It might be interjected, ‘Though the yogi does not perceive a chariot, there is a perception of the mere collection of its parts.’¹

To explain: It is quite comical for someone to be scouring for yarn amongst the ashes of burnt wool.

The chariot has no existence, and without
An owner of the parts, its parts cannot exist.

‘If the chariot is disassembled, wouldn’t one still perceive a pile consisting of its wheels and so forth? How can you then claim that, “…without an owner of the parts, its parts cannot exist”?’

That is not so. It is only when the perceiver’s understanding is related to a chariot that the wheels and other such parts will be thought of as a chariot, and not when the cognition is different, in which case the wheels and so forth may themselves be understood as possessors of parts on the basis of their own constituents. When wheels and so forth have no relationship at all to a chariot, they will not be thought of as parts of a chariot.

This point may further be understood through the following example:

Like parts that vanish when a chariot is burnt,
Are parts whose owner has been scorched by reason’s flames. (6.161)

For example, when the part-possessing chariot is burnt, its parts too are certainly consumed. In a similar way, when the rubbing of the sticks of analysis produces the fire of reason which consumes things into imperceptibility, and the chariot is thus burnt to the point of intangibility, since the parts too become fuel for the fires of reason and will certainly be burnt, they do not retain their identity.

And just as the analytical consideration of a chariot that establishes it as a dependent imputation, allows one not to infringe upon the relative truth, and allows yogis to easily access the actual reality of things:

Just so the world at large agrees the self is based
Upon the aggregates, the elements and on
The sense fields, it is what assimilates these things.

Just as the chariot is imputed in relation to the wheels and so forth, where the assimilated are the wheels and other parts and the assimilator is the chariot, the self assimilates the five aggregates, the six elements and six sense fields, as the self is imputed in relation to the aggregates and so forth. This is saying that, just as a chariot is the assimilation of the wheels and so forth, the self is likewise the assimilation of the aggregates and so forth.

And just as this classification of the assimilated and the assimilator is a worldly convention, the classification of the roles of acted and actor is accepted in a similar fashion to the chariot. To explain:

Assimilation is the act and actor too. (6.162)

This presentation is saying that the assimilation (upadāna) is the act in the sense of the aggregates and so forth, and the actor in the sense of the self.

If dependent imputations are related to correctly, they will not encourage ideas such as those of constancy or inconstancy, and concepts such as permanence, impermanence and so forth will easily be avoided. To express this:

It is not real, thus not a constant entity,
Is not inconstant, has no birth and no decay.
Such qualities as permanence do not apply.
It’s not the same, nor something that is quite distinct. (6.163)

This self which is imputed in relation to the aggregates is not a constant thing, nor is it inconstant. If the self were inconstant, this would contradict the Treatise where it states:

The assimilated, which arise
And cease to be, are not the self.
How indeed could the assimilated
Become that which assimilates.²

And:

Something cannot come from nothing.
Unwanted consequences would ensue:
The self would be something produced,
And though arisen, would not have a cause.³

Therefore, if the aggregates were the self, it would then arise and cease, yet it is not held to be something arising and ceasing. It would therefore make sense to draw the conclusion that the aggregates are not the self. It is hence not tenable that it is something inconstant.

That it is constant is just as untenable, as it is stated:

It is not tenable to say
That it existed in times past.
What took place in former lives
Is not identical to this.

One may think, ‘That was myself,’
But the assimilated was different then.
And what indeed is your own self
Apart from what is assimilated.⁴

When saying it has no birth and no decay, this is indicative of the statement the Master made about these two qualities when giving the unwanted consequence that, ‘It would be appearing and disappearing.’⁵

And concerning the line such qualities as permanence do not apply, as the Master states when considering the self through the analysis of the Tathāgata:

How could there in this peace
Be the four of permanence and so forth?
How could there in this peace
Be the four of finiteness and so forth?

He who grasps the gross idea
That the Tathāgata exists,
Has the idea that when transcended
He will no longer exist.

But being empty of inherent nature
It does not make sense to think
That he is existent or non-existent
When having passed beyond.⁶

It is not the same, nor is it something quite distinct from the aggregates. As stated:

If the self were the aggregates,
It would be appearing and disappearing.
If it was different from the aggregates,
It would not have the aggregates’ characteristics.⁷

Similarly:

Fuel is not the same as the fire.
…⁸

And why can one not entertain these ideas of constancy and so forth in relation to the self? Because, as it says, it is not real. If the self were by nature a real entity, ideas such as constancy and so forth could be relevant to it. But the self cannot have any of these since it does not exist. As stated in a sutra:

Four imperishable dharmas
Are taught by the World Protector:
Beings, space, the awakening mind,
As well as the Buddha qualities.

If these were substantial
They would be considered perishable.
But being non-existent they do not perish,
And are therefore called imperishable.⁹

The sevenfold analysis demonstrates that there is not something either permanent or impermanent. But for those failing to see its non-existence, ignorance leads to the belief in its existence, and this view of identity which clings to the idea, ‘This is me,’ keeps them circling in cyclic existence.

This self – the sense of ego that is always felt
By every kind of being, and the sense of ‘mine’
Which is all that relates to it – confusion spawns
As customary fact when left unanalysed. (6.164)

After searching for it and finding through reasoning that it is unfeasible, the tīrthikas who are mistaken about its nature, believe it to be distinct from the aggregates. Those of our own side, when fooled by the idea that the self cannot exist separate from the aggregates, assert that the self is just the aggregates themselves. But those having an unmistaken understanding of the Tathāgata’s teachings will think that this is not how it is, and that the self is free from this type of thinking in all ways.¹⁰ They understand that in all the states of being associated with ignorance – humans, spirits, animals and so forth – a sense of self is constantly present, and that influenced by this labelling, anything or anyone related with it, associated with it – whether internal entities such as eyes, or external things – become encompassed by the idea of ownership. This self is not established in and of itself but comes about through lack of understanding.

Because confusion is the cause of this conventional designation despite such thing existing, yogis do not apprehend anything whatsoever, and not apprehending eyes and so forth will neither have any grasping towards them. And as yogis apprehend nothing possessing inherent reality, they are liberated from cyclic existence. As stated:

When the ideas of ‘I’ and ‘mine’
Whether inner or outer cease,
Grasping is halted, and as that ends
There ceases to be further births.¹¹

But how is it that ownership cannot occur without a self? To explain this it was stated:

Without a maker there is nothing made,
And thus without an ‘I’ there is no ‘mine.’
And with the view that ‘I’ and ‘mine’ are void,
It’s liberation that the yogis reach. (6.165)

Just as without a potter there a pot cannot come to be, without an ‘I’ there can be no ‘mine.’ Therefore, as they do not apprehend ‘I’ and ‘mine,’ yogis have no cyclic perception and reach liberation. Without apprehending forms and so forth, attachment and other emotional involvement with these will not occur, and by this hearers and solitary buddhas are established in transcendence without any further existences. Bodhisattvas however, although they have seen selflessness, will out of compassion maintain their link with existence until awakening. Wise individuals should therefore examine this presentation of selflessness well.

To add that, in the same way that the analysis of the chariot relates to the imputation of the self and what it assimilates, it is applicable to all other things as well:

A pot, a blanket, straw mats, armies, woods, a necklace, or a tree,
A house, a cart, a cottage, or else anything that it may be

These are not found to exist in any of the seven ways when subjected to the analysis of the chariot. And here it may be added: and yet, according to general consensus they exist. And other types of things of similar sort:

Should likewise be acknowledged as they’re generally made out to be,

… just as consensus thinks they are without analysing. And why?

Because the Mighty Sage would not with normal people disagree. (6.166)

As stated in the scriptures:

The world may quarrel with me, but I have no quarrel with the world.¹²

One should thus not discredit the general consensus of the world.

‘So how does the world designate things as conventions?’ To explain this it is said:

The parts and whole, the traits and qualified, the wish and he who wants,
The features, featured, fuel and fire, and all pairs like these are when
Examined like the cart shown to exist in none of seven ways.
And yet, according to the general consensus they exist. (6.167)

Just as a pot is the whole while clay and so forth are its parts; the pot is the qualified while the dark pattern of flames and so forth are traits; and the pot is the featured, while its features are being pot-bellied, having a spout, a long neck and so forth. This similarly applies to blankets and so forth. To wish is to have a craving. He who wants is the support for the wish. Fire is that which burns; fuel that which is burnt.

It’s based on the parts that a whole is imputed, and based on the whole that parts are imputed, as in the example of the chariot. So too with the rest, including fire in relation to the fuel, and fuel in relation to fire. These are worldly conventions that cannot be subjected to analysis.

To explain that not only are such things, parts and so forth, established only in mutual dependence, even causes and effects are mutually dependent: Because…

A cause will only be a cause when there’s a product it has made.
If it does not produce results, it lacks that which makes it a cause.
Results will likewise only come about when there exists a cause.

This should be understood as saying that, in the case of cause and result too, it is only when there is one that there is the other. Causes and results do not have any inherent existence.

And if you dare to presume that these two are established in and of themselves, then… my word!

So tell me then, which one derives from which? Which is the first to come? (6.168)

Is it the cause or the result which precedes the other, and from which is either the cause or the result then made? Among them, is the cause or the result the first? Understand therefore that cause and result are relative imputations alike unto the chariot, and not inherently real.

Furthermore, if a cause really produces a result, is there contact or not when it is produced? For instance,

If you suggest that there is contact when a cause makes a result,
Then they’re a single force; the maker and result are not distinct.
If they’re apart, non-causes are not different from what is the cause.
Discarding these two options there’s no other notion possible. (6.169)

If the cause and result connect during production, as they connect they are one, just as there is no difference in the water when a river meets the ocean. And as one cannot then differentiate between them by saying, ‘This is the cause; that is the result,’ what is then produced by what? If they do not meet during production, just as other non-results are not produced when there is no meeting, its result should likewise not be produced when there is no meeting. But if there is production without contact, then anything can be produced.

For someone who claims that there are inherent causes and results, it is not possible to come up with a third option other than the product and the producer either being in contact or not, and the only conclusion must therefore be that there is no inherently real causal production.

Therefore,

But if your cause produces no result, results do not exist.

And when causes do not produce results, there are no results, which means that:

And causes that have no results are not as causes justified.

It is the causal function of giving rise to results that makes it a cause. If there were causes even in the absence of results, the causal quality of the cause would then not have anything to do with causality, which can’t be accepted. Causes and results cannot therefore be inherently existent.

‘So how do you suggest it is then?’

But since these two are both just like illusions I am not at faultIn granting that the factual things of worldly life can still appear. (6.170)

In the case of distinctively characterised entities produced and their producers, this analysis will apply. If, however, it is the case that the production of things is a mistaken imputation, their nature being as unarisen as illusions, and even though unreal they can still be conceptual objects like things such as the hairs appearing to one with cataracts, these considerations are not relevant. The faults mentioned above will not then apply to me, and the things of the world, existing as they are if left unanalysed, remain accounted for.