Bibliotheca Polyglotta

Nāgārjuna: Vigrahavyāvartanīvṛtti

Complete text

kiṃ cānyat | sata eva pratiṣedho nāsti ghaṭo geha ity ayaṃ yasmāt |
dṛṣṭaḥ pratiṣedho ’yaṃ sataḥ svabhāvasya te tasmāt ||11||

又復有義偈言
法若有自體可得遮諸法
諸法若無體竟為何所遮
如有瓶有？可得遮瓶？
見有物則遮見無物不遮

’di ltar gźan yaṅ |
gaṅ phyir khyim na bum pa de || med ces yod pa ñid la ’gog |
| mthoṅ ste de phyir khyod kyis ’di || yod pa’i raṅ bźin ’gog pa yin |

Furthermore: Since the negation ’There is no pot in the house’ is seen to be only of an existent, this negation of yours is that of an existent intrinsic nature.

iha ca sato ’rthasya pratiṣedhaḥ kriyate nāsataḥ | tadyathā nāstighaṭo geha iti sato ghaṭasya pratiṣedhaḥ kriyate nāsataḥ | evam eva nāsti svabhāvo dharmāṇāṃ iti sataḥ svabhāvasya pratiṣedhaḥ prāpnoti nāsataḥ | tatra yad uktaṃ niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā iti tad na | pratisedhasaṃbhāvād eva sarvabhāvasvabhāvo ’pratiṣiddhaḥ |

此偈明何義有物得遮無物不遮如無瓶？則不須遮有瓶得遮無瓶不遮如是如是法無自體則不須遮法有自體可得有遮無云何處若一切法皆無自體而便遮言一切諸法無自體者義不相應汝何所遮若有遮體能遮一切諸法自體

’di la don yod pa la ’gog par byed kyi | med pa la ni ma yin te | dper na khyim na bum pa med ces bya ba lta bu ste | bum pa yod pa la ’gog pa yin gyi | med pa la ni ma yin no || de bźin du chos rnams kyi raṅ bźin med do źes bya ba yaṅ raṅ bźin yod pa la ’gog par || ’gyur ba yin gyi | med pa la ni ma yin pas de la chos thams cad kyi raṅ bźin med do źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de mi ruṅ ṅo || ’di ltar gźan yaṅ ’gog pa yod pa ñid kyi phyir dṅos po thams cad kyi raṅ bźin rab tu grub pa yin no ||

It is only an existent object that is negated, not a non-existent one, For instance, when it is said: ‘There is no pot in the house’, it is an existent pot that is negated, not a non-existent one. In like manner it follows that the negation ‘The things have no intrinsic nature’ is the negation of an existent intrinsic nature, not of a non-existent one. In these circumstances, the statement that all things are devoid of an intrinsic nature is not valid. By the very fact that a negation is possible, the intrinsic nature of all things is non-negated.

kiṃ cānyat | atha nāsti sa svabhāvaḥ kiṃ nu pratiṣidhyate tvayānena | vacanena rte vacanāt pratiṣedhaḥ sidhyate hy asataḥ ||12||

偈言若法無自體言語何所遮
若無法得遮無語亦成遮

| ji ltar raṅ bźin de med na || khyod kyi tshig des ci źig dgag |
| med pa yin na tshig med par || ’gog par rab tu grub pa yin |

If that intrinsic nature does not exist, what, then, do you negate by this statement? The negation of a non-existent is established without words.

atha nāsty eva sa svabhāvo ’nena vacanena niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā iti kiṃ bhavatā pratiṣidhyate | asato hi vacanād vinā siddhaḥ pratiṣedhaḥ, tadyathāgneḥ śaityasya, apām auṣṇyasya |

此偈明何義若法無體語亦無體云何遮言一切諸法皆無自體若如是遮不說言語亦得成遮若如是者火冷水堅如是等過

ji ste raṅ bźin de med pa ñid yin na ni | dṅos po thams cad raṅ bźin med do źes bya ba’i tshig ’dis khyod kyis ci źig ’gog par byed | ’di ltar med pa la ni tshig med par yaṅ ’gog par ’grub ste | ji ltar me la graṅ ba ñid daṅ | chu la tsha ba ñid lta bu’o ||

If that intrinsic nature does not really exist, what do you negate by this statement: ‘All things are devoid of an intrinsic nature’? The negation of a non-existent, e.g., that of the coolness of fire or of the heat of water is established without words. Furthermore:

kiṃ cānyat | bālānām iva mithyā mṛgatṛṣṇāyāṃ yathājalagrāhaḥ |
evaṃ mithyāgrāhaḥ syāt te pratiṣedhyato hy asataḥ ||13||

又復有義偈言
如愚癡之人妄取炎為水
若汝遮妄取其事亦如是

’di ltar gźan yaṅ |
byis pa rnams ni smig rgyu la || ji ltar log par chur ’dzin ltar |
| de bźin khyod kyis log par ’dzin || yod par min la dgag par bya |

Just as ignorant people wrongly perceive a mirage as water, [and that wrong perception is removed by some person who knows, in like manner you may think that] you negate a wrong perception of a non-entity.

syāt te buddhiḥ, yathā bālānāṃ mṛgatṛṣṇāyāṃ mithyā jalam iti grāho bhavati, nanu nirjalā sā mṛgatṛṣṇeti tatra paṇḍitajātīyena_puruṣeṇocyate tasya grāhasya vinivartanārtham, evaṃ niḥsvabhāveṣu yaḥ svabhāve grāhaḥ sattvānāṃ tasya vyāvartanārthaṃ niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā ity ucyata iti, atra brūmaḥ |

此偈明何義若汝意謂如愚癡人取炎為水於無水中虛妄取水有黠慧人為迥彼心而語之言汝妄取水如是如是於無自體一切法中取法自體為彼眾生妄心迥故說一切法皆無自體此我今說偈言

khyod kyi blo la ji ltar byis pa rnams smig rgyu la log par chur ’dzin pa na | de skyes bu mkhas pa’i raṅ bźin can gyis ’dzin pa de bzlog pa’i phyir de na chu med kyi | de ni smig rgyu’o źes zer ba de bźin du raṅ bźin med pa rnams la sems can rnams kyi raṅ bźin du ’dzin pa gaṅ yin pa de bzlog pa’i phyir dṅos po thams cad ni raṅ bźin med pa’o źes bya ba’o sñam du sems na | ’dir smra bar bya ste |

When ignorant people wrongly perceive a mirage as water, a scholarly person, in order to remove that perception, says: ‘But that mirage is without water’. Likewise, you may think that the statement ‘All things are devoid of an intrinsic nature’ is meant for removing people’s perception of an intrinsic nature in things that are devoid of an intrinsic nature. To this we reply:

nanv evaṃ saty asti grāho grāhyaṃ catad grahītā ca |
pratiṣedhaḥ pratiṣedhyaṃ pratiṣeddhāceti ṣaṭkaṃ tat ||14||

取所取能取遮所遮能
遮如是六種義皆悉是有法

| de lta na ni ’dzin pa daṅ || gzuṅ ba ’dzin pa po de daṅ |
| ’gog pa dgag bya ’gog pa po || de drug yod pa ma yin nam |

But this being so, the aggregate of the six following things exists: the perception, the object to be perceived, the perceiver of that object, the negation, the object to be negated, and the negation.

yady evaṃ, asti tāvat sattvānāṃ grāhaḥ, asti grāhyaṃ, santi ca tad grahītāraḥ, asti pratiṣedhastasyāpi mithyāgrāhasya, asti pratiṣedhyaṃ yad idaṃ mithyāgrāho nāma, santi ca pratiṣeddhāro yuṣmad ādayo ’sya grāhasyeti siddhaṃ ṣaṭkaṃ | tasya ṣaṭkasya prasiddhatvād yad uktaṃ śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti tad na |

此偈明何義若當如是有眾生者有取所取有能取者得言虛妄遮所遮等如是六種義成若六義成而說諸一切空者是義不然偈言

6 gal te de lta na ni re źig sems can rnams kyi ’dzin pa yaṅ yod pa daṅ | gzuṅ ba yod pa daṅ | de ’dzin pa po yod pa daṅ | log par ’dzin pa de ’gog pa yaṅ yod pa daṅ | dgag par bya ba log par ’dzin pa de yaṅ yod pa daṅ | khyed la sogs pa ’dzin pa de ’gog pa po yaṅ yod de | drug tu grub pa ma yin nam | de drug tu gyur na ni | ma bkag pa ñid yin pa’i phyir daṅ dṅos po thams cad ni stoṅ pa’o źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de mi ruṅ ṅo ||

If this is so, then the perception of people, the object to be perceived, people who perceive it, the negation of that wrong perception, the object to be negated, viz., the wrong perception, and people like you who negate this perception - all these exist. The aggregate of the six is, therefore, established. [And] that aggregate of the six being established, your statement that all things are void is not valid.

atha naivāsti grāho naiva grāhyaṃ na ca grahītāraḥ |
pratiṣedhaḥ pratiṣedhyaṃ pratiṣeddhāro nanu na santi ||15||

若無取所取亦無有能
取則無遮所遮亦無有能遮

| ji ste ’dzin pa yod min źiṅ || gzuṅ med ’dzin pa po med na |
| ’o na ’gog daṅ dgag bya daṅ || ’gog pa po yaṅ yod min te |

You may think that there is no perception, no object to be perceived, and no perceiver. But, in that case, there is no negation, no object to be negated, and no negator.

atha mā bhūd eṣa doṣa iti kṛtvā naiva grāho ’sti naiva grāhyaṃ na ca grahītāra ity evaṃ sati grāhasya yaḥ pratiṣedho niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā iti so ’pi nāsti, pratiṣedhyam api nāsti, pratiṣeddhāro ’pi na santi |

此偈明何義若汝意謂無如量過非取所取非能取者彼若如是虛妄取遮一切諸法無自體者彼遮亦無所遮亦無能遮亦無偈言

ci ste skyon der gyur na mi ruṅ ṅo sñam nas ’dzin pa yaṅ med | gzuṅ ba yaṅ med ’dzin pa po yaṅ med do źe na | de lta na ni dṅos po thams cad ni raṅ bźin med do źes bya ba ’dzin pa ’gog pa gaṅ yin pa de yaṅ med la | dgag par bya ba yaṅ med | ’gog pa po yaṅ med par ’gyur te |

If, in order to avoid this defect, you say that there is no perception, no object to be perceived, and no perceiver, then even the negation of the perception, viz., the statement that all things are void, does not exist. The object to be negated and the negators, too, do not exist.

pratiṣedhaḥ pratiṣedhyaṃ pratiṣeddhāraś ca yady uta na santi |
siddhā hi sarvabhāvās teṣām eva svabhāvaś ca ||16||

若無遮所遮亦無有能遮
則一切法成彼自體亦成

| gal te ’gog daṅ dgag bya daṅ || ’gog pa po yaṅ yod min na |
| dṅos po kun daṅ de rnams kyi || raṅ bźin ñid kyaṅ grub yin na |

And if there is no negation, no object to be negated and no negator, then all things are established, as well as their intrinsic nature.

yadi ca na pratiṣedho na pratiṣedhyaṃ na pratiṣeddhāraḥ santyapratiṣiddhāḥ sarvabhāvā asti ca sarvabhāvānāṃ svabhāvaḥ |

此偈明何義若非有遮非有所遮非有能遮是則不遮一切諸法則一切法皆有自體

gal te ’gog pa yaṅ med | dgag par bya ba yaṅ med | ’gog pa po yaṅ med na ni | dṅos po thams cad kyaṅ ma bkag par yod la | dṅos po rnams kyi raṅ bźin yaṅ yod do ||

And if there is no negation, no object to be negated, and no negator, then all things are non-negated, and they have an intrinsic nature.

kiṃ cānyat | hetoś ca te na siddhir naiḥ svābhāvyāt kuto hi te hetuḥ |
nirhetukasya siddhir na copapannāsya te ’rthasya ||17||

偈言
汝因則不成無體云何因
若法無因者云何得言成

’di ltar gźan yaṅ |
khyod la gtan tshigs ma grub ste || raṅ bźin med phyir khyod gtan tshigs || ṅa la yaṅ źes bya ba ni ṅed la yaṅ ṅo |
| gaṅ la yod de khyod don te || gtan tshigs med phyir grub mi ’thad |

Furthermore:Your ‘reason’ [for establishing your thesis] cannot be established. How can there be, indeed, a ‘reason’ for you, when everything is devoid of an intrinsic nature? And this thesis of yours which is devoid of a ‘reason’, cannot be established.

niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā ity etasminn arthe te hetor asiddhiḥ | kiṃ kāraṇam | niḥsvabhāvatvād dhi sarvabhāvānāṃ śūnyatvāt tato hetuḥ kutaḥ | asati hetau nirhetukasyārthasya śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti kuta eva prasiddhiḥ | tatra yad uktaṃ śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti tad na |

此偈明何義若一切法空無自體如是義中說因不成何以故一切諸法空無自體何處有因若法無因一切法空以何因成是故汝說一切法空無自體者是義不然

dṅos po thams cad ni raṅ bźin med do źes bya ba’i don ’di la khyod kyi gtan tshigs ma grub ste | de ci’i phyir źe na | dṅos po thams cad ni raṅ bźin med pa’i phyir stoṅ pa ñid yin pas de’i phyir gtan tshigs ga la yod | gtan tshigs med na ni gtan tshigs med par dṅos po thams cad stoṅ pa’o źes bya ba’i don gaṅ la grub pas de la dṅos po thams cad stoṅ pa’o źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de mi ruṅ bo ||

Your reason for the thesis that all things are devoid of an intrinsic nature cannot be established. - Why? – Because all things, being devoid of an intrinsic nature, are void. How, therefore, can there be a reason? [And] if there is no reason, how indeed can the thesis devoid of a reason, namely that all things are void, be established? - In these circumstances, your statement that all things are void is not valid.

kiṃ cānyat | yadi cāhetoḥ siddhiḥ svabhāvavinivartanasya te bhavati |
svābhāvyasyāstitvaṃ mamāpi nirhetukaṃ siddham ||18||

偈言
汝若無因成諸法自體迥
我亦無因成諸法有自體

’di ltar gźan yaṅ || ṅa la yaṅ źes bya ba ni ṅed la yaṅ ṅo |
khyod la gtan tshigs med par yaṅ || raṅ bźin bzlog pa grub yin na || ṅa la yaṅ źes bya ba ni ṅed la yaṅ ṅo |
| ṅa la ’aṅ gtan tshigs med par ni || raṅ bźin ñid ni yod par ’grub |

Moreover: If your negation of the intrinsic nature is established without any reason, my affirmation of the things’ being endowed with an intrinsic nature is also established without any reason.

atha manyase nirhetukī siddhir niḥsvabhāvatvasya bhāvānām iti yathā tava svabhāvavinivartanaṃ nirhetukaṃ siddhaṃ tathā mamāpi svabhāvasadbhāvo nirhetukaḥ siddhaḥ |

此偈明何義若汝意謂我無因成法無自體如汝無因自體迥成我自體法亦無因成偈言

ci ste de la gtan tshigs med par yaṅ dṅos po rnams kyi raṅ bźin med par ’grub po sñam du sems na | ji ltar khyod la gtan tshigs med par raṅ bźin bzlog pa grub pa de bźin du | ṅa la yaṅ gtan tshigs med par dṅos po’i raṅ bźin yod par ’grub bo || ṅa la yaṅ źes bya ba ni ṅed la yaṅ ṅo |

atha hetor astitvaṃ bhāvāsvābhāvyam ity anupapannam |
lokeṣu niḥsvabhāvo na hi kaścana vidyate bhāvaḥ ||19||

若有因無體是義不相應
世間無體法則不得言有

| gal te gtan tshigs yod na dṅos || raṅ bźin med ces bya mi ’thad |
| ’jig rten na ni raṅ bźin med || dṅos po ’ga’ yaṅ yod min no ||

If you think that the fact that the things are devoid of an intrinsic nature is the existence of the reason, [we answer:] that argument is not valid.- Why? - Because there is nothing in the world that is existent, while being devoid of an intrinsic nature.

yadi hetor astitvaṃ manyase niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā iti, tad anupapannam | kiṃ kāraṇam | na hi loke niḥsvabhāvaḥ kaści bhāvo ’sti |

此偈明何義若汝意謂我有因成因無自體若如是者無自體義則不相應何以故一切世間無自體者

gal || te dṅos po rnams kyi raṅ bźin med pa ñid kyi gtan tshigs yod pa kho na’o sñam du sems na | de lta na ni dṅos po thams cad raṅ bźin med do źes bya ba mi ’thad do || ci’i phyir źe na | ’jig rten na raṅ bźin med pa’i dṅos po ’ga’ yaṅ yod pa ma yin no || ’di ltar raṅ bźin yod min na ||

kiṃ cānyat | pūrvaṃ cet pratiṣedhaḥ paścāt pratiṣedhyam ity anupapannam |
paścāc cānupapanno yugapac ca yata svabhāvaḥ san ||20||

不得言有 <偈言br />前遮後所遮如是不相應
若後遮及並如是知有體

| gal te ’gog sṅa dgag phyi źes || zer na ’thad pa ma yin la |
| ’phyi źiṅ cig car ’aṅ mi ’thad do || raṅ bźin med pa źes bya ba |

It is not possible to hold that the negation comes first and then the thing to be negated. Nor is it possible to hold that the negation comes after [the thing to be negated], or that they are simultaneous. - The intrinsic nature of the things is, therefore, existent.

iha pūrvaṃ cet pratiṣedhaḥ paścāc ca pratiṣedyam iti nopapannam | asati hi pratiṣedhye kasya pratiṣedhaḥ | atha paścāt pratiṣedhaḥ pūrvaṃ pratiṣedhyam iti ca nopapannam | siddhe hi pratiṣedhye kiṃ pratiṣedhaḥ karoti | atha yugapatpratiṣedhapratiṣedhya iti tathāpi na pratiṣedhaḥ pratiṣedhyasyārthasya kāraṇam, pratiṣedhyo na pratiṣedhasya ca, yathā yugapadutpannayoḥ śaśaviṣāṇayor naiva dakṣiṇaṃ savyasya kāraṇaṃ savyaṃ vā dakṣiṇasya kāraṇaṃ bhavatīti | tatra yad uktaṃ niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā iti tad na | atrocyate | yat tāvad bhavatoktaṃ sarveṣāṃ bhāvānāṃ sarvatra na vidyate svabhāvaś cet | tvadvacanam asvabhāvaṃ na nivartayituṃ svabhāvam alam iti || atra brūmaḥ |

此偈明何義若遮在前所遮在後義不相應未有所遮遮何所遮若遮在後所遮在前亦不相應所遮已成遮何能遮若遮所遮二法同時不相因緣遮不因所遮所遮不因遮皆有自體故則不得言遮如角並生各不相因左不因右右不因左如是若說一切諸法無自體者是義不然釋初分竟迥諍論譯上分第四釋曰如汝所說我今答汝汝說偈言若一切無體言語是一切言語自無體何能遮後體此偈我今答偈言

’dir gal te ’gog pa ni sṅa la dgag par bya ba ni ’phyi’o źe na | ’thad pa ma yin te | dgag par bya ba yod pa ma yin na gaṅ gi ’gog pa yin par ’gyur ro || ’on te ’gog pa ni ’phyi la dgag par bya ba ni sṅa’o źe na | de ’thad pa ma yin te | dgag par bya ba grub zin na | ci źig ’gog par byed | ’on te ’gog pa daṅ dgag par bya ba ’gog mñam mo źe na | de lta na yaṅ ’gog pa ni dgag par bya ba’i don gyi rgyu ma yin la | dgag par bya ba yaṅ ’gog pa’i ma yin te | dper na ri boṅ gi rva g-yas g-yon gñis mgo mñam du skyes pa lta bu ste | rva g-yas pa yaṅ g-yon pa’i rgyu ma yin pa | g-yon pa yaṅ g-yas pa’i rgyu ma yin pa lta bu yin pas de la dṅos po thams cad raṅ bźin med do źes pa gaṅ yin pa de mi ruṅ ṅo || ’dir bśad pa re źig khyod kyis | gal te dṅos po thams cad kyi || raṅ bźin kun la’aṅ yod min na || khyod kyi tshigs kyaṅ raṅ bźin med || raṅ bźin bzlog par mi nus so || źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de la bśad par bya ste |

It is not possible to hold that the negation comes first and then the thing to be negated. For, if the thing to be negated does not exist, of what is the negation? Nor is it possible to hold that the negation comes after the thing to be negated. For, if the thing to be negated is [already] established, what purpose is served by the negation? Now [if you say that] the negation and the thing to be negated are simultaneous, [we answer]: even in that way, the negation is not the cause of the object to be negated, nor is the object to be negated the cause of the negation, just as of the two horns, grown simultaneously, the right horn is not the cause of the left horn, nor is the left horn the cause of the right horn. - In these circumstances, your statement that all things are void is not valid.

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