Therefore,

Since worldly standards are not valid all the way,
The world cannot disprove what is reality.

As was explained above, at the level of actual reality the worldly perspective is in every respect invalid. Thus, when the context is actual reality, the worldly cannot invalidate it.What can the worldly perspective invalidate? To explain:

But worldly objects are agreed on in the world,
So they’ll disprove you if you do reject these things. (6.31)

For instance, if someone were to say, ‘Something of mine has been stolen,’ and another poses the question, ‘What thing was it?’, and they reply, ‘A vase,’ and the other refutes it, saying, ‘A vase is not a thing, because it is a cognitive object, like a dream-vase;’ denials of objects like this the world can invalidate, since there is worldly consensus about mundane things. But when it comes to the level of the noble ones’ vision and learned individuals making valid analyses, the worldly cannot invalidate these. Learned ones may apply this position also when examining other things.¹

With this, worldly invalidation has been avoided even if it was the case that worldly convention accepted other-production. However, since there is no other-production even from the worldly perspective, also when resorting to the worldly perspective one will not be able to invalidate the refutation of other-production using their view. To show this, it was said:

A worldly person may just sow a seed
But later say, ‘I have produced this child,’
Or else believe that he, ‘did plant this tree.’
No other-rising hence within the world. (6.32)

When it becomes evident that the child is male, a man will say, ‘I produced this boy.’ However, it is not as though a boy having those features is ejected from his body and put into the mother. There is merely an excretion in the form of a seed. But it is clearly the worldly opinion that, since it was due to his depositing the cause that a child then emerged, semen and child are not separate. If they were separate it would be as if they were distinct entities, and one wouldn’t then express it like that. The same may be applied to the seed and the tree.

Thus, to indicate the virtues of interdependence in terms of avoiding permanence and nihilism when explained in the above manner, it was said:

Because the sprout and seed are not distinct,
Seeds haven’t been destroyed when sprouts are there.
And since they neither are the very same,
We wouldn’t say the seeds exist with sprouts. (6.33)

If the sprout was other than the seed, the sprout’s presence would unequivocally mean that the seed was terminated – since the presence of wild oxen does not prevent dead cattle from ceasing to exist, and the presence of ordinary beings does nothing to the transcendence (nirvāṇa) of noble ones. But because they are not distinct, the identity of being a sprout does not terminate the seed, and in this way nihilism is avoided. And because they are not identical the very thing which is seed is not the sprout, and since this prevents imperishability, permanence is avoided.

As taught:

If seed exists, so does sprout;
But seed is not the sprout itself.
It is not other, it is not it – hence,
Dharmatā is neither permanence nor nihilism.²

If seed exists… means that, ‘When there is an existence of seed, then….’ If it is suggested that, ‘A sprout arising with the seed as its cause cannot really be different from the seed,’ it states here: But seed is not the sprout itself. If asking, ‘Doesn’t the seed turn into the sprout?’ Then we have the statement: It is not other, it is not it – …. Since both the positions of sameness and otherness are impossible, neither that it is distinct and nor that it is not distinct will be reasonable. Hence, with both options refuted, that the nature of things (dharmatā) is beyond permanence and nihilism becomes manifestly apparent.

The essential point to be understood here is this: If seed and sprout were endowed with any sense of inherent existence (svabhāva), they would have to be either the same or different. But when they have no such inherent existence, being just like seeds and sprouts appearing in a dream, how can there then be actual oneness or difference. This is the very sense of the following explanation:

Formations are the consequence of ignorance,
But those formations are not present in that itself
Formations and ignorance are empty
By nature, free from fluctuation.³

And as stated in the Treatise:

Whatever is dependently arisen from something
Is not then that exact same thing,
Nor is it other than it –
Hence, no permanence, no annihilation.⁴

That, ‘There is no inherent production whatsoever,’ is something one absolutely must accept. If it wasn’t so:

If things existed with their own identity,
Rejecting this would mean the ruin of these things,
And emptiness would be destroying entities.
This makes no sense, and therefore things do not exist. (6.34)

If things such as material form and sensation were produced from causes and conditions with inherent characteristics, with their own essence and nature, when the yogi then sees entities as empty of inherent nature and realises that all dharmas lack inherent nature, his realisation of emptiness would occur through a rejection of an inherent nature that was actually produced like that. Then, just as such things as hammers can cause the destruction of vases and so forth, this emptiness would discard the intrinsic nature of things, which would not be justified. Therefore, that things have inherent characteristics would never be acceptable.

As taught at length in the noble Heap of Jewels Sutra:

Furthermore, Kāśyapa, the correct middle way approach to analysing dharmas is the following: It is not emptiness that makes dharmas empty; dharmas themselves are empty. It is not characterlessness that makes dharmas characterless; dharmas themselves are characterless. It is not aimlessness that makes dharmas aimless; dharmas themselves are aimless. It is not fabricationlessness that makes dharmas fabricationless; dharmas themselves are fabricationless. It is not productionlessness that makes dharmas productionless; dharmas themselves are productionless. It is not originationlessness that makes dharmas originationless; dharmas themselves are originationless.⁵

Some assert a dependent nature, and thinking that its contingent emptiness characterised by a lack of apprehender and apprehended can neither be expressed as same nor different – just as with impermanence and so forth – they are saying that, ‘It is only through emptiness itself that all things are empty, and not by their very nature.’⁶ As the Four Hundred Verses explains:

One cannot regard the non-empty as empty,
And then think, ‘I shall reach nirvana.’
Mistaken ideas do not lead to nirvana –
That is what the tathāgatas have declared.⁷

And, as the Treatise states:

The victorious ones spoke of emptiness
As the relinquishment of every view,
And stated that those who take emptiness
As a view accomplish nothing.⁸

Here, some say: ‘Indeed there is no production ultimately, based on the refutation of production from self and other. But direct perception and inference shows us that the nature of material form, sensation and so forth are undoubtedly other-produced. If this is not maintained, why say there are two truths? One would end up with just a single truth. And then other-production would be entirely non-existent.’

To this we reply: That is indeed true, and ultimately there aren’t two truths as seen in statements such as, ‘Mendicants. The highest truth is only one, namely: the undeceiving objective is transcendence. All composite phenomena are deceptive false objects.’⁹ Accordingly, since the relative truth is the means for accessing the ultimate truth, when production from self and other is left unanalysed, the worldly perspective is acknowledged.

Thus:

When analysed there’s nothing that remains of things
Except the very nature of reality.
And thus the things which are conventions of the world
Are not to be subjected to analysis. (6.35)

And so, when material form, sensation and so forth are scrutinised in this manner, asking, ‘Are they produced from self, or are they produced from other?’, since there is ultimately neither production nor cessation, apart from the essential nature nothing other by way of production and so forth remains. Therefore, dispensing with thorough analysis of these things, such as asking, ‘Is it from self or other…?’, one should merely take one’s cue from the other and acknowledge what is observed by the worldly when they say, ‘If this is present, this arises.’ 

As Āryadeva explained:

Just as through a foreign tongue
Barbarians cannot be brought to understanding,
One will not make the world understand
Unless using the worldly perspective.¹⁰

And as stated in the Treatise:

Without relying on the conventional
One cannot realise the ultimate.
Without realising the ultimate
One cannot reach transcendence.¹¹

Worldly conventions collapse when subjected to analysis. As taught at length in the sutras:

If for instance three things are combined,
Some wood, some string and a practiced hand,
Pleasant sounds will issue from
The tūṇa, vīnā, sughoṣaka and such.¹²

But though a learned person were to explore
Where they are going and whence they came,
Searching the four directions and in-between,
He will fail to find the sounds’ coming and going.

Likewise, from causes and conditions
All composite phenomena are produced;
But the yogi endowed with authentic vision
Sees these composites as empty and fickle.

The aggregates, elements and sensory fields
Are empty within and empty without;
The sentient lacking selfhood have no abode –
Space-like nature is the hallmark of dharmas.¹³

One may interject: ‘If every type of adherence to things is to be eliminated, we are perplexed as to what to do with this adherence to a conventional truth; there has to be some sort of substantial nature produced which acts as the cause for thoroughly afflicted and completely purified states.’ This way of expressing it too though is nothing but mere words. Why?

No reasoning permits production from itself
Or other at the level of reality.
It can’t be justified even conventionally.
So then, by what can your production be sustained? (6.36)

Just as on the ultimate level the above explained reasoning does not allow for production from self or other, also conventionally it renders production illogical – how then can your production of entities be maintained? Therefore, though unwilling, one must by necessity accept the statement, ‘In neither of the two truths does production with distinct characteristics (svalakṣaṇa) occur.’

Some look at the statement, ‘Not from self …,’ and think that master Nāgārjuna is only refuting the imputed nature (parikalpitasvabhāva) and not the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhāva). This assertion of theirs is unreasonable and cannot be maintained, and those who speak like this will certainly be disproved.¹⁴

‘But if there is no production with distinct identities in either of the truths, how is it that their distinct natures are observed in the world?’ To explain:

Such empty objects as reflections and the like
Are not unheard of when conditions do convene.
And just as from reflections and such empty things
Cognitions with their aspects are indeed produced, (6.37)

It is the same with every empty entity,
As from these very empty things, things do emerge.

All phenomena remain inseparable from the workings of cause and effect. So, what learned individual, when considering the causality involved in the appearance of an insubstantial reflection, would perceive this mere existence of nothing other than a causal process involving material form, sensation and so forth, and become convinced of it having a truly existent nature? Therefore, although its existence is perceived, there is no intrinsic production taking place. As stated:

O Druma, though it has no true nature,
A reflection may still appear to be
Within a spotless mirror. This is how
You should come to understand phenomena.¹⁵

Hence,

And since true character exists in neither truth,
There’s nothing that’s eternal or that terminates. (6.38)

Because things are empty of an inherent nature, like the appearance of reflections, they are in nature essenceless both in the ultimate and relative truths, and both permanence and nihilism are therefore avoided. As the Treatise for instance states:

‘It is not so that what intrinsically exists
Is non-existent’ – this is eternalism.
To say, ‘It was before, but now is no more,’
Implies that one professes nihilism.¹⁶

Likewise:

With the acceptance of existent things
The views of eternalism and nihilism follow,
Because an existent thing must be
Either permanent or impermanent.¹⁷

And similarly:

Through mastery of magical emanation
The Teacher can make an emanation appear,
And that emanated emanation again
Can make further emanations appear.

The actor and enacted karmic act
Are similarly a display of emanations –
Like an emanation that emanates
Yet another emanation.

The afflictions, actions, bodies,
Karmic agents and results
Are like the city of gandharvas,
Similar to dreams and mirages.¹⁸

This example of magical emanations demonstrates how things lacking inherence produce things lacking inherence.

Since there is therefore no intrinsic nature in either truth, the views of eternalism and nihilism are thoroughly abandoned. In addition, there will be no need to justify the link between the result and the karmic act, even when a long time has passed since the act took place, by resorting to such ideas as a substrate consciousness, karmic indelibility and obtention. How so?

Because it doesn’t really cease to be,
Though there’s no substrate, still the potency
Of karma stays long after it has ceased,
And will produce effects – this you should know. (6.39)

Those for whom karmic acts cease will in response to the critical remark, ‘How can a karmic act that has ceased to be give rise to a result?’, venture to confirm the potential of ceased karmic acts by maintaining a substrate consciousness, a separate indelible dharma similar to a promissory note, obtention, or that there is a continuum of consciousness that takes on the karmic imprints.¹⁹ But for those for whom karmic acts are not inherently produced, they also do not cease; and since it is not impossible for a result to manifest from what has not been destroyed, when the karmic acts do not perish the link between the karmic act and its result becomes perfectly tenable. As the Treatise states:

Karma is not produced because
It has no inherent nature at all.
And since it is unproduced,
It also does not cease to be.²⁰

And from the sutras:

A human lifespan is a hundred years,
Thus we call that a lifetime.
But one cannot gather years in a heap.
This is established in a similar way.

When we say, ‘It is not exhausted,’
And when we say, ‘Karma is exhausted,’
The empty aspect is its non-exhaustion,
Conventionally its exhaustion is taught.²¹

To explain through simile the sense of what was just related:

The foolish man who has a pleasant dream
Is still desirous when waking up.
And likewise, though the karmic act has ceased
And lacks reality, it has results. (6.40)

As stated in the Transmigration Sutra:

Great King. Take for instance a man who is asleep and dreams of having intercourse with a beautiful lady, and on waking keeps yearning for her. What’s your opinion, Great King? Would such a man as this, who first dreams that he has intercourse with a beautiful lady and then having awoken still yearns for her, be a wise man?

He replied: No, Illustrious One, he would not. And why? Illustrious One, that dream-woman is non-existent; she cannot be perceived, let alone be a partner in intercourse. That man has nothing in store for him but misery and fatigue.

The Illustrious One said: It is similar, Great King, for immature and uninformed ordinary beings who on seeing material things crave material enjoyment. Craving these things they become attached. With attachment they bring about physical, verbal and mental karmic actions through desire, anger and confusion. When those karmic acts have been consummated, they cease. Having ceased they do not remain in the east … (and so forth), or in the intermediate directions. At a later time, when the moment of death arrives, the associated karma is activated as the final moment of consciousness ceases. At that time, it is just as in the example of the beautiful lady of he who awoke from sleep: one will tend towards that very mental karma. Thus, Great King, as that final moment of consciousness ceases, the first moment of consciousness belonging to the next birth determines whether one appears among the gods … (and so forth), or among the deprived spirits. As soon as that first moment of consciousness ceases, Great King, a mindstream that accords with the resultant manifest experience arises. While there are no phenomena whatsoever, Great King, that are transferred from this world to the next, death and rebirth are still evident. Great King, the ceasing of the final moment of consciousness is what we call ‘death’, while the initial moment of consciousness belonging to the next birth is what we call ‘rebirth’. But, Great King, as the final moment of consciousness ceases it doesn’t go anywhere. And the initial moment of consciousness belonging to the next birth doesn’t come from anywhere either. How can that be so? Because it is devoid of inherent existence. That final moment of consciousness Great King, is empty of a final moment of consciousness; death is empty of death; karma is empty of karma; the initial moment of consciousness is empty of an initial moment of consciousness; rebirth is empty of rebirth; and karmas do not disappear.²²