Bibliotheca Polyglotta

If [it is true that] negation is only of an existent, then this voidness is established - for you negate the things’ being devoid of an intrinsic nature.

yadi sata eva pratiṣedho bhavati nāsato bhavāṃś ca sarvabhāvānāṃ niḥsvabhāvatvaṃ pratiṣedhayati, nanu pratisiddhaṃ sarvabhāvānāṃ niḥsvabhāvatvaṃ | tvadvacanena pratiṣedhasadbhāvān niḥsvabhāvatvasya ca sarvabhāvānāṃ pratiṣiddhatvāt prasiddhā śūnyatā |

此偈明何義法若有者則可得遮法若無者則不得遮汝難我言一切諸法皆無自體實如汝言一切諸法皆無自體何以知之以汝遮法無自體成若遮諸法無自體成得言一切諸法皆空偈言

1 || gal te yod pa kho na la ’gog par byed pa yin gyi | med pa la ni ma yin no || khyed kyaṅ dṅos po thams cad kyi raṅ bźin med pa ñid ’gog par byed pa yin pas ’o na dṅos po thams cad kyi raṅ bźin med pa ñid rab tu grub pa ma yin nam | khyod kyi gtan tshigs ’gog par byed pa yod pa’i phyir daṅ | dṅos po thams cad kyi raṅ bźin med pa ñid bkag pa’i phyir stoṅ pa ñid rab tu grub pa yin no ||

If negation is only of the existent and not of the non-existent, and if you negate the being-devoid of-an-intrinsic-nature of all things, then the being-devoid-of-an-intrinsic-nature of all things is established. Since, in virtue of your statement, negation exists’, and since the being-devoid-of-an-intrinsic-nature of all things has been negated, voidness is established.

pratiṣedhayase ’tha tvaṃ śūnyatvaṃ tac ca nāsti śūnyatvam |
pratiṣedhaḥ sata iti te nanv eṣa vihīyate vādaḥ ||62||

汝為何所遮汝所遮則空
法空而有遮如是汝諍失

| stoṅ ñid gaṅ la khyod ’gog pa’i || stoṅ ñid de yaṅ med yin na |
| ’o na yod la ’gog yin źes || smras pa de ñams ma yin nam |

Now, if’ you negate voidness, and if that voidness does not exist, then your position that negation is of an existent is abandoned.

atha pratiṣedhayasi tvaṃ sarvabhāvānāṃ niḥsvabhāvatvaṃ śūnyatvaṃ nāsti tac ca śūnyatvaṃ, yā tar hi te pratijña sataḥ pratiṣedho bhavati nāsata iti sā hīnā |

此偈明何義若一切法遮有自體若無自體彼得言空彼空亦空是故汝言有物得遮無物不遮義不相應

ci ste khyod dṅos po thams cad kyi raṅ bźin med pa ñid de | stoṅ pa ñid ’gog par byed la stoṅ pa de yaṅ med pa yin na | ’o na yod pa la ’gog par byed kyi med pa la ni ma yin no źes khyod kyis dam bcas pa gaṅ yin pa de ñams pa yin no ||

Now, if you negate the being-devoid-of-an-intrinsic-nature of all things, i.e. their voidness, and if that voidness does not exist, then your proposition that negation is of an existent and not of a non-existent, is abandoned’.

kiṃ cānyat | pratiṣedhyāmi nāhaṃ kiṃcit pratiṣedhyam asti na ca kiṃcit |
tasmāt pratiṣedhayasīty adhilaya eṣa tvayā kriyate ||63||

又復有義偈言
我無有少物是故我不遮
如是汝無理 ……橫而難成

’di ltar gźan yaṅ
| dgag bya ci yaṅ med pas na || da ni ci yaṅ mi ’gog go |
| de phyir ’gog par byed do źes || skur pa de ni khyod kyis btab |

Besides:I do not negate anything, nor is there anything to be negated. You, therefore, calumniate me when you say: ‘You negate’.

yady ahaṃ kiṃcit pratiṣedhayāmi tatas tad api tvayā yuktam eva vaktuṃ syāt | na caivāhaṃ kiṃcit pratiṣedhayāmi, yasmān na kiṃcit pratiṣeddhavyam asti | tasmāc chūnyeṣu sarvabhāveṣv avidyamāne pratiṣedhye pratiṣedhe ca pratiṣedhayasīty eṣa tvayā prastuto ’dhilayaḥ kriyata iti | yat punar bhavatoktaṃ atha nāsti sa svabhāvaḥ kiṃ nu pratiṣedhyate tvayānena | vacanena rte vacanāt pratiṣedhaḥ sidhyate hy asata iti || atra brūmaḥ |

此偈明何義若我如是少有物遮汝得難我我無物遮如是無物我無所遮如是無遮一切法空如是無物遮與所遮是故汝向如是難言何所遮者此汝無理……橫難我又復汝說偈言若法無自體言語何所遮若無法得遮無語亦成遮此偈我今答偈言

gal te ṅas ci źig ’gog par byed na ni de’i phyir khyod kyis de skad kyaṅ smra ba’i rigs na gaṅ gi phyir dgag par bya ba ci yaṅ med pas ṅa ni cuṅ zad kyaṅ ’gog par mi byed do || de’i phyir dṅos po thams cad stoṅ pa yin te | dgag par bya ba daṅ | ’gog par byed pa yod pa ma yin pa las ’gog par byed do źes khyod kyis skur pa thog tu ma bab pa de btab bo || gźan yaṅ khyod kyis | ci ste raṅ bźin de med na || khyod kyi tshig des ci źig dgag | med pa yin na tshig med par || ’gog pa rab tu grub pa yin || źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de ’di la bśad par bya ste |

Even that you could rightly say, if I negated something. I, however, do not negate anything, for there is nothing to be negated. Thus, while, all things being void, there is neither a thing to be negated nor a negation, you make an absurd calumny when you say: ‘You negate’.

yac cāha rte vacanād asataḥ pratiṣedhavacanasiddhir iti |
atra jñāpayate vāg asad iti tad na pratinihanti ||64||

汝言語法別此義我今說
無法得說語而我則無過

| tshig med par yaṅ med pa yi || ’gog pa ’grub par ’gyur źes pa |
| de la tshig ni med ces par || go bar byed kyi skye sel min |

Regarding your assertion that the statement of the negation of the non-existent is established without words, we observe: Here speech makes it known as n on-existent, it does not deny it.

yac ca bhavān bravīti, ṛte ’pi vacanād asataḥ pratiṣedhaḥ prasiddhaḥ, tatra kiṃ niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā ity etat tvadvacanaṃ karotīti, atra brūmaḥ | niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāva ity etat khalu vacanaṃ na niḥsvabhāvān eva sarvabhāvān karoti | kiṃ tv asati svabhāve bhāvā niḥsvabhāvā iti jñāpayati | tadyathā kaścid brūyād avidyamānagṛhe devadatte ’sti gṛhe devadatta iti | tatrainaṃ kaścit pratibrūyān nāstīti | na tad vacanaṃ devadattasyāsadbhāvaṃ karoti kiṃ tu jñapayati kevalam asaṃbhavaṃ gṛhe devadattasya | tadvan nāsti svabhāvo bhāvānām ity etad vacanaṃ na bhāvānāṃ niḥsvabhāvatvaṃ karoti kiṃtu sarvabhāveṣu svabhāvasyābhāvaṃ jñāpayati | tatra yad bhavatoktaṃ kiṃ asati svabhāve nāsti svabhāva ity etad vacanaṃ karoti, ṛte ’pi vacanāt prasiddhaḥ svabhāvasyābhāva iti tan na yuktaṃ | anyac ca | bālānām iva mithyā mṛgatṛṣṇāyāṃ yathājalagrāhaḥ | evaṃ mithyāgrāhaḥ syāt te pratiṣedhyato hy asataḥ || ity ādayo yā punaś catasro gāthā bhavatoktā atra brūmaḥ

此偈明何義若汝說言無有言語亦成遮者隨何等法彼一切法皆無自體說彼諸法無自體語非此言語作無自體此我今答若說諸法無自體語此語非作無自體法又復有義以無法體知無法體以有法體知有法體譬如屋中實無天得有人問言有天得不答者言有復有言無答言無者語言不能於彼屋中作天得無但知屋中空無天得如是若說一切諸法無自體者此語不能作一切法無自體無但知諸法自體無體若汝說言若無物者則不得言法無自體以無語故不得成法無自體者義不相應又復汝說偈言如愚癡之人妄取炎為水若汝遮妄取其事亦如是取所取能取遮所遮能遮如是六種義皆悉是有法若無取所取亦無有能取則無遮所遮亦無有能遮若無遮所遮亦無有能遮則一切法成彼自體亦成此四行偈我今答汝偈言

khyod kyi tshig dag med par yaṅ ste | tshig ma gtogs par yaṅ med pa’i ’gog pa ’grub na | de la ci’i dṅos po thams cad raṅ bźin med pa yin no źes smras pa’i khyod kyi tshig des ci źig byed ces smras pa gaṅ yin pa ’di la bśad par bya ste | dṅos po thams cad raṅ bźin med pa’o źes bya ba’i tshig ’di ni dṅos po rnams raṅ bźin med pa ñid du byed pa ma yin gyi | ’on kyaṅ raṅ bźin med pa la dṅos po rnams raṅ bźin med pa’o źes go bar byed pa yin no || dper na ’ga’ źig na re lha sbyin khyim na med bźin du lha sbyin khyim na yod do źes zer ba daṅ | de ni de la kha cig na re med do źes zer ba na | tshig des lha sbyin med par mi byed kyi lha sbyin khyim na mi srid par ston pa ’ba’ źig tu zad do || de bźin du dṅos po rnams kyi raṅ bźin med do źes bya ba’i tshig de yaṅ dṅos po rnams kyi raṅ bźin med pa ñid du byed pa ma yin gyi | ’on kyaṅ dṅos po thams cad raṅ bźin med pa sgyu ma’i skyes bu daṅ ’dra bar skyes bu yaṅ dag pa’i ṅo bo daṅ bral ba rnams la rmoṅs pa’i phyir | byis pa skye bo ma rig pas rmoṅs pa rnams kyi raṅ bźin daṅ bcas pa ñid du sgro btags pa rnams la raṅ bźin yod pa ma yin par go bar byed pa yin pas de la raṅ bźin yod pa ma yin na tshig med par yaṅ ste tshig ma gtogs par yaṅ raṅ bźin yod pa ma yin par rab tu grub pa yin no || raṅ bźin med do źes bya ba’i tshig des ci źig byed ces khyod kyis smras pa gaṅ yin pa de rigs pa ma yin no || gźan yaṅ | byis pa rnams ni smig rgyu la || ji ltar log par chur ’dzin ltar || de bźin khyod kyis log par ’dzin || yod pa yin la dgag par bya || źes bśad pa la sogs pa yaṅ khyod kyis tshigs su bcad pa bźi smras pa gaṅ yin pa ’di la bśad par bya ste |

Regarding your statement: ‘The negation of the non-existent is established even without words; what purpose is, therefore, served by your statement “All things are devoid of an intrinsic nature” we observe: The statement: ‘All things are devoid of an intrinsic nature’, does not make all things devoid of an intrinsic nature. But, since there is no intrinsic nature, it makes known that the things are devoid of an intrinsic nature. Here is an example: While Devadatta is not in the house, somebody says that Devadatta is in the house. On that occasion, somebody tells him in reply: ‘He is not [in the house]’. That statement does not create Devadatta’s non-existence, but only makes known Devadatta’s non-existence in the house. Similarly the statement ‘things have no intrinsic nature’ does not create the being-devoid-of-an-intrinsic-nature of the things, but makes known the absence of an intrinsic nature in all things. - In these circumstances, your statement: ‘If there is no intrinsic nature, what purpose is served by the statement “There is no intrinsic nature”? The absence of an intrinsic nature is established even without words’, is not appropriate.

mṛgatṛṣṇādṛṣṭānte yaḥ punar uktas tvayā mahāṃś carcaḥ |
tatrāpi nirṇayaṃ śṛṇu yathā sa dṛṣṭānta upapannaḥ ||65||

汝說鹿愛喻以明於大義
汝聽我能答如譬喻相應

| smig rgyu’i dpe la khyod kyis khyod || ’gro ba chen pos smras pa gaṅ |
| der yaṅ ci nas dpe de ’thad || gtan la dbab la mñan par gyis |

You have introduced a great deliberation with the example of the mirage. Listen to the decision in that matter also, showing how that example is appropriate.

ya eta tvayā mṛgatṛṣṇādṛṣṭānte mahāṃś carca uktas tatrāpi yo nirṇayaḥ sa śrūyatāṃ yathopapanna eṣa dṛṣṭānto bhavati |

此偈明何義汝若說此鹿愛譬喻以明大義汝聽我答如喻相應偈言

khyod kyis smig rgyu’i dpe de la ’gro ba chen po smras pa gaṅ yin pa der yaṅ dpe de ci nas kyaṅ ’thad pa gtan la dbab pa gaṅ yin pa de ñon cig |

sa yadi svabhāvataḥ syād grāho na syāt pratītya saṃbhūtaḥ |
yaś ca pratītya bhavati grāho nanu śūnyatā saiva ||66||

若彼有自體不須因緣生
若須因緣者如是得言空

| gal te ’dzin de raṅ bźin yod || brten nas ’byuṅ bar mi ’gyur ro |
| ’dzin pa gaṅ źig brten nas ’byuṅ || de ñid stoṅ ñid ma yin nam |

If that perception were by its own nature, it would not be dependently originated. That perception, however, which comes into existence dependently is voidness indeed.If that perception were by its own nature, it would not be dependently originated. That perception, however, which comes into existence dependently is voidness indeed.

yadi mṛgatṛṣṇāyāṃ sa yathā jalagrāhaḥ svabhāvataḥ syān na syāt pratītyasamutpannaḥ | yato mṛgatṛṣṇāṃ ca pratītya viparītaṃ ca darśanaṃ pratītyāyoniśomanaskāraṃ ca pratītya syād udbhūto ’taḥ pratītyasamutpannaḥ | yataś ca pratītyasamutpanno ’taḥ svabhāvataḥ śūnya eva | yathā pūrvam uktaṃ tathā |

此偈明何義若鹿愛中妄取水體非因緣生汝喻相當鹿愛因緣彼顛倒見顛倒見者以不觀察因緣而生如是得言因緣而生若因緣生彼自體空如是之義如前所說

gal te smig rgyu la chu’o sñam du ’dzin pa raṅ bźin gyis yod pa źig yin na | rten ciṅ ’brel par ’byuṅ ba yin par mi ’gyur 1 || ba źig na | gaṅ gi phyir smig rgyu la yaṅ brten | phyin ci log gi lta ba daṅ | tshul bźin ma yin pa’i yid la byed pa la ma brten nas byuṅ ba de’i phyir rten ciṅ ’brel par ’byuṅ ba yin no || gaṅ gi phyir rten ciṅ ’brel bar ’byuṅ ba yin pa de’i phyir raṅ bźin gyis stoṅ pa yin te | sṅar ji skad bstan pa de daṅ ’dra’o ||

If that perception of a mirage as water were by its own nature, it would not be dependently originated. Since, however, it comes into existence in dependence upon the mirage, the wrong sight and the distracted attention, it is dependently originated. And since it is dependently originated, it is indeed void by its own nature - as previously stated.

kiṃ cānyat | yadi ca svabhāvataḥ syād grāhaḥ kastaṃ nivartayed grāhaṃ |
śéṣeṣv apy eṣa vidhis tasmād eṣo ’nupālambhaḥ ||67||

又復有義偈言
若取自體實何人能遮迥
餘者亦如是是故我無過

’di ltar gźan yaṅ
| gal te ’dzin pa raṅ bźin yod || ’dzin pa de la su źig bzlog |
| lhag ma rnams la’aṅ tshul de yin || de phyir klan ka de med do |

Furthermore:If that perception were by its own nature, who would remove that perception? The same method applies to the rest [of the things] too. Hence this is a non-criticism.

yadi ca mṛgatṛṣṇāyāṃ jalagrāhaḥ svabhāvataḥ syāt ka eva taṃ vinivartayet | na hi svabhāvaḥ śakyo vinivartayituṃ yathāgner uṣṇatvam apāṃ dravatvam ākāśasya nirāvaraṇatvaṃ | dṛṣṭaṃ cāsya vinivartanam | tasmāc chūnyasvabhāvo grāhaḥ | yathā caitad evaṃ śeṣeṣv api dharmeṣv eṣa kramaḥ pratyavagantavyo grāhyaprabhṛtiṣu pañcasu | tatra yad bhavatoktaṃ ṣaṭkabhāvād aśūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti tad na | yat punar bhavatoktaṃ hetoś ca te na siddhir naiḥ svābhāvyāt kuto hi te hetuḥ | nirhetukasya siddhir na copapannāsya te ’rthasyeti || atra brūmaḥ |

此偈明何義若鹿愛中取水體實何人能迥若有自體則不可迥如火熱水濕空無障礙見此得迥如是取自體空如是如是餘法中義應如是知如是等如取無實餘五亦爾若汝說彼六法是有如是得言一切諸法皆不空者義不相應又復汝說偈言汝因則不成無體云何因若法無因者云何得言成汝若無因成諸法自體迥我亦無因成諸法有自體若有因無體是義不相應世間無體法則不得言有此偈我今答偈言

gal te smig rgyu la chur ’dzin pa ’di raṅ bźin gyis yod pa źig yin na | de la sus kyaṅ bzlog par mi ’gyur te | ji ltar me’i tsha ba ñid daṅ | chu’i gśer ba ñid daṅ | nam mkha’i mi bsgrib pa ñid bźin du raṅ bźin ni bzlog par mi nus pa yin na de ni bzlog par yaṅ mthoṅ ṅo || de’i phyir ’dzin pa de raṅ bźin gyis med pa yin no || ’di ji lta ba bźin na gzuṅ ba la sogs pa chos lhag ma lṅa po rnams la yaṅ tshul de lta bur rtogs par bya ba yin pas de la drug tshan drug yod pa’i phyir dṅos po thams cad stoṅ pa ma yin no źes smra ba gaṅ yin pa de mi ruṅ ṅo || gźan yaṅ | khyod la gtan tshigs ma grug ste || raṅ bźin med phyir khyod gtan tshigs || gaṅ la yod do khyod don de || gtan tshigs med par ’grub mi ’thad || ces bya ba ’dir bśad par bya ste |

If the perception of water in a mirage were by its own nature, who indeed would remove it? For an intrinsic nature cannot be: e.g., the heat of fire, the fluidity of water, the openness of space’. Its removal, however, is seen. The intrinsic nature of the perception is, therefore, void. The same method is to be understood with regard to the rest of the things, viz., the five things beginning with the object to be perceived - In these circumstances, your statement that all things are non-void because of the existence of’ the aggregate of the six, is not valid.

etena hetv abhāvaḥ pratyuktaḥ pūrvam eva sa samatvāt |
mṛgatṛṣṇādṛṣṭāntavyāvṛttividhau ya uktaḥ prāk ||68||

此無因說者義前已說竟
三時中說因彼平等而說

| ’di la sṅa mas gtan tshigs med || lan btab bsgrub byar mtshuṅs phyir ro |
| sṅa ma smig rgyu’i dpes bzlog pa || bsgrub tshe smras pa gaṅ yin pa’o |

The case being the same, we have already answered by what precedes [the objection of] absence of reason, which was stated in [your] refutation of the example of the mirage.

etena cedānīṃ carcena pūrvoktena hetv abhāvo ’pi pratyukto ’vagantavyaḥ | ya eva hi carcaḥ pūrvasmin hetāv uktaḥ ṣaṭkapratisedhasya sa evehāpi carcayitavyaḥ | yat punar bhavatoktaṃ pūrvaṃ cet pratiṣedhaḥ paścāt pratiṣedhyam ity anupapannam | paścāc cānupapanno yugapac ca yataḥ svabhāvaḥ sann iti || atra brūmaḥ |

此偈明何義如是大義於前已說此則無因應如是知如是論義前因已說遮六種迥彼前論義今於此說又復汝說偈言前遮後所遮如是不相應後遮若俱並如是知有體此偈我今答偈言

da ltar gyi ’gro ba ’di dag daṅ sṅar bstan pas gtan tshigs med pa’i yaṅ lan btab par rigs par bya ste | sṅar gtan tshigs bstan pa drug tshan ’gag par byed pa’i ’gro ba gaṅ yin pa de ñid ’dir yaṅ ’gro bar bya ba yin no || gźan yaṅ | ’di ltar raṅ bźin yod min na || gal te ’gog sṅa dgag ’phyi źes || zer na ’thad pa ma yin la || ’phyi daṅ cig car mi ’thad do || źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa ’di la bśad par bya ste |

It should be understood that by the preceding deliberation we have also answered [the objection of] absence of reason. The same deliberation regarding the negation of the aggregate of the six, which was stated in the preceding reason, should also be considered here.

yas traikālye hetuḥ pratyuktaḥ pūrvaṃ eva sa samatvāt |
traikālyapratihetuś ca śūnyatāvādināṃ prāptaḥ ||69||

若說三時因前如是平等
如是三時因與說空相應

| dus gsum gtan tshigs gaṅ yod sṅar || lan btab de daṅ mtshuṅs phyir ro |
| dus gsum khyed kyi gtan tshigs ni || stoṅ ñid smra ba rnams la ruṅ |

We have already answered [the question relating to] the reason [for a negation] in the three times, for the case is the same. And a counter-reason for the three times is obtained for the upholders of the doctrine of voidness.

ya eva hetus traikālye pratiṣedhavācī sa uktotaraḥ pratyavagantavyaḥ | kasmāt | sādhyasamatvāt | tathā hi tvadvacanena pratiṣedhas traikālye ’nupapannapratiṣedhavat sa pratiṣedho ’pi | tasmāt pratiṣedhapratiṣedhye ’sati yad bhavān manyate pratiṣedhaḥ pratisiddha iti tad na | yas trikālapratiṣedhavācī hetur eṣa eva śūnyatāvādināṃ prāptaḥ sarvabhāvasvabhāvapratiṣedhakatvān na bhavataḥ | atha vā katham etad uktottaram | pratiṣedhayāmi nāhaṃ kiṃcit pratiṣedhyam asti na ca kiṃcit | tasmāt pratiṣedhayasīty adhilaya eṣa tvayā kriyate || iti pratyuktam | atha manyase triṣv api kāleṣu pratiṣedhaḥ iddhaḥ, dṛṣṭaḥ pūrvakālīno ’pi hetuḥ, uttarakālīno ’pi, yugapatkālīno ’pi hetuḥ, tatra pūrvakālīno hetur yathā pitā putrasya, paścāt kālīno yathā śiṣya ācāryasya, yugapatkālīno yathā pradīpaḥ prakāśasyety atra brūmaḥ | na caitad evam, | uktā hy etasmin krame trayaḥ pūrvadoṣāḥ | api ca yady evaṃ, pratiṣedhasadbhāvas tvayābhyupagamyate pratijñāhāniś ca te bhavati | etena krameṇa svabhāvapratiṣedho ’pi siddhaḥ |

此偈明何義若遮此因三時言語此先已答應如是知何以故因平等故如遮三時彼不相應彼語亦在遮所遮中若汝意謂無遮所遮猶故得遮我已遮竟此三時因與說空人言語相應又復云何先已說竟如向偈言我無有少物是故我不遮如是汝無理 ……橫而難我若汝復謂三時遮成見前時因見後時因見俱時因彼前時因如父以子後時因者如師弟子俱時因者如燈以明此我今說此不如是前說三種彼三種中一一復有三種過失此前已說復次第遮汝立宗失如是等自體遮成偈言

gtan tshigs dus gsum ’gog par byed pa źes bya ba gaṅ yin pa de ni lan btab zin te | gaṅ gi phyir źe na bsgrub par bya ba daṅ mtshuṅs pa’i phyir ro || ’di ltar khyod kyi tshig gis ’gog pa dus gsum du yaṅ mi ’thad par ’gyur ba’i ’gog pa bźin du dgag par bya ba yaṅ de yin no || de’i phyir ’gog pa daṅ dgag par bya ba med na ’gog pa bkag go sñam du khyod sems pa gaṅ yin pa de mi ruṅ ṅo || ’gog pa dus gsum la źes bya ba’i gtan tshigs dus gsum ’gog par byed pa źes bya ba gaṅ yin pa de ñid ni dṅos po thams cad ’gog par byed pa źes bya ba gaṅ yin pa’i phyir stoṅ pa ñid smra ba rnams la yod pa ñid yin gyi | khyod la ni med do || yaṅ na ’di ji ltar lan btab pa yin źe na | dgag bya ci yaṅ med pas na || ṅa ni ci yaṅ mi ’gog go || de phyir ’gog par byed do źes || skur ba de ni khyod kyis btab || ces lan btab pa yin no || ’on te dus gsum car du yaṅ ’gog pa grub pa yin pas te | sṅon gyi dus kyi rgyu daṅ | phyi ma’i dus kyi rgyu daṅ | cig car gyi dus kyi rgyu yaṅ mthoṅ bas so || de la sṅon gyi dus kyi rgyu ni ji lta bu’i pha bźin no || phyi ma’i dus kyi ni ji ltar slob dpon gyis slob ma bźin no || cig car gyi dus kyi ni ji ltar snaṅ ba’i sgron ma bźin no sñam du sems na de ni de lta ma yin par tshul ’di la skyon sṅar bstan zin to || gźan yaṅ gal te de lta yin na dgag pa srid par khyod kyis khas blaṅs la | de ni ma grub pas khyod kyis dam bcas pa yaṅ ñams pa yin no || rgyu ’dis raṅ bźin ’gog pa yaṅ grub pa yin no ||

It has to be understood that the question why a negation is possible in the three times has already received. -Why? -Because the reason is of the same nature as the thesis to be established. To explain: In virtue of your statement, a negation is not possible in the three times, and, like the negation, the thing to be negated, also, does not exist. Thus, there being no negation and no object to be negated, your opinion that the negation has been negated, is untenable. That very reason which expresses a negation of the three times is obtained for the upholders of the doctrine of voidness, for they negate the intrinsic nature of all things, - not for you. Or it has been answered in the following way: ‘I do not negate anything, nor is there anything to be negated. You, therefore, calumniate me when you say: “You negate”’. Now, if you think: the negation is established in all the three; we see the antecedent cause, the subsequent cause, and the simultaneous cause: antecedent cause, e.g., the father as the cause of the son; subsequent cause, e.g., the disciple as the cause of the teacher; simultaneous cause, e.g., the lamp as the cause of the light, - we reply: this is not so. For in this way are stated the three former defects. Moreover, if this is so, you admit the existence of a negation, and you abandon your proposition. The negation of an intrinsic nature is also established in this way.

prabhavati ca śūnyateyaṃ yasya prabhavanti tasya sarvārthāḥ |
prabhavati na tasya kiṃ cin na prabhavati śūnyatā yasya ||70||

若人信於空彼人信一切
若人不信空彼不信一切

| gaṅ la stoṅ pa ñid srid pa || de la don rnams thams cad srid |
| gaṅ la stoṅ ñid mi srid pa || de la ci yaṅ mi srid do |

All things prevail for him, for whom prevails this voidness. Nothing prevails for him for whom voidness does not prevail.

yasya śūnyateyaṃ prabhavati tasya sarvārthā laukikalokottarāḥ prabhavanti | kiṃ kāraṇam | yasya hi śūnyatā prabhavati tasya pratītyasamutpādaḥ prabhavati | yasya pratītyasamutpādaḥ prabhavati tasya catvāry āryasatyāni prabhavanti | yasya catvāry āryasatyāni prabhavanti tasya śrāmaṇyaphalāni prabhavanti, sarvaviśeṣādhigamāḥ prabhavanti | yasya sarvaviśeṣādhigamāḥ prabhavanti tasya trīṇi ratnāni buddhadharmasaṃghāḥ prabhavanti | yasya pratītyasamutpādaḥ prabhavati tasya dharmo dharmahetur dharmaphalaṃ ca prabhavanti, tasyādharmo ’dharmahetur adharmaphalaṃ ca prabhavanti | yasya dharmādharmau dharmādharmahetū dharmādharmaphale ca prabhavanti | tasya kleśaḥ kleśasamudayaḥ kleśavastūni ca prabhavanti | yasyaitat sarvaṃ prabhavati pūrvoktaṃ tasya sugatidurgativyavasthā sugatidurgatigamanaṃ sugatidurgatigāmī mārgaḥ sugatidurgativyatikramāṇaṃ sugatidurgativyatikramopāyaḥ sarvasaṃ vyavahārāś ca laukikā vyavasthāpitāḥ | svayam adhigantavyā anayā diśā kiṃcic chakyaṃ vacanenopadeṣṭum iti | bhavati cātrayaḥ śūnyatāṃ pratītyasamutpādaṃ madhyamāṃ pratipadaṃ ca | ekārthāṃ nijagāda praṇamāmi tam apratimabuddham ||

此偈明何義若人信空彼人則信一切世間出世間法何以故若人信空則信因緣和合而生若信因緣和合而生則信四諦若信四諦彼人則信一切勝證若人能信一切勝證則信三寶謂佛法僧若信因緣和合而生彼人則信法因法果若人能信法因法果彼人則信非法因果若人能信法因法果信非法因信非法果則信煩惱煩惱和合煩惱法物彼人如是一切皆信如是前說彼人則信善行惡行若人能信善行惡行彼人則信善惡行法若人能信善惡行法則知方便過三惡道彼人如是能信一切世間諸法如是無量不可說盡空自體因緣三一中道說我歸命禮彼無上大智慧

gaṅ la stoṅ ñid ’di srid pa de la ’jig rten pa daṅ | ’jig rten las ’das pa’i don thams cad srid pa yin no || ci’i phyir źe na | gaṅ la srid pa de la rten ciṅ ’brel par ’byuṅ ba daṅ | ’phags pa’i bden pa bźi daṅ | dge || sbyoṅ gi ’bras bu daṅ | khyad par du rtogs pa thams cad srid do || gaṅ la khyad par du rtogs pa thams cad srid pa de la dkon mchog gsum po || saṅs rgyas daṅ | chos daṅ | dge ’dun srid do || gaṅ la rten ciṅ ’brel bar ’byuṅ pa srid pa de la chos daṅ | chos kyi rgyu daṅ | chos kyi ’bras bu daṅ | chos ma yin pa daṅ | chos ma yin pa’i rgyu daṅ | chos ma yin pa’i ’bras bu srid do || gaṅ la chos daṅ | chos ma yin pa daṅ | rgyu daṅ ’bras bu srid pa de la ñon moṅs pa daṅ ñon moṅs pa kun ’byuṅ ba daṅ | ñon moṅs pa’i gźi rnams srid do || gaṅ la sṅar bstan pa de thams cad srid pa de la bde ’gro daṅ | ṅan ’gro rnam par gźag pa daṅ | bde ’gro daṅ | ṅan ’gror ’gro ba’i sems can daṅ | bde ’gro daṅ | ṅan ’gro las ’da’ ba daṅ | bde ’gro daṅ | ṅan ’gro las ’gro ba’i thabs daṅ | ’jig rten pa’i tha sñad thams cad rnam par gźag pa yin te tshig gis ji sñed cig bstan par nus pas phyogs ’dis raṅ gis rtogs par bya’o || ’dir yaṅ | gaṅ źig stoṅ daṅ rten ’byuṅ dag | dbu ma’i lam du don gcig par || gsuṅ mchog mtshuṅs pa med pa yin || saṅs rgyas de la phyag ’tshal lo ||

For whom this voidness prevails, for him all things - mundane and supramundane - prevail. - Why? - Because Dependent Origination prevails for him for whom voidness prevails. The Four Noble Truths prevail for him for whom Dependent Orignation prevails. The results of monastic life as well as all special acquisitions prevail for him whom the Four Noble Truths prevail. The Three Jewels, viz., the Buddha, the Dharma and the Saṃgha, prevail for him for whom all the special acquisitions prevail. For whom Dependent Origination prevails, for him merit, the cause of merit, the result of merit, demerit, the cause of demerit, the result of demerit, - all these prevail. For whom merit and demerit, the causes of merit and demerit and the results merit and demerit prevail, for him passion, the origination of passion, and the objective grounds of passion prevail. For whom all that prevails, for him the law concerning the happy and the unhappy states, the attainment of those states, the way leading to those states, the act of passing beyond those states, the means of passing beyond those states, and all worldly conventions are established. They are to be understood individually by each person, following this direction: a part [only] can be taught in words. I adore that incomparable Buddha who taught Voidness, Dependent Origination and the Middle Way as equivalent.

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