Since that is what these words communicate:

It is the worldly fact that aggregates are five
While one is placed within the world’s reality.
But when the wisdom of reality they seek
Has dawned, for yogis these will no longer appear. (6.91)

And since this is the case:

If form is absent don’t assume the mind is real.
And don’t insist that form is there without the mind.

When reasoning shows that form does not exist, since the existence of either of them is then untenable one must concede that mind too can’t exist. And, when mind is understood to exist, form should be likewise accepted since both are confirmed by worldly consensus.This may also be seen from the scriptures:

The Buddha would reject them equally within
The wisdom texts – in abhidharma both were taught. (6.92)

The aggregates of form and so forth were all five equally taught in the Abhidharma, through distinctions such as their unique as well as shared defining characteristics. And in the Perfection of Intelligence all five of them were equally refuted in statements such as, ‘Subhūti. Form is inherently empty…,’ until, ‘Consciousness ….’ 

With this it has been proven by scripture and reasoning that:

Dismiss the tiered system of the dual truth,
Your substance is then barred and cannot be maintained.

To claim that, ‘form does not exist, there is only consciousness,’ is to disregard the tiered levels of the relative and ultimate as has been explained. And while disregarding the levels of these truths, your substantial existence still remains unproven. What does this mean? Since substantial existence has previously been refuted, you exert yourself to no avail.

Acknowledge thus that there are levels to the truth:
Birth in the world but never in reality. (6.93)

Here they reply: ‘One may well explain the intent of this sutra in that particular way, but there are certainly other sutras where we also find that only mind exists. As stated:

‘Without external appearances
The mind appears in various ways,
Like bodies, possessions and abodes –
I teach that these are only mind.¹

‘Here, bodies refer to the sense fields of the eye and so forth. Possessions refer to objects, such as forms and so forth. Abodes refer to the world of the vessel. Since nothing exists externally separate from mind, it is only consciousness that appears in the form of bodies, possessions and abodes, and these are taken to be external objectively existent things separate from consciousness. Hence, the three realms are mind only.’

The statements of this sutra are also given with intentional ambiguity. To explain:

The sutras where it states that what we see is not
External, but the mind perceived in various ways,

There was an intention behind this, in that

That was provisional, taught to invalidate
The physical for those who are attached to form. (6.94)

This provisional meaning teaching is aimed at those with great yearning for material things, who due to that lose their free will through being overcome by desire, anger, pride and so forth. Their obsession with these things leads to much negativity which in turn destroys the merit and wisdom they have developed. To overcome afflictions caused by material things, the Illustrious One would thus teach such ones that things are only mind, in the same way that he would teach about the skeletons that are not in fact there to desirous individuals in order to overcome desire for external objects.

‘How can one be certain that this is a provisional meaning and not the definitive meaning?’

Based on scripture and reasoning. And in order to show this it was said:

The Teacher did express it as provisional.
Provisionality is shown by reasoning.

It is not only this sutra that is provisional in meaning, but others as well:

This scripture makes it clear that other sutras too
Of similar sort will likewise be the leading truth. (6.95)

And which sutras are of a similar kind? When presenting the three natures – the imputed, the dependent and the thoroughly established – the Unraveling the Intent Sutra² states that the imputed is nonexistent, the dependent is existent […], and likewise presents statements such as:

Deep and subtle is the carrying consciousness,
Like a river’s current, a flow of every seed.
Since it would be wrong to think of it as the self,
I do not teach it to the immature.³

As stated:

Like a doctor will prescribe medicine
According to various needs of patients,
In the same way the Buddha taught
To beings that there is only mind.⁴

These scriptural quotes make it clear that this is provisional in meaning. Similarly,

[…]: In the sutras mention is made by the Illustrious One of the tathāgata nature. The Illustrious One describes it as present within the bodies of all sentient beings, a natural pure perfection, primordially unsullied and endowed with the thirty-two marks of excellence. The Illustrious One says that it is like a precious jewel that is wrapped in filthy garments, wrapped in the garments of aggregates, elements and sense fields, held back by attachment, aversion and confusion, sullied by the taints of misconceptions, something permanent, lasting and unchangeable. How is this tathāgata nature the Illustrious Tathāgata speaks of not the same as the ātman taught by the misguided? Illustrious One, the misguided also describe the ātman as permanent, uncreative, without properties, pervasive and indestructible.

The Illustrious One replied: No, Mahāmati. When I teach the tathāgata nature, it is not the same as the ātman propounded by the misguided. Mahāmati, the tathāgatas, arhats, truly complete buddhas teach emptiness, the ultimate end, transcendence, the unborn, featureless, wishless and so forth as the tathāgata nature. The tathāgata nature is used to indicate the unapparent state of non-conceptuality so that immature beings may lay aside their fear of selflessness. O Mahāmati, the future and present bodhisattvas, great beings, would not maintain belief in a self.

Take as example, Mahāmati, the potter who by using his hands, craftsmanship, tools, water, cord and perseverance can make pots of various shapes from a single lump of clay. In the same manner, Mahāmati, the tathāgatas may teach the lack of self of phenomena, the reversal of all conceptual characteristics, in various modes using intelligence and skilful means such as tathāgata nature or selflessness when suitable. In a way similar to the potter, they teach using all manners of terms and expressions.

This is why, Mahāmati, the teaching on the tathāgata nature is not like the ātman taught by the misguided. Through teaching the tathāgata nature, Mahāmati, the tathāgatas may provisionally lead the misguided who cling to their teachings on the ātman. Thus they teach the tathāgata nature. It is how those who have ended up with ways of thinking that conceptualise a real self may gain the perspective that can accommodate the three liberations, and thus swiftly realise unsurpassable true and complete awakening.⁵

As it also teaches:

Mahāmati. The features of emptiness, non-arising, non-duality and lack of inherent nature are found in the sutras of all buddhas.⁶

It has thus been made abundantly clear through this citation that sutras of this type that the proponents of consciousness take as definitive in meaning are in fact all provisional in meaning. To explain how reasoning will also show them to be provisional in meaning:

The buddhas taught that when there is no object known
The knowing of it will be easy to refute.
The known is therefore what’s initially denied,
Because without the known the knowing is disproved. (6.96)

The illustrious buddhas introduce students in stages to the lack of inherence. Meritorious activity makes it easier for one to access the true state of things (dharmatā), and the teachings on generosity and so forth are therefore given first, as a skilful method for accessing the true state. Refuting the known is similarly a skilful way of coming to understand selflessness, and the illustrious ones therefore present the refutation of knowable objects initially, since those who understand the selflessness of the known object will find it easy to relate to the selflessness of the knower. In some cases, those who have understood how knowable objects have no inherent nature, will gain the realisation of the knower’s lack of an inherent nature by themselves. In some cases they will need some guidance. The refutation of knowable objects is therefore taught first.

To encourage intelligent individuals to identify other texts in a similar fashion, it is said:

And thus you should discern the level of the text:
When what is being explained is not reality
But leads one, then the sutra is provisional;
It is definitive if voidness is the theme. (6.97)

Sutras which do not explicitly express interdependent origination through such particular attributes as non-arising and so forth, may be described as aids that help one approach the lack of inherent nature, as when it states:

To counteract attachment to form
You taught about form, saying
‘If the eyes do not apprehend the elements,
How can they apprehend what they give rise to?’⁷

And from a sutra:

Impermanence means non-existence.⁸

While they are definitive if the topic matter is emptiness, as found in statements such as the following:

Know that sutras where the Sugata explains
Emptiness are classed as definitive in meaning,
While dharmas where he teaches beings, individuals
And persons are all provisional in meaning.⁹

And,

All the sutras that I have taught
In the many thousands of realms
Are identical in meaning though the words differ,
But cannot be fully reiterated.

Through contemplating a single item
One will be practicing all.
Of all the many dharmas
Expressed by the myriad buddhas,

Every dharma relates selflessness.
And if anyone skilled in the meaning
Of things studies this point,
The qualities of Buddha will not be hard to find.¹⁰

Similar and more extensive presentations on this matter may be found in various sutras such as the noble Akṣayamati.¹¹

To present one stance on this: The snake is an imputation upon the interdependence of a coiled rope, because it isn’t actually there. A real snake is thoroughly established because it is not an imputation. As in this example, inherent nature is an imputation on what is dependently created. And as we find stated:

Inherent natures cannot be fabricated
And do not depend on anything else.¹²

Hence, inherent essences cannot be created. The apprehended and reflection-like interdependence which is imputed on is the actual fact from the perspective of the buddhas, since it is then no longer an imputation. Directly perceiving the nature itself, without reference to created entities, they realise the actual reality, and are therefore called buddhas.¹³

Such an understanding of the three natures – the imputed, the dependent and the thoroughly established – as presented here, helps explain the intention of the sutras. When the duality of apprehended and apprehender does not have a reality beyond the dependent nature, it should be considered whether these two can in fact be imputed on the dependent nature. But this digression shall end here, and we now return to the main subject matter.

Having thus also refuted production from other, now in relation to the refutation of production from both, it was said:

That things arise from both will not be reasonable,
Because one will encounter faults explained above.

For the Possibilists (syādvādika), production takes place both from self and other, meaning that they believe in production from both. A pot, they say, comes about through factors such as a lump of clay, a stick, a potter’s wheel, string, water, the potter and so forth. Since the clay and the pot aren’t separate things, the pot produced exists in the nature of the clay, hence self-production. Since such things as the work of the potter involved in its production are distinct from it, there is other-production. This is the idea underlying their belief in both self- and other-production.

And just as with the external environment, individual creatures also come about from self and other. In this regard they present a list of principles: ‘There are nine principles involved in this: life-force, inanimate factors, merit, negativity, defilements, vows and so forth.’ Given that Maitreya’s future birth exists in the nature of his life-force, there is self-production, because Maitreya and his life-force are not separate things. Life-force is a component of migratory existence, and these opponents therefore assert that it is a cause for existences such as that of a god. Since one’s birth takes place through external factors such as one’s father and mother, religious ways or lack thereof, defilements and so forth, there is other-production. ‘Hence,’ they say, ‘we are not affected by the statement, “There is no production from self, nor is there production from other,” because we propose that there is neither exclusively self-production nor other-production.’

This is not a reasonable argument, as explained: Production from both is likewise unjustified. Why? Since it would involve the faults already mentioned. Because holding the position of both involves the faults already pointed out for both positions, production from both is not possible.

Because the pot exists in the nature of the clay there is no production, since it already exists. As has been explained:

If it came from itself there would be nothing gained.
What is produced, produced once more – that makes no sense.¹⁴

Similarly, it should be acknowledged that as he already exists by nature of his life-force, Maitreya isn’t then born.

Because the pot is not present in the identity of the water, string, wheel and so forth, it cannot be produced from them. As has been explained:

If it were possible that something else could be produced
Based on what’s other, utter darkness should emerge from flames;
And one would see production of all things from everything,
Since in their difference every non-producer is the same.¹⁵

The case of Maitreya arising from what is other, such as his father and mother, may be explained in the same manner.

Just as it was previously shown how production from self and from other is untenable in the worldly relative and ultimately, to now conclude the above treatment that showed that the reasoning presented by the Syādvādikas does not work it was said:

Not in the world nor actually can this be claimed ...

To express that, we do not merely allude to the reasons presented above that show how production from both is untenable, but will explain so here as well, it was said:

When by each one production cannot be sustained. (6.98)

For example, since a single sesame seed may yield oil, many of them will as well, while this is not the case for sand where such a capacity is not observed. Likewise, it is when productive ability is there for individual members that a collection of such things will have it too. Hence, production from both is unreasonable.

The Substantivists (svabhāvavāda)¹⁶ will say, ‘With causal production, the cause and effect must either be the same, different or both, and then one will run into those problems. But if I do not assert a cause, those problems will not be an issue. Hence, it is in fact the case that things arise by themselves. We do not observe anything that deliberately makes the roughness and smoothness of the fibres and petals of the lotus flower; nor do we observe anything that makes the various colours and shapes of the petals, stamens and pistils. The same is the case for breadfruit, pomegranate and so forth. And just as with these things that are part of the environment, we do not observe anything that intentionally designs the colours, shapes and so forth of lifeforms such as peacocks, partridges and cranes. The fact therefore, is that production of things happens naturally.’

To comment on this:

If causelessly production could in fact take place,
Then endless things would always come from everything.
And people of the world would not in all these ways
Be planting seeds and so forth to make crops appear. (6.99)

If things could arise spontaneously, just as the breadfruit tree wouldn’t then be the cause of breadfruit, all other sorts of things that are not its cause could also produce it – neem, mango and so forth – since they would all equally be non-causes. Just as breadfruit could be found on trees that aren’t its cause, it could also emerge from anywhere in the three realms. And, even though fruits such as mango and breadfruit¹⁷ are seasonal, appearing only at certain times, they would then be perennial, not being reliant on seasons.

Similarly, since peacocks wouldn’t be the cause of peacock feathers, crows would also have peacock feathers; and even at the embryonic stage, peacocks would always have parrot feathers. Every being would in this way perpetually come into being, but this is clearly not the case – so to assert naturalness makes no sense.

Having shown how it contradicts reason, to further explain how it contradicts what we can observe it says, ‘… and people of the world wouldn’t then be preparing all these things, like seeds, to make their crops appear.’ This demonstrates that production doesn’t happen naturally.

Furthermore,

If living were devoid of causes one would not
Perceive more than the sky-lotus’s scent and hue.
But since the dazzling beauty of the world is seen,
Just like one’s mind the world arises causally. (6.100)

If lifeforms were devoid of causality, one wouldn’t come to have perceptions any more than one does of the scent and colour of a blue lotus in space, but one does. And therefore you should acknowledge that just as with the workings of mind, every state of being is causally arisen.

According to you, a mental impression of the colour blue will not occur if one removes the blue object. And since the mental impression of blue is only there with the presence of blueness, and not by itself, this invalidates the claim of naturalness.