If there was such a thing there would be no fault. But being unsubstantiated,

… Well that will be a feat to prove:

Why?

Inseparable continua make little sense. (6.60)

Possible means that something is feasible. It is not credible that mutually distinct existent identities constitute an inseparable continuum, because they are different, just like things that are separate. To show this, it was said:

What makes for Upagupta’s and Maitreya’s traits
Are different, and not part of one continuum.
And when distinct things keep their separate character,
It’s nonsense to believe they’re one continuum. (6.61)

The idea is similar here: that a singular continuum does not hold up to reason.

It was suggested that, ‘It is the fact of a potential ripening or not that determines whether there will be a consciousness of something or not, and not whether a knowable object is present or not.’¹ This has hereby been refuted by explaining how potential is an impossibility; and we are therefore left with the position that, ‘Without a knowable object there can be no consciousness.’

Having given this explanation, the proponents of consciousness will still insist that their own presentation is sound, and say:

‘Promoted by its own potential there appears
A ceaseless rising of the visual consciousness,
And this potential which supports its consciousness
Is taken as the physical eye faculty.’ (6.62)

‘An imprint of eye-consciousness is deposited in the substrate consciousness by another moment of consciousness, and as this later ripens, a consciousness with corresponding features is created. The uninterrupted instants of potential that have the uninterrupted potential to produce this consciousness, acting as its support, are what through ignorance is taken by the world to be the physical eye faculty; but there is in fact no eye faculty present apart from consciousness. The same applies to the other faculties.’

Thus, having explained how there is no eye-faculty apart from consciousness, they proceed to assert that material form is not something apart from consciousness either, saying:

‘But people cannot see that without outer forms
These sense-produced cognitions clearly manifest
As blue and such, originating from their seeds,
Instead they take the mind to be external things.’ (6.63)

‘When the bandhujivaka² and kiṅśuka flowers appear with a reddish hue, like gems they do not need to adopt their colour from something external. Nevertheless, the continua of sprouts and so forth are perceived as arising with their particular aspects in connection with the propelling potential of their own seeds. Similarly, colours such as blue appear as experiences of consciousnesses of blue and so forth without any external physical forms, and in relation to their appearance as blue and such, worldly people become convinced that they are external things. For example, say that on the branches of the trees surrounding a lake of clear water one were to hang red rubies (padmarāga) that would then be reflected in the water. Although there are external appearances of gems perceived in the water, it is not as if they are actually in there. This example may then be applied to consciousness. As such, there are no objects external to consciousness.’

‘Or, said differently:

‘The images in dreams are not external things
But mind that is assuming shapes resulting from
Potentials present. When awake it is the same:
There’s nothing on the outside, just the thinking mind.’ (6.64)

That is not how it is. How so?

If in the dream such blueness may present itself
To mind even without the function of the eyes,
Then why do these things not appear now to the blind
From seeds that ripen though they cannot use their eyes? (6.65)

Now, while we are awake, a clear visual consciousness comes about through the visual perception of forms. If this is exactly the same as what happens in a dream – and without the eyes being active the mental consciousness itself appears from the ripening of its imprint and takes on concordant features as an eye-consciousness – then why cannot a blind person see the same features when awake as someone who is not blind, when these are supposed to appear as such when their imprints ripen? In as much as the eyes are not operating, these two cases are exactly the same.

They might then think: ‘That the eye is inoperative is not the reason the mental consciousness appears in that manner; rather it is the ripening of a potential that mental consciousness has for those features. Hence, when that potential is ready to ripen, the mental consciousness appears with those features, but this only happens in dreams on the condition of sleep, and not while one is awake.’
This does not make sense. How so?

And if you say it is when sleeping that the sixth’s
Potential ripens, and not while one is awake,
Then why not say that just as now it isn’t ripe,
The sixth’s potential neither ripens in the dream? (6.66)

Sixth refers to the mental consciousness. If words are all it takes to claim that the mental consciousness potential ripens in that manner in dreams but not in the waking state, then we might as well verbally claim that, just as in the waking state the consciousness potential does not ripen in that manner, it will likewise not ripen in dreams.

This enables us to say:

For just as lack of eyesight cannot be its cause,
When dreaming it is not the sleep that is the cause.

Dream perceptions are, like the waking state of a blind person, a instance where an operative consciousness-supporting faculty is lacking, and therefore it is not so that a mental eye faculty named potential is there to act as a support for the features the mental faculty takes on as its mental faculty potential ripens. Thus, just as lacking eyes is not its cause for a waking blind man, neither should sleep be the cause for the ripening of imprints of consciousness in dreams.

Therefore, since that is the case,

We therefore grant that there are things as well as eyes
That cause our false perceptions seen when in a dream. (6.67)

Therefore one must accept that in dreams as well there are such objects that are known in such a such a way and there is such a support for the eye-consciousness.

As this is so,

It seems that every counterargument they have
Is nothing more than repetition of their claim.
Their case is thus rejected – …

It is shown that, this triad taking place in the waking state is empty of inherent existence, because it too is a perception, as in a dream. Our opponents then claim that, ‘Waking consciousness is empty of sense objects, because they are consciousness, like the experience of dream appearances;’ ‘The object apprehended while awake is by nature false, because it is an object, like dream objects;’ and also, ‘Without a dependent nature the thoroughly afflicted and fully purified states could not exist, because they would be as unfounded tortoise fur.’ They also use the example of cataracts to this effect. In these and other ways, the proponents of consciousness give various replies which the competent middle way proponent sees through as mere claims, the arguments of the proponents of consciousness are discredited.

Being at odds with scripture and so forth, it is similarly inadmissible; since,

… nowhere will one find
The Buddha stating that there are existent things. (6.68)

As stated:

The threefold world is mere imputation,
Not something essentially existent.
Theoreticians, however, believe that
This imputation is the essence of things.³

There is no nature, no cognition,
There is no substrate, no entities;
But the base and immature theoreticians,
Like corpses, imagine these to be.⁴

To take entitylessness as the emptiness of one thing in another is senseless, as the scriptures also state:

Mahāmati. The emptiness of one thing in another is the crudest form of emptiness.⁵

To this one may say, ‘That a cow does not exist because it is not a horse makes no sense, because they have their own identity,’ and so forth.

Likewise,

O Illustrious One. They access the dharmadhātu by using their faculties. The twenty-two faculties are: the eye faculty, ear faculty, nose faculty, tongue faculty, body faculty, mind faculty, female faculty, male faculty, life force faculty, the faculty of happiness, faculty of suffering, faculty of pleasure, faculty of displeasure, faculty of neutrality, faculty of faith, faculty of diligence, faculty of attention, faculty of concentration, faculty of intelligence, the faculty of making the unknown known, the faculty of full knowing, and the faculty of possessing full knowledge.

Regarding these, the eye faculty can’t ever be determined throughout the three times. Not being determinable throughout the three times, there is no such eye faculty. The eye faculty being non-existent, how can there be a conventionally designated eye faculty? It is similar to a hollow fist; a falsehood, inauthentic, there is nothing there.⁶ It may be nominally indicated, but ultimately neither hollow nor fist can be ascertained. The eye faculty is just like a hollow fist; a falsehood, nothing there, something inauthentic. A feigned, deceptive phenomenon that can fool a child. There is nothing there, it is inauthentic. It may, in the same way, be nominally indicated, but ultimately neither an eye nor a faculty can be observed.

The Illustrious One gained the wisdom of omniscience and used the designation eye faculty in order to communicate with the many beings who remain perverted, but ultimately there is no such thing. The faculty is without inherent existence; it is devoid of facultyness. The eye does not exist as eyeness; the faculty does not exist as facultyness. How so? The eye does not have an eye nature; and a phenomenon that has no nature is not an existent thing. Not being an existent thing it is not established. It is unproduced and unceasing. It cannot be designated as something past or future.

Illustrious One, it is just like someone having a dream where he is laughing, joyous and playing, who remembers this when waking up. Even though he is able to bring it to mind, it is not something that can be ascertained. How is that so? These things can’t even be found in the dream, not to mention when waking up – they are nowhere. The faculties are just like this dream; one cannot determine an essence to any phenomenon whatsoever. Hence they are said to be inexpressible.⁷

The aggregates, elements, sense fields, interdependence and so forth are all explained to be like the faculties. How could these ever then have any inherent nature? The proponents of consciousness who haven’t properly explored the intent of the Teacher’s words are therefore unable to apply their intelligence to good ends, and will surely be defeated.

‘But,’ they may say, ‘if in the absence of objects there is no consciousness, how can one then explain that yogis following their guru’s instructions perceive the ground completely covered in skeletons?’

When yogis train according to their guru’s words
And see that skeletons are covering the earth,
The three are still considered unproduced, because …

… that is to say, the object, faculty and consciousness. Why? It is a meditative concentration:

It’s guidance utilising false mind images. (6.69)

The reason is that it is described as a mental exercise involving non-reality.

One must necessarily accept that this is the case. Otherwise,

And if you think that these repulsive images
Are just like any object that the mind conceives,
When other people turn their minds towards such things
They should discern them, and these wouldn’t then be false. (6.70)

When you witness such things as a theatrical performance, among those who are watching, the image present to the eye consciousness of one will similarly be so also for others. If the present case was similar, then non-yogis should be able to perceive exactly the same images as the yogi when directing their gaze towards objects such as these skeletons, their being the same as consciousness of blue and so forth. This meditative concentration would then no longer be a mental application involving non-reality.