Bibliotheca Polyglotta

Nāgārjuna: Mūlamadhyamakakārikā

Complete text

pūrvā prajñāyate koṭir nety uvāca mahāmuniḥ |
saṃsāro ’navarāgro hi nāsyādir nāpi paścimam || 1 ||

中論觀本際品第十一(八偈) 大聖之所說本際不可得
生死無有始亦復無有終

[Chapter] 11: An Analysis of the Past (purva) and Future Limits (aparakiti) of Existence] (samsara) 1. The great ascetic [Buddha] said: “The extreme limit (koti) of the past cannot be discerned.”
“Existence-in-flux” (samsara) is without bounds; indeed, there is no beginning nor ending of that [existence].

Investigation of Extremes of Before and After When asked, “is a before-extreme evident?” the great Muni said, “it is not.” Samsara has no beginning, no end; it has no before, no after.

(4) ＊中論觀本際品第十一八偈 (5)問曰。無本際經説。衆生往來生死。本際不可(6)得。是中説有衆生有生死。以何因縁故而(7)作是説。答曰(8)大聖之所説本際不可得(9)生死無有始亦復無有終(10)聖人有三種。一者外道五神通。二者阿羅漢(11)辟支佛。三者得神通大菩薩佛於三種中最(12)上故言大聖。佛所言説無不是實説。生死(13)無始。何以故。生死初後不可得。是故言無(14)始汝謂若無初後。應有中者。是亦不然。

11 pūrvāparakoṭiparīkṣā ekādaśamaṃ prakaraṇam | atrāha- vidyata eva ātmā, saṃsārasadbhāvāt | yadi hi ātmā na syāt, kasya pañcagatike ājavaṃjavībhāvena janmamaraṇaparaṃparayā saṃsaraṇaṃ syāt? uktaṃ hi bhagavatā- anavarāgro hi bhikṣavo jātijarāmaraṇasaṃsāraḥ iti | avidyānīvaraṇānāṃ sattvānāṃ tṛṣṇāsaṃyojanānāṃ tṛṣṇāgaṇḍurabaddhānāṃ saṃsaratāṃ saṃdhāvatāṃ pūrvā koṭirna prajñāyata iti | yadā ca bhagavadupadeśātsaṃsāro 'sti, tadā saṃsartāpyasti | sa ca ātmā ucyata iti | ucyate | syādātmā, yadā saṃsāra eva syāt | katham? yasmādasya-
pūrvā prajñāyate koṭirnetyuvāca mahāmuniḥ |
saṃsāro 'navarāgro hi nāsyādirnāpi paścimam || 1 ||
koṭirbhāgo deśa iti paryāyāḥ | pūrvā koṭiḥ pūrvo deśa ityarthaḥ | yadi hi saṃsāro nāma kaścit syāt, niyataṃ tasya pūrvamapi syāt, paścimamapi, ghaṭādīnāmiva | uktaṃ ca bhagavatā- anavarāgro hi bhikṣavo jātijarāmaraṇasaṃsāra iti | yad eva avarāgre na staḥ, saṃsārasya anavarāgravacanāt, saṃsāra eva nāstīti nanu spaṣṭamādeśayāmāsa bhagavān | tasmānnāsti saṃsāraḥ, pūrvāparakoṭayanupalambhāt, alātacakravat, iti sthitam ||
atredaṃ vicāryate- yadi pūrvaṃ cāparaṃ ca saṃsārasya niṣiddhaṃ bhagavatā, kathaṃ punaridam āha- tasmāttarhi saṃsārakṣayāya pratipatsyāmaha ityevaṃ vo bhikṣavaḥ śikṣitavyam, iti? ucyate | avidyānīvaraṇānāṃ sattvānāmityādiviśeṣaṇopādānātteṣāmevāyamanavarāgraḥ saṃsāra iti pratīyate, na punastattvajñānānilabalāt samunmūlitāvidyānīvaraṇatarūṇām | teṣāṃ tu lokottaramārgajñānāgninā dagdhāśeṣakleśavāsanāmūlaniḥśeṣapādapānāṃ bhavatyeva antaḥ iti vijñeyam ||
kathaṃ punarādirahitānāmantopadeśa iti yāvat | dṛṣṭametad bāhyeṣu vrīhyādiṣu ādyabhāve 'pi dahanādisaṃparkādantasadbhāvaḥ | yathoktamāryadevapādaiḥ-
yathā bījasya dṛṣṭo 'nto na cādistasya vidyate | tathā kāraṇavaikalyājjanmano 'pi na saṃbhavaḥ || iti |
sa ca antopadeśo laukika eva vyavahāre sthitvā saṃsāracārakāvabaddhānāmutsāhanārthaṃ sattvānāṃ deśito laukikajñānāpekṣayā | vastukacintāyāṃ tu saṃsāra eva nāsti, tatkuto 'sya parikṣayaḥ? pradīpāvasthāyāṃ rajjūragaparikṣayavat ||
atrāha- yadyevaṃ laukikajñānāpekṣayā antavad ādirapi kiṃ nocyate? ucyate | ahetukadoṣaprasaṅgāt laukikajñānāpekṣayāpi saṃsārasyāderabhāva ityubhayathāpyāderabhāva eveti vijñeyam || 1 ||

naivāgraṃ nāvaraṃ yasya tasya madhyaṃ kuto bhavet |
tasmān nātropapadyante pūrvāparasahakramāḥ || 2 ||

若無有始終中當云何有
是故於此中先後共亦無

2. How could there be a middle portion of that which has no “before” and “after”;
It follows that “past,” “future,” and “simultaneous events” do not obtain.
Birth and death are not separate / different, not simultaneous / the same.

For that without beginning [and] end, where can a middle be in that? Therefore, it is not possible for it to have before, after, and simultaneous phases.

(15)何以故(16)若無有始終中當云何有(17)是故於此中先後共亦無(18)因中後故有初。因初中故有後。若無初(19)無後。云何有中。生死中無初中後。是故説(20)先後共不可得。

atrāha- yadyāpi avarāgre na staḥ saṃsārasya, tathāpi madhyamasti, apratiṣedhāt | tataś ca asti saṃsāro madhyasadbhāvāt | iha yannāsti, na tasya madhyamasti tadyathā kūrmaromaprāvaraṇasyeti | hāsyaḥ khalvasi | nanu ca bhoḥ,
naivāgraṃ nāvaraṃ yasya tasya madhyaṃ kuto bhavet |
agram iti ādiḥ, pūrvam, prathamam ucyate | avaram iti avasānam, antaḥ, vyavaccheda ucyate | yasya saṃsārasya ādirantaś ca pratiṣiddhaḥ, tasya kuto madhyaṃ bhaviṣyati? tataś ca saṃjñāmātrakameva viparyāsaparavaśamānasānāṃ saṃsāraḥ ādimadhyāvasānavirahitatvādākāśavadalātacakrādivaditi bhāvaḥ | saṃsārābhāvācca nāsti ātmeti | yata evaṃ saṃsārasyādimadhyāvasānāni na santi, ata eva saṃsārābhāvājjātijarāmaraṇādīnāṃ pūrvāparasahakramā api naiva santīty āha-
tasmānnātropapadyante pūrvāparasahakramāḥ || 2 ||

pūrvaṃ jātir yadi bhavej jarāmaraṇam uttaram |
nirjarā maraṇā jātir bhavej jāyeta cāmṛtaḥ || 3 ||

若使先有生後有老死者
不老死有生不生有老死

3. If birth [is regarded as] the former, and growing old and dying [are regarded as] coming into being later,
Then birth exists without growing old and dying, and [something] is born without death.

If birth were before and aging/death after, there would be birth without aging/death and also without dying one would be born.

何以故(21)若使先有生後有老死者(22)不老死有生不生有老死

yathā ca nopapadyante tathā pratipādayann āha-
pūrvaṃ jātiryadi bhavejjarāmaraṇamuttaram |
nirjarāmaraṇā jātirbhavejjāyeta cāmṛtaḥ || 3 ||
yadi pūrvaṃ jātirbhavet, tadā maraṇasahitā syāt | na ca jarādirahitā jātiryujyate, asaṃskṛtatvaprasaṅgāt | jarāmaraṇarahitasya bhāvasya jātau parikalpyamānāyāmanyatra amṛtasyaiva devadattasya prathamamiha jātiḥ parikalpyamānā syāt | tataś ca ādimān saṃsāraḥ syādahetukadoṣaś ca | abhūvamatītamadhvānam, ityevaṃ pūrvāntakalpanā ca na syāt | abhūtvā ca pūrvaṃ paścādihotpādaḥ syāt ||
atha syāt- āmrādīnāṃ yathā pūrvaṃ vināpi jarāmaraṇasaṃbandhāt prathamameva utpādo dṛṣṭaḥ, evamātmāno 'pīti | naivam | sādhyasamatvāt | āmrādīnāmapi hi svabījanirodhe samutpadyamānatvāt nānyatrāvinaṣṭānāmutpāda iti samam etat pūrveṇa ||
atha syāt- anyad eva vṛkṣādbījam, ato 'nyatrāvināśapūrvaka eva vṛkṣasyotpāda iti naivam | kāryakāraṇayoranyatvasyāsiddhatvāt | tathā ca vakṣyati-
pratītya yadyadbhavati na hi tāvattadeva tat |
na cānyadapi tattasmānnocchinnaṃ nāpi śāśvatam ||
na ca bījādvṛkṣasyānyatvam | ataḥ sādhyasamam etat | yataś ca anyatrāmṛtasya ihotpādo nāsti, na pūrvaṃ jātirabhyupeyā || 3 ||

paścāj jātir yadi bhavej jarāmaraṇam āditaḥ |
ahetukam ajātasya syāj jarāmaraṇaṃ katham || 4 ||

若先有老死而後有生者
是則為無因不生有老死

4. If birth were later, and growing old and dying were earlier,
How would there be an uncaused growing old and dying of something unborn?

If birth were after and aging/death before, how could there be an uncaused aging/death which has no birth?

(23)若先有老死而後有生者(24)是則爲無因不生有老死(25)生死衆生。若先生漸有老。而後有死者。則(26)生無老死。法應生有老死老死有生。又不(27)老死而生。是亦不然。又不因生有老死。(28)若先老死後生。老死則無因。生在後故。又(29)不生何有老死。若謂生老死先後不可。謂(16b1)一時成者。是亦有過。

atha pūrvaṃ jarāmaraṇam, paścājjātiḥ, evamapi-
paścājjātiryadi bhavejjarāmaraṇamāditaḥ |
ahetukamajātasya syājjarāmaraṇaṃ katham || 4 ||
jātipratyayaṃ jarāmaraṇam iti vacanājjātihetukaṃ jarāmaraṇamuktaṃ bhagavatā | yadi etatpūrvaṃ syāttadā nirhetukaṃ syāt | tasmānna yuktam etat | yato 'pyuktam-
yatha ukkhitte loḍhammi ukkheve atthi kāraṇaṃ | ṣaḍane kāraṇaṃ ṇatthi aṇṇaṃ ukkhevakāraṇā || iti |
yathāṣyatrotkṣepaḥ patanakāraṇaṃ nānyat, evamihāpi jātimevakāraṇatvena vināśasya varṇayāmo nānyat, iti nāstyahetukatā vināśasya | jātihetukatvāccāsyodgamanameva vināśasya hetur iti kṛtvā eṣāpi gāthā sunītā bhavati-
evime saṃkhatā dhammā saṃbhavanti sakāraṇā |
sa bhāva eva dhammāṇaṃ yaṃ vibhonti samuggatā ||
iti || 4 ||

na jarāmaraṇaṃ caiva jātiś ca saha yujyate |
mriyeta jāyamānaś ca syāc cāhetukatobhayoḥ || 5 ||

生及於老死不得一時共
生時則有死是二俱無因

5. And a birth which is simultaneous with growing old and dying is likewise impossible;
For, that which is being born would die, and both would be without cause.

It is not suitable for birth and aging/death to be simultaneous; that which is being born would be dying and both would be without cause.

何以故(2)生及於老死不得一時共(3)生時則有死是二倶無因(4)若生老死一時則不然何以故。生時即有死(5)故。法應生時有死時無。若生時有死。是事(6)不然。若一時生則無有相因。如牛角一時(7)出則不相因。

idānīṃ sahabhāvenāpi jātijarāmaraṇānāmasadbhāvaṃ pratipādayann āha-
na jarāmaraṇenaiva jātiś ca saha yujyate |
mriyeta jāyamānaś ca syāccāhetukatobhayoḥ || 5 ||
yadi sahabhāvo jātijarāmaraṇānāṃ syāt, tadā jāyamānasya maraṇaṃ syāt | na caitadyuktam | na ca parasparaviruddhatvādālokāndhakāravadekakālatā yuktā | na caivaṃ loke dṛṣṭaṃ yajjāyamāna eva mriyate iti | api ca | ahetukatvaṃ jātyādīnāṃ sahabhāvakalpanāyāṃ syāt | na hi sahabhūtayoḥ savyetaragoviṣāṇayoranyonyahetukatā dṛṣṭeti na yuktam etat || 5 ||

yatra na prabhavanty ete pūrvāparasahakramāḥ |
prapañcayanti tāṃ jātiṃ taj jarāmaraṇaṃ ca kim || 6 ||

若使初後共是皆不然者
何故而戲論謂有生老死

6. Since the past, future, and simultaneous activity do not originate,
To what purpose [do you] explain in detail [the existence of] birth, growing old and dying?

Why fixate on that birth, that aging/dying, for which the phases of before, after, simultaneity are impossible?

是故(8)若使初後共是皆不然者(9)何故而戲論謂有生老死(10)思惟生老死三皆有過故。即無生畢竟空。(11)汝今何故貪著。戲論生老死。謂有決定相。

tad evam-
yatra na prabhavantyete pūrvāparasahakramāḥ |
prapañcayanti tāṃ jātiṃ tajjarāmaraṇaṃ ca kim || 6 ||
yasyāṃ jātau yatra jarāmaraṇe ete pūrvāparasahakramāḥ na santi, tāṃ jātimanupalabhamānā āryāḥ kiṃ prapañcayanti? kiṃśabdo 'saṃbhave | naiva prapañcayantītyarthaḥ | athavā | evamavidyamāneṣu jātyādiṣu tāṃ jātibhavidyamānāṃ bālāḥ kiṃ prapañcayanti tacca jarāmaraṇaṃ yanna saṃvidyate? tasmādavastuka eva bālānāṃ prapañca ityabhiprāyaḥ || 6 ||

kāryaṃ ca kāraṇaṃ caiva lakṣyaṃ lakṣaṇam eva ca |
vedanā vedakaś caiva santy arthā ye ca ke cana || 7 ||

諸所有因果相及可相法
受及受者等所有一切法

7. That which is produced and its cause, as well as the characteristic and that which is characterized,
The sensation and the one who senses, and whatever other things there are —

It is not just samsara alone that has no before-extreme, cause and fruit themselves, and characteristics and the basis for characteristics themselves,

(12)復次(13)諸所有因果相及可相法(14)受及受者等所有一切法

yathā ca saṃsārasya pūrvā koṭirnāsti, evamanyeṣāmapi bhāvānāmity āha-
kāryaṃ ca kāraṇaṃ caiva lakṣyaṃ lakṣaṇameva ca |
vedanā vedakaścaiva santyarthā ye ca kecana || 7 ||

pūrvā na vidyate koṭiḥ saṃsārasya na kevalam |
sarveṣām api bhāvānāṃ¹ pūrvā koṭī na vidyate || 8 ||

1. Ye (2007, 167): eva dharmmāṇāṃ.

非但於生死本際不可得
如是一切法本際皆亦無

8. Not only is the former limit of existence-in-flux (samsara) not to be found,
But the former limit of all those things is not to be found.

feeling and the feeler, whatever is suitable to bear meaning, also all things have no before-extreme.

(15)非但於生死本際不可得(16)如是一切法本際皆亦無(17)一切法者。所謂因果相可相。受及受者等。皆(18)無本際。非但生死無本際。以略開示故。(19)説生死無本際

pūrvā na vidyate koṭiḥ saṃsārasya na kevalam |
sarveṣāmapi bhāvānāṃ pūrvā koṭirna vidyate || 8 ||
tatra yadi pūrvaṃ kāraṇaṃ paścātkāryaṃ syāt, akāryakaṃ kāraṇaṃ nirhetukaṃ syāt | atha pūrvaṃ kāryaṃ paścātkāraṇam, evam api kāraṇātpūrvaṃ kāryaṃ nirhetukameva syāt | atha yugapatkāryakāraṇe syātām, evamubhayamapyahetukaṃ syāt | evaṃ lakṣyalakṣaṇe vedanāvedakau ca yojyau | na ca kevalaṃ saṃsārasya vyākhyānena kāryakāraṇādikaṃ vyākhyātaṃ veditavyam, api ca ye 'pyante padārthā jñānajñeyapramāṇaprameyasādhanasādhyāvayavāvayaviguṇaguṇyādayaḥ, teṣāmapi pūrvā koṭirna vidyata iti yojyam || ata eva āryaratnameghasūtre āryasarvanīvaraṇaviṣkambhiṇā mahābodhisattvena bhagavān stutaḥ-
ādiśāntā hyanutpannāḥ prakṛtyaiva ca nirvṛtāḥ |
dharmāste vivṛtā nātha dharmacakrapravartane || iti
tathā-
ādita śūnya anāgata dharmā no gata asthita sthānaviviktāḥ |
nityamasāraka māyasabhāvāḥ śuddha viśuddha nabhopama sarvi ||
yaṃ ca pabhāṣati dharma jinasya taṃ ca na paśyati so 'kṣayatāya |
ādinirātma nisattvimi dharmāstāṃś ca ca pabhāṣati no ca kṣapeti |
kalpita buccati kalpitamātraṃ antu na labhyati saṃsaramāṇe |
koṭi alakṣaṇa yā puri āsīdeti anāgati pratyayatāye ||
karma kriyā ca pravartati evaṃ hīnautkṛṣṭatayā samudenti | jaḍḍaka dharma sadā prakṛtīye śūnya nirātma vijānatha sarvān ||
ityādi || |

pūrvāparakoṭiparīkṣā nāmaikādaśamaṃ prakaraṇaṃ ||

sngon dang phyi ma’i mtha’ brtag pa zhes bya ste rab tu byed pa bcu gcig pa’o || ||

ity ācāryacandrakīrtipādoparacitāyāṃ prasannapadāyāṃ madhyamakavṛttau pūrvāparakoṭiparīkṣā nāmaikādaśamaṃ prakaraṇam ||

svayaṃ kṛtaṃ parakṛtaṃ dvābhyāṃ kṛtam ahetukam |
duḥkham ity eka icchanti tac ca kāryaṃ na yujyate || 1 ||

中論觀苦品第十二(十偈) 自作及他作共作無因作
如是說諸苦於果則不然

[Chapter] 12: An Analysis of Sorrow (dukkha) (suffering) 1. Some say:
Sorrow (dukkha) is produced by oneself (i), or by another (ii), or by both [itself and another] (iii), or from no cause at all (iv);
But [to consider] that [sorrow (dukkha)] as what is produced is not possible.

Investigation of Anguish Some assert that anguish arises from being made by self, made by other, by both, without cause. To do that is not suitable.

(20) ＊中論觀苦品第十二十偈 (21)有人説曰 (22)自作及他作共作無因作(23)如是説諸苦於果則不然(24)有人言。苦惱自作。或言他作。或言亦自作亦(25)他作。或言無因作。於果皆不然。於果皆不(26)然者。衆生以衆縁致苦。厭苦欲求滅。不(27)知苦惱實因縁有四種謬。

svayaṃ kṛtaṃ yadi bhavet pratītya na tato bhavet |
skandhān imān amī skandhāḥ saṃbhavanti pratītya hi || 2 ||

苦若自作者則不從緣生
因有此陰故而有彼陰生

2. If it were produced by itself (i.e. self-causation), it would not exist dependent on something else.
Certainly those “groups of universal elements” (skandhas) exist presupposing these “groups.”

If it were made by self, therefore it would not be contingently arising, because those aggregates arise contingently on these aggregates.

是故説於果皆(28)不然何以故(29)苦若自作者則不從縁生(16c1)因有此陰故而有彼陰生(2)若苦自作。則不從衆縁生。自名從自性(3)生。是事不然。何以故。因前五陰有後五陰(4)生。是故苦不得自作。問曰。若言此五陰作(5)彼五陰者。則是他作。答曰。是事不然。

yady amībhya ime ’nye syur ebhyo vāmī pare yadi |
bhavet parakṛtaṃ duḥkhaṃ parair ebhir amī kṛtāḥ || 3 ||

若謂此五陰異彼五陰者
如是則應言從他而作苦

3. If these were different from those, or if those were different from these,
Sorrow (dukkha) would be produced by something other than itself (i.e. other-causation), because those would be made by these others.

If that were other than this and if this were other than that, anguish would be made by other and that would be made by those others.

何以(6)故(7)若謂此五陰異彼五陰者(8)如是則應言從他而作苦(9)若此五陰與彼五陰異。彼五陰與此五陰(10)異者。應從他作。如縷與布異者。應離縷(11)有布。若離縷無布者。則布不異縷。如是(12)彼五陰異此五陰者。則應離此五陰有彼(13)五陰。若離此五陰無彼五陰者。則此五陰(14)不異彼五陰。是故不應言苦從他作。問曰(15)自作者。是人人自作苦。自受苦。

svapudgalakṛtaṃ duḥkhaṃ yadi duḥkhaṃ punar vinā |
svapudgalaḥ sa katamo yena duḥkhaṃ svayaṃ kṛtam || 4 ||

若人自作苦離苦何有人
而謂於彼人而能自作苦

4. If sorrow (dukkha) is made through one’s own personality (i) (svapudgala), then one’s own personality would be without sorrow (dukkha);
Who is that “own personality” by which sorrow (dukkha) is self-produced (i)?

If anguish were made by one’s own person, who would that person be who has made anguish by himself, but is not included in the anguish?

答曰(16)若人自作苦離苦何有人(17)而謂於彼人而能自作苦(18)若謂人自作苦者。離五陰苦。何處別有人。(19)而能自作苦。應説是人。而不可説。是故苦(20)非人自作。若謂人不自作苦。他人作苦與(21)此人。者是亦不然。

parapudgalajaṃ duḥkhaṃ yadi yasmai pradīyate |
pareṇa kṛtvā tad duḥkhaṃ sa duḥkhena vinā kutaḥ || 5 ||

若苦他人作而與此人者
若當離於苦何有此人受

5. If sorrow (dukkha) were produced by a different personality (ii) (parapudgala),
How would he, to whom is given that sorrow (dukkha) by another after he had produced it, be without sorrow (dukkha)?

If anguish arose from another person, how could it be suitable for there to be [someone] not included in the anguish, who has been given it by another who made the anguish?

何以故(22)若苦他人作而與此人者(23)若當離於苦何有此人受(24)若他人作苦。與此人者。離五陰無有此(25)人受。

parapudgalajaṃ duḥkhaṃ yadi kaḥ parapudgalaḥ |
vinā duḥkhena yaḥ kṛtvā parasmai prahiṇoti tat || 6 ||

苦若彼人作持與此人者
離苦何有人而能授於此

6. If sorrow (dukkha) is produced by a different personality, who is that different personality
Who, while being without sorrow (dukkha), yet makes and transmits that [sorrow (dukkha)] to the other?

If anguish arose [from] another person, who would that other person be who, having made it, gives it to someone else, but is not included in the anguish?

復次(26)苦若彼人作持與此人者(27)離苦何有人而能授於此(28)若謂彼人作苦授與此人者。離五陰苦。何(29)有彼人作苦持與此人。若有者應説其(17a1)相。

svayaṃ kṛtasyāprasiddher duḥkhaṃ parakṛtaṃ kutaḥ |
paro hi duḥkhaṃ yat kuryāt tat tasya syāt svayaṃ kṛtam || 7 ||

自作若不成云何彼作苦
若彼人作苦即亦名自作

7. It is not established that sorrow (dukkha) is self-produced (i), [but] how is [sorrow (dukkha)] produced by another (ii)?
Certainly the sorrow (dukkha), which would be produced by another (ii), in his case would be self-produced (i’).

Since it is not established as made by self, how can anguish have been made by other? [For] whatever anguish is made by other, that has been made by his self.

復次(2)自作若不成云何彼作苦(3)若彼人作苦即亦名自作(4)種種因縁彼自作苦不成而言他作苦。是亦(5)不然。何以故。此彼相待故。若彼作苦於彼(6)亦名自作苦。自作苦先已破。汝受自作苦不(7)成故。他作亦不成。

na tāvat svakṛtaṃ duḥkhaṃ na hi tenaiva tat kṛtam |
paro nātmakṛtaś cet syād duḥkhaṃ parakṛtaṃ katham || 8 ||

苦不名自作法不自作法
彼無有自體何有彼作苦

8. Sorrow (dukkha) is not self-produced (i), for that which is produced is certainly not produced by that [personality].
If the “other” (para) is not produced by the individual self (ātma), how would sorrow (dukkha) be that produced by another?

Anguish is not made [by] self; that is not made by that itself. If it is not made by an other self, how can anguish be made by other?

復次(8)苦不名自作法不自作法(9)彼無有自體何有彼作苦(10)自作苦不然。何以故。如刀不能自割。如是(11)法不能自作法。是故不能自作。他作亦不(12)然。何以故。離苦無彼自性。若離苦有彼自(13)性者。應言彼作苦。彼亦即是苦。云何苦自(14)作苦。問曰。若自作他作不然。應有共作。

syād ubhābhyāṃ kṛtaṃ duḥkhaṃ syād ekaikakṛtaṃ yadi |
parākārāsvayaṃkāraṃ duḥkham ahetukaṃ kutaḥ || 9 ||

若此彼苦成應有共作苦
此彼尚無作何況無因作

9. Sorrow (dukkha) could be made by both [self and the “other”] (iii) if it could be produced by either one.
[But] not produced by another, and not self-produced (iv) —how can sorrow (dukkha) exist without a caused

If it is made by each, anguish would be made by both. Not made by self, not made by other, how can anguish have no cause?

答(15)曰(16)若此彼苦成應有共作苦(17)此彼尚無作何況無因作(18)自作他作猶尚有過。何況無因作。無因多(19)過。如破作作者品中説。

na kevalaṃ hi duḥkhasya cāturvidhyaṃ na vidyate |
bāhyānām api bhāvānāṃ cāturvidhyaṃ na vidyate || 10 ||

非但說於苦四種義不成
一切外萬物四義亦不成

10. Not only are the four [causal] interpretations not possible in respect to sorrow (dukkha),
[but also] none of the four [causal] interpretations is possible even in respect to external things (bhava).

Not only does anguish alone not have the four aspects, external things too do not have the four aspects.

復次(20)非但説於苦四種義不成(21)一切外萬物四義亦不成(22)佛法中雖説五受陰爲苦。有外道人。謂苦(23)受爲苦。是故説。不但説於苦四種義不成。(24)外萬物。地水山木等。一切法皆亦不成

duḥkhaparīkṣā nāma dvādaśamaṃ prakaraṇaṃ ||

bdag gis byas pa dang gzhan gyis byas pa brtag pa zhes bya ba ste rab (3)tu byed pa bcu gnyis pa’o ||

tan mṛṣā moṣadharma yad bhagavān ity abhāṣata |
sarve ca moṣadharmāṇaḥ saṃskārās tena te mṛṣā || 1 ||

如佛經所說虛誑妄取相
諸行妄取故是名為虛誑

|| bcom ldan ’das kyis chos gang zhig | slu ba de ni brdzun zhes gsungs | |
’du byed thams cad slu ba’i chos | | des na de dag brdzun pa yin | |

[Chapter] 13: An Analysis of Conditioned Elements (samskara) (the real) 1. A thing of which the basic elements are deception is vain, as the glorious one said.
All conditioned elements (samskara) are things that have basic elements (dharma) which are deception; therefore, they are vain.

Investigation of Samskaras The Bhagavan said that whatever dharma is deceptive, that is false. All conditions [are] deceptive dharmas, thus they are false.

(25) ＊中論觀行品第十三九偈 (26)問曰(27)如佛經所説虚誑妄取相(28)諸行妄取故是名爲虚誑(29)佛經中説。虚誑者。即是妄取相。第一實者。(17b1)所謂涅槃非妄取相。以是經説故。當知有(2)諸行虚誑妄取相。

tan mṛṣā moṣadharma yad yadi kiṃ tatra muṣyate |
etat tūktaṃ bhagavatā śūnyatāparidīpakam || 2 ||

虛誑妄取者是中何所取
佛說如是事欲以示空義

2. “If that which has deceptive basic elements is vain, what is there which deceives?”
This was spoken by the glorious one to illuminate “emptiness.”

If whatever is a deceptive phenomenon is false, what is deceptive about it [in what way is it deceptive]? That statement by the Bhagavan is a complete presentation of emptiness.

答曰(3)虚誑妄取者是中何所取(4)佛説如是事欲以示空義(5)若妄取相法即是虚誑者。是諸行中爲何(6)所取。佛如是説。當知説空義。問曰。云何(7)知一切諸行皆是空。答曰。一切諸行虚妄(8)相故空。諸行生滅不住。無自性故空。諸行(9)名五陰。從行生故。五陰名行。是五陰皆虚(10)妄無有定相。何以故。如嬰兒時色非匍匐(11)時色。匍匐時色非行時色。行時色非童子時(12)色。童子時色非壯年時色。壯年時色非老年(13)時色。如色念念不住故。分別決定性不可(14)得。嬰兒色爲即是匍匐色乃至老年色爲(15)異。二倶有過。何以故。若嬰兒色即是匍匐(16)色。乃至老年色者。如是則是一色皆爲嬰(17)兒。無有匍匐乃至老年。又如泥團常是泥(18)團終不作瓶。何以故。色常定故。若嬰兒色(19)異匍匐色者。則嬰兒不作匍匐。匍匐不作(20)嬰兒。何以故。二色異故。如是童子少年壯年(21)老年色不應相續。有失親屬法無父無(22)子。若爾者。唯有嬰兒應得父。餘則匍匐乃(23)至老年不應有分。是故二倶有過。問曰。色(24)雖不定。嬰兒色滅已。相續更生乃至老年(25)色。無有如上過。答曰。嬰兒色相續生者。(26)爲滅已相續生。爲不滅相續生。若嬰兒色(27)滅。云何有相續。以無因故。如雖有薪(28)可燃。火滅故無有相續。若嬰兒色不滅(29)而相續者。則嬰兒色不滅。常住本相亦無(17c1)相續。問曰。我不説滅不滅故相續生。但(2)説不住相似生故言相續生。答曰。若爾者。(3)則有定色而更生。如是應有千萬種色。但(4)是事不然。如是亦無相續。如是一切處(5)求色無有定相。但以世俗言説故有。如(6)芭蕉樹求實不可得。但有皮葉。如是智者(7)求色相。念念滅更無實色可得。不住色形(8)色相。相似次第生難可分別。如燈炎分別(9)定色不可得。從是定色更有色生不可(10)得。是故色無性故空。但以世俗言説故有。(11)受亦如是。智者種種觀察。次第相似故生滅(12)難可別知。如水流相續。但以覺故説三受(13)在身。是故當知。受同色説。想因名相生。(14)若離名相則不生。是故佛説。分別知名字(15)相故名爲想。非決定先有。從衆縁生無定(16)性。無定性故如影隨形。因形有影。無形(17)則無影。影無決定性。若定有者。離形(18)應有影。而實不爾。是故從衆縁生。無自(19)性故不可得。想亦如是。但因外名相。以世(20)俗言説故有。識因色聲香味觸等眼耳鼻舌(21)身等生。以眼等諸根別異故。識有別異。是(22)識爲在色爲在眼爲在中間。無有決定。(23)但生已識塵識此人識彼人。知此人識爲(24)即是知彼人識。爲異是二難可分別。如(25)眼識耳識亦難可分別。以難分別故。或(26)言一或言異。無有決定分別。但從衆縁(27)生故。眼等分別故空無自性。如伎人含一(28)珠出已復示人則生疑。爲是本珠爲更有(29)異。識亦如是。生已更生。爲是本識爲是異(18a1)識。是故當知。識不住故無自性。虚誑如幻。(2)諸行亦如是。諸行者身口意。行有二種淨(3)不淨。何等爲不淨。惱衆生貪著等名不淨。(4)不惱衆生實語不貪著等名淨。或増或減。(5)淨行者。在人中欲天色天無色天受果報(6)已則減。還作故名増。不淨行者亦如是。在(7)地獄畜生餓鬼阿修羅中受果報已則減。還(8)作故名増。是故諸行有増有減故不住。如(9)人有病。隨宜將適病則除愈。不將適病(10)則還集。諸行亦如是。有増有減故不決定。(11)但以世俗言説故有。因世諦故得見第(12)一義諦。所謂無明縁諸行。從諸行有識著。(13)識著故有名色。從名色有六入。從六入(14)有觸。從觸有受。從受有愛。從愛有取。(15)從取有有。從有有生。從生有老死憂悲苦(16)惱恩愛別苦怨憎會苦等。如是諸苦皆以行(17)爲本。佛以世諦故説。若得第一義諦生眞(18)智慧者則無明息。無明息故諸行亦不集。(19)諸行不集故見諦所斷身見疑戒取等斷。及(20)思惟所斷貪恚色染無色染調戲無明亦斷。(21)以是斷故一一分滅。所謂無明諸行識名色(22)六入觸受愛取有生老死憂悲苦惱恩愛別苦(23)怨憎會苦等皆滅。以是滅故五陰身畢竟滅(24)更無有餘。唯但有空。是故佛欲示空義(25)故。説諸行虚誑。復次諸法無性故虚誑。虚(26)誑故空。

bhāvānāṃ niḥsvabhāvatvam anyathābhāvadarśanāt |
nāsvabhāvaś ca bhāvo ’sti bhāvānāṃ śūnyatā yataḥ || 3 ||

諸法有異故知皆是無性
無性法亦無一切法空故

3. [An opponent says:]
There is non-self-existence of things [since] a thing, by observation, [becomes] something else. (i.e. impermanence)
A thing without self-existence does not exist—due to the emptiness of existing things.

Things have no essential nature because they are seen to change into something else. Things do not lack an essential nature because things are emptiness.

如偈説(27)諸法有異故知皆是無性(28)無性法亦無一切法空故(29)諸法無有性。何以故。諸法雖生不住自性。(18b1)是故無性。如嬰兒定住自性者。終不作匍(2)匐乃至老年。而嬰兒次第相續有異相現匍(3)匐乃至老年。是故説見諸法異相故知無(4)性。問曰。若諸法異相無性即有無性法有(5)何咎。答曰。若無性云何有法云何有相。何(6)以故。無有根本故但爲破性故説無性。是(7)無性法若有者。不名一切法空。若一切法(8)空。云何有無性法。

kasya syād anyathābhāvaḥ svabhāvaś cen na vidyate |
kasya syād anyathābhāvaḥ svabhāvo yadi vidyate || 4 ||

諸法若無性云何說嬰兒
乃至於老年而有種種異若諸法有性云何而得異
若諸法無性云何而有異

4. If self-existence does not exist, whose “other-existence” would there be?
.
[Nagarjuna answers:]
If self-existence does exist, whose “other-existence” would there be?

If there were no essential nature, whose [nature] would it be to change into something else? If there were an essential nature, how would it be possible to change into something else?

No English

問曰(9)諸法若無性云何説嬰兒(10)乃至於老年而有種種異(11)諸法若無性則無有異相而汝説有異相。(12)是故有諸法性若無諸法性云何有異相。 (13)答曰(14)若諸法有性云何而得異(15)若諸法無性云何而有異(16)若諸法決定有性。云何可得異性。名決定(17)有不可變異。如眞金不可變。又如暗性(18)不變爲明。明性不變爲暗。

No English

tasyaiva nānyathābhāvo nāpy anyasyaiva yujyate |
yuvā na jīryate yasmād yasmāj jīrṇo na jīryate || 5 ||

是法則無異異法亦無異
如壯不作老老亦不作壯

5. Just as there is no other-existence of a thing, so also [an-other-existence] of something else is not possible—
Since a youth is not aging (jiryate), and since “who has already aged” is not aging (jiryate).

This itself does not change into something else. The other itself too does not [either]. Because youth does not age. Because age too does not age.

復次(19)是法則無異異法亦無異(20)如壯不作老老亦不作壯(21)若法有異者。則應有異相。爲即是法異。爲(22)異法異。是二不然。若即是法異。則老應作(23)老。而老實不作老。若異法異者。老與壯異(24)壯應作老。而壯實不作老。二倶有過。問(25)曰。若法即異。有何咎。如今眼見年少經(26)日月歳數則老。

tasya ced anyathābhāvaḥ kṣīram eva bhaved dadhi |
kṣīrād anyasya kasyacid dadhibhāvo bhaviṣyati || 6 ||

若是法即異乳應即是酪
離乳有何法而能作於酪

6. If there would be an other-existence of a thing, milk would exist as curds.
[But] surely “being curds” will be something other than milk.

If this itself changes into something else, milk itself would be curds. Something other than milk would be the being of curds.

答曰(27)若是法即異乳應即是酪(28)離乳有何法而能作於酪(29)若是法即異者。乳應即是酪。更不須因縁。(18c1)是事不然。何以故。乳與酪有種種異故。乳(2)不即是酪。是故法不即異。若謂異法爲異(3)者。是亦不然。離乳更有何物爲酪。如是(4)思惟。是法不異。異法亦不異。是故不應(5)偏有所執。問曰。破是破異猶有空在。空即(6)是法。

yady aśūnyaṃ bhavet kiṃcit syāc chūnyam iti kiṃ cana |
na kiṃcid asty aśūnyaṃ ca kutaḥ śūnyaṃ bhaviṣyati || 7 ||

若有不空法則應有空法
實無不空法何得有空法

7. If something would be non-empty, something would [logically also] be empty
But nothing is non-empty, so how will it become empty?

If a bit of the non-empty existed, a bit of the empty would also exist. If there did not exist a bit of the non-empty, how could the empty exist?

答曰(7)若有不空法則應有空法(8)實無不空法何得有空法(9)若有不空法。相因故應有空法。而上來種(10)種因縁破不空法。不空法無故則無相待。(11)無相待故何有空法。問曰。汝説不空法(12)無故空法亦無。若爾者。即是説空。但無(13)相待故不應有執。若有對應有相待。若(14)無對則無相待。相待無故則無相。無相故(15)則無執。如是即爲説空。

śūnyatā sarvadṛṣṭīnāṃ proktā niḥsaraṇaṃ jinaiḥ |
yeṣāṃ tu śūnyatādṛṣṭis tān asādhyān babhāṣire || 8 ||

大聖說空法為離諸見故
若復見有空諸佛所不化

8. Emptiness is proclaimed by the victorious one as the refutation of all viewpoints;
But those who hold “emptiness” as a viewpoint—[the true perceivers] have called those “incurable” (asadhya).

The Conquerors taught emptiness as the forsaking of all views. Those who view emptiness are taught to be without realisation [incurable/incorrigible].

答曰(16)大聖説空法爲離諸見故(17)若復見有空諸佛所不化(18)大聖爲破六十二諸見。及無明愛等諸煩(19)惱故説空。若人於空復生見者。是人不可(20)化。譬如有病須服藥可治。若藥復爲病(21)則不可治。如火從薪出以水可滅。若從(22)水生爲用何滅。如空是水能滅諸煩惱火。(23)有人罪重貪著心深。智慧鈍故。於空生見。(24)或謂有空。或謂無空。因有無還起煩惱。若(25)以空化此人者。則言我久知是空。若離(26)是空則無涅槃道。如經説。離空無相無作(27)門。得解脱者。但有言説◎

saṃskāraparīkṣā² nāma trayodaśamaṃ prakaraṇaṃ ||

2. Ye (2007, 163): śūnyatāparīkṣā.

中論觀行品第十三(九偈)

’du byed brtag pa zhes bya ba ste rab tu byed pa bcu sum pa’o ||

draṣṭavyaṃ darśanaṃ draṣṭā trīṇy etāni dviśo dviśaḥ |
sarvaśaś ca na saṃsargam anyonyena vrajanty uta || 1 ||

中論觀合品第十四(八偈) 見可見見者是三各異方
如是三法異終無有合時

|| blta bya lta ba lta ba po | | gsum po de dag gnyis gnyis dang | |
thams cad kyang ni phan tshun du | | phrad par ’gyur pa yod ma yin | |

[Chapter] 14: An Analysis of Unification (samsarga) (combination) 1. That which is seen, sight, and the “seer”: these three
Do not combine together either in pairs or altogether.

Investigation of Connections The seen, the seeing and the seer: these three do not mutually connect [as] pairs or all [together].

(28) ◎ 中論觀合品第十四八偈 (29)説曰。上破根品中。説見所見見者皆不成。此(19a1)三事無異法故則無合。無合義今當説。問(2)曰。何故眼等三事無合。答曰(3)見可見見者是三各異方(4)如是三法異終無有合時(5)見是眼根。可見是色塵。見者是我。是三事各(6)在異處終無合時。異處者。眼在身内色在(7)身外。我者或言在身内。或言遍一切處。是(8)故無合。復次若謂有見法。爲合而見不合(9)而見。二倶不然。何以故。若合而見者。隨有(10)塵處應有根有我。但是事不然。是故不(11)合。若不合而見者。根我塵各在異處亦應(12)有見。而不見。何以故。如眼根在此不見(13)遠處瓶。是故二倶不見。問曰。我意根塵。四(14)事合故有知生。能知瓶衣等萬物。是故有(15)見可見見者。答曰。是事根品中已破。今當更(16)説。汝説四事合故知生。是知爲見瓶衣等(17)物已生。爲未見而生。若見已生者。知則無(18)用。若未見而生者。是則未合。云何有知生。(19)若謂四事一時合而知生。是亦不然。若一時(20)生則無相待。何以故。先有瓶次見後知生。(21)一時則無先後。知無故見可見見者亦無。如(22)是諸法如幻如夢無有定相。何得有合。(23)無合故空。

evaṃ rāgaś ca raktaś ca rañjanīyaṃ ca dṛśyatām |
traidhena śeṣāḥ kleśāś ca śeṣāṇy āyatanāni ca || 2 ||

染與於可染染者亦復然
餘入餘煩惱皆亦復如是

2. Desire, the one who desires, and the object of desire have to be regarded in the same way,
[As also] the impurities which remain and the three kinds of “base of sense” (ayatana) which remain.

Likewise desire, desiring and the desired, the remaining afflictions and also the remaining sense-fields do [not connect] by three aspects.

復次(24)染與於可染染者亦復然(25)餘入餘煩惱皆亦復如是(26)如見可見見者無合故。染可染染者亦應無(27)合。如説見可見見者三法。則説聞可聞聞(28)者餘入等。如説染可染染者。則説瞋可瞋(29)瞋者餘煩惱等。

anyenānyasya saṃsargas tac cānyatvaṃ na vidyate |
draṣṭavyaprabhṛtīnāṃ yan na saṃsargaṃ vrajanty ataḥ || 3 ||

異法當有合見等無有異
異相不成故見等云何合

3. [Some hold:] There is unification (samsarga) of one different thing with another different thing; [but] since the differentness
Of what is seen, etc. does not exist, those [factors] do not enter into unification.

If the other connects to the other, because the seen and so forth do not exist [as] other, therefore there is no connection.

復次(19b1)異法當有合見等無有異(2)異相不成故見等云何合(3)凡物皆以異故有合。而見等異相不可得。是(4)故無合。

na ca kevalam anyatvaṃ draṣṭavyāder na vidyate |
kasyacit kenacit sārdhaṃ nānyatvam upapadyate || 4 ||

非但見等法異相不可得
所有一切法皆亦無異相

4. Not only does the differentness of that which is seen, etc. not exist,
Also the differentness of something coming from another does not obtain.

Not only are the seen and so forth alone not existing as other, it is invalid for anything simultaneous with something to be other [than it].

復次(5)非但見等法異相不可得(6)所有一切法皆亦無異相(7)非但見可見見者等三事異相不可得。一切(8)法皆無異相。問曰。何故無有異相。

anyad anyat pratītyānyan nānyad anyad ṛte ’nyataḥ |
yat pratītya ca yat tasmāt tad anyan nopapadyate || 5 ||

異因異有異異離異無異
若法從因出是法不異因

5. A thing is different insofar as it presupposes a second different thing.
One thing is not different from another thing without the other thing.

The other is other in dependence upon the other. Without the other, the other would not be other. It is invalid for whatever is dependent on something to be other than that.

答曰(9)異因異有異異離異無異(10)若法從因出是法不異因(11)汝所謂異。是異因異法故名爲異。離異法(12)不名爲異。何以故。若法從衆縁生。是法不(13)異因。因壞果亦壞故。如因梁椽等有舍。(14)舍不異梁椽。梁椽等壞舍亦壞故。問曰。若(15)有定異法。有何咎。

yady anyad anyad anyasmād anyasmād apy ṛte bhavet |
tad anyad anyad anyasmād ṛte nāsti ca nāsty ataḥ || 6 ||

若離從異異應餘異有異
離從異無異是故無有異

6. If one different thing is different from a second different thing, it exists without a second different thing;
But without a second different thing, one different thing does not exist as a different thing.

If the other was other than the other, then, without the other, it would be other. Without the other it would not be other. Therefore, it does not exist.

答曰(16)若離從異異應餘異有異(17)離從異無異是故無有異(18)若離從異有異法者。則應離餘異有異(19)法。而實離從異無有異法。是故無餘異。如(20)離五指異有拳異者拳異。應於瓶等異物(21)有異。今離五指異。拳異不可得。是故拳異。(22)於瓶等無有異法。問曰。我經説。異相不(23)從衆縁生。分別總相故有異相。因異相故(24)有異法。

nānyasmin vidyate ’nyatvam ananyasmin na vidyate |
avidyamāne cānyatve nāsty anyad vā tad eva vā || 7 ||

異中無異相不異中亦無
無有異相故則無此彼異

7. Differentness does not exist in a different thing, nor in what is not different.
When differentness does not exist, then there is neither what is different nor “this” [from which something can be different].

Otherness does not exist in the other. Nor does it exist in what is not other. If otherness does not exist, neither the other nor that itself exists.

答曰(25)異中無異相不異中亦無(26)無有異相故則無此彼異(27)汝言分別總相故有異相。因異相故有異(28)法。若爾者。異相從衆縁生。如是即説衆縁(29)法。是異相離異法不可得故。異相因異法(19c1)而有。不能獨成。今異法中無異相。何以故。(2)先有異法故何用異相。不異法中亦無異(3)相。何以故。若異相在不異法中。不名不異(4)法。若二處倶無。即無異相。異相無故此彼法(5)亦無。

na tena tasya saṃsargo nānyenānyasya yujyate |
saṃsṛjyamānaṃ saṃsṛṣṭaṃ saṃsraṣṭā ca na vidyate || 8 ||

是法不自合異法亦不合
合者及合時合法亦皆無

8. Unification is not possible by [uniting] one thing with that one thing, nor by [uniting] one thing with a different thing;
Thus, the becoming unified, the state of being united, and the one who unites are not possible.

That does not connect with that. The other too does not connect with the other. The connecting, the connection and the connector too do not exist.

復次異法無故亦無合(6)是法不自合異法亦不合(7)合者及合時合法亦皆無(8)是法自體不合。以一故。如一指不自合。異(9)法亦不合。以異故。異事已成不須合故。如(10)是思惟。合法不可得。是故説合者合時合(11)法。皆不可得◎(12)中論卷第二(16)◎中論卷第三(17)　龍樹菩薩造　＊梵志青目釋(18)姚秦◎三藏鳩摩羅什譯　

saṃsargaparīkṣā nāma caturdaśamaṃ prakaraṇaṃ ||

phrad pa brtag pa zhes bya ste rab tu byed pa bcu bzhi pa’o ||

na saṃbhavaḥ svabhāvasya yuktaḥ pratyayahetubhiḥ |
hetupratyayasaṃbhūtaḥ svabhāvaḥ kṛtako bhavet || 1 ||

觀有無品第十五(十一偈) 眾緣中有性是事則不然
性從眾緣出即名為作法

|| rang bzhin rgyu dang rkyen las ni | | (5)’byung bar rigs pa ma yin no | |
rgyu dang rkyen las byung ba yi | | rang bzhin byas pa can du ’gyur | |

[Chapter] 15: An Analysis of a Self-existent Thing (svabhava) (being and non-being) 1. The production of a self-existent thing by a conditioning cause is not possible,
[For,] being produced through dependence on a cause, a self-existent thing would be “something which is produced” (krtaka).

Investigation of Essences It is unreasonable for an essence to arise from causes and conditions. Whatever essence arose from causes and conditions would be something that has been made.

(19) 觀有無品第十五十一偈 (20)問曰。諸法各有性。以有力用故。如瓶有(21)瓶性布有布性。是性衆縁合時則出。答曰(22)衆縁中有性是事則不然(23)性從衆縁出即名爲作法(24)若諸法有性。不應從衆縁出。何以故。若(25)從衆縁出。即是作法無有定性。問曰。若諸(26)法性從衆縁作。有何咎。

svabhāvaḥ kṛtako nāma bhaviṣyati punaḥ katham |
akṛtrimaḥ svabhāvo hi nirapekṣaḥ paratra ca || 2 ||

性若是作者云何有此義
性名為無作不待異法成

2. How, indeed, will a self-existent thing become “something which is produced”?
Certainly, a self-existent thing [by definition] is “not-produced” and is independent of anything else.

How is it possible for there to be “an essence which has been made?” Essences are not contrived and not dependent on anything else.

答曰(27)性若是作者云何有此義(28)性名爲無作不待異法成(29)如金雜銅則非眞金。如是若有性則不須(20a1)衆縁。若從衆縁出當知無眞性。又性若決(2)定。不應待他出。非如長短彼此無定性(3)故待他而有。問曰。諸法若無自性。應有他(4)性。

kutaḥ svabhāvasyābhāve parabhāvo bhaviṣyati |
svabhāvaḥ parabhāvasya parabhāvo hi kathyate || 3 ||

法若無自性云何有他性
自性於他性亦名為他性

3. If there is an absence of a self-existent thing, how will an other-existent thing (parabhava) come into being?
Certainly the self-existence of an other-existent thing is called ”other-existence.”

If an essence does not exist, how can the thingness of the other exist? [For] the essence of the thingness of the other is said to be the thingness of the other.

答曰(5)法若無自性云何有他性(6)自性於他性亦名爲他性(7)諸法性衆縁作故。亦因待成故無自性。若爾(8)者。他性於他亦是自性。亦從衆縁生相待(9)故。亦無無故。云何言諸法從他性生。他性(10)亦是自性故。問曰。若離自性他性有諸法。(11)有何咎。

svabhāvaparabhāvābhyām ṛte bhāvaḥ kutaḥ punaḥ |
svabhāve parabhāve ca sati bhāvo hi sidhyati || 4 ||

離自性他性何得更有法
若有自他性諸法則得成

4. Further, how can a thing [exist] without either self-existence or other-existence?
If either self-existence or other existence exist, then an existing thing, indeed, would be proved.

Apart from an essence and the thingness of the other, what things are there? If essences and thingnesses of others existed, things would be established.

答曰(12)離自性他性何得更有法(13)若有自他性諸法則得成(14)汝説離自性他性有法者。是事不然。若離(15)自性他性則無有法何以故。有自性他性(16)法則成。如瓶體是自性依物是他性。問曰。(17)若以自性他性破有者。今應有無。

bhāvasya ced aprasiddhir abhāvo naiva sidhyati |
bhāvasya hy anyathābhāvam abhāvaṃ bruvate janāḥ || 5 ||

有若不成者無云何可成
因有有法故有壞名為無

5. If there is no proof of an existent thing, then a non-existent thing cannot be proved.
Since people call the other-existence of an existent thing a “non-existent thing.”

If things were not established, non-things would not be established. [When] a thing becomes something else, people say that it is a non-thing.

答曰(18)有若不成者無云何可成(19)因有有法故有壞名爲無(20)若汝已受有不成者。亦應受無亦無。何以(21)故。有法壞敗故名無。是無因有壞而有。

svabhāvaṃ parabhāvaṃ ca bhāvaṃ cābhāvam eva ca |
ye paśyanti na paśyanti te tattvaṃ buddhaśāsane || 6 ||

若人見有無見自性他性
如是則不見佛法真實義

6. Those who perceive self-existence and other-existence, and an existent thing and a non-existent thing,
Do not perceive the true nature of the Buddha’s teaching.

Those who view essence, thingness of the other, things and non-things do not see the suchness in the teaching of the awakened.

復(22)次(23)若人見有無見自性他性(24)如是則不見佛法眞實義(25)若人深著諸法。必求有見。若破自性則見(26)他性。若破他性則見有。若破有則見無。若(27)破無則迷惑。若利根著心薄者。知滅諸見(28)安隱故。更不生四種戲論。是人則見佛法(29)眞實義。是故説上偈。

kātyāyanāvavāde cāstīti nāstīti cobhayam |
pratiṣiddhaṃ bhagavatā bhāvābhāvavibhāvinā || 7 ||

佛能滅有無如化迦旃延
經中之所說離有亦離無

7. In “The Instruction of Katyayana” both “it is” and “it is not” are opposed
By the Glorious One, who has ascertained the meaning of “existent” and non-existent.”

Through knowing things and non-things, the Buddha negated both existence and non-existence in his Advice to Katyayana.

復次(20b1)佛能滅有無如化迦旃延(2)經中之所説離有亦離無(3)刪陀迦旃延經中。佛爲説正見義離有離(4)無。若諸法中少決定有者。佛不應破有無。(5)若破有則人謂爲無。佛通達諸法相故。説(6)二倶無。是故汝應捨有無見。

yady astitvaṃ prakṛtyā syān na bhaved asya nāstitā |
prakṛter anyathābhāvo na hi jātūpapadyate || 8 ||

若法實有性後則不應異
性若有異相是事終不然

8. If there would be an existent thing by its own nature, there could not be “non-existence’ of that [thing].
Certainly an existent thing different from its own nature would never obtain.

If [things] existed essentially, they would not come to non-existence. It is never the case that an essence could become something else.

復次(7)若法實有性後則不應異(8)性若有異相是事終不然(9)若諸法決定有性。終不應變異。何以故。若(10)定有自性。不應有異相。如上眞金喩。今(11)現見諸法有異相故。當知無有定相。

prakṛtau kasya vāsatyām anyathātvaṃ bhaviṣyati |
prakṛtau kasya vā satyām anyathātvaṃ bhaviṣyati || 9 ||

若法實有性云何而可異
若法實無性云何而可異

9. [An opponent asks:] If there is no basic self-nature (prakti), of what will there be “otherness”?
[Nagarjuna answers:] If there is basic self-nature, of what will there be “otherness”?

If essences did not exist, what could become something else? Even if essences existed, what could become something else?

復(12)次(13)若法實有性云何而可異(14)若法實無性云何而可異(15)若法定有性。云何可變異。若無性則無自(16)體。云何可變異。

astīti śāśvatagrāho nāstīty ucchedadarśanam |
tasmād astitvanāstitve nāśrīyeta vicakṣaṇaḥ || 10 ||

定有則著常定無則著斷
是故有智者不應著有無

10. “It is” is a notion of eternity. “It is not” is a nihilistic view.
Therefore, one who is wise does not have recourse to “being” or “non-being.”

“Existence” is the grasping at permanence; “non-existence” is the view of annihilation. Therefore, the wise do not dwell, in existence or non-existence.

復次(17)定有則著常定無則著斷(18)是故有智者不應著有無(19)若法定有有相。則終無無相。是即爲常。何(20)以故。如説三世者。未來中有法相。是法(21)來至現在。轉入過去。不捨本相。是則爲(22)常。又説因中先有果。是亦爲常。若説定(23)有無。是無必先有今無。是則爲斷滅。斷滅(24)名無相續。因由是二見。即遠離佛法。問曰。(25)何故因有生常見。因無生斷見。

asti yad dhi svabhāvena na tan nāstīti śāśvatam |
nāstīdānīm abhūt pūrvam ity ucchedaḥ prasajyate || 11 ||

若法有定性非無則是常
先有而今無是則為斷滅

11. That which exists by its own nature is eternal since “it does not not-exist.”
If it is maintained: “That which existed before does not exist now,” there annihilation would logically follow.

“Since that which exists by its essence is not non-existent,” is [the view of] permanence. “That which arose before is now non-existent,”leads to [the view of] annihilation.

答曰(26)若法有定性非無則是常(27)先有而今無是則爲斷滅(28)若法性定有。則是有相非無相。終不應無。(29)若無則非有。即爲無法。先已説過故。如(20c1)是則墮常見。若法先有。敗壞而無者。是名(2)斷滅。何以故。有不應無故。汝謂有無各有(3)定相故。若有斷常見者。則無罪福等破世(4)間事是故應捨

svabhāvaparīkṣā nāma pañcadaśamaṃ prakaraṇaṃ ||

rang bzhin brtag pa zhes bya ba ste rab tu byed pa bco lnga pa’o ||

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