One may then ask, ‘What is this self, the reference point for the view of identity? This we do not know.’

To take one such case:

Misguided ones belive the self consumes and lasts,
Is uncreative, and lacks features or pursuits.
The differences between the schools of Tīrthikas
Are based on minor variations on this theme. (6.121)

As the Sāṃkhyas say:

Primordial nature is uncreated.
The seven – the great principle, etc – are both created and creative.¹
The sixteen² are just created.
Soul is neither created nor creative.³

The primordial nature (or primordial creator; prakṛti)⁴ is so called because it has creative potential (prakaraṇa). In what situation is it creative? When seeing the desire of a soul (puruṣa).⁵ When a soul gives rise to desire to enjoy objects such as sound, being aware of the soul’s desire, nature joins with the soul leading to the production of sound and so forth. The order in which this takes place is in the following:

From the primordial nature comes the great principle (mahat),⁶ from which comes the ego (ahaṃkara), and from this again the group of sixteen. Among the sixteen, the five elements come from the five, meaning that sound and so forth give rise to the elements.⁷

That it is uncreated implies that it has creative potential, but is not itself created in the way that the great principle is. The great principle and so forth have creative potential as well as being created manifestations, which is why it is stated that the seven – the great principle, etc – are both created and creative; the great principle and the others are creators from the point of view of their own creations, and they are created from the point of view of the primordial nature. The sixteen that consist of the mind faculty and so forth are only creations, which is why it says that the sixteen are created. The word just (tu) makes it clear that they are exclusively creations. When it comes to souls, the phrase soul is neither created nor creative, is saying that it does not have creative potential nor is a created manifestation.

This being the order in which all types of manifest creations happen, something should be said about how the soul becomes a consumer as it gives rise to desire. This happens when, governed by the understanding mind the mental faculties of the ear and so forth focus on the apprehended object, such as sound, making the soul aware of the mentally grasped object. Since it is therefore in the soul’s nature to entertain this mental awareness, it is said that ‘the self enjoys the objects.’ Desire hence leads to the passionate consumption of objects, but when passion is diminished and the soul becomes free from the desire for objects, a gradual development of meditative absorptions can take place leading to the adoption of divine sensory powers. With that one comes to see the reality of things through divine sight, and on observing this gives rise to a sense of shame, similar to that felt by an adulteress; and with no further incitement towards the self there is then release. A step by step reversal of all the groups of manifest creations leads to pleace without any further appearances, at which point the soul is left in its solitary state, and this is what is called liberation.

It is permanent in the sense that, although temporarily crippled by manifest creations, it always remains uncrippled in its original and isolated stated. While the primordial nature is an active creator, and among the manifest creations some are also active creators, the self is a non-creator in the sense of being a disinterested spectator to activities. The way in which it is an enjoyer has already been explained above. It is without properties (guṇa) since it is not of the nature of rajas, tamas and sattva.⁸ Since pervasiveness does not involve activity, it is inactive. These are the characteristics of the soul (puruṣa).

It was mentioned that, ‘while the primordial nature is an active creator, and among the manifest creations some are also active creators…;’ so which of the manifest creations are active creators and which are not? We will go into some detail to explain this matter.

Rajas, tamas and sattva are the three properties. Rajas is characterised by movement and involvement, tamas by heaviness and darkness, and sattva by lightness and clarity. They are synonymous with happiness, suffering and confusion. In the primary principle (pradhāna) these are in perfect equilibrium, their qualities in their original form cancelling each other out. The primordial nature (prakṛti) is the state when these have not yet manifestly evolved.

As was said, ‘from the primordial nature comes the great principle (mahat),’ a synonym for intelligence (buddhi). From the great principle comes the ego (ahaṃkara), which has three forms: changeable (vikāra[?]), luminous (sāttvika) and dark (tāmasika). From the changeable ego come the five subtle elements (tanmātra): form, sound, smell, taste and texture. From the subtle elements come the major elements: earth, water, fire, wind and ether. From the luminous ego come the five motor organs (voice, hands, legs, anus and genitals) and five mental organs (eyes, ears, nose, tongue and skin), which together with mind, which has both characteristics, makes eleven. The dark ego is involved in both other types of ego. The great principle, the ego and the five subtle elements are creators and creations, while the ten faculties, mind and major elements are only creations. The primordial nature is uncreated. This is what the scripture states.

The different systems of the misguided (tīrthika) are similar to that propounded by the Sāṃkhyas with minor variations. The Vaiśeṣikas say that the self has nine principles: intelligence, pleasure, pain, desire, anger, effort, righteousness (dharma), non-righteousness (adharma) and creative force. Intelligence is what apprehends objects. Pleasure is the experience of desired objects. Pain it its opposite. Attachment is to be drawn towards desirable things. Aversion is to feel opposed to undesirable objects. Effort is to have the adroitness to bring one’s goals to completion. Righteousness is what brings higher states and the excellent goal. Non-righteousness is the opposite. Creative force is what thinking leads to, and is the cause of thinking.

As long as these nine principles of the self remain present in the self, one will keep engaging in their related virtuous and non-virtuous activities, thus perpetuating cyclic existence. When the soul, through discriminative insight, manages to sever the principles of intelligence and so forth at the root, it will remain in its own true state and become liberated.

The self is also described as permanent, a creator, a consumer, endowed with properties and, since it is pervasive, inactive. There are some who hold that it is active due to the fact that it contracts and expands. The Vedavādins assert for instance that it is like the space inhabiting jars: a difference in bodies makes what is singular manifold.

The differences between the systems of misguided schools are hence based on minor variations in how the self is specified to be.

Concerning this self that is talked about in the various scriptural traditions of the misguided:

Since it is unborn, like a barren woman’s son,
There cannot be a self like that of which you speak,
It cannot be the basis for the sense of self –
As even relative that would not be allowed. (6.122)

This is because it would contradict their own inferential logic. Since it is unborn, just like the son of a barren woman, a self such as they present it, cannot exist. And, being unborn, it can also not be the reference for the ego (ahaṃkara). One should see that, not only is it unreasonable for it to exist and be the reference for ego in actual reality, but also relatively it doesn’t have these two traits.

And not only does it not make sense that it is something existent and supports the ego, also

And since its qualities that one may find described
Within the various scriptures of the Tīrthikas
Are contradicted when they argue it’s unborn,
These features will amount to nothing in the end. (6.123)

According to the scriptures of the Sāṃkhyas, the self is characterised as being permanent, a non-creator, a consumer, without features and inactive. But this self can’t be permanent, can’t be a non-creator and so forth, and can’t be inactive because – as they themselves say – it is unborn, just as the son of a barren woman. This will apply equally against the tradition of the Vaiśeṣikas, using the same line of reasoning, ‘The self can’t be permanent, can’t be a non-creator…,’ and so forth. This position can in fact be used against any proponent of self, using the argument of it being unborn and the example of the barren woman’s son to expose the thing itself and its features.

This being the case,

There is therefore no self distinct from aggregates,

There is therefore no self that exists as something separate from the aggregates, since apart from the them no self can be perceived. If it did exist as something separate from the aggregates, it would be something that could be established on its own, but this is not the case. Hence, no self exists that is distinct from the aggregates,

Since it can’t be perceived without the aggregates.

As stated:

It is not possible for there to be a self
That is different from the assimilated.
If separate it should be perceived also without
The assimilated, yet it is not.⁹

Likewise,

If it was different from the aggregates,
It would not have the aggregates’ characteristics.¹⁰

Not only is a self that is different from the aggregates non-existent; also

Since they know no such thing and still think there’s a self,
The worldly wouldn’t claim the ego is thus based. (6.124)

Even those who do not identify the self in these particular ways will still due to their habitual clinging have notions of ‘I’ and ‘mine,’ and thus believe in a self. It is therefore not viable that there is a self distinct from the aggregates that forms the support for the ego.

They may then think, ‘Even though they do not at present think of it in terms of being permanent, unproduced and so forth, from past familiarity they still have the view that it is the ego’s reference point.’

That is not so. It is not the case that only those who have a familiarity with the scriptures of these individuals believe in a self.

One may observe that there are those without such prior familiarity, who still maintain a sense of ego in this life have, such as:

Through aeons born among for instance animals,
They would not think it unproduced and permanent.
Yet still they would be harbouring a sense of self.
There is therefore no self distinct from aggregates. (6.125)

Beings that have not left the animal states for an untold number of aeons, will not during that time have considered there to be a self that has these features. The words for instance (api) are meant to include hell beings and so forth. Having observed that those who haven’t been exposed to a self that that havs these features, still have a sense of ego, what rational individual would then insist that such a self, forming the basis for a sense of ego, exists? There cannot therefore be a self that is distinct from the aggregates.

There are some belonging to our own side who say:

Some say no self is found distinct from aggregates,
The reference for self-view is thus the aggregates.

The reasonings presented have shown that no self can be found separate from the aggregates. There is therefore no self that is distinct from the aggregates, and the aggregates are hence the only reference for the view of identity. This is why it is said that the self is merely the aggregates alone. This is the position held by the noble Saṃmitīya school¹¹ , who belong to our own tradition.

Among them,

While some insist all five support the view of self,
Some others will insist it is the mind alone. (6.126)

For some it is the five aggregates (form, feeling, perception, formations and consciousness) which serve as the reference for the view of identity, and maintain that it is in connection with them that this conception of selfhood occurs. As is stated:

The Illustrious One said: O mendicants, those ascetics and brahmins who perceive things in terms of ‘I’, are in fact only perceiving the five assimilated aggregates.¹²

They therefore say that it was in order to clarify the statement, ‘The view you have is in relation to a collection (kāya) that is by nature perishing (√sad-), and not in relation to an I or a mine,’¹³ that he expressed the view (dṛṣṭi) that insists on I and mine as being the view of identity (satkāyadṛṣṭi).¹⁴

Others claim that the self is in the mind, and refer to verses such as the following, where the mind is spoken of as the self:

Oneself is one’s own protector.
Who else can protect one?
The wise attain the higher realms
By properly taming the self.¹⁵

How do they support this? By saying that there is no self apart from the aggregates, and that other sutra statements talk of taming the mind:

To tame the mind is excellent.
Taming the mind brings happiness.¹⁶

The mind being the basis of the ego, is thus labeled the self.

To reply to this:

The aggregates are multiple, so if they are
The self, the consequence would be a lot of selves.
The self is then a substance, and can be observed,
And what you can engage is not a fallacy. (6.127)

To hold the position that the aggregates are the self will mean that the self is manifold because the aggregates are manifold. And if it was the case that mind is the self, one could distinguish between eye-consciousness and so forth, or between the different moments of consciousness appearing and disappearing, and the self would also then be multiple. Fault like this must be mentioned if one is to follow reason. What the faults will be, is in this way explained to those who profess the self to be the aggregates or the consciousness, and other faults that befall them are mentioned in relation to each of these positions. A scriptural source states that, ‘With birth in the world, only a single individual is born,’¹⁷ which means that the self is not held to be multiple.

Concerning the statement the self would be substantial, since the concept of aggregate is used in relation to substances of form and so forth distinguished in terms of the past and so forth, and it is only in relation to these that the convention self is used, the self too would be a substance. And that is not the intent of the following statements:

Mendicants, these five are mere names, mere conventions, mere designations. Which five? The past, the future, space, transcendence and the individual.¹⁸

And:

As with a gathering of parts
One may speak of a chariot,
Contingent on the aggregates
Convention grants a sentient being.¹⁹

Since it follows that the self would be substantial, the aggregates cannot therefore be the self.

Also, since the view of identity would be based in something substantial, not being mistaken it would be equal to conceptions such as blue or yellow. To give up the view of identity would not then an abandonment of the origin, but would simply be like letting go of an attraction towards an object, such as visual impressions of blue, yellow and so forth.

Also,

Nirvana would be the destruction of the self.
Before, it would arise and vanish all the time.
Without an agent the result would not exist.
Distinct are culprit and experiencing side. (6.128)

If the self were made up of the aggregates, when one reaches nirvana and the aggregates are discontinued, the self would be annihilated. Such a belief in annihilation would be a nihilistic view, since according to yourself it constitutes an extremist view to think that there is permanence or annihilation in relation to any idea of selfhood involved in the ‘I’- and ‘mine’-based view of self. One cannot therefore accept that the self is discontinued at the time of nirvana, since that would constitute an extremist view. Hence, the self cannot be made up of the aggregates.

Just as prior to entering nirvana, the aggregates arise and vanish every instant, the self too would be arising and vanishing, since the self is made up of the aggregates. And just as one couldn’t then say, ‘This body of mine came into being,’ the statement, ‘At that point, at that time, I was a king named Māndātṛ,’ would not have been made, because the self, just like the body, would have been destroyed, and it would be accepted that it was another that was born at present. As the Treatise states:

The assimilated, which arises
And ceases to be, is not the self.
How indeed could the assimilated
Become the that which assimilates.²⁰

Likewise,

If the self were the aggregates,
It would be appearing and disappearing.²¹

And if it keeps appearing and disappearing, an agent self does not exist, which means it cannot have a relationship to a result. If the act by which it comes into being is impermanent, the agent then no longer existing, having nothing to support it the act as well will not exist. There will then be no viable relationship between actions and their results.

If the result of karma produced in a prior moment were experienced in subsequent moments, the result of karma accumulated by one would be experienced by another, which is why it says, the culprit and the experiencer would be other. What has been done can then disappear, and there can be consequences from what one has not done. The Treatise states:

If it were different, even in the absence
Of that it could then still be present.
And what was would likewise then remain,
It could now be born without having died.

Karmas would disappear, be annihilated,
And the consequence of acts carried out by one
Could be experienced by another.
These and other faults would follow.²²

It does not therefore make sense that the aggregates can be the self.

They might then say: ‘Although the former and latter moments are indeed different, they form a single continuum and we are therefore not at fault.’

To reply:

‘It’s really one continuum, thus we’re not at fault;’
The problems with continua were shown before.

This was treated when it was said, things related respectively to Maitreya and Upagupta…²³ And as stated:

If being a human is different from a god,
That would mean impermanence.
If being a human is different from a god,
A continuity becomes untenable.²⁴

Thus, since it does not make sense that things that are mutually distinct can be included within a single continuum, this consequence cannot be avoided.

To express that neither the aggregates nor the mind can therefore be the self, it was said:

The aggregates or mind as self thus makes not sense,

The foregoing discussion of unwanted consequences is not the only thing that shows how untenable it is for the aggregates or the mind to be the self. In addition:

The world as finite and so forth was not endorsed. (6.129)

Since it was not mentioned whether there is an end to the world and so forth, it does not make sense to say that the aggregates or the mind is the self. The fourteen indeterminable issues are mentioned by all schools:

‘The world is eternal’ or ‘the world is not eternal;’ or ‘the world is both eternal and not eternal’ or ‘the world is neither eternal nor not eternal…;’²⁵

Since the Illustrious One said that no reply could be given to these, they are classified as indeterminable issues (avyākṛtamūla).

These were hence dismissed, and if a mendicant upholds the idea that the world is eternal, the scriptures of the Pūrvaśaila school state that, ‘The one who upholds the view that the world is eternal is subject to expulsion. The one who upholds the view that the world is not eternal is subject to expulsion. The one who upholds the view that the world is both eternal and not eternal is subject to expulsion. The one who upholds the view that the world is neither eternal nor not eternal is subject to expulsion;’ and that one should not associate with them.²⁶

There are thus said to be fourteen indeterminable issues. And if you take the word world to mean the aggregates, since the aggregates arise and cease and are therefore impermanent, one would in effect determine that the world is not eternal. And by saying that the aggregates are not present subsequent to nirvana, one is determining that the world is finite. One would similarly have determined that the Tathāgata does not exist after death. But since the statements saying that the world is finite and so forth were dismissed, it is thus unreasonable that the aggregates themselves can be the self.

Also,

For you, when yogis understand the lack of self,
All things would then lose their existence certainly.

If the aggregates or the mind were the self, when the yogi ponders the truth and understands the truth of suffering in terms of non-self – that ‘all phenomena are selfless’ – then it would be seeing the lack of aggregates that would be seeing the lack of self, which is not what you assert. The aggregates cannot therefore be the self.

One might contend, ‘When the term self is used in the context of the relationship between the act and its result, it can only be referring to the aggregates as there is nothing else that can be the self. But when seeing the lack of self, it is the soul (puruṣa), the inner experiencer (antaḥkaraṇa) imagined by non-buddhists, that is being referred to. Thus, when seeing selflessness one is just seeing the idea of a lack of this inner soul, and it does not follow that one is seeing the lack of all things.’

To reply:

If it is an eternal self that is dismissed,
Then neither mind nor aggregates can be the self. (6.130)

If you worry that the consequence will be that there are then no existent things, and so seize on the idea that the term self refers to a permanent self, no longer thinking that it is the aggregates or the mind that are the self, then you have deserted your own position.

One might then think, ‘I do not agree that that is what it is referring in that context, and therefore I am not at fault.’

Well, this too will not suffice. How can you just be adopting whatever unreasonable position that you like, saying that in that particular case it is the inner soul that is the self, and otherwise it is the aggregates? If you say it is because it just can’t be, it has also already been shown that it is impossible that it can be referring to the aggregates. Hence, if you do not accept that in the context of the thought, ‘all phenomena are selfless,’ the term self refers to the aggregates, you cannot claim that it does so elsewhere. If you claim that it does refer to the aggregates elsewhere, then you will have to say it does in this context too.