Bibliotheca Polyglotta

na svataḥ prasiddhiḥ pratyakṣasya tenaiva pratyakṣena, anumānasya tenaivānumānena, upamānasya tenaivopamānena, āgamasya tenaivāgamena | nāpi parasparataḥ pratyakṣasyānumānopamānāgamaiḥ, anumānasya pratyakṣopamānāgamaiḥ, upamānasya pratyakṣānumānāgamaiḥ, āgamasya pratyakṣānumānopamānaiḥ | nāpipratyakṣānumānopamānāgamānām anyaiḥ pratyakṣānumānopamānāgamair yathā svam | nāpi prameyaiḥ samastavyastaiḥ svaviṣayaparaviṣayasaṃgṛhītaiḥ | nāpy akasmāt | nāpi samuccyenaiteṣāṃ kāraṇānāṃ pūrvoddiṣṭānāṃ viṃśattriṃśaccatvāriṃśatṣaṭviṃśatyer vā | tatra yad uktaṃ pramāṇādhigamyatvāt prameyānāṃ bhāvānāṃ santi ca te prameyā bhāvās tāni ca pramāṇāni yais te pramāṇaiḥ prameyā bhāvāḥ samadhigatā iti tad na | yat punar bhavatoktam | kuśalānāṃ dharmāṇāṃ dharmāvasthāvidaś ca manyante | kuśalaṃ janāḥ svabhāvaṃ śeṣaṣvapyeṣa viniyoga iti || atra brūmaḥ |

此偈明何義如是量非自成現非現成比非比成喻非喻成阿含亦爾非阿含成比非比成喻非喻成阿含亦爾非阿含成非是自僚迭互相成現非比喻阿含等成比非現喻阿含等成喻非現比阿含等成阿含非現比喻等成非異現比譬喻阿含別有現比譬喻阿含異量來成如量自分和合不成自他境界和合不成非無因成非聚集成此之因緣如先所說二十三十或四五六二十三十四十五十或有六十若汝所說以有量故得言所量有量所量證一切法皆有自體義不相應又復汝說偈言智人知法說善法有自體世人知有體餘法亦如是出法出自體是聖人所說如是不出法不出法自體此偈我今答偈言

raṅ gis te mṅon sum ni mṅon sum de ñid kyis daṅ | rjes su dpag pa ni rjes su dpag pa de ñid kyis daṅ | luṅ ni luṅ de ñid kyis daṅ | dpes gźal ba ni dpes ’jal ba de ñid kyis rab tu mi ’grub la phan tshun gyis te | mṅon sum ni rjes su dpag pa daṅ | dpes ’jal ba daṅ | luṅ rnams kyis daṅ | rjes su dpag pa ni mṅon sum daṅ | dpe ’jal ba daṅ | luṅ rnams kyis daṅ | dpes ’jal ba ni mṅon sum daṅ rje su dpag pa daṅ | luṅ rnams kyis daṅ | luṅ ni mṅon sum daṅ | rjes su dpag pa daṅ | dpes ’jal bas kyaṅ ma yin la | raṅ gi ji lta ba bźin du | mṅon sum daṅ rjes su dpag pa daṅ | dpes ’jal ba daṅ | luṅ rnams kyis ni mṅon sum daṅ | rjes su dpag pa daṅ | dpes ’jal ba daṅ | luṅ gźan rnams kyis kyaṅ ma yin la | gźal bar bya ba raṅ daṅ gźan gyis bsdus pa mtha’ dag daṅ | re res kyaṅ ma yin la | rgyu med pas kyaṅ ma yin la | kun bsdus pas kyaṅ ma yin no || gtan tshigs sṅar bstan pa de dag ni | ñi śu’am | sum cu’am | bźi bcu’am | sum cu rtsa drug gis kyaṅ mi bsgrub na | de la gaṅ khyod kyis gźal bar bya ba’i dṅos po rnams ni tshad mas khoṅ du chud par bya ba yin pa’i phyir dṅos po gźal bar bya ba de dag kyaṅ yod la | khyod kyi tshad ma gaṅ dag gis dṅos po gźal bar bya ba dag yaṅ dag par khoṅ du chud pa’i tshad ma de dag kyaṅ yod do źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de mi ruṅ ṅo || gźan yaṅ khyod kyis | skye bo chos kyi gnas skabs mkhas || dge ba dag gi chos rnams la || dge ba’i raṅ bźin yin par ni || sems śiṅ lhag ma rnams daṅ yaṅ || źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de la bśad par bya ste |

Perception is not established by that very perception, inference is not established by that very inference, identification is not established by that very identification, and testimony is not established by that very testimony. Nor are they established by one another, i.e., perception by inference, identification and testimony, inference by perception, identification and testimony, identification by perception, inference and testimony, and testimony by perception, inference and identification. Nor are perception, inference, identification and testimony established, respectively, by another perception, another inference, another identification, and another testimony. Nor are the pramāṇas established by the prameyas, taken collectively or individually, each pramāṇa being established either by the corresponding prameya or by the other prameyas too. Nor are they established accidentally. Nor again are they established by a combination of the causes mentioned before, whatever their number: twenty, thirty, forty or twenty-six. -In these circumstances, your statement: ‘Because the things to be cognized are to be apprehended through the means of true cognition, those things to be cognized exist as well as those means of true cognition through which those things to be cognized are apprehended’, is not valid.

kuśalānām dharmāṇāṃ dharmāvasthāvido bruvanti yadi |
kuśalaṃ svabhāvam evaṃ pravibhāgenābhidheyaḥ syāt ||52||

若法師所說善法有自體
此善法自體法應分分說

chos kyi gnas skabs rab mkhas pa || dge ba yin ni chos rnams kyi |
| dge ba’i raṅ bźin smra ba gaṅ || de ltar rab phye brjod bya yin |

If people conversant with the state of things say that the good things have a good intrinsic nature, that has to be stated in detail.

此偈明何義若彼法師謂彼善法有自體者應分分說此善自體此之善法如彼善心善心自體如是如是一切諸法不如是見若如是說亦法自體義不相應

chos kyi gnas skabs la mkhas pa dge ba’i chos kyi dge ba’i raṅ gi ṅo bo sems pa de yaṅ khyod kyis rab tu phye ste | 7 ’di ni dge pa’i raṅ gi ṅo bo yin | ’di dag ni dge ba’i chos de dag yin te | ’di ni dge ba de rnam par śes pa yin | ’di ni dge ba de rnam par śes pa’i raṅ gi ṅo bo yin | de bźin du thams cad la bstan par bya ba yin no | de yaṅ de ltar ma bstan pas de’i phyir raṅ || gi ṅo bo ji lta ba bźin du chos rnams kyi raṅ gi ṅo bo bstan to źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de mi ruṅ ṅo ||

People conversant with the state of things think that the good things have a good intrinsic nature. But that has to be stated by you in detail: this is that good intrinsic nature; these are those good things; this is that good consciousness; this is that intrinsic nature of the good consciousness, and so on. This, however, is not seen to be soThus your statement that the intrinsic nature of each individual thing has been explained is not valid.

kiṃ cānyat | yadi ca pratītya kuśalaḥ svabhāva utpadyate sa kuśalānām |
dharmāṇāṃ parabhāvaḥ svabhāva evaṃ kathaṃ bhavati ||53||

又復有義
偈言若善法自體從於因緣
善法是他體云何是自體

’di ltar gźan yaṅ
| gal te dge ba’i chos rnams kyi || dge ba’i raṅ gi ṅo bo de |
| brten nas skye na de lta na || gźan dṅos raṅ ṅor ji ltar ’gyur |

Furthermore:If the good intrinsic nature originates dependently it is an extrinsic nature of the good things.How can it be thus their intrinsic nature?

yadi ca kuśalānāṃ svabhāvo hetupratyayasāmagrīṃ pratītyotpaduyate sa parabhāvād utpannaḥ kuśalānāṃ dharmāṇāṃ kathaṃ svabhāvo bhavati | evam evākuśalaprabhṛtīnām | tatrayad uktaṃ kuślānām dharmāṇāṃ kuśalaḥ svabhāvo ’py upadiṣṭaḥ, evam akuśalādīnāṃ cākuśalādir iti tad na |

此偈明何義若善法體從於因緣和合而生彼是他體善法云何得有自體如善法體餘亦如是若汝說言如彼善法善法自體如是不善不善體等義不相應

2 gal te dge ba’i chos rnams kyi raṅ gi ṅo bo ni rgyu daṅ rkyen tshogs pa la brten nas skye’o źe na | de gźan gyi dṅos po la brten nas skyes pa yin na | dge ba’i chos rnams kyi raṅ gi ṅo bor ji ltar ’gyur | mi dge ba la sogs pa dag la yaṅ de bźin du sbyar ro || de la gaṅ gi phyir dge ba’i chos rnams kyi dge ba’i raṅ gi ṅo bo yaṅ bstan la | de bźin du mi dge ba la sogs pa’i chos rnams kyi mi dge ba la sogs pa’i raṅ gi ṅo bo yaṅ bstan pa yin no źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de mi ruṅ ṅo ||

If the intrinsic nature of the good things originates in dependence upon the cause-condition complex, how can it, being born of an extrinsic nature, be the intrinsic nature of the good things? The same holds true of the bad and other things. – In these circumstances, your statement that the good intrinsic nature of the good things has been explained, as well as the bad intrinsic nature of the bad things, and so on, is not valid.

kiṃ cānyat | atha na pratītya kiṃcit svabhāva utpadyate sa kuśalānām |
dharmāṇām evaṃ syād vāso na brahmacaryasya ||54||

又復有義
偈言若少有善法不從因緣生
善法若如是無住梵行處

| ’di ltar gźan yaṅ
| ’on te dge ba’i chos rnams kyi || raṅ gi ṅo bo de ’ga’ la ’aṅ |
| ma brten skye na de lta na’aṅ || tshaṅs par spyod la gnas mi ’gyur |

Now, if [you think] that intrinsic nature of the good things originates without depending on anything, then there would be no practice of religious life.

atha manyase na kiṃcit pratītya kuśalānāṃ dharmāṇāṃ kuśalaḥsvabhāva utpadyate, evam akuśalānāṃ dharmāṇām akuślaḥ, avyākṛtānām avyākṛta iti, evam satyabrahmacaryavāso bhavati | kiṃ kāraṇaṃ | pratītyasamutpādasya hy evaṃ sati pratyākhyānaṃ bhavati | pratītyasamutpādasya pratyākhyānāt pratītyasamutpādadarśanapratyākhyānaṃ bhavati | na hy avidyamānasya pratītyasamutpādasya darśanam upapadyamānaṃ bhavati | asati pratītyasamutpādadarśane dharmadarśanaṃ na bhavati | uktaṃ hi bhagavatā yo hi bhikṣavaḥ pratītyasamutpādaṃ paśyati sa dharmaṃ paśyatīti | dharmadarśanābhāvād brahmacaryavāsābhāvaḥ | athavā pratītyasamutpādapratyākhyānād duḥkhasamudayapratyākhyānaṃ bhavati | pratītyasamutpādo hi duḥkhasya samudayaḥ | duḥkhasamudayasya pratyākhyānād duḥkhapratyākhyānaṃ bhavati | asati hi samudaye tat kuto duḥkhaṃ samudeṣyati | duḥkhapratyākhyānāt samudayapratyākhyānāc ca duḥkhanirodhasya pratyākhyānaṃ bhavati | asati hi duḥkhasamudaye kasya prahāṇān nirodho bhaviṣyati | [duḥkhanirodhapratyākhyānān mārgasya pratyākhyānaṃ bhavati] | asati hi duḥkhanirodhe kasya prāptaye mārge bhaviṣyati duḥkhanirodhagāmī | evaṃ caturṇām āryasatyānām abhāvaḥ | teṣām abhāvāc chrāmaṇyaphalābhāvaḥ | saty adarśanāc chrāmaṇyaphalāni hi samadhigamyante | śrāmaṇyaphalānām abhāvād abrahmacaryavāsa iti |

此偈明何義若汝意謂少有善法不因緣生如是不善不善自體無記無記自體若當如是無住梵行何以故汝若如是是則捨離十二因緣若當捨離十二因緣是則捨見十二因緣若如是無十二因緣則不得見十二因緣如其不見十二因緣不得見法世尊說言若比丘見十二因緣彼則見法若不見法不住梵行若離如是十二因緣則離苦集十二因緣是苦集故若離苦集是則離苦若無集候何處有苦若無苦者云何有滅若無苦滅當於何處修苦滅道若如是者無四聖諦無四聖諦則亦無有聲聞道果見四聖諦如是則證聲聞道果無聲聞果無住梵行

’on te dge ba’i chos rnams kyi dge ba’i raṅ gi ṅo bo ni ’ga’ la’aṅ ma brten par skye la | mi dge ba la sogs pa dag gi yaṅ de lta bu yin no sñam du sems na | de lta na ni tshaṅs par spyod pa la gnas par mi ’gyur ro || ci’i phyir źe na | de lta yin na ni rten ciṅ ’brel par ’byuṅ ba btaṅ ba yin no || rten ciṅ ’brel bar ’byuṅ ba gtaṅ ba’i phyir | rten ciṅ ’brel par ’byuṅ ba mthoṅ ba btaṅ ba yin te | rten ciṅ ’brel par ’byuṅ ba yod pa ma yin pa ni mthoṅ ba ste | dmigs par ’thad pa ma yin no || rten ciṅ ’brel par ’byuṅ ba mthoṅ ba med na | chos mthoṅ ba med pa yin no || bcom ldan ’das kyis ni dge sloṅ sus rten ciṅ ’brel bar ’byuṅ ba mthoṅ ba des chos mthoṅ ṅo źes gsuṅs so || 7 chos mthoṅ ba med pa’i phyir tshaṅs par spyod pa la gnas pa med pa yin no || yaṅ na rten ciṅ ’brel par ’byuṅ ba btaṅ bas sdug bsṅal kun ’byuṅ ba btaṅ ba yin te | sdug bsṅal kun ’byuṅ ba ni rten ciṅ ’brel par ’byuṅ ba yin pas so || sdug bsṅal kun ’byuṅ ba btaṅ bas sdug bsṅal btaṅ ba yin te | kun ’byuṅ ba med na gaṅ las sdug bsṅal kun ’byuṅ bar ’gyur | sdug bsṅal gtaṅ ba’i phyir daṅ | kun ’byuṅ ba gtaṅ ba’i phyir daṅ | sdug bsṅal ’gog pa btaṅ ba yin te | sdug bsṅal daṅ kun ’byuṅ ba gñis med na gaṅ źig spaṅs pas ’gog par ’gyur bas so || sdug bsṅal ’gog pa med na gaṅ źig thob par bya ba’i phyir sdug bsṅal ’gog par ’gyur ba’i lam du ’gyur | des na ’phags pa’i bden pa bźi dag med par ’gyur te | de med pa’i phyir dge sbyoṅ gi tshul gyi ’bras bu med par ’gyur te | bden pa mthoṅ ba las dge sbyoṅ gi tshul gyi ’bras bu rnams yaṅ dag par ’thob pas so || dge sbyoṅ gi tshul gyi ’bras bu rnams med pas tshaṅs par spyod pa la gnas par mi ’gyur ro ||

Now, if you think that the good intrinsic nature of the good things originates without depending on anything, and that the same is true of the bad intrinsic nature of the bad things and of the indeterminate intrinsic nature of the indeterminate things, then there is no practice of religious life. - Why? - Because, if this is so, one rejects Dependent Origination. By rejecting Dependent Origination, one rejects the vision of Dependent Origination. For if Dependent Origination does not exist, there can be no question of its vision. If there is no vision of Dependent Origination, there is no vision of Dharma. For the Lord has said:‘0 monks, he who sees the pratītyasamutpāda sees the Dharma’. [And] if one does not see the Dharma, there is no practice of religious life. Or, rejecting Dependent Origination, one rejects the origination of sorrow. For Dependent Origination is the origination of sorrow. By rejecting the origination of sorrow, one rejects sorrow. For, if there is no origination, how will that sorrow originate? If sorrow and [its] origination are rejected, then the cessation of sorrow is rejected. For if there is no origination of sorrow, what will come to cease through abandonment? [And] if the cessation of sorrow is rejected, the Way is rejected. For, if there is no cessation of sorrow, for obtaining what will there be a way to the cessation of sorrow? Thus, the Four Noble Truths will cease to exist. If they do not exist, there is no result of monasticism. For it is through the vision of [those.] Truths that the results of monasticism are attained. [And] if the results of monasticism do not exist, there is no practice of religious life.

kiṃ cānyat | nādharmo dharmo vā saṃvyavahārāś calaukikā na syuḥ |
nityāś ca sasvabhāvāḥ syur nityatvād ahetumataḥ ||55||

又復有義偈言
非法非非法世間法亦無
有自體則當常則無因緣

’di ltar gźan yaṅ
| rgyu mi ldan pa rtag pa’i phyir || chos rnams thams cad rtag par ’gyur |
| chos sam chos ma yin med ciṅ || ’jig rten pa yi tha sñad med |

Furthermore:There would be neither merit nor demerit nor the worldly conventions . All things, being endowed with an intrinsic nature, would be permanent - for that which has no cause is permanent.

此偈明何義若當如是離於因緣和合生者汝得多過以不得法及非法故一切世間法皆不可得何以故因緣和合生一切法以一切法皆從因緣和合而生若無因緣和合生者則一切法皆不可得又復自體不從因緣和合而生無因緣有則是常法何以故無因緣法則是常故彼若如是無住梵行又復汝法自有過失何以故世尊所說一切有為皆悉無常彼何自體皆悉無常偈言

de lta yin na rten ciṅ ’brel par ’byuṅ ba gtoṅ ba de la skyon cir ’gyur źe na | chos med pa daṅ | chos ma yin pa med pa daṅ | ’jig rten pa’i tha sñad rnams med par ’gyur ro || ci’i phyir źe na | ’di thams cad ni rten ciṅ ’brel par ’byuṅ ba yin na rten ciṅ ’brel par ’byuṅ ba de med na gaṅ las ’byuṅ bar ’gyur | gźan yaṅ raṅ gi ṅo bo daṅ bcas pa daṅ | rten ciṅ ’brel par ’byuṅ ba ma yin pa daṅ | rgyu med pa las byuṅ ba daṅ rtag par ’gyur te | rgyu med pa rnams ni rtag pa ñid yin pa’i phyir daṅ | de la tshaṅs par spyod pa la gnas pa ma yin pa de ñid du yaṅ ’gyur ro || grub pa’i mtha’ daṅ yaṅ ’gal te | ci’i phyir źe na | bcom ldan ’das kyis ’du byed thams cad ni mi rtag pa’o źes bśad pa yin no || de dag ni raṅ gi ṅo bo ñid daṅ bcas pa’i rtag pa ñid kyis rtag pa yin no ||

If this is so, what defect follows for you who reject DependentOrigination? - There is no merit. There is no demerit. Nor do exist the worldly conventions. - Why? - Because all that is dependently originated; how will it be, if there is no dependent origination? Moreover, being endowed with an intrinsic nature, not dependently originated and devoid of a cause, it would be permanent. - Why? -Because things that have no cause are permanent. - There would thus follow that very non-practice of religious life. And you would contradict your own tenet - Why? - Because the Lord has taught that all conditioned things are impermanent. They become permanent, because they are [Supposed to be] endowed with an intrinsic nature and hence [to be] permanent.

evam akuśaleṣv avyākṛteṣu nairyāṇikādiṣu ca doṣaḥ |
tasmāt sarvaṃ saṃskṛtam asaṃskṛtam te bhavaty eva ||56||

善不善無記一切有為法
如汝說則常汝有如是過

| mi dge ba daṅ luṅ ma bstan || ṅes ’byin stshogs la’aṅ skyon de bźin |
| de bas khyod kyi ’dus byas kun || ’dus ma byas pa ñid du ’gyur |

And the same defect exists also with regard to the bad things, the indeterminate things, those things which lead to emancipation, and so on. Thus, all that is conditioned certainly becomes for you unconditioned.

yaś caiṣa kuśaleṣu dharmeṣu nirdiṣṭaḥ kalpaḥ sa evākuśaleṣu, sa evāvyākṛteṣu, sa eva nairyāṇikaprabhṛtiṣu | tasmāt te sarvam idaṃ saṃskṛtam asaṃskṛtam saṃpadyate | kiṃ kāraṇaṃ | hetau hy asaty utpādasthitibhaṅgā na bhavanti | utpādasthitibhaṅgeṣv asatsu saṃskṛtalakṣaṇābhāvāt sarvaṃ saṃskṛtam asaṃskṛtam saṃpadyate | tatra yad uktaṃ kuśalādīnāṃ bhāvānāṃ svabhāvasadbhāvād aśūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti tad na | yat punar bhavatoktaṃ yadi ca na bhavet svabhāvo dharmāṇāṃ niḥsvabhāva ity eva | nāmāpi bhaven naivaṃ nāma hi nirvastukaṃ nāstīti || atra brūmaḥ |

此偈明何義若說善法有法自體不善無記亦如是說若如是者汝說一切有為法常何以故法若無因無生住滅無生住滅非有為法則一切法皆是無為若說善等一切諸法皆有自體則一切法皆悉不空義不相應又復汝說偈言諸法若無體無體不得名有自體有名唯名云何名此偈我今答偈言

dge ba’i || chos rnams la rtag pa de bstan pa gaṅ yin pa de ñid mi dge ba rnams daṅ | luṅ du ma bstan pa rnams la yaṅ yod | de ñid ṅes par ’byin pa la sogs pa la yaṅ yod do || de bas na khyod kyi ’dus byas ’di thams cad ’dus ma byas su ’gyur ro || ci’i phyir źe na | rgyu med na skye ba daṅ gnas pa daṅ ’jig pa dag med pa’i phyir ro || de med na ’dus byas kyi mtshan ñid med pa’i phyir thams cad ’dus ma byas su ’gyur ro || de la dge ba la sogs pa dag gi dṅos po dag gi raṅ gi ṅo bo yod pa’i phyir dṅos po thams cad stoṅ pa ma yin no źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de mi ruṅ ṅo || bya ba’i miṅ || de yaṅ de bźin med ’gyur te || gźi med miṅ ni med pas so || źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa ’di la bśad par bya ste |

And the same method that has been indicated, concerning the good things, applies also to the bad things, to the indeterminate things, to those things which lead to emancipation, and so on. Thus all that, though conditioned, turns out to be unconditioned for you. - Why? - Because, there being no cause, there is no origination, no subsistence and no destruction. [And] there being no origination, no subsistence and no destruction, all that is conditioned turns out to be unconditioned, because of the absence of the specific character of’ the conditioned. In these circumstances, your statement that all things are non-void because the good and other things have an intrinsic nature, is not valid.

yaḥ sadbhūtaṃ nāmātra brūyāt sasvabhāva ity evam |
bhavatā prativaktavyo nāma brūmaś ca na vayaṃ tat ||57||

若人說有名語言有自體
彼人汝可難語名我不實

| gaṅ źig raṅ bźin bcas pa źes || miṅ ni yod par smra ba la |
| de ltar miṅ gi lan btab kyis || ṅa ni miṅ yod mi smra’o |

He who says that the name is existent, deserves indeed the answer from you: ‘There is an intrinsic nature". We, however, do not say that.

yo nāmātra sadbhūtaṃ brūyāt sasvabhāva iti sa bhavatā prativaktavyaḥ syāt | yasya sadbhūtaṃ nāma svabhāvasya tasmāt tenāpi svabhāvena sadbhūtena bhavitavyam | na punar vayaṃ nāma sadbhūtaṃ brūmaḥ | tad api hi bhāvasvabhāvasyābhāvān nāma niḥsvabhāvaṃ, tasmāc chūnyam, śūnyatvād asadbhūtam | tatra yad bhavatoktaṃ nāma sadbhāvāt sadbhūtaḥ svabhāva iti tad na |

此偈明何義若何人說名有自體彼人如是汝則得難彼人說言有體有名無體無名我不如是說有名體何以知之一切諸法皆無自體若無自體彼得言空彼若空者得言不實若汝有名有自體義不相應

gaṅ źig miṅ ’di raṅ bźin daṅ bcas pa yin no źes miṅ yod par smra ba de la khyod kyis lan gdab par bya ba yin gyi | gal te miṅ can gyi raṅ bźin de med na | de’i phyir miṅ de yaṅ raṅ bźin yod pa ma yin par bya dgos te | yod pa ma yin pa la ni miṅ gi raṅ bźin yod par mi ’gyur bas ṅed cag kyaṅ miṅ gi raṅ bźin yod par mi smra’o || de bas na dṅos po rnams kyi raṅ bźin yaṅ med pa’i phyir miṅ gi raṅ bźin yaṅ med pa yin no || de’i phyir stoṅ pa yin no || stoṅ pa ñid yin pa’i phyir yod pa ma yin pas de la khyod kyis miṅ yod pa’i phyir raṅ gi ṅo bo yod do źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de mi ruṅ ṅo ||

He who says that the name is existent, deserves the answer from you: ‘There is an intrinsic nature’. That intrinsic nature, which is designated by the existent name, must also be, for that reason, existent. For a non-existent intrinsic nature cannot have anexistent name. We, however, do not say that the name is existent. Since the things have no intrinsic nature, that name also is devoid of an intrinsic nature. For that reason, it is void, and, being void, it is non-existent. - In these circumstances, your statement that because of the existence of the name the intrinsic nature I’s existent, is not valid.

kiṃ cānyat |
nāmāsad iti ca yad idaṃ tat kiṃ nu sato bhavaty utāpy asataḥ |
yadi hi sato yady asato dvidhāpi te hīyate vādaḥ ||58||

又復有義偈言
若此名無者則有亦是無
若言有言無汝宗有二失
若此名有者則無亦是有
若言無言有汝諍有二失

| ’di ltar gźan yaṅ | med la miṅ med ces gaṅ ’di || ci de yod pa’am med pa yin |
| gal te yod pa’am med pa yin || khyod kyis smras pa gñi ga’aṅ ñams |

Furthermore:Does this name ‘non-existent’ designate something existent or non-existent. Be it the name of an existent or of a non-existent thing, in both ways your position is abandoned.

yac caitan nāmāsad iti tat kiṃ sato ’sato vā | yadi hi satas tan nāma yady asata ubhayathāpi pratijña hīyate | tatra yadi tāvat sato nāmāsad iti pratijña hīyate | na hīdānīṃ tad asad idānīṃ sat | athāsato ’sad iti nāma, asad bhūtasya nāma na bhavati | tasmād yā pratijñā nāmnaḥ sadbhūtaḥ svabhāva iti sā hinā |

此偈明何義若此名無如是宗失如其是有如導諍失我宗不爾有物有名無物無名如是諸法有自體者義不相應

med pa la miṅ med do źes bya ba gaṅ yin pa ’di ci miṅ med pa de yod pa yin nam ’on te med pa yin | gal te miṅ de yod pa źig gi yin nam | gal te med pa źig gi yin na dam bcas pa gñi ga yaṅ ñams par ’gyur te | de la gal te re źig miṅ med pa źes bya ba’i miṅ yod pa yin no źe na | miṅ med do źes bya ba’i dam bcas pa ñams par ’gyur te | da ni de med pa ma yin te | da ni de yod pas so ci ste miṅ med pa źes bya ba med pa yin no źe na | med pa la ni miṅ med do || de bas na miṅ gi raṅ bźin yod do źes khyod kyis dam bcas pa gaṅ yin pa de ñams pa yin no ||

Does this name ‘non-existent’ designate something existent or non-existent? Be it the name of an existent or of a non-existent thing, in both ways the proposition is abandoned. If [the thing named is] existent, the proposition [‘The name is:] "Non-existent... is abandoned. For the same thing cannot be now non-existent, now existent. If, on the other hand, [you say that] the thing named is non-existent, [it has to be replied:] that which is non-existent has no name.

kiṃ cānyat | sarveṣāṃ bhāvānāṃ śūnyatvaṃ copapāditaṃ pūrvam |
sa upālambhas tasmād bhāvaty ayaṃ cāpratijñāyāḥ ||59||

又復有義偈言
如是我前說一切法皆空
我義宗如是則不得有過

| ’di ltar gźan yaṅ | dṅos po dag ni thams cad kyi || stoṅ pa ñid ni sṅar bstan pas |
| de phyir dam bcas med par yaṅ || klan ka gaṅ yin de tshol byed |

Furthermore:We have already established the voidness of all things. This criticism, therefore, turns out to be one of something which is not a proposition.

iha cāsmābhiḥ pūrvam eva sarveṣāṃ bhāvānāṃ vistarataḥ śūnyatvam upapāditam | tatra prāṅ nāmno ’pi śūnyatvam uktam | sa bhavān aśūnyatvaṃ parigṛhya parivṛtto vaktuṃ yadi bhāvānāṃ svabhāvo na syād asvabhāva iti nāmāpīdaṃ na syād iti tasmād apratijñopālambho ’yaṃ bhavataḥ saṃpadyate | na hi vayaṃnāma sadbhūtam iti brūmaḥ | yat punar bhavatoktaṃ atha vidyate svabhāvaḥ sa ca dharmāṇāṃ na vidyate tasmāt | dharmair vinā svabhāvaḥ sa yasya tad yuktam upadeṣṭum iti || atra brūmaḥ |

此偈明何義我前已說一切法空亦說名空取空名而有所說若一切法皆無自體名亦無體我如是說義宗無過我不說名有自體故又復汝說偈言若離法有名不在於法中說離法有名彼人則可難此偈我今答偈言

’dir ṅed cag gi sṅar dṅos po thams cad kyi stoṅ pa ñid rgya cher bstan pas der miṅ yaṅ stoṅ pa ñid du bstan pa yin no || de’i phyir dam bcas pa med par yaṅ khyod klan ka ’di tshol bar byed kyi | ṅed miṅ yod do źes mi smra’o | gźan yaṅ khyod kyis | ’on te ’di ltar raṅ bźin yod || de ni chos la medce na || chos rnams med par raṅ bźin te || gaṅ gi yin par de bstan rigs || źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa ’di la bśad par bya ste |

Here we have already established in detail the voidness of all things. Even the name has already been stated to be void. Now you, assuming non-voidness, have returned to the charge. If the things had nointrinsic nature, then even the name ‘absence of intrinsic nature’would not exist. Your criticism, therefore, turns out to be one of something which is not a proposition. We do not say, indeed, that the name is existent.

atha vidyate svabhāvaḥ sa ca dharmāṇāṃ na vidyata itīdaṃ |
āśaṅkitaṃ yad uktaṃ bhavaty anāśaṅkitaṃ tac ca ||60||

若別有自體不在於法中
汝慮我故說此則不須慮

| ’on te raṅ bźin źig yod la || de ni chos la med do źes |
| dogs pa bsu na smra ba ’di || dogs pa gaṅ yin de med do |

‘Now [you may say:] There is an intrinsic nature, but that does not belong to the things’ - this suspicion of yours is not shared by us.

na hi vayaṃ dharmāṇāṃ svabhāvaṃ pratiṣedhayāmo dharmavinirmuktasya vā kasyacid arthasya svabhāvam abhyupagacchāmaḥ | nanv evaṃ sati ya upālambho bhavato yadi dharmā niḥsvabhāvāḥ kasya khalv idānīm anyasyārthasya dharmavinirmuktasya svabhāvo bhavati sa yuktam upadeṣṭum iti dūrāpakṛṣṭam evaitad bhavati, upālambho na bhavati | yat punar bhavatoktaṃ sata eva pratiṣedho nāsti ghaṭo geha ity ayaṃ yasmāt | dṛṣtaḥ pratiṣedho ’yaṃ sataḥ svabhāvasya te tasmād iti || atra brūmaḥ |

此偈明何義彼不須慮汝妄難我我則不遮諸法自體我不離法別有物取何人取法彼人須慮我不取法故不遮法云何有過若我取法有自體者則可難言汝不相應我不如是汝難大賒全不相當又復汝說偈言法若有自體可得遮諸法諸法無自體竟為何所遮如有瓶有泥可得遮瓶泥見有物則遮見無物不遮此偈我今答偈言

ṅed ni chos rnams kyi raṅ bźin yaṅ ’gog par mi byed la | chos las ma gtogs pa’i don ’ga’ źig gi raṅ bźin yin par yaṅ khas mi len no || de lta yin na ’on te chos rnams raṅ bźin med pa yin na | raṅ bźin te chos las ma gtogs pa don gźan gaṅ źig gi yin pa de bstan pa’i rigs so źes bya ba’i khyod kyi klan ka thag bsriṅs pa yin pas klan kar mi ’gyur ba ma yin nam | gźan yaṅ khyod kyis | gaṅ phyir khyim na bum pa de || med ces yod pa ñid la ’gog | mthoṅ ste de phyir khyod kyi ’di || yod pa’i raṅ bźin ’gog pa yin || źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa ’di la bśad par bya ste |

We do not, indeed, deny the intrinsic nature of the things. Nor do we affirm the intrinsic nature of a certain object apart from the things. Now, this being so, your criticism: ‘If the things are devoid of an intrinsic nature, you should explain to what other object, apart from thethings, there now happens to belong the intrinsic nature, is thrown far away. It is no criticism at all.

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