Furthermore,

And if, for you, the seed and sprout are indistinct,
The so-called sprout should like the seed not be observed.
Or, since they are the very same, just as the sprout
They both should then be seen – thus do not make such claims. (6.11)

When the sprout is present the identity of seed cannot be perceived with its own essence, and likewise since it is not distinct from the seed the identity of sprout should just like the identity of seed not be perceived. Alternatively, when the sprout is perceived, being of the very identity of the sprout the seed should likewise be perceived, since it is not anything other than sprout and so forth. Wanting to avoid the faults of these consequences, one should not assert that the seed and the sprout are indistinct.

Having thus refuted production from self imputed in other traditions claiming to understand reality, in order to shown how these ideas are not even tenable when considered in terms of the conventions of worldly people not trained in other traditions, it is said:

It’s when the cause has ceased that its result is seen,
And thus that they’re the same is not the worldly view.

Since it is when the causal seed has disappeared that the resultant sprout is seen, even worldly people do not see seed and sprout as indistinct. If they were the same, then just like the cause one should not be able to see the result, but it is seen. Therefore, it is not the case that they are indistinct.

Since production from self is in conflict with reason for both sides:

So, neither in reality nor in the world
Is this imagined self-production reasonable. (6.12)

For this reason, the master did not make any distinctions, but refuted production overall when saying, ‘Not from self….’ Some say that, ‘Entities are ultimately not produced from self since they exist, like a sentient being,’ but making such a distinction by adding ultimately should be considered utterly meaningless.

Furthermore,

If one accepts self-rising, maker and the made,
As well as act and actor, these would be the same.
They’re not, so self-arising I cannot accept –
The faults entailed have been elaborately explained. (6.13)

As stated:

It would never make sense
That cause and result are identical.
If cause and result were identical,
The produced and the producer would be the same.¹

They cannot be identical, since it would follow that father and son, or the eye and consciousness, would be identical. And thus it was stated:

If the wood were the fire,
Doer and act would be the same.²

Thus, fearing these and other unwanted consequences, and wishing to reach an unmistaken realisation of the two truths, one should not hold that things can be produced from self.

‘That entities do not arise from themselves is certainly the case. This position is indeed reasonable. But the words how could it arise from other? do not make sense. Based on the scriptures which state, “The four external conditions are: the causal, the object, the immediately preceding and the dominant; conditions are the creators of entities,” although undesirable, production from other must be upheld.’

Some say: ‘The causal conditions are five excepting the enabling cause. The object condition is any dharma suitable to be an object of the six consciousnesses perceived as an object. The immediately preceding condition is the mind and mental states other than the mind which has entered transcendence without remaining aggregates. The dominant condition is the enabling cause.’ ³

Others say: ‘From the definition which states, “The cause is what accomplishes,” its causal condition is that which is something’s producer, constituting a seed; while the object condition is the object that causes production, similar to a supporting cane, of the causally arisen mind and mental factors, similar to the old person getting up, which is the sense of the statement, “It is the support of the generated dharmas.” That which is like an immediately preceding condition is that as soon as the cause has ceased the condition is there for the production of the result, just as a sprout immediately succeeds the disappearance of the seed. The dominant condition is that which by its presence makes something arise.⁴

‘Any other conditions, such as the simultaneously produced or subsequently produced, are included within these. Since an almighty god (īśvara) and so on are not conditions, it is ascertained that “There is no fifth condition.”’⁵

This cannot be upheld, since it contradicts reasoning and scripture. To explain this in terms of reasoning:

If something different could give rise to something else,
Then utter darkness should emerge from tongues of flame.

This is neither observed nor logical, and thus not the case. Hence, it is stated:

That cause and result are different
Would never be tenable.
If cause and result were different,
A cause and a non-cause would be identical.⁶

Furthermore:

And anything could be produced from everything,

… as any cause and non-cause could lead to the production of any result and non-result. Why is that?

Since in their difference all non-makers are the same. (6.14)

The productive rice seed is just as different from its resultant rice sprout as non-productive fire, charcoal, barley seeds and so on are; and just as the rice sprout is produced from the rice seed that is other, the same could then happen from fire, charcoal, barley seeds and so forth. Also, just as a separate rice sprout arises from a rice seed, so should a pot, a piece of cloth and so forth. This however is not what we see. Hence, this cannot be the case.

To this they reply, ‘Although the cause and effect are indeed different, a consequence of this is not that everything may arise from everything, since one may observe that there is a specific order (niyata) to things. This specific order is such that,

‘What has potential to be made defines result.
What can produce it is the cause, though something else.
In one continuum, from makers, things arise,
And rice sprouts won’t therefore produce barley and such.’ (6.15)

Here, result has a kṛtya-affix⁷ indicating the sense of potential. ‘That which has the potential to be produced by something is its result, while that which can produce that result, although it is other, is the cause. Therefore, it is only through a specific sense of otherness that entities are related as cause and result, and not a general type of otherness. They are of one continuum, and the producer yields produced – it is not the case that it belongs to a separate continuum, such as for instance a barley seed, nor that it belongs to the same continuum but is not the producer, as is the case for a former instance that cannot come after a latter instance – and therefore it does not follow that everything can arise from everything.’

This too is inadequate. What is it that makes for this specific order? Where does this come from when saying that, ‘The cause of the rice sprout is only the rice seed and nothing other, and the result of the rice seed is only the rice sprout and nothing other’? This is the question that may be asked of those who claim cause and result. If they say, ‘Because we observe a specific order,’ and when further questioned they reply, ‘A specific order is observed,’ that is non-sensical; because by just saying that, ‘Because of observing a specific order, a specific order is observed,’ they provide no reason for the specific order and are not able to even slightly avoid the faults that have been stated.

Furthermore, to illustrate that the general agreement that there is no separation between common and specific otherness disproves this exact claim, it was said:

Take species such as barley, ironwood or dhak:
These can’t produce a rice-sprout, lack that potency,
Don’t share continuum, lack similarity.
With otherness, a rice seed too lacks in these ways. (6.16)

Just as barley, ironwood⁸ , dhak tree⁹ and so forth are other, and are therefore not held to be producers of the rice sprout, and do not have the ability to produce a rice sprout, are not part of the same continuum and have no likeness, the rice seed as well is not special in any of the particular ways just mentioned, because it is just something other. Hence, in this context the refutation is done by reiterating as if established, the otherness that others accept to be established.

Now, to explain how cause and result cannot possibly be different:

The sprout is never there the same time as the seed,
So how can seed be other without otherness?
Thus since one cannot prove that seeds give rise to sprouts,
Give up this view that things arise from something else. (6.17)

One can only see a difference between Maitreya and Upagupta based on their correlation, but seed and sprout are not simultaneous objects like that, since without the seed transforming there will be no sprout. Because there is no existence of sprout at the same time as the seed is present, the seed has no otherness in relation to the sprout. And in the absence of otherness one cannot say that, ‘The sprout is produced from something other.’ Therefore, abandon this position of production from other.

The meaning of this is as explained:

The nature of existents
Is not in their conditions and the like.
If there is no self-existence,
How can there be other-existence?¹⁰

Here, conditions and the like may be causes or conditions, the gathering of causes and conditions, or something different. If their nature does not transform, the nature of results will not exist, since these will not have been produced. When they are non-existent, there can be no sense of difference in relation to the conditions and so forth. The seventh case implies, ‘The existence of which indicates existence.’ In terms of location, the nature of results do not exist in the conditions and so forth, like a vessel and a juniper tree. When something does not exist in something, it cannot be produced from that, like the example of sand and sesame oil. As stated:

If it is non-existent
And arises from those conditions,
Then why can it not arise
Also from non-conditions?¹¹

Thus, this position of support does not hold true when scrutinised in light of this verse of the master.

‘When you here say, “the sprout cannot exist as the same time as the seed,” this is not reasonable: just as one can see the pans of a balance scale ascending and descending at the same time, the sprout is produced as the seed is being destroyed. Thus, at exactly the same time as the seed is destroyed the sprout is produced, and therefore the destruction of the seed and the production of the sprout are simultaneous, and the seed and sprout are present at the same time. Hence, there is otherness.’ To present this, they say:

‘As when you see the levers of a balance scale
Ascending and descending simultaneously;
Just so producers cease as what’s produced appears.’

‘Hence,’ they claim, ‘we are not at fault.’

If it was like that:

If coinciding, yes – they don’t, so this can’t be. (6.18)

It is unsuitable to think of the arising and destruction of produced and producer as simultaneous as in the example of a balance scale. Why? Even though the ascending and descending are simultaneous in the example of the scale, there is no such simultaneity in the actual case that example is being linked to, thus it does not make sense.

To indicate why it is not so, it was said:

While made it faces its production, isn’t yet.
While ceasing it still is, but tends towards its end.
So how can this be similar to a balance scale?

When we say being produced, it is approaching production and is therefore in the future, and when saying ceasing, it is approaching cessation and is present now. Thus, one is not existent since it has not been produced but will be produced, while one is existent now and can therefore cease. How can this instance be similar to a balance scale? Since the two pans of a balance scale both are in the present, the acts of ascending and descending are simultaneous, but as the seed is in the present and the sprout in the future they are not simultaneous, so this is not similar to a balance scale.

One might then think, ‘Even though they are not simultaneous, there is still simultaneity with respect to the processes.’ But this too is unacceptable, since you would not accept that there is a separation between phenomena and their processes. So, furthermore,

Arising with no subject doesn’t make much sense. (6.19)

Since the sprout, the subject in the process of production, is in the future, it does not exist. Without the existence of that, the unsupported cannot exist; how can that which does not exist be simultaneous with the cessation? Hence, it is certainly illogical that the processes can be simultaneous. As stated:

If an unproduced entity existed somewhere,
It could be under production.
But such an entity being nonexistent,
How can there be production?¹²

This means that, if the unproduced entity we call ‘sprout’ were to exist somewhere before being produced, it could be said to have production, but one cannot establish this in any way prior to the actual production, because it has as yet not been produced. Hence, since the entity that supports the process of production does not exist before its production, it cannot be endowed with it; so, ‘How is there production?’ Since the word that (tasmin) is referring to the entity (bhāve), they are in case-agreement; entity (bhāve) is in the seventh case, and nonexistent (asati) is a further specification of the entity. The word how (kim) is to be joined with be produced (utpadyate). Hence, the meaning becomes, ‘When that entity is a nonexistent, how can there be production? Not even the slightest thing is being produced.’

If one then asks: ‘But isn’t the example of the balance scale presented in the noble Rice Seedling Sutra, where it says, “In the way that the arms of a pair of scales ascend and descend simultaneously, the sprout is produced just as the seed ceases.”?’¹³ Yes, that is certainly presented there, but not in order to indicate production from other, nor in order to indicate production of inherent characteristics. Why then? It was done in order to clarify how instantaneous dependent arising is like an illusion when left unexamined. As has been explained:

Since sprouts do not originate
From destruction or non-destruction of seeds,
You stated that any production
Is like the appearance of illusions.¹⁴

To this it may be said: ‘Since seed and sprout are not simultaneous and therefore cannot be other, making production nonsensical, production should then be possible when we have simultaneity since there is then otherness, as is the case with eye consciousness and sensations and so forth that are simultaneous with it. Just as the simultaneous occurrence of eye, form and so on, and sensations and so on, produce a coinciding eye consciousness, the eye and so on, and the mind are also the very conditions for the coinciding sensations and so forth.’