines the sense of cognition only. Hence there is no way whatsoever that there can be an apprehender of it; and that which cannot be apprehended cannot exist.

Now they reply, ‘It isn’t actually a case of another apprehending something else, but it has reflexive awareness. And since reflexive awareness apprehends itself, that shows it to be existent.’ To show how this can’t be, we explain:

It isn’t proven to experience itself.

It is unproven that it can so-called ‘apprehend itself.’

There are those who cite the Sautrāntika position in order to prove reflexive awareness: ‘When a fire is kindled it will simultaneously illumine itself together with vases and other things without distinction. And words signify both themselves and a referent. Similarly, when consciousness occurs it can fully discern itself and objects without distinction. Hence, reflexive awareness most certainly exists.

‘Though unwilling, one must by necessity accept reflexive awareness. Otherwise, when remembering the experience, “I saw …,” one wouldn’t then remember both the object as well as the experience, “I saw it.” Why? The memory would be of the experienced object, while the knowing of it would not have been experienced and could not then be remembered.

‘As long as awareness is not reflexive it cannot be experienced. And that there is another cognition experiencing it is unreasonable. Why? If the cognition experiencing it is other, the consequence will be that of infinite regress. If you accept that immediately following one cognition distinguishing the colour blue, there is a consciousness distinguishing that, one would need yet another experiencer of the cognition of the cognition of blue; and then yet another again; leading to the fault of infinite regress.

‘And it can’t be that cognition discerns something separate from it, since then all strings of awareness would be objects of distinct consciousnesses, and sentient beings only have a single stream of consciousness. It is like a stack of a hundred blue lotus-petals being pierced; consciousness engages with things in succession, but so rapidly that it appears to be happening simultaneously.⁸³ Hence, to avoid the fault of infinite regress one must necessarily accept reflexive awareness.

‘With that, both objects involved when subsequently remembering the thought “I saw …” will be accounted for. But if the nature of cognition isn’t known by reflexive awareness, it’s illogical that its object can be remembered. And so, as the subsequent memory “I saw…” appears to one’s cognition, it may be inferred that the trigger for the cognitive experience of a subsequent memory containing both these objects must have been an experience of its own nature and the nature of the object. The subsequent memory proves the experience of oneself; and when experience of oneself exists, the dependent nature exists. You asked, “What would then know of its existence?”⁸⁴ This is the answer.’

To show that this is illogical, it was said:

It isn’t proven to experience itself.
And if you say a later memory is proof,
You’re giving something that is unproven as proof;
And what’s not proven cannot function as a proof. (6.73)

If this is the proof they now present to substantiate it, since memory is impossible in that it’s produced neither from self nor from other, how could the unproven memory prove the unproven reflexive awareness? Even in terms of worldly conventions it would be impossible for memory to be the result of reflexive awareness. How so? If, as in the case of fire, cognition is used to prove reflexive awareness – and because of its presence, like fire is deduced from smoke, one is to be convinced of its existence via the subsequent occurrence of memory – since this reflexive awareness remains something unproven, how could memory, the result of reflexive awareness and something that doesn’t occur if reflexive awareness doesn’t exist, exist? One can’t be certain of the presence of a water-crystal gem just from seeing water, or a fire-crystal gem just from seeing fire, because even without these water may be the result of such phenomena as rain, and fire may be produced for instance by rubbing sticks together. In the same way, this shows that memory may arise in the absence of reflexive awareness. And therefore, since memory as a result of reflexive awareness is non-existent without it, you’re giving something unproven as proof. In proving reflexive awareness, this unproven term ‘memory’ has no relevance as evidence – just like thinking of sound’s impermanence as something perceived by the eyes.

But say we dispense with such analysis:

But let’s assume that self-awareness is affirmed.
That memory remembers it is still unsound,
Because it’s other, like an unknown in one’s mind.
This argument will conquer any counterclaim. (6.74)

If we do say that cognition is aware of itself and the object, it is still illogical for a remembering cognition to remember them, because the remembering cognition is accepted as other in relation to the cognition that experienced the object. The reflexive awareness and experience of the object that happened in Maitreya’s mind will not be remembered by Upagupta, because he didn’t experience them. Similarly, seeing as they are other, it would be just like an unknown mind appearing to oneself, and a subsequent consciousness taking place within a stream of mind cannot therefore have that memory, because it didn’t experience that cognition and object.

Now, one may think that such a memory can exist, since this is a case of a single continuum where things have a causal relationship. But this too is not the case because we have an argument which defeats any objection. The argument of stating, ‘Since they are other …,’ will utterly defeat any counterclaims such as, ‘They are part of the same continuum,’ or, ‘They are in a causal relationship,’ and so on. Since a moment of recollecting cognition would come about subsequent to the experience, it is something other; and being in that way just the same as having a cognition of another stream of mind, we may say that it isn’t of a single continuum as the cognition that experienced, or in a causal relationship, and so forth. So this argument of stating that they are other is a sweeping refutation.

They might then ask, ‘How do you explain it?’ To clarify:

For us, the one who has the memory is not
Distinct from he who had experience of something.
To think, ‘I saw,’ is therefore memory to us,
As is the way conventional worldly people think. (6.75)

I have already explained in relation to the experience of an object, how between the cognition that experienced the object and the cognition that remembers there cannot be otherness. And since, when there has been an experience, the rememberer is not another, it isn’t the case that the cognition which remembers that experience is not the experiencer, and the memory can therefore appear with the object. Since it isn’t the case that the discernment of the experiencing cognition isn’t the discernment of the rememberer, one can have the thought, ‘I saw….’ This is also the worldly viewpoint, which shouldn’t be subjected to rigorous analysis, since the conventions of the world operate on false premises.

This being the case:

And so, as self-awareness cannot be the case,
What is perceiving your dependent nature then?
The actor, act and object cannot be the same,
And thus to apprehend itself makes little sense. (6.76)

An awareness thinking, ‘I cognise myself,’ implies that it itself is the thing acted upon, while the cognition, the actor, is also itself. And as its act is also not then separate, it follows that the actor, the acted upon and the act would be the same. These are however not seen to be the same, just like the wood-cutter, the wood and the act of cutting are not the same. Since reflexive awareness cannot therefore exist, it doesn’t apprehend itself. As stated in the Descent Onto Langka:

Just as a sword does not cut
Its own blade; and a fingertip
Cannot touch itself; the same applies
To the mind perceiving itself.⁸⁵

Therefore, as reflexive awareness does not exist:

If, even though it is by nature unproduced
And isn’t known, dependent nature can exist,
How has the barren woman’s son offended them
That he should suffer this denial of being real? (6.77)

As was demonstrated above, a dependent nature can be neither self- nor other-produced, and is likewise shown to be something that can’t be known. And if you do accept the existence of a dependent nature that is by nature unproduced and unknowable, why should you then not also accept the existence of things that have the same status as this dependent nature? Has the barren woman’s son harmed you in any way? A barren woman’s son too may be described as utterly unfathomable, an ineffable object of the noble ones’ wisdom⁸⁶ , so you have to accept his existence!

If it is indeed an existent dependent nature which is, as they posit, ’… the cause for things that are but imputations…,’⁸⁷ then logically:

When this dependent nature can’t exist at all,
Then how can it be causing relative events?

The thinking being that a cause for the relative does not then exist in the slightest. And so, for them there is nothing that can actually cause worldly conventional reality. How terrible!

When so obsessed with substance, our opponents will
Just gainsay every normal worldly principle. (6.78)

Foolishly clinging to one part of substantial reality is like pouring water into the unfired earthenware pot of the dependent nature. Due to their ignorant ways they find that they destroy everything: i.e. worldly principles that are only sound from the worldly perspective – commands such as sit!, go!, do!, cook! and so forth – as well as anything encompassed by material form, sensation and so forth. With that, nothing but failure lies ahead, and no good result will transpire.

And so, in their folly, these teachers insist on a path they themselves conceptually fabricate. But,

There is no other method that will lead to peace
Apart from noble master Nāgārjuna’s way.

How so? Since,

But they stray from the truths, the real and relative –
One gains not liberation when ignoring these. (6.79)

And why will disregarding these two hinder liberation? To explain:

Conventional truth works as a means to reach an end.
The ultimate is like the end one tries to reach.
But those who do not see how these should be discerned
Are led by faulty fancies down mistaken paths. (6.80)

As stated in the noble Absorption Revealing Reality:

The knowers of the world themselves declared,
And not by hearsay, that there are two truths:
The relative and the ultimate.
There is no such thing as a third truth.

That beings may benefit from developing
Faith in the bliss-gone ones,
For beings’ sake the Victor taught
The relative to aid the world.

Relatively the Lion of Men would
Identify six classes of beings:
Hell-beings, animals and spirits,
Demigods, humans and gods.

You, so incomparable, taught about beings
Of the world in all their distinctions:
In terms of social rank, the high and low,
As citizens, the rich and the poor,

As slaves and servants,
Men, women and neuters.
The wise who have understood relative truth
Teach in this way to aid the world.

Cyclic beings drawn to these states
Are driven by the eight concerns of beings:
Gain and loss, fame and disrepute,
Praise and blame, pleasure and pain.

When success is gained attachment grows,
While encountering loss upsets their minds;
The rest may be similarly represented.
These eight sicknesses cause constant harm.

Do understand that their judgement is mistaken
Who profess the relative to be the ultimate.
Those who say the repulsive is appealing,
Suffering is pleasure, who claim an inherent self

Where there is no self, who say the impermanent
Is permanent; they hold to signs who are thus inclined,
And when learning of the doctrine of the Sugata
They will fear it, and lacking understanding reject it.

And those who reject the teachings of the Sugata
Will suffer unbearably in the realms of hell.
Immature children who unwisely pursue pleasure
Will endure abundant sufferings.

Only those who do not err, but understand
The teachings that benefit the world,
Can shed them like a worn-out serpent skin,
Pass beyond existence and find peace.

‘All phenomena lack inherent existence,
Are empty and signless – that is the ultimate.’
Those who hear this and rejoice,
Will find the unsurpassed awakening.⁸⁸

Victorious One, you who see the lack of skandhas,
The absence of all elements and sense fields,
That this house of faculties lacks all identity,
O Sage, you see all things to be like this.⁸⁹

So how can there ever be liberation for those separated from the relative and ultimate truths? Hence, these proponents of consciousness certainly stray, following mistaken pathways due to their erroneous ideas.
To teach the conventional truth is a method. As stated:

What is heard and what is taught
Is the inexpressible dharma –
Nothing expressed apart from superimpositions,
But heard and taught nonetheless.⁹⁰

Only by basing oneself on the conventional truth can the ultimate be taught. And by understanding the teachings on the ultimate, the ultimate state can be attained. As stated in the Treatise:

Without relying on the conventional
The ultimate cannot be indicated.
Without relying on the ultimate
Transcendence cannot be reached.⁹¹

To teach the ultimate is what the method aims to do, what it should result in; meaning that it is what is aimed for, the result, that to be attained, or what should be understood.

Here they might interject: ‘I won’t stand for any more of your discourteous talk! You display some skill in criticising others and have refuted the dependent nature through logical reasoning. But, in doing so you refute the very relative that you accept, as the arguments presented render it illogical.’

You’re like someone who feigns friendship and serves poisoned food to the person who has stolen all your wealth accumulated since beginningless time so that you can get it back. If this is how you prefer to avenge yourself we will relish it. That is excellent! As,

The claims concerning the dependent you have made,
I wouldn’t venture even for the relative.
Although they don’t exist, pragmatically I say
They do, in order to comply with worldly view. (6.81)

For us the relative is not how you independently propose in your philosophical system that the dependent nature is something realised by the noble ones’ wisdom. How is it then? Although without existence, since the worldly consensus is that things exists, we will say so merely to express the viewpoint of the world, since agreeing with them becomes a remedial method. As stated:

The Illustrious One said: The world may quarrel with me, but I have no quarrel with the world. I accept as existent whatever the world claims exists. I accept as without existence whatever the world claims does not exist.⁹²

Concerning the relative:

For arhats, who have left behind the aggregates
And dwell in peace, these things do not indeed exist.
If that was true for those who dwell within the world,
I wouldn’t say that from the worldly view they do. (6.82)

For the arhats who have entered the realm of transcendence with no remainder of aggregates, the relative does not essentially exist in any way whatsoever. If it was equally non-existent for worldly beings too, then just as with the aggregates of an arhat, I wouldn’t say that it exists from the worldly perspective. Therefore, it is in relation to others that I accept the relative, and not from my own side.

This is only what the worldly claim. And if what they hold must be refuted, then go ahead and refute them; direct it not at another. To express this:

But if you think that they will be no match for you,
Then go ahead and contradict the worldly view.
So let the battle of the world and you commence,
And after I shall follow who’s more powerful. (6.83)

We would find it immensely difficult to refute the relative reality of the world. Still, you go ahead and refute the worldly relative! And if you are not defeated by the world I would have to support you. But the world will prevail, so I will remain neutral. Let the fight between you and the world commence; and if you are victorious we shall agree and follow your lead. But if the world defeats you, that will mean the world is the stronger and we shall follow them.

To this they object: ‘So, although unfounded, you accept the relative out of fear of the world’s disapproval. You should then also accept the position of mind-only so as not to be disproven by scripture and statements such as, “They think, ‘The three realms are mind only.’”’⁹³

Let me explain. Failing to recognise the unique nature of the floor mosaic that is the collected sutras formed by the blue sapphire of the Sugata’s teachings, and thus mistaking it for water, you profess consciousness to be a real entity. Then, wishing to scoop up some of this water by asserting consciousness as a real entity, you attempt to rinse and fill the unfired earthen jar of your intellect causing it to shatter into a hundred pieces, and become the laughing stock of those who understand its nature. The intent of this sutra is not as you think.

If you then wonder what it is, it was explained:

In Present’s presence bodhisattvas realise
The three realms to be nothing more than consciousness,
And seeing that eternal makers are disproved,
They understand the maker to be mind alone. (6.84)

That same sutra elaborates on this point:

… [they] consider in due order the steps of dependent origination. … ‘In this way this mass of suffering, this tree of suffering, manifests with neither creator nor experiencer.’ They think, ‘Because of clinging to a creator, acts are distinguished. Where there is no creator, no acts are ultimately perceived.’ They think, ‘The three realms are mind only. The twelve links of existence distinguished in the teachings of the Tathāgata are all based on a single mind.’⁹⁴

As such, having refuted a permanent creator, they see that relatively it is simply the mind alone that is the creator, and realise the three realms to be merely consciousness.

As for the meaning of the constituent words: Bodhi (awakening/enlightenment) refers to the wisdom of omniscience; and to be intent (sattva) on that, to have a wish for or consideration of it, is what is meant by bodhisattva. Alternatively, bodhisattva is to be guaranteed awakening (bodhi), to possess it, to be there. Or, bodhisattva may refer to an individual sentient being certain to awaken (bodhi). It is an abbreviation with the intermediate word omitted.⁹⁵ Realise (paraiti) means to come to understand. Presence (abhimukha) implies that one is in the presence of the basic space of phenomena (dharmadhātu). Present (abhimukhī) is the name of the sixth ground.

Then, having clarified the meaning of this sutra, it is explained how this sense is also presented a futher sutra:

And hence to fuel the insight of the clever ones,
Make clear the meaning, the Omniscient One expressed
These vajra-words in the Descent Onto Langka
That shatter lofty mountains of misguided views. (6.85)

The verse here indicated by the word these is the following:

The person, continuum, aggregates,
As well as conditions and particles,
Primary principle and a creator god,
These, I say, are mind alone.⁹⁶

Such is the verse as extracted from the noble Descent Onto Langka.

To explain the meaning of this it is said:

A maker, such as those we find described within
The scriptures of the various misguided schools,
A person or the like, he could not find – and so,
The Victor said that mind alone creates the world. (6.86)

The word misguided (tīrthya) is used generically, including also Buddhists who entertain concepts about a person and so forth. From one side these are not actually Buddhist, but are just like the misguided because they lack an unmistaken understanding of the teaching. This reference is therefore all-inclusive.

As stated:

Come! Ask the world, those who claim
A person, aggregates – the Sāṃkhyas,
The Aulūkyas⁹⁷ , the Jains – if any profess
Transcendence of being and nonbeing.

See thus how the immortal teachings
Of the buddhas, stating the profound,
Beyond being and nonbeing,
Is a dharma that is truly unique.⁹⁸

Those who believe in aggregates and so forth may be identified as non-Buddhists. Respective systems (yathāsvam) refers to each of their different philosophies. Hence, this is describing how the misguided believe that such things as the aggregates are creators; and seeing as cyclic existence is beginningless, all sorts of conceptual ideas have already been or will be thought of. At present there are those such as the White Renunciates⁹⁹ who do appear to be teaching about the aggregates and so forth.

So, the meaning the sutra conveys is that the Tathāgata did not observe that a person or the like is the creator of things, and taught that mind alone creates the world.

We have now seen how the refutation of a separate creator is implicit, and explained how the word only cannot be used to refute knowable objects. To state in different words how this does not deny external things, it is said:

Awakened indicates awakened to the truth.
And likewise when the sutras speak of only mind
It means that mind alone is foremost for the world.
Denying matter never was the sutra’s goal. (6.87)

Just as we use the term awakened (buddha) as an abbreviation of the expression awakened to reality (buddhatattva), one should understand that the same is the case when saying that the three realms are mind-only (cittamātra), implying that mind alone is primary (cittamātrapradhāna), and negating that anything else is of prime importance. This therefore demotes physical form from the primary role, but is not a refutation of its existence, saying that mind alone exists and that matter is nonexistent.

Thus one must necessarily accept the intent of the sutra to be is as we have explained it. But, considering your tradition:

If mind alone in fact was meant to indicate
Denial of the physical reality,
Then why indeed was mind too by the Mighty One
Described to be from karma and confusion born? (6.88)

The noble Ten Grounds Sutra states that consciousness is caused by confusion and formations, and not that it is intrinsically existent. A consciousness established in and of itself wouldn’t be subject to ignorance or formations; however, it does in fact rely on them. There is therefore no such thing as an inherently existent consciousness. Just as the perception of hairs for one with cataracts, it exists when a distorting condition is present, and not when such a distorting condition is absent. As stated:

Thus the bodhisattvas consider in due order the steps of dependent origination. They think, ‘Not knowing the truths there is ignorance of the ultimate truth. The karma of ignorance ripens as mental formations. The initial mind based on these mental formations is consciousness. The four aggregates subject to grasping arising together with consciousness are name and form. The development of name and form leads to the six sense fields. The defilement that results from the meeting of faculty, object and consciousness is contact. With contact there is feeling. Attachment to feeling is craving. As craving proliferates there is grasping. The defiled karma resulting from grasping is becoming. The result of becoming is birth, and the emergence of the aggregates. As the aggregates develop there is ageing. With ageing the aggregates deteriorate and there is death. The intense agony of shock and longing that accompanies death is grief. The wailing that accompanies grief is lament. Its effect on the five faculties is suffering. Its effect on one’s mental outlook is despair. Great suffering and despair ends in torment. In this way this mass of suffering, this tree of suffering, manifests without a creator, without an experiencer.’¹⁰⁰

‘Ignorance produces two effects: it distorts what sentient beings observe, and provides a cause for mental formations to manifest. Mental formations likewise produce two effects: they make future ripening results manifest, and provide a cause for consciousness to manifest. Consciousness produces two effects: it creates a link to the continuity of existence, and provides a cause for name and form to manifest. Name and form produce two effects: they mutually support each other, and provide a cause for the six sense fields to manifest. The six sense fields produce two effects: they display their respective spheres of activity, and provide a cause for contact to manifest. Contact produces two effects: it provides contact with the object, and provides a cause for feeling to manifest. Feeling produces two effects: it creates experiences that are pleasant, unpleasant and neither of these, and provides a cause for craving to manifest. Craving produces two effects: it makes one desire desirable things, and provides a cause for grasping to manifest. Grasping produces two effects: as above,¹⁰¹ and it provides a cause for becoming to manifest. Becoming produces two effects: it creates a basis for further types of existence, and provides a cause for birth to manifest. Birth produces two effects: as above,¹⁰² and it provides a cause for ageing to manifest. Ageing produces two effects: it causes the decline of the faculties, and provides a cause for one’s encounter with death to manifest. And death produces two effects: it causes the destruction of the compounded, and provides and cause for misapprehension to continue without interruption.’¹⁰³

As these and similar statements make clear, consciousness is taught to be caused by ignorance and mental formations.

Thus, when corrupting conditions are present, consciousness comes into being. In what manner is it then absent when they are absent? This is elaborated upon:

‘As ignorance ceases mental formations cease,’ means that when the condition of ignorance is absent mental formations are stilled and do not persist. ‘As mental formations cease consciousness ceases,’ means that when the condition of mental formations is absent consciousness is stilled and does not persist. …¹⁰⁴

This continues up until:

… They think, ‘When things combine formations increase. When things are separate formations do not increase. When things amass formations increase. When things do not amass they do not increase. We have in this way seen the many adversities that accompany conditioned phenomena, and shall sever this process of combining, this amassing; but shall forsake attaining the ultimate pacification of all that is conditioned in order that we may bring sentient beings to maturity.’

O royal sons. As they, in this way, consider how this conditioning is riddled with adversity, lacks intrinsic essence, is unarisen and unceasing …,¹⁰⁵

This being the case, who in their right mind would, on seeing the scriptural statements presented here, conclude that consciousness has substantial existence? Making that assumption is based purely on belief.

Therefore, when saying mind-only, what is emphasised is that mind alone is primary, and this scripture is not at all implying that there is no physical form. And to indicate how it is mind that is primary, it is said:

It truly is the mind that makes the spectacle
That is the worlds of beings and environments.
It’s stated that all beings’ states are karma-born –
Dispense with mind and there will be karma no more. (6.89)

Here, the world of beings refers to the individual states of existence sentient beings meet with due to their karma and afflictions. The world of the vessel refers to everything from the wind-maṇḍala up to the celestial realm of Akaniṣṭha produced by their shared karma. The variegated facets of such things as the patterns on a peacock’s feathers are produced from the particular karma of that peacock. The varieties of such things as lotus flowers are produced from the shared karma of all sentient beings. Take this to apply to all things in general. As stated:

Just as when one is born on Mount Black,
It is their karma that decides whether
A being is in hell or realms divine,
If trees will be of weapons or of gems.¹⁰⁶

Since this is the case, all states of existence arise from karma and karma again is dependent on mind, the reason for this being that it is only sentient life that can accumulate karma, and without mind there is no karma.

It is therefore the mind that is the primary cause for entering the states of existence, not anything else. This is why the sutras posit that mind alone is primary and not physical form. Why?

Though matter is a fact, it can’t claim to possess
The same creative power that the mind displays.

The thinking being that physical form is an inanimate substance.

A maker other than the mind is thus denied,
But that is not to say that matter is disproved. (6.90)

Some claim that such things as the primary principle (pradhāna) is the creator. Some claim that it is the mind. But there is no disagreement about the fact that material form cannot be the creator. Therefore, in order to disprove their belief in such identities as the primary principle as creator, the creative ability that mind alone exhibits is said to be the creator. The justification for saying this is that, as one has then disproved that such things as the primary principle can be the creator, one annihilates the topic of the debate. It is like eliminating one of two opposing kings both vying for control of a country, thus leading one of them to gain domination of the country and leaving the populace unharmed, which is important to both. Here too, for the benefit of both, material form is never denied, so that one may still retain the idea that there is material form.

Since that is what these words communicate:

It is the worldly fact that aggregates are five
While one is placed within the world’s reality.
But when the wisdom of reality they seek
Has dawned, for yogis these will no longer appear. (6.91)

And since this is the case:

If form is absent don’t assume the mind is real.
And don’t insist that form is there without the mind.

When reasoning shows that form does not exist, since the existence of either of them is then untenable one must concede that mind too can’t exist. And, when mind is understood to exist, form should be likewise accepted since both are confirmed by worldly consensus.This may also be seen from the scriptures:

The Buddha would reject them equally within
The wisdom texts – in abhidharma both were taught. (6.92)

The aggregates of form and so forth were all five equally taught in the Abhidharma, through distinctions such as their unique as well as shared defining characteristics. And in the Perfection of Intelligence all five of them were equally refuted in statements such as, ‘Subhūti. Form is inherently empty…,’ until, ‘Consciousness ….’ 

With this it has been proven by scripture and reasoning that:

Dismiss the tiered system of the dual truth,
Your substance is then barred and cannot be maintained.

To claim that, ‘form does not exist, there is only consciousness,’ is to disregard the tiered levels of the relative and ultimate as has been explained. And while disregarding the levels of these truths, your substantial existence still remains unproven. What does this mean? Since substantial existence has previously been refuted, you exert yourself to no avail.

Acknowledge thus that there are levels to the truth:
Birth in the world but never in reality. (6.93)

Here they reply: ‘One may well explain the intent of this sutra in that particular way, but there are certainly other sutras where we also find that only mind exists. As stated:

‘Without external appearances
The mind appears in various ways,
Like bodies, possessions and abodes –
I teach that these are only mind.¹⁰⁷

‘Here, bodies refer to the sense fields of the eye and so forth. Possessions refer to objects, such as forms and so forth. Abodes refer to the world of the vessel. Since nothing exists externally separate from mind, it is only consciousness that appears in the form of bodies, possessions and abodes, and these are taken to be external objectively existent things separate from consciousness. Hence, the three realms are mind only.’

The statements of this sutra are also given with intentional ambiguity. To explain:

The sutras where it states that what we see is not
External, but the mind perceived in various ways,

There was an intention behind this, in that

That was provisional, taught to invalidate
The physical for those who are attached to form. (6.94)

This provisional meaning teaching is aimed at those with great yearning for material things, who due to that lose their free will through being overcome by desire, anger, pride and so forth. Their obsession with these things leads to much negativity which in turn destroys the merit and wisdom they have developed. To overcome afflictions caused by material things, the Illustrious One would thus teach such ones that things are only mind, in the same way that he would teach about the skeletons that are not in fact there to desirous individuals in order to overcome desire for external objects.

‘How can one be certain that this is a provisional meaning and not the definitive meaning?’

Based on scripture and reasoning. And in order to show this it was said:

The Teacher did express it as provisional.
Provisionality is shown by reasoning.

It is not only this sutra that is provisional in meaning, but others as well:

This scripture makes it clear that other sutras too
Of similar sort will likewise be the leading truth. (6.95)

And which sutras are of a similar kind? When presenting the three natures – the imputed, the dependent and the thoroughly established – the Unraveling the Intent Sutra¹⁰⁸ states that the imputed is nonexistent, the dependent is existent […], and likewise presents statements such as:

Deep and subtle is the carrying consciousness,
Like a river’s current, a flow of every seed.
Since it would be wrong to think of it as the self,
I do not teach it to the immature.¹⁰⁹

As stated:

Like a doctor will prescribe medicine
According to various needs of patients,
In the same way the Buddha taught
To beings that there is only mind.¹¹⁰

These scriptural quotes make it clear that this is provisional in meaning. Similarly,

[…]: In the sutras mention is made by the Illustrious One of the tathāgata nature. The Illustrious One describes it as present within the bodies of all sentient beings, a natural pure perfection, primordially unsullied and endowed with the thirty-two marks of excellence. The Illustrious One says that it is like a precious jewel that is wrapped in filthy garments, wrapped in the garments of aggregates, elements and sense fields, held back by attachment, aversion and confusion, sullied by the taints of misconceptions, something permanent, lasting and unchangeable. How is this tathāgata nature the Illustrious Tathāgata speaks of not the same as the ātman taught by the misguided? Illustrious One, the misguided also describe the ātman as permanent, uncreative, without properties, pervasive and indestructible.

The Illustrious One replied: No, Mahāmati. When I teach the tathāgata nature, it is not the same as the ātman propounded by the misguided. Mahāmati, the tathāgatas, arhats, truly complete buddhas teach emptiness, the ultimate end, transcendence, the unborn, featureless, wishless and so forth as the tathāgata nature. The tathāgata nature is used to indicate the unapparent state of non-conceptuality so that immature beings may lay aside their fear of selflessness. O Mahāmati, the future and present bodhisattvas, great beings, would not maintain belief in a self.

Take as example, Mahāmati, the potter who by using his hands, craftsmanship, tools, water, cord and perseverance can make pots of various shapes from a single lump of clay. In the same manner, Mahāmati, the tathāgatas may teach the lack of self of phenomena, the reversal of all conceptual characteristics, in various modes using intelligence and skilful means such as tathāgata nature or selflessness when suitable. In a way similar to the potter, they teach using all manners of terms and expressions.

This is why, Mahāmati, the teaching on the tathāgata nature is not like the ātman taught by the misguided. Through teaching the tathāgata nature, Mahāmati, the tathāgatas may provisionally lead the misguided who cling to their teachings on the ātman. Thus they teach the tathāgata nature. It is how those who have ended up with ways of thinking that conceptualise a real self may gain the perspective that can accommodate the three liberations, and thus swiftly realise unsurpassable true and complete awakening.¹¹¹

As it also teaches:

Mahāmati. The features of emptiness, non-arising, non-duality and lack of inherent nature are found in the sutras of all buddhas.¹¹²

It has thus been made abundantly clear through this citation that sutras of this type that the proponents of consciousness take as definitive in meaning are in fact all provisional in meaning. To explain how reasoning will also show them to be provisional in meaning:

The buddhas taught that when there is no object known
The knowing of it will be easy to refute.
The known is therefore what’s initially denied,
Because without the known the knowing is disproved. (6.96)

The illustrious buddhas introduce students in stages to the lack of inherence. Meritorious activity makes it easier for one to access the true state of things (dharmatā), and the teachings on generosity and so forth are therefore given first, as a skilful method for accessing the true state. Refuting the known is similarly a skilful way of coming to understand selflessness, and the illustrious ones therefore present the refutation of knowable objects initially, since those who understand the selflessness of the known object will find it easy to relate to the selflessness of the knower. In some cases, those who have understood how knowable objects have no inherent nature, will gain the realisation of the knower’s lack of an inherent nature by themselves. In some cases they will need some guidance. The refutation of knowable objects is therefore taught first.

To encourage intelligent individuals to identify other texts in a similar fashion, it is said:

And thus you should discern the level of the text:
When what is being explained is not reality
But leads one, then the sutra is provisional;
It is definitive if voidness is the theme. (6.97)

Sutras which do not explicitly express interdependent origination through such particular attributes as non-arising and so forth, may be described as aids that help one approach the lack of inherent nature, as when it states:

To counteract attachment to form
You taught about form, saying
‘If the eyes do not apprehend the elements,
How can they apprehend what they give rise to?’¹¹³

And from a sutra:

Impermanence means non-existence.¹¹⁴

While they are definitive if the topic matter is emptiness, as found in statements such as the following:

Know that sutras where the Sugata explains
Emptiness are classed as definitive in meaning,
While dharmas where he teaches beings, individuals
And persons are all provisional in meaning.¹¹⁵

And,

All the sutras that I have taught
In the many thousands of realms
Are identical in meaning though the words differ,
But cannot be fully reiterated.

Through contemplating a single item
One will be practicing all.
Of all the many dharmas
Expressed by the myriad buddhas,

Every dharma relates selflessness.
And if anyone skilled in the meaning
Of things studies this point,
The qualities of Buddha will not be hard to find.¹¹⁶

Similar and more extensive presentations on this matter may be found in various sutras such as the noble Akṣayamati.¹¹⁷

To present one stance on this: The snake is an imputation upon the interdependence of a coiled rope, because it isn’t actually there. A real snake is thoroughly established because it is not an imputation. As in this example, inherent nature is an imputation on what is dependently created. And as we find stated:

Inherent natures cannot be fabricated
And do not depend on anything else.¹¹⁸

Hence, inherent essences cannot be created. The apprehended and reflection-like interdependence which is imputed on is the actual fact from the perspective of the buddhas, since it is then no longer an imputation. Directly perceiving the nature itself, without reference to created entities, they realise the actual reality, and are therefore called buddhas.¹¹⁹

Such an understanding of the three natures – the imputed, the dependent and the thoroughly established – as presented here, helps explain the intention of the sutras. When the duality of apprehended and apprehender does not have a reality beyond the dependent nature, it should be considered whether these two can in fact be imputed on the dependent nature. But this digression shall end here, and we now return to the main subject matter.

Having thus also refuted production from other, now in relation to the refutation of production from both, it was said:

That things arise from both will not be reasonable,
Because one will encounter faults explained above.

For the Possibilists (syādvādika), production takes place both from self and other, meaning that they believe in production from both. A pot, they say, comes about through factors such as a lump of clay, a stick, a potter’s wheel, string, water, the potter and so forth. Since the clay and the pot aren’t separate things, the pot produced exists in the nature of the clay, hence self-production. Since such things as the work of the potter involved in its production are distinct from it, there is other-production. This is the idea underlying their belief in both self- and other-production.

And just as with the external environment, individual creatures also come about from self and other. In this regard they present a list of principles: ‘There are nine principles involved in this: life-force, inanimate factors, merit, negativity, defilements, vows and so forth.’ Given that Maitreya’s future birth exists in the nature of his life-force, there is self-production, because Maitreya and his life-force are not separate things. Life-force is a component of migratory existence, and these opponents therefore assert that it is a cause for existences such as that of a god. Since one’s birth takes place through external factors such as one’s father and mother, religious ways or lack thereof, defilements and so forth, there is other-production. ‘Hence,’ they say, ‘we are not affected by the statement, “There is no production from self, nor is there production from other,” because we propose that there is neither exclusively self-production nor other-production.’

This is not a reasonable argument, as explained: Production from both is likewise unjustified. Why? Since it would involve the faults already mentioned. Because holding the position of both involves the faults already pointed out for both positions, production from both is not possible.

Because the pot exists in the nature of the clay there is no production, since it already exists. As has been explained:

If it came from itself there would be nothing gained.
What is produced, produced once more – that makes no sense.¹²⁰

Similarly, it should be acknowledged that as he already exists by nature of his life-force, Maitreya isn’t then born.

Because the pot is not present in the identity of the water, string, wheel and so forth, it cannot be produced from them. As has been explained:

If it were possible that something else could be produced
Based on what’s other, utter darkness should emerge from flames;
And one would see production of all things from everything,
Since in their difference every non-producer is the same.¹²¹

The case of Maitreya arising from what is other, such as his father and mother, may be explained in the same manner.

Just as it was previously shown how production from self and from other is untenable in the worldly relative and ultimately, to now conclude the above treatment that showed that the reasoning presented by the Syādvādikas does not work it was said:

Not in the world nor actually can this be claimed ...

To express that, we do not merely allude to the reasons presented above that show how production from both is untenable, but will explain so here as well, it was said:

When by each one production cannot be sustained. (6.98)

For example, since a single sesame seed may yield oil, many of them will as well, while this is not the case for sand where such a capacity is not observed. Likewise, it is when productive ability is there for individual members that a collection of such things will have it too. Hence, production from both is unreasonable.

The Substantivists (svabhāvavāda)¹²² will say, ‘With causal production, the cause and effect must either be the same, different or both, and then one will run into those problems. But if I do not assert a cause, those problems will not be an issue. Hence, it is in fact the case that things arise by themselves. We do not observe anything that deliberately makes the roughness and smoothness of the fibres and petals of the lotus flower; nor do we observe anything that makes the various colours and shapes of the petals, stamens and pistils. The same is the case for breadfruit, pomegranate and so forth. And just as with these things that are part of the environment, we do not observe anything that intentionally designs the colours, shapes and so forth of lifeforms such as peacocks, partridges and cranes. The fact therefore, is that production of things happens naturally.’

To comment on this:

If causelessly production could in fact take place,
Then endless things would always come from everything.
And people of the world would not in all these ways
Be planting seeds and so forth to make crops appear. (6.99)

If things could arise spontaneously, just as the breadfruit tree wouldn’t then be the cause of breadfruit, all other sorts of things that are not its cause could also produce it – neem, mango and so forth – since they would all equally be non-causes. Just as breadfruit could be found on trees that aren’t its cause, it could also emerge from anywhere in the three realms. And, even though fruits such as mango and breadfruit¹²³ are seasonal, appearing only at certain times, they would then be perennial, not being reliant on seasons.

Similarly, since peacocks wouldn’t be the cause of peacock feathers, crows would also have peacock feathers; and even at the embryonic stage, peacocks would always have parrot feathers. Every being would in this way perpetually come into being, but this is clearly not the case – so to assert naturalness makes no sense.

Having shown how it contradicts reason, to further explain how it contradicts what we can observe it says, ‘… and people of the world wouldn’t then be preparing all these things, like seeds, to make their crops appear.’ This demonstrates that production doesn’t happen naturally.

Furthermore,

If living were devoid of causes one would not
Perceive more than the sky-lotus’s scent and hue.
But since the dazzling beauty of the world is seen,
Just like one’s mind the world arises causally. (6.100)

If lifeforms were devoid of causality, one wouldn’t come to have perceptions any more than one does of the scent and colour of a blue lotus in space, but one does. And therefore you should acknowledge that just as with the workings of mind, every state of being is causally arisen.

According to you, a mental impression of the colour blue will not occur if one removes the blue object. And since the mental impression of blue is only there with the presence of blueness, and not by itself, this invalidates the claim of naturalness.

Those who believe that mind originates from the elements¹²⁴ think, ‘Causes are evident and cannot be denied, because we do see them, and because of the faults you have mentioned. The causal relationships between things is a fact commonly accepted in the world. There are only four things that are real: earth, water, fire and wind, and these form the basis for the endless variety within the world. Not only is it the case that a particular synthesis of these leads to the varieties of lotus, pomegranate and so forth, and species such as peacock and crane, that we can observe; sentience and the ability to distinguish between the various types of things also originate with them. Just as when particular elements combine and develop, producing the intoxicating capacity of alcohol that causes beings to experience intoxication and stupefaction, so it is that certain combinations of the major elements developing from the embryonic stage oblong (kalana) give rise to consciousness and eventually the ability to distinguish between all manner of things. All the things that make up the environment and the living beings therefore develop from within this world, and there is nothing that is now the outcome of karmic acts, nor will the actions of this life have an effect in future lives after one dies.’

My dear, let us enjoy ourselves and eat.
What is past will not haunt you, my beauty.
This body is but a gathering of things,
O timid girl, what is gone will not return.¹²⁵

Desiring to have sex with his daughter he spoke thus to convince her that there are no future lives.

To address this: How can you be so certain that there are no other lives? If they say, ‘Because they can’t be directly perceived,’ is the fact that you don’t have direct perception of other lives something you directly perceive, or not? ‘I directly perceive it.’ Well, if you directly perceive that there is no direct perception of other lives, that would mean that non-existent things can also be directly perceived. And then, non-existent things would be existent for you because they are directly perceived in exactly the same way as existent things. In that case there would be nothing that could be labeled non-existent. And without their opposite, existent things likewise cannot exist. And when there are neither existent things nor non-existent things, that undermines the existence of elements and non-existence of future lives.

If they say, ‘It is not directly perceived;’ something that is not directly perceived cannot be apprehended precisely because it is not directly perceived. And how could failing to apprehend be a valid way to infer the non-existence of future lives?

They then suggest, ‘It is apprehended through inference.’ But in regard to using inference as a valid way of proving things, you have made the claim:

There is nothing more to man
Than what our senses reveal.
What the learned say, dear girl,
Is nothing but a wolf’s trail.¹²⁶

Therefore, if you keep on denying everything, I can use the same approach used when rejecting that mind comes from the elements to entirely reject this too.

Furthermore, someone with a visual impairment who thinks that there are such things as two moons when in fact there are not, will also mistakenly see other things that aren’t really there, such as hair strands, bees and so forth. Similarly, when thinking that future lives and the like do not exist, because you have a perverted understanding, you will likewise be mistaken about other things that you see. To express this it was said:

If it’s the nature of the elements that make
Your mental image though its nature it does lack,
How could someone so densely dimmed towards this life
Be trusted to have knowledge of the lives beyond? (6.101)

How can these four that you talk of, that are of the nature of earth and so forth, become objects of your mind without sharing its nature? Having such a flawed way of seeing this world, how could you possibly have any understanding of that which is beyond this world, a sphere of knowledge requiring exceptionally subtle divine vision?

Furthermore,

When you deny that there are lives beyond this one,
Your view of how things are is flawed since such views have
This bodily existence as their common ground,
Like when you make the claim that elements are real. (6.102)

Common (sama) means that there is a similarity of kind. Ground (āśraya) means that it underlies it.¹²⁷ Body (mūrti) refers to corporeality. Such views implies this particular view that rejects past and future lives. Since it describes it as being a common ground, this is a specifying compound. Bodily existence is the common ground, and the phrase is thus combined as such views have this bodily existence as their common ground. A matup-affix is used to give the sense of in whom it is.¹²⁸ That then becomes, since such views have this bodily existence as their common ground, supplying the reason.¹²⁹

Concerning this ground, as long as the mind is thought to be generated from the elements and no room is left for the possibility of past and future lives, there is a common ground for this mistaken view of denying past and future lives and when thinking that the elements are really existent, and the common ground for these types of views of the materialist is this bodily existence. There are thus two contexts here: one being their understanding of the natural elements, and the other their denial of past and future lives. Here in the verse, one of these indicates their stance and the other serves as an example, when it says, like when you make the claim that elements are real; in that context as well, it is physical reality which is the common ground for their view, and this view of how knowable things are is flawed.

They might think, ‘There is nothing wrong in the way I see things when understanding the natural existence of the elements; so the example that you use in your proof is void.’

That is not so, since the fact that they are unproduced shows that it is a mistaken view to think that these elements, being in nature non-existent, can have any sense of production or existence. If they say that we would need to prove that the elements are in fact unproduced, we don’t, because it has already been proven. To express this:

It has been shown how elements cannot exist,
As it was generally disproved things can’t arise
From self, other, both, or without a cause; and so
Though not explicit, they have no reality. (6.103)

It has been commonly refuted that existent things can be produced from self, other, both or causelessly, and since this general refutation showing that there is no production also applies to production with respect to the elements, they have no inherent existence and the example is therefore valid. This likewise applies to those who variously refute the Omniscient One, who propound that entities exist, who propound that entities do not exist, who propound an almighty god, time, particles, primordial nature or inherence, or anyone else. One may in these cases adapt the verse accordingly, for example:

When you deny that the Perfect Buddha exists,
Your view of how things are is flawed since such views have
This bodily existence as their common ground,
Like when you make the claim that elements are real.¹³⁰

This will serve to refute all views that hold on to any form of existence or non-existence. Nothing unwanted can ever befall us, so by skilfully altering this verse we are certain to eliminate each and every position our opponents may formulate, thus halting the entire web of conception and making the ultimate wisdom manifest.

They might then think, ‘You are equally affected by this consequence.’ But we are not, because there is no example that shows our proof to be mistaken. We may say:

When I acknowledge there are lives beyond this one,
My view of how this are is accurate since such views have
This bodily existence as a common ground,
Like when I claim the understanding of selflessness.

Likewise,

When I say that the Omniscient One exists at present,
My view of how things are is accurate since such views have…,

The reason and example are the same two; and this may likewise be applied in connection with all things. With this approach, whatever the thesis may be it remains valid that:

It can’t come from itself, and how from other things?
Can’t come from both, how could it be without a cause?¹³¹

One may ask, ‘If things are neither produced from self, other, both, nor causelessly, how are they then produced?’

To explain: If things had any sort of inherent existence, no other type of arising could be conceived of, and one would undoubtedly have to observe that they arose either from self, other, both, or causelessly. Some might propose that things are produced from a creator god or the like, but in those cases too, such things as a creator god would be a self, an other, or both; so those propounding such things as a god to be the cause, will not therefore avoid the problems already presented. Hence, no fifth cause of production can be imagined. To express how, in the absence of any other alternative, and since production by any of these four conceivable options has been refuted, there is no inherent production of things, it was said:

Because things don’t arise from self, other or both,
Nor causelessly, they’re nothing in and of themselves.

One might then ask, ‘If things are indeed without inherent arising, how do we then apprehend the unarisen, such as the colour blue?’

To explain: Since there is no way that a true nature of blueness and so forth could be objectified, the nature of things such as blue is not apprehended.

‘If that is the case, what are these things which keep appearing as actual objects to our perception?’

To explain: the mistaken is not the actual nature – true identities are only perceived by the ignorant and not by those free from ignorance. To express this:

The clouds of dense confusion lie across the world,
And therefore objects are perceived mistakenly. (6.104)

By clouds amassing rain-clouds are meant. Since thick ignorance, similar to a layer of clouds, blocks the perception of the nature of blueness and so forth, immature beings cannot perceive the true nature of blue. They make the mistake of thinking that it has essential nature, and with this belief the immature perceive it to be real.

They interject: ‘With the actual reality not being in any way seen since it is blocked by ignorance, how does this mistaken perception then come about?’

To show by means of external examples how things are experienced as real in this way despite this not actually being the case, it was said:

An eye disease may cause mistaken visions like
Hairs, double moons, the peacock eyes, bees and so forth.

Just as in instances when things are taken to be real when in fact not really there, such as when cataracts lead the afflicted to perceive hairs and so forth…,

The unwise, tricked by their confusion, will likewise
Believe the sundry fashioned imagery they see. (6.105)

The Illustrious One has stated that:

Confusion leads to formations.¹³²

That:

A person affected by ignorance generates meritorious formations, non-meritorious formations and unwavering formations.¹³³

And likewise that:

When ignorance is halted formations cease.¹³⁴

Accordingly,

It is a sign of witlessness if one declares,
‘Confusion causes karma; does not come without.’
Just like the sun of wisdom sheds the nightly gloom,
The wise unravel emptiness and are set free. (6.106)

When seeing the statement, ‘Confusion leads to formations,’¹³⁵ the judicious not only come to appreciate that formations lack inherent existence. Due to their understanding they also rid themselves of ignorance and stop perpetuating conditioned phenomena, having abandoned the causes for their perpetuation. Thus they are freed from cyclic existence.

They now object, ‘If form and so forth ultimately have no inherent nature whatsoever, then they are just like the son of a barren woman in having no ultimate existence, which means that relatively too they wouldn’t have any inherent nature. But form and so forth do have a relative nature. Therefore, seeing as they have such an existence, they must then have ultimate existence.’

‘If in reality things don’t in fact exist,
They’re like a barren woman’s son and should like him
Have no existence also as conventional things.
They must therefore exist as things inherently.’ (6.107)

We reply:

Take objects such as hairs, although they are not there,
Do still appear to someone who has cataracts.
Thus, first of all, please settle your dispute with them.
And then go deal with those impaired by ignorance. (6.108)

First you should then take your arguments to those who have defective eyesight, such as those suffering from cataracts, and ask them, ‘Why is it that you see such non-existent things as strands of hair, but not the son of a barren woman?’ And then you should question those whose mind’s eye is veiled by the cataracts of ignorance, asking them, ‘Why is it that you see forms that are by nature unarisen, but not the son of a barren woman?’

I am not the one to be censured here. I am quoting the scriptures: ‘that yogis see things in this way, and that others who wish to gain the wisdom of the yogis should pay attention to the way in which they explain the nature of things.’¹³⁶ It is through realisation, brought about by yogic wisdom, that entities may be explained as lacking inherent nature. This is not something taken from my own understanding, since my mind’s eye is veiled by the cataracts of ignorance. But as is stated:

Devoid of nature, the aggregates are emptiness.
Devoid of nature, awakening is emptiness.
Anything engaged in is empty by nature.
The wise understand this, the immature do not.

With the nature of insight seen to be empty,
The nature of the known seen to be empty,
The knower as well is thus understood;
This is called practicing the path of awakening.¹³⁷

And the yogis are therefore not the ones to be censured; they are the ones who see that no phenomena have inherent nature, either relatively or ultimately.

So stop censuring the cataract-ridden! First of all take a closer look at yourself. To explain:

In fact you too see things that are not really there,
The city of gandharvas, images in dreams,
Illusions, a mirage, reflections and so forth.
So, is it not unsound how these appear to you? (6.109)

To take dream perceptions as an example, they are just as non-existent as the son of a barren woman. Still, one can experience a dream but not the son of a barren woman. It is the same with the city of gandharvas.¹³⁸ A mirage refers to the phenomena of water appearing in a mirage. The same is the case for illusions. When saying reflections and so forth, the phrase and so forth is meant to include such things as echoes and apparitions. And although everything in these examples is empty of inherent existence, they can be seen; but the son of a barren woman cannot. So you should in fact be censuring yourself. And only after that should you come criticising me.

We may well then say:

Though actually these are as unborn as
The barren woman’s son, that does not mean
That these things are not seen within the world.
It’s therefore not conclusive what you say. (6.110)

As the Illustrious One has stated:

Beings are explained to be like dreams,
And not considered real in actual fact.
Nothing appearing in a dream is real,
But people misconstruing still believe.

The city of gandharvas may appear,
But there is no such city anywhere.
Just as its city status is but a name,
The Sugata sees beings in the same way.¹³⁹

Though to the observer there is water,
No water can be found in a mirage.
Just so for those confused by their ideas
The unappealing is considered fair.¹⁴⁰

O Druma, though it has no true nature,
Within a spotless mirror
Reflections may still appear –
You should understand phenomena thus.¹⁴¹

So as this scriptural quote makes clear, even though a true nature has not arisen, material forms and so forth are perceptible objects to worldly people, while the son of a barren woman is not, and your argument is therefore inconclusive.

We are not affected by this argument; we do not assert that forms and so forth are inherently produced on the conventional level whilst refuting them ultimately. How so? Since just as

A barren woman’s son cannot in fact be born
By worldly standards or in true reality.
It is the same with anything, they don’t occur
As true things in reality nor in the world. (6.111)

This being the case,

The Teacher thus proclaimed that all phenomena
Are peace from the beginning, free from any birth,
Complete transcendence¹⁴² of a nature that is real,
Which means that there is never any birth of things. (6.112)

And seeing as we have such scriptural statements, this means that there is never any production taking place. As a scripture states:

When turning the Wheel of Dharma
You teach that all phenomena
Are primordial peace free from arising,
The transcendence of any real nature.¹⁴³

Since they are the object of serene wisdom, all phenomena are peace. And why are they the object of serene wisdom? The statement, free from arising, supplies the reason: it is because they are unarisen. Since they are unarisen, they are the object of serene wisdom. Why are they unarisen? As stated, there is utter transcendence of any real nature. If something has an inherent existent nature and this then were to arise, that nature would not then be existing, and what is there then that arises? Thus it is taught that there cannot at any point be arising: what did not occur before cannot then occur later, and what occurs later cannot then transform again. So what then is there? The utter transcendence of any real nature. The word primordial is used to show that it is not the case that these are only unarisen in relation to yogic wisdom. What is then being shown? That also prior to that, in the context of worldly conventions, these are in and of themselves unarisen. Primordial is a synonym for at the start, and should be understood to apply to the context of worldly conventional reality. And thus it was that the bodhisattva noble Sarvanivaraṇa Viṣkambhin gave praise to the Illustrious One expressing his excellent qualities with the words, ‘When turning the Wheel of Dharma you teach that all phenomena ….’

Those belonging to our own side do not in fact object to this. How so? Because they accept that

Though pots and such aren’t there in true reality,
The world’s consensus is that they in fact exist.
For all phenomena this is the case, which means
It doesn’t follow they’re like barren women’s sons. (6.113)

Some think that, ‘When the bases for the imputation exist – earth, water, fire, wind, form, smell, taste and texture – a jar can be imputed with good reason, it is well-founded. But if it is the case that everything is nothing but imputation, and a basis for the imputation does not have any substantial existence, it cannot be denied that it becomes equivalent to the case of the son of a barren woman.’

This is unsound, because the basis for imputation cannot possibly be substantially established. As stated:

Apart from form and so forth
A pot cannot exist,
And apart from wind and so forth
Form can likewise not exist.¹⁴⁴

Similarly:

Earth, water, fire and wind do not
Inherently exist by themselves.
Without three, one cannot be.
Without one, there cannot be three.

If without three each cannot be,
And without one three cannot be,
Then each exists not by itself,
And how to then form a composite?¹⁴⁵

Just as you wouldn’t grant that the impermanent could arise from the permanent, it is unsound that something lacking substantial existence could come from something having substantial existence. As stated:

How can impermanent things
Come from what is permanent?
A cause and effect that are incompatible
Can never be observed.¹⁴⁶

Thus, based on a collection of imputedly existent things such as a face, one will observe an imputed reflection in a mirror. Based on imputed constituent parts such as pillars and so forth, one imputes a house. A forest is similarly a conceptual designation based on trees. Just as one in dreams may experience sprouts, that are by nature uncreated, being created from seeds that are also by nature uncreated, it makes sense that all imputedly existent things, being imputations, may serve as supports for imputedly existent things. As stated:

Through mastery of magical emanation
…
Are like the city of gandharvas,
Similar to dreams and mirages.
This is therefore not a topic of dispute.¹⁴⁷

Now they say, ‘If production from self, other, both and uncaused is refuted on both levels, how can one then ascertain that such things as ignorance, formations and seeds give rise to consciousness, sprouts and so forth conventionally?’

To explain:

And so, since things do not arise uncaused,
Are not the work of an almighty god,
Nor are produced from self, other, or both,
They are interdependently brought forth. (6.114)

As has been explained, the arising of things does not happen just naturally by itself; nor does it happen through such things as a creator god, time, particles, primordial nature (prakṛti), souls (puruṣa), Nārāyaṇa¹⁴⁸ and so forth; nor is there production from self, other or both. And therefore it is simply the case that, in dependence on that, this arises; which ensures that worldly conventions are not violated. As the Illustrious One has stated:

The hallmark of phenomena is this: If this is present, that will happen. If this has arisen, that will arise. And so, confusion leads to formations …¹⁴⁹

Similarly,

When there is this, there is that,
Like short exists when there is long.
When this takes place, that occurs,
Like light emerging from a lamp.¹⁵⁰

And from the Treatise as well, where it teaches that it is simply like this:

An agent depends on there being an act,
And the act again depends on the agent.
Apart from this we see no other way
To demonstrate what these are.

And assimilation should thus be understood,
As act and agent is then excluded.
Through the case of agent and action
All remaining things can be made clear.¹⁵¹

This explanation of interdependence as a mere conditionality, not only renders implausible any kind of conceptual notion of production that is uncaused and so forth, but also any other sort of idea: the dualities of eternalism and nihilism, permanence and impermanence, existent things and non-existent things and so forth become impossible. To express this:

And as all things arise interdependently
These theories will not withstand analysis.
Submitted to interdependence’s arguments
All complex nets of faulty views are ripped to shreds. (6.115)

Since it is only through the reasoning which states, ‘based on this, that arises,’ that relative entities can be found to have an existent identity (svātmabhāva) and not through any other, the view presented here – arguing for a mere conditionality of dependent arising – tears up the entire net of faulty views. By positing such mere conditionality as dependent arising, one cannot accept that entities have any inherent nature whatsoever. As stated:

Something arising based on this and that
Hasn’t come into being in and of itself.
How then can that which has no self-becoming
Be seen as something that has come into being?¹⁵²

Similarly,

Interdependent arising itself
Is called emptiness.
This, itself being an imputation,
Conveys the middle way.¹⁵³

And from the sutras:

What is born conditionally is unborn,
Having no inherent being of its own.
Depending on conditions they are said to be empty –
He who understands emptiness is heedful.¹⁵⁴

With an inherent nature impermissible, how can any of these aforementioned explanations then be maintained in its absence? If there were any kind of inherent nature, other concepts of production would be permissible: things coming about of their own accord, from self, other, both, a creator god, or the like; and following that, once things have arisen, concepts of them remaining permanently, ending in destruction, or the like. But not otherwise. To express this:

Such theories are relevant if things exist,
But now it has been shown how things cannot exist.
Without existents such ideas can’t be maintained,
Just like a fire won’t keep burning without fuel. (6.116)

The arguments presented have left absolutely no room for an existent entity. For this reason the yogis who have actualised the noble path and see reality through non-seeing, do not observe even the slightest existent phenomenon. Also, any ideas of form and sensation, virtue and non-virtue, things and non-things and so forth, entertained since time without beginning, are prevented. To illustrate: for someone suffering from cataracts, applying eye-ointment has the effect of counteracting such mistaken ideas as seeing hairs, although there is no actual change in the nature of those hairs.

Thus,

While ordinary men are trapped by theories,
By not pursuing concepts yogis are set free.
The wise have said that it’s analysis which will
Alleviate one of conceptual ideas. (6.117)

Since it is only the conceptual ideas that trap ordinary beings who are ignorant of this reality of things, yogis are liberated when realising this reality. For this reason the master, as explained in the Middle Way Treatise, clearly sets forth that the result of analysis is the reversal of each and every conceptual idea. As stated:

If things were inherently existent,
What would be the benefit in seeing emptiness?
Conceptual seeing is that which binds us,
And that which is refuted here.¹⁵⁵

And therefore,

He did not for the love of quarrelling present
The treatise’s explorations, but to liberate.

Thus, when the master gave the extensive presentations of reasoning in the Middle Way Treatise, he did not do so for the love of dispute, meaning that he didn’t present them in order to triumph over opponents. He presented these analyses so that beings could be liberated, thinking how excellent it would be if by presenting the reality of things through the Middle Way Treatise sentient beings could come to an unmistaken realisation of this reality and thereby reach liberation.

‘But haven’t you been systematically reiterating all these ideas held by your opponents and then proved them wrong? When using the treatise in this argumentative way, how can you propose that its purpose isn’t precisely the refutation of ideas?’

Let me explain. Although these analyses were not carried out for the purposes of dispute, the systems of our opponents being feeble will not be able to hold up in the face of a presentation of actual reality; they crumble just like darkness in the presence of light. So the fault lies not with us. To express this:

One can’t be blamed if one’s opponents’ theories
Are shattered when unravelling reality. (6.118)

As stated:

Although the tathāgatas did not teach
This dharma for the sake of dispute,
It will incinerate opposing arguments
Like fire consumes its fuel.¹⁵⁶

If this wasn’t the case, and this dharma was taught for the sake of argumentation, one would definitely develop aversion for the faulty positions of any opponents, end up cherishing the rational approach of one’s own side, and there wouldn’t be any reversal of conceptual ideas. How so? As,

To be too fond of one’s own view, and hostile to
The views of others, this is still conceptual.

Failing to reverse conceptual ideas results in bondage, not liberation. But when this dharma isn’t used for the sake of dispute:

But when desire and aversion are dispelled,
Analysis will bring one swift deliverance. (6.119)

As stated:

Great beings are not partial,
Do not engage in arguments.
How can there be opposing views
For those who are impartial?¹⁵⁷

Similarly,

Attached to your own position,
And disliking the position of others,
You will not reach transcendence.
Dualism does not bring peace.¹⁵⁸

And from a sutra:

If attachment develops when learning the Dharma
And dislike stirs when hearing non-Dharma,
Pride and conceit become one’s downfall –
Pride is a catalyst that furthers suffering.¹⁵⁹

The selflessness of phenomena having thus been demonstrated through scripture and reasoning, there now follows a presentation of the selflessness of the person:

They see how all afflictions and all faults
Come from the the view of an identity.
And realising its object as the self,
The yogi goes on to refute this self. (6.120)

The view of identity¹⁶⁰ is to have an afflicted investigative mind that works in terms of the thoughts ‘I’ and ‘mine.’ They originate with it, meaning that the identity view is what brings them about. And what are they? The afflictions and the faults. Afflictions refer to desire and so forth. Faults refer to birth, ageing, sickness, death, grief and so forth. Every last one of these stems from the view of identity. The sutras state that all afflictions:

… have their root in the view of identity, have their cause in the view of identity, originate with the identity view.¹⁶¹

When it states that they have their cause in the view of identity, this means that the view of identity is the cause for all of them, since mental formations will continue to be created and the suffering of birth and so forth will continue to manifest for those who have not given up the view of identity. Its reference point is the self, since self-clinging has a self as its object. So when desiring to get rid of each and every affliction and fault, it is actually the view of identity that should be abandoned; and that again is removed when having understood the selflessness of the self, which is why the yogi will first refute the self. With that refuted the view of identity too is discarded, which in turn fully counteracts afflictions and faults. Analysis of the self is therefore a means to accomplish liberation. Hence, at the very beginning yogis start by analysing the self, asking: ‘What is this so-called self, the reference point for the view of identity?’

One may then ask, ‘What is this self, the reference point for the view of identity? This we do not know.’

To take one such case:

Misguided ones belive the self consumes and lasts,
Is uncreative, and lacks features or pursuits.
The differences between the schools of Tīrthikas
Are based on minor variations on this theme. (6.121)

As the Sāṃkhyas say:

Primordial nature is uncreated.
The seven – the great principle, etc – are both created and creative.¹⁶²
The sixteen¹⁶³ are just created.
Soul is neither created nor creative.¹⁶⁴

The primordial nature (or primordial creator; prakṛti)¹⁶⁵ is so called because it has creative potential (prakaraṇa). In what situation is it creative? When seeing the desire of a soul (puruṣa).¹⁶⁶ When a soul gives rise to desire to enjoy objects such as sound, being aware of the soul’s desire, nature joins with the soul leading to the production of sound and so forth. The order in which this takes place is in the following:

From the primordial nature comes the great principle (mahat),¹⁶⁷ from which comes the ego (ahaṃkara), and from this again the group of sixteen. Among the sixteen, the five elements come from the five, meaning that sound and so forth give rise to the elements.¹⁶⁸

That it is uncreated implies that it has creative potential, but is not itself created in the way that the great principle is. The great principle and so forth have creative potential as well as being created manifestations, which is why it is stated that the seven – the great principle, etc – are both created and creative; the great principle and the others are creators from the point of view of their own creations, and they are created from the point of view of the primordial nature. The sixteen that consist of the mind faculty and so forth are only creations, which is why it says that the sixteen are created. The word just (tu) makes it clear that they are exclusively creations. When it comes to souls, the phrase soul is neither created nor creative, is saying that it does not have creative potential nor is a created manifestation.

This being the order in which all types of manifest creations happen, something should be said about how the soul becomes a consumer as it gives rise to desire. This happens when, governed by the understanding mind the mental faculties of the ear and so forth focus on the apprehended object, such as sound, making the soul aware of the mentally grasped object. Since it is therefore in the soul’s nature to entertain this mental awareness, it is said that ‘the self enjoys the objects.’ Desire hence leads to the passionate consumption of objects, but when passion is diminished and the soul becomes free from the desire for objects, a gradual development of meditative absorptions can take place leading to the adoption of divine sensory powers. With that one comes to see the reality of things through divine sight, and on observing this gives rise to a sense of shame, similar to that felt by an adulteress; and with no further incitement towards the self there is then release. A step by step reversal of all the groups of manifest creations leads to pleace without any further appearances, at which point the soul is left in its solitary state, and this is what is called liberation.

It is permanent in the sense that, although temporarily crippled by manifest creations, it always remains uncrippled in its original and isolated stated. While the primordial nature is an active creator, and among the manifest creations some are also active creators, the self is a non-creator in the sense of being a disinterested spectator to activities. The way in which it is an enjoyer has already been explained above. It is without properties (guṇa) since it is not of the nature of rajas, tamas and sattva.¹⁶⁹ Since pervasiveness does not involve activity, it is inactive. These are the characteristics of the soul (puruṣa).

It was mentioned that, ‘while the primordial nature is an active creator, and among the manifest creations some are also active creators…;’ so which of the manifest creations are active creators and which are not? We will go into some detail to explain this matter.

Rajas, tamas and sattva are the three properties. Rajas is characterised by movement and involvement, tamas by heaviness and darkness, and sattva by lightness and clarity. They are synonymous with happiness, suffering and confusion. In the primary principle (pradhāna) these are in perfect equilibrium, their qualities in their original form cancelling each other out. The primordial nature (prakṛti) is the state when these have not yet manifestly evolved.

As was said, ‘from the primordial nature comes the great principle (mahat),’ a synonym for intelligence (buddhi). From the great principle comes the ego (ahaṃkara), which has three forms: changeable (vikāra[?]), luminous (sāttvika) and dark (tāmasika). From the changeable ego come the five subtle elements (tanmātra): form, sound, smell, taste and texture. From the subtle elements come the major elements: earth, water, fire, wind and ether. From the luminous ego come the five motor organs (voice, hands, legs, anus and genitals) and five mental organs (eyes, ears, nose, tongue and skin), which together with mind, which has both characteristics, makes eleven. The dark ego is involved in both other types of ego. The great principle, the ego and the five subtle elements are creators and creations, while the ten faculties, mind and major elements are only creations. The primordial nature is uncreated. This is what the scripture states.

The different systems of the misguided (tīrthika) are similar to that propounded by the Sāṃkhyas with minor variations. The Vaiśeṣikas say that the self has nine principles: intelligence, pleasure, pain, desire, anger, effort, righteousness (dharma), non-righteousness (adharma) and creative force. Intelligence is what apprehends objects. Pleasure is the experience of desired objects. Pain it its opposite. Attachment is to be drawn towards desirable things. Aversion is to feel opposed to undesirable objects. Effort is to have the adroitness to bring one’s goals to completion. Righteousness is what brings higher states and the excellent goal. Non-righteousness is the opposite. Creative force is what thinking leads to, and is the cause of thinking.

As long as these nine principles of the self remain present in the self, one will keep engaging in their related virtuous and non-virtuous activities, thus perpetuating cyclic existence. When the soul, through discriminative insight, manages to sever the principles of intelligence and so forth at the root, it will remain in its own true state and become liberated.

The self is also described as permanent, a creator, a consumer, endowed with properties and, since it is pervasive, inactive. There are some who hold that it is active due to the fact that it contracts and expands. The Vedavādins assert for instance that it is like the space inhabiting jars: a difference in bodies makes what is singular manifold.

The differences between the systems of misguided schools are hence based on minor variations in how the self is specified to be.

Concerning this self that is talked about in the various scriptural traditions of the misguided:

Since it is unborn, like a barren woman’s son,
There cannot be a self like that of which you speak,
It cannot be the basis for the sense of self –
As even relative that would not be allowed. (6.122)

This is because it would contradict their own inferential logic. Since it is unborn, just like the son of a barren woman, a self such as they present it, cannot exist. And, being unborn, it can also not be the reference for the ego (ahaṃkara). One should see that, not only is it unreasonable for it to exist and be the reference for ego in actual reality, but also relatively it doesn’t have these two traits.

And not only does it not make sense that it is something existent and supports the ego, also

And since its qualities that one may find described
Within the various scriptures of the Tīrthikas
Are contradicted when they argue it’s unborn,
These features will amount to nothing in the end. (6.123)

According to the scriptures of the Sāṃkhyas, the self is characterised as being permanent, a non-creator, a consumer, without features and inactive. But this self can’t be permanent, can’t be a non-creator and so forth, and can’t be inactive because – as they themselves say – it is unborn, just as the son of a barren woman. This will apply equally against the tradition of the Vaiśeṣikas, using the same line of reasoning, ‘The self can’t be permanent, can’t be a non-creator…,’ and so forth. This position can in fact be used against any proponent of self, using the argument of it being unborn and the example of the barren woman’s son to expose the thing itself and its features.

This being the case,

There is therefore no self distinct from aggregates,

There is therefore no self that exists as something separate from the aggregates, since apart from the them no self can be perceived. If it did exist as something separate from the aggregates, it would be something that could be established on its own, but this is not the case. Hence, no self exists that is distinct from the aggregates,

Since it can’t be perceived without the aggregates.

As stated:

It is not possible for there to be a self
That is different from the assimilated.
If separate it should be perceived also without
The assimilated, yet it is not.¹⁷⁰

Likewise,

If it was different from the aggregates,
It would not have the aggregates’ characteristics.¹⁷¹

Not only is a self that is different from the aggregates non-existent; also

Since they know no such thing and still think there’s a self,
The worldly wouldn’t claim the ego is thus based. (6.124)

Even those who do not identify the self in these particular ways will still due to their habitual clinging have notions of ‘I’ and ‘mine,’ and thus believe in a self. It is therefore not viable that there is a self distinct from the aggregates that forms the support for the ego.

They may then think, ‘Even though they do not at present think of it in terms of being permanent, unproduced and so forth, from past familiarity they still have the view that it is the ego’s reference point.’

That is not so. It is not the case that only those who have a familiarity with the scriptures of these individuals believe in a self.

One may observe that there are those without such prior familiarity, who still maintain a sense of ego in this life have, such as:

Through aeons born among for instance animals,
They would not think it unproduced and permanent.
Yet still they would be harbouring a sense of self.
There is therefore no self distinct from aggregates. (6.125)

Beings that have not left the animal states for an untold number of aeons, will not during that time have considered there to be a self that has these features. The words for instance (api) are meant to include hell beings and so forth. Having observed that those who haven’t been exposed to a self that that havs these features, still have a sense of ego, what rational individual would then insist that such a self, forming the basis for a sense of ego, exists? There cannot therefore be a self that is distinct from the aggregates.

There are some belonging to our own side who say:

Some say no self is found distinct from aggregates,
The reference for self-view is thus the aggregates.

The reasonings presented have shown that no self can be found separate from the aggregates. There is therefore no self that is distinct from the aggregates, and the aggregates are hence the only reference for the view of identity. This is why it is said that the self is merely the aggregates alone. This is the position held by the noble Saṃmitīya school¹⁷² , who belong to our own tradition.

Among them,

While some insist all five support the view of self,
Some others will insist it is the mind alone. (6.126)

For some it is the five aggregates (form, feeling, perception, formations and consciousness) which serve as the reference for the view of identity, and maintain that it is in connection with them that this conception of selfhood occurs. As is stated:

The Illustrious One said: O mendicants, those ascetics and brahmins who perceive things in terms of ‘I’, are in fact only perceiving the five assimilated aggregates.¹⁷³

They therefore say that it was in order to clarify the statement, ‘The view you have is in relation to a collection (kāya) that is by nature perishing (√sad-), and not in relation to an I or a mine,’¹⁷⁴ that he expressed the view (dṛṣṭi) that insists on I and mine as being the view of identity (satkāyadṛṣṭi).¹⁷⁵

Others claim that the self is in the mind, and refer to verses such as the following, where the mind is spoken of as the self:

Oneself is one’s own protector.
Who else can protect one?
The wise attain the higher realms
By properly taming the self.¹⁷⁶

How do they support this? By saying that there is no self apart from the aggregates, and that other sutra statements talk of taming the mind:

To tame the mind is excellent.
Taming the mind brings happiness.¹⁷⁷

The mind being the basis of the ego, is thus labeled the self.

To reply to this:

The aggregates are multiple, so if they are
The self, the consequence would be a lot of selves.
The self is then a substance, and can be observed,
And what you can engage is not a fallacy. (6.127)

To hold the position that the aggregates are the self will mean that the self is manifold because the aggregates are manifold. And if it was the case that mind is the self, one could distinguish between eye-consciousness and so forth, or between the different moments of consciousness appearing and disappearing, and the self would also then be multiple. Fault like this must be mentioned if one is to follow reason. What the faults will be, is in this way explained to those who profess the self to be the aggregates or the consciousness, and other faults that befall them are mentioned in relation to each of these positions. A scriptural source states that, ‘With birth in the world, only a single individual is born,’¹⁷⁸ which means that the self is not held to be multiple.

Concerning the statement the self would be substantial, since the concept of aggregate is used in relation to substances of form and so forth distinguished in terms of the past and so forth, and it is only in relation to these that the convention self is used, the self too would be a substance. And that is not the intent of the following statements:

Mendicants, these five are mere names, mere conventions, mere designations. Which five? The past, the future, space, transcendence and the individual.¹⁷⁹

And:

As with a gathering of parts
One may speak of a chariot,
Contingent on the aggregates
Convention grants a sentient being.¹⁸⁰

Since it follows that the self would be substantial, the aggregates cannot therefore be the self.

Also, since the view of identity would be based in something substantial, not being mistaken it would be equal to conceptions such as blue or yellow. To give up the view of identity would not then an abandonment of the origin, but would simply be like letting go of an attraction towards an object, such as visual impressions of blue, yellow and so forth.

Also,

Nirvana would be the destruction of the self.
Before, it would arise and vanish all the time.
Without an agent the result would not exist.
Distinct are culprit and experiencing side. (6.128)

If the self were made up of the aggregates, when one reaches nirvana and the aggregates are discontinued, the self would be annihilated. Such a belief in annihilation would be a nihilistic view, since according to yourself it constitutes an extremist view to think that there is permanence or annihilation in relation to any idea of selfhood involved in the ‘I’- and ‘mine’-based view of self. One cannot therefore accept that the self is discontinued at the time of nirvana, since that would constitute an extremist view. Hence, the self cannot be made up of the aggregates.

Just as prior to entering nirvana, the aggregates arise and vanish every instant, the self too would be arising and vanishing, since the self is made up of the aggregates. And just as one couldn’t then say, ‘This body of mine came into being,’ the statement, ‘At that point, at that time, I was a king named Māndātṛ,’ would not have been made, because the self, just like the body, would have been destroyed, and it would be accepted that it was another that was born at present. As the Treatise states:

The assimilated, which arises
And ceases to be, is not the self.
How indeed could the assimilated
Become the that which assimilates.¹⁸¹

Likewise,

If the self were the aggregates,
It would be appearing and disappearing.¹⁸²

And if it keeps appearing and disappearing, an agent self does not exist, which means it cannot have a relationship to a result. If the act by which it comes into being is impermanent, the agent then no longer existing, having nothing to support it the act as well will not exist. There will then be no viable relationship between actions and their results.

If the result of karma produced in a prior moment were experienced in subsequent moments, the result of karma accumulated by one would be experienced by another, which is why it says, the culprit and the experiencer would be other. What has been done can then disappear, and there can be consequences from what one has not done. The Treatise states:

If it were different, even in the absence
Of that it could then still be present.
And what was would likewise then remain,
It could now be born without having died.

Karmas would disappear, be annihilated,
And the consequence of acts carried out by one
Could be experienced by another.
These and other faults would follow.¹⁸³

It does not therefore make sense that the aggregates can be the self.

They might then say: ‘Although the former and latter moments are indeed different, they form a single continuum and we are therefore not at fault.’

To reply:

‘It’s really one continuum, thus we’re not at fault;’
The problems with continua were shown before.

This was treated when it was said, things related respectively to Maitreya and Upagupta…¹⁸⁴ And as stated:

If being a human is different from a god,
That would mean impermanence.
If being a human is different from a god,
A continuity becomes untenable.¹⁸⁵

Thus, since it does not make sense that things that are mutually distinct can be included within a single continuum, this consequence cannot be avoided.

To express that neither the aggregates nor the mind can therefore be the self, it was said:

The aggregates or mind as self thus makes not sense,

The foregoing discussion of unwanted consequences is not the only thing that shows how untenable it is for the aggregates or the mind to be the self. In addition:

The world as finite and so forth was not endorsed. (6.129)

Since it was not mentioned whether there is an end to the world and so forth, it does not make sense to say that the aggregates or the mind is the self. The fourteen indeterminable issues are mentioned by all schools:

‘The world is eternal’ or ‘the world is not eternal;’ or ‘the world is both eternal and not eternal’ or ‘the world is neither eternal nor not eternal…;’¹⁸⁶

Since the Illustrious One said that no reply could be given to these, they are classified as indeterminable issues (avyākṛtamūla).

These were hence dismissed, and if a mendicant upholds the idea that the world is eternal, the scriptures of the Pūrvaśaila school state that, ‘The one who upholds the view that the world is eternal is subject to expulsion. The one who upholds the view that the world is not eternal is subject to expulsion. The one who upholds the view that the world is both eternal and not eternal is subject to expulsion. The one who upholds the view that the world is neither eternal nor not eternal is subject to expulsion;’ and that one should not associate with them.¹⁸⁷

There are thus said to be fourteen indeterminable issues. And if you take the word world to mean the aggregates, since the aggregates arise and cease and are therefore impermanent, one would in effect determine that the world is not eternal. And by saying that the aggregates are not present subsequent to nirvana, one is determining that the world is finite. One would similarly have determined that the Tathāgata does not exist after death. But since the statements saying that the world is finite and so forth were dismissed, it is thus unreasonable that the aggregates themselves can be the self.

Also,

For you, when yogis understand the lack of self,
All things would then lose their existence certainly.

If the aggregates or the mind were the self, when the yogi ponders the truth and understands the truth of suffering in terms of non-self – that ‘all phenomena are selfless’ – then it would be seeing the lack of aggregates that would be seeing the lack of self, which is not what you assert. The aggregates cannot therefore be the self.

One might contend, ‘When the term self is used in the context of the relationship between the act and its result, it can only be referring to the aggregates as there is nothing else that can be the self. But when seeing the lack of self, it is the soul (puruṣa), the inner experiencer (antaḥkaraṇa) imagined by non-buddhists, that is being referred to. Thus, when seeing selflessness one is just seeing the idea of a lack of this inner soul, and it does not follow that one is seeing the lack of all things.’

To reply:

If it is an eternal self that is dismissed,
Then neither mind nor aggregates can be the self. (6.130)

If you worry that the consequence will be that there are then no existent things, and so seize on the idea that the term self refers to a permanent self, no longer thinking that it is the aggregates or the mind that are the self, then you have deserted your own position.

One might then think, ‘I do not agree that that is what it is referring in that context, and therefore I am not at fault.’

Well, this too will not suffice. How can you just be adopting whatever unreasonable position that you like, saying that in that particular case it is the inner soul that is the self, and otherwise it is the aggregates? If you say it is because it just can’t be, it has also already been shown that it is impossible that it can be referring to the aggregates. Hence, if you do not accept that in the context of the thought, ‘all phenomena are selfless,’ the term self refers to the aggregates, you cannot claim that it does so elsewhere. If you claim that it does refer to the aggregates elsewhere, then you will have to say it does in this context too.

Also,

For you the yogi seeing selflessness would not
Then realise the reality of form and such.
Not having seen its nature, when perceiving form
They’re caught by it, creating passion and so forth. (6.131)

Someone who has not savoured the nectar found in the centre of the flower cannot gain an experience of it merely by saying that there is a cuckoo upon the flower. And once its flavour is known, the experience will not go away, and one cannot rid oneself of the accompanying clinging, just by saying there’s no cuckoo upon flower.

It’s the same in this case. If a yogi sees that phenomena like forms and so forth lack a permanent self but does not come to understand their nature, what will he have gained? And, although by perceiving the nature of forms and so forth the attachment to such perceptions are relinquished, what effect will that have on the non-existent self? Nobody who understands its lack of existence and abandons attachment to these objects is doing this so that it may experience pleasure, thinking, ‘May the inner soul be happy!’; or, worrying that it will suffer, avoids those things that are uncomfortable to it. Since perception of form leads to this involvement, attachment and so forth will be the outcome. And since coming to understand its nature will not lead to the destruction of attachment and so forth, this approach may be considered equal to that of non-Buddhist schools.

One might think, ‘We accept the validity of the scriptures, and will not be harmed by these logical measures. And the scriptures do state that the aggregates constitute the self:

O mendicants, those ascetics and brahmins who perceive things in terms of ‘I’, are in fact only perceiving the five assimilated aggregates.¹⁸⁸

‘And so, this is the case here too.’

That aggregates are self, you base this claim upon
The Teacher’s statement that, ‘The aggregates are self.’
But this refutes a self distinct from aggregates,
As other sutras state that form is not the self. (6.132)

This sutra where it is recognised that, ‘The aggregates are the self,’ is not in fact saying that the aggregates constitute the self. What does it then say? The intent of the Illustrious One was to indicate that there is no self whatsoever separate from the aggregates, in order to refute the scriptures of the misguided using the relative truth, and to clarify what is the unmistaken relative truth. If you ask how one can be certain that this is a refutation of a self that is distinct from the aggregates, the reason is that other sutras refute the idea that form and so forth constitute the self.

‘How so?’

That neither form nor feeling constitute the self,
Nor do perception, formations, or consciousness,
Has been proclaimed in various other sutra quotes.
In brief, that aggregates are self is not affirmed. (6.133)

It is therefore certain that when this sutra states, ‘[when they] regard these five assimilated aggregates as the self…,’¹⁸⁹ it is in fact refuting that there is a self that is something other than the aggregates. While instances when form and so forth constituting a self is refuted, should be taken to express a refutation of the self that is the object of the view of identity, as dependently imputed in relation to the assimilated aggregates, since these are contexts where one is considering the actual reality of things. And it makes sense that one will be freed from attachment to form and so forth since, ‘When the assimilator is not observed, what it assimilates will likewise not be present.’ As this is what is stated in other sutras, the previous sutra quote is not therefore claiming that the aggregates are the self.

Also, although this sutra statement is phrased as an affirmation, it wouldn’t serve to indicate that the aggregates constitute the self. And why? As,

When saying it’s the aggregates that are the self,
It’s their collection, not the aggregates themselves.

For example, when saying that the trees make up the forest, it is the collection of trees that are a forest. It is not the trees themselves, since it would then follow that the forest is present in each individual tree. Likewise, it is the collection of the aggregates that make up the self.

And since a collection isn’t actually anything whatsoever:

But this does not exist, and so it cannot be –
Can’t be protector, cannot tame, nor serve as judge. (6.134)

The Illustrious One spoke of a protector and a judge in the statement:

Oneself is one’s own protector.
Oneself is one’s own enemy.
Oneself is one’s own judge
Of one’s good and bad deeds.¹⁹⁰

And of a tamer in the statement:

The wise attain the higher realms
By properly taming their self.¹⁹¹

A collection however, not being something substantially existent, cannot logically be a protector, a tamer, or a judge, and the collection is therefore not the self.

One may think, ‘Because the collection is not anything apart from the collected parts, one identifies the result as the collection of parts. It is hence permissible to speak of a protector, a tamer and a judge.’

This cannot be, since the problems with that have already been explained. And also,

A chariot would be the presence of its parts.
As with a chariot, the same goes for the self.

From a sutra:

‘A self’, you say, O demon mind;
A fancy you thus entertain.
It’s void this heap, of factors formed.
There is no being present here.

As with a gathering of parts
One may speak of a chariot,
Contingent on the aggregates
Convention grants a sentient being.¹⁹²

Thus,

‘Contingent on the aggregates,’ the sutra states.
The self is thus not just the aggregates combined. (6.135)

Something that is contingently imputed cannot be reduced to the assembly of its perceived parts, because a dependent labelling is taking place, just as when elements combine to form a product. Although things may be produced from the elements and receive labels such as blue and so forth, or eye and so forth, these two types of phenomena are not just the mere assembly of the elements. Similarly, although the self has the characteristic of being an imputation made in relation to the aggregates, that it is just the assembly of the aggregates does not suffice.

One might object, ‘That is inconclusive owing to things such as pots.’

No it isn’t, since one cannot prove that such things as pots are reducible to the gathering of form and so forth, and because of similar criticisms.¹⁹³

One could ask, ‘If the mere collection of wheels and so forth is not the chariot, then what is?’ And it might then be supposed that only when the wheels and so forth assume a certain shape does the term chariot become applicable. And likewise, that the self is just the arrangement of form and so forth.

But that is not so. And why?

‘It is the shape,’ you say, but shape belongs to form.
So though you say it’s these that constitute the self,
The mental groups cannot then be what this self is

And why is that?

Due to the fact that these cannot assume a shape. (6.136)

Meaning that this is so because they have no physical form.

Furthermore,

It makes no sense that grasped and grasper are the same,

Why?

Since act and actor then would be identical.

The grasper means the one who assimilates by performing the grasping, while the act is the assimilation that takes place when something is grasped. And here, the grasper is a reference to the self, while the grasped refers to the five aggregates. If the self is the mere collection of form and so forth, then the grasper and the act are identical. But this would not be acceptable, since it would then follow that the elements and the material components they make up, and the pot and the potter, are identical. As stated:

If fuel were the fire,
Act and actor are identical.¹⁹⁴

And,

The fire and the fuel thus fully clarify
All such relationships,
The self and what is assimilated, along with things
Like earthen pots, woollen cloths and such.¹⁹⁵

Here it is saying that, just as fire and fuel cannot be claimed to be identical, this claim does not hold for the self and the assimilated either.

One might think, ‘There is no existent assimilator doing the acting, there is nothing more than the mere collection of the assimilated.’
But to explain how this is unreasonable:

‘There is no actor, just the act,’ you might then think.
But no, since without actor there can be no act. (6.137)

Thus it can’t be like that: if one does not accept an actor, the act which is then unfounded cannot be accepted. As the Treatise states:

And assimilation should thus be understood,
As act and agent is then excluded.
Through the case of agent and action
All remaining things can be made clear.¹⁹⁶

Here, the verb root has been combined with the lyuṭ-suffix¹⁹⁷ , making upādāna, with reference to the act of assimilation. But since a verb root cannot occur isolated from its function, the way it functions implies that which is assimilated and the assimilator; since in the word in question, assimilation (upādāna), the verb has been supplied with a lyuṭ-suffix, by the rule which states, ‘kṛt and lyuṭ are inclusive,’¹⁹⁸ it is also expressive of that which is assimilated.

Thus, just as it is in relation to an actor that the acted is designated, and in relation to the acted that an actor is designated, the assimilator is similarly designated in relation to the assimilated, and the assimilated in relation to the assimilator. It states:

So it is neither distinct from the assimilated,
Nor the same as the assimilated.
There is no self without the assimilated,
Still one can’t conclude that it does not exist.¹⁹⁹

This is saying that there cannot be an act in the absence of an actor. And when it is stated that, ‘Though the actor is not apprehended, the act still exists, as does its result,’²⁰⁰ this is meant to refute an inherently existent actor. It is not to be understood as saying that conventional norms of what is dependently designated should be discarded. As stated:

A person affected by ignorance generates meritorious formations…²⁰¹

Also,

The Sage states that the self is recognised
With reference to earth, water, fire, wind,
To consciousness and space – six elements –
And six supports of contact, such as eyes; (6.138)

And is assumed from mind and mental states.
And it is therefore these though not the same,
Nor just the mere collection they make up.
One cannot find the sense of self in these. (6.139)

From the sutras:

O Great King. The person, the individual, is the six elements, the six fields of contact and the eighteen movements of the mind.²⁰²

The six elements are earth, water, fire, wind, consciousness and space, and it is in relation to these that the self is imputed. The six supports of contact, such as eyes, refer to the sense field of visual perception and so forth, up to the sense field of mental perception, and it is in relation to these that the self is imputed.

The eighteen movements of the mind refers to the six ways the mind can be pleasantly involved with visual, audible, olfactory, palatable, tactile, or mental objects, the ways it can be unpleasantly involved with these, and the ways it can have a neutral involvement with these; and in relation to these, and assumed from the mind and mental states, the self is imputed.

Since it is stated that, ‘the self is imputed in relation to the elements and so forth,’ it here states, it is these though not the same, meaning that it is not anything other nor is it the same. It neither makes sense that is it just the mere collection of these. Since it cannot be that the self is these aforementioned phenomena, it does not stand to reason that the ego mind is found in them. And when the aggregates cannot be the abode of the ego, and is not something other than the aggregates, the ego then has no abode; and the yogi seeing no ‘I’ comes to understand that neither does ‘mine’ have any essence, eliminates every conditioned phenomenon and transcends to the state free from adoption, illustrating how brilliant this analysis is.

If those saying the aggregates, or the mind, are the abodes of the self were right, a sense of self would remain as long the aggregates were present, since they constitute the actual basis for the sense of self. To explain:

That seeing selflessness would shed the lasting self
While not believing it to be ego’s support,
I find it quite astounding then to hear you say
That knowing selflessness uproots the view of self. (6.140)

If the ego is based in a permanent self, and without it the ego is shed, yet you claim the abode of the self to be something other than that, and that only through seeing that something else is lacking that the sense of ego is halted – my goodness! How extraordinary!

To clarify this lack of a relationship through an example:

Like he who finds that there’s a snake within his wall,
Proclaiming it’s no elephant to ease his fright
And to escape the harm the serpent can inflict,
Will surely end up being ridiculed by all. (6.141)

Someone encountering a dangerous situation, but who does not see the danger they’re in and fails to take the appropriate steps to avoid it, thus remaining relaxed and displaying no anxiety, will end up being bitten by the snake. That no elephant is present will not be helpful in removing the danger the snake poses. It is the same when one says that the aggregates or consciousness are the self, as a lack of a permanent self will not then be any help in removing the ego which is based in the aggregates. This cyclic state will certainly not then subside.

Having thus given an exhaustive treatment of these two positions, showing how the self can neither be composed of nor distinct from the aggregates, it is discussed how the self cannot be existent within a relationship of support and supported:

The self is not within the aggregates,
Nor are the aggregates found in the self.
If they were different that could be surmised.
As they’re not different it’s but an idea. (6.142)

If there were a difference it would make sense that things could be a support and a supported, as when saying there is curd in a bowl. The bowl and the curd being different from the worldly point of view, are seen to be in a relationship of support and supported. But since the aggregates are not separate from the self in this manner, and the self is not separate from the aggregates, these two cannot be in a relationship of support and supported.

To indicate how the self cannot be the possessor of the aggregates it was said:

One cannot claim the self possesses form, because
There is no self, so ownership does not apply.
One owns a cow: distinct. One has a body: same.
But form is not the same nor different from the self. (6.143)

That the self could be the same as or different from the aggregates has already been disproved. Possession too is problematic. When saying that Devadatta has a body no difference perceived, while when saying he owns a cow a difference certainly exists. But as there is neither identity nor difference in relation to form and the self, it isn’t possible to say that the self could possess form.

Now, to enumerate the mistaken perceptions and aspects involved in the view of identity by summarising the positions that have been refuted, it is said:

Form’s not the self, the self does not possess the form,
There is no self in form, and form’s not within self –
All aggregates considered in this fourfold way
And added up amount to twenty views of self. (6.144)