‘That entities do not arise from themselves is certainly the case. This position is indeed reasonable. But the words how could it arise from other? do not make sense. Based on the scriptures which state, “The four external conditions are: the causal, the object, the immediately preceding and the dominant; conditions are the creators of entities,” although undesirable, production from other must be upheld.’

Some say: ‘The causal conditions are five excepting the enabling cause. The object condition is any dharma suitable to be an object of the six consciousnesses perceived as an object. The immediately preceding condition is the mind and mental states other than the mind which has entered transcendence without remaining aggregates. The dominant condition is the enabling cause.’ ¹

Others say: ‘From the definition which states, “The cause is what accomplishes,” its causal condition is that which is something’s producer, constituting a seed; while the object condition is the object that causes production, similar to a supporting cane, of the causally arisen mind and mental factors, similar to the old person getting up, which is the sense of the statement, “It is the support of the generated dharmas.” That which is like an immediately preceding condition is that as soon as the cause has ceased the condition is there for the production of the result, just as a sprout immediately succeeds the disappearance of the seed. The dominant condition is that which by its presence makes something arise.²

‘Any other conditions, such as the simultaneously produced or subsequently produced, are included within these. Since an almighty god (īśvara) and so on are not conditions, it is ascertained that “There is no fifth condition.”’³

This cannot be upheld, since it contradicts reasoning and scripture. To explain this in terms of reasoning:

If something different could give rise to something else,
Then utter darkness should emerge from tongues of flame.

This is neither observed nor logical, and thus not the case. Hence, it is stated:

That cause and result are different
Would never be tenable.
If cause and result were different,
A cause and a non-cause would be identical.⁴

Furthermore:

And anything could be produced from everything,

… as any cause and non-cause could lead to the production of any result and non-result. Why is that?

Since in their difference all non-makers are the same. (6.14)

The productive rice seed is just as different from its resultant rice sprout as non-productive fire, charcoal, barley seeds and so on are; and just as the rice sprout is produced from the rice seed that is other, the same could then happen from fire, charcoal, barley seeds and so forth. Also, just as a separate rice sprout arises from a rice seed, so should a pot, a piece of cloth and so forth. This however is not what we see. Hence, this cannot be the case.

To this they reply, ‘Although the cause and effect are indeed different, a consequence of this is not that everything may arise from everything, since one may observe that there is a specific order (niyata) to things. This specific order is such that,

‘What has potential to be made defines result.
What can produce it is the cause, though something else.
In one continuum, from makers, things arise,
And rice sprouts won’t therefore produce barley and such.’ (6.15)

Here, result has a kṛtya-affix⁵ indicating the sense of potential. ‘That which has the potential to be produced by something is its result, while that which can produce that result, although it is other, is the cause. Therefore, it is only through a specific sense of otherness that entities are related as cause and result, and not a general type of otherness. They are of one continuum, and the producer yields produced – it is not the case that it belongs to a separate continuum, such as for instance a barley seed, nor that it belongs to the same continuum but is not the producer, as is the case for a former instance that cannot come after a latter instance – and therefore it does not follow that everything can arise from everything.’

This too is inadequate. What is it that makes for this specific order? Where does this come from when saying that, ‘The cause of the rice sprout is only the rice seed and nothing other, and the result of the rice seed is only the rice sprout and nothing other’? This is the question that may be asked of those who claim cause and result. If they say, ‘Because we observe a specific order,’ and when further questioned they reply, ‘A specific order is observed,’ that is non-sensical; because by just saying that, ‘Because of observing a specific order, a specific order is observed,’ they provide no reason for the specific order and are not able to even slightly avoid the faults that have been stated.

Furthermore, to illustrate that the general agreement that there is no separation between common and specific otherness disproves this exact claim, it was said:

Take species such as barley, ironwood or dhak:
These can’t produce a rice-sprout, lack that potency,
Don’t share continuum, lack similarity.
With otherness, a rice seed too lacks in these ways. (6.16)

Just as barley, ironwood⁶ , dhak tree⁷ and so forth are other, and are therefore not held to be producers of the rice sprout, and do not have the ability to produce a rice sprout, are not part of the same continuum and have no likeness, the rice seed as well is not special in any of the particular ways just mentioned, because it is just something other. Hence, in this context the refutation is done by reiterating as if established, the otherness that others accept to be established.

Now, to explain how cause and result cannot possibly be different:

The sprout is never there the same time as the seed,
So how can seed be other without otherness?
Thus since one cannot prove that seeds give rise to sprouts,
Give up this view that things arise from something else. (6.17)

One can only see a difference between Maitreya and Upagupta based on their correlation, but seed and sprout are not simultaneous objects like that, since without the seed transforming there will be no sprout. Because there is no existence of sprout at the same time as the seed is present, the seed has no otherness in relation to the sprout. And in the absence of otherness one cannot say that, ‘The sprout is produced from something other.’ Therefore, abandon this position of production from other.

The meaning of this is as explained:

The nature of existents
Is not in their conditions and the like.
If there is no self-existence,
How can there be other-existence?⁸

Here, conditions and the like may be causes or conditions, the gathering of causes and conditions, or something different. If their nature does not transform, the nature of results will not exist, since these will not have been produced. When they are non-existent, there can be no sense of difference in relation to the conditions and so forth. The seventh case implies, ‘The existence of which indicates existence.’ In terms of location, the nature of results do not exist in the conditions and so forth, like a vessel and a juniper tree. When something does not exist in something, it cannot be produced from that, like the example of sand and sesame oil. As stated:

If it is non-existent
And arises from those conditions,
Then why can it not arise
Also from non-conditions?⁹

Thus, this position of support does not hold true when scrutinised in light of this verse of the master.

‘When you here say, “the sprout cannot exist as the same time as the seed,” this is not reasonable: just as one can see the pans of a balance scale ascending and descending at the same time, the sprout is produced as the seed is being destroyed. Thus, at exactly the same time as the seed is destroyed the sprout is produced, and therefore the destruction of the seed and the production of the sprout are simultaneous, and the seed and sprout are present at the same time. Hence, there is otherness.’ To present this, they say:

‘As when you see the levers of a balance scale
Ascending and descending simultaneously;
Just so producers cease as what’s produced appears.’

‘Hence,’ they claim, ‘we are not at fault.’

If it was like that:

If coinciding, yes – they don’t, so this can’t be. (6.18)

It is unsuitable to think of the arising and destruction of produced and producer as simultaneous as in the example of a balance scale. Why? Even though the ascending and descending are simultaneous in the example of the scale, there is no such simultaneity in the actual case that example is being linked to, thus it does not make sense.

To indicate why it is not so, it was said:

While made it faces its production, isn’t yet.
While ceasing it still is, but tends towards its end.
So how can this be similar to a balance scale?

When we say being produced, it is approaching production and is therefore in the future, and when saying ceasing, it is approaching cessation and is present now. Thus, one is not existent since it has not been produced but will be produced, while one is existent now and can therefore cease. How can this instance be similar to a balance scale? Since the two pans of a balance scale both are in the present, the acts of ascending and descending are simultaneous, but as the seed is in the present and the sprout in the future they are not simultaneous, so this is not similar to a balance scale.

One might then think, ‘Even though they are not simultaneous, there is still simultaneity with respect to the processes.’ But this too is unacceptable, since you would not accept that there is a separation between phenomena and their processes. So, furthermore,

Arising with no subject doesn’t make much sense. (6.19)

Since the sprout, the subject in the process of production, is in the future, it does not exist. Without the existence of that, the unsupported cannot exist; how can that which does not exist be simultaneous with the cessation? Hence, it is certainly illogical that the processes can be simultaneous. As stated:

If an unproduced entity existed somewhere,
It could be under production.
But such an entity being nonexistent,
How can there be production?¹⁰

This means that, if the unproduced entity we call ‘sprout’ were to exist somewhere before being produced, it could be said to have production, but one cannot establish this in any way prior to the actual production, because it has as yet not been produced. Hence, since the entity that supports the process of production does not exist before its production, it cannot be endowed with it; so, ‘How is there production?’ Since the word that (tasmin) is referring to the entity (bhāve), they are in case-agreement; entity (bhāve) is in the seventh case, and nonexistent (asati) is a further specification of the entity. The word how (kim) is to be joined with be produced (utpadyate). Hence, the meaning becomes, ‘When that entity is a nonexistent, how can there be production? Not even the slightest thing is being produced.’

If one then asks: ‘But isn’t the example of the balance scale presented in the noble Rice Seedling Sutra, where it says, “In the way that the arms of a pair of scales ascend and descend simultaneously, the sprout is produced just as the seed ceases.”?’¹¹ Yes, that is certainly presented there, but not in order to indicate production from other, nor in order to indicate production of inherent characteristics. Why then? It was done in order to clarify how instantaneous dependent arising is like an illusion when left unexamined. As has been explained:

Since sprouts do not originate
From destruction or non-destruction of seeds,
You stated that any production
Is like the appearance of illusions.¹²

To this it may be said: ‘Since seed and sprout are not simultaneous and therefore cannot be other, making production nonsensical, production should then be possible when we have simultaneity since there is then otherness, as is the case with eye consciousness and sensations and so forth that are simultaneous with it. Just as the simultaneous occurrence of eye, form and so on, and sensations and so on, produce a coinciding eye consciousness, the eye and so on, and the mind are also the very conditions for the coinciding sensations and so forth.’

That is not the case. Why?

Were eye-mentation separate from what’s making it,
Like co-occurring eyes, perceptions and so forth,
What purpose would production serve for what exists?
The problems faced if it does not have been explained. (6.20)

If you claim that eyes and so forth, and the simultaneous perceptions and so forth, are the very conditions for such an eye consciousness, then being existent at that time it would be an ‘other’ relying on them, but for something existent to be produced serves no purpose at all, hence it would not be produced. Then, if wishing to avoid its non-production, you do not accept that it is existing, saying, ‘At the time in question there is no otherness of the eye and so forth in relation to the non-existent consciousness,’ the faults of such a position have already been explained. Therefore, if you claim such other-production, even if otherness was a possibility, production would be impossible, and since that is impossible both are impossible. Even if production was possible, otherness would be impossible, and since that is impossible both are impossible. Hence, external objects do not exist in any way whatsoever, and with the emptiness of external objects one is left with nothing but mere words, which shows that this way of understanding it is unacceptable.

Now, to explain how from among cause and effect there is no time when there is reliance on a cause, it was said:

If separate things are made by a productive cause,
Do they exist or not? Both? Neither of these two?
Why need producing if they do? What’s done if not?
What’s done if both? What’s done if neither of the two? (6.21)

A producing cause is not the producer of an existent product, because of the faults that have already been explained in such statements as, ‘That the produced is produced once more is senseless;’ there would not then be the slightest purpose to it having conditions. When the produced does not exist, what would the producers do? It is just as non-existent as the horns of a donkey. As stated:

For you who assert the existence of results,
And you who assert their non-existence,¹³
There would be no point in embellishing
Your house with pillars and such.¹⁴

And from the Middle Way Treatise:

If a result has an intrinsic essence,
How can a cause produce it?
If a result does not have an intrinsic essence,
How can a cause produce it?

If there is no production,
Causation becomes unfeasible.
If causation is unfeasible,
What becomes of the result?¹⁵

For that which is both, what would conditions do for it? The faults that follow from this are those that have already been explained. A dual entity is both, and when it is both it is in fact two. But since having an essence of existence and non-existent in one thing at the same time is impossible, something having that sort of nature cannot occur. And since it cannot occur, what could producing conditions do for it? As the Treatise states:

How can nirvāṇa be both
An existent and a non-existent?
These two cannot coexist,
Just like light and darkness.¹⁶

Likewise,

What both is and is not an agent
Cannot make what both is and is not.
Since they are mutually exclusive,
How could one thing both be and not be?¹⁷

If a result could be neither existent nor non-existent, what would be the function of conditions in relation to something which is neither, since a result that defies both existence and non-existence cannot exist? When both existence and non-existence are impossible, to refute them by saying neither existent nor non-existent doesn’t make the slightest difference. When neither are established, to have what is neither existent nor non-existent is impossible. As stated:

Nirvāṇa is taught to be neither
An existent nor a non-existent.
If non-existents and existents were established,
This would be established.¹⁸

If they say, ’Since any sort of reasoning we put forth in order to establish production is completely incinerated by the fire of your intellect, like firewood soaked in oil, we will no longer encourage the blazing fire of your intelligence with any more logical fuel. You may ask, “Will not your theory fail without backing it up with logical reasoning?” It will not. This is something established from the point of view of the world, hence there is no use at all for reasoning, since worldly perception is very powerful.’

‘What is the point of all these reasoned arguments
When it’s the normal view the world gives credence to.
The world indeed agrees things come from other things,
Which means other-production – what is there to prove?’ (6.22)

‘When all worldly people maintain a certain view, that is something very influential, and it is certainly other-production that is this view. When reasoning finds faults with something, it is only relevant when it comes to what is not directly perceived, and not what is within the scope of direct perception. Therefore, even though it is not reasonable, things are still produced from other.’

Those who lack an unmistaken realisation of the sense of the treatise, and are faced with the maturation of habitual tendencies for real existence developed since beginningless cyclic existence, cannot bear to hear about what separates them from their cherished fixation for existence, and therefore resort to nonsense about how the world will invalidate this. Since one cannot counteract their ravings about worldly invalidation without explaining to them the many and vast ways of origination in the world, an explanation is at this point given about the principles of the two truths, in order to clarify the particular cases of worldly invalidation:

The things perceived may either be correct or false.
As such all things convey a dual character.
Correctly seen, the object is reality;
As taught, the truth is relative when falsely seen. (6.23)

In this context, the illustrious buddhas knowing unmistakenly the reality of the two truths taught that all external and internal existent things – compounded phenomena, sprouts and so forth – have a dual nature, namely the relative (saṃvṛti) and the ultimate (paramārtha). The ultimate is the actual nature accessible in the domain of superior wisdom for those with genuine vision, but which is not something established in and of itself – this is one nature. The other is the independent existence perceived owing to the false perception of ordinary beings whose mind’s eye is completely covered by the blurring cataracts of ignorance. The objects that the infantile perceive in this manner are not intrinsically established. All existent things are thereby perceived with these two natures. And with respect to these two natures, that which is the object of genuine seeing is the actual reality, which is the meaning of the term ultimate truth. Its nature will be further explained. That which is the object of false seeing is the relative truth.

Then, having in this way presented the principle of two truths, to now demonstrate that in relation to those who see falsely there are two ways of seeing, genuine and false, and hence also a duality in relation to the object and consciousness when perceiving, it was said:

As faculties may function well or be at fault,
One further reckons two types of the falsely seen.
Compared to knowledge stemming from sound faculties,
What’s known through faulty faculties is held as false. (6.24)

Those with clear faculties, free of cataracts and unimpaired by jaundice and so forth, unmistakenly apprehend external objects the way they are. The opposite is the case for those with impaired faculties. Compared to the understanding of those with sound faculties, the understanding of those with impaired faculties is considered mistaken.

In order to illustrate that, ‘Just as their understanding may be of two types, either mistaken or unmistaken, the same is the case with objects,’ it was explained:

Perceptions of the world that happens when
Six faculties have not been compromised
Are true within the world, the rest are all
Considered false according to the world. (6.25)

Internal conditions that impair the faculties are such things as cataracts, jaundice and so on, and ingesting datura and the like. External conditions that distort the faculties are oil, water and mirrors, sounds and so on made inside a cave and the like, and sunlight under particular conditions of location or time, and so on. These impair the faculties without being internal, causing perceptions such as reflections, echoes and mirages of water. Magical formulas, potions and so on, employed for instance by illusionists, should likewise be included within this category. What impairs the mind are these things, as well as mistaken philosophical systems and so on, and apparently sound inferences. These are explained in terms of the principles of dreams and so on. Therefore, the understanding that the world gains through the sixfold faculties, when none of the mentioned conditions impairing one’s faculties are present, is considered true from the worldly perspective, but not for a noble one. Reflections and so forth, appearing with the nature of objects when the faculties are compromised in a certain way, are mistaken from the worldly point of view.

To provide some examples to illustrate the sense of what has just been explained, it was said:

Ideas diverse misguided thinkers have made up
When tossed around within the sleep of ignorance,
And notions from illusions, mirages and such,
Not even worldly folk will think that these are real. (6.26)

The misguided (tīrthika), in their quest to reach the actual reality, fail to properly and unmistakenly comprehend the way of production, cessation and so on of entities well-known even to such uneducated individuals as cowherds, women and so forth. Their search for perfection resembles letting go of the lower branch before having taken hold of the higher branch when climbing a tree: their grave mistakes will send them plummeting into the ravine of faulty views. Not seeing the two truths they fail to reach their goal. Thus, the three properties (guṇa)¹⁹ and so on that they conceive of do not exist even in the worldly relative sense.

This being the case:

Perceptions of the ones impaired by eye disease
Cannot invalidate what’s known by healthy ones.
Just so, a mind which lacks the wisdom beyond taint
Cannot invalidate a flawless intellect. (6.27)

The refutation of other-production demonstrated here is not a mere worldly viewpoint. What then? It is the accepted vision of noble ones. This refutation of production being extraordinary, just as an undistorted apprehension cannot be invalidated by someone with cataracts disease who perceives hair-strands and the like, undefiled vision cannot be invalidated by the understanding of ordinary beings lacking undefiled wisdom, and worldly ones cannot therefore invalidate that which falls within this sort of domain. They are truly laughable opponents for a noble one. We therefore have two truths, and by distinguishing between a relative and an ultimate, entities are said to have a dual essence.

In order to describe the worldly relative truth, it was said:

It’s relative, delusion, when the real is masked.
Regarding as the truth what is in fact contrived
Is relative truth, this is what the sage expressed –
And that which is contrived is simply relative. (6.28)

As it obscures sentient beings’ ability to see things for what they are, it is confusion; and this condition of ignorance superimposing non-factual inherent characteristics to things, concealing the perception of the actual, is the relative (saṃvṛti). This relative causes things to be experienced as real, and that which lacks inherent nature is seen as inherently distinct. As this is relatively true for the mistaken world, it is the worldly relative truth. It is contrived interdependence.

Certain dependently arisen things, like reflections, echoes and so forth, appear as false also to the ignorant, while certain things like blueness and the like, and such things as material form, mind and feelings, appear as true. The actual does not appear in any way whatsoever to the ignorant. The latter, as well those things that also relatively are false, are therefore not the relative truth. As such, the relative truth is a principle relevant as long as one has the afflicted ignorance involved in the links of existence.

The hearers, solitary buddhas and bodhisattvas have relinquished afflicted vision, and not entertaining assumptions about truth they experience conditioned things as similar to reflections and such, contrived in nature but not real. For the immature these things are deceptive, while for the others they are dependently originated, like illusions and so forth, and therefore merely relative. Since they relate to this with only cognitively obscured ignorance, it does appear to noble ones in the appearance-associated domain, but not while in the appearance-free domain. Buddhas have fully and perfectly realised phenomena in all their aspects, and it is therefore held that they have arrested the movement of mind and mental factors for good. The Illustrious One thus taught that there is the relative truth and the merely relative.
What is ultimate for ordinary beings is merely relative in the appearance-associated domain of noble ones, while the ultimate for the latter is its emptiness-nature. The buddhas’ ultimate is the very nature itself. As this is undeceiving it is the ultimate truth, and something they have a direct personal experience with. Since the relative truth is deceptive it is not an ultimate truth.

Having covered the relative truth, the ultimate truth should be described. That, however, is impossible to explicitly indicate because it is ineffable and not a knowable object. To elucidate its nature to those who are interested with something they are familiar with, an example is therefore employed:

That faulty image one presumes – those falling hairs
Which come when one is suffering from an eye disease –
Is seen for what it is by one with proper sight;
At present we may thus deduce reality. (6.29)

Witnessing how someone suffering from cataracts, through the influence of that ailment sees such things as accumulating strands of hair filling for instance the rhinoceros-bowl he is holding, and his struggle to get rid of them by repeatedly upending the bowl, the one without cataracts might wonder, ‘What is he doing?’ and approach him. And even though she directs her eyes to the area of the supposed hair she does not perceive any hairs, and will also not entertain concepts of particular attributes related to these hairs, such as being things or non-things, hairs or not, dark blue and so forth. So, when the cataract-ridden individual relates his thinking to the one without cataracts, saying, ‘I see hairs,’ the other will want to clear away these concepts. And although she will certainly reject the perspective of the one with cataracts, and say, ‘There are no hairs,’ she isn’t actually denying them. The healthy one sees the actual reality of the hair-strands; the other doesn’t.
Similarly, the nature of the aggregates, elements, sense fields and so forth perceived by those impaired by the cataracts of ignorance and unable to see the actual reality, is the relative nature of these things. But like the cataract-free individual looking at the hair-strands, when the illustrious buddhas who are free from the habitual patterns of ignorance view those very aggregates and so forth, they see their real nature, and this is their ultimate truth.

‘But there couldn’t be any seeing of such a nature, could there? So how do they then see?’ Though that is true, it is said that, ‘It’s by not seeing it that they see.’ As indicated at length in the noble Accessing the Two Truths:

Devaputra. If ultimately the ultimate truth was a physical, verbal or mental object, it couldn’t be considered the ultimate truth; it would be the relative truth. Ultimately, Devaputra, the ultimate truth is beyond all conventions, undifferentiated, unproduced, unceasing, and beyond something expressed and an expressing, something known and a knowing. The ultimate truth, Devaputra, transcends being an object of the omniscient wisdom of those endowed with the most supreme of all aspects, and isn’t expressed by words such as ultimate truth. All phenomena are false; they are deceptive phenomena. The ultimate truth cannot be described, Devaputra. Why? No such phenomena as someone showing, something shown and someone shown to can appear ultimately. And non-apparent phenomena cannot explain non-apparent phenomena.²⁰

Thus, distinctions such as objective entity and non-entity, own-entity and other-entity, truth and non-truth, durability and termination, permanence and impermanence, happiness and suffering, pure and impure, self and non-self, empty and non-empty, characteristics and characterised, oneness and difference, arising and ceasing and so forth cannot be found in the actual reality, because it has no observable nature. Only noble beings therefore have a valid consideration of actual reality – those who are not noble beings do not.

If one insists that the world can invalidate it, and professes that the worldly perspective is a valid way of analysing actual reality, then:

If worldly standards were correct the world would see
Reality; what need for other noble ones?
Would there be reason to traverse the noble path?
It’s senseless that the standards of a fool are sound. (6.30)

If one were to accept that the worldly perspective is valid knowledge, and that the actual reality is seen by them, one would have to accept that they have relinquished ignorance, because a fool having valid knowledge is unreasonable. Someone who lacks understanding of a certain object is considered unreliable in relation to that thing, such as someone who lacks knowledge of how to examine precious stones. If the eyes and so forth could ascertain the actual reality, then endeavouring in moral discipline, learning, contemplation, meditation and so forth in order to actualise the noble path would be pointless. Hence this cannot be the case.

Therefore,

Since worldly standards are not valid all the way,
The world cannot disprove what is reality.

As was explained above, at the level of actual reality the worldly perspective is in every respect invalid. Thus, when the context is actual reality, the worldly cannot invalidate it.What can the worldly perspective invalidate? To explain:

But worldly objects are agreed on in the world,
So they’ll disprove you if you do reject these things. (6.31)

For instance, if someone were to say, ‘Something of mine has been stolen,’ and another poses the question, ‘What thing was it?’, and they reply, ‘A vase,’ and the other refutes it, saying, ‘A vase is not a thing, because it is a cognitive object, like a dream-vase;’ denials of objects like this the world can invalidate, since there is worldly consensus about mundane things. But when it comes to the level of the noble ones’ vision and learned individuals making valid analyses, the worldly cannot invalidate these. Learned ones may apply this position also when examining other things.²¹

With this, worldly invalidation has been avoided even if it was the case that worldly convention accepted other-production. However, since there is no other-production even from the worldly perspective, also when resorting to the worldly perspective one will not be able to invalidate the refutation of other-production using their view. To show this, it was said:

A worldly person may just sow a seed
But later say, ‘I have produced this child,’
Or else believe that he, ‘did plant this tree.’
No other-rising hence within the world. (6.32)

When it becomes evident that the child is male, a man will say, ‘I produced this boy.’ However, it is not as though a boy having those features is ejected from his body and put into the mother. There is merely an excretion in the form of a seed. But it is clearly the worldly opinion that, since it was due to his depositing the cause that a child then emerged, semen and child are not separate. If they were separate it would be as if they were distinct entities, and one wouldn’t then express it like that. The same may be applied to the seed and the tree.

Thus, to indicate the virtues of interdependence in terms of avoiding permanence and nihilism when explained in the above manner, it was said:

Because the sprout and seed are not distinct,
Seeds haven’t been destroyed when sprouts are there.
And since they neither are the very same,
We wouldn’t say the seeds exist with sprouts. (6.33)

If the sprout was other than the seed, the sprout’s presence would unequivocally mean that the seed was terminated – since the presence of wild oxen does not prevent dead cattle from ceasing to exist, and the presence of ordinary beings does nothing to the transcendence (nirvāṇa) of noble ones. But because they are not distinct, the identity of being a sprout does not terminate the seed, and in this way nihilism is avoided. And because they are not identical the very thing which is seed is not the sprout, and since this prevents imperishability, permanence is avoided.

As taught:

If seed exists, so does sprout;
But seed is not the sprout itself.
It is not other, it is not it – hence,
Dharmatā is neither permanence nor nihilism.²²

If seed exists… means that, ‘When there is an existence of seed, then….’ If it is suggested that, ‘A sprout arising with the seed as its cause cannot really be different from the seed,’ it states here: But seed is not the sprout itself. If asking, ‘Doesn’t the seed turn into the sprout?’ Then we have the statement: It is not other, it is not it – …. Since both the positions of sameness and otherness are impossible, neither that it is distinct and nor that it is not distinct will be reasonable. Hence, with both options refuted, that the nature of things (dharmatā) is beyond permanence and nihilism becomes manifestly apparent.

The essential point to be understood here is this: If seed and sprout were endowed with any sense of inherent existence (svabhāva), they would have to be either the same or different. But when they have no such inherent existence, being just like seeds and sprouts appearing in a dream, how can there then be actual oneness or difference. This is the very sense of the following explanation:

Formations are the consequence of ignorance,
But those formations are not present in that itself
Formations and ignorance are empty
By nature, free from fluctuation.²³

And as stated in the Treatise:

Whatever is dependently arisen from something
Is not then that exact same thing,
Nor is it other than it –
Hence, no permanence, no annihilation.²⁴

That, ‘There is no inherent production whatsoever,’ is something one absolutely must accept. If it wasn’t so:

If things existed with their own identity,
Rejecting this would mean the ruin of these things,
And emptiness would be destroying entities.
This makes no sense, and therefore things do not exist. (6.34)

If things such as material form and sensation were produced from causes and conditions with inherent characteristics, with their own essence and nature, when the yogi then sees entities as empty of inherent nature and realises that all dharmas lack inherent nature, his realisation of emptiness would occur through a rejection of an inherent nature that was actually produced like that. Then, just as such things as hammers can cause the destruction of vases and so forth, this emptiness would discard the intrinsic nature of things, which would not be justified. Therefore, that things have inherent characteristics would never be acceptable.

As taught at length in the noble Heap of Jewels Sutra:

Furthermore, Kāśyapa, the correct middle way approach to analysing dharmas is the following: It is not emptiness that makes dharmas empty; dharmas themselves are empty. It is not characterlessness that makes dharmas characterless; dharmas themselves are characterless. It is not aimlessness that makes dharmas aimless; dharmas themselves are aimless. It is not fabricationlessness that makes dharmas fabricationless; dharmas themselves are fabricationless. It is not productionlessness that makes dharmas productionless; dharmas themselves are productionless. It is not originationlessness that makes dharmas originationless; dharmas themselves are originationless.²⁵

Some assert a dependent nature, and thinking that its contingent emptiness characterised by a lack of apprehender and apprehended can neither be expressed as same nor different – just as with impermanence and so forth – they are saying that, ‘It is only through emptiness itself that all things are empty, and not by their very nature.’²⁶ As the Four Hundred Verses explains:

One cannot regard the non-empty as empty,
And then think, ‘I shall reach nirvana.’
Mistaken ideas do not lead to nirvana –
That is what the tathāgatas have declared.²⁷

And, as the Treatise states:

The victorious ones spoke of emptiness
As the relinquishment of every view,
And stated that those who take emptiness
As a view accomplish nothing.²⁸

Here, some say: ‘Indeed there is no production ultimately, based on the refutation of production from self and other. But direct perception and inference shows us that the nature of material form, sensation and so forth are undoubtedly other-produced. If this is not maintained, why say there are two truths? One would end up with just a single truth. And then other-production would be entirely non-existent.’

To this we reply: That is indeed true, and ultimately there aren’t two truths as seen in statements such as, ‘Mendicants. The highest truth is only one, namely: the undeceiving objective is transcendence. All composite phenomena are deceptive false objects.’²⁹ Accordingly, since the relative truth is the means for accessing the ultimate truth, when production from self and other is left unanalysed, the worldly perspective is acknowledged.

Thus:

When analysed there’s nothing that remains of things
Except the very nature of reality.
And thus the things which are conventions of the world
Are not to be subjected to analysis. (6.35)

And so, when material form, sensation and so forth are scrutinised in this manner, asking, ‘Are they produced from self, or are they produced from other?’, since there is ultimately neither production nor cessation, apart from the essential nature nothing other by way of production and so forth remains. Therefore, dispensing with thorough analysis of these things, such as asking, ‘Is it from self or other…?’, one should merely take one’s cue from the other and acknowledge what is observed by the worldly when they say, ‘If this is present, this arises.’ 

As Āryadeva explained:

Just as through a foreign tongue
Barbarians cannot be brought to understanding,
One will not make the world understand
Unless using the worldly perspective.³⁰

And as stated in the Treatise:

Without relying on the conventional
One cannot realise the ultimate.
Without realising the ultimate
One cannot reach transcendence.³¹

Worldly conventions collapse when subjected to analysis. As taught at length in the sutras:

If for instance three things are combined,
Some wood, some string and a practiced hand,
Pleasant sounds will issue from
The tūṇa, vīnā, sughoṣaka and such.³²

But though a learned person were to explore
Where they are going and whence they came,
Searching the four directions and in-between,
He will fail to find the sounds’ coming and going.

Likewise, from causes and conditions
All composite phenomena are produced;
But the yogi endowed with authentic vision
Sees these composites as empty and fickle.

The aggregates, elements and sensory fields
Are empty within and empty without;
The sentient lacking selfhood have no abode –
Space-like nature is the hallmark of dharmas.³³

One may interject: ‘If every type of adherence to things is to be eliminated, we are perplexed as to what to do with this adherence to a conventional truth; there has to be some sort of substantial nature produced which acts as the cause for thoroughly afflicted and completely purified states.’ This way of expressing it too though is nothing but mere words. Why?

No reasoning permits production from itself
Or other at the level of reality.
It can’t be justified even conventionally.
So then, by what can your production be sustained? (6.36)

Just as on the ultimate level the above explained reasoning does not allow for production from self or other, also conventionally it renders production illogical – how then can your production of entities be maintained? Therefore, though unwilling, one must by necessity accept the statement, ‘In neither of the two truths does production with distinct characteristics (svalakṣaṇa) occur.’

Some look at the statement, ‘Not from self …,’ and think that master Nāgārjuna is only refuting the imputed nature (parikalpitasvabhāva) and not the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhāva). This assertion of theirs is unreasonable and cannot be maintained, and those who speak like this will certainly be disproved.³⁴

‘But if there is no production with distinct identities in either of the truths, how is it that their distinct natures are observed in the world?’ To explain:

Such empty objects as reflections and the like
Are not unheard of when conditions do convene.
And just as from reflections and such empty things
Cognitions with their aspects are indeed produced, (6.37)

It is the same with every empty entity,
As from these very empty things, things do emerge.

All phenomena remain inseparable from the workings of cause and effect. So, what learned individual, when considering the causality involved in the appearance of an insubstantial reflection, would perceive this mere existence of nothing other than a causal process involving material form, sensation and so forth, and become convinced of it having a truly existent nature? Therefore, although its existence is perceived, there is no intrinsic production taking place. As stated:

O Druma, though it has no true nature,
A reflection may still appear to be
Within a spotless mirror. This is how
You should come to understand phenomena.³⁵

Hence,

And since true character exists in neither truth,
There’s nothing that’s eternal or that terminates. (6.38)

Because things are empty of an inherent nature, like the appearance of reflections, they are in nature essenceless both in the ultimate and relative truths, and both permanence and nihilism are therefore avoided. As the Treatise for instance states:

‘It is not so that what intrinsically exists
Is non-existent’ – this is eternalism.
To say, ‘It was before, but now is no more,’
Implies that one professes nihilism.³⁶

Likewise:

With the acceptance of existent things
The views of eternalism and nihilism follow,
Because an existent thing must be
Either permanent or impermanent.³⁷

And similarly:

Through mastery of magical emanation
The Teacher can make an emanation appear,
And that emanated emanation again
Can make further emanations appear.

The actor and enacted karmic act
Are similarly a display of emanations –
Like an emanation that emanates
Yet another emanation.

The afflictions, actions, bodies,
Karmic agents and results
Are like the city of gandharvas,
Similar to dreams and mirages.³⁸

This example of magical emanations demonstrates how things lacking inherence produce things lacking inherence.

Since there is therefore no intrinsic nature in either truth, the views of eternalism and nihilism are thoroughly abandoned. In addition, there will be no need to justify the link between the result and the karmic act, even when a long time has passed since the act took place, by resorting to such ideas as a substrate consciousness, karmic indelibility and obtention. How so?

Because it doesn’t really cease to be,
Though there’s no substrate, still the potency
Of karma stays long after it has ceased,
And will produce effects – this you should know. (6.39)

Those for whom karmic acts cease will in response to the critical remark, ‘How can a karmic act that has ceased to be give rise to a result?’, venture to confirm the potential of ceased karmic acts by maintaining a substrate consciousness, a separate indelible dharma similar to a promissory note, obtention, or that there is a continuum of consciousness that takes on the karmic imprints.³⁹ But for those for whom karmic acts are not inherently produced, they also do not cease; and since it is not impossible for a result to manifest from what has not been destroyed, when the karmic acts do not perish the link between the karmic act and its result becomes perfectly tenable. As the Treatise states:

Karma is not produced because
It has no inherent nature at all.
And since it is unproduced,
It also does not cease to be.⁴⁰

And from the sutras:

A human lifespan is a hundred years,
Thus we call that a lifetime.
But one cannot gather years in a heap.
This is established in a similar way.

When we say, ‘It is not exhausted,’
And when we say, ‘Karma is exhausted,’
The empty aspect is its non-exhaustion,
Conventionally its exhaustion is taught.⁴¹

To explain through simile the sense of what was just related:

The foolish man who has a pleasant dream
Is still desirous when waking up.
And likewise, though the karmic act has ceased
And lacks reality, it has results. (6.40)

As stated in the Transmigration Sutra:

Great King. Take for instance a man who is asleep and dreams of having intercourse with a beautiful lady, and on waking keeps yearning for her. What’s your opinion, Great King? Would such a man as this, who first dreams that he has intercourse with a beautiful lady and then having awoken still yearns for her, be a wise man?

He replied: No, Illustrious One, he would not. And why? Illustrious One, that dream-woman is non-existent; she cannot be perceived, let alone be a partner in intercourse. That man has nothing in store for him but misery and fatigue.

The Illustrious One said: It is similar, Great King, for immature and uninformed ordinary beings who on seeing material things crave material enjoyment. Craving these things they become attached. With attachment they bring about physical, verbal and mental karmic actions through desire, anger and confusion. When those karmic acts have been consummated, they cease. Having ceased they do not remain in the east … (and so forth), or in the intermediate directions. At a later time, when the moment of death arrives, the associated karma is activated as the final moment of consciousness ceases. At that time, it is just as in the example of the beautiful lady of he who awoke from sleep: one will tend towards that very mental karma. Thus, Great King, as that final moment of consciousness ceases, the first moment of consciousness belonging to the next birth determines whether one appears among the gods … (and so forth), or among the deprived spirits. As soon as that first moment of consciousness ceases, Great King, a mindstream that accords with the resultant manifest experience arises. While there are no phenomena whatsoever, Great King, that are transferred from this world to the next, death and rebirth are still evident. Great King, the ceasing of the final moment of consciousness is what we call ‘death’, while the initial moment of consciousness belonging to the next birth is what we call ‘rebirth’. But, Great King, as the final moment of consciousness ceases it doesn’t go anywhere. And the initial moment of consciousness belonging to the next birth doesn’t come from anywhere either. How can that be so? Because it is devoid of inherent existence. That final moment of consciousness Great King, is empty of a final moment of consciousness; death is empty of death; karma is empty of karma; the initial moment of consciousness is empty of an initial moment of consciousness; rebirth is empty of rebirth; and karmas do not disappear.⁴²

Some might think: ‘Say one accepts that not being inherently produced it is not spent,⁴³ and this is why there can be a ripening result. In that case, since the ripening manifests without it having ceased, there will likewise be another ripening after the initial ripening has taken place because it hasn’t been spent. And, since after that ripening there will be yet another ripening, this leads to the fault of infinite regress.’ This will not be the case:

Just as with cataracts one will see hairs
And not just any other random thing,
Although as non-existents they’re the same
The ripened won’t be ripening again. (6.41)

As an example, take objects that are similar in that they are nonexistent: someone with cataracts will see nonexistent objects such as strands of hair, but not the appearance of other types of things, such as a donkey’s horns and a barren woman’s child. Likewise, while the natures of karmas are equal in their non-cessation, they have specific ripening results.

This example not only shows that karma isn’t unspecific, but also that its maturation is specific. To explain:

The negative will therefore further woe,
While virtues lead to what is fortunate.
It’s freedom to see neither good nor bad.
To question karmic links was still deterred. (6.42)

Though virtuous and non-virtuous karmas lack intrinsic essence, still, just as there is a sense of certainty for the one seeing hair strands, non-virtue will not have have a pleasant outcome while virtue will not have an unpleasant outcome. When not apprehending karma as virtuous and non-virtuous one is liberated. The Illustrious One saw that if ordinary beings were to enter into very detailed analyses of it, they could end up denying karmic consequences and demolishing the relative. Stating that, ‘The workings of karmic consequences are inconceivable,’ he thus discouraged speculation about the workings of karmic actions and results.

‘If this is how the relationship between karmic actions and results is posited, when it is stated in the Descent Onto Lanka⁴⁴ that the substrate consciousness is the basis of all the unlimited particular potentials, containing the seeds that cause the production of all things, like the ocean is for the waves, can this then be something utterly unproduced in every respect?’

That is not how it is, because the statements presenting this as something existent were given in order to instruct disciples. It should be understood that it is as an approximation of the nature of all things that what is in fact emptiness is described with the term substrate consciousness. Not only is the substrate consciousness then existent, but the person too exists – such statements of their existence are given in order to nurture individuals who need to be trained. It was for instance stated:

O mendicants. The five aggregates are the burden. The carrier of the burden is the person.⁴⁵

To some it was taught that there are only the aggregates; and terms such as mind, mentation and consciousness were used when explaining that, ‘By immersing oneself with faith, moral discipline and so forth, one will improve, and in future lives take rebirth in the higher realms.’ But all such teachings were given with intentional ambiguity.

If one wonders what the intention behind them was, it is said:

And so, for those who are not able to
Accommodate the most profound of views,
He taught a substrate, that the person does
Exist, that aggregates alone exist. (6.43)

The kinds of students who have previously had prolonged exposure to misguided (tīrthika) views will struggle to assimilate the profound nature of things (dharmatā), and become frightened when hearing statements such as, ‘I am not, nor will I be ….’⁴⁶ When from the very outset they relate to the instructions of the Teacher like they would the edge of a precipice, backing away from it, they will not accomplish the supreme goal. By initially presenting them with such topics as the substrate consciousness, their misguided beliefs are counteracted as they are steered towards the greater purpose of these instructions. Since they will later, when gaining an unmistaken understanding of the teachings, naturally abandon these, it is definitely a beneficial approach and in no way mistaken. As Āryadeva explained:

One should first of all assess
Their particular inclinations.
If estranged they will never become
Vessels for the sacred Dharma.⁴⁷

For didactic reasons not only did he teach topics such as the substrate consciousness, but also:

He taught by saying I and mine, although
Free from the view of an identity.
And likewise, though things lack inherent truth,
He taught provisionally that they exist. (6.44)

Although he had relinquished any ego and mine by leaving behind the identity view in its entirety, as worldly convention uses terms such as I and mine as a means of communication, the Illustrious One taught using the expressions I and mine. Similarly, although things do not have an intrinsic nature, teaching that they exist can be a means for leading the worldly to understanding, and thus he taught their existence.

As stated at length in the Verses Agreeing with the Pūrvaśaila School:

If the guides of the world
Did not conform with the world,
Nobody would know about Buddha
Or the Buddhist teachings.

While knowing that the aggregates,
Elements and sense fields are of one nature,
He taught about the three realms
To accord with the world.

Though phenomena are unnameable,
He expressed himself to beings
Using an inconceivable variety of terms
To accord with the world.

He taught the non-existence of things,
While dwelling in the nature of awakening
Where there is no non-existence at all,
To accord with the world.

Though seeing no objects nor non-objects,
The supreme of speakers professed
Cessation and the ultimate truth
To accord with the world.

Though being without destruction and creation
Things are equal in the realm of phenomena,
He taught about the inferno of the aeon
To accord with the world.

Although the nature of sentient beings
Is not observed throughout the three times,
He taught about the characters of beings
To accord with the world.⁴⁸

The proponents of consciousness cannot accept the teachings of the Middle Way, and therefore express the tradition they themselves have conceptually fashioned regarding how to regard objects in order to dispel what has been explained here, saying:

When bodhisattvas dwell within intelligence
They know reality to be just consciousness;
No subject can be seen without the object, thus
They find the triple realm to be the mind alone. (6.45)

The word established means to dwell. To be established in intelligence is to dwell in intelligence (prajñā); and the one who is there is established in intelligence, is practicing intelligence. The bodhisattvas refers to those who have reached Present. Those who unmistakenly and without any superimposition whatsoever know, see and fully comprehend the actual reality, know reality. This then forms part of the phrase … know reality to be simply consciousness. Since they realise that in the absence of material form the mind and mental states are merely dependently arisen entities, they know reality to be simply consciousness.

One may ask how they know the actual reality to be simply consciousness. That is why it is said, ‘Seeing no subject in the absence of objects, and realising the three realms as mere consciousness….’ Through the presented reasoning the bodhisattvas come to see that, as there are no apprehended objects, there is also no apprehending subject, and then cultivate the thought, ‘…the three realms are mere consciousness…,’ over an extended period of time. Through this cultivation they come to see mere inexpressible entities through self-cognition, and gradually realise the actual reality as mere consciousness.

‘If they are simply consciousness; in the absence of external objects how can a consciousness bearing their aspects arise?’ To this they say:

It is just like the waves that will appear
Upon the ocean as by wind it’s stirred,
When from the substrate, seed of all, appears
Just consciousness by self-potential spurred. (6.46)

When a stretch of water in the ocean, the supporter of waves, is agitated by the wind, through the conditioning wind’s stirrings one can discern the movements of rising waves previously dormant, as if they are competing to assume a physical identity.

Similarly, the continuum of consciousness has been ongoing since beginningless time, and as tendencies for grasping at subject and object ripen things assume particular identities. When these cease they leave particular imprints in the substrate consciousness that serve as causes for later occurrences of consciousnesses with similar features. Eventually the conditions for them to ripen stir, and they reach ripening. It is in relation to these impure merely dependent occurrences that immature beings then impute concepts of subject and object where there are in fact no objects whatsoever apart from consciousness.

As the proponents of an almighty god (īśvara) and so forth will say:

Just as the spider is the cause of the spiderweb,
The water-crystal is for water,
And the fig-tree for its branches,
He is the cause for all things embodied.⁴⁹

Just as those who profess such things as an almighty god as the creator of the world, the proponents of a substrate consciousness claim that the substrate consciousness is the omnific source (sarvabījaka), since it is the fundamental seed of all things perceived. The only difference between them is that the almighty god is said to be permanent while the substrate consciousness is impermanent.

‘Since this is the way it is clearly presented in the scriptures:

And this dependent nature is the source
From whence ideas of real things then appear –
Appears without external things, exists,
In nature free from all abstracting thought. (6.47)

‘The dependent nature must unquestionably be accepted, since it is held to be the basis for the entire interlacing matrix of thought. One cannot mistake a rope for a snake without the rope as a contingent cause, and one cannot mistake earth and so forth for a vase without the contingent causes of earth and so forth; the latter would not happen in relation to the element of space. Likewise, in the absence of external objects, what would be the rationale for such thoughts as blue and so forth to occur? Hence, one must inevitably accept that the dependent nature is the cause of thoughts; it is the cause for the conditions of thorough affliction and complete purification. In this way, emptiness may be properly understood through statements such as:

“What lacks a certain thing is found to be empty of that, while that which remains is what actually exists.” This is the authentic and precise understanding granting unmistaken access to emptiness.⁵⁰

‘It is by nature beyond the scope of all elaboration, and since verbal expression relies on designations there is no way to communicate it through the medium of words. Thus, to summarise, the dependent nature is here presented as threefold: (1) it arises solely from its own imprints without knowable objects; (2) it has existence; and (3) it is not within the scope of any mental elaboration. That it is the cause for things having imputed existence is established by the fact of its existence, and this is therefore not a point apart from the aforementioned three.’

To this we say:

But how can mind be there without external things?

This should be investigated. They might reply:

‘It’s like a dream,’ you say. …

‘Someone asleep inside a tiny room might dream that the room is filled with a herd of mad elephants, which is not at all the case. That there can be consciousness in the absence of external objects must therefore necessarily be acknowledged.’

To show that this is completely unfounded, it is said:

… Well, let’s consider that:

How? Well,

For me, in dreams as well my mind does not exist,
Which means that your example is not relevant. (6.48)

The cognition appearing as a herd of mad elephants⁵¹ is for us as non-existent as the object itself, because it is unproduced. And when consciousness is non-existent, this example will not be applicable for both of us, and therefore there is no existent consciousness in the absence of external things.

They might think, ’But if the mistaken cognition of the dream does not exist, one shouldn’t then be able to remember one’s dream-experiences when waking up.’ This too is unsound, in that

If mind exists since dreams can be recalled
When waking, then external things should too,

Why?

Since just as you recall the thought ‘I saw,’
You do remember these external things. (6.49)

If the memory of the dream-experience meant that mind exists, the object too would then exist since the experience of the object is also remembered. The unavoidable alternative is to say that consciousness does not exist.

To this they reply: ‘If appearances of such things as elephants in dreams did exist, the eye-consciousness should also be operative then since they are being apprehended; but it is not, since the fivefold collection of consciousness is interrupted by sleep and hence not present.’ Thus,

You claim, ‘It’s not there when one is asleep, because
There is no visual consciousness, just conscious mind,
Its images believed to be external things.
And as in dreams, the same is taking place right now.’ (6.50)

‘When dreaming the eye-consciousness is in every way absent, and with that absent there cannot be an eye sense field (āyatana) apprehending the appearances of such things as elephants; but the mental consciousness is operative. Therefore, it cannot be denied that external forms are absent, and that it is the features of one’s own consciousness that are taken to be external. And just as it is only consciousness appearing in dreams without external things, the same is the case now.’

That is not so, since it is impossible for the mental consciousness to arise in dreams. So,

Just like for you externals are not there
In dreams, the mind as well is not produced.

Hence,

All three, the eye, the object seen, the mind
Which they engender, each of these are false. (6.51)

The perception of forms happens when the eye, the form and the mind are in proximity. Likewise, when objects are distinguished in dreams, a coming together of these three is observed. And just as in that context eyes and form are found to be non-existent, eye-consciousness too has no existence. And just as with these three, the same is the case for the rest:

The rest, with ears and such, are unproduced.

The words ears and so forth include the rest, from sound and ear consciousness up to and including mentation, mental phenomena and mental consciousness. Thus, since all of these triads are false within the dream, it makes no sense to say that the mental consciousness exists in dreams.
Some think that, ‘The form apprehended by the mental consciousness belongs to the sense field of mental phenomena, and does exist in the dream. Hence, it is not at all the case that consciousness exists without objects.’ But this sentiment is also unreasonable, since the three are utterly unfeasible in dreams. If they say they have accepted this in order disprove the scriptural tradition of the others, the dream example becomes meaningless, because what is deemed not false cannot serve to illustrate things that are considered false.

To explain that, since the three are unreal in dreams, this may be used as a proof to confirm unsubstantiality, and that therefore in the waking state as well all phenomena are shown to be without intrinsic nature, it was said:

The same holds true awake as when you dream
Since all things are deceptive; there’s no mind,
There are no objects and no faculties. (6.52)

It should be acknowledged that, just as in dreams objects, faculties and consciousness are false, the same is the case in the waking state. Hence:

As when perceiving illusory beings
That appear while not really there,
The Sugata taught that these phenomena
Are like illusions, similar to dreams.⁵²

Similarly,

Existence as a being is like a dream –
None are born, there are none who die.
The labels and lives of beings are not found;
These dharmas are like bubbles and plantain trees.⁵³

These and similar statements clearly express this.

Thus, these three are explained to be unproduced both with regard to the cognition of waking life and the dream state:

But just as one may see them when asleep,
The three are still here now when we’re awake.

While the sleep of unknowing remains, for those who have emerged from the sleep state and are awake, these three parts continue to be present – even though not produced in and of themselves – as dream perceptions caused by the sleep of ignorance. The same is the case for those who are asleep and have not emerged from the state of dreaming; this triad exists with the same type of nature also then.

And just as when awake the three are gone,
They’re gone when from delusion’s sleep we wake. (6.53)

When sleep ends and one is awake, the dream perceptions involving the three do not persist. Likewise, for those who have fully eradicated the sleep of ignorance and directly perceive the dharma expanse (dharmadhātu), these three do not exist. Hence, consciousness does not exist in the absence of external phenomena.

They might argue: ’Someone with cataracts does perceive things that are non-existent, such as hairs. Therefore consciousness must exist without external things.’ This is also untenable. Why?

The hairs an eye disease will make appear;
The mind which the afflicted sense affects;
His intellect will see them both as real.
With healthy sight they are both seen as false. (6.54)

This is to be regarded exactly as with dreams. From the perspective of the one with cataracts the appearance of hairs exists, while from the perspective of the one without cataracts both are unproduced, since one can hardly confirm consciousness in the absence of objects.

This must necessarily be agreed to. Otherwise,

If there could be cognition without something known,
One would expect that healthy vision too should know
These hairs when gazing at the spot where hairs appear.
This doesn’t happen, hence this cannot be the case. (6.55)

If a cognition having the features of hair strands could arise for the one with cataracts without existing hair strands, then someone without cataracts directing their gaze to the same place where the one with cataracts is seeing hairs should also have a mental experience of them, since they are equally non-existent for both. Hence it is illogical to say that consciousness arises in the absence of objects.

They might say: ’This would be the case if an existent object was the cause for the arising of consciousness. So how is it? It is the ripening or non-ripening of former imprints deposited in the consciousness that determines whether a particular consciousness arises or not. Hence, only when an imprint of another cognition in the form of hair strands left there ripens, does a cognition having these features occur; otherwise not.’ To then explain how this too is unfeasible:

‘There is no ripe potential for the healthy one,
And therefore he does not have this experience;
It’s not because there’s nothing there that can be known.’
But since potential is unreal this doesn’t work. (6.56)

… such a knowable object is lacking means that the knowable thing does not exist. Only if a so-called potential was something existent would there be the occurrence or non-occurrence of consciousness related to its ripening or non-ripening. Therefore this doesn’t prove it.

So why can’t potential exist? To explain:

Potential for what has arisen cannot be,
Nor can it be for what in fact is unproduced.

Is this assumed potential something connected with a present consciousness, or with a past or future consciousness? In the case of a produced present consciousness, there cannot be potential. When we talk of the potential’s we are using the sixth case,⁵⁴ and to say that the essentially resultant consciousness is itself the very cause is illogical. If it were, we would have a causeless result, and once the sprout is produced the seed would also not be destroyed. Therefore it is impossible for a produced consciousness to have potential.

When we say from the potential we are using the fifth case,⁵⁵ and as has already been explained, since it is existent it would be illogical for a produced consciousness to then originate from a potential. Hence there cannot be potential for that which is already a product.

Nor can that consciousness, when by nature unproduced, have potential. Because

With no distinction one cannot distinguish it,
Or else the barren woman’s son would be a fact. (6.57)

Without something distinct one cannot make distinctions. How so? When referring to consciousness potential, consciousness distinguishes the potential, and potential is the basis distinguished. But a thing yet to be produced cannot be used to indicate negation or affirmation in relation to something, saying it is a consciousness such-and-such or non-consciousness such-and-such. That being the case, what sort of distinction would one then actually be making by saying it is the potential for that? And when it can’t be distinguished as such, to say that will come from it won’t serve to identify it, and one isn’t actually indicating anything at all.

If one still insists that something unproduced can have potential, one would have to agree that a barren woman can have a son. Therefore, potential for something unproduced cannot exist.

They might then think: ‘The consciousness in question is an anticipated consciousness that will arise by virtue of this potential, and as it is the potential for that consciousness we can say, “It arises from this.” In this way the entities of distinguisher and basis distinguished are established, just as in everyday language one might say, “Please make some boiled rice,” or “Please weave a garment from this yarn.” This is explained in a treatise as well:’

‘There are three that enter the womb,
The cakravartin and the two self-manifest ones,
….’⁵⁶

To explain how this is empty rhetorics:

You may suggest that in the future it will be.
But lacking in potential it cannot spring forth.

Things that may occur at certain times can arise, but what is certain never to arise – such as a barren woman’s son or things such as space – will not. Thus in this context, if the potential did exist, consciousness could certainly come into being. But when the future consciousness does not exist, and its potential therefore doesn’t exist, as is the case for such things as a barren woman’s son, the absence of its potential means that it certainly can’t arise. This also applies when explaining boiled rice and so forth.

And although it is indeed the case that consciousness and potential are mutually reliant, a thing that is dependent does not in fact have existence. Thus,

And mutual dependence used to prove something,
The wise will say this fails to prove establishment. (6.58)

To say, ‘When consciousness exists, its potential is a fact; and consciousness arises from that,’ describes a case of mutual dependence. If they say, ‘That is exactly the way of things,’ they are effectively saying that consciousness does not inherently exist. For example, only when there is long can there be short, and when there is short can there be long; only when there is there can here exist, and when there is here can there exist. These are all nominal imputations lacking any intrinsic establishment. So if that is the case, they are in fact agreeing with us. As explained:

A cause in the absence of an effect
Has no existence as a cause.
Hence, it necessarily follows
That every effect is also a cause.⁵⁷

And from the Treatise:

If a thing is dependently established,
And that upon which it depends
Is established only in dependence on it,
What is then established in dependence on what?⁵⁸

Meaning that, if a thing such as consciousness were established in dependence on a particular potential, and that particular potential the consciousness relies on to establish its nature in turn depends on it; in establishing these two it must then be asked which is established in dependence on which? It continues:

How can a dependently established entity
Depend when it is not established?
And if you say the established depends,
Its dependence makes no sense.⁵⁹

Meaning that, if consciousness is established in dependence on a potential, is it established or not as it depends on that potential? If it is not established it can’t rely on that potential, because it is as unestablished as the horns of a donkey. On the other hand, if it is established while depending, its establishment would mean that it cannot be dependent.

The wise have thus stated that, ‘Things that are established in mutual dependence are not established.’ A future phenomenon cannot therefore have potential.

To explain that past potential likewise cannot be, it was said:

If it comes from a ceased potential’s ripening,
A separate potential then brings forth something.

If it is so that, as a result of a produced consciousness having ceased a particular potential is left in the substrate consciousness, and through the ripening of this ceased consciousness’s potential a consciousness arises, this would be an instance of something other arising from an extraneous potential. How so? Because:

As parts of a continuum must be distinct …,

‘Tan- means to extend’.⁶⁰ Accordingly, a continuum (saṃtāna) implies a succession, like the continuum of a river, and means that there is a continuous flow, a continuous transmission, with a connection between cause and result. In its usage in the case of the succession of birth and death, there is a sense of a sustaining of the conditioned moments of the three times in a continuous and unbroken sequential state, and as the parts of this continuum exist in substantial instances, the branches of the continuum being instances of substance are what is spoken of as the continuity. These are mutually other and separate things, and our opponents accept their otherness. Hence, when caused by these imprints a latter resultant moment occurs, it is different from the causal moment during which the imprints were set in place, and as such this will be a case of something distinct coming from a separate potential. If they think, ‘This is what we assert, and it is unmistaken,’ that is not so. What one is in fact saying by this assertion is that anything can be produced from anything, as explained in the line:

One could have everything come from just anything. (6.59)

The refutation of other-production has already been covered, and will not be reiterated here.⁶¹

To this they reply:

‘The parts of a continuum are separate,
But their continuum is an unbroken whole,
Hence there’s no fault.’ …

‘The substantial moments of the sequence are indeed mutually distinct but the continuum is a singular thing, so it does not follow that everything can be produced from everything.’

If there was such a thing there would be no fault. But being unsubstantiated,

… Well that will be a feat to prove:

Why?

Inseparable continua make little sense. (6.60)

Possible means that something is feasible. It is not credible that mutually distinct existent identities constitute an inseparable continuum, because they are different, just like things that are separate. To show this, it was said:

What makes for Upagupta’s and Maitreya’s traits
Are different, and not part of one continuum.
And when distinct things keep their separate character,
It’s nonsense to believe they’re one continuum. (6.61)

The idea is similar here: that a singular continuum does not hold up to reason.

It was suggested that, ‘It is the fact of a potential ripening or not that determines whether there will be a consciousness of something or not, and not whether a knowable object is present or not.’⁶² This has hereby been refuted by explaining how potential is an impossibility; and we are therefore left with the position that, ‘Without a knowable object there can be no consciousness.’

Having given this explanation, the proponents of consciousness will still insist that their own presentation is sound, and say:

‘Promoted by its own potential there appears
A ceaseless rising of the visual consciousness,
And this potential which supports its consciousness
Is taken as the physical eye faculty.’ (6.62)

‘An imprint of eye-consciousness is deposited in the substrate consciousness by another moment of consciousness, and as this later ripens, a consciousness with corresponding features is created. The uninterrupted instants of potential that have the uninterrupted potential to produce this consciousness, acting as its support, are what through ignorance is taken by the world to be the physical eye faculty; but there is in fact no eye faculty present apart from consciousness. The same applies to the other faculties.’

Thus, having explained how there is no eye-faculty apart from consciousness, they proceed to assert that material form is not something apart from consciousness either, saying:

‘But people cannot see that without outer forms
These sense-produced cognitions clearly manifest
As blue and such, originating from their seeds,
Instead they take the mind to be external things.’ (6.63)

‘When the bandhujivaka⁶³ and kiṅśuka flowers appear with a reddish hue, like gems they do not need to adopt their colour from something external. Nevertheless, the continua of sprouts and so forth are perceived as arising with their particular aspects in connection with the propelling potential of their own seeds. Similarly, colours such as blue appear as experiences of consciousnesses of blue and so forth without any external physical forms, and in relation to their appearance as blue and such, worldly people become convinced that they are external things. For example, say that on the branches of the trees surrounding a lake of clear water one were to hang red rubies (padmarāga) that would then be reflected in the water. Although there are external appearances of gems perceived in the water, it is not as if they are actually in there. This example may then be applied to consciousness. As such, there are no objects external to consciousness.’

‘Or, said differently:

‘The images in dreams are not external things
But mind that is assuming shapes resulting from
Potentials present. When awake it is the same:
There’s nothing on the outside, just the thinking mind.’ (6.64)

That is not how it is. How so?

If in the dream such blueness may present itself
To mind even without the function of the eyes,
Then why do these things not appear now to the blind
From seeds that ripen though they cannot use their eyes? (6.65)

Now, while we are awake, a clear visual consciousness comes about through the visual perception of forms. If this is exactly the same as what happens in a dream – and without the eyes being active the mental consciousness itself appears from the ripening of its imprint and takes on concordant features as an eye-consciousness – then why cannot a blind person see the same features when awake as someone who is not blind, when these are supposed to appear as such when their imprints ripen? In as much as the eyes are not operating, these two cases are exactly the same.

They might then think: ‘That the eye is inoperative is not the reason the mental consciousness appears in that manner; rather it is the ripening of a potential that mental consciousness has for those features. Hence, when that potential is ready to ripen, the mental consciousness appears with those features, but this only happens in dreams on the condition of sleep, and not while one is awake.’
This does not make sense. How so?

And if you say it is when sleeping that the sixth’s
Potential ripens, and not while one is awake,
Then why not say that just as now it isn’t ripe,
The sixth’s potential neither ripens in the dream? (6.66)

Sixth refers to the mental consciousness. If words are all it takes to claim that the mental consciousness potential ripens in that manner in dreams but not in the waking state, then we might as well verbally claim that, just as in the waking state the consciousness potential does not ripen in that manner, it will likewise not ripen in dreams.

This enables us to say:

For just as lack of eyesight cannot be its cause,
When dreaming it is not the sleep that is the cause.

Dream perceptions are, like the waking state of a blind person, a instance where an operative consciousness-supporting faculty is lacking, and therefore it is not so that a mental eye faculty named potential is there to act as a support for the features the mental faculty takes on as its mental faculty potential ripens. Thus, just as lacking eyes is not its cause for a waking blind man, neither should sleep be the cause for the ripening of imprints of consciousness in dreams.

Therefore, since that is the case,

We therefore grant that there are things as well as eyes
That cause our false perceptions seen when in a dream. (6.67)

Therefore one must accept that in dreams as well there are such objects that are known in such a such a way and there is such a support for the eye-consciousness.

As this is so,

It seems that every counterargument they have
Is nothing more than repetition of their claim.
Their case is thus rejected – …

It is shown that, this triad taking place in the waking state is empty of inherent existence, because it too is a perception, as in a dream. Our opponents then claim that, ‘Waking consciousness is empty of sense objects, because they are consciousness, like the experience of dream appearances;’ ‘The object apprehended while awake is by nature false, because it is an object, like dream objects;’ and also, ‘Without a dependent nature the thoroughly afflicted and fully purified states could not exist, because they would be as unfounded tortoise fur.’ They also use the example of cataracts to this effect. In these and other ways, the proponents of consciousness give various replies which the competent middle way proponent sees through as mere claims, the arguments of the proponents of consciousness are discredited.

Being at odds with scripture and so forth, it is similarly inadmissible; since,

… nowhere will one find
The Buddha stating that there are existent things. (6.68)

As stated:

The threefold world is mere imputation,
Not something essentially existent.
Theoreticians, however, believe that
This imputation is the essence of things.⁶⁴

There is no nature, no cognition,
There is no substrate, no entities;
But the base and immature theoreticians,
Like corpses, imagine these to be.⁶⁵

To take entitylessness as the emptiness of one thing in another is senseless, as the scriptures also state:

Mahāmati. The emptiness of one thing in another is the crudest form of emptiness.⁶⁶

To this one may say, ‘That a cow does not exist because it is not a horse makes no sense, because they have their own identity,’ and so forth.

Likewise,

O Illustrious One. They access the dharmadhātu by using their faculties. The twenty-two faculties are: the eye faculty, ear faculty, nose faculty, tongue faculty, body faculty, mind faculty, female faculty, male faculty, life force faculty, the faculty of happiness, faculty of suffering, faculty of pleasure, faculty of displeasure, faculty of neutrality, faculty of faith, faculty of diligence, faculty of attention, faculty of concentration, faculty of intelligence, the faculty of making the unknown known, the faculty of full knowing, and the faculty of possessing full knowledge.

Regarding these, the eye faculty can’t ever be determined throughout the three times. Not being determinable throughout the three times, there is no such eye faculty. The eye faculty being non-existent, how can there be a conventionally designated eye faculty? It is similar to a hollow fist; a falsehood, inauthentic, there is nothing there.⁶⁷ It may be nominally indicated, but ultimately neither hollow nor fist can be ascertained. The eye faculty is just like a hollow fist; a falsehood, nothing there, something inauthentic. A feigned, deceptive phenomenon that can fool a child. There is nothing there, it is inauthentic. It may, in the same way, be nominally indicated, but ultimately neither an eye nor a faculty can be observed.

The Illustrious One gained the wisdom of omniscience and used the designation eye faculty in order to communicate with the many beings who remain perverted, but ultimately there is no such thing. The faculty is without inherent existence; it is devoid of facultyness. The eye does not exist as eyeness; the faculty does not exist as facultyness. How so? The eye does not have an eye nature; and a phenomenon that has no nature is not an existent thing. Not being an existent thing it is not established. It is unproduced and unceasing. It cannot be designated as something past or future.

Illustrious One, it is just like someone having a dream where he is laughing, joyous and playing, who remembers this when waking up. Even though he is able to bring it to mind, it is not something that can be ascertained. How is that so? These things can’t even be found in the dream, not to mention when waking up – they are nowhere. The faculties are just like this dream; one cannot determine an essence to any phenomenon whatsoever. Hence they are said to be inexpressible.⁶⁸

The aggregates, elements, sense fields, interdependence and so forth are all explained to be like the faculties. How could these ever then have any inherent nature? The proponents of consciousness who haven’t properly explored the intent of the Teacher’s words are therefore unable to apply their intelligence to good ends, and will surely be defeated.

‘But,’ they may say, ‘if in the absence of objects there is no consciousness, how can one then explain that yogis following their guru’s instructions perceive the ground completely covered in skeletons?’

When yogis train according to their guru’s words
And see that skeletons are covering the earth,
The three are still considered unproduced, because …

… that is to say, the object, faculty and consciousness. Why? It is a meditative concentration:

It’s guidance utilising false mind images. (6.69)

The reason is that it is described as a mental exercise involving non-reality.

One must necessarily accept that this is the case. Otherwise,

And if you think that these repulsive images
Are just like any object that the mind conceives,
When other people turn their minds towards such things
They should discern them, and these wouldn’t then be false. (6.70)

When you witness such things as a theatrical performance, among those who are watching, the image present to the eye consciousness of one will similarly be so also for others. If the present case was similar, then non-yogis should be able to perceive exactly the same images as the yogi when directing their gaze towards objects such as these skeletons, their being the same as consciousness of blue and so forth. This meditative concentration would then no longer be a mental application involving non-reality.

Similarly, one should understand that

It’s similar to cataract-inflicted eyes
When spirits see a river’s water being pus.

It was previously explained that, ‘The mind sees hairs through the influence of this disease …,’⁶⁹ and any other similar cases may be considered along the same lines; but we shall desist from elaborating more for now.

In short, please understand that, just as what you know
Has no existence, neither does the mind itself. (6.71)

One should come to recognise that just as knowable objects have no inherent existence, the mind too that entertains images of knowable objects is in and of itself un-produced. As stated:

Without a knowing there’s no known;
And lacking that, no consciousness.
Hence you declared that knowing and
The known lack inherent existence.⁷⁰

Similarly,

Consciousness is like an illusion –
Thus spoke The Sun’s Kinsman.
And what it perceives is likewise
Certainly like illusory things.⁷¹

Those who are seized by this consciousness-claiming madness⁷² and deny external objects, are sure to plunge into the ravine of self-hood, and must therefore be treated by noble compassionate practitioners with an excellent and harsh mantric cure of scripture and reasoning.