An external example is now provided to clarify the point that the self is an imputed idea as just explained:

A chariot is not distinct from its own parts,
Nor indistinct, and their possessor it is not,
It is not in its parts, they aren’t contained in it,
It’s not the mere assembly, nor is it the shape. (6.151)

Five of the positions mentioned here have already been covered previously: that of sameness, difference, support, supported and possessor.

The positions of a collection and of shape needs to be demonstrated, and are therefore now explained:

If just the mere assembly were the chariot,
The chariot would be there in the separate parts.

This point has been previously made. It is here revisited since it provides clarification by mentioning additional faults. It may then be said:

Without an owner of the parts they can’t be parts.
The chariot as shape will neither make much sense. (6.152)

Since there can be no parts when there is no owner of the parts, the parts do not exist. How can their assembly then be the chariot? Here the word also (api; here: neither) is used in an inclusive sense and should be understood to include the unreasonableness of either the mere shape or the mere assembly being the chariot. How so? Because they cannot be parts if there is no possessor of parts. For the mere shape to be the chariot does not then work. The non-existence of the possessor of the parts is accepted by those belonging to our own side.¹

Furthermore, if the shape is claimed to be the chariot, is it then contended that the shape is that of the parts or the collection? If it is suggested that it is the shape of the individual parts, do they still have their former shape, or have they left it behind? That they have not left it behind makes no sense. Why?

You say the shape that each part had before
Is present now within the chariot.
Then just as when it was in separate parts,
It’s not there now when there’s a chariot. (6.153)

If the particular shapes that the wheels and so forth had before there was a chariot are exactly the same as the particular shapes of the wheels and so forth when there is a chariot, then it follows that just as the chariot is not there when they are disassembled, it should equally not be there even when they form a chariot, since its shape is indistinguishable from that of the parts.

In case of the second position, that only with a difference in shape is there a chariot, then:

And if right now, when there’s a chariot here,
The wheels and so forth have a different shape,
Then this should be perceived, but it is not.
The chariot is thus not just the shape. (6.154)

If the particular shapes (square, long, round and so forth) that the individual parts (wheels, axle, nails and so forth) had before were to have distinctively different shapes when they constitute the chariot, then this should be perceptible. But we do not see that. We do not see the wheel’s spokes, rim, hub and so forth to have other shapes when mounted on the chariot. The squareness and so forth of the axle and other parts are likewise not transformed into something else. Hence, it makes no sense for the chariot to be the shape of its parts.

One might think, ‘It is the particular shape of the gathered parts, wheels and so forth, that is the chariot.’

To explain how this likewise does not make sense:

For you, collections are not real at all,
Its shape is thus not that of gathered parts.
For how could it assume a shape at all,
Based on something that’s utterly unreal? (6.155)

If a so-called collection had the slightest real existence, it could serve as the basis for the designation of a shape. But this collection of parts is not a real entity at all. And how can that which has no existence whatsoever serve as a basis for the imputation of a shape, when it is claimed that imputations can only be made based on something substantial?

They assert that, ‘Though it is unreal, in dependence on this collection there is an unreal shape.’ And that’s exactly it:

But it is just as you yourself assert,
That based upon a cause that is unreal
Arise results that are themselves unreal.
Please see that this is how all things occur. (6.156)

Unreal formations come about based on unreal ignorance. Unreal sprouts arise from unreal seeds. All causal relationships should be understood to have this character of unreality. Why completely exhaust oneself in the pointless pursuit of real things, like chasing the shadow-deer whose meat one cannot eat?

This shows it makes no sense that the idea
Of pot comes from these bases such as form.

There are some who say that it is upon such bases as form and so forth that ideas of pots and so forth are made.² But the example of the chariot disproves this as well.

Furthermore,

And being unproduced these don’t exist,
That they comprise a shape is hence unsound. (6.157)

That form and so forth are not produced has been explained previously. And not being produced, form and so forth do not exist. How could it make sense for things that do not exist to be the cause of imputations such as pot? Hence, to claim that pots and so forth is the assimilation of something substantial does not make sense, and therefore pots and other things do not inhere in the particular shapes of the physical constituents and so forth.

Here it might be interjected: ‘But if the chariot is found not to exist when scrutinised in the sevenfold manner just explained, without the existence of the chariot the conventional designation of chariot employed in the world would be invalidated. However, we do see the use of such commands as, “Fetch the chariot!”, “Please buy a chariot,” “Please mend the chariot,” and so forth. Based on general consensus then, things such as chariots must exist.’

To respond: It is in fact you who end up with this problem. A chariot is found to be untenable when subjected to the scrutiny of the sevenfold analysis explained above, but you refuse to accept that there are alternative ways of allowing existent things to remain valid. How can such worldly conventions as the statement, ‘Fetch the chariot!’, then retain their validity for you? We are not affected by this problem, because:

These seven points leave it unjustified
Both in reality, and in the world.
But left unanalysed the world will still
Identify it based upon its parts. (6.158)

When scrutinised in this sevenfold manner – by saying that the chariot is not distinct from its own parts and so forth – one cannot prove that there is a chariot either ultimately or relatively. But if analysis is suspended, just as there are things such as the colour blue or the experience of feelings, it is still the case that in the worldly context it is imputed in relation to its parts, such as the wheels and so forth. The consequence that worldly conventions will be violated does not therefore apply to us, because the assertion of a dependent imputation is similar to asserting the mere conditionality of dependent arising. Our opponents would therefore do well to accept this.

With this position, not only does worldly consensus make the usage of the conventional designation chariot perfectly clear, but the particular implications of the term will also, when not subjected to analysis, be acceptable according to worldly norms. As such,

It’s something that has parts, composed of separate bits.
A chariot is held to be a functional thing.
For people it is real as what assimilates.

The chariot is something that has parts based on the fact that it consists of parts such as wheels and so forth. And it is composed of separate bits from the fact that its bits are the wheels and so forth. It is a functional thing in relation to how it assimilates the constituent wheels and so forth. It is posited as an assimilator in relation to what it assimilates.

There are some with a mistaken understanding of the scriptures, who say that the mere collection of parts exists, but the possessor of the parts has no existence whatsoever, because it is not apprehended as distinct from them. They likewise say that only the bits exist but not what they compose; that only the action exists but not the actor; and as nothing is perceived apart from the assimilated, the assimilated exist but the assimilator does not. And when they adhere to this distorted description of the worldly relative, the consequence of their own argument will be that the parts, and so forth, too are non-existent.

Do not lay waste to what the world agrees upon! (6.159)

This should certainly be avoided.

It is a fact that when subjected to such scrutiny the worldly relative is rendered non-existent, yet when left unanalysed consensus makes it existent. And through this tiered approach the yogi swiftly determines the depths of the actual reality of things. How is this done?

The yogi asks, ‘These seven points show it’s unreal,
So how can it exist?’ – and finds that it does not.
With this they easily access the truth of things.
That it is real is still accepted here and now. (6.160)

Upon investigation the yogi will think, ‘If the entity that we call a chariot was inherently established, an identifiable entity should undoubtedly be found through the sevenfold analysis; but it is not. The chariot is therefore only an idea entertained when one is under the influence of the cataracts of ignorance, and has no inherent existence.’ Gaining certainty about this, the yogi will access the reality of things with ease. The word still (api), emphasises that the relative is not infringed upon, but when left unanalysed is accepted as real according to consensus.³ Those who are wise will undoubtedly accept this position, seeing that it is flawless and serves great benefit.