Complete text |
Title |
Preface |
Chapter 1: Pramuditā |
Chapter 2: Vimalā |
Chapter 3: Prabhākarī |
Chapter 4: Arciṣmatī |
Chapter 5: Sudurjayā |
Chapter 6: Abhimukhī |
Chapter 7: Dūraṃgamā |
Chapter 8: Acalā |
Chapter 9: Sādhumatī |
Chapter 10: Dharmameghā |
Chapter 11: buddhabhūmi |
How can we be certain of this? As:
If it came from itself there would be nothing gained.
What is produced, produced once more – that makes no sense. (6.8)
It refers to the production, the actor in the act of production, meaning the sprout. From itself means that the production comes from its very own self-identity. Thus, the assertion here is that the sprout’s own identity cannot produce that very sprout’s identity. Why? If that very identity already gained was to come from the same existing identity of that itself, there would be no additional quality achieved at all, since it was existent already.1
To explain how the position of self-production conflicts with reason, it was said, ‘What is produced, produced once more – that makes no sense.’
Immediately following this assertion, logical reasoning is supplied:
To think that what’s produced is then produced again
Would mean that sprouts and such could never be procured.
If one claims that seeds already produced are reproduced, does that imply that its production must stop for the sprout to be produced? What is there to prevent it being produced yet again? The consequence would be that sprouts, stalks, buds and so on would never be produced. Furthermore,
The seed would be produced until the end of time –
… for the very reason already given. If one then thinks, ‘When the conducive conditions such as water, time and so on, are present for the production of a sprout, the seed will transform and the sprout be produced; and since the presence of that agent, the sprout, opposes it, the seed will then be destroyed. Therefore, the mentioned faults do not apply here. And since the seed and the sprout are not really different, it is not the case that it is not produced from self.’ This is untenable, because
How could what will destroy it ever come to be? (6.9)
Since seed and sprout are not really different, it is illogical that the sprout could destroy it – they are thought to be ‘alike in own identity’.
Furthermore,
A sprout distinct in shape, hue, taste, strength, ripening,
And different from its cause, could not exist for you.
Shape refers to being long, round and so on; colour to yellow and so on; taste to sweetness and so on; and potential refers to special powers or particular abilities, such as being a remedy for haemorrhoids which makes haemorrhoids disappear when applied to the body, or the oṣadhi-herb which enables one to travel in the sky by merely holding it. Maturation refers to a substance’s special feature acquired as it transforms, such as the pepper-plant (pippalī) becoming sweet. If the seed and the sprout are indeed indistinct, that which is the identity of seed should likewise be observed without difference as the shape and so forth of the sprout. Since this is not observed, just as seeds from for example garlic, are different from sprouts of for example plantain trees, it is untenable that they are not different.
One may think that, ‘Since it abandons the seed-phase and attains another phase, the seed can turn into a sprout.’ In that case:
Its former likeness left behind as it adopts
Another form, what’s left of its identity? (6.10)
Its entity means the thing itself and not something other. But since with this way of thinking the non-otherness of the sprout would be an impossibility, its non-otherness is impaired. They may think that, ‘Although the shape and so forth of the seed and sprout are different, the substance is the same.’ But that cannot be so. If one does not perceive their shape and so forth, one cannot perceive their substance.
Furthermore,
And if, for you, the seed and sprout are indistinct,
The so-called sprout should like the seed not be observed.
Or, since they are the very same, just as the sprout
They both should then be seen – thus do not make such claims. (6.11)
When the sprout is present the identity of seed cannot be perceived with its own essence, and likewise since it is not distinct from the seed the identity of sprout should just like the identity of seed not be perceived. Alternatively, when the sprout is perceived, being of the very identity of the sprout the seed should likewise be perceived, since it is not anything other than sprout and so forth. Wanting to avoid the faults of these consequences, one should not assert that the seed and the sprout are indistinct.
Having thus refuted production from self imputed in other traditions claiming to understand reality, in order to shown how these ideas are not even tenable when considered in terms of the conventions of worldly people not trained in other traditions, it is said:
It’s when the cause has ceased that its result is seen,
And thus that they’re the same is not the worldly view.
Since it is when the causal seed has disappeared that the resultant sprout is seen, even worldly people do not see seed and sprout as indistinct. If they were the same, then just like the cause one should not be able to see the result, but it is seen. Therefore, it is not the case that they are indistinct.
Since production from self is in conflict with reason for both sides:
So, neither in reality nor in the world
Is this imagined self-production reasonable. (6.12)
For this reason, the master did not make any distinctions, but refuted production overall when saying, ‘Not from self….’ Some say that, ‘Entities are ultimately not produced from self since they exist, like a sentient being,’ but making such a distinction by adding ultimately should be considered utterly meaningless.
Furthermore,
If one accepts self-rising, maker and the made,
As well as act and actor, these would be the same.
They’re not, so self-arising I cannot accept –
The faults entailed have been elaborately explained. (6.13)
As stated:
It would never make sense
That cause and result are identical.
If cause and result were identical,
The produced and the producer would be the same.2
They cannot be identical, since it would follow that father and son, or the eye and consciousness, would be identical. And thus it was stated:
If the wood were the fire,
Doer and act would be the same.3
Thus, fearing these and other unwanted consequences, and wishing to reach an unmistaken realisation of the two truths, one should not hold that things can be produced from self.