To clarify this lack of a relationship through an example:

Like he who finds that there’s a snake within his wall,
Proclaiming it’s no elephant to ease his fright
And to escape the harm the serpent can inflict,
Will surely end up being ridiculed by all. (6.141)

Someone encountering a dangerous situation, but who does not see the danger they’re in and fails to take the appropriate steps to avoid it, thus remaining relaxed and displaying no anxiety, will end up being bitten by the snake. That no elephant is present will not be helpful in removing the danger the snake poses. It is the same when one says that the aggregates or consciousness are the self, as a lack of a permanent self will not then be any help in removing the ego which is based in the aggregates. This cyclic state will certainly not then subside.

Having thus given an exhaustive treatment of these two positions, showing how the self can neither be composed of nor distinct from the aggregates, it is discussed how the self cannot be existent within a relationship of support and supported:

The self is not within the aggregates,
Nor are the aggregates found in the self.
If they were different that could be surmised.
As they’re not different it’s but an idea. (6.142)

If there were a difference it would make sense that things could be a support and a supported, as when saying there is curd in a bowl. The bowl and the curd being different from the worldly point of view, are seen to be in a relationship of support and supported. But since the aggregates are not separate from the self in this manner, and the self is not separate from the aggregates, these two cannot be in a relationship of support and supported.

To indicate how the self cannot be the possessor of the aggregates it was said:

One cannot claim the self possesses form, because
There is no self, so ownership does not apply.
One owns a cow: distinct. One has a body: same.
But form is not the same nor different from the self. (6.143)

That the self could be the same as or different from the aggregates has already been disproved. Possession too is problematic. When saying that Devadatta has a body no difference perceived, while when saying he owns a cow a difference certainly exists. But as there is neither identity nor difference in relation to form and the self, it isn’t possible to say that the self could possess form.

Now, to enumerate the mistaken perceptions and aspects involved in the view of identity by summarising the positions that have been refuted, it is said:

Form’s not the self, the self does not possess the form,
There is no self in form, and form’s not within self –
All aggregates considered in this fourfold way
And added up amount to twenty views of self. (6.144)

When the five aggregates’ lack of self is considered in terms of the four aspects of the view of identity, the twentyfold view of identity emerges. But in the Treatise, in the context of the fivefold analysis, doesn’t it state the following?

He is not the aggregates, nor different from them,
The aggregates are not in him, nor is he in them,
The Tathāgata does not possess the aggregates –
So who is the Tathāgata?¹

But how can that make twenty as mentioned above, when multiplied by five? This division of the view of identity is found presented in the sutras, and as there is no way of being caught up in a self without perceiving the aggregates, it is the fourfold way of perceiving the aggregates that is relevant. There would in fact be no way of coming to believe in a self if it weren’t for the aggregates, and the fifth aspect is therefore not possible in relation to the view of identity. The view of identity is therefore only twentyfold. The fifth way mentioned in the Treatise – that of otherness – should be taken as refutating the traditions of the misguided (tīrthika).

As the scriptures state, when the twenty lofty peaks of the view of identity are brought down, the resultant state of a stream-enterer will manifest:

The vajra-wisdom seeing selflessness brings down
The mountains of the view of self, and when that goes
The lofty peaks that rest upon this massive range
Of viewing an identity are also crushed. (6.145)

For as long as the noble vajra of wisdom does not descend upon the mountain of the view of identity, the rock face of afflictions will grow daily, emerging from beginningless cyclic existence as it rises as high as the hilltops of the three worlds, spreading throughout all directions and emerging from the golden ground of ignorance. When demolished by the vajra of realising selflessness, those lofty peaks, here to be understood as its summits, will be destroyed together with it.

Now, for the refutation of a substantially existent imputed self as proposed by the Saṃmitīyas, it was said:

Some claim the person is substantial, yet cannot
Be labeled same or other, permanent or not,
That it’s an object of the six consciousnesses,
And claim this is the basis for the sense of self. (6.146)

As said here: firstly, not being able to be perceived except for the aggregates, the person cannot be distinct from them; it is further also not constituted by the aggregates, as its arising and ceasing would be a consequence; hence rendering being described as the same as or different from the aggregates impossible. As it cannot be the same or different, it cannot be described as permanent or impermanent either, but it is known by the six consciousnesses. It further makes sense that the person is substantially existent, being described as the actor and the enjoyer, and that which links samsara and nirvana, bondage and liberation. This is what is held to be the abode for the sense of self.

To explain how it does not make sense to say this:

To say, ‘mind is distinct from body,’ means it’s not
Ineffable – real things can’t be ineffable.
If self was proven to be real in any way,
It would be real, like mind, and not ineffable. (6.147)

After this verse, showing how something cannot at the same time be ineffable and substantially existent,

… to explain how it has imputed existence, it was said:

Since, as you say, a pot is not real in itself –
There’s nothing to point out apart from form and such –
Do not then think the self exists from its own side
When it’s ineffable except for aggregates. (6.148)

The sense intended here is that a pot can neither be described as the same as, nor different from, form and so forth, and is thence held to have imputed existence. And as with a pot, the self too should then be an imputation.

After having given refutation and proof in the two foregoing verses, and seeing as an existent thing may be talked of in terms of sameness and difference, we now embark upon a refutation of the self based on the fact that it does not have the features of an existent entity.

You would agree that consciousness is not distinct
From its own self, yet is a thing distinct from form.
As these two aspects may be seen in entities,
No self exists; it lacks the features of a thing. (6.149)

If, as you say, the self is substantially existent, it should surely be like consciousness, which is not distinct from itself, while it is distinct from form and so forth. But, as it is not, it is therefore not an entity that has the features phenomena usually have. Hence, the self is not an existent entity like a pot.

With this analysis it therefore does not make sense for the person to be substantially existent.

The basis of the sense of self is thus no thing,
Not other than the aggregates, nor them themselves;
It isn’t their support, or else possessing them.

When the abode of the sense of self is analysed, that it is substantially existent makes no sense. It cannot be distinct from the aggregates, isn’t constituted by the aggregates, and doesn’t have a supportive relationship with them either. The words it is their support would imply that the aggregates exist based upon it, but as a succinct description it is meant to cover both options in the support-supported relationship. It also does not make sense that it possesses the aggregates.

Hence, it is still acceptable to assert that the self is an imputation, or imperceptible. But the aforementioned aspects may not be used to proclaim a self:

And yet related to the aggregates it’s there. (6.150)

With the simple expression, ‘based on this, that arises,’ no claim to production that is causeless and so forth is made, and the framework of the relative truth is not infringed upon. Similarly, in this case: when contingent on a dependent imputation, the faulty aspects mentioned are avoided, and thus retaining worldly convention and being accepted as an imputation contingent on the aggregates, a self is seen according to conventional designations.