Bibliotheca Polyglotta

If my statement does not exist in the combination of the cause and the conditions, or independently of them, then the voidness of the things is established because of their being devoid of an intrinsic nature.

yadi madvaco hetau nāsti mahābhūteṣu saṃprayukteṣu viprayukteṣu vā, pratyayeṣu nāsty uraḥkaṇṭhauṣṭhajjihvādantamūlatālunāsikāmūrdhaprabhṛtiṣu yatneṣu, nobhayasāmagryām asti, hetupratyayasāmagrīvinirmuktaṃ pṛthag eva ca nāsti, tasmān niḥsvabhāvam, niḥsvabhāvatvāc chūnyam | nanu śūnyatatvaṃ siddhaṃ niḥsvabhāvatvād asya madīyavacasaḥ | yathā caitan madvacanaṃ niḥsvabhāvatvāc chūnyaṃ tathā sarvabhāvā api niḥsvabhāvatvāc chūnyā iti | tatra yad bhavatoktaṃ tvadīyavacasaḥ śūnyatvāc chūnyatā sarvabhāvānāṃ nopapadyata iti tad na |

此偈明何義若彼言語因中大中和合中無離散中無咖喉脣舌齒根？鼻頂等諸處皆各有力如是二處和合中無若離如是因緣和合更無別法以如是故無有自體無自體故我言一切皆無自體空義則成如此言語無自體空諸法如是無自體空是故汝言汝語空故不能說空是義不然

gal te ṅa’i tshig rgyu ’byuṅ ba chen po rnams daṅ mtshuṅs par ldan pa rnams daṅ | ldan pa ma yin pa rnams la yaṅ med | rkyen braṅ daṅ | lkog ma daṅ | mchu daṅ | lce daṅ | so’i thun daṅ | rkan daṅ | sna daṅ | spyi bo la sogs pa daṅ | ’bad pa rnams la yaṅ med | gñi ga tshogs pa la yaṅ med | rgyu daṅ rkyen tshogs pa la yaṅ med | rgyu daṅ rkyen tshogs pa las ma gtogs pa tha dad pa yaṅ med do || de’i phyir raṅ bźin med pa yin te | raṅ bźin med pa’i phyir stoṅ pa yin no źe na | ’o na ni ṅa’i tshig de stoṅ par grub ste | raṅ bźin med pa ñid yin pa’i phyir ro || ji ltar ṅa’i tshig de raṅ bźin med pa ñid yin pa’i phyir stoṅ pa yin pa de bźin du dṅos po thams cad kyaṅ raṅ bźin med pa ñid yin pa’i phyir stoṅ pa yin pas na de la khyod kyis tshig stoṅ pa yin pa’i phyir dṅos po thams cad stoṅ pa ñid du mi ’thad do źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de mi ruṅ ṅo ||

If my statement does not exist in its cause and in its conditions ..., it is devoid of an intrinsic nature and thus void. Now the voidness of this statement of mine is established because of its being devoid of an intrinsic nature. And just as this statement of mine is void because of its being devoid of an intrinsic nature, so also are all things void because of their being devoid of an intrinsic nature. In these circumstances, your statement: ‘Because of the voidness of your statement it is not possible to establish the voidness of all things’, is not valid.

kiṃ cānyat |
yaś ca pratītyabhāvo bhāvānāṃ śūnyateti sā proktā |br />yaś ca pratītyabhāvo bhavati hi tasyāsvabhāvatvam ||22||

又復有義偈言
若因緣法空我今說此義
何人有因緣彼因緣無體

’di ltar gźan yaṅ |
dṅos rnams rten nas byuṅ ba gaṅ || de ni stoṅ ñid ces bya daṅ |
| gaṅ źig rten nas ’byuṅ ba de || raṅ bźin ñid med yin par smra |

FurthermoreThat nature of the things which is dependent is called voidness, for that nature which is dependent is devoid of an intrinsic nature.

śūnyatārthaṃ ca bhavān bhāvānām anavasāya pravṛtta upālambhaṃ vaktuṃ tvadvacanasya niḥsvabhāvatvād bhāvānāṃ svabhāvapratiṣedho nopapadyata iti | iha hi yaḥ pratītyabhāvo bhāvānāṃ sā śūnyatā | kasmāt | niḥsvabhāvatvāt | ye hi pratītyasamutpannā bhāvās te na sasvabhāvā bhavanti svabhāvābhāvāt | kasmāt | hetupratyayasāpekṣatvāt | yadi hi svabhāvato bhāvā bhaveyuḥ, pratyākhyāpi hetupratyayaṃ ca bhaveyuḥ | na caivaṃ bhavanti | tasmān niḥsvabhāvā niḥsvabhāvatvāc chūnyā ity abhidhīyante | evaṃ madīyam api vacanaṃ pratītyasamutpannatvān niḥsvabhāvaṃ niḥsvabhāvatvāc chūnyam ity upapannam | yathā ca pratītyasamutpannatvāt svabhāvaśūnyā api rathapaṭaghaṭādayaḥ sveṣu sveṣu kāryeṣu kāṣṭhatṛṇamṛttikāharaṇe madhūdakapayasāṃ dhāraṇe śītavātātapaparitrāṇaprabhṛtiṣu vartante evam idaṃ madīyavacanaṃ pratītyasamutpannavān niḥsvabhāvam api niḥsvabhāvatvaprasādhane bhāvānāṃ vartate | tatra yad uktaṃ niḥsvabhāvatvāt tvadīyavacanasya śūnyatvaṃ, śūnyatvāt tasya ca tena sarvabhāvasvabhāvapratiṣedho nopapanna iti tad na |

此偈明何義汝不能解一切法空不知空義何能咎我如汝所言汝語言空語無自體無自體故不能遮法此法若是因緣生者生故得言一切法空得言一切皆無自體以何義故知因緣牲法無自體若法一切皆因緣生則一切法皆無自體法無自體則須因緣若有自體何用因緣若離因生則無諸法若因緣生則無自體以無自體故得言空如是我語亦因緣生若因生生則無自體以無自體故得言空以一切法因緣生者自體皆空如？瓶衣蕃等諸物彼法各各自有因緣世間薪草士所作器水蜜乳等將來將去及舉掌等又復寒熱風等障中諸受用法因緣生故皆無自體如是如是我語因緣和合而生如是得言無有自體若無自體如是得言無自體成如是空語世間受用是故汝言無自體故汝語亦空則不能遮諸法自體是義不然

khyod kyis ni dṅos po rnams kyi stoṅ pa ñid kyi don khoṅ du chud par khyod kyi tshig raṅ bźin med pa yin pa’i phyir | dṅos po rnams kyi raṅ bźin ’gog pa mi ’thad de źes klan ka tshol ba smra bar byed de | ’dir ni dṅos po rnams rten nas ’byuṅ ba gaṅ yin pa de ni stoṅ pa ñid yin no || ci’i phyir źe na | raṅ bźin med pa ñid yin pa’i phyir ro || dṅos po gaṅ dag rten ciṅ ’brel bar ’byuṅ ba de dag ni raṅ bźin daṅ bcas pa ma yin te | raṅ bźin med pa’i phyir || ci’i phyir źe na | rgyu daṅ rkyen la ltos pa daṅ bcas pa’i phyir ro || gal te dṅos po rnams raṅ bźin gyis yod pa ni rgyu daṅ rkyen med kyaṅ yod par ’gyur ba źig na | de ltar yaṅ ma yin pas de’i phyir raṅ bźin med pa yin te | des na stoṅ pa’o || źes bya bar ’thad do || de bźin du ṅa’i tshig kyaṅ rten ciṅ ’brel bar ’byuṅ ba yin te | de’i phyir raṅ bźin med do || raṅ bźin med pa ñid yin pa’i phyir stoṅ pa’o źes bya bar ’thad pa yin no || ji ltar bum pa daṅ snam bu la sogs pa rten ciṅ ’brel bar ’byuṅ ba ñid yin pa’i phyir raṅ bźin stoṅ pa yin pa sbraṅ rtse daṅ | chu daṅ | ’o thug ’dzin pa daṅ | len pa daṅ | graṅ ba daṅ | rluṅ daṅ | ñi mas yoṅs su skyob bar nus pa de bźin du ṅa’i tshig kyaṅ rten ciṅ ’brel par ’byuṅ ba yin pa’i phyir raṅ bźin med pa yin yaṅ dṅos po rnams raṅ bźin med par rab || tu sgrub par nus pa yin pas de la khyod kyi tshig raṅ bźin med pa ñid yin pa’i phyir dṅos po thams cad kyi raṅ bźin ’gog pa ’thad pa ma yin no źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de mi ruṅ ṅo ||

You have not understood the meaning of the voidness of the things. So you have set out to criticize me, saying: ‘Since your statement is devoid of an intrinsic nature, the negation of the intrinsic nature of the things is not valid’. That nature of the things which is dependent is voidness. - Why - Because it is devoid of an intrinsic nature. Those things which are dependently originated are not, indeed, endowed with an intrinsic nature; for they have no intrinsic nature. - Why? - Because they are dependent on causes and conditions. If the things were by their own nature, they would be even without the aggregate of causes and conditions. But they are not so. Therefore they are said to be devoid of an intrinsic nature, and hence void. Likewise it follows that my statement also, being dependently originated, is devoid of an intrinsic nature, and hence void. - But things like a cart, a pot, a cloth, etc., though devoid of an intrinsic nature because of being dependently originated, are occupied with their respective functions, e.g., carrying wood, grass and earth, containing honey, water and milk, and protecting from cold, wind and heat. Similarly this statement of mine, though devoid of an intrinsic nature because of being dependently originated, is engaged in the task of establishing the being-devoid-of-an-intrinsic-nature of the things. - In these circumstances, your statement: ‘Your statement, being devoid of an intrinsic nature, is void, and, being void, it cannot negate the intrinsic nature of all things’, is not valid.

kiṃ cānyat | nirmitako nirmitakaṃ māyāpuruṣaḥ svamāyayā sṛṣṭam |
pratiṣedhayeta yadvat pratiṣedho ’yaṃ tathaiva syāt ||23||

又復有義偈言
化入於化入幻入於幻入
如是遮所遮其義亦如是

| ’di ltar gźan yaṅ | sprul pa yis ni sprul pa daṅ || sgyu ma yis ni skyes bu yi |
| sgyu mas phyuṅ la ’gog byed ltar || ’gog pa de yaṅ de bźin ’gyur |

Furthermore:Suppose that a person, artificially created, should prevent another artificial person, or that a magic man should prevent another man created by his own magic [from doing something]. Of the same nature would be this negation.

yathā nirmitakaḥ puruṣo ’nyaṃ nirmitakaṃ puruṣaṃ kasmiṃścid arthe vartamānaṃ pratiṣedhayet, māyākāreṇa vā sṛṣṭo māyāpuruṣo ’nyaṃ māyāpuruṣaṃ svamāyayā sṛṣṭaṃ kasmiṃścid arthe vartamānaṃ pratiṣedhyate, tatra yo nirmitakaḥ puruṣaḥ pratiṣidhyate so ’pi śūnyaḥ | yaḥ pratiṣedhayati so ’pi śūnyaḥ | yo māyāpuruṣaḥ pratiṣidhyate so ’pi śūnyaḥ | yaḥ pratiṣedhayatiso ’pi śūnyaḥ | evam eva madvacanena śūnyenāpi sarvabhāvānāṃ svabhāvapratiṣedha upapannaḥ | tatra yad bhavatoktaṃ śūnyatvāt tvadvacanasya sarvabhāvasvabhāvapratiṣedho nopapanna iti tad na | tatra yo bhavatā ṣaṭkoṭiko vāda uktaḥ so ’pi tenaivapratiṣiddhaḥ | naiva hy evaṃ sati na sarvabhāvāntargataṃ madvacanaṃ, nāsty aśūnyaṃ, nāpi sarvabhāvā aśūnyāḥ | yat punar bhavatoktaṃ atha sasvabhāvam etad vākyaṃ pūrvā hatā pratijñā te | vaiṣamikatvaṃ tasmin viśeṣahetuś ca vaktavya iti || atrāpi brūmaḥ |

此偈明何義甘化丈夫於異化入見有去來種種所作而更遮之如幻丈夫於異幻入見有去來種種所作而便遮之能遮化入彼則是空若彼能遮化入是空所遮化入則亦是空若所遮空遮入亦空能遮幻入彼則是空若彼能遮空遮入亦空所遮幻入則亦是空若所遮空遮入亦空如是如是我語言空如幻化空如是空語能遮一切諸法自體是故汝言汝語空故則不能遮一切諸法有自體者汝彼語言則不相應若汝說言彼六種諍彼如是遮如是我語非一切法我語亦空諸法亦空非一切法皆悉不空又復汝說偈言若語有自體前所立宗壞如是則有過應更說勝因此偈我今答偈言

ji ltar sprul pa’i skyes bus sprul pa’i skyes bu źig don ’ga’ źig gi phyir ’oṅ bar byed pa la ’gog par byed pa daṅ | sgyu ma mkhan gyis phyuṅ ba’i sgyu ma’i skyes bus sgyu ma’i skyes bu gźan źig don ’ga’ źig gi phyir ’oṅ bar byed pa la ’gog par byed pa bźin te de la sprul pa’i skyes bu dgag par bya ba gaṅ yin pa de yaṅ stoṅ pa yin | ’gog par byed pa de yaṅ stoṅ pa yin sgyu ma’i skyes bu dgag par bya ba gaṅ yin pa de yaṅ stoṅ pa yin ’gog par byed pa gaṅ yin pa de yaṅ stoṅ pa yin pa de bźin du ṅa’i tshig stoṅ pas kyaṅ dṅos po thams cad stoṅ pa ñid du dṅos po thams cad kyi raṅ bźin ’gog pa ’thad pa na de la khyod kyi tshig stoṅ pa ñid yin pa’i phyir dṅos po thams cad kyi raṅ bźin ’gog pa ’thad pa ma yin no źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de ruṅ ba ma yin no || de la khyod kyis mu drug tu smras pa gaṅ yin pa de yaṅ de ñid kyis bkag pa yin te | de lta yin na thams cad kyi naṅ du ṅa’i tshig kyaṅ ma ’dus pa yin źiṅ mi stoṅ ba’aṅ ma yin la | dṅos po thams cad kyaṅ mi stoṅ ba ma yin no || yaṅ khyod kyis | ’on te tshig de raṅ bźin bcas || khyod kyi dam bcas sṅa ma ñams || mi ’dra ñid de de yin na || gtan tshig khyad par brjod par byos || źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa ’di la bśad par bya ste |

(not complete)There, the artificial man who is prevented is void, and he (the artificial man) who prevents is also void; the magic man who is prevented is void, and he (the magic man) who prevents is also void. In like manner, a negation of the intrinsic nature of all things by my statement is possible, even though this statement is void. In these circumstances, your statement: ‘Because of the voidness of your statement, a negation of the intrinsic nature of all things is not possible’, is not valid. In this way is also prevented the controversial discussion in six points that you spoke of. For, this being so, it is not true that my statement is not included in all things; there is nothing that is non-void; nor are all things non-void. Now about your statement [contained in v. 11 above]:

na svābhāvikam etad vākyaṃ tasmān na vādahānirme |
nāsti ca vaiṣamikatvaṃ viśeṣahetuś cana nigadyaḥ ||24||

言語無自體所說亦無體
我如是無過不須說勝因

| ṅa’i tshig de raṅ bźin med || de phyir smras pa ma ñams la |
| mi ’dra ñid kyaṅ med pas na || gtan tshigs khyad par bśad mi bya |

This statement is not endowed with an intrinsic nature. There is therefore no abandonment of position on my part. There is no discordance, and [hence] there is no special reason to be stated.

na tāvan mamaitad vacanaṃ pratītyasamutpannatvāt svabhāvopapannam | yathā pūrvam uktaṃ svabhāvānupapannatvāc chūnyam iti | yasmāc cedam api madvacanaṃ śūnyaṃ śeṣā api sarvabhāvāḥ śūnyāḥ, tasmānnāsti vaiṣamikatvam | yadi hi vayaṃ brūma idaṃ vacanam aśūnyaṃ śeṣāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ śūnyā iti tato vaiśamikatvaṃ syāt | na caitad evam | tasmān na vaiśamikatvaṃ | yasmāc ca vaiśamikatvaṃ na saṃbhavatīdam vacanam aśūnyaṃ śeṣāḥ punaḥ sarvabhāvāḥ śūnyā iti, tasmād asmābhir viśeṣahetur na vaktavyo ’nena hetunedaṃ vacanaṃ aśūnyaṃ sarvabhāvāḥ punaḥ śūnyā iti | tatra yad bhavatoktaṃ vādahānis te vaiṣamikatvaṃ ca viśeṣahetuś ca tvayā vaktavya iti tad na | yat punar bhavatoktaṃ mā śabdavad ity etat syāt te buddhir na ca etad upapannam | śabdena hy atra satā bhaviṣyato vāraṇaṃ tasyeti || atra brūmaḥ |

此偈明何義我此語言以因緣生非有自體如前所說自體不生故得言空如是得言此語言空餘一切法悉皆是空如是空故我則無過若我說言此語不空餘一切法悉皆空者我則有過我不如是是故無過理實不得語言不空餘一切法皆悉是空我以是故不說勝因若語不空餘一切法皆悉空者可說勝因是故汝言汝諍論壞語則有過應說勝因是義不然又復汝說偈言若謂如勿聲是義則不然聲有能遮聲無聲何能遮此偈我今答偈言

re źig ṅa’i tshig de ni rten ciṅ ’brel par ’byuṅ ba yin pa’i phyir raṅ bźin ’thad pa ma yin te | ji skad du | sṅar raṅ bźin ’thad pa ma yin pa’i phyir stoṅ pa yin no źes bśad pa lta bu’o || gaṅ gi phyir ṅa’i tshig de yaṅ stoṅ pa yin | dṅos po lhag ma rnams kyaṅ stoṅ pa yin pa de’i phyir mi ’dra ba ñid med do || gal te ṅa na re tshig de ni stoṅ pa ma yin la dṅos po lhag ma thams cad ni stoṅ pa yin no źes ’chad ba ni des na mi ’dra ba ñid du yaṅ ’gyur na | de na de lta ma yin pas de’i phyir mi ’dra ba ñid med do || gaṅ gi phyir tshig de ni stoṅ pa ma yin la dṅos po lhag ma thams cad ni stoṅ pa yin no źes mi ’dra ba ñid mi srid pa de’i phyir kho bos gtan tshigs des na tshig de ni stoṅ pa ma yin la | dṅos po thams cad ni stoṅ pa yin no źes gtan tshigs kyi khyad par bśad par mi bya ste | de la khyed kyis smras pa yaṅ ñams la | mi ’dra ba ñid kyaṅ yin pas khyad kyis gtan tshigs khyad par yaṅ brjod par byos śig ces smras pa gaṅ yin pa de mi druṅ ṅo || yaṅ | de sgra ma ’byin lta bu’o | źes || khyod blo sems ni de mi ’thad || ’di la sgra ni yod pa yis || ’byuṅ bar ’gyur ba de bzlog yin || źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa ’di la bśad par bya ste |

This statement of mine, being dependently originated, is not endowed with an intrinsic nature. As previously stated, since it is not endowed with an intrinsic nature, it is void. And since this statement of mine is void, just as all other things are void, there is no discordance. For, there would be a discordance [only] if we said: This statement is non-void, while all other things are void. We, however, do not say that. There is, therefore, no discordance. And since the following discordance, this statement is non-void while all other things are void, does not exist, we do not have to state the special reason: for this reason this statement is non-void while all [other] things are void. - In these circumstances, your statement: ‘There is on your part an abandonment of position, there is a discordance, and you should state the special reason’, is not valid. (noe english)

mā śabdavad iti nāyaṃ dṛṣṭānto yas tvayā samārabdhaḥ |
śabdena tac ca śabdasya vāraṇaṃ naivam evaitat ||25||

汝言勿聲者此非我譬喻
我非以此聲能遮彼聲故

sgra ma ’byin źes bya bźin źes || khyod kyis gaṅ brtsams dpe ’di min |
| de ni sgra yis sgra bzlog pas || ’di ni de lta ma yin no |

The example given by you: ‘It is like “Do not make a sound” is not appropriate. There a sound is prevented by another sound, but the case here is not just the same.

nāpy ayam asmākaṃ dṛṣṭāntaḥ | yathā kaś cin mā śabdaṃ kārṣīr iti bruvan śabdam eva karoti śabdaṃ ca pratiṣedhayati, tadvat tac chūnyaṃ vacanaṃ na śūnyatāṃ pratiṣedhayati | kiṃ kāraṇam | atra hi dṛṣṭānte śabdena śabdasya vyāvartanaṃ kriyate | na caitad evam | vayaṃ brūmo niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā niḥsvabhāvatvāc chūnyā iti | kiṃ kāraṇāṃ |

此偈明何義此非我喻如何人言莫作聲者彼自作聲以聲遮聲聲非不空我則不爾語言亦空遮法亦空何以故譬如彼聲能迥此聲我不如是我如是說一切諸法皆無自體以無自體故得言空何以故

’di ni ṅed kyi dpe ma yin te | ji ltar ’ga’ źig na re | sgra ma ’dzin źes de skad zer ba na sgra ñid ’byin ciṅ sgra zlog par byed pa ltar tshig stoṅ pa de ñid ’gog par mi byed do || ci’i phyir źe na | ’di la dpes sgra zlog par byed pa de ltar ’di ni ma yin te | ṅed ni dṅos po thams cad raṅ bźin med pa yin te | raṅ bźin med pa’i phyir stoṅ pa yin na źes ’chad do || ci’i phyir źe na |

This example, moreover, is not ours. That void statement does not prevent voidness as a person, when he says: ‘Do not make a sound’, makes a sound and at the same time prevents a sound. - Why? - Because, in this example, a sound is prevented by another sound. But the case here is not the same. We say: all things are devoid of an intrinsic nature, and hence void.- Why? -

naiḥsvābhāvyānāṃ cen naiḥsvābhāvyena vāraṇaṃ yadi hi |
naiḥsvābhāvyanivṛttau svābhāvyaṃ hi prasiddhaṃ syāt ||26||

若無體語迥無自體
則一切法皆成自體

| gal te raṅ bźin med ñid kyis || ji ste raṅ bźin med la bzlog |
| raṅ bźin med pa ñid log na || raṅ bźin ñid du rab grub ’gyur |

Because, if things devoid of an intrinsic nature were prevented by something devoid of an intrinsic nature, with the cessation of [their] being devoid of an intrinsic nature would be established [their] being endowed with an intrinsic nature.

yathā mā śabdaṃ kārṣīr iti śabdena śabdasya vyāvartanaṃ kriyate, evaṃ yadi naiḥsvābhāvyena vacanena naiḥsvābhāvyānāṃ bhāvānāṃ vyāvartanaṃ kriyate tato ’yaṃ dṛṣṭānta upapannaḥ syāt | iha tu naiḥsvābhāvyena vacanena bhāvānāṃ svabhāvapratiṣedhaḥ kriyate | yadi naiḥsvābhāvyena vacanena bhāvānāṃ naiḥsvābhāvyapratiṣedhaḥ kriyate naiḥsvābhāvyapratisiddhatvād eva bhāvāḥ sasvabhāvā bhaveyuḥ | sasvabhāvatvād aśūnyāḥ syuḥ | śūnyatāṃ ca vayaṃ bhāvānām ācakṣamahe nāśūnyatām ity adṛṣṭānta evāyam iti |

如言勿聲聲能遮聲如是如是無自體語遮無體法若如是遮無自體者則一切法皆成自體若有自體則一切法皆悉不空我說法空不說不空譬喻如是偈言

ji ltar sgra ma ’byin ces bya ba lta bu sgras zlog par byed pa de bźin du | gal te tshig raṅ bźin med pa ñid kyi dṅos po raṅ bźin med pa rnams la zlog par byed na ni des na dpe ’di ’thad par ’gyur ba źig na | ’dir ni tshig raṅ bźin med pa ñid kyi dṅos po rnams kyi raṅ bźin ’gog par byed do || gal te tshig raṅ bźin med pa ñid kyis dṅos po rnams kyi || raṅ bźin med pa ñid ’gog par byed na ni raṅ bźin med pa ñid bkag pa’i phyir dṅos po rnams raṅ bźin daṅ bcas par ’gyur la | raṅ bźin daṅ bcas pa’i phyir stoṅ pa ma yin par ’gyur ro || kho bo cag ni dṅos po rnams stoṅ pa ñid smra yi | stoṅ pa ñid ma yin par ni smra ba ma yin pas dpe ma yin no ||

This example would be appropriate if by a statement devoid of an intrinsic nature were prevented things devoid of an intrinsic nature - as by the sound: ‘Do not make a sound’ is prevented another sound. Here, however, by a statement devoid of an intrinsic nature is negated the intrinsic nature of the things. If by a statement devoid of an intrinsic nature were negated the things’ being devoid of an intrinsic nature, the things, by the very fact of being negated in their quality of being devoid of an intrinsic nature would be endowed with an intrinsic nature. Being endowed with an intrinsic nature, they would be non-void. We, however, declare that the things are void, not that they are non-void. This, therefore, is a non-example.

athavā nirmitakāyāṃ yathā striyāṃ strīyam ity asadgrāham |
nirmitakaḥ pratihanyāt kasyacid evaṃ bhaved etat ||27||

如或有丈夫妄取化女身
而生於欲心此義亦如是

| yaṅ na kha cig sprul pa yis || bud med la ni bud med sñam |
| log ’dzin ’byuṅ la sprul pa yis || ’gog byed ’di ni de lta yin |

Or suppose that an artificial person should prevent the false notion of somebody who with regard to an artificial woman thinks: ‘This is a woman’. This would be like that.

atha vā yathā kasyacit puruṣasya nirmitakāyāṃ striyāṃ svabhāvaśūnyāyāṃ paramārthataḥ strīyam ity asadgrāhaḥ syāt, evaṃ tasyāṃ tenāsadgrāheṇa sa rāgam utpādayet | tathāgatena vā tathāgataśravakeṇa vā nirmitako nirmitaḥ syāt | tathāgatādhiṣṭhānena vā tathāgataśrāvakādhiṣṭhānena vā sa tasya tam asadgrāhaṃ vinivartayet | evam eva nirmitakopamena śūnyena madvacanena nirmitakastrīsadṛśeṣu sarvabhāveṣu niḥsvabhāveṣu yo ’yaṃ svabhāvagrāhaḥ sa nivartyate | tasmād ayam atra dṛṣṭāntaḥ śūnyatāprasādhanaṃ pratyupapadyamāno netaraḥ |

此偈明何義如化婦女實自體空如或丈夫於化女身生實有想起於欲心彼虛妄取諸法亦爾彼或如來如來弟子聲聞之人為迥彼人虛妄取心或是如來威神之力如來弟子聲聞威力化作化人如是如是語空如化如化婦女無自體空法如是空取法自體能遮令迥如是如是以此空喻能成空義我則相應非汝相應偈言

yaṅ na ji ltar skyes bu kha cig sprul pa’i bud med raṅ bźin gyis stoṅ pa yin pa la don dam par bud med do sñam du log par ’dzin par ’gyur ro || de’i phyir de log par ’dzin pa des de’i ’dod chags bskyed pa la de bźin gśegs pa’am | de bźin gśegs pa’i ñan thos kyis sprul pa źig sprul la | des de’i log par ’dzin pa de zlog par byed do || de bźin du ṅa’i tshig stoṅ pa sprul pa lta bus dṅos po thams cad kyi raṅ bźin med pa sprul pa’i bud med daṅ ’dra ba dag la raṅ bźin yod par ’dzin pa gaṅ yin pa zlog par byed do || de bas na ’dir stoṅ pa ñid du rab tu bsgrub pa la dpe ’di ’thad pa yin gyi | cig śos ni ma yin no ||

Or suppose that in an artificial woman, void of an intrinsic nature, some man should have the false notion that it is really a woman and, as a result of that false notion, should feel desire for her. The Tathāgata or a disciple of the Tathāgata would [then] create an artificial man [and] the latter would dispel the false notion of that man, through the power of the Tathāgata or of the disciple of the Tathāgata. Likewise, by my void statement, comparable to the artificial man, is prevented the idea of an intrinsic nature in all things which are devoid of an intrinsic nature and comparable to the artificial woman. Thus, this is an appropriate example for establishing voidness, not the other one.

atha vā sādhyasamo ’yaṃ hetur na hi vidyate dhvaneḥ sattā |
samvyavahāraṃ ca vayaṃ nānabhyupagamya kathayāmaḥ ||28||

同所成不然響中無因故
我依於世諦故作如是說

| yaṅ na gaṅ phyir bsgrub bya daṅ || gtan tshigs ’di mtshuṅs sgra yod min |
| tha sñad khas rnams ma blaṅs par || ṅed cag ’chad par mi byed do |

Or this reason is similar in nature to the thesis to be established, for sound has no [real] existence. We do not speak, however, without having recourse to the conventional truth.

mā śabdavad iti sādhyasama evāyaṃ hetuḥ | kasmāt | sarvabhāvānāṃ naiḥsvābhāvyenāviśiṣṭatvāt | na hi tasya dhvaneḥ pratītyasamutpannatvāt svabhāvasattā vidyate | tasyāḥ svabhāvasattāyā avidyamānatvād yad uktaṃ śabdena hy atra satā bhaviṣyato vāraṇaṃ tasyeti tad vyāhanyate | api ca na vayaṃ vyavahārasatyam anabhyupagamya vyavahārasatyaṃ pratyākhyāya kathayāmaḥ śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti | na hi vyavahārasatyam anāgamya śakyā dharmadeśanā kartuṃ | yathoktaṃ vyavahāram anāśritya paramārtho na deśyate | paramārtham anāgamya nirvāṇaṃ nādhigamyata iti || tasmān madvacana vac chūnyāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvānāṃ ca niḥsvabhāvatvam ubhayathopapadyamānam iti | yat punar bhavatoktaṃ pratiṣedhapratiṣedho ’pyevam iti mataṃ bhavet tad asad eva evaṃ tava pratijñā lakṣaṇato dūṣyate na mameti || atra brūmaḥ |

此偈明何義若汝或謂如勿聲者因同所成何以故以因不離一切諸法無自體故非彼聲響而有自體以因緣生故無自體若無自體汝說聲有能遮聲者彼義則壞又我所說不違世諦不捨世諦依世諦故能工一切諸法體空若離世諦法不可說佛說偈言若不依世諦不得證真諦若不證真諦不得涅槃證此偈明何義如是諸法非是不空一切諸法皆無自體此二無異又復汝說偈言汝謂遮所遮如是亦不然如是汝宗相自壞則非我此偈我今答偈言

bsgrub par bya ba daṅ | sgra ma ’byin źes bya ba lta bu’o źes bya ba’i gtan tshigs ’di mtshuṅs pa kho na yin no || ci’i phyir źe na | dṅos po thams cad ni raṅ bźin med pa ñid du khyad par med pa ñid kyi phyir sgra de ni rten ciṅ ’brel par ’byuṅ ba ñid yin pa’i phyir raṅ bźin yod pa ma yin no || de lta bas na raṅ źin yod pa ma yin pa ñid kyi phyir | ’di la sgra ni yod pa yis || ’byuṅ bar gyur pa de bzlog yin || źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa bzlog pa yin no || gźan yaṅ tha sñad kyi bden pa khas ma blaṅs śiṅ ma brten par dṅos po thams cad stoṅ pa’o źes mi ’chad do || tha sñad kyi bden pa khas ma blaṅs par ni chos bstan par mi nus te | ji skad du | tha sñad la ni ma brten par || dam pa’i don la mi ston la || dam pa’i don la ma brten par || mya ṅan ’das pa mi rtogs so || źes gsuṅs pa lta bu’o || de lta bas na dṅos po thams cad kyi raṅ bźin med pa ñid du gñi ga ’thad pa na ṅa’i tshig bźin du dṅos po thams cad stoṅ pa yin no || yaṅ khyod kyis | ’gog pa’i ’gog pa’aṅ de lta źes || ’dod na de yaṅ bzaṅ min te || de lta na yaṅ khyod dam bcas || mtshan ñid skyon yod ṅed la med || ces smras pa gaṅ yin pa ’di la bśad par bya ste |

The reason ‘It is like ‘‘Do not make a sound’’’ is of the same nature as the thesis to be established - Why? - Because all things, being devoid of an intrinsic nature, are alike. That sound, being dependently originated, has no existence by its own nature. [And] since it has no existence by its own nature, your statement: ‘For here a sound that is existent prevents the other sound that will be’, is precluded. It is not, however, without having recourse to the conventional truth, it is not by rejecting the conventional truth, that we say: All things are void. For it is not possible to teach the absolute truth without having recourse to the conventional truth. As it is said: ‘The transcendent truth cannot be taught without having recourse to the conventional truth. [And] Nirvāṇa cannot be attained without realizing the transcendent truth’ Thus, all things are void like my statement, and that all things are devoid of an intrinsic nature, follows in both ways [i.e., both by virtue of the ‘reason’ and of the thesis to be established]’. Now about your statement [contained in v. IV]:

yadi kācana pratijñā syān me tata eṣa me bhaved dośa
nāsti ca mama pratijñā tasmān naivāsti me doṣaḥ ||29||

若我宗有者我則是有過
我宗無物故如是不得過

| gal te ṅas dam bcas ’ga’ yod || des na ṅa la skyon de yod |
| ṅa la dam bcas med pas na || ṅa la skyon med kho na yin |

If I had any proposition , then this defect would be mine. I have, however, no proposition. Therefore, there is no defect that is mine.

yadi ca kācin mama pratijñā syāt tato mama pratijñālakṣanaprāptatvāt pūrvako doṣo yathā tvayoktas tathā mama syāt | na mama kācid asti pratijñā | tasmāt sarvabhāveṣu śūnyeṣv atyantopaśānteṣu prakṛtivivikteṣu kutaḥ pratijñā | kutaḥ pratijñālakṣaṇaprāptiḥ | kutaḥ pratijñālakṣaṇaprāptikṛto doṣaḥ | tatra yad bhavatoktaṃ tava pratijñālakṣaṇaprāptatvāt tavaiva doṣa iti tad na | yat punar bhavatoktaṃ pratyakṣeṇa hi tāvad yady upalabhya vinivartayasi bhāvān | tad nāsti pratyakṣaṃ bhāvā yenopalabhyante || anumānaṃ pratyuktaṃ pratyakṣenāgamopamāne ca | anumānāgamasādhyā ye ’rthā dṛṣṭāntasādhyāś ceti || atra vayaṃ brūmaḥ |

此偈明何義若我宗有則有宗相若我有宗有宗相者我則得汝向所說過如是非我有宗如是諸法實寂靜故本性空故何處有宗如是宗相為於處宗相可得我無宗相何得咎我是故汝言汝有宗相得過咎者是義不然又復汝說偈言若彼現是有汝可得有迥彼現亦是無云何得取迥說現比阿含譬喻等四量現比阿含成譬喻亦能成此偈我今答偈言

gal te dam bcas pa ’ga’ źig yod na ni | des na khyod kyis ji skad smras pa bźin du || ṅa la dam bcas pa’i mtshan ñid khas blaṅs pa sṅon du soṅ ba’i skyon yod pa źig na ṅa la dam bcas pa ’ga’ yaṅ med do || de’i phyir dṅos po thams cad stoṅ pa gtan du ñe bar źi ba raṅ bźin gyis dben pa dag la dam bcas pa ga la yod | dam bcas pa’i mtshan ñid kyaṅ ga la yod | dam bcas pa’i mtshan ñid las byuṅ ba’i skyon yaṅ ga la yod de | de la khyod la dam bcas pa’i mtshan ñid kyis thob pa’i phyir khyod la skyon yod do źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de yaṅ med do || yaṅ khyod kyis | re źig dṅos rnams mṅon sum gyis || dmigs nas zlog par byed yin na || gaṅ gis dṅos rnams dmigs ’gyur ba || mṅon sum de ni med pa yin || rjes dpag luṅ daṅ dpes gźal daṅ || rjes dpag luṅ gis bsgrub bya daṅ || dpes bsgrub bya ba’i don gaṅ yin || mṅon sum gyis ni lan btab po || źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa ’di la bśad par bya ste ||

If I had any proposition, then the defect previously stated by you would be mine, because it would affect the specific character of my proposition. [But] I have no proposition. Thus [we observe:] When all things are void, perfectly appeased and by nature isolated, how can there be a proposition? How can something affect the specific character of a proposition? [And] how can there be a defect, caused by the fact of affecting the specific character of a proposition? - In these circumstances, your statement: ‘The defect is only yours because it affects the specific character of your proposition’, is not valid.

yadi kiṃcid upalabheyaṃ pravartayeyaṃ nivartayeyaṃ vā |
pratyakṣādibhir arthais tad abhāvān me ’nupālambhaḥ ||30||

若我取轉迥則須用現等
取轉迥有過不爾云何過

| gal te mṅon sum la sogs pa’i || don gyis ’ga’ źig dmigs na ni |
| bsgrub pa’am bzlog par bya na de || med phyir ṅa la klan ka med |

If I apprehended something with the help of perception, etc., then I would either affirm or deny. [But] since that thing does not exist, I am not to blame.

yady ahaṃ kiṃcid artham upalabheyaṃ pratyakṣānumānopamānāgamaiś caturbhiḥ pramāṇaiś caturṇāṃ vā pramāṇānām anyatamena, ata eva pravartayeyaṃ vā nivartayeyaṃ vā | yathārthamevāhaṃ kaṃ cin nopalabhe tasmān na pravartayāmi na nivartayāmi | tatraivaṃ sati yo bhavatopālambha ukto yadi pratyakṣādīnāṃ pramāṇānām anyatamenopalabhya bhāvān vinivartayasi nanu tāni pramāṇāni na santi taiś ca pramāṇair api gamyā arthā na santīti sa me bhavaty evānupālambhaḥ |

此偈明何義我若如是少有法物則須現比阿含譬喻如是四量復有四量我若如是取轉迥者我則有過我既不取少法轉迥若我如是不轉不迥汝若如是與我過者是義不然若現等量復有量成量則無窮汝如是義不能咎我

gal te ṅas mṅon sum daṅ | rjes su dpag pa daṅ | dpes ’jal ba daṅ | luṅ rnams kyis sam | tshad ma bźi rnams las gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ ba źig gis ’ga’ źig dmigs na ni || de’i phyir sgrub par byed pa’am | don bzlog par bya na ṅas don ji ltar yaṅ ma dmigs pas de’i phyir bsgrub par yaṅ mi bya | bzlog par yaṅ mi bya | de ltar gyur daṅ de la khyod kyis gal te mṅon sum la sogs pa rnams la tshad ma gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ bźig gis dṅos po rnams dmigs nas zlog par byed pa yin na | tshad ma de dag kyaṅ med | de dag gis khoṅ du chud par bya ba’i don yaṅ med pas źes klan ka smra ba gaṅ yin pa’i klan ka de ṅa la mi ’byuṅ ṅo ||

If I apprehended something with the help of the four pramāṇas, viz., perception, inference, identification and verbal testimony, or with the help of one of these, then only would I either affirm or deny. [But] since I do not even apprehend an object of any kind, I neither affirm nor deny. In these circumstances, your criticism: ‘If [you say that] you deny the things after having apprehended them through one of the pramāṇas, viz., perception, etc., [we reply:] those pramāṇas do not exist, nor do exist the objects to be apprehended through them’, does not concern me at all.

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