With this analysis it therefore does not make sense for the person to be substantially existent.

The basis of the sense of self is thus no thing,
Not other than the aggregates, nor them themselves;
It isn’t their support, or else possessing them.

When the abode of the sense of self is analysed, that it is substantially existent makes no sense. It cannot be distinct from the aggregates, isn’t constituted by the aggregates, and doesn’t have a supportive relationship with them either. The words it is their support would imply that the aggregates exist based upon it, but as a succinct description it is meant to cover both options in the support-supported relationship. It also does not make sense that it possesses the aggregates.

Hence, it is still acceptable to assert that the self is an imputation, or imperceptible. But the aforementioned aspects may not be used to proclaim a self:

And yet related to the aggregates it’s there. (6.150)

With the simple expression, ‘based on this, that arises,’ no claim to production that is causeless and so forth is made, and the framework of the relative truth is not infringed upon. Similarly, in this case: when contingent on a dependent imputation, the faulty aspects mentioned are avoided, and thus retaining worldly convention and being accepted as an imputation contingent on the aggregates, a self is seen according to conventional designations.

An external example is now provided to clarify the point that the self is an imputed idea as just explained:

A chariot is not distinct from its own parts,
Nor indistinct, and their possessor it is not,
It is not in its parts, they aren’t contained in it,
It’s not the mere assembly, nor is it the shape. (6.151)

Five of the positions mentioned here have already been covered previously: that of sameness, difference, support, supported and possessor.

The positions of a collection and of shape needs to be demonstrated, and are therefore now explained:

If just the mere assembly were the chariot,
The chariot would be there in the separate parts.

This point has been previously made. It is here revisited since it provides clarification by mentioning additional faults. It may then be said:

Without an owner of the parts they can’t be parts.
The chariot as shape will neither make much sense. (6.152)

Since there can be no parts when there is no owner of the parts, the parts do not exist. How can their assembly then be the chariot? Here the word also (api; here: neither) is used in an inclusive sense and should be understood to include the unreasonableness of either the mere shape or the mere assembly being the chariot. How so? Because they cannot be parts if there is no possessor of parts. For the mere shape to be the chariot does not then work. The non-existence of the possessor of the parts is accepted by those belonging to our own side.¹

Furthermore, if the shape is claimed to be the chariot, is it then contended that the shape is that of the parts or the collection? If it is suggested that it is the shape of the individual parts, do they still have their former shape, or have they left it behind? That they have not left it behind makes no sense. Why?

You say the shape that each part had before
Is present now within the chariot.
Then just as when it was in separate parts,
It’s not there now when there’s a chariot. (6.153)

If the particular shapes that the wheels and so forth had before there was a chariot are exactly the same as the particular shapes of the wheels and so forth when there is a chariot, then it follows that just as the chariot is not there when they are disassembled, it should equally not be there even when they form a chariot, since its shape is indistinguishable from that of the parts.

In case of the second position, that only with a difference in shape is there a chariot, then:

And if right now, when there’s a chariot here,
The wheels and so forth have a different shape,
Then this should be perceived, but it is not.
The chariot is thus not just the shape. (6.154)

If the particular shapes (square, long, round and so forth) that the individual parts (wheels, axle, nails and so forth) had before were to have distinctively different shapes when they constitute the chariot, then this should be perceptible. But we do not see that. We do not see the wheel’s spokes, rim, hub and so forth to have other shapes when mounted on the chariot. The squareness and so forth of the axle and other parts are likewise not transformed into something else. Hence, it makes no sense for the chariot to be the shape of its parts.

One might think, ‘It is the particular shape of the gathered parts, wheels and so forth, that is the chariot.’

To explain how this likewise does not make sense:

For you, collections are not real at all,
Its shape is thus not that of gathered parts.
For how could it assume a shape at all,
Based on something that’s utterly unreal? (6.155)

If a so-called collection had the slightest real existence, it could serve as the basis for the designation of a shape. But this collection of parts is not a real entity at all. And how can that which has no existence whatsoever serve as a basis for the imputation of a shape, when it is claimed that imputations can only be made based on something substantial?

They assert that, ‘Though it is unreal, in dependence on this collection there is an unreal shape.’ And that’s exactly it:

But it is just as you yourself assert,
That based upon a cause that is unreal
Arise results that are themselves unreal.
Please see that this is how all things occur. (6.156)

Unreal formations come about based on unreal ignorance. Unreal sprouts arise from unreal seeds. All causal relationships should be understood to have this character of unreality. Why completely exhaust oneself in the pointless pursuit of real things, like chasing the shadow-deer whose meat one cannot eat?

This shows it makes no sense that the idea
Of pot comes from these bases such as form.

There are some who say that it is upon such bases as form and so forth that ideas of pots and so forth are made.² But the example of the chariot disproves this as well.

Furthermore,

And being unproduced these don’t exist,
That they comprise a shape is hence unsound. (6.157)

That form and so forth are not produced has been explained previously. And not being produced, form and so forth do not exist. How could it make sense for things that do not exist to be the cause of imputations such as pot? Hence, to claim that pots and so forth is the assimilation of something substantial does not make sense, and therefore pots and other things do not inhere in the particular shapes of the physical constituents and so forth.

Here it might be interjected: ‘But if the chariot is found not to exist when scrutinised in the sevenfold manner just explained, without the existence of the chariot the conventional designation of chariot employed in the world would be invalidated. However, we do see the use of such commands as, “Fetch the chariot!”, “Please buy a chariot,” “Please mend the chariot,” and so forth. Based on general consensus then, things such as chariots must exist.’

To respond: It is in fact you who end up with this problem. A chariot is found to be untenable when subjected to the scrutiny of the sevenfold analysis explained above, but you refuse to accept that there are alternative ways of allowing existent things to remain valid. How can such worldly conventions as the statement, ‘Fetch the chariot!’, then retain their validity for you? We are not affected by this problem, because:

These seven points leave it unjustified
Both in reality, and in the world.
But left unanalysed the world will still
Identify it based upon its parts. (6.158)

When scrutinised in this sevenfold manner – by saying that the chariot is not distinct from its own parts and so forth – one cannot prove that there is a chariot either ultimately or relatively. But if analysis is suspended, just as there are things such as the colour blue or the experience of feelings, it is still the case that in the worldly context it is imputed in relation to its parts, such as the wheels and so forth. The consequence that worldly conventions will be violated does not therefore apply to us, because the assertion of a dependent imputation is similar to asserting the mere conditionality of dependent arising. Our opponents would therefore do well to accept this.

With this position, not only does worldly consensus make the usage of the conventional designation chariot perfectly clear, but the particular implications of the term will also, when not subjected to analysis, be acceptable according to worldly norms. As such,

It’s something that has parts, composed of separate bits.
A chariot is held to be a functional thing.
For people it is real as what assimilates.

The chariot is something that has parts based on the fact that it consists of parts such as wheels and so forth. And it is composed of separate bits from the fact that its bits are the wheels and so forth. It is a functional thing in relation to how it assimilates the constituent wheels and so forth. It is posited as an assimilator in relation to what it assimilates.

There are some with a mistaken understanding of the scriptures, who say that the mere collection of parts exists, but the possessor of the parts has no existence whatsoever, because it is not apprehended as distinct from them. They likewise say that only the bits exist but not what they compose; that only the action exists but not the actor; and as nothing is perceived apart from the assimilated, the assimilated exist but the assimilator does not. And when they adhere to this distorted description of the worldly relative, the consequence of their own argument will be that the parts, and so forth, too are non-existent.

Do not lay waste to what the world agrees upon! (6.159)

This should certainly be avoided.

It is a fact that when subjected to such scrutiny the worldly relative is rendered non-existent, yet when left unanalysed consensus makes it existent. And through this tiered approach the yogi swiftly determines the depths of the actual reality of things. How is this done?

The yogi asks, ‘These seven points show it’s unreal,
So how can it exist?’ – and finds that it does not.
With this they easily access the truth of things.
That it is real is still accepted here and now. (6.160)

Upon investigation the yogi will think, ‘If the entity that we call a chariot was inherently established, an identifiable entity should undoubtedly be found through the sevenfold analysis; but it is not. The chariot is therefore only an idea entertained when one is under the influence of the cataracts of ignorance, and has no inherent existence.’ Gaining certainty about this, the yogi will access the reality of things with ease. The word still (api), emphasises that the relative is not infringed upon, but when left unanalysed is accepted as real according to consensus.³ Those who are wise will undoubtedly accept this position, seeing that it is flawless and serves great benefit.

It might be interjected, ‘Though the yogi does not perceive a chariot, there is a perception of the mere collection of its parts.’⁴

To explain: It is quite comical for someone to be scouring for yarn amongst the ashes of burnt wool.

The chariot has no existence, and without
An owner of the parts, its parts cannot exist.

‘If the chariot is disassembled, wouldn’t one still perceive a pile consisting of its wheels and so forth? How can you then claim that, “…without an owner of the parts, its parts cannot exist”?’

That is not so. It is only when the perceiver’s understanding is related to a chariot that the wheels and other such parts will be thought of as a chariot, and not when the cognition is different, in which case the wheels and so forth may themselves be understood as possessors of parts on the basis of their own constituents. When wheels and so forth have no relationship at all to a chariot, they will not be thought of as parts of a chariot.

This point may further be understood through the following example:

Like parts that vanish when a chariot is burnt,
Are parts whose owner has been scorched by reason’s flames. (6.161)

For example, when the part-possessing chariot is burnt, its parts too are certainly consumed. In a similar way, when the rubbing of the sticks of analysis produces the fire of reason which consumes things into imperceptibility, and the chariot is thus burnt to the point of intangibility, since the parts too become fuel for the fires of reason and will certainly be burnt, they do not retain their identity.

And just as the analytical consideration of a chariot that establishes it as a dependent imputation, allows one not to infringe upon the relative truth, and allows yogis to easily access the actual reality of things:

Just so the world at large agrees the self is based
Upon the aggregates, the elements and on
The sense fields, it is what assimilates these things.

Just as the chariot is imputed in relation to the wheels and so forth, where the assimilated are the wheels and other parts and the assimilator is the chariot, the self assimilates the five aggregates, the six elements and six sense fields, as the self is imputed in relation to the aggregates and so forth. This is saying that, just as a chariot is the assimilation of the wheels and so forth, the self is likewise the assimilation of the aggregates and so forth.

And just as this classification of the assimilated and the assimilator is a worldly convention, the classification of the roles of acted and actor is accepted in a similar fashion to the chariot. To explain:

Assimilation is the act and actor too. (6.162)

This presentation is saying that the assimilation (upadāna) is the act in the sense of the aggregates and so forth, and the actor in the sense of the self.

If dependent imputations are related to correctly, they will not encourage ideas such as those of constancy or inconstancy, and concepts such as permanence, impermanence and so forth will easily be avoided. To express this:

It is not real, thus not a constant entity,
Is not inconstant, has no birth and no decay.
Such qualities as permanence do not apply.
It’s not the same, nor something that is quite distinct. (6.163)

This self which is imputed in relation to the aggregates is not a constant thing, nor is it inconstant. If the self were inconstant, this would contradict the Treatise where it states:

The assimilated, which arise
And cease to be, are not the self.
How indeed could the assimilated
Become that which assimilates.⁵

And:

Something cannot come from nothing.
Unwanted consequences would ensue:
The self would be something produced,
And though arisen, would not have a cause.⁶

Therefore, if the aggregates were the self, it would then arise and cease, yet it is not held to be something arising and ceasing. It would therefore make sense to draw the conclusion that the aggregates are not the self. It is hence not tenable that it is something inconstant.

That it is constant is just as untenable, as it is stated:

It is not tenable to say
That it existed in times past.
What took place in former lives
Is not identical to this.

One may think, ‘That was myself,’
But the assimilated was different then.
And what indeed is your own self
Apart from what is assimilated.⁷

When saying it has no birth and no decay, this is indicative of the statement the Master made about these two qualities when giving the unwanted consequence that, ‘It would be appearing and disappearing.’⁸

And concerning the line such qualities as permanence do not apply, as the Master states when considering the self through the analysis of the Tathāgata:

How could there in this peace
Be the four of permanence and so forth?
How could there in this peace
Be the four of finiteness and so forth?

He who grasps the gross idea
That the Tathāgata exists,
Has the idea that when transcended
He will no longer exist.

But being empty of inherent nature
It does not make sense to think
That he is existent or non-existent
When having passed beyond.⁹

It is not the same, nor is it something quite distinct from the aggregates. As stated:

If the self were the aggregates,
It would be appearing and disappearing.
If it was different from the aggregates,
It would not have the aggregates’ characteristics.¹⁰

Similarly:

Fuel is not the same as the fire.
…¹¹

And why can one not entertain these ideas of constancy and so forth in relation to the self? Because, as it says, it is not real. If the self were by nature a real entity, ideas such as constancy and so forth could be relevant to it. But the self cannot have any of these since it does not exist. As stated in a sutra:

Four imperishable dharmas
Are taught by the World Protector:
Beings, space, the awakening mind,
As well as the Buddha qualities.

If these were substantial
They would be considered perishable.
But being non-existent they do not perish,
And are therefore called imperishable.¹²

The sevenfold analysis demonstrates that there is not something either permanent or impermanent. But for those failing to see its non-existence, ignorance leads to the belief in its existence, and this view of identity which clings to the idea, ‘This is me,’ keeps them circling in cyclic existence.

This self – the sense of ego that is always felt
By every kind of being, and the sense of ‘mine’
Which is all that relates to it – confusion spawns
As customary fact when left unanalysed. (6.164)

After searching for it and finding through reasoning that it is unfeasible, the tīrthikas who are mistaken about its nature, believe it to be distinct from the aggregates. Those of our own side, when fooled by the idea that the self cannot exist separate from the aggregates, assert that the self is just the aggregates themselves. But those having an unmistaken understanding of the Tathāgata’s teachings will think that this is not how it is, and that the self is free from this type of thinking in all ways.¹³ They understand that in all the states of being associated with ignorance – humans, spirits, animals and so forth – a sense of self is constantly present, and that influenced by this labelling, anything or anyone related with it, associated with it – whether internal entities such as eyes, or external things – become encompassed by the idea of ownership. This self is not established in and of itself but comes about through lack of understanding.

Because confusion is the cause of this conventional designation despite such thing existing, yogis do not apprehend anything whatsoever, and not apprehending eyes and so forth will neither have any grasping towards them. And as yogis apprehend nothing possessing inherent reality, they are liberated from cyclic existence. As stated:

When the ideas of ‘I’ and ‘mine’
Whether inner or outer cease,
Grasping is halted, and as that ends
There ceases to be further births.¹⁴

But how is it that ownership cannot occur without a self? To explain this it was stated:

Without a maker there is nothing made,
And thus without an ‘I’ there is no ‘mine.’
And with the view that ‘I’ and ‘mine’ are void,
It’s liberation that the yogis reach. (6.165)

Just as without a potter there a pot cannot come to be, without an ‘I’ there can be no ‘mine.’ Therefore, as they do not apprehend ‘I’ and ‘mine,’ yogis have no cyclic perception and reach liberation. Without apprehending forms and so forth, attachment and other emotional involvement with these will not occur, and by this hearers and solitary buddhas are established in transcendence without any further existences. Bodhisattvas however, although they have seen selflessness, will out of compassion maintain their link with existence until awakening. Wise individuals should therefore examine this presentation of selflessness well.