Bibliotheca Polyglotta

vinā vā saha vā nāsti vibhavaḥ saṃbhavena vai |
vinā vā saha vā nāsti saṃbhavo vibhavena vai || 1 ||

中論觀成壞品第二十一(二十偈) 離成及共成是中無有壞
離壞及共壞是中亦無成

|| ’jig pa ’byung ba med par ram | | lhan cig yod pa nyid ma yin | |
’byung ba ’jig pa med par ram | | lhan cig yod pa nyid ma yin | |

[Chapter] 21: An Analysis of Origination (sambhava) and Disappearance (vibhava) (coming to be and passing away) 1. There is no disappearance either with origination or without it.
There is no origination either with disappearance or without it.

Investigation of Rising and Passing Passing does not exist without or together with rising. Rising does not exist without or together with passing.

(11) ＊中論觀成壞品第二十一二十偈 (12)問曰。一切世間事現是壞敗相。是故有壞。答(13)曰(14)離成及共成是中無有壞(15)離壞及共壞是中亦無成(16)若有成若無成倶無壞。若有壞若無壞倶(17)無成。

bhaviṣyati kathaṃ nāma vibhavaḥ saṃbhavaṃ vinā |
vinaiva janma maraṇaṃ vibhavo nodbhavaṃ vinā || 2 ||

若離於成者云何而有壞
如離生有死是事則不然

2. How, indeed, will disappearance exist at all without origination?
[How could there be] death without birth?
There is no disappearance without [prior] origination.

How can passing exist without rising? Is there death without birth? There is no passing without rising.

何以故(18)若離於成者云何而有壞(19)如離生有死是事則不然

saṃbhavenaiva vibhavaḥ kathaṃ saha bhaviṣyati |
na janma maraṇaṃ caivaṃ tulyakālaṃ hi vidyate || 3 ||

成壞共有者云何有成壞
如世間生死一時俱不然

3. How can disappearance exist concomitantly with origination?
Since, surely, death does not exist at the same moment as birth.

How could passing exist together with rising? Death does not exist at the same time as birth.

(20)成壞共有者云何有成壞(21)如世間生死一時倶不然

bhaviṣyati kathaṃ nāma saṃbhavo vibhavaṃ vinā |
anityatā hi bhāveṣu na kadācin na vidyate || 4 ||

若離於壞者云何當有成
無常未曾有不在諸法時

4. How, indeed, will origination exist at all without disappearance?
For, impermanence does not fail to be found in existent things ever.

How could rising exist without passing? Things are never not impermanent.

(22)若離於壞者云何當有成(23)無常未曾有不在諸法時(24)若離成壞不可得。何以故。若離成有壞者。(25)則不因成有壞。壞則無因。又無成法而(26)可壞。成名衆縁合。壞名衆縁散。若離成(27)有壞者。無成誰當壞。如無瓶不得言瓶(28)壞。是故離成無壞。若謂共成有壞者。是(29)亦不然。何以故。法先別成而後有合。合法(28a1)不離異。若壞離異壞則無因。是故共成亦(2)無壞。若離壞共壞無有成者。若離壞有(3)成成則爲常。常是不壞相。而實不見有法(4)常不壞相。是故離壞無成。若謂共壞有成(5)者。是亦不然。成壞相違。云何一時有。如人(6)有髮無髮不得一時倶。成壞亦爾。是故(7)共壞有成。是事不然。何以故。若謂分別法(8)者。説成中常有壞。是事不然。何以故。若成(9)中常有壞。則不應有住法。而實有住。是故(10)若離壞共壞不應有成。

saṃbhavo vibhavenaiva kathaṃ saha bhaviṣyati |
na janma maraṇaṃ caiva tulyakālaṃ hi vidyate || 5 ||

成壞共無成離亦無有成
是二俱不可云何當有成

5. How can origination exist concomitantly with disappearance?
Since, surely, death does not exist at the same moment as birth.

How could rising exist together with passing? Birth does not exist at the same time as death.

復次(11)成壞共無成離亦無有成(12)是二倶不可云何當有成(13)若成壞共亦無成。離亦無成。若共成則二法(14)相違。云何一時。若離則無因。二門倶不成。(15)云何當有成。若有應説。問曰現有盡滅相(16)法。是盡滅相法。亦説盡亦説不盡。如是則(17)應有成壞。

sahānyo’nyena vā siddhir vinānyo’nyena vā yayoḥ |
na vidyate tayoḥ siddhiḥ kathaṃ nu khalu vidyate || 6 ||

6. When two things cannot be proved either separately or together,
No proof exists of those two things.
How can these two things be proved?

How can those that are not established either mutually together or not mutually together be established?

kṣayasya saṃbhavo nāsti nākṣayasyāsti saṃbhavaḥ |
kṣayasya vibhavo nāsti vibhavo nākṣayasya ca || 7 ||

盡則無有成不盡亦無成
盡則無有壞不盡亦不壞

7. There is no origination of that which is destructible, nor of that which is not-destructible.
There is no disappearance of that which is destructible nor of that which is non-destructible.

The finished does not rise; the unfinished too does not rise; the finished does not pass; the unfinished too does not pass.

答曰(18)盡則無有成不盡亦無成(19)盡則無有壞不盡亦不壞(20)諸法日夜中念念常滅盡過去。如水流不住。(21)是則名盡。是事不可取不可説。如野馬(22)無決定性可得。如是盡無決定性可得。(23)云何可得分別説有成。是故言盡亦不成。(24)成無故亦不應有壞。是故説盡亦無有壞。(25)又念念生滅常相續不斷故名不盡。如是法(26)決定常住不斷。云何可得分別説言今是(27)成時。是故説無盡亦無成。成無故無壞。是(28)故説不盡亦無壞。如是推求。實事不可得(29)故。無成無壞。問曰。且置成壞。但令有法(28b1)有何咎。

saṃbhavo vibhavaś caiva vinā bhāvaṃ na vidyate |
saṃbhavaṃ vibhavaṃ caiva vinā bhāvo¹ na vidyate || 8 ||

1. Ye (2007, 161): bhāvān.

若離於成壞是亦無有法
若當離於法亦無有成壞

8. Origination and disappearance cannot exist without an existent thing.
Without origination and disappearance an existent thing does not exist.

Rising and passing do not exist without the existence of things. Things do not exist without the existence of rising and passing.

答曰(2)若離於成壞是亦無有法(3)若當離於法亦無有成壞(4)離成壞無法者。若法無成無壞。是法應(5)或無或常。而世間無有常法。汝説離成壞(6)有法。是事不然。問曰。若離法但有成壞。(7)有何咎。答曰。離法有成壞。是亦不然。何以(8)故。若離法誰成誰壞。是故離法有成壞。是(9)事不然。

saṃbhavo vibhavaś caiva na śūnyasyopapadyate |
saṃbhavo vibhavaś caiva nāśūnyasyopapadyate || 9 ||

若法性空者誰當有成壞
若性不空者亦無有成壞

9. Origination and disappearance does not obtain for that which is empty.
Origination and disappearance does not obtain for that which is non-empty.

Rising and passing are not possible for the empty; rising, passing are not possible for the non-empty also.

復次(10)若法性空者誰當有成壞(11)若性不空者亦無有成壞(12)若諸法性空。空何有成壞。若諸法性不空。(13)不空則決定有。亦不應有成壞。

saṃbhavo vibhavaś caiva naika² ity upapadyate |
saṃbhavo vibhavaś caiva na nānety upapadyate || 10 ||

2. Ye (2007, 167): naikam.

成壞若一者是事則不然
成壞若異者是事亦不然

10. It does not obtain that origination and disappearance are the same thing.
It does not obtain that origination and disappearance are different.

Rising and passing cannot possibly be one; rising and passing also cannot possibly be other.

復次(14)成壞若一者是事則不然(15)成壞若異者是事亦不然(16)推求成壞一則不可得。何以故。異相故。種種(17)分別故。又成壞異亦不可得。何以故。無有(18)別故。亦無因故。

dṛśyate saṃbhavaś caiva vibhavaś caiva³ te bhavet |
dṛśyate saṃbhavaś caiva mohād vibhava eva ca || 11 ||

3. Ye (2007, 153): ceti; cf. Tib: ngo snyam du.

若謂以眼見而有生滅者
則為是癡妄而見有生滅

11. [You argue:] Origination, as well as disappearance, is seen.
[Therefore] it would exist for you.
[But] origination and disappearance are seen due to a delusion.

If you think that you can see rising and passing, rising and passing are seen by delusion.

復次(19)若謂以眼見而有生滅者(20)則爲是癡妄而見有生滅(21)若謂以眼見有生滅者。云何以言説破。(22)是事不然。何以故。眼見生滅者。則是愚癡顛(23)倒故。見諸法性空無決定如幻如夢。但凡(24)夫先世顛倒因縁得此眼。今世憶想分別因(25)縁故。言眼見生滅。第一義中實無生滅。是(26)事已於破相品中廣説。

na bhāvāj jāyate bhāvo bhāvo ’bhāvān na jāyate |
nābhāvāj jāyate ’bhāvo ’bhāvo bhāvān na jāyate || 12 ||

從法不生法亦不生非法
從非法不生法及於非法

12. An existent thing does not originate from [another] thing; and an existent thing does not originate from a non-existent thing.
Also, a non-existent thing does not originate from another non-existent thing; and a non-existent thing does not originate from an existent thing.

Things are not created from things; things are not created from nothing; nothing is not created from nothing; nothing is not created from things.

復次(27)從法不生法亦不生非法(28)從非法不生法及於非法(29)從法不生法者。若失若至二倶不然。從(28c1)法生法。若至若失是則無因。無因則墮斷(2)常。若已至從法生法。是法至已而名爲生。(3)則爲是常。又生已更生。又亦無因生。是事(4)不然。若＊已失從法生法者。是則失因。生(5)者無因。是故從失亦不生法。從法不生(6)非法者。非法名無所有。法名有。云何從有(7)相生無相。是故從法不生非法。從非法(8)不生法者。非法名爲無。無云何生有。若(9)從無生有者。是則無因。無因則有大過。(10)是故不從非法生法。不從非法生非法(11)者。非法名無所有。云何從無所有生無所(12)有。如兎角不生龜毛。是故不從非法生(13)非法。問曰。法非法雖種種分別故無生。但法(14)應生法。

na svato jāyate bhāvaḥ parato naiva jāyate |
na svataḥ parataś caiva jāyate jāyate kutaḥ || 13 ||

法不從自生亦不從他生
不從自他生云何而有生

13. An existent thing does not originate either by itself or by something different.
Or by itself and something different [at the same time]. How, then, can it be produced?

Things are not created from themselves, nor are they created from something else; they are not created from [both] themselves and something else. How are they created?

答曰(15)法不從自生亦不從他生(16)不從自他生云何而有生(17)法未生時無所有故。又即自不生故。是故法(18)不自生。若法未生則亦無他。無他故不得(19)言從他生。又未生則無自。無自亦無他。(20)共亦不生。若三種不生。云何從法有法(21)生。

bhāvam abhyupapannasya śāśvatocchedadarśanam |
prasajyate sa bhāvo hi nityo ’nityo ’tha⁴ vā bhavet || 14 ||

4. Ye (2007, 153): 'pi.

若有所受法即墮於斷常
當知所受法為常為無常

14. For someone assuming an existent thing, either an eternalistic or nihilistic point of view would logically follow,
For that existent thing would be either eternal or liable to cessation.

If you assert the existence of things, the views of eternalism and annihilationism will follow, because things are permanent and impermanent.

復次(22)若有所受法即墮於斷常(23)當知所受法爲常爲無常(24)受法者。分別是善是不善常無常等。是人必(25)墮若常見若斷見。何以故。所受法應有二(26)種。若常若無常。二倶不然。何以故。若常即(27)墮常邊。若無常即墮斷邊。

bhāvam abhyupapannasya naivocchedo na śāśvatam |
udayavyayasaṃtānaḥ phalahetvor bhavaḥ sa hi || 15 ||

所有受法者不墮於斷常
因果相續故不斷亦不常

15. [An opponent objects:]
For someone assuming an existent thing, there is not [only] eternalism or nihilism,
Since this is existence: namely, the continuity of the originating and stopping of causes and product.

If you assert the existence of things, eternalism and annihilationism will not be, because the continuity of the rising and passing of cause -effect is becoming.

問曰(28)所有受法者不墮於斷常(29)因果相續故不斷亦不常(29a1)有人雖信受分別説諸法。而不墮斷常。(2)如經説五陰無常苦空無我。而不斷滅。雖(3)説罪福無量劫數不失。而不是常。何以故。(4)是法因果常生滅相續故往來不絶。生滅故(5)不常。相續故不斷。

udayavyayasaṃtānaḥ phalahetvor bhavaḥ sa cet |
vyayasyāpunarutpatter hetūcchedaḥ prasajyate || 16 ||

若因果生滅相續而不斷
滅更不生故因即為斷滅

16. [Nagarjuna replies:]
If this is existence: namely, the continuity of originating and stopping of causes and product,
It would logically follow that the cause is destroyed because the destroyed thing does not originate again.

If the continuity of the rising and passing of cause-effect is becoming, because what has passed will not be created again, it will follow that the cause is annihilated.

答曰(6)若因果生滅相續而不斷(7)滅更不生故因即爲斷滅(8)若汝説諸法因果相續故不斷不常。若滅法(9)已滅更不復生。是則因斷。若因斷云何有相(10)續。已滅不生故。

sadbhāvasya svabhāvena nāsadbhāvaś ca yujyate |
nirvāṇakāle cocchedaḥ praśamād bhavasaṃtateḥ || 17 ||

法住於自性不應有有無
涅槃滅相續則墮於斷滅

17. If there is self-existence of something which is intrinsically existing, then non-existence does not obtain.
At the time of nirvana there is destruction of the cycle of existence (bhavasamtana) as a result of the cessation.

If things exist essentially, it would be unreasonable [for them] to become nothing. At the time of nirvana [they] would be annihilated, because the continuity of becoming is totally pacified.

復次(11)法住於自性不應有有無(12)涅槃滅相續則墮於斷滅(13)法決定在有相中。爾時無無相。如瓶定在(14)瓶相。爾時無失壞相。隨有瓶時無失壞相。(15)無瓶時亦無失壞相。何以故。若無瓶則無(16)所破。以是義故滅不可得。離滅故亦無生。(17)何以故。生滅相因待故。又有常等過故。是(18)故不應於一法而有有無。又汝先説因果(19)生滅相續故。雖受諸法不墮斷常。是事(20)不然。何以故。汝説因果相續故有三有相(21)續。滅相續名涅槃。若爾者。涅槃時應墮斷(22)滅。以滅三有相續故。

carame na niruddhe ca prathamo yujyate bhavaḥ |
carame nāniruddhe ca prathamo yujyate bhavaḥ || 18 ||

若初有滅者則無有後有
初有若不滅亦無有後有

18. If the last [part of existence] is destroyed, the first [part of] existence does not obtain.
If the last [part of existence] is not destroyed, the first [part of] existence does not obtain.

If the end stops, it is unreasonable for there to be a beginning of becoming. When the end does not stop, it is unreasonable for there to be a beginning of becoming.

復次(23)若初有滅者則無有後有(24)初有若不滅亦無有後有(25)初有名今世有。後有名來世有。若初有(26)滅次有後有。是即無因。是事不然。是故(27)不得言初有滅有後有。若初有不滅。亦(28)不應有後有。何以故。若初有未滅而有後(29)有者。是則一時有二有。是事不然。是故初(29b1)有不滅無有後有。問曰。後有不以初有(2)滅生。不以不滅生。但滅時生。

nirudhyamāne carame prathamo yadi jāyate |
nirudhyamāna ekaḥ syāj jāyamāno ’paro bhavet || 19 ||

若初有滅時而後有生者
滅時是一有生時是一有

19. If the first [part of existence] were produced while the final part were being destroyed,
There would be one thing being destroyed and being produced [both at the same time].

If the beginning is created while the end is stopping, the stopping would be one and the creating would be another.

答曰(3)若初有滅時而後有生者(4)滅時是一有生時是一有(5)若初有滅時。後有生者。即二有一時倶。一有(6)是滅時。一有是生時。問曰。滅時生時二有倶(7)者則不然。但現見初有滅時後有生。

na cen nirudhyamānaś ca jāyamānaś ca yujyate⁵ |
sārdhaṃ ca mriyate yeṣu teṣu skandheṣu jāyate || 20 ||

5. Ye (2007, 162): vidyate.

若言於生滅而謂一時者
則於此陰死即於此陰生

20. If the one “being destroyed” and the one “being produced” cannot exist together,
Can someone be produced in those “groups of universal elements” (skandhas) in which he is [also] “dying”?

If it is also unreasonable for stopping and creating to be together, aren’t the aggregates that die also those that are created?

答曰(8)若言於生滅而謂一時者(9)則於此陰死即於此陰生(10)若生時滅時一時無二有。而謂初有滅時後(11)有生者。今應隨在何陰中死。即於此陰生。(12)不應餘陰中生。何以故。死者即是生者。(13)如是死生相違法。不應一時一處。是故汝(14)先説滅時生時一時無二有。但現見初有滅(15)時後有生者。是事不然。

evaṃ triṣv api kāleṣu na yuktā bhavasaṃtatiḥ |
triṣu kāleṣu yā nāsti sā kathaṃ bhavasaṃtatiḥ⁶ || 21 ||

6. Ye (2007, 154): yā nāsti triṣu kāleṣu kutaḥ sā bhavasaṃtatiḥ.

三世中求有相續不可得
若三世中無何有有相續

21. Thus, the chain of existences is not possible in any of the tree times [i.e. past, present, and future];
And if it does not exist in the three times, how can the chain of existences exist?

Likewise, if the continuity of becoming is not reasonable at any of the three times, how can there be a continuity of becoming which isnon-existent in the three times?

復次(16)三世中求有相續不可得(17)若三世中無何有有相續(18)三有名欲有色有無色有。無始生死中不得(19)實智故。常有三有相續。今於三世中諦求(20)不可得。若三世中無有。當於何處有有相(21)續。當知有有相續。皆從愚癡顛倒故有。實(22)中則無◎(23)中論卷第三(3)中論卷第四(4)　龍樹菩薩造＊梵志青目釋(5)姚秦＊三藏鳩摩羅什譯　

saṃbhavavibhavaparīkṣā nāmaikaviṃśatitamaṃ prakaraṇaṃ ||

’byung ba dang ’jig pa brtag pa zhes bya ba ste rab tu byed pa nyi shu gcig pa’o ||

skandhā na nānyaḥ skandhebhyo nāsmin skandhā na teṣu saḥ |
tathāgataḥ skandhavān na katamo ’tra⁷ tathāgataḥ || 1 ||

7. Ye (2007, 154): nu.

觀如來品第二十二(十六偈) 非陰不離陰此彼不相在
如來不有陰何處有如來

|| phung min phung po las gzhan min | | de la phung med de der med | |
de bzhin (4)gshegs pa phung ldan min | | de bzhin gshegs pa gang zhig yin | |

[Chapter] 22: An Analysis of the “Fully Completed” (Tathagata) (the Buddha) 1. That one [who is “fully-completed”] is not the “groups of universal elements” (skandha), nor something other than the “groups”; the “groups” are not in him, nor is he in them;
The “fully completed” does not possess the “groups.”
What, then, is the “fully completed”?

Investigation of the Tathagata Not the aggregates, not other than the aggregates; the aggregates are not in him; he is not in them: the Tathagata does not possess the aggregates. What is the Tathagata?

(6) ◎ 觀如來品第二十二十六偈 (7)問曰。一切世中尊。唯有如來正遍知。號爲(8)法王。一切智人是則應有。答曰。今諦思惟。(9)若有應取。若無何所取。何以故。如來(10)非陰不離陰此彼不相在(11)如來不有陰何處有如來(12)若如來實有者。爲五陰是如來。爲離五陰(13)有如來。爲如來中有五陰。爲五陰中有如(14)來。爲如來有五陰。是事皆不然。五陰非是(15)如來。何以故。生滅相故。五陰生滅相。若如來(16)是五陰。如來即是生滅相。若生滅相者。如(17)來即有無常斷滅等過。又受者受法則一。受(18)者是如來。受法是五陰。是事不然。是故如來(19)非是五陰。離五陰亦無如來。若離五陰(20)有如來者。不應有生滅相。若爾者。如來(21)有常等過。又眼等諸根不能見知。但是事(22)不然。是故離五陰亦無如來。如來中亦(23)無五陰。何以故。若如來中有五陰。如器中(24)有果水中有魚者。則爲有異。若異者。即有(25)如上常等過。是故如來中無五陰。又五陰中(26)無如來。何以故。若五陰中有如來。如床上(27)有人器中有乳者。如是則有別異。如上説(28)過。是故五陰中無如來。如來亦不有五陰。(29)何以故。若如來有五陰。如人有子。如是則(30a1)有別異。若爾者。有如上過。是事不然。是故(2)如來不有五陰。如是五種求不可得。何等(3)是如來。問曰。如是義求如來不可得。而五(4)陰和合有如來。

buddhaḥ skandhān upādāya yadi nāsti svabhāvataḥ |
svabhāvataś ca yo nāsti kutaḥ sa parabhāvataḥ || 2 ||

陰合有如來則無有自性
若無有自性云何因他有

2. If the Buddha exists dependent on the “groups,” then he is not “that which exists by itself” (svabbava)
And how can he exist as something else (parabhava) (“other-existence”) if he is not “that which exists by itself” (svabbava)?

If the buddha depends on the aggregates, he does not exist from an own-nature. How can that which does not exist from an own-nature exist from an other-nature?

答曰(5)陰合有如來則無有自性(6)若無有自性云何因他有(7)若如來五陰和合故有。即無自性。何以故。(8)因五陰和合有故。問曰。如來不以自性(9)有。但因他性有。答曰。若無自性。云何因(10)他性有。何以故。他性亦無自性。又無相待(11)因故。他性不可得。不可得故不名爲他。

pratītya parabhāvaṃ yaḥ so ’nātmety upapadyate |
yaś cānātmā sa ca kathaṃ bhaviṣyati tathāgataḥ || 3 ||

法若因他生是即為非我
若法非我者云何是如來

3. That which exists presupposing another existent thing is properly called a “non-individual self” (anatma).
How will that which is a non-individual self become the “fully completed”?

It is not tenable for something dependent on other-nature to be self-existent. How can that which has no self-existence be tathagata?

復(12)次(13)法若因他生是即爲非我(14)若法非我者云何是如來(15)若法因衆縁生。即無有我。如因五指有(16)拳。是拳無有自體。如是因五陰名我。是(17)我即無自體。我有種種名。或名衆生人天(18)如來等。若如來因五陰有。即無自性。無自(19)性故無我。若無我云何説名如來。是故偈(20)中説法若因他生是即爲非我。若法非我者(21)云何是如來。

yadi nāsti svabhāvaś ca parabhāvaḥ kathaṃ bhavet |
svabhāvaparabhāvābhyām ṛte kaḥ sa tathāgataḥ || 4 ||

若無有自性云何有他性
離自性他性何名為如來

4. And if there is no self-existence (svabhava), how would it have an “other-existence” (parabhava)?
What would that “fully completed” [reality] be without either a self-existence or other-existence?

If self-nature does not exist, how can there be the existence of other-nature? What is a Tathagata apart from own-nature and other-nature?

復次(22)若無有自性云何有他性(23)離自性他性何名爲如來(24)若無自性。他性亦不應有。因自性故名(25)他性。此無故彼亦無。是故自性他性二倶無。(26)若離自性他性。誰爲如來。

skandhān yady anupādāya bhavet kaścit tathāgataḥ |
sa idānīm upādadyād upādāya tato bhavet || 5 ||

若不因五陰先有如來者
以今受陰故則說為如來

5. If some kind of “fully completed” [thing] would exist without dependence on the “groups,”
It is dependent now; therefore it exists dependent [on something].

If there exists a tathagata [who is] not depending on the aggregates, he exists in depending [on them] now and will henceforth depend.

復次(27)若不因五陰先有如來者(28)以今受陰故則説爲如來

skandhāṃś cāpy anupādāya nāsti kaścit tathāgataḥ |
yaś ca nāsty anupādāya sa upādāsyate katham || 6 ||

今實不受陰更無如來法
若以不受無今當云何受

6. There is no kind of “fully completed” [being] which is not dependent on the “groups.”
And whatever is not non-dependent—how will it become dependent?

If there does not exist a tathagata [who is]not depending on the aggregates, how does he grasp [depend on? them]?

(29)今實不受陰更無如來法(30b1)若以不受無今當云何受

na bhavaty anupādattam upādānaṃ ca kiṃ cana |
na cāsti nirupādānaḥ kathaṃ cana tathāgataḥ || 7 ||

若其未有受所受不名受
無有無受法而名為如來

7. There is nothing whatever that is dependent on [the “groups”] and there is no thing whatever on which something does not depend.
There would not exist in any way a “fully completed” [being] without being dependent on [the “groups”].

[Since] there is nothing to be grasped/dependent on, there can be no grasping/depending. There is no tathagata at all who is without grasping/depending.

(2)若其未有受所受不名受(3)無有無受法而名爲如來

tattvānyatvena yo nāsti mṛgyamāṇaś ca pañcadhā |
upādānena sa kathaṃ prajñapyate tathāgataḥ || 8 ||

若於一異中如來不可得
五種求亦無云何受中有

8. That [fully completed being] which does not exist by its actual reality (tattva) or by some other reality (anyatva) according to the five-fold examination—
How is the “fully completed” [being] perceived by being dependent?

If having examined in five ways, how can that tathagata who does not exist as that one or the other be [conventionally] understood by grasping/depending?

(4)若於一異中如來不可得(5)五種求亦無云何受中有

yad apīdam upādānaṃ tat svabhāvān na vidyate |
svabhāvataś ca yan nāsti kutas tat parabhāvataḥ || 9 ||

又所受五陰不從自性有
若無自性者云何有他性

9. So when there is dependence, self-existence does not exist;
And if there is no self-existence whatever, how is an other-existence possible?

That which is grasped/depended on does not exist from its own nature. It is impossible for that which does not exist from its own nature to exist from another nature.

(6)又所受五陰不從自性有(7)若無自性者云何有他性(8)若未受五陰。先有如來者。是如來今應受(9)五陰。已作如來。而實未受五陰時先無如(10)來。今云何當受。又不受五陰者。五陰不名(11)爲受。無有無受而名爲如來。又如來一異(12)中求不可得。五陰中五種求亦不可得。若爾(13)者。云何於五陰中説有如來。又所受五陰。(14)不從自性有。若謂從他性有。若不從自(15)性有。云何從他性有。何以故。以無自性(16)故。又他性亦無。

evaṃ śūnyam upādānam upādātā ca sarvaśaḥ |
prajñapyate ca śūnyena kathaṃ śūnyas tathāgataḥ || 10 ||

以如是義故受空受者空
云何當以空而說空如來

10. Thus “dependence” and “that which is dependent” are completely empty (sunya).
How is that empty “fully completed one” known through that which is empty?

In that way, what is grasped/depended on and what grasps/depends are empty in every aspect. How can an empty tathagata be [conventionally] understood by what is empty?

復次(17)以如是義故受空受者空(18)云何當以空而説空如來(19)以是義思惟。受及受者皆空。若受空者。云(20)何以空受。而説空如來。問曰。汝謂受空受(21)者空。則定有空耶。答曰不然。

śūnyam iti na vaktavyam aśūnyam iti vā bhavet |
ubhayaṃ nobhayaṃ ceti prajñaptyarthaṃ tu kathyate || 11 ||

空則不可說非空不可說
共不共叵說但以假名說

11. One may not say that there is “emptiness” (sunya) (1) nor that there is non-emptiness. (2)”
Nor that both [exist simultaneously] (3), nor that neither exists (4); the purpose for saying [“emptiness”] is for the purpose of conveying knowledge.

Do not say “empty,” or “not empty,” or “both,” or “neither:” these are mentioned for the sake of [conventional] understanding.

何以故(22)空則不可説非空不可説(23)共不共叵説但以假名説(24)諸法空則不應説。諸法不空亦不應説。諸(25)法空不空亦不應説。非空非不空亦不應(26)説。何以故。但破相違故。以假名説。如是(27)正觀思惟。諸法實相中。不應以諸難爲難。

śāśvatāśāśvatādy atra kutaḥ śānte catuṣṭayam |
antānantādi cāpy atra kutaḥ śānte catuṣṭayam || 12 ||

寂滅相中無常無常等四
寂滅相中無邊無邊等四

12. How, then, will “eternity,” “non-eternity,” and [the rest of] the Tetralemma apply to bliss (santa)?
How, then, will “the end,” “without end,” and [the rest of] the Tetralemma apply to bliss?

Where can the four such as permanence and impermanence exist in this peaceful one? Where can the four such as end and no-end [of the world] exist in this peaceful one?

(28)何以故(29)寂滅相中無常無常等四(30c1)寂滅相中無邊無邊等四(2)諸法實相。如是微妙寂滅。但因過去世。起(3)四種邪見。世間有常。世間無常。世間常無(4)常。世間非常非無常。寂滅中盡無。何以故。諸(5)法實相。畢竟清淨不可取。空尚不受。何況(6)有四種見。四種見皆因受生。諸法實相無(7)所因受。四種見皆以自見爲貴。他見爲賤。(8)諸法實相無有此彼。是故説寂滅中無四(9)種見。如因過去世有四種見。因未來世(10)有四種見亦如是。世間有邊。世間無邊。世(11)間有邊無邊。世間非有邊非無邊。問曰。若(12)如是破如來者。則無如來耶。

ghanagrāho gṛhītas tu yenāstīti tathāgataḥ |
nāstīti sa vikalpayan nirvṛtasyāpi kalpayet || 13 ||

邪見深厚者則說無如來
如來寂滅相分別有亦非

13. That image of nirvana [in which] the Buddha (Tathagata) either “is” or “is not”—
By him who [so imagines nirvana] the notion is crudely grasped.

Those who hold the dense apprehension, “the tathagata exists” conceive the thought, “he does not exist in nirvana.”

答曰(13)邪見深厚者則説無如來(14)如來寂滅相分別有亦非(15)邪見有二種。一者破世間樂。二者破涅槃(16)道。破世間樂者。是麁邪見。言無罪無福。(17)無如來等賢聖。起是邪見捨善爲惡。則破(18)世間樂。破涅槃道者。貪著於我。分別有無。(19)起善滅惡。起善故得世間樂。分別有無故(20)不得涅槃。是故若言無如來者。是深厚邪(21)見。乃失世間樂。何況涅槃。若言有如來。亦(22)是邪見。何以故。如來寂滅相。而種種分別故。(23)是故寂滅相中。分別有如來。

svabhāvataś ca śūnye ’smiṃś cintā naivopapadyate |
paraṃ nirodhād bhavati buddho na bhavatīti vā || 14 ||

如是性空中思惟亦不可
如來滅度後分別於有無

14. Concerning that which is empty by its own nature (svabhava), the thoughts do not arise that:
The Buddha “exists” or “does not exist” after death.

For that one empty of own-nature, it is entirely inappropriate to think that once the buddha has nirvana-ed he either “exists” or “does not exist.”

亦爲非(24)如是性空中思惟亦不可(25)如來滅度後分別於有無(26)諸法實相性空故。不應於如來滅後思惟(27)若有若無。若有無。如來從本已來畢竟空。

prapañcayanti ye buddhaṃ prapañcātītam avyayam |
te prapañcahatāḥ sarve na paśyanti tathāgatam || 15 ||

如來過戲論而人生戲論
戲論破慧眼是皆不見佛

15. Those who describe in detail the Buddha, who is unchanging and beyond all detailed description—
Those, completely defeated by description, do not perceive the “fully completed” [being].

Those who make fixations about Buddha who is beyond fixations and without deterioration -- all those who are damaged by fixations do not see the tathagata.

(28)何況滅後(29)如來過戲論而人生戲論(31a1)戲論破慧眼是皆不見佛(2)戲論名憶念取相分別此彼。言佛滅不滅(3)等。是人爲戲論。覆慧眼故不能見如來法(4)身。此如來品中。初中後思惟。如來定性不(5)可得。

tathāgato yatsvabhāvas tatsvabhāvam idaṃ jagat |
tathāgato niḥsvabhāvo niḥsvabhāvam idaṃ jagat || 16 ||

如來所有性即是世間性
如來無有性世間亦無性

16. The self-existence of the “fully completed” [being] is the self-existence of the world.
The “fully completed” [being] is without self-existence [and] the world is without self-existence.

Whatever is the own-nature of the tathagata, that is the own-nature of this world. The tathagata has no own-nature. This world has no own-nature.

是故偈説(6)如來所有性即是世間性(7)如來無有性世間亦無性(8)此品中思惟推求。如來性即是一切世間性。(9)問曰。何等是如來性。答曰。如來無有性。同(10)世間無性

tathāgataparīkṣā nāma dvāviṃśatitamaṃ prakaraṇaṃ ||

de bzhin gshegs (5)pa brtag pa zhes bya ba ste rab tu byed pa nyi shu gnyis pa’o ||

saṃkalpaprabhavo rāgo dveṣo mohaś ca kathyate |
śubhāśubhaviparyāsān saṃbhavanti pratītya hi || 1 ||

中論觀顛倒品第二十三(二十四偈) 從憶想分別生於貪恚癡
淨不淨顛倒皆從眾緣生

|| ’dod chags zhe sdang gti mug rnams | | kun tu rtog las ’byung bar gsungs | |
sdug dang mi sdug phyin ci log | | brten pa nyid las kun tu ’byung | |

[Chapter] 23: An Analysis of Errors (viparyasa) (the perverted views) 1. It is said that desire (raga), hate, and delusion are derived from mental fabrication (samkalpa),
Because they come into existence presupposing errors as to what is salutary and unsalutary.

Investigation of Error It is said that desire, hatred, stupidity arise from conceptuality; they arise in dependence on the pleasant, the unpleasant and confusion. [they arise in dependence on confusion about the pleasant and unpleasant]

(11) 中論觀顛倒品第二十三二十四偈 (12)問曰(13)從憶想分別生於貪恚癡(14)淨不淨顛倒皆從衆縁生(15)經説因淨不淨顛倒。憶想分別生貪恚癡。是(16)故當知有貪恚癡。

śubhāśubhaviparyāsān saṃbhavanti pratītya ye |
te svabhāvān na vidyante tasmāt kleśā na tattvataḥ || 2 ||

若因淨不淨顛倒生三毒
三毒即無性故煩惱無實

2. Those things which come into existence presupposing errors as to what is salutary and unsalutary
Do not exist by their own nature (svabhava); therefore the impurities (klesa) do not exist in reality.

Whatever arises in dependence upon the pleasant, the unpleasant and confusion, (whatever arises in dependence on confusion about the pleasant and unpleasant) they have no own-nature, therefore, afflictions do not really exist (do not exist in themselves).

答曰(17)若因淨不淨顛倒生三毒(18)三毒即無性故煩惱無實(19)若諸煩惱。因淨不淨顛倒。憶想分別生。即(20)無自性。是故諸煩惱無實。

ātmano ’stitvanāstitve na kathaṃ cic ca sidhyataḥ |
taṃ vināstitvanāstitve kleśānāṃ sidhyataḥ katham || 3 ||

我法有以無是事終不成
無我諸煩惱有無亦不成

3. The existence or non-existence of the individual self (ātma) is not proved at all.
Without that [individual self], how can the existence or non-existence of the impurities be proved?

The existence or non-existence of self is not established in any way. Without that, how can the existence or non-existence of afflictions be established?

復次(21)我法有以無是事終不成(22)無我諸煩惱有無亦不成(23)我無有因縁若有若無而可成。今無我諸(24)煩惱云何以有無而可成。

kasya cid dhi bhavantīme kleśāḥ sa ca na sidhyati |
kaścid āho vinā kaṃcit santi kleśā na kasyacit || 4 ||

誰有此煩惱是即為不成
若離是而有煩惱則無屬

4. For impurities exist of somebody, and that person is not proved at all.
Is it not so that without someone the impurities do not exist of anybody?

These afflictions are someone’s. But that [someone] is not established. Without [someone], the afflictions are not anyone’s.

何以故(25)誰有此煩惱是即爲不成(26)若離是而有煩惱則無屬(27)煩惱名爲能惱他。惱他者應是衆生。是衆(28)生於一切處推求不可得。若謂離衆生但(29)有煩惱。是煩惱則無所屬。若謂雖無我而(31b1)煩惱屬心。是事亦不然。

svakāyadṛṣṭivat kleśāḥ kliṣṭe santi na pañcadhā |
svakāyadṛṣṭivat kliṣṭaṃ kleśeṣv api na pañcadhā || 5 ||

如身見五種求之不可得
煩惱於垢心五求亦不得

5. In reference to the view of having a body of one’s own, the impurities do not exist in what is made impure according to the five-fold manner.
In reference to the view of having a body of one’s own, that which is made impure does not exist in the impurities according to the five-fold manner.

Like [the self apprehended in] the view of one’s own body, the afflictions do not exist in five ways in the afflicted. Like [the self apprehended in] the view of one’s own body, the afflicted does not exist in five ways in the afflictions.

何以故(2)如身見五種求之不可得(3)煩惱於垢心五求亦不得(4)如身見。五陰中五種求不可得。諸煩惱亦於(5)垢心中。五種求亦不可得。又垢心於煩惱(6)中。五種求亦不可得。

svabhāvato na vidyante śubhāśubhaviparyayāḥ |
pratītya katamān kleśāḥ śubhāśubhaviparyayān || 6 ||

淨不淨顛倒是則無自性
云何因此二而生諸煩惱

6. The errors as to what is salutary and non-salutary do not exist as self-existent entities (svabhavatas)
Depending on which errors as to what is salutary and non-salutary are then impurities?

If confusion about the pleasant and unpleasant does not exist from its own nature, what afflictions can depend on confusion about the pleasant and unpleasant?

復次(7)淨不淨顛倒是則無自性(8)云何因此二而生諸煩惱(9)淨不淨顛倒者。顛倒名虚妄。若虚妄即無(10)性。無性則無顛倒。若無顛倒。云何因顛倒(11)起諸煩惱。

rūpaśabdarasasparśā gandhā dharmāś ca ṣaḍvidham |
vastu rāgasya doṣasya mohasya ca vikalpyate || 7 ||

色聲香味觸及法為六種
如是之六種是三毒根本

7. Form, sound, taste, touch, smell, and the dharmas: this six-fold
Substance (vastu) of desire, hate, and delusion is imagined.

Colour/shape, sound, taste, tactile sensation, smell and dharmas: these six are conceived as the basis of desire, hatred and stupidity.

問曰(12)色聲香味觸及法爲六種(13)如是之六種是三毒根本(14)是六入三毒根本。因此六入生淨不淨顛(15)倒。因淨不淨顛倒生貪恚癡。

rūpaśabdarasasparśā gandhā dharmāś ca kevalāḥ |
gandharvanagarākārā marīcisvapnasaṃnibhāḥ || 8 ||

色聲香味觸及法體六種
皆空如炎夢如乾闥婆城

8. Form, sound, taste, touch, smell, and the dharmas are
Merely the form of a fairy castle, like a mirage, a dream.

Colour/shape, sound, taste, tactile sensation, smell and dharmas: these are like gandharva-cities and similar to mirages, dreams.

答曰(16)色聲香味觸及法體六種(17)皆空如炎夢如乾闥婆城

aśubhaṃ vā śubhaṃ vāpi kutas teṣu bhaviṣyati |
māyāpuruṣakalpeṣu pratibimbasameṣu ca || 9 ||

如是六種中何有淨不淨
猶如幻化人亦如鏡中像

9. How will “that which is salutary” or “that which is non-salutary” come into existence
In a formation of a magical man, or in things like a reflection?

How can the pleasant and unpleasant occur in those [things] which are like phantoms and similar to reflections?

(18)如是六種中何有淨不淨(19)猶如幻化人亦如鏡中像(20)色聲香味觸法自體。未與心和合時。空無(21)所有。如炎如夢。如化如鏡中像。但誑惑(22)於心無有定相。如是六入中。何有淨不淨。

anapekṣya śubhaṃ nāsty aśubhaṃ prajñapayemahi |
yat pratītya śubhaṃ tasmāc chubhaṃ naivopapadyate || 10 ||

不因於淨相則無有不淨
因淨有不淨是故無不淨

10. We submit that there is no non-salutary thing unrelated to a salutary thing.
[And in turn] depending on which, there is a salutary thing; therefore, a salutary thing does not obtain.

Something is called “pleasant” in dependence on the unpleasant. Since that would not exist without relation to the pleasant, therefore, the pleasant is not tenable.

(23)復次(24)不因於淨相則無有不淨(25)因淨有不淨是故無不淨(26)若不因於淨。先無有不淨。因何而説不(27)淨。是故無不淨。

anapekṣyāśubhaṃ nāsti śubhaṃ prajñapayemahi |
yat pratītyāśubhaṃ tasmād aśubhaṃ naiva vidyate || 11 ||

不因於不淨則亦無有淨
因不淨有淨是故無有淨

11. We submit that there is no salutary thing unrelated to a non-salutary thing,
[And in turn] depending on which, there is a non-salutary thing; therefore a non-salutary thing does not obtain.

Something is called “unpleasant” in dependence on the pleasant. Since that would not exist without relation to the unpleasant, therefore, the unpleasant is not tenable.

復次(28)不因於不淨則亦無有淨(29)因不淨有淨是故無有淨(31c1)若不因不淨。先無有淨。因何而説淨。是(2)故無有淨。

avidyamāne ca śubhe kuto rāgo bhaviṣyati |
aśubhe ’vidyamāne ca kuto dveṣo bhaviṣyati || 12 ||

若無有淨者何由而有貪
若無有不淨何由而有恚

12. If “what is salutary” does not exist, how will there be desire [for it]?
And if “what is non-salutary” does not exist, how will there be hatred [for it]?

If the pleasant does not exist, how can desire exist? If the unpleasant does not exist, how can hatred exist?

復次(3)若無有淨者何由而有貪(4)若無有不淨何由而有恚(5)無淨不淨故。則不生貪恚。問曰。經説常等(6)四顛倒。若無常中見常。是名顛倒。若無常(7)中見無常。此非顛倒。餘三顛倒亦如是。有(8)顛倒故。顛倒者亦應有。何故言都無。

anitye nityam ity evaṃ yadi grāho viparyayaḥ |
nānityaṃ vidyate śūnye kuto grāho viparyayaḥ || 13 ||

於無常著常是則名顛倒
空中無有常何處有常倒

13. Even if the notion “What is permanent is in something impermanent” is in error,
How can this notion be in error since “what is impermanent” does not exist in emptiness?

If such an apprehension as “the impermanent is permanent” is confused, since impermanence does not exist in the empty, how can such an apprehension be confused?

答(9)曰(10)於無常著常是則名顛倒(11)空中無有常何處有常倒(12)若於無常中著常。名爲顛倒。諸法性空中(13)無有常。是中何處有常顛倒。餘三亦如是。

anitye nityam ity evaṃ yadi grāho viparyayaḥ |
anityam ity api grāhaḥ śūnye kiṃ na viparyayaḥ || 14 ||

若於無常中著無常非倒
空中無無常何有非顛倒

14. Even if the notion “what is permanent is in something impermanent” is in error,
Is not then the notion concerning emptiness, i.e., that it is impermanent, in error?

If such an apprehension as “the impermanent is permanent” is confused, how would the apprehension “there is impermanence in the empty” also not be confused?

(14)復次(15)若於無常中著無常非倒(16)空中無無常何有非顛倒(17)若著無常言是無常。不名爲顛倒者。諸法(18)性空中無無常。無常無故誰爲非顛倒。餘三(19)亦如是。

yena gṛhṇāti yo grāho grahītā yac ca gṛhyate |
upaśāntāni sarvāṇi tasmād grāho na vidyate || 15 ||

可著著者著及所用著法
是皆寂滅相云何而有著

15. That by which a notion is formed, the notion, those who have notions, and that which is grasped [in the notion]:
All have ceased; therefore, the notion does not exist.

[The means] by which one apprehends, the apprehension [itself], the apprehender and the apprehended: all are completely pacified, therefore there is no apprehending.

復次(20)可著著者著及所用著法(21)是皆寂滅相云何而有著(22)可著名物著者名作者。著名業。所用法名(23)所用事。是皆性空寂滅相。如如來品中所(24)説。是故無有著。

avidyamāne grāhe ca mithyā vā samyag eva vā |
bhaved viparyayaḥ kasya bhavet kasyāviparyayaḥ || 16 ||

若無有著法言邪是顛倒
言正不顛倒誰有如是事

16. If a notion is not existing either as false or true,
Whose is the error? Whose is the non-error?

If there is neither confused nor right apprehension, who is confused and who is not confused?

復次(25)若無有著法言邪是顛倒(26)言正不顛倒誰有如是事(27)著名憶想分別此彼有無等。若無此著者。(28)誰爲邪顛倒。誰爲正不顛倒。

na cāpi viparītasya saṃbhavanti viparyayāḥ |
na cāpy aviparītasya saṃbhavanti viparyayāḥ || 17 ||

有倒不生倒無倒不生倒
倒者不生倒不倒亦不生

17. Nor do errors of someone who has erred come into existence.
Nor do errors of someone who has not erred come into existence.

Confusions do not occur for those who are [already] confused; confusions do not occur for those who are not [yet] confused;

復次(29)有倒不生倒無倒不生倒(32a1)倒者不生倒不倒亦不生

na viparyasyamānasya saṃbhavanti viparyayāḥ |
vimṛśasva svayaṃ kasya saṃbhavanti viparyayāḥ || 18 ||

若於顛倒時亦不生顛倒
汝可自觀察誰生於顛倒

18. And errors of someone who is at present in error do not come into existence.
Now you examine of whom do errors really come into existence!

confusions do not occur for those who are being confused. For whom do confusions occur? Examine this by yourself!

(2)若於顛倒時亦不生顛倒(3)汝可自觀察誰生於顛倒(4)已顛倒者。則更不生顛倒。已顛倒故。不顛(5)倒者亦不顛倒。無有顛倒故。顛倒時亦(6)不顛倒。有二過故。汝今除憍慢心。善自(7)觀察。誰爲顛倒者。

anutpannāḥ kathaṃ nāma bhaviṣyanti viparyayāḥ |
viparyayeṣv ajāteṣu viparyayagataḥ kutaḥ || 19 ||

諸顛倒不生云何有此義
無有顛倒故何有顛倒者

19. How in all the world will errors which have not originated come into existence?
And if errors are not originated, how can there be someone involved in error?

If confusions are not born, how can they exist? If confusions are not born, where can there be someone who has confusion?

復次(8)諸顛倒不生云何有此義(9)無有顛倒故何有顛倒者(10)顛倒種種因縁破故。墮在不生。彼貪著不(11)生。謂不生是顛倒實相。是故偈説。云何名(12)不生爲顛倒。乃至無漏法尚不名爲不生(13)相。何況顛倒是不生相。顛倒無故何有顛倒(14)者。因顛倒有顛倒者。

na svato jāyate bhāvaḥ parato naiva jāyate |
na svataḥ parataś ceti viparyayagataḥ kutaḥ || 20 ||

20. Since no being is produced by itself, nor by something different,
Nor by itself and something different at the same time, how can there be someone involved in error?

Things are not born from themselves, not born from others. If they are also not from self and others, where can there be someone who has confusion?

ātmā ca śuci nityaṃ ca sukhaṃ ca yadi vidyate |
ātmā ca śuci nityaṃ ca sukhaṃ ca na viparyayaḥ || 21 ||

若常我樂淨而是實有者
是常我樂淨則非是顛倒

21. If the individual self, “what is pure,” “what is eternal,” and happiness really exist,
Then the individual self, “what is pure,” “what is eternal,” and happiness are not errors.

If self and purity and permanence and happiness were existent, self and purity and permanence and happiness would not be confusions.

復次(15)若常我樂淨而是實有者(16)是常我樂淨則非是顛倒(17)＊若常我樂淨是四實有性者。是常我樂淨(18)則非顛倒。何以故。定有實事故。云何言顛(19)倒。若謂常＊我樂淨倒是四無者。無常苦無(20)我不淨。是四應實有。不名顛倒。顛倒相違(21)故名不顛倒。是事不然。

nātmā ca śuci nityaṃ ca sukhaṃ ca yadi vidyate |
anātmā ’śucy anityaṃ ca naiva duḥkhaṃ ca vidyate || 22 ||

若常我樂淨而實無有者
無常苦不淨是則亦應無

22. But if individual self, “what is pure,” “what is eternal,” and happiness do not exist,
Then non-individual self, “what is impure,” “what is impermanent” and sorrow (dukkha) do not exist.

If self and purity and permanence and happiness were non-existent, selflessness, impurity, impermanence and anguish would not exist.

何以故(22)若常我樂淨而實無有者(23)無常苦不淨是則亦應無(24)若＊常我樂淨是四實無。無故無常等四事(25)亦不應有。何以故。無相因待故。

evaṃ nirudhyate ’vidyā viparyayanirodhanāt |
avidyāyāṃ niruddhāyāṃ saṃskārādyaṃ nirudhyate || 23 ||

如是顛倒滅無明則亦滅
以無明滅故諸行等亦滅

23. From the cessation of error ignorance ceases;
When ignorance has ceased, conditioning forces (samskara) and everything else cease.

Thus by stopping confusion, ignorance will stop. If ignorance is stopped, impulsive acts etc. will stop.

復次(26)如是顛倒滅無明則亦滅(27)以無明滅故諸行等亦滅(28)如是者如其義。滅諸顛倒故。十二因縁根(29)本無明亦滅。無明滅故三種行業。乃至老死(32b1)等皆滅。

yadi bhūtāḥ svabhāvena kleśāḥ kecid dhi kasyacit |
kathaṃ nāma prahīyeran kaḥ svabhāvaṃ prahāsyati || 24 ||

若煩惱性實而有所屬者
云何當可斷誰能斷其性

24. If any kind of self-existent impurities belong to somebody,
How in all the world would they be eliminated? Who can eliminate that which is self-existent?

If the afflictions of some existed by their own nature, how could they be let go of? Who can let go of what exists by nature?

復次(2)若煩惱性實而有所屬者(3)云何當可斷誰能斷其性(4)若諸煩惱即是顛倒。而實有性者。云何可(5)斷。誰能斷其性。若謂諸煩惱皆虚妄無性(6)而可斷者。是亦不然。

yady abhūtāḥ svabhāvena kleśāḥ kecid dhi kasyacit |
kathaṃ nāma prahīyeran ko ’sadbhāvaṃ prahāsyati || 25 ||

若煩惱虛妄無性無屬者
云何當可斷誰能斷無性

25. If any kind of self-existent impurities do not belong to somebody,
How in all the world would they be eliminated? Who can eliminate that which is non-self-existent?

If the afflictions of some did not exist by their own nature, how could they be let go of? Who can let go of what does not exist?

何以故(7)若煩惱虚妄無性無屬者(8)云何當可斷誰能斷無性(9)若諸煩惱虚妄無性。則無所屬。云何可斷。(10)誰能斷無性法◎

viparyāsaparīkṣā nāma trayoviṃśatitamaṃ prakaraṇaṃ ||

phyin ci log brtag pa zhes bya ba ste rab tu byed pa nyi shu gsum pa’o ||

yadi śūnyam idaṃ sarvam udayo nāsti na vyayaḥ |
caturṇām āryasatyānām abhāvas te prasajyate || 1 ||

中論觀四諦品第二十四(四十偈) 若一切皆空無生亦無滅
如是則無有四聖諦之法

|| (4)gal te ’di dag kun stong na | | ’byung ba med cing ’jig pa med | |
’phags pa’i bden pa bzhi po rnams | | khyod la med par thal bar ’gyur | |

[Chapter] 24: An Analysis of the Holy Truths (aryasatya) (the noble truths) 1. If everything is empty, there is no origination nor destruction.
Then you must incorrectly conclude that there is non-existence of the four holy truths.

Investigation of the Ennobling Truths “If all were empty, nothing could come about or perish. It would follow for you that the four ennobling truths could not exist.

(11) ◎ 中論觀四諦品第二十四四十偈 (12)問曰。破四顛倒。通達四諦。得四沙門果(13)若一切皆空無生亦無滅(14)如是則無有四聖諦之法

parijñā ca prahāṇaṃ ca bhāvanā sākṣikarma ca |
caturṇām āryasatyānām abhāvān nopapadyate || 2 ||

以無四諦故見苦與斷集
證滅及修道如是事皆無

2. If there is non-existence of the four holy truths, the saving knowledge, the elimination [of illusion],
The “becoming” [enlightened] (bhavana), and the “realization” [of the goal] are impossible.

Since the four ennobling truths would not exist, understanding, letting go, cultivating and realizing would no longer be valid.

(15)以無四諦故見苦與斷集(16)證滅及修道如是事皆無

tadabhāvān na vidyante catvāry āryaphalāni ca |
phalābhāve phalasthā no na santi pratipannakāḥ || 3 ||

以是事無故則無四道果
無有四果故得向者亦無

3. If there is non-existence, then also the four holy “fruits” do not exist.
In the non-existence of fruit there is no “residing in fruit” nor obtaining.

“Since they would not exist, the four fruits would also not exist. If the fruits did not exist, there could be no abiding in the fruits. Experiencing them would also not exist.

(17)以是事無故則無四道果(18)無有四果故得向者亦無

saṃgho nāsti na cet santi te ’ṣṭau puruṣapudgalāḥ |
abhāvāc cāryasatyānāṃ saddharmo ’pi na vidyate || 4 ||

若無八賢聖則無有僧寶
以無四諦故亦無有法寶

4. When the community [of Buddhists] does not exist, then those eight “kinds of persons” [i.e., four abiding in the fruit and four who are obtaining] do not exist.
Because there is non-existence of the four holy truths, the real dharma does not exist.

“If those eight beings did not exist, the Community would not exist. Since there would be no ennobling truths, the sublime Dharma could also not exist.

(19)若無八賢聖則無有僧寶(20)以無四諦故亦無有法寶

dharme cāsati saṃghe ca kathaṃ buddho bhaviṣyati |
evaṃ trīṇy api ratnāni bruvāṇaḥ pratibādhase || 5 ||

以無法僧寶亦無有佛寶
如是說空者是則破三寶

5. And if there are no dharma and community, how will the Buddha exist?
By speaking thus, [that everything is empty] certainly you deny the three jewels [i.e., the Buddha, the dharma, and the community].

“If the Community and the Dharma did not exist, how could Buddha exist? When you talk of emptiness, the three Jewels are maligned.

(21)以無法僧寶亦無有佛寶(22)如是説空者是則破三寶(23)若一切世間皆空無所有者。即應無生無(24)滅。以無生無滅故。則無四聖諦。何以故。(25)從集諦生苦諦。集諦是因苦諦是果。滅苦(26)集諦名爲滅諦。能至滅諦名爲道諦。道諦(27)是因滅諦是果。如是四諦有因有果。若無(28)生無滅則無四諦。四諦無故。則無見苦斷(29)集證滅修道。見苦斷集證滅修道無故。則無(32c1)四沙門果。四沙門果無故。則無四向四得者。(2)若無此八賢聖。則無僧寶。又四聖諦無故。(3)法寶亦無。若無法寶僧寶者。云何有佛。得(4)法名爲佛。無法何有佛。汝説諸法皆空。則(5)壞三寶。

śūnyatāṃ phalasadbhāvam adharmaṃ dharmam eva ca |
sarvasaṃvyavahārāṃś ca laukikān pratibādhase || 6 ||

空法壞因果亦壞於罪福
亦復悉毀壞一切世俗法

6. You deny the real existence of a product, of right and wrong,
And all the practical behavior of the world as being empty.

“The existence of actions and fruits, what is not Dharma and what is Dharma, the conventions of the world: all these too are maligned.”

復次(6)空法壞因果亦壞於罪福(7)亦復悉毀壞一切世俗法(8)若受空法者。則破罪福及罪福果報。亦破(9)世俗法。有如是等諸過故。諸法不應空。

atra brūmaḥ śūnyatāyāṃ na tvaṃ vetsi prayojanam |
śūnyatāṃ śūnyatārthaṃ ca tata evaṃ vihanyase || 7 ||

汝今實不能知空空因緣
及知於空義是故自生惱

7. We reply that you do not comprehend the point of emptiness;
You eliminate both “emptiness” itself and its purpose from it.

An explanation for that: since you do not understand the need for emptiness, emptiness, and the point of emptiness, therefore in that way you malign.

答(10)曰(11)汝今實不能知空空因縁(12)及知於空義是故自生惱(13)汝不解云何是空相。以何因縁説空。亦不(14)解空義。不能如實知故。生如是疑難。

dve satye samupāśritya buddhānāṃ dharmadeśanā |
lokasaṃvṛtisatyaṃ ca satyaṃ ca paramārthataḥ || 8 ||

諸佛依二諦為眾生說法
一以世俗諦二第一義諦

8. The teaching by the Buddhas of the dharma has recourse to two truths:
The world-ensconced truth (T1) and the truth which is the highest sense (T2).

The Dharma taught by Buddhas perfectly relies on two truths: the ambiguous truths of the world and the truths of the sublime meaning.

復(15)次(16)諸佛依二諦爲衆生説法(17)一以世俗諦二第一義諦

ye ’nayor na vijānanti vibhāgaṃ satyayor dvayoḥ |
te tattvaṃ na vijānanti gambhīraṃ buddhaśāsane || 9 ||

若人不能知分別於二諦
則於深佛法不知真實義

9. Those who do not know the distribution (vibhagam) of the two kinds of truth
Do not know the profound “point” (tattva) (T3) in the teaching of the Buddha.

Those who do not understand the division into two truths, cannot understand the profound reality of the Buddha’s teaching.

(18)若人不能知分別於二諦(19)則於深佛法不知眞實義(20)世俗諦者。一切法性空。而世間顛倒故生虚(21)妄法。於世間是實。諸賢聖眞知顛倒性。故(22)知一切法皆空無生。於聖人是第一義諦名(23)爲實。諸佛依是二諦。而爲衆生説法。若人(24)不能如實分別二諦。則於甚深佛法。不(25)知實義。若謂一切法不生是第一義諦。不(33a1)須第二俗諦者。是亦不然。

vyavahāram anāśritya paramārtho na deśyate |
paramārtham anāgamya nirvāṇaṃ nādhigamyate || 10 ||

若不依俗諦不得第一義
不得第一義則不得涅槃

10. The highest sense [of the truth] (T2) is not taught apart from practical behavior (T1),
And without having understood the highest sense (T2) one cannot understand nirvana (T3).

Without relying on conventions, the sublime meaning cannot be taught. Without understanding the sublime meaning, one will not attain nirvana.

何以故(2)若不依俗諦不得第一義(3)不得第一義則不得涅槃(4)第一義皆因言説。　言説是世俗。是故若不(5)依世俗。第一義則不可説。若不得第一(6)義。云何得至涅槃。是故諸法雖無生。而有(7)二諦。

vināśayati durdṛṣtā śūnyatā mandamedhasam |
sarpo yathā durgṛhīto vidyā vā duṣprasādhitā || 11 ||

不能正觀空鈍根則自害
如不善咒術不善捉毒蛇

11. Emptiness, having been dimly perceived, utterly destroys the slow-witted.
It is like a snake wrongly grasped or [magical] knowledge incorrectly applied.

If their view of emptiness is wrong, those of little intelligence will be hurt. Like handling a snake in the wrong way, or casting a spell in the wrong way.

復次(8)不能正觀空鈍根則自害(9)如不善咒術不善捉毒蛇(10)若人鈍根。不善解空法。於空有失而生邪(11)見。如爲利捉毒蛇不能善捉反爲所害。(12)又如咒術欲有所作不能善成則還自害。(13)鈍根觀空法亦如是。

ataś ca pratyudāvṛttaṃ cittaṃ deśayituṃ muneḥ |
dharmaṃ matvāsya dharmasya mandair duravagāhatām || 12 ||

世尊知是法甚深微妙相
非鈍根所及是故不欲說

12. Therefore the mind of the ascetic [Guatama] was diverted from teaching the dharma,
Having thought about the incomprehensibility of the dharma by the stupid.

Therefore, knowing how difficult it is for the weak to understand the depths of this Dharma, the heart of the Muni strongly turned away from teaching the Dharma.

復次(14)世尊知是法甚深微妙相(15)非鈍根所及是故不欲説(16)世尊以法甚深微妙。非鈍根所解。是故不(17)欲説。

śūnyatāyām adhilayaṃ yaṃ punaḥ kurute bhavān |
doṣaprasaṅgo nāsmākaṃ sa śūnye nopapadyate || 13 ||

汝謂我著空而為我生過
汝今所說過於空則無有

13. Time and again you have made a condemnation of emptiness,
But that refutation does not apply to our emptiness.

Since [those] erroneous consequences do not apply to emptiness, whatever rejections you make of emptiness do not apply to me.

復次(18)汝謂我著空而爲我生過(19)汝今所説過於空則無有(20)汝謂我著空故。爲我生過。我所説性空。空(21)亦復空。無如是過。

sarvaṃ ca yujyate tasya śūnyatā yasya yujyate |
sarvaṃ na yujyate tasya śūnyaṃ yasya na yujyate || 14 ||

以有空義故一切法得成
若無空義者一切則不成

14. When emptiness “works”, then everything in existence “works”. (A)
If emptiness “does not work”, then all existence “does not work”. (B)

Those for whom emptiness is possible, for them everything is possible. Those for whom emptiness is not possible, for them everything is not possible.

復次(22)以有空義故一切法得成(23)若無空義者一切則不成(24)以有空義故。一切世間出世間法皆悉成(25)就。若無空義。則皆不成就。

sa tvaṃ doṣān ātmanīyān asmāsu paripātayan |
aśvam evābhirūḍhaḥ sann aśvam evāsi vismṛtaḥ || 15 ||

汝今自有過而以迴向我
如人乘馬者自忘於所乘

15. You, while projecting your own faults on us, (i.e. objectifying emptiness)
Are like a person who, having mounted his horse, forgot the horse!(i.e. a tool)

You are transferring your own mistakes onto me. This is like mounting a horse but forgetting about the horse itself.

復次(26)汝今自有過而以迴向我(27)如人乘馬者自忘於所乘(28)汝於有法中有過不能自覺。而於空中見(29)過。如人乘馬而忘其所乘。

svabhāvād yadi bhāvānāṃ sadbhāvam anupaśyasi |
ahetupratyayān bhāvāṃs tvam evaṃ sati paśyasi || 16 ||

若汝見諸法決定有性者
即為見諸法無因亦無緣

16. If you recognize real existence on account of the self-existence of things,
You perceive that there are uncaused and unconditioned things.

If you view all things as existing from their own nature, then you would view all things as not having causes and conditions.

可以故(33b1)若汝見諸法決定有性者(2)即爲見諸法無因亦無縁(3)汝説諸法有定性。若爾者。則見諸法無因(4)無縁。何以故。若法決定有性。則應不生(5)不滅。如是法何用因縁。若諸法從因縁生(6)則無有性。是故諸法決定有性。則無因縁。(7)若謂諸法決定住自性。是則不然。

kāryaṃ ca kāraṇaṃ caiva kartāraṃ karaṇaṃ kriyām |
utpādaṃ ca nirodhaṃ ca phalaṃ ca pratibādhase || 17 ||

即為破因果作作者作法
亦復壞一切萬物之生滅

17. You deny “what is to be produced,” cause, the producer, the instrument of production, and the producing action,
And the origination, destruction, and “fruit.”

Cause and effect itself, agents, tools and acts, production and cessation, the effects too would be undermined.

何以故(8)即爲破因果作作者作法(9)亦復壞一切萬物之生滅(10)諸法有定性。則無因果等諸事。

yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatāṃ tāṃ pracakṣmahe |
sā prajñaptir upādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā || 18 ||

眾因緣生法我說即是無
亦為是假名亦是中道義

18. The “originating dependently” we call “emptiness”;
This apprehension, i.e., taking into account [all other things], is the understanding of the middle way.

Whatever is contingently related, that is explained as emptiness. That is contingently configured; it is the central path.

如偈説(11)衆因縁生法我説即是無(12)亦爲是假名亦是中道義

apratītya samutpanno dharmaḥ kaścin na vidyate |
yasmāt tasmād aśūnyo hi dharmaḥ kaścin na vidyate || 19 ||

未曾有一法不從因緣生
是故一切法無不是空者

19. Since there is no dharma whatever originating independently,
No dharma whatever exists which is not empty.

Because there are no things at all, which are not contingently emergent, therefore, there are no things at all, which are not empty.

(13)未曾有一法不從因縁生(14)是故一切法無不是空者(15)衆因縁生法。我説即是空。何以故。衆縁具足(16)和合而物生。是物屬衆因縁故無自性。無(17)自性故空。空亦復空。但爲引導衆生故。(18)以假名説。離有無二邊故名爲中道。是法(19)無性故不得言有。亦無空故不得言無。(20)若法有性相。則不待衆縁而有。若不待(21)衆縁則無法。是故無有不空法。汝上所説(22)空法有過者。此過今還在汝。

yady aśūnyam idaṃ sarvam udayo nāsti na vyayaḥ |
caturṇām āryasatyānām abhāvas te prasajyate || 20 ||

若一切不空則無有生滅
如是則無有四聖諦之法

20. If all existence is not empty, there is neither origination nor destruction.
You must wrongly conclude then that the four holy truths do not exist.

If all were not empty, nothing could come about or perish. It would follow for you that the four ennobling truths could not exist.

何以故(23)若一切不空則無有生滅(24)如是則無有四聖諦之法(25)若一切法各各有性不空者。則無有生滅。(26)無生滅故。則無四聖諦法。

apratītya samutpannaṃ kuto duḥkhaṃ bhaviṣyati |
anityam uktaṃ duḥkhaṃ hi tat svābhāvye na vidyate || 21 ||

苦不從緣生云何當有苦
無常是苦義定性無無常

21. Having originated without being conditioned, how will sorrow (dukkha) come into existence?
It is said that sorrow (dukkha) is not eternal; therefore, certainly it does not exist by its own nature (svabbava).

If things were not contingently emergent, how could anguish exist? Impermanent things are taught to be anguish; in their very own nature they do not exist.

何以故(27)苦不從縁生云何當有苦(28)無常是苦義定性無無常(29)苦不從縁生故則無苦。何以故。經説無常(33c1)是苦義。若苦有定性。云何有無常。以不捨(2)自性故。

svabhāvato vidyamānaṃ kiṃ punaḥ samudeṣyate |
tasmāt samudayo nāsti śūnyatāṃ pratibādhataḥ || 22 ||

若苦有定性何故從集生
是故無有集以破空義故

22. How can that which is existing by its own nature originate again?
For him who denies emptiness there is no production.

If it did exist from its own nature, why would it have an origin? Therefore, for those who undermine emptiness, it can have no origin.

復次(3)若苦有定性何故從集生(4)是故無有集以破空義故(5)若苦有定性者。則不應更生。先已有故。(6)若爾者。則無集諦。以壞空義故。

na nirodhaḥ svabhāvena sato duḥkhasya vidyate |
svabhāvaparyavasthānān nirodhaṃ pratibādhase || 23 ||

苦若有定性則不應有滅
汝著定性故即破於滅諦

23. There is no destruction of sorrow (dukkha) if it exists by its own nature.
By trying to establish “self-existence” you deny destruction.

If anguish existed by its own nature, there could be no cessation. Because its own nature would be totally present, cessation too would be undermined.

復次(7)苦若有定性則不應有滅(8)汝著定性故即破於滅諦(9)苦若有定性者。則不應滅。何以故。性則無(10)滅故。

svābhāvye sati mārgasya bhāvanā nopapadyate |
athāsau bhāvyate mārgaḥ svābhāvyaṃ te na vidyate || 24 ||

苦若有定性則無有修道
若道可修習即無有定性

24. If the path [of release] is self-existent, then there is no way of bringing it into existence (bhavana);
If that path is brought into existence, then “self-existence,” which you claim does not exist.

If the path existed by its own nature, cultivation would not be appropriate. If the path is to be cultivated, your own nature cannot exist.

復次(11)苦若有定性則無有修道(12)若道可修習即無有定性(13)法若定有。則無有修道。何以故。若法實者(14)則是常。常則不可増益。若道可修。道則無(15)有定性。

yadā duḥkhaṃ samudayo nirodhaś ca na vidyate |
mārgo duḥkhanirodhatvāt katamaḥ prāpayiṣyati || 25 ||

若無有苦諦及無集滅諦
所可滅苦道竟為何所至

25. When sorrow (dukkha), origination, and destruction do not exist,
What kind of path will obtain the destruction of sorrow (dukkha)?

When anguish, origins and cessation cannot exist, what ceasing of anguish could one seek to attain by the path?

復次(16)若無有苦諦及無集滅諦(17)所可滅苦道竟爲何所至(18)諸法若先定有性。則無苦集滅諦。今滅苦(19)道。竟爲至何滅苦處。

svabhāvenāparijñānaṃ yadi tasya punaḥ katham |
parijñānaṃ nanu kila svabhāvaḥ samavasthitaḥ || 26 ||

若苦定有性先來所不見
於今云何見其性不異故

26. If there is no complete knowledge as to self-existence, how [can there be] any knowledge of it?
Indeed, is it not true that self-existence is that which endures?

If non-understanding existed by its very own nature, how could one ever understand? Doesn’t it abides by nature?

復次(20)若苦定有性先來所不見(21)於今云何見其性不異故(22)若先凡夫時。不能見苦性。今亦不應見。何(23)以故。不見性定故。

prahāṇasākṣātkaraṇe bhāvanā caivam eva te |
parijñāvan na yujyante catvāry api phalāni ca || 27 ||

如見苦不然斷集及證滅
修道及四果是亦皆不然

27. As in the case of complete knowledge, neither destruction, realization, “bringing into existence,”
Nor are the four holy fruits possible for you.

In the same way, your letting go, realizing, cultivating and the four fruits too are as impossible as understanding.

復次(24)如見苦不然斷集及證滅(25)修道及四果是亦皆不然(26)如苦諦性先不見者後亦不應見。如是亦(27)不應有斷集證滅修道。何以故。是集性先(28)來不斷。今亦不應斷。性不可斷故。滅先來(29)不證。今亦不應證。先來不證故。道先來不(34a1)修。今亦不應修。先來不修故。是故四聖諦。(2)見斷證修四種行。皆不應有。四種行無故。(3)四道果亦無。

svabhāvenānadhigataṃ yat phalaṃ tat punaḥ katham |
śakyaṃ samadhigantuṃ syāt svabhāvaṃ parigṛhṇataḥ || 28 ||

是四道果性先來不可得
諸法性若定今云何可得

28. If you accept “self-existence,” and a “fruit” is not known by its self-existence,
How can it be known at all?

How can any fruits, which totally hold their own nature and by their own nature are unattained, be attained?

何以故(4)是四道果性先來不可得(5)諸法性若定今云何可得(6)諸法若有定性。四沙門果先來未得。今云何(7)可得。若可得者。性則無定。

phalābhāve phalasthā no na santi pratipannakāḥ |
saṃgho nāsti na cet santi te ’ṣṭau puruṣapudgalāḥ || 29 ||

若無有四果則無得向者
以無八聖故則無有僧寶

29. In the non-existence of “fruit,” there is no “residing in fruit” nor obtaining [the “fruit”];
When the community [of Buddhists] does not exist, then those eight “kinds of persons” do not exist.

If the fruits did not exist, there could be no abiding in the fruits. Experiencing them would also not exist. If those eight beings did not exist, the Community would not exist.

復次(8)若無有四果則無得向者(9)以無八聖故則無有僧寶(10)無四沙門果故。則無得果向果者。無八賢(11)聖故。則無有僧寶。而經説八賢聖。名爲僧(12)寶。

abhāvāc cāryasatyānāṃ saddharmo ’pi na vidyate |
dharme cāsati saṃghe ca kathaṃ buddho bhaviṣyati || 30 ||

無四聖諦故亦無有法寶
無法寶僧寶云何有佛寶

30. Because there is non-existence of the four holy truths, the real dharma does not exist.
And if there is no dharma and community, how will the Buddha exist?

Since there would be no ennobling truths, the sublime Dharma could also not exist. If the Community and the Dharma did not exist, how could Buddha exist?

復次(13)無四聖諦故亦無有法寶(14)無法寶僧寶云何有佛寶(15)行四聖諦得涅槃法。若無四諦則無法寶。(16)若無二寶云何當有佛寶。汝以如是因縁。(17)説諸法定性。則壞三寶問曰。汝雖破諸法。(18)究竟道阿耨多羅三藐三菩提應有。因是道(19)故名爲佛。

apratītyāpi bodhiṃ ca tava buddhaḥ prasajyate |
apratītyāpi buddhaṃ ca tava bodhiḥ prasajyate || 31 ||

汝說則不因菩提而有佛
亦復不因佛而有於菩提

31. For you, either the one who is enlightened (buddha) comes into being independent of enlightenment,
Or enlightenment comes into being independent of the one who is enlightened.

It would also follow that your Buddha does not depend on awakening. It would also follow that your awakening does not depend on Buddha.

答曰(20)汝説則不因菩提而有佛(21)亦復不因佛而有於菩提(22)汝説諸法有定性者。則不應因菩提有(23)佛。因佛有菩提。是二性常定故。

yaś cābuddhaḥ svabhāvena sa bodhāya ghaṭann api |
na bodhisattvacaryāyāṃ bodhiṃ te ’dhigamiṣyati || 32 ||

雖復勤精進修行菩提道
若先非佛性不應得成佛

32. For you, some one who is a non-buddha by his own nature (svabhava) but strives for enlightenment (i.e. a Bodhisattva)
Will not attain the enlightenment though the “way of life of becoming fully enlightened.”

For you, someone who by his very nature is not Buddha could not attain awakening however much he strove in the practice of awakening for the sake of awakening.

復次(24)雖復勤精進修行菩提道(25)若先非佛性不應得成佛(26)以先無性故。如鐵無金性。雖復種種鍛(27)煉。終不成金。

na ca dharmam adharmaṃ vā kaścij jātu kariṣyati |
kim aśūnyasya kartavyaṃ svabhāvaḥ kriyate na hi || 33 ||

若諸法不空無作罪福者
不空何所作以其性定故

33. Neither the dharma nor non-dharma will be done anywhere.
What is produced which is non-empty? Certainly self-existence is not produced.

No one would ever do what is Dharma and what is not Dharma. What can that which is not empty do? Inherent nature is inactive.

復次(28)若諸法不空無作罪福者(29)不空何所作以其性定故(34b1)若諸法不空。終無有人作罪福者。何以故。(2)罪福性先已定故。又無作作者故。

vinā dharmam adharmaṃ ca phalaṃ hi tava vidyate |
dharmādharmanimittaṃ ca phalaṃ tava na vidyate || 34 ||

汝於罪福中不生果報者
是則離罪福而有諸果報

34. Certainly, for you, there is a product without [the distinction] of dharma or non-dharma.
Since, for you, the product caused by dharma or non-dharma does not exist.

Even without Dharma and not-Dharma, you would have the fruits. You would not have the fruits which have arisen from the causes of Dharma and not-Dharma.

復次(3)汝於罪福中不生果報者(4)是則離罪福而有諸果報(5)汝於罪福因縁中。皆無果報者。則應離罪(6)福因縁而有果報。何以故。果報不待因出(7)故。問曰。離罪福可無善惡果報。但從罪(8)福有善惡果報。

dharmādharmanimittaṃ vā yadi te vidyate phalam |
dharmādharmasamutpannam aśūnyaṃ te kathaṃ phalam || 35 ||

若謂從罪福而生果報者
果從罪福生云何言不空

35. If, for you, the product is caused by dharma or non-dharma, be non-empty?
How can that product, being originated by dharma or non-dharma empty?

If you have the fruits which have arisen from the causes of Dharma and not-Dharma, why are the fruits which have arisen from the Dharma and not-Dharma not empty?

答曰(9)若謂從罪福而生果報者(10)果從罪福生云何言不空(11)若離罪福無善惡果。云何言果不空。若爾(12)離作者則無罪福。汝先説諸法不空。是(13)事不然。

sarvasaṃvyvahārāṃś ca laukikān pratibādhase |
yat pratītyasamutpādaśūnyatāṃ pratibādhase || 36 ||

汝破一切法諸因緣空義
則破於世俗諸餘所有法

36. You deny all mundane and customary activities
When you deny emptiness [in the sense of] dependent co-origination (patytya-samutpada).

Whoever undermines emptiness which is contingent emergence also undermines all the conventions of the world.

復次(14)汝破一切法諸因縁空義(15)則破於世俗諸餘所有法(16)汝若破衆因縁法第一空義者。則破一切世(17)俗法。

na kartavyaṃ bhavet kiṃcid anārabdhā bhavet kriyā |
kārakaḥ syād akurvāṇaḥ śūnyatāṃ pratibādhataḥ || 37 ||

若破於空義即應無所作
無作而有作不作名作者

37. If you deny emptiness, there would be action which is unactivated.
There would be nothing whatever acted upon, and a producing action would be something not begun.

If one undermines emptiness, there would be no actions at all and actions without an author and agents who do not act.

何以故(18)若破於空義即應無所作(19)無作而有作不作名作者(20)若破空義。則一切果皆無作無因。又不作(21)而作。又一切作者不應有所作。又離作者。(22)應有業有果報有受者。但是事皆不然。是(23)故不應破空。

ajātam aniruddhaṃ ca kūṭaśthaṃ ca bhaviṣyati |
vicitrābhir avasthābhiḥ svabhāve rahitaṃ jagat || 38 ||

若有決定性世間種種相
則不生不滅常住而不壞

38. According to [the doctrine of] “self-existence” the world is free from different conditions;
Then it will exist as unproduced, undestroyed and immutable.

If there were inherent nature, all beings would be unborn and unceasing, would be fixed in place forever, separated from the variety of situations.

復次(24)若有決定性世間種種相(25)則不生不滅常住而不壞(26)若諸法有定性。則世間種種相。天人畜生萬(27)物。皆應不生不滅常住不壞。何以故。有實(28)性不可變異故。而現見萬物。各有變異相(29)生滅變易。是故不應有定性。

asaṃprāptasya ca prāptir duḥkhaparyantakarma ca |
sarvakleśaprahāṇaṃ ca yady aśūnyaṃ na vidyate || 39 ||

若無有空者未得不應得
亦無斷煩惱亦無苦盡事

39. If non-emptiness does not exist, then something is attained which is not attained;
There is cessation of sorrow (dukkha) and actions, and all evil is destroyed.

If [things] were not empty, there could be no attainment of what had not been attained, no ending of anguish and no letting go of all actions and afflictions.

復次(34c1)若無有空者未得不應得(2)亦無斷煩惱亦無苦盡事(3)若無有空法者。則世間出世間所有功徳未(4)得者。皆不應得。亦不應有斷煩惱者。亦(5)無苦盡。何以故。

yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaṃ paśyatīdaṃ sa paśyati |
duḥkhaṃ samudayaṃ caiva nirodhaṃ mārgam eva ca || 40 ||

是故經中說若見因緣法
則為能見佛見苦集滅道

40. He who perceives dependent co-origination (patytya-samutpada)
Also understands sorrow (dukkha), origination, and destruction as well as the path [of release].

He who sees contingent emergence sees anguish and origins and cessation and the path itself.

以性定故(6)是故經中説若見因縁法(7)則爲能見佛見苦集滅道(8)若人見一切法從衆縁生。是人即能見佛(9)法身。増益智慧。能見四聖諦苦集滅道。見(10)四聖諦得四果滅諸苦惱。是故不應破空(11)義。若破空義則破因縁法。破因縁法。則破(12)三寶。若破三寶。則爲自破。

āryasatyaparīkṣā nāma caturviṃśatitamaṃ prakaraṇaṃ ||

’phags pa’i bden pa brtag pa zhes bya ba ste rab tu byed pa nyi shu bzhi pa’o ||

yadi śūnyam idaṃ sarvam udayo nāsti na vyayaḥ |
prahāṇād vā nirodhād vā kasya nirvāṇam iṣyate || 1 ||

中論觀涅槃品第二十五(二十四偈) 若一切法空無生無滅者
何斷何所滅而稱為涅槃

|| gal te ’di dag kun stong na | | ’byung ba med cing ’jig pa med | |
gang (6)zhig spong dang ’gags pa las | | mya ngan ’da’ bar ’gyur bar ’dod | |

[Chapter] 25: An Analysis of Nirvana (nirvana) 1. If all existence is empty, there is no origination nor destruction.
Then whose nirvana through elimination [of suffering] and destruction [of illusion] would be postulated?

Investigation of Nirvana If everything were empty, there would be no arising and perishing. From the letting go of and ceasing of what could one assert nirvana(-ing)?

(13) ＊中論觀涅槃品第二十五二十四偈 (14)問曰(15)若一切法空無生無滅者(16)何斷何所滅而稱爲涅槃(17)若一切法空。則無生無滅。無生無滅者。何(18)所斷何所滅。而名爲涅槃。是故一切法不(19)應空。以諸法不空故。斷諸煩惱滅五陰。(20)名爲涅槃。

yady aśūnyam idaṃ sarvam udayo nāsti na vyayaḥ |
prahāṇād vā nirodhād vā kasya nirvāṇam iṣyate || 2 ||

若諸法不空則無生無滅
何斷何所滅而稱為涅槃

2. If all existence is non-empty, there is no origination nor destruction.
Then whose nirvana through elimination [of suffering] and destruction [of illusion] would be postulated?

If everything were not empty, there would be no arising and perishing. From the letting go of and ceasing of what could one assert nirvana(-ing)?

答曰(21)若諸法不空則無生無滅(22)何斷何所滅而稱爲涅槃(23)若一切世間不空。則無生無滅。何所斷何(24)所滅。而名爲涅槃。是故有無二門。則非(25)至涅槃。

aprahīṇam asaṃprāptam anucchinnam aśāśvatam |
aniruddham anutpannam etan nirvāṇam ucyate || 3 ||

無得亦無至不斷亦不常
不生亦不滅是說名涅槃

3. Nirvana has been said to be neither eliminated nor attained, neither annihilated nor eternal,
Neither disappeared nor originated.

No letting go, no attainment, no annihilation, no permanence, no cessation, no birth: that is spoken of as nirvana.

所名涅槃者(26)無得亦無至不斷亦不常(27)不生亦不滅是説名涅槃(28)無得者。於行於果無所得。無至者。無處(29)可至。不斷者。五陰先來畢竟空故。得道入(35a1)無餘涅槃時。亦無所斷。不常者。若有法可(2)得分別者。則名爲常。涅槃寂滅無法可分(3)別故。不名爲常。生滅亦爾。如是相者名爲(4)涅槃。復次經説。涅槃非有非無非有無。非(5)非有非非無。一切法不受内寂滅名涅槃。

bhāvas tāvan na nirvāṇaṃ jarāmaraṇalakṣaṇam |
prasajyetāsti bhāvo hi na jarāmaraṇaṃ vinā || 4 ||

涅槃不名有有則老死相
終無有有法離於老死相

4. Nirvana is certainly not an existing thing, for then it would be characterized by old age and death.
In consequence it would involve the error that an existing thing would not become old and be without death.

Nirvana is not a thing. Then it would follow that it would have the characteristics of aging and death. There does not exist any thing that is without aging and death.

(6)何以故(7)涅槃不名有有則老死相(8)終無有有法離於老死相(9)眼見一切萬物皆生滅故。是老死相。涅槃若(10)是有則應有老死相。但是事不然。是故涅(11)槃不名有。又不見離生滅老死別有定法(12)而名涅槃。若涅槃是有即應有生滅老死(13)相。以離老死相故。名爲涅槃。

bhāvaś ca yadi nirvāṇaṃ nirvāṇaṃ saṃskṛtaṃ bhavet |
nāsaṃskṛto hi vidyate bhāvaḥ kva cana kaś cana || 5 ||

若涅槃是有涅槃即有為
終無有一法而是無為者

5. And if nirvana is an existing thing, nirvana would be a constructed product (samskrta),
Since never ever has an existing thing been found to be a non-constructed-product (asamskrta).

If nirvana were a thing, nirvana would be a conditioned phenomenon. There does not exist any thing anywhere that is not a conditioned phenomenon.

復次(14)若涅槃是有涅槃即有爲(15)終無有一法而是無爲者(16)涅槃非是有。何以故。一切萬物從衆縁生。(17)皆是有爲。無有一法名爲無爲者。雖常法(18)假名無爲。以理推之。無常法尚無有。何(19)況常法不可見不可得者。

bhāvaś ca yadi nirvāṇam anupādāya tat katham |
nirvāṇaṃ nānupādāya kaścid bhāvo hi vidyate || 6 ||

若涅槃是有云何名無受
無有不從受而名為有法

6. But if nirvana is an existing thing, how could [nirvana] exist without dependence [on something else]?
Certainly nirvana does not exist as something without dependence.

If nirvana were a thing, how would nirvana not be dependent? There does not exists any thing at all that is not dependent.

復次(20)若涅槃是有云何名無受(21)無有不從受而名爲有法(22)若謂涅槃是有法者。經則不應説無受是(23)涅槃。何以故。無有有法不受而有。是故涅(24)槃非有。問曰。若有非涅槃者無應是涅槃(25)耶。

yadi bhāvo na nirvāṇam abhāvaḥ kiṃ bhaviṣyati |
nirvāṇaṃ yatra bhāvo na nābhāvas tatra vidyate || 7 ||

有尚非涅槃何況於無耶
涅槃無有有何處當有無

7. If nirvana is not an existing thing, will nirvana become a non-existing thing?
Wherever there is no existing thing, neither is there a non-existing thing.

If nirvana were not a thing, how could it possibly be nothing? The one for whom nirvana is not a thing, for him it is not nothing.

答曰(26)有尚非涅槃何況於無耶(27)涅槃無有有何處當有無(28)若有非涅槃。無云何是涅槃。何以故。因有(29)故有無。若無有。何有無。如經説。先有今(35b1)無則名無。涅槃則不爾。何以故。非有法變(2)爲無故。是故無亦不作涅槃。

yady abhāvaś ca nirvāṇam anupādāya tat katham |
nirvāṇaṃ na hy abhāvo ’sti yo ’nupādāya vidyate || 8 ||

若無是涅槃云何名不受
未曾有不受而名為無法

8. But if nirvana is a non-existing thing, how could [nirvana] exist without dependence [on something else]?
Certainly nirvana is not a non-existing thing which exists without dependence.

If nirvana were nothing, how could nirvana possibly be not dependent? There does not exist any nothing which is not dependent.

復次(3)若無是涅槃云何名不受(4)未曾有不受而名爲無法(5)若謂無是涅槃。經則不應説不受名涅槃。(6)何以故。無有不受而名無法。是故知涅槃(7)非無。問曰。若涅槃非有非無者。何等是涅(8)槃。

ya ājavaṃjavībhāva upādāya pratītya vā |
so ’pratītyānupādāya nirvāṇam upadiśyate || 9 ||

受諸因緣故輪轉生死中
不受諸因緣是名為涅槃

9. That state which is the rushing in and out [of existence] when dependent or conditioned—
This [state], when not dependent or not conditioned, is seen to be nirvana.

Whatever things come and go are dependent or caused. Not being dependent and not being caused is taught to be Nirvana.

答曰(9)受諸因縁故輪轉生死中(10)不受諸因縁是名爲涅槃(11)不如實知顛倒故。因五受陰往來生死。如(12)實知顛倒故。則不復因五受陰往來生(13)死。無性五陰不復相續故。説名涅槃。

prahāṇaṃ cābravīc chāstā bhavasya vibhavasya ca |
tasmān na bhāvo nābhāvo nirvāṇam iti yujyate || 10 ||

如佛經中說斷有斷非有
是故知涅槃非有亦非無

10. The teacher [Gautama] has taught that a “becoming” and a “non-becoming” (vibhava) are destroyed;
Therefore it obtains that: Nirvana is neither an existent thing nor a non-existent thing.

The teacher taught [it] to be the letting go of arising and perishing. Therefore, it is correct that nirvana is not a thing or nothing.

復次(14)如佛經中説斷有斷非有(15)是故知涅槃非有亦非無(16)有名三有。非有名三有斷滅。佛説斷此二(17)事故。當知涅槃非有亦非無。問曰。若有若(18)無非涅槃者。今有無共合。是涅槃耶。

bhaved abhāvo bhāvaś ca nirvāṇam ubhayaṃ yadi |
bhaved abhāvo bhāvaś ca mokṣas tac ca na yujyate || 11 ||

若謂於有無合為涅槃者
有無即解脫是事則不然

11. If nirvana were both an existent and a non-existent thing,
Final release (moksa) would be [both] an existent and a non-existent thing; but that is not possible.

If nirvana were both a thing and nothing, it would follow that it would be a thing and nothing. That is incorrect.

答曰(19)若謂於有無合爲涅槃者(20)有無即解脱是事則不然(21)若謂於有無合爲涅槃者。即有無二事合(22)爲解脱。是事不然。何以故。有無二事相違(23)故。云何一處有。

bhaved abhāvo bhāvaś ca nirvāṇam ubhayaṃ yadi |
nānupādāya nirvāṇam upādāyobhayaṃ hi tat || 12 ||

若謂於有無合為涅槃者
涅槃非無受是二從受生

12. If nirvana were both an existent and a non-existent thing,
There would be no nirvana without conditions, for these both [operate with] conditions.

If nirvana were both a thing and nothing, nirvana would not be not-dependent, because it would depend on those two.

復次(24)若謂於有無合爲涅槃者(25)涅槃非無受是二從受生(26)若謂有無合爲涅槃者。經不應説涅槃(27)名無受。何以故。有無二事從受生。相因而(28)有。是故有無二事。不得合爲涅槃。

bhaved abhāvo bhāvaś ca nirvāṇam ubhayaṃ katham |
asaṃskṛtaṃ hi nirvāṇaṃ bhāvābhāvau ca saṃskṛtau || 13 ||

有無共合成云何名涅槃
涅槃名無為有無是有為

13. How can nirvana exist as both an existent thing and a non-existent thing,
For nirvana is a non-composite-product (asamskrta), while both an existent thing and a non-existent thing are composite products (samskrta).

How could nirvana be both a thing and nothing? Nirvana is unconditioned; things and nothings are conditioned.

復次(29)有無共合成云何名涅槃(35c1)涅槃名無爲有無是有爲(2)有無二事共合。不得名涅槃。涅槃名無爲。(3)有無是有爲。是故有無非是涅槃。

bhaved abhāvo bhāvaś ca nirvāṇa ubhayaṃ katham |
tayor abhāvo hy ekatra prakāśatamasor iva || 14 ||

有無二事共云何是涅槃
是二不同處如明暗不俱

14. How can nirvana exist as both an existent and a non-existent thing?
There is no existence of both at one and the same place, as in the case of both darkness and light.

How could nirvana exist as both a thing and nothing? Those two do not exist as one. They are like light and dark.

復次(4)有無二事共云何是涅槃(5)是二不同處如明暗不倶(6)有無二事。不得名涅槃。何以故。有無相違(7)一處不可得。如明暗不倶。是故有時無無。(8)無時無有。云何有無共合。而名爲涅槃。問(9)曰。若有無共合非涅槃者。今非有非無應(10)是涅槃。

naivābhāvo naiva bhāvo nirvāṇam iti yā ’ñjanā |
abhāve caiva bhāve ca sā siddhe sati sidhyati || 15 ||

若非有非無名之為涅槃
此非有非無以何而分別

15. The assertion: “Nirvana is neither an existent thing nor a non-existent thing”
Is proved if [the assertion]: “It is an existent thing and a non-existent thing” were proved.

The presentation of neither a thing nor nothing as nirvana will be established [only] if things and nothings are established.

答曰(11)若非有非無名之爲涅槃(12)此非有非無以何而分別(13)若涅槃非有非無者。此非有非無。因何而(14)分別。是故非有非無是涅槃者。是事不然。

naivābhāvo naiva bhāvo nirvāṇaṃ yadi vidyate |
naivābhāvo naiva bhāva iti kena tad ajyate || 16 ||

分別非有無如是名涅槃
若有無成者非有非無成

16. If nirvana is neither an existent thing nor a non-existent thing,
Who can really arrive at [the assertion]: “neither an existent thing nor a non-existent thing”?

If nirvana is neither a thing nor nothing, by who could “neither a thing nor nothing” be perceived?

(15)復次(16)分別非有無如是名涅槃(17)若有無成者非有非無成(18)汝分別非有非無是涅槃者是事不然。何以(19)故。若有無成者。然後非有非無成。有相違名(20)無。無相違名有。是有無第三句中已破。有(21)無無故。云何有非有非無。是故涅槃。非非(22)有非非無。

paraṃ nirodhād bhagavān bhavatīty eva nājyate |
na bhavaty ubhayaṃ ceti nobhayaṃ ceti nājyate || 17 ||

如來滅度後不言有與無
亦不言有無非有及非無

17. It is not expressed if the Glorious One [the Buddha] exists (1) after his death,
Or does not exist (2), or both (3) or neither (4).

After the Bhagavan has entered nirvana, one cannot perceive [him? it?] as “existing,” likewise as “not existing,” nor can one percieve [him? it?] as “both” or “neither”.

復次(23)如來滅度後不言有與無(24)亦不言有無非有及非無

tiṣṭhamāno ’pi bhagavān bhavatīty eva nājyate |
na bhavaty ubhayaṃ ceti nobhayaṃ ceti nājyate || 18 ||

如來現在時不言有與無
亦不言有無非有及非無

18. Also, it is not expressed if the Glorious One exists (1) while remaining [in the world],
Or does not exist (2), or both (3) or neither (4).

Even when the Bhagavan is alive, one cannot perceive [him? it?] as “existing,” likewise as “not existing,” nor can one percieve [him? it?] as “both” or “neither”.

(25)如來現在時不言有與無(26)亦不言有無非有及非無(27)若如來滅後若現在。有如來亦不受。無如(28)來亦不受。亦有如來亦無如來亦不受。非(29)有如來非無如來亦不受。以不受故。不(36a1)應分別涅槃有無等。離如來誰當得涅(2)槃。何時何處以何法説涅槃。是故一切時(3)一切種。求涅槃相不可得。

na saṃsārasya nirvāṇāt kiṃcid asti viśeṣaṇam |
na nirvāṇasya saṃsārāt kiṃcid asti viśeṣaṇam || 19 ||

涅槃與世間無有少分別
世間與涅槃亦無少分別

19. There is nothing whatever which differentiates the existence-in-flux (samsara) from nirvana;
And there is nothing whatever which differentiates nirvana from existence-in-flux.

Samsara does not have the slightest distinction from Nirvana. Nirvana does not have the slightest distinction from Samsara.

復次(4)涅槃與世間無有少分別(5)世間與涅槃亦無少分別(6)五陰相續往來因縁故。説名世間。五陰性畢(7)竟空無受寂滅。此義先已説。以一切法不生(8)不滅故。世間與涅槃無有分別。涅槃與世(9)間亦無分別。

nirvāṇasya ca yā koṭiḥ koṭiḥ saṃsaraṇasya ca |
na tayor antaraṃ kiṃcit susūkṣmam api vidyate || 20 ||

涅槃之實際及與世間際
如是二際者無毫釐差別

20. The extreme limit (koti) of nirvana is also the extreme limit of existence-in-flux;
There is not the slightest bit of difference between these two.

Whatever is the end of Nirvana, that is the end of Samsara. There is not even a very subtle slight distinction between the two.

復次(10)涅槃之實際及與世間際(11)如是二際者無毫釐差別(12)究竟推求世間涅槃實際無生際。以平等不(13)可得故。無毫釐差別。

paraṃ nirodhād antādyāḥ śāśvatādyāś ca dṛṣṭayaḥ |
nirvāṇam aparāntaṃ ca pūrvāntaṃ ca samāśritāḥ || 21 ||

滅後有無等有邊等常等
諸見依涅槃未來過去世

21. The views [regarding] whether that which is beyond death is limited by a beginning or an end or some other alternative
Depend on a nirvana limited by a beginning (purvanta) and an end (aparanta),

Views about who passes beyond, ends etc. and permanence etc. are contingent upon nirvana and later ends and former ends.

復次(14)滅後有無等有邊等常等(15)諸見依涅槃未來過去世(16)如來滅後有如來無如來。亦有如來亦無(17)如來。非有如來非無如來。世間有邊世(18)間無邊。世間亦有邊亦無邊。世間非有邊(19)非無邊。世間常世間無常。世間亦常亦無常。(20)世間非有常非無常。此三種十二見。如來滅(21)後有無等四見。依涅槃起。世間有邊無邊(22)等四見。依未來世起。世間常無常等四見。(23)依過去世起。如來滅後有無等不可得。涅槃(24)亦如是。如世間前際後際有邊無邊有常無(25)常等不可得。涅槃亦如是。是故説世間涅槃(26)等無有異。

śūnyeṣu sarvadharmeṣu kim anantaṃ kim antavat |
kim anantam antavac ca nānantaṃ nāntavac ca kim || 22 ||

一切法空故何有邊無邊
亦邊亦無邊非有非無邊

22. Since all dharmas are empty, what is finite? What is infinite?
What is both finite and infinite? What is neither finite nor infinite?

In the emptiness of all things what ends are there? What non-ends are there? What ends and non-ends are there? What of neither are there?

復次(27)一切法空故何有邊無邊(28)亦邊亦無邊非有非無邊

kiṃ tad eva kim anyat kiṃ śāśvataṃ kim aśāśvatam |
aśāśvataṃ śāśvataṃ ca kiṃ vā nobhayam apy atha || 23 ||

何者為一異何有常無常
亦常亦無常非常非無常

23. Is there anything which is this or something else, which is permanent or impermanent,
Which is both permanent and impermanent, or which is neither?

Is there this? Is there the other? Is there permanence? Is there impermanence? Is there both permanence and impermanence? Is there neither?

(29)何者爲一異何有常無常(36b1)亦常亦無常非常非無常

sarvopalambhopaśamaḥ prapañcopaśamaḥ śivaḥ |
na kva cit kasyacit kaścid dharmo buddhena deśitaḥ || 24 ||

諸法不可得滅一切戲論
無人亦無處佛亦無所說

24. The cessation of accepting everything [as real] is a salutary (siva) cessation of phenomenal development (prapanca);
No dharma anywhere has been taught by the Buddha of anything.

Totally pacifying all referents and totally pacifying fixations is peace. The Buddha nowhere taught any dharma to anyone.

(2)諸法不可得滅一切戲論(3)無人亦無處佛亦無所説(4)一切法一切時一切種。從衆縁生故。畢竟空(5)故無自性。如是法中。何者是有邊誰爲有(6)邊。何者是無邊。亦有邊亦無邊。非有邊非無(7)邊。誰爲非有邊非無邊。何者是常誰爲是(8)常。何者是無常。常無常非常非無常。誰爲非(9)常非無常。何者身即是神。何者身異於神。(10)如是等六十二邪見。於畢竟空中皆不可得。(11)諸有所得皆息。戲論皆滅。戲論滅故。通達諸(12)法實相得安隱道。從因縁品來。分別推求(13)諸法。有亦無。無亦無。有無亦無。非有非無亦(14)無。是名諸法實相。亦名如法性實際涅槃。(15)是故如來無時無處。爲人説涅槃定相。是(16)故説諸有所得皆息。戲論皆滅

nirvāṇaparīkṣā nāma pañcaviṃśatitamaṃ prakaraṇaṃ ||

mya ngan las ’das pa brtag pa zhes bya ba ste rab tu byed pa nyi shu lnga pa’o || ||

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