Bibliotheca Polyglotta

迴諍論者龍樹菩薩之所作也數舒盧迦三十二字此論正本凡有六百大魏都鄴興和三年歲次大梁建辰之月朔次癸酉辛卯之日烏萇國人剎利王種三藏法師毘目智仙共天竺國婆羅門人瞿曇流支在鄴城內金華寺譯時日所費二十餘功大數凡有一萬一千九十八字對譯沙門曇林之筆受驃騎大將軍開府儀同三司御史中尉勃海高仲密啟請供養且記時事以章以聞令樂法者若見若聞同崇翻譯矣迴諍論偈初分第一龍樹菩薩造後魏三藏毘目智仙共瞿曇流支譯問曰偈言 ...¹ 迴諍論釋初分第三釋曰論初偈言

1. The root verses have been removed from the introduction.

’jam dpal gźon nur gyur pa la phyag ’tshal lo |

sarveṣāṃ bhāvānāṃ sarvatra na vidyate svabhāvaś cet |
tvadvacanam asvabhāvaṃ na nivartayituṃ svabhāvam alam ||1||

若一切無體言語是一切
言語自無體何能遮彼體

| gal te dṅos po thams cad kyi || raṅ bźin kun la yod min na |
| khyod kyi tshig kyaṅ raṅ bźin med || raṅ bźin bzlog par mi nus so |

If an intrinsic nature of things, whatever they may be, exists nowhere, your [very] statement must be devoid of an intrinsic nature. It is not, therefore, in a position to deny the intrinsic nature [of the things].

yadi sarveṣāṃ bhāvānāṃ hetau pratyayeṣu ca sāmagryāṃ ca pṛthak ca sarvatra svabhāvo na vidyata iti kṛtvā śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti | na hi bīje hetubhūte ’ṅkuro ’sti, na pṛthivyaptejovāyvādīnām ekaikasmin pratyayasaṃjñite, na pratyayeṣu samagreṣu, na hetuprayayasāmagryām, na hetupratyayavinirmuktaḥ pṛthag eva ca | yasmād atra sarvatra svabhāvo nāsti tasmān niḥsvabhāvo ’ṅkuraḥ | yasmān niḥsvabhāvas tasmāc chūnyaḥ | yathā cāyam aṅkuro niḥsvabhāvo niḥsvabhāvatvāc ca śūnyas tathā sarvabhāvā api niḥsvabhāvatvāc chūnyā iti | atra vayaṃ brūmaḥ | yady evam, tavāpi vacanaṃ yad etac chūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti tad api śūnyam | kiṃ kāraṇam | tad api hetau nāsti mahābhūteṣu saṃprayukteṣu viprayukteṣu vā, pratyayeṣu nāsty uraḥkaṇṭhauṣṭhajihvādantamūlatālunāsikāmūrdhaprabhṛtiṣu yatneṣu, ubhayasāmagryāṃ nāsti, hetupratyayavinirmuktaṃ pṛthag eva ca nāsti | yasmād atra sarvatra nāsti tasmān niḥsvabhāvam | yasmān niḥsvabhāvaṃ tasmāc chūnyam | tasmād anena sarvabhāvasvabhāvavyāvartanam aśakyaṃ kartum | na hy asatāgninā śakyaṃ dagdhum | na hy asatā śastreṇa śakyaṃ chettum | na hy asatībhir adbhiḥ śakyaṃ kledayitum | evam asatā vacanena na śakyaḥ sarvabhāvasvabhāvapratiṣedaḥ kartum | tatra yad uktaṃ sarvabhāvasvabhāvaḥ pratiṣiddha iti tad na |

此偈明何義若一切法皆是因緣則是因緣因緣和合離諸因緣是則更無一切自體如是一切諸法皆空如芽非是種子中有非地非水非火非風非虛空等因緣中有非是一一因緣中有非諸因緣和合中有非離因緣因緣和合餘處別有若此等中一切皆無如是得言芽無自體若如是無一切自體彼得言空若一切法皆悉空者則無言語若無言語則不能遮一切諸法若汝意謂言語不空言語所說一切法空是義不然何以故汝言一切諸法皆空則語亦空何以故以因中無四大中無一一中無和合中無因緣和合不和合中一切皆無如是言語咽喉中無脣舌齒根？鼻頂等一一皆無和合中無二處俱無唯有因緣因緣和合若離如是因緣和合更無別法若如是者一切言語皆無自體若如是無言語自體則一切法皆無自體若此言語無自體者唯有遮名穴能遮法譬如無火則不能燒亦如無刀則不能割又如無水則不能瀾如是無語云何能遮諸法自體既不能遮諸法自體而心憶念遮一切法自體迥者義不相應又復有義偈言

gal te dṅos po thams cad kyi raṅ bźin ni rgyu daṅ rkyen daṅ | rgyu daṅ rkyen tshogs pa daṅ tha dad pa kun la yod pa ma yin pa’i phyir dṅos po thams cad stoṅ pa yin te | myu gu ni rgyu sa bon du gyur pa la yaṅ med | rkyen źes bya bas daṅ chu daṅ me daṅ rluṅ la sogs pa re re la yaṅ med | rkyen ’dus pa dag la yaṅ med | rgyu daṅ rkyen tshogs pa dag la yaṅ med | rgyu daṅ rkyen tshogs pa las ma gtogs pa tha dad pa la yaṅ med do || gaṅ gi phyir raṅ bźin ’di thams cad la yaṅ med pa de’i phyir myu gu’i raṅ bźin med de de bas na stoṅ pa yin no || ji ltar myu gu raṅ bźin med | raṅ bźin med pa ñid yin pa’i phyir | stoṅ pa yin pa de bźin du dṅos po thams cad kyaṅ raṅ bźin med pa ñid yin pa’i phyir | stoṅ pa yin no źe na | gal te de lta ma yin na ni dṅos po thams cad stoṅ pa yin no źes bya ba gaṅ yin pa’i khyod kyi tshig de yaṅ stoṅ pa yin no || ci’i phyir źe na | de yaṅ rgyu ’byuṅ ba chen po rnams daṅ mtshuṅs par ldan pa rnams daṅ ldan pa ma yin pa rnams la yaṅ med | rkyen braṅ daṅ | lkog ma daṅ | mchu daṅ | lce rtse daṅ | so’i brun daṅ | rkan daṅ | sna daṅ | spyi bo la sogs pa daṅ | ’bad pa rnams la yaṅ med | gñi ga tshogs pa yaṅ med | rgyu daṅ rkyen tshogs pa la yaṅ med | rgyu daṅ rkyen tshogs pa las ma gtogs pa tha dad pa yaṅ med do | gaṅ gi phyir ’di thams cad la med pa’i phyir ’di raṅ bźin med pa yin te | raṅ bźin med pa’i phyir stoṅ pa yin no || de lta bas na ’dis dṅos po thams cad zlog par byed mi nus so | me med pas kyaṅ sreg par byed mi nus so || mtshon cha med pas kyaṅ gcad par mi nus śiṅ chu med pas kyaṅ baṅs par mi nus pa de bźin du tshig med pas kyaṅ | dṅos po thams cad kyi raṅ bźin zlog par byed mi nus pas de la dṅos po thams cad kyi raṅ bźin bkag go źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de mi ruṅ ṅo ||

Whether in the causes, in the conditions, in the combination of the causes and the conditions, or in a different thing, nowhere does exist an intrinsic nature of the things, whatever they may be. On this ground it is said that all things are void. For instance, the sprout is neither in the seed, its cause, nor in the things known as its conditions, viz., earth, water, fire, wind, etc., taken one by one, nor in the totality of the conditions, nor in the combination of the causes and the conditions, nor is it anything different from the causes and the conditions. Since there is nowhere an intrinsic nature, the sprout is devoid of an intrinsic nature. Being devoid of an intrinsic nature, it is void. And just as this sprout is devoid of an intrinsic nature and hence void, so also are all the things. Here we observe: if this is so, your statement that all things are void, must also be void. - why? - because your statement is neither in its cause - the [four] great elements, taken collectively or individually; - nor in its conditions, the efforts made in the breast, the throat, the lips, the tongue, the roots of the teeth, the palate, the nose, the head, etc.; nor in the combination of both [the cause and the condition]; - nor again is it anything apart from the cause and the conditions. Since it is nowhere, it is devoid of an intrinsic nature, [and] since it is devoid of an intrinsic nature, it is void. For this reason, it is incapable of denying the intrinsic nature of all things. A fire that does not exist cannot burn, a weapon that does not exist cannot cut, water that does not exist cannot moisten; similarly a statement that does not exist cannot deny the intrinsic nature of all things. In these circumstances, your statement that the intrinsic nature of all things has been denied, is not valid.

atha sasvabhāvam etad vākyaṃ pūrvā hatā pratijñā te |
vaiṣamikatvaṃ tasmin viśeṣahetuś ca vaktavyaḥ ||2||

若語有自體前所立宗壞
如是則有過應更說勝因

| ’on te tshig de raṅ bźin bcas || khyod kyis dam bcas sṅa ma ñams |
|mi ’dra ñid de de yin na || gtan tshigs khyad par brjod par byos |

Now, if this sentence is endowed with an intrinsic nature, your former proposition is destroyed. There is a discordance, and you should state the special reason for it.

athāpi manyase mā bhūd eṣa doṣa iti sasvabhāvam etad vākyaṃ sasvabhāvatvāc cāśūnyaṃ tasmād anena sarvabhāvasvabhāvaḥ pratiṣiddha iti, atra brūmaḥ | yady evam, yā te pūrvā pratijñā śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti hatā sā | kim cānyat | sarvabhāvāntargatam ca tvadvacanam | kasmāc chūnyeṣu sarvabhāveṣu tvadvacanam aśūnyam, yenāśūnyatvāt sarvabhāvasvabhāvaḥ pratiṣiddhaḥ | evaṃ ṣaṭkoṭiko vādaḥ prasaktaḥ | sa punaḥ katham iti | hanta cet punaḥ śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvās tena tvadvacanaṃ śūnyaṃ sarvabhāvāntargatatvāt | tena śūnyena pratiṣedhānupapattiḥ | tatra yaḥ pratiṣedhaḥ śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti so ’nupapannaḥ | upapannaś cet punaḥ śūnyāḥ sarvabhāva iti pratiṣedhas tena tvadvacanam apy aśūnyam | aśūnyatvād anena pratiṣedho ’nupapannaḥ atha śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvās tvadvacanaṃ cāśūnyaṃ yena pratiṣedhaḥ, tena tvadvacanaṃ sarvatrāsaṃgṛhītam | tatra dṛṣṭāntavirodhaḥ | sarvatra cet punaḥ saṃgṛhītaṃ tvadvacanaṃ sarvabhāvāś ca śūnyās tena tad api śūnyam | śūnyavād anena nāsti pratiṣedhaḥ | atha śūnyam asti cānena pratiṣedhaḥ śūnyāḥ sarvabhāva iti tena śūnyā api sarvabhāvāḥ kāryakriyāsamarthā bhaveyuḥ | na caitad iṣṭam | atha śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā na ca kāryakriyāsamarthā bhavanti mā bhūd dṛṣṭāntavirodha iti kṛtvā, śūnyena tvadvacanena sarvabhāvasvabhāvapratiṣedho nopapanna iti | kiṃ cānyat | evaṃ tad astitvād vaiṣamikatvaprasaṅgaḥ kiṃcic chūnyaṃ kiṃcid aśūnyam iti | tasmiṃś ca vaiṣamikatve viśeṣahetur vaktavyo yena kiṃcic chūnyaṃ kiṃcid aśūnyaṃ syāt | sa ca nopadiṣṭo hetuḥ | tatra yad uktaṃ śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti tad na |

此偈明何義若此言語有自體者汝前所立義宗自壞是則有過若爾便應更說勝因若汝意謂語有自體餘法空者如是則違諸法空語汝宗亦壞又復有義言語不離一切法數若一切法皆悉空者言語亦空若言語空則不能遮一切諸法若如是者於六種中諍論相應彼復云何汝不相應汝說一切諸法皆空則語亦空何以故言語亦是一切法故言語若空則不能遮彼若遮言一切法空則不相應又若相應言語能遮一切法體一切法空語則不空語若不空遮一切法則不相應若諸法空言語不空語何以所遮又若此語入一切中喻不相當若彼言語是一切者一切既空言語亦空若語言空則不能遮若語言空諸法亦空以空能遮諸法令空如是則空亦是因緣是則不可又若汝畏喻不相當一切法空能作因緣如是空語則不能遮一切自體又復有義一邊有過以法有空亦有不空彼若有過更說勝因若一邊空一邊不空如是若說一切法空無自體者義不相應

’on te skyon der gyur na mi ruṅ ṅo sñam nas ṅa’i tshig de ni raṅ bźin daṅ bcas pa yin te | de’i phyir stoṅ pa ma yin no || de bas na ’dis ni dṅos po thams cad kyi raṅ bźin bkag go sñam du sems na | ’o na de ltar yin na ni dṅos po thams cad ni stoṅ pa yin no źes sṅar dam bcas pa gaṅ yin pa de ñams pa yin no || ’di ltar gźan yaṅ thams cad kyi naṅ du ni khyod kyi tshig kyaṅ ’dus pa yin na | ci’i phyir dṅos po thams cad stoṅ ba yin bźin du ’di ltar stoṅ pa ñid ma yin pa’i phyir des dṅos po thams cad raṅ bźin bkag go źes bya ba’i khyod kyi tshig stoṅ pa ma yin par ’gyur | de lta na ni smras pa mu drug tu thal bar ’gyur ro || de yaṅ ji lta bu źe na | ’on kyaṅ gal te dṅos po thams cad stoṅ pa yin no źe na khyod kyi tshig kyaṅ stoṅ pa yin te | thams cad kyi naṅ du || ’dus pa’i phyir || stoṅ pa des pa ni dgag pa mi ’thad pas de la dṅos po thams cad ni stoṅ pa yin no źes dgag pa gaṅ yin pa de ’thad pa ma yin no || gal te ’thad pa yin no źe na | dṅos po thams cad ni stoṅ pa yin źes bkag pas des na khyod kyi tshig kyaṅ stoṅ pa yin la | stoṅ pa ñid yin pa’i phyir des ni ’gog pa mi ’thad do || gal te dṅos po thams cad ni stoṅ pa yin la | gaṅ gis ’gog par byed pa khyod kyi tshig ni stoṅ pa ma yin no źe na | des na khyod kyi tshig thams cad kyi naṅ du ma ’dus pa yin te | de la ’gal ba’i dper ’gyur ro || gal te thams cad kyi naṅ du khyod kyi tshig bsdus so źe na | dṅos po thams cad stoṅ pa yin pas des na de yaṅ stoṅ pa yin no || de’i phyir ’dis ’gog pa med do || gal te stoṅ pa yin yaṅ dṅos po thams cad ni stoṅ pa’o źes ’dis ’gog pa yod do źe na | des na dṅos po thams cad stoṅ pa yin yaṅ bya ba byed nus par ’gyur te de ni ’dod pa ma yin no || gal te ’gal ba’i dper gyur nas mi ruṅ ṅo sñam nas dṅos po thams cad stoṅ pa yin te bya ba byed mi nus so źe na | khyod kyi tshig stoṅ bas kyaṅ dṅos po thams cad kyi raṅ bźin ’gog par mi ’thad do || ji ltar gźan yaṅ de skad zer na ni kha cig ni stoṅ | kha cig ni mi stoṅ ṅo źes mi ’dra ba ñid du thal bar ’gyur ro || mi ’dra ba ñid yin na ni gaṅ gis na kha cig ni stoṅ kha cig ni mi stoṅ par gyur pa’i gtan tshigs kyi khyad par yaṅ smros śig | gtan tshigs de yaṅ ma brtan pas de la dṅos po thams cad ni stoṅ pa’o źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de mi ruṅ ṅo ||

Now you may think, in order to avoid this effect: this sentence is endowed with an intrinsic nature, and being endowed with an intrinsic nature, it is non-void; thus the intrinsic nature of all things have been denied by it. – To this we reply: If so, then your former proposition ’All things are void’ is destroyed. Furthermore: Your statement is included in all things. [Now] if all things are void, for that reason is your statement non-void, - that statement which has denied the intrinsic nature of all things because it is [itself] non-void? Thus arises a controversial discussion in six points. How is it? – Well, (1) If all things are void, then your statement is void, being included in all things. [And] a negation by that [statement] which is void is a logical impossibility. In these cirkumstances, the negation that all things are void is not valid. If, on the other hand, the nagation that all things are void is not valid, then your statement is non-void. [But] that negation which it establishes because it is non-void, is not valid. Now, if all things are void, but your statement by which is effected the negation is non void, then your statement is not included in all things. Your proposition, there, is contradicted by the example. If, on the contrary, your statement is included in all things, and if all things are void, then your statement also is void. [And] since it is void, it cannot establish a negation Let us then assume that it is void and that there is the negation by it: ’All things are void’. But, in that case, all things, though void, would be capable of performing actions – which is absurd. Let it be granted, then, that all things are void and that they are not capable of performing actions; let the proposition not be contradicted by the example. In that case, however, the negation of the intrinsic nature of all things by your void statement is not valid. Furthermore: If your statement exists, there arises the following discordance: some things are void, and some other things, non-void. And you should state the special reason for it, explaining why some things are void, while others are not. You have, however, not stated that reason. In these circumstances, your statement that all things are void is not valid.

kiṃ cānyat |
mā śabdavad ity etat syāt te buddhi na caitad upapannam |
śabdena hy atra satā bhaviṣyato vāraṇaṃ tasya ||3||

又復有義偈言
汝謂如勿聲是義則不然
聲有能遮聲無聲何能遮

’di ltar gźan yaṅ |
de sgra ma ’byin lta bu’o źes | khyod blo sems na de mi ’thad |
|’di la sgra ni yod pa yis || ’byuṅ bar ’gyur ba de bzlog yin ||

Moreover: If you think that it is like ’Do not make a sound’, [we reply:] this also is not valid. For here a sound that is existent prevents the other sound that will be.

syāt te buddhiḥ, yathā nāma kaścid brūyān mā śabdaṃ kārṣīr iti svayam eva śabdaṃ kuryāt tena ca śabdena tasya śabdasya vyāvartanaṃ kriyeta, evam eva śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti śūnyena vacanena sarvabhāvasvabhāvasya vyāvartanaṃ kriyata iti | atra vayaṃ brūmaḥ | etad apy anupapannam | kiṃ kāraṇam | satā hy atra śabdena bhaviṣyataḥ śabdasya pratiṣedhaḥ kriyate | na punar iha bhavataḥ satā vacanena sarvabhāvasvabhāvapratiṣedhaḥ kriyate | tava hi matena vacanam apy asat, sarvabhāvasvabhāvo ’py asan | tasmād ayaṃ mā śabdavad iti viṣamopanyāsaḥ |

此偈明何義若汝意謂聲能遮聲如有人言汝莫作聲彼自作聲而能遮聲如是如是一切法空空語能遮此我今說此不相應何以故以此聲有能遮彼聲汝語非有則不能遮諸法自體汝所立義語亦是無諸法亦無如是若謂如勿聲者此則有過

dper na kha cig na re sgra ma ’byin cig ces bdag ñid sgra ’byin te | sgra des sgra zlog par byed do || de bźin du dṅos po thams cad ni stoṅ pa źes stoṅ pa’i raṅ bźin gyi tshig gis dṅos po thams cad kyi raṅ bźin zlog par byed do sñam na | ’dir smras pa | der yaṅ ’thad pa ma yin te | ’di la sgra yod pas sgra ’byuṅ bar ’gyur ba ’gog par byed pa yin gyi | ’dir ni khyod kyi yod pa’i tshig gis dṅos po thams cad kyi raṅ bźin ’gog par mi byed de | khyod kyi lugs kyi tshig kyaṅ yod pa ma yin | dṅos po thams cad kyi raṅ bźin yaṅ yod pa ma yin pas de’i phyir sgra ma ’byin źes pa lta bu’o źes bya ba ’di ni mi mthun par sgra smras pa yin no ||

You may think: When somebody says: ’Do not make a sound’, he himself makes a sound, and that sound prevents the other sound; in just the same manner, the void statement that all things are void prevents the intrinsic nature of all things. -To this we reply: This also is not valid. - Why ? - Because here a sound that is existent negates the future sound. In your case, however, it is not an existent statement that negates the intrinsic nature of all things. For, in your opinion the statement is non-existent, the intrinsic nature of all things is non-existent. Thus, it is like "Do not make a sound" is a defective proposition.

pratiṣedhapratiṣedho ’py evam iti mataṃ bhavet tad asad eva |
evam tava pratijñā lakṣaṇato dūṣyate na mama ||4||

偈言
汝謂遮所遮如是亦不然
如是汝宗相自壞則非我

|’gog pa’i ’gog pa’aṅ de lta źes || ’dod na de yaṅ bzaṅ min te |
| de lta bas na’aṅ khyod dam bcas || mtshan ñid skyon yod ṅed la med |

If you think that the same holds true of the negation of the negation also, that is false. It is your proposition which by virtue of its specific character is thus rendered defective, not mine.

syāt te buddhiḥ pratiṣedhapratiṣedho ’py anena iva kalpenānupapannaḥ, tatra yad bhavān sarvabhāvasvabhāvapratiṣedhavacanaṃ pratiṣedhayati tad anupapannam iti | atra vayaṃ brūmaḥ | etad apy asad eva | kasmāt | tava hi pratijñālakṣaṇaprāptaṃ na mama | bhavān bravīti śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti nāham | pūrvakaḥ pakṣo na mama | tatra yad uktaṃ pratiṣedhapratiṣedho ’py evaṃ saty anupapanna iti tad na |

此偈明何義若汝意謂遮與所遮亦如是者彼不相應若汝說言我語能遮一切諸法有自體者彼不相應此我今說是義不然何以故知如是宗相汝過非我汝說一切諸法皆空如是汝義前宗有過咎不在我若汝說言汝遮所遮不相應者是義不然

khyod kyi blo la rnam pa ’di ñid kyis ’gog pa’i ’gog pa yaṅ mi ’thad de | de la khyod kyis dṅos po thams cad kyi raṅ bźin ’gog pa’i tshig ’gog par byed pa’i tshig gaṅ yin pa de yaṅ mi ’thad do sñam du sems na | ’dir smra bar bya ste | de yaṅ bzaṅ po ma yin te | de ci’i phyir źe na | khyed la ni dam bcas pa’i mtshan ñid kyis ’di ’thob kyi | ṅed la ni med pas de lta yin na ni ’gog pa’i ’gog pa yaṅ ’thad pa ma yin no źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de mi ruṅ ṅo |||’di la skye bo chos kyi gnas skabs la mkhas pa rnams ni dge ba’i chos rnams la brgya rtsa bcu dgur sems te|

You may think: ’According to this very method a negation of negation also is impossible; so your negation of the statement negating the intrinsic nature of all things is impossible’. -To this we reply: This also is false. - Why ? - Because the objection applies [only] to the specific character of your proposition, not to that of mine. It is you who say that all things are void, not I. The initial thesis is not mine. - In these circumstances, your staternent that, such being the case, a negation of negation also is impossible, is not valid.

kiṃ cānyat | pratyakṣeṇa hi tāvad yady upalabhya vinivartayasi bhāvān |
tan nāsti pratyakṣaṃ bhāvā yenopalabhyante ||5||

又復有義
偈言
若彼現是有汝何得有迥
彼現亦是無云何得取迥

’di ltar gźan yaṅ |
re źig dṅos rnams mṅon sum gyis || dmigs nas zlog par byed min na |
| gaṅ gis dṅos rnams dmigs ’gyur ba || mṅon sum de ni med pa yin |

Moreover: Now, if [you say that] you deny the things after having apprehended them through perception, [we reply:] that perception through which the things are apprehended does not exist.

yadi pratyakṣataḥ sarvabhāvānupalabhya bhavān nivartayati śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti tad anupannam | kasmāt | pratyakṣam api hi pramāṇaṃ sarvabhāvāntargatatvāc chūnyam | yo bhāvān upalabhate so ’pi śūnyaḥ | tasmāt pratyakṣeṇa pramāṇena nopalaṃbhabhāvo ’nupalabdhasya ca pratiṣedhānupapattiḥ | tatra yad uktaṃ śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti tad anupapannam | syāt te buddhiḥ, anumānenāgamenopamānena vā sarvabhāvān upalabhya sarvabhāvavyāvartanaṃ kriyata iti, atra brūmaḥ |

此偈明何義若一切法有現有現可取汝得迥我諸法令空而實不爾何以故知之現量入在一切法數則亦是空若汝分別依現有比現比皆空如是無現比何可得現之與比是二皆無云何得遮汝言一切諸法空者是義不然若汝復謂或比或喻或以阿含得一切法如是一切諸法自體我能迥者此義今說

gal te khyod kyis dṅos po thams cad mṅon sum gyi dmigs nas dṅos po thams cad ni stoṅ pa’o źes zlog par byed na ni mi ruṅ ṅo || de yaṅ ’thad pa ma yin te | ci’i phyir źe na | dṅos po thams cad kyi naṅ du ni mṅon sum gyi tshad ma yaṅ ’dus pa’i phyir stoṅ pa yin la | dṅos po la dmigs par byed pa gaṅ yin pa de yaṅ stoṅ pa yin no || de’i phyir mṅon sum gyi tshad mas dmigs pa med do || mi dmigs pa ’gog pa yaṅ mi ’thad pas de la dṅos po thams cad ni stoṅ pa’o źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de ’thad pa ma yin no || ’on te khyod kyi blo la rjes su dpag pa daṅ luṅ daṅ dpes sems ’jal bas dmigs nas dṅos po ’di thams cad zlog par byed do sñam du sems na ’dir smra bar bya ste |

You cannot say that you deny all things in the statement ’All things are void’, after having apprehended them through perception. Why? Because even perception, an instrument of true cognition, is void, being included in all things. The person who apprehends the things is alse void. Thus, there is no such thing as apprehension through perception, an instrument of true cognition; and a negation of that which is not apprehended is a logical impossibility. In these circumstances, your statement that all things are void is not valid. You think, perhaps, that you deny all things after having apprehended them through inference, verbal testimony and identification. To this we reply:

anumānaṃ pratyuktaṃ pratyakṣeṇāgamopamāne ca |
anumānāgamasādhyā te ’rthā dṛṣṭāntasādhyāś ca ||6||

偈言
說現比阿含譬喻等四量
現比阿含成譬喻亦能成

| rjes dpag luṅ daṅ || dpes ’jal daṅ || rjes dpag luṅ gis bsgrub bya daṅ |
| dpes bsgrub bya ba’i don gaṅ yin || mṅon sum gyis ni lan btab po ||

In our refutation of perception, we have [already] refuted inference, verbal testimony and identification, as well as the objects to be established by inference, verbal testimony and identification.

anumānopamānāgamāś ca pratyakṣeṇa pramāṇena pratyuktāḥ yathā hi pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇaṃ śūnyaṃ sarvabhāvānāṃ śūnyatvād evam anumānopamānāgamā api śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvānāṃ śūnyatvāt | ye ’numānasādhyā arthā āgamasādhyā upamānasādhyāś ca te ’pi śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvānāṃ śūnyatvāt | anumānopamānāgamaiś ca yo bhāvān upalabhate so ’pi śūnyaḥ | tasmād bhāvānām upalambhābhāvo ’nupalabdhānāṃ ca svabhāvapratiṣedhānupapattiḥ | tatra yad uktaṃ śūnyaḥ sarvabhāvā iti tad na |

此偈明何義比喻阿含現等四量若現能成比阿含等皆亦能成如一切法皆悉是空現量亦空如是比喻亦空彼量所成一切諸法皆悉是空以四種量在一切故隨何等法若為比成亦譬喻成亦阿含成彼所成法一切皆空汝以比喻阿含等三量一切法所量亦空若如是者法不可得量所量無是故無遮如是若說一切法空無自體者義不相應

rjes su dpag pa daṅ | dpes ’jal ba daṅ | luṅ yaṅ mṅon sum gyi tshad mas lan btab pa yin te | ’di ltar mṅon sum gyi tshad ma ni stoṅ pa yin te | dṅos po thams cad stoṅ pa ñid yin pa’i phyir ro || de bźin du rjes su dpag pa daṅ | dpes ’jal ba daṅ | luṅ yaṅ stoṅ pa yin te | dṅos po thams cad stoṅ pa ñid yin pa’i phyir ro || rjes su dpag pas bsgrub par bya ba’i don daṅ | luṅ gis bsgrub par bya ba daṅ | dpes bsgrub bar bya ba gaṅ yin pa de dag kyaṅ stoṅ pa ma yin te | dṅos po thams cad stoṅ pa ñid yin pa’i phyir ro || rjes su dpag pa daṅ | luṅ daṅ | dpes ’jal ba dag gis dṅos po rnams la dmigs par byed pa gaṅ yin pa de yaṅ stoṅ pa ñid yin te | de’i phyir dṅos po rnams dmigs pa med do || mi dmigs pa’i raṅ bźin ’gog pa mi ’thad pas de la dṅos po thams cad ni stoṅ pa’o źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de mi ruṅ ṅo ||

We have [already] refuted inference, identification and verbal testimony, in our refutation of the ‘instrument of true cognition’, perception. Just as perception, an ‘instrument of true cognition’, is void because all things are void, so also are inference, identification and verbal testimony void because all things are void. Those objects which are to be established by inference, verbal testimony and identification, are also void because all things are void. The person who apprehends the things through inference, identification and verbal testimony, is also void. Thus, there is no apprehension of things, and a negation of the intrinsic nature of things that are not apprehended is a logical impossibility. In these circumstances, your statement that all things are void is not valid.

kiṃ cānyāt | kuśalānāṃ dharmānāṃ dharmāvasthāvidaś ca manyante |
kuśalaṃ janāḥ svabhāvaṃ śeṣeṣv apy eṣa viniyogaḥ ||7||

又復有義偈言
智人知法說善法有自體
世人知有體餘法亦如是

’di ltar gźan yaṅ |
skye bo chos kyi gnas skabs mkhas || dge ba dag gi chos rnams la |
| dge ba’i raṅ bźin yin par ni || sems śiṅ lhag ma rnams la yaṅ |

Moreover:People conversant with the state of things think that the good things have a good intrinsic nature. The same distinction is made with regard to the rest [of the things] too (the bad things, and so on).

iha janā dharmāvasthāvido manyante kuśalānāṃ dharmāṇām ekonaviṃśaśatam | tadyathaikadeśo vijñānasya vedanāyāḥ saṃjñāyāś cetanāyāḥ sparśasya manasikārasya cchandasyādhimokṣasya vīryasya smṛteḥ samādheḥ prajñāyā upekṣāyāḥ prayogasya saṃprayogasya prāpter adhyāśayasyāpratighasya rater vyavasāyasyautsukyasyonmugdher utsāhasyāvighātasya vaśitāyāḥ pratighātasyāvipratisārasya parigrahasyāparigrahasya ...dhṛter adhyavasāyasyānautsukyasyānunmugdher anutsāhasya prārthanāyāḥ praṇidher madasya viṣayāṇāṃ viprayogasyānairyāṇikatāyā utpādasya sthiter anityatāyāḥ samanvāgamasya jarāyāḥ paritāpasyārater vitarkasya prīteḥ prasādasya ... premṇaḥ pratikūlasya pradakṣiṇagrāhasya vaiśāradyasya gauravasya citrīkārasya bhakter abhakteḥ śuśrūṣāyā ādarasyānādarasya praśrabdher hāsasya vāco vispandanāyāḥ siddhasyāprasādasyāpraśrabdheḥ ... dākṣyasya sauratyasya vipratisārasya śokasyopāyāsāyāsasya ... apradakṣiṇagrāhasya saṃśayasya saṃvarāṇāṃ pariśuddher adhyātmasaṃprasādasya bhīrutāyāḥ, śraddhā hrīrārjavam avañcanam upaśamo ’cāpalam apramādo mārdavaṃ pratisaṃkhyānaṃ nirvairaparidāhāvamado ’lobho ’doṣo ’mohaḥ sarvajñātāpratiniḥsargo vibhavo ’patrāpyamaparicchadanaṃ mananaṃ kāruṇyaṃ maitryadīnatāraṇā ... anupanāho ’nīrṣyācetaso ’paryādānaṃ kṣāntir vyavasargo ’sauratyaṃ paribhogānvayaḥ puṇyamasaṃjñisamāpattirnair yāṇikatāsarvajñatāsaṃskṛtā dharmā ity ekonaviṃśaśataṃ kuśalānāṃ dharmāṇāṃ kuśalaḥ svabhāvaḥ. tathākuśalānāṃ dharmāṇām akuśalaḥ svabhāvaḥ, nivṛtāvyākṛtānāṃ nivṛtāvyākṛtaḥ, prakṛtāvyākṛtānāṃ prakṛtāvyākṛtaḥ, kāmoktānāṃ kāmoktaḥ, rūpoktānāṃ rūpoktaḥ, ārūpyoktanāṃārūpyoktaḥ, anāsravāṇām anāsravaḥ, duḥkhasamudayanirodhamārgoktānāṃ duḥkhasamudayanirodhamārgoktaḥ, bhāvanāprahātavyānāṃ bhāvanāprahātavyaḥ, aprahātavyānām aprahātavyaḥ | yasmād evam anekaprakāro dharmasvabhāvo dṛṣṭas tasmād yad uktaṃ niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā niḥsvabhāvatvāc chūnyā iti tad na |

此偈明何義法師說善法善法一百一十有九謂心一相一者受二者想三者覺四者觸五者觀察六者欲七者信解脫八者精進九者憶念十者三摩提十一者慧十二者捨十三者修十四者合修十五者習十六者得十七者成十八者辯才十九者適者二十者勤二十一者思二十二者心二十三者勢力二十四者不疾二十五者自在二十六者善辯才二十七者不悔二十八者悔二十九者少欲三十者不少欲三十一者捨三十二者不思三十三者不心三十四者不願三十五者樂說三十六者不著境界三十七者不行三十八者生三十九者住四十者滅四十一者集四十二者老四十三者熱惱四十四者悶四十五者疑四十六者思量四十七者愛四十八者信四十九者樂五十者不順五十一者順取五十二者不畏大眾五十三者恭敬五十四者作勝法五十五者敬五十六者不敬五十七者供給五十八者不供給五十九者定順六十者宿六十一者發動六十二者不樂六十三者覆六十四者不定六十五者愁惱六十六者心不得六十七者荒亂六十八者懈怠六十九者憂憒七十者希淨七十一者內信七十二者畏七十三者信七十四者懈七十五者質直七十六者不誑七十七者寂靜七十八者不驚七十九者不錯八十者柔軟八十一者開解八十二者嫌八十三者燒八十四者惺八十五者不貪八十六者不瞋八十七者不癡八十八者不一切知八十九者放捨九十者不有九十一者愧九十二者不自隱惡九十三者悲九十四者喜九十五者捨九十六者神通九十七者不執九十八者不…… 九十九者心淨一百者忍辱一百一者利益一百二者能用一百三者福德一百四者無想定一百五者不一切智一百六者無常三昧 S少十三法無處訪本S 如是如是善法一百一十有九如彼善法善法自體依不善法不善法自體如是無記無記本性無記本性無記欲界欲界色界色界無色界無色界無漏無漏苦集滅道苦集滅道修定修定如是如是見有無量種種諸法皆有自體如是若說一切諸法皆無自體如是無體得言空者義不相應

’di la skye bo chos kyi gnas skabs la mkhas pa rnams ni dge ba’i chos rnams la brgya rtsa bcu dgur sems te | ’di lta ste | rnam par śes pa daṅ | tshor ba daṅ | ’du śes daṅ | sems pa daṅ| reg pa daṅ | yid la byed pa daṅ | ’dun pa daṅ | mos pa daṅ | brtson ’grus daṅ | dran pa daṅ | tiṅ ṅe ’dzin daṅ | śes rab daṅ | btaṅ sñoms daṅ | sbyor ba daṅ | yaṅ dag par sbyor ba daṅ | thob pa daṅ | lhag pa’i bsam pa daṅ| khoṅ khro ba med pa daṅ | dga’ ba daṅ | ’bad pa daṅ | rtsol ba daṅ | rmoṅs pa med pa daṅ | spro ba daṅ | gnod pa med pa daṅ | dbaṅ daṅ ldan pa daṅ | khoṅ khro daṅ | yid la gcags pa med pa daṅ | ’dzin pa daṅ | mi ’dzin pa daṅ | dran pa daṅ | brtan pa daṅ| lhag par źen pa daṅ | rmoṅs ’brel daṅ | spro ba med pa daṅ | don du gñer ba daṅ | smon lam daṅ | rgyags pa daṅ | yul daṅ mi ldan pa daṅ | ṅes par ’byin pa ma yin pa daṅ | skye ba daṅ | gnas pa daṅ mi rtag pa daṅ | rga ba daṅ | ldan pa daṅ | yoṅs su gduṅs pa daṅ | mi dga’ ba daṅ | rtog pa daṅ | sdug pa daṅ | daṅ ba daṅ | ’dod pa daṅ | mi mthun pa daṅ | mthun par ’dzin pa daṅ | rjes su mi mthun par bzuṅ ba daṅ | mi ’jigs pa daṅ | źes daṅ | ri mor byed pa daṅ | dad pa daṅ | ma dad pa daṅ | bsgo ba bźin byed pa daṅ | gus pa daṅ | ma gus pa daṅ | rgod pa daṅ | śin tu sbyaṅs pa daṅ| ṅag daṅ| ’gul ba daṅ| grub pa daṅ| ma daṅ ba daṅ| śin tu ma sbyaṅs pa daṅ| rnam par byaṅ ba daṅ| brtan pa daṅ| des pa daṅ| yid la gcags pa daṅ| mya ṅan daṅ| ’khrugs pa daṅ| rgyags pa daṅ| mi mthun par ’dzin pa daṅ| the tshom daṅ| sdom pa daṅ | yoṅs su dag pa daṅ | naṅ legs par daṅ ba daṅ | ’jigs pa’i phyogs gcig daṅ | dad pa daṅ | ṅo tsha śes pa daṅ | gnam pa daṅ | mi ’drid pa daṅ | ñe bar źi ba daṅ | rtab bag ma yin pa daṅ | bag yod pa daṅ | byams par lta ba daṅ | so sor brtag pa daṅ | yid byuṅ ba daṅ | yoṅs su gduṅs pa med pa daṅ | rgyags pa med pa daṅ | chags pa med pa daṅ | źe sdaṅ med pa daṅ | gti mug med pa daṅ | thams cad śes pa ñid daṅ | mi gtoṅ ba daṅ | ’byor ba daṅ | khrel yod pa daṅ | mi ’chab pa daṅ | sñiṅ rje daṅ | sems pa mi gtoṅ ba daṅ | byams pa daṅ | źum pa med pa daṅ | dga’ bral ba daṅ | rdzu ’phrul daṅ | khon du mi ’dzin pa daṅ | phrag dog med pa daṅ | sems yoṅs su gdug pa med pa daṅ | bzod pa daṅ | rnam par spaṅs ba daṅ | des pa ma yin pa daṅ | yoṅs su loṅs spyod pa’i rjes su mthun pa daṅ | bsod nams daṅ | ’du śes pa’i sñoms par ’jug pa daṅ | ṅes par ’byin pa ñid daṅ | thams cad mi śes pa ñid daṅ | ’du ma byas pa’i chos so źes de ltar dge ba’i chos rnams la dge ba’i raṅ bźin brgya rtsa bcu dgu daṅ | de bźin du mi dge ba’i chos rnams pa mi dge ba’i raṅ bźin daṅ | bsgribs la luṅ du ma bstan pa rnams la bsgribs la luṅ du ma bstan pa’i raṅ bźin daṅ ma bsgribs la luṅ du ma bstan pa rnams la ma bsgribs la luṅ du ma bstan pa’i raṅ bźin daṅ | ’dod par gsuṅs pa rnams la ’dod par gsuṅs pa daṅ | gzugs su gsuṅs pa rnams la gzugs su gsuṅs pa daṅ | gzugs med par gsuṅs pa rnams la gzugs med par gsuṅs pa daṅ | zag pa med pa rnams la zag pa med pa daṅ | sdug bsṅal daṅ | kun ’byuṅ ba daṅ | ’gog pa daṅ | lam źes bya ba rnams la sdug bsṅal daṅ | kun ’byuṅ ba daṅ | ’gog pa daṅ | lam źes bya ba’i raṅ bźin daṅ | bsgoms pas spaṅ bar bya ba rnams la bsgoms pas spaṅ bar bya ba daṅ | spaṅ bar bya ba ma yin pa rnams la spaṅ bar bya ba ma yin pa’i raṅ bźin du sems te | de’i phyir de ltar na rnam pa du ma’i chos kyi raṅ bźin mthoṅ bas de bas na dṅos po thams cad ni raṅ bźin med pa ste | raṅ bźin med pa ñid yin pa’i phyir stoṅ pa’o źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de mi ruṅ ṅo ||

kiṃ cānyat | nairyāṇikasvabhāvo dharmā nairyāṇikāś ca ye teṣāṃ |
dharmāvasthoktānām evam anairyāṇikādīnām ||8||

此復有義
偈言出法出法體是聖人所說
如是不出法不出法自體

’di ltar gźan yaṅ |
ṅes ’byin la sogs rnams kyi chos || gnas skabs gsuṅs pa de rnams la |
| ṅes ’byin raṅ bźin chos rnams daṅ || ṅes ’byin min gaṅ tshul de bźin |

And those things which lead to emancipation have an intrinsic nature that leads to emancipation. Similarly with the things which do not lead to emancipation, and so on, things which have been mentioned in connection with the state of things.

iha ca dharmāvasthoktānāṃ nairyāṇikānāṃ dharmānāṃ nairyāṇikaḥ svabhāvaḥ, anairyāṇikānām anairyāṇikaḥ, bodhyaṅgikānāṃ bodhyaṅgikaḥ, abodhyaṅgikānām abodhyaṅgikaḥ, bodhipakṣikāṇāṃ bodhipakṣikaḥ, abodhipakṣikāṇām bodhipakṣikaḥ | evam api śeṣāṇām | tad yasmād evam anekaprakāro dharmāṇāṃ svabhāvo dṛṣṭas tasmād yadyuktaṃ niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā niḥsvabhāvatvāc chūnyā iti tad na |

此偈明何義如說出法出法自體如是不出法不淨法自體覺分覺分自體菩提分菩提分自體非菩提分非菩提分自體如是餘法皆亦如是若如是見彼無量種諸法自體而如是說一切諸法皆無自體以無自體名為空者義不相應

’di la ṅes par ’byin pa’i chos kyi gnas skabs gsuṅs pa rnams la ṅes par ’byin pa’i raṅ bźin daṅ | ṅes par ’byin pa ma yin pa rnams la ṅes par ’byin pa ma yin pa’i raṅ bźin daṅ | byaṅ chub kyi yan lag daṅ ldan pa rnams la byaṅ chub kyi yan lag daṅ ldan pa daṅ | byaṅ chub kyi yan lag daṅ mi ldan pa rnams la byaṅ chub kyi yan lag daṅ mi ldan pa daṅ | byaṅ chub kyi phyogs daṅ ldan pa rnams la byaṅ chub kyi phyogs daṅ ldan pa daṅ | byaṅ chub kyi phyogs daṅ mi ldan pa rnams la byaṅ chub kyi phyogs daṅ mi ldan pa daṅ lhag ma rnams la yaṅ de bźin te | de’i phyir de ltar rnam pa du ma’i chos rnams kyi raṅ bźin mthoṅ ba de’i phyir dṅos po thams cad ni raṅ bźin med pa ste | de bas na stoṅ pa’o źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de mi ruṅ ṅo ||

Thus, since the intrinsic nature of things is in this way seen to be of different kinds, your statement that all things are devoid of an intrinsic nature and that being devoid of an intrinsic nature they are void, is not valid. Furthermore:

kiṃ cānyat | yadi ca na bhavet svabhāvo dharmāṇāṃ niḥsvabhāva ity eva |
nāmāpi bhaven naivaṃ nāma hi nirvastukaṃ nāsti ||9||

又復有義
偈言諸法若無體無體不得名
有自體有名唯名云何名

’di ltar gźan yaṅ |
gal te chos kyi raṅ bźin med || raṅ bźin med ces bya ba’i miṅ |
| miṅ yaṅ de bźin med ’gyur ñid || gźi med miṅ ni med phyir ro |

If the things had no intrinsic nature, then even the name ‘absence of intrinsic nature’ would not exist; for there is no name without an object [to be named].

yadi sarvadharmāṇāṃ svabhāvo na bhavet tatrāpi niḥsvabhāvo bhavet | tatra niḥsvabhāva ity evaṃ nāmāpi na bhavet | kasmāt | nāma hi nirvastukaṃ kiṃcid api nāsti | tasmān nāmasadbhāvāt svabhāvo bhāvānām asti svabhāvasadbhāvāc cāśūnyāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ | tasmad yad uktaṃ niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā niḥsvabhāvatvāc chūnyā iti tad na |

此偈明何義若一切法皆無自體說無自體言語亦無何以故有物有名無物無名以一切法皆有名故當知諸法皆有自體法有自體故不得言一切法空如是若說一切法空無自體者義不相應

gal te chos thams cad kyi raṅ bźin med pa yin na de la yaṅ raṅ bźin med do źes bya ba’i miṅ yaṅ de bźin du med par ’gyur ro || ci’i phyir źe na | gźi med pa’i miṅ ni ’ga’ yaṅ med pa’i phyir ro || de bas na mi srid pa’i phyir dṅos po rnams kyi raṅ bźin yod do || raṅ bźin yod pa’i phyir dṅos po thams cad stoṅ pa ma yin no || de bas na chos thams cad raṅ bźin med pa ste | raṅ bźin med pa ñid yin pa’i phyir stoṅ pa’o źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de rigs pa ma yin no ||

If all things were devoid of an intrinsic nature, there would, nevertheless, be an absence of intrinsic nature. [But] then, even the name ‘absence of intrinsic nature’ would not exist. - Why? - Because there is no name whatsoever without an object [to be named].Thus, since the name exists, there is an intrinsic nature of the things; and since they have an intrinsic nature, all things are non-void. Your statement, therefore, that all things are devoid of an intrinsic nature and that, being devoid of an intrinsic nature, they are void, is not valid.

kiṃ cānyat | atha vidyate svabhāvaḥ sa ca dharmāṇāṃ na vidyate tasmāt |
dharmair vinā svabhāvaḥ sa yasya tadyuktam upadeṣṭum ||10||

偈言若離法有名於彼法中無
說離法有名彼人則可難

| ’on te ’di ltar raṅ bźin yod || de ni chos la med ce na |
| chos rnams med pa’i raṅ bźin te || gaṅ gi yin pa de bstan rigs |

Moreover: Now you may say: There is an intrinsic nature, but that does not belong to the things. There is, then, an intrinsic nature without the things, and you should explain to what it belongs.

atha manyase mā bhūd avastukaṃ nāmeti kṛtvāsti svabhāvaḥ, sa punar dharmāṇāṃ na saṃbhavati, evaṃ dharmaśūnyatāniḥsvabhāvatvād dharmāṇāṃ siddhā bhaviṣyati, na ca nirvastukaṃ nāmeti, atra vayaṃ brūmaḥ | evaṃ yasyedānīṃ sa svabhāvo dharmavinirmuktasyārthasya sa yuktam upadeṣṭum arthaḥ | sa ca nopadiṣṭaḥ | tasmād yā kalpanāsti svabhāvo na sa punar dharmāṇām iti sā hīnā |

此偈明何義若汝意謂有法有名離法有名如是一切諸法皆空無自體成非物無名有物有名此我今說若如是者有何等人說離法體別有名字若別有名別有法者則不得示彼不可示如是汝心分別別有諸法別有名者是義不然

’on te gźi med pa’i miṅ du gyur na mi ruṅ ṅo sñam nas raṅ bźin ni yod la | de yaṅ chos thams cad la ni mi srid do || de ltar na chos rnams raṅ bźin med pa’i phyir chos ni stoṅ par ’gyur la | miṅ gźi med par yaṅ ma yin no sñam du sems na | ’dir smra bar bya ste | de lta yin na raṅ bźin de chos la gtogs pa’i don gaṅ yin pa’i don de bstan par rigs so || de yaṅ ma bstan pas de’i phyir raṅ bźin ni yod la | de yaṅ chos rnams ni med do ces rtog pa gaṅ yin pa de ñams so ||

Now you may fancy: Let there be no name without an object; there is an intrinsic nature, but that does not belong to the things; thus, the voidness of the things because of their being devoid of an intrinsic nature will be established, and the name will not be without an object [to be named ].- To this we reply: You should explain that object, apart from the things, to which now belongs thus that intrinsic nature. You have, however, not explained that. Hence your assumption: ‘there is an intrinsic nature but it does not belong to the things’, is ruled out.

kiṃ cānyat | sata eva pratiṣedho nāsti ghaṭo geha ity ayaṃ yasmāt |
dṛṣṭaḥ pratiṣedho ’yaṃ sataḥ svabhāvasya te tasmāt ||11||

又復有義偈言
法若有自體可得遮諸法
諸法若無體竟為何所遮
如有瓶有？可得遮瓶？
見有物則遮見無物不遮

’di ltar gźan yaṅ |
gaṅ phyir khyim na bum pa de || med ces yod pa ñid la ’gog |
| mthoṅ ste de phyir khyod kyis ’di || yod pa’i raṅ bźin ’gog pa yin |

Furthermore: Since the negation ’There is no pot in the house’ is seen to be only of an existent, this negation of yours is that of an existent intrinsic nature.

iha ca sato ’rthasya pratiṣedhaḥ kriyate nāsataḥ | tadyathā nāstighaṭo geha iti sato ghaṭasya pratiṣedhaḥ kriyate nāsataḥ | evam eva nāsti svabhāvo dharmāṇāṃ iti sataḥ svabhāvasya pratiṣedhaḥ prāpnoti nāsataḥ | tatra yad uktaṃ niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā iti tad na | pratisedhasaṃbhāvād eva sarvabhāvasvabhāvo ’pratiṣiddhaḥ |

此偈明何義有物得遮無物不遮如無瓶？則不須遮有瓶得遮無瓶不遮如是如是法無自體則不須遮法有自體可得有遮無云何處若一切法皆無自體而便遮言一切諸法無自體者義不相應汝何所遮若有遮體能遮一切諸法自體

’di la don yod pa la ’gog par byed kyi | med pa la ni ma yin te | dper na khyim na bum pa med ces bya ba lta bu ste | bum pa yod pa la ’gog pa yin gyi | med pa la ni ma yin no || de bźin du chos rnams kyi raṅ bźin med do źes bya ba yaṅ raṅ bźin yod pa la ’gog par || ’gyur ba yin gyi | med pa la ni ma yin pas de la chos thams cad kyi raṅ bźin med do źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de mi ruṅ ṅo || ’di ltar gźan yaṅ ’gog pa yod pa ñid kyi phyir dṅos po thams cad kyi raṅ bźin rab tu grub pa yin no ||

It is only an existent object that is negated, not a non-existent one, For instance, when it is said: ‘There is no pot in the house’, it is an existent pot that is negated, not a non-existent one. In like manner it follows that the negation ‘The things have no intrinsic nature’ is the negation of an existent intrinsic nature, not of a non-existent one. In these circumstances, the statement that all things are devoid of an intrinsic nature is not valid. By the very fact that a negation is possible, the intrinsic nature of all things is non-negated.

kiṃ cānyat | atha nāsti sa svabhāvaḥ kiṃ nu pratiṣidhyate tvayānena | vacanena rte vacanāt pratiṣedhaḥ sidhyate hy asataḥ ||12||

偈言若法無自體言語何所遮
若無法得遮無語亦成遮

| ji ltar raṅ bźin de med na || khyod kyi tshig des ci źig dgag |
| med pa yin na tshig med par || ’gog par rab tu grub pa yin |

If that intrinsic nature does not exist, what, then, do you negate by this statement? The negation of a non-existent is established without words.

atha nāsty eva sa svabhāvo ’nena vacanena niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā iti kiṃ bhavatā pratiṣidhyate | asato hi vacanād vinā siddhaḥ pratiṣedhaḥ, tadyathāgneḥ śaityasya, apām auṣṇyasya |

此偈明何義若法無體語亦無體云何遮言一切諸法皆無自體若如是遮不說言語亦得成遮若如是者火冷水堅如是等過

ji ste raṅ bźin de med pa ñid yin na ni | dṅos po thams cad raṅ bźin med do źes bya ba’i tshig ’dis khyod kyis ci źig ’gog par byed | ’di ltar med pa la ni tshig med par yaṅ ’gog par ’grub ste | ji ltar me la graṅ ba ñid daṅ | chu la tsha ba ñid lta bu’o ||

If that intrinsic nature does not really exist, what do you negate by this statement: ‘All things are devoid of an intrinsic nature’? The negation of a non-existent, e.g., that of the coolness of fire or of the heat of water is established without words. Furthermore:

kiṃ cānyat | bālānām iva mithyā mṛgatṛṣṇāyāṃ yathājalagrāhaḥ |
evaṃ mithyāgrāhaḥ syāt te pratiṣedhyato hy asataḥ ||13||

又復有義偈言
如愚癡之人妄取炎為水
若汝遮妄取其事亦如是

’di ltar gźan yaṅ |
byis pa rnams ni smig rgyu la || ji ltar log par chur ’dzin ltar |
| de bźin khyod kyis log par ’dzin || yod par min la dgag par bya |

Just as ignorant people wrongly perceive a mirage as water, [and that wrong perception is removed by some person who knows, in like manner you may think that] you negate a wrong perception of a non-entity.

syāt te buddhiḥ, yathā bālānāṃ mṛgatṛṣṇāyāṃ mithyā jalam iti grāho bhavati, nanu nirjalā sā mṛgatṛṣṇeti tatra paṇḍitajātīyena_puruṣeṇocyate tasya grāhasya vinivartanārtham, evaṃ niḥsvabhāveṣu yaḥ svabhāve grāhaḥ sattvānāṃ tasya vyāvartanārthaṃ niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā ity ucyata iti, atra brūmaḥ |

此偈明何義若汝意謂如愚癡人取炎為水於無水中虛妄取水有黠慧人為迥彼心而語之言汝妄取水如是如是於無自體一切法中取法自體為彼眾生妄心迥故說一切法皆無自體此我今說偈言

khyod kyi blo la ji ltar byis pa rnams smig rgyu la log par chur ’dzin pa na | de skyes bu mkhas pa’i raṅ bźin can gyis ’dzin pa de bzlog pa’i phyir de na chu med kyi | de ni smig rgyu’o źes zer ba de bźin du raṅ bźin med pa rnams la sems can rnams kyi raṅ bźin du ’dzin pa gaṅ yin pa de bzlog pa’i phyir dṅos po thams cad ni raṅ bźin med pa’o źes bya ba’o sñam du sems na | ’dir smra bar bya ste |

When ignorant people wrongly perceive a mirage as water, a scholarly person, in order to remove that perception, says: ‘But that mirage is without water’. Likewise, you may think that the statement ‘All things are devoid of an intrinsic nature’ is meant for removing people’s perception of an intrinsic nature in things that are devoid of an intrinsic nature. To this we reply:

nanv evaṃ saty asti grāho grāhyaṃ catad grahītā ca |
pratiṣedhaḥ pratiṣedhyaṃ pratiṣeddhāceti ṣaṭkaṃ tat ||14||

取所取能取遮所遮能
遮如是六種義皆悉是有法

| de lta na ni ’dzin pa daṅ || gzuṅ ba ’dzin pa po de daṅ |
| ’gog pa dgag bya ’gog pa po || de drug yod pa ma yin nam |

But this being so, the aggregate of the six following things exists: the perception, the object to be perceived, the perceiver of that object, the negation, the object to be negated, and the negation.

yady evaṃ, asti tāvat sattvānāṃ grāhaḥ, asti grāhyaṃ, santi ca tad grahītāraḥ, asti pratiṣedhastasyāpi mithyāgrāhasya, asti pratiṣedhyaṃ yad idaṃ mithyāgrāho nāma, santi ca pratiṣeddhāro yuṣmad ādayo ’sya grāhasyeti siddhaṃ ṣaṭkaṃ | tasya ṣaṭkasya prasiddhatvād yad uktaṃ śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti tad na |

此偈明何義若當如是有眾生者有取所取有能取者得言虛妄遮所遮等如是六種義成若六義成而說諸一切空者是義不然偈言

6 gal te de lta na ni re źig sems can rnams kyi ’dzin pa yaṅ yod pa daṅ | gzuṅ ba yod pa daṅ | de ’dzin pa po yod pa daṅ | log par ’dzin pa de ’gog pa yaṅ yod pa daṅ | dgag par bya ba log par ’dzin pa de yaṅ yod pa daṅ | khyed la sogs pa ’dzin pa de ’gog pa po yaṅ yod de | drug tu grub pa ma yin nam | de drug tu gyur na ni | ma bkag pa ñid yin pa’i phyir daṅ dṅos po thams cad ni stoṅ pa’o źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de mi ruṅ ṅo ||

If this is so, then the perception of people, the object to be perceived, people who perceive it, the negation of that wrong perception, the object to be negated, viz., the wrong perception, and people like you who negate this perception - all these exist. The aggregate of the six is, therefore, established. [And] that aggregate of the six being established, your statement that all things are void is not valid.

atha naivāsti grāho naiva grāhyaṃ na ca grahītāraḥ |
pratiṣedhaḥ pratiṣedhyaṃ pratiṣeddhāro nanu na santi ||15||

若無取所取亦無有能
取則無遮所遮亦無有能遮

| ji ste ’dzin pa yod min źiṅ || gzuṅ med ’dzin pa po med na |
| ’o na ’gog daṅ dgag bya daṅ || ’gog pa po yaṅ yod min te |

You may think that there is no perception, no object to be perceived, and no perceiver. But, in that case, there is no negation, no object to be negated, and no negator.

atha mā bhūd eṣa doṣa iti kṛtvā naiva grāho ’sti naiva grāhyaṃ na ca grahītāra ity evaṃ sati grāhasya yaḥ pratiṣedho niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā iti so ’pi nāsti, pratiṣedhyam api nāsti, pratiṣeddhāro ’pi na santi |

此偈明何義若汝意謂無如量過非取所取非能取者彼若如是虛妄取遮一切諸法無自體者彼遮亦無所遮亦無能遮亦無偈言

ci ste skyon der gyur na mi ruṅ ṅo sñam nas ’dzin pa yaṅ med | gzuṅ ba yaṅ med ’dzin pa po yaṅ med do źe na | de lta na ni dṅos po thams cad ni raṅ bźin med do źes bya ba ’dzin pa ’gog pa gaṅ yin pa de yaṅ med la | dgag par bya ba yaṅ med | ’gog pa po yaṅ med par ’gyur te |

If, in order to avoid this defect, you say that there is no perception, no object to be perceived, and no perceiver, then even the negation of the perception, viz., the statement that all things are void, does not exist. The object to be negated and the negators, too, do not exist.

pratiṣedhaḥ pratiṣedhyaṃ pratiṣeddhāraś ca yady uta na santi |
siddhā hi sarvabhāvās teṣām eva svabhāvaś ca ||16||

若無遮所遮亦無有能遮
則一切法成彼自體亦成

| gal te ’gog daṅ dgag bya daṅ || ’gog pa po yaṅ yod min na |
| dṅos po kun daṅ de rnams kyi || raṅ bźin ñid kyaṅ grub yin na |

And if there is no negation, no object to be negated and no negator, then all things are established, as well as their intrinsic nature.

yadi ca na pratiṣedho na pratiṣedhyaṃ na pratiṣeddhāraḥ santyapratiṣiddhāḥ sarvabhāvā asti ca sarvabhāvānāṃ svabhāvaḥ |

此偈明何義若非有遮非有所遮非有能遮是則不遮一切諸法則一切法皆有自體

gal te ’gog pa yaṅ med | dgag par bya ba yaṅ med | ’gog pa po yaṅ med na ni | dṅos po thams cad kyaṅ ma bkag par yod la | dṅos po rnams kyi raṅ bźin yaṅ yod do ||

And if there is no negation, no object to be negated, and no negator, then all things are non-negated, and they have an intrinsic nature.

kiṃ cānyat | hetoś ca te na siddhir naiḥ svābhāvyāt kuto hi te hetuḥ |
nirhetukasya siddhir na copapannāsya te ’rthasya ||17||

偈言
汝因則不成無體云何因
若法無因者云何得言成

’di ltar gźan yaṅ |
khyod la gtan tshigs ma grub ste || raṅ bźin med phyir khyod gtan tshigs || ṅa la yaṅ źes bya ba ni ṅed la yaṅ ṅo |
| gaṅ la yod de khyod don te || gtan tshigs med phyir grub mi ’thad |

Furthermore:Your ‘reason’ [for establishing your thesis] cannot be established. How can there be, indeed, a ‘reason’ for you, when everything is devoid of an intrinsic nature? And this thesis of yours which is devoid of a ‘reason’, cannot be established.

niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā ity etasminn arthe te hetor asiddhiḥ | kiṃ kāraṇam | niḥsvabhāvatvād dhi sarvabhāvānāṃ śūnyatvāt tato hetuḥ kutaḥ | asati hetau nirhetukasyārthasya śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti kuta eva prasiddhiḥ | tatra yad uktaṃ śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti tad na |

此偈明何義若一切法空無自體如是義中說因不成何以故一切諸法空無自體何處有因若法無因一切法空以何因成是故汝說一切法空無自體者是義不然

dṅos po thams cad ni raṅ bźin med do źes bya ba’i don ’di la khyod kyi gtan tshigs ma grub ste | de ci’i phyir źe na | dṅos po thams cad ni raṅ bźin med pa’i phyir stoṅ pa ñid yin pas de’i phyir gtan tshigs ga la yod | gtan tshigs med na ni gtan tshigs med par dṅos po thams cad stoṅ pa’o źes bya ba’i don gaṅ la grub pas de la dṅos po thams cad stoṅ pa’o źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de mi ruṅ bo ||

Your reason for the thesis that all things are devoid of an intrinsic nature cannot be established. - Why? – Because all things, being devoid of an intrinsic nature, are void. How, therefore, can there be a reason? [And] if there is no reason, how indeed can the thesis devoid of a reason, namely that all things are void, be established? - In these circumstances, your statement that all things are void is not valid.

kiṃ cānyat | yadi cāhetoḥ siddhiḥ svabhāvavinivartanasya te bhavati |
svābhāvyasyāstitvaṃ mamāpi nirhetukaṃ siddham ||18||

偈言
汝若無因成諸法自體迥
我亦無因成諸法有自體

’di ltar gźan yaṅ || ṅa la yaṅ źes bya ba ni ṅed la yaṅ ṅo |
khyod la gtan tshigs med par yaṅ || raṅ bźin bzlog pa grub yin na || ṅa la yaṅ źes bya ba ni ṅed la yaṅ ṅo |
| ṅa la ’aṅ gtan tshigs med par ni || raṅ bźin ñid ni yod par ’grub |

Moreover: If your negation of the intrinsic nature is established without any reason, my affirmation of the things’ being endowed with an intrinsic nature is also established without any reason.

atha manyase nirhetukī siddhir niḥsvabhāvatvasya bhāvānām iti yathā tava svabhāvavinivartanaṃ nirhetukaṃ siddhaṃ tathā mamāpi svabhāvasadbhāvo nirhetukaḥ siddhaḥ |

此偈明何義若汝意謂我無因成法無自體如汝無因自體迥成我自體法亦無因成偈言

ci ste de la gtan tshigs med par yaṅ dṅos po rnams kyi raṅ bźin med par ’grub po sñam du sems na | ji ltar khyod la gtan tshigs med par raṅ bźin bzlog pa grub pa de bźin du | ṅa la yaṅ gtan tshigs med par dṅos po’i raṅ bźin yod par ’grub bo || ṅa la yaṅ źes bya ba ni ṅed la yaṅ ṅo |

atha hetor astitvaṃ bhāvāsvābhāvyam ity anupapannam |
lokeṣu niḥsvabhāvo na hi kaścana vidyate bhāvaḥ ||19||

若有因無體是義不相應
世間無體法則不得言有

| gal te gtan tshigs yod na dṅos || raṅ bźin med ces bya mi ’thad |
| ’jig rten na ni raṅ bźin med || dṅos po ’ga’ yaṅ yod min no ||

If you think that the fact that the things are devoid of an intrinsic nature is the existence of the reason, [we answer:] that argument is not valid.- Why? - Because there is nothing in the world that is existent, while being devoid of an intrinsic nature.

yadi hetor astitvaṃ manyase niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā iti, tad anupapannam | kiṃ kāraṇam | na hi loke niḥsvabhāvaḥ kaści bhāvo ’sti |

此偈明何義若汝意謂我有因成因無自體若如是者無自體義則不相應何以故一切世間無自體者

gal || te dṅos po rnams kyi raṅ bźin med pa ñid kyi gtan tshigs yod pa kho na’o sñam du sems na | de lta na ni dṅos po thams cad raṅ bźin med do źes bya ba mi ’thad do || ci’i phyir źe na | ’jig rten na raṅ bźin med pa’i dṅos po ’ga’ yaṅ yod pa ma yin no || ’di ltar raṅ bźin yod min na ||

kiṃ cānyat | pūrvaṃ cet pratiṣedhaḥ paścāt pratiṣedhyam ity anupapannam |
paścāc cānupapanno yugapac ca yata svabhāvaḥ san ||20||

不得言有 <偈言br />前遮後所遮如是不相應
若後遮及並如是知有體

| gal te ’gog sṅa dgag phyi źes || zer na ’thad pa ma yin la |
| ’phyi źiṅ cig car ’aṅ mi ’thad do || raṅ bźin med pa źes bya ba |

It is not possible to hold that the negation comes first and then the thing to be negated. Nor is it possible to hold that the negation comes after [the thing to be negated], or that they are simultaneous. - The intrinsic nature of the things is, therefore, existent.

iha pūrvaṃ cet pratiṣedhaḥ paścāc ca pratiṣedyam iti nopapannam | asati hi pratiṣedhye kasya pratiṣedhaḥ | atha paścāt pratiṣedhaḥ pūrvaṃ pratiṣedhyam iti ca nopapannam | siddhe hi pratiṣedhye kiṃ pratiṣedhaḥ karoti | atha yugapatpratiṣedhapratiṣedhya iti tathāpi na pratiṣedhaḥ pratiṣedhyasyārthasya kāraṇam, pratiṣedhyo na pratiṣedhasya ca, yathā yugapadutpannayoḥ śaśaviṣāṇayor naiva dakṣiṇaṃ savyasya kāraṇaṃ savyaṃ vā dakṣiṇasya kāraṇaṃ bhavatīti | tatra yad uktaṃ niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā iti tad na | atrocyate | yat tāvad bhavatoktaṃ sarveṣāṃ bhāvānāṃ sarvatra na vidyate svabhāvaś cet | tvadvacanam asvabhāvaṃ na nivartayituṃ svabhāvam alam iti || atra brūmaḥ |

此偈明何義若遮在前所遮在後義不相應未有所遮遮何所遮若遮在後所遮在前亦不相應所遮已成遮何能遮若遮所遮二法同時不相因緣遮不因所遮所遮不因遮皆有自體故則不得言遮如角並生各不相因左不因右右不因左如是若說一切諸法無自體者是義不然釋初分竟迥諍論譯上分第四釋曰如汝所說我今答汝汝說偈言若一切無體言語是一切言語自無體何能遮後體此偈我今答偈言

’dir gal te ’gog pa ni sṅa la dgag par bya ba ni ’phyi’o źe na | ’thad pa ma yin te | dgag par bya ba yod pa ma yin na gaṅ gi ’gog pa yin par ’gyur ro || ’on te ’gog pa ni ’phyi la dgag par bya ba ni sṅa’o źe na | de ’thad pa ma yin te | dgag par bya ba grub zin na | ci źig ’gog par byed | ’on te ’gog pa daṅ dgag par bya ba ’gog mñam mo źe na | de lta na yaṅ ’gog pa ni dgag par bya ba’i don gyi rgyu ma yin la | dgag par bya ba yaṅ ’gog pa’i ma yin te | dper na ri boṅ gi rva g-yas g-yon gñis mgo mñam du skyes pa lta bu ste | rva g-yas pa yaṅ g-yon pa’i rgyu ma yin pa | g-yon pa yaṅ g-yas pa’i rgyu ma yin pa lta bu yin pas de la dṅos po thams cad raṅ bźin med do źes pa gaṅ yin pa de mi ruṅ ṅo || ’dir bśad pa re źig khyod kyis | gal te dṅos po thams cad kyi || raṅ bźin kun la’aṅ yod min na || khyod kyi tshigs kyaṅ raṅ bźin med || raṅ bźin bzlog par mi nus so || źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de la bśad par bya ste |

It is not possible to hold that the negation comes first and then the thing to be negated. For, if the thing to be negated does not exist, of what is the negation? Nor is it possible to hold that the negation comes after the thing to be negated. For, if the thing to be negated is [already] established, what purpose is served by the negation? Now [if you say that] the negation and the thing to be negated are simultaneous, [we answer]: even in that way, the negation is not the cause of the object to be negated, nor is the object to be negated the cause of the negation, just as of the two horns, grown simultaneously, the right horn is not the cause of the left horn, nor is the left horn the cause of the right horn. - In these circumstances, your statement that all things are void is not valid.

hetupratyayasāmagryāṃ ca pṛṭhak cāpi madvaco na yadi |
nanu śūnyatvaṃ siddhiṃ bhāvānām asvabhāvatvāt ||21||

我語言若離因緣和合法
是則空義成諸法無自體

| gal te ṅa’i tshig rgyu rkyen daṅ || tshogs daṅ tha dad pa yaṅ med |
| ’o na dṅos rnams stoṅ grub ste || raṅ bźin med pa ñid phyir ro |

If my statement does not exist in the combination of the cause and the conditions, or independently of them, then the voidness of the things is established because of their being devoid of an intrinsic nature.

yadi madvaco hetau nāsti mahābhūteṣu saṃprayukteṣu viprayukteṣu vā, pratyayeṣu nāsty uraḥkaṇṭhauṣṭhajjihvādantamūlatālunāsikāmūrdhaprabhṛtiṣu yatneṣu, nobhayasāmagryām asti, hetupratyayasāmagrīvinirmuktaṃ pṛthag eva ca nāsti, tasmān niḥsvabhāvam, niḥsvabhāvatvāc chūnyam | nanu śūnyatatvaṃ siddhaṃ niḥsvabhāvatvād asya madīyavacasaḥ | yathā caitan madvacanaṃ niḥsvabhāvatvāc chūnyaṃ tathā sarvabhāvā api niḥsvabhāvatvāc chūnyā iti | tatra yad bhavatoktaṃ tvadīyavacasaḥ śūnyatvāc chūnyatā sarvabhāvānāṃ nopapadyata iti tad na |

此偈明何義若彼言語因中大中和合中無離散中無咖喉脣舌齒根？鼻頂等諸處皆各有力如是二處和合中無若離如是因緣和合更無別法以如是故無有自體無自體故我言一切皆無自體空義則成如此言語無自體空諸法如是無自體空是故汝言汝語空故不能說空是義不然

gal te ṅa’i tshig rgyu ’byuṅ ba chen po rnams daṅ mtshuṅs par ldan pa rnams daṅ | ldan pa ma yin pa rnams la yaṅ med | rkyen braṅ daṅ | lkog ma daṅ | mchu daṅ | lce daṅ | so’i thun daṅ | rkan daṅ | sna daṅ | spyi bo la sogs pa daṅ | ’bad pa rnams la yaṅ med | gñi ga tshogs pa la yaṅ med | rgyu daṅ rkyen tshogs pa la yaṅ med | rgyu daṅ rkyen tshogs pa las ma gtogs pa tha dad pa yaṅ med do || de’i phyir raṅ bźin med pa yin te | raṅ bźin med pa’i phyir stoṅ pa yin no źe na | ’o na ni ṅa’i tshig de stoṅ par grub ste | raṅ bźin med pa ñid yin pa’i phyir ro || ji ltar ṅa’i tshig de raṅ bźin med pa ñid yin pa’i phyir stoṅ pa yin pa de bźin du dṅos po thams cad kyaṅ raṅ bźin med pa ñid yin pa’i phyir stoṅ pa yin pas na de la khyod kyis tshig stoṅ pa yin pa’i phyir dṅos po thams cad stoṅ pa ñid du mi ’thad do źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de mi ruṅ ṅo ||

If my statement does not exist in its cause and in its conditions ..., it is devoid of an intrinsic nature and thus void. Now the voidness of this statement of mine is established because of its being devoid of an intrinsic nature. And just as this statement of mine is void because of its being devoid of an intrinsic nature, so also are all things void because of their being devoid of an intrinsic nature. In these circumstances, your statement: ‘Because of the voidness of your statement it is not possible to establish the voidness of all things’, is not valid.

kiṃ cānyat |
yaś ca pratītyabhāvo bhāvānāṃ śūnyateti sā proktā |br />yaś ca pratītyabhāvo bhavati hi tasyāsvabhāvatvam ||22||

又復有義偈言
若因緣法空我今說此義
何人有因緣彼因緣無體

’di ltar gźan yaṅ |
dṅos rnams rten nas byuṅ ba gaṅ || de ni stoṅ ñid ces bya daṅ |
| gaṅ źig rten nas ’byuṅ ba de || raṅ bźin ñid med yin par smra |

FurthermoreThat nature of the things which is dependent is called voidness, for that nature which is dependent is devoid of an intrinsic nature.

śūnyatārthaṃ ca bhavān bhāvānām anavasāya pravṛtta upālambhaṃ vaktuṃ tvadvacanasya niḥsvabhāvatvād bhāvānāṃ svabhāvapratiṣedho nopapadyata iti | iha hi yaḥ pratītyabhāvo bhāvānāṃ sā śūnyatā | kasmāt | niḥsvabhāvatvāt | ye hi pratītyasamutpannā bhāvās te na sasvabhāvā bhavanti svabhāvābhāvāt | kasmāt | hetupratyayasāpekṣatvāt | yadi hi svabhāvato bhāvā bhaveyuḥ, pratyākhyāpi hetupratyayaṃ ca bhaveyuḥ | na caivaṃ bhavanti | tasmān niḥsvabhāvā niḥsvabhāvatvāc chūnyā ity abhidhīyante | evaṃ madīyam api vacanaṃ pratītyasamutpannatvān niḥsvabhāvaṃ niḥsvabhāvatvāc chūnyam ity upapannam | yathā ca pratītyasamutpannatvāt svabhāvaśūnyā api rathapaṭaghaṭādayaḥ sveṣu sveṣu kāryeṣu kāṣṭhatṛṇamṛttikāharaṇe madhūdakapayasāṃ dhāraṇe śītavātātapaparitrāṇaprabhṛtiṣu vartante evam idaṃ madīyavacanaṃ pratītyasamutpannavān niḥsvabhāvam api niḥsvabhāvatvaprasādhane bhāvānāṃ vartate | tatra yad uktaṃ niḥsvabhāvatvāt tvadīyavacanasya śūnyatvaṃ, śūnyatvāt tasya ca tena sarvabhāvasvabhāvapratiṣedho nopapanna iti tad na |

此偈明何義汝不能解一切法空不知空義何能咎我如汝所言汝語言空語無自體無自體故不能遮法此法若是因緣生者生故得言一切法空得言一切皆無自體以何義故知因緣牲法無自體若法一切皆因緣生則一切法皆無自體法無自體則須因緣若有自體何用因緣若離因生則無諸法若因緣生則無自體以無自體故得言空如是我語亦因緣生若因生生則無自體以無自體故得言空以一切法因緣生者自體皆空如？瓶衣蕃等諸物彼法各各自有因緣世間薪草士所作器水蜜乳等將來將去及舉掌等又復寒熱風等障中諸受用法因緣生故皆無自體如是如是我語因緣和合而生如是得言無有自體若無自體如是得言無自體成如是空語世間受用是故汝言無自體故汝語亦空則不能遮諸法自體是義不然

khyod kyis ni dṅos po rnams kyi stoṅ pa ñid kyi don khoṅ du chud par khyod kyi tshig raṅ bźin med pa yin pa’i phyir | dṅos po rnams kyi raṅ bźin ’gog pa mi ’thad de źes klan ka tshol ba smra bar byed de | ’dir ni dṅos po rnams rten nas ’byuṅ ba gaṅ yin pa de ni stoṅ pa ñid yin no || ci’i phyir źe na | raṅ bźin med pa ñid yin pa’i phyir ro || dṅos po gaṅ dag rten ciṅ ’brel bar ’byuṅ ba de dag ni raṅ bźin daṅ bcas pa ma yin te | raṅ bźin med pa’i phyir || ci’i phyir źe na | rgyu daṅ rkyen la ltos pa daṅ bcas pa’i phyir ro || gal te dṅos po rnams raṅ bźin gyis yod pa ni rgyu daṅ rkyen med kyaṅ yod par ’gyur ba źig na | de ltar yaṅ ma yin pas de’i phyir raṅ bźin med pa yin te | des na stoṅ pa’o || źes bya bar ’thad do || de bźin du ṅa’i tshig kyaṅ rten ciṅ ’brel bar ’byuṅ ba yin te | de’i phyir raṅ bźin med do || raṅ bźin med pa ñid yin pa’i phyir stoṅ pa’o źes bya bar ’thad pa yin no || ji ltar bum pa daṅ snam bu la sogs pa rten ciṅ ’brel bar ’byuṅ ba ñid yin pa’i phyir raṅ bźin stoṅ pa yin pa sbraṅ rtse daṅ | chu daṅ | ’o thug ’dzin pa daṅ | len pa daṅ | graṅ ba daṅ | rluṅ daṅ | ñi mas yoṅs su skyob bar nus pa de bźin du ṅa’i tshig kyaṅ rten ciṅ ’brel par ’byuṅ ba yin pa’i phyir raṅ bźin med pa yin yaṅ dṅos po rnams raṅ bźin med par rab || tu sgrub par nus pa yin pas de la khyod kyi tshig raṅ bźin med pa ñid yin pa’i phyir dṅos po thams cad kyi raṅ bźin ’gog pa ’thad pa ma yin no źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de mi ruṅ ṅo ||

You have not understood the meaning of the voidness of the things. So you have set out to criticize me, saying: ‘Since your statement is devoid of an intrinsic nature, the negation of the intrinsic nature of the things is not valid’. That nature of the things which is dependent is voidness. - Why - Because it is devoid of an intrinsic nature. Those things which are dependently originated are not, indeed, endowed with an intrinsic nature; for they have no intrinsic nature. - Why? - Because they are dependent on causes and conditions. If the things were by their own nature, they would be even without the aggregate of causes and conditions. But they are not so. Therefore they are said to be devoid of an intrinsic nature, and hence void. Likewise it follows that my statement also, being dependently originated, is devoid of an intrinsic nature, and hence void. - But things like a cart, a pot, a cloth, etc., though devoid of an intrinsic nature because of being dependently originated, are occupied with their respective functions, e.g., carrying wood, grass and earth, containing honey, water and milk, and protecting from cold, wind and heat. Similarly this statement of mine, though devoid of an intrinsic nature because of being dependently originated, is engaged in the task of establishing the being-devoid-of-an-intrinsic-nature of the things. - In these circumstances, your statement: ‘Your statement, being devoid of an intrinsic nature, is void, and, being void, it cannot negate the intrinsic nature of all things’, is not valid.

kiṃ cānyat | nirmitako nirmitakaṃ māyāpuruṣaḥ svamāyayā sṛṣṭam |
pratiṣedhayeta yadvat pratiṣedho ’yaṃ tathaiva syāt ||23||

又復有義偈言
化入於化入幻入於幻入
如是遮所遮其義亦如是

| ’di ltar gźan yaṅ | sprul pa yis ni sprul pa daṅ || sgyu ma yis ni skyes bu yi |
| sgyu mas phyuṅ la ’gog byed ltar || ’gog pa de yaṅ de bźin ’gyur |

Furthermore:Suppose that a person, artificially created, should prevent another artificial person, or that a magic man should prevent another man created by his own magic [from doing something]. Of the same nature would be this negation.

yathā nirmitakaḥ puruṣo ’nyaṃ nirmitakaṃ puruṣaṃ kasmiṃścid arthe vartamānaṃ pratiṣedhayet, māyākāreṇa vā sṛṣṭo māyāpuruṣo ’nyaṃ māyāpuruṣaṃ svamāyayā sṛṣṭaṃ kasmiṃścid arthe vartamānaṃ pratiṣedhyate, tatra yo nirmitakaḥ puruṣaḥ pratiṣidhyate so ’pi śūnyaḥ | yaḥ pratiṣedhayati so ’pi śūnyaḥ | yo māyāpuruṣaḥ pratiṣidhyate so ’pi śūnyaḥ | yaḥ pratiṣedhayatiso ’pi śūnyaḥ | evam eva madvacanena śūnyenāpi sarvabhāvānāṃ svabhāvapratiṣedha upapannaḥ | tatra yad bhavatoktaṃ śūnyatvāt tvadvacanasya sarvabhāvasvabhāvapratiṣedho nopapanna iti tad na | tatra yo bhavatā ṣaṭkoṭiko vāda uktaḥ so ’pi tenaivapratiṣiddhaḥ | naiva hy evaṃ sati na sarvabhāvāntargataṃ madvacanaṃ, nāsty aśūnyaṃ, nāpi sarvabhāvā aśūnyāḥ | yat punar bhavatoktaṃ atha sasvabhāvam etad vākyaṃ pūrvā hatā pratijñā te | vaiṣamikatvaṃ tasmin viśeṣahetuś ca vaktavya iti || atrāpi brūmaḥ |

此偈明何義甘化丈夫於異化入見有去來種種所作而更遮之如幻丈夫於異幻入見有去來種種所作而便遮之能遮化入彼則是空若彼能遮化入是空所遮化入則亦是空若所遮空遮入亦空能遮幻入彼則是空若彼能遮空遮入亦空所遮幻入則亦是空若所遮空遮入亦空如是如是我語言空如幻化空如是空語能遮一切諸法自體是故汝言汝語空故則不能遮一切諸法有自體者汝彼語言則不相應若汝說言彼六種諍彼如是遮如是我語非一切法我語亦空諸法亦空非一切法皆悉不空又復汝說偈言若語有自體前所立宗壞如是則有過應更說勝因此偈我今答偈言

ji ltar sprul pa’i skyes bus sprul pa’i skyes bu źig don ’ga’ źig gi phyir ’oṅ bar byed pa la ’gog par byed pa daṅ | sgyu ma mkhan gyis phyuṅ ba’i sgyu ma’i skyes bus sgyu ma’i skyes bu gźan źig don ’ga’ źig gi phyir ’oṅ bar byed pa la ’gog par byed pa bźin te de la sprul pa’i skyes bu dgag par bya ba gaṅ yin pa de yaṅ stoṅ pa yin | ’gog par byed pa de yaṅ stoṅ pa yin sgyu ma’i skyes bu dgag par bya ba gaṅ yin pa de yaṅ stoṅ pa yin ’gog par byed pa gaṅ yin pa de yaṅ stoṅ pa yin pa de bźin du ṅa’i tshig stoṅ pas kyaṅ dṅos po thams cad stoṅ pa ñid du dṅos po thams cad kyi raṅ bźin ’gog pa ’thad pa na de la khyod kyi tshig stoṅ pa ñid yin pa’i phyir dṅos po thams cad kyi raṅ bźin ’gog pa ’thad pa ma yin no źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de ruṅ ba ma yin no || de la khyod kyis mu drug tu smras pa gaṅ yin pa de yaṅ de ñid kyis bkag pa yin te | de lta yin na thams cad kyi naṅ du ṅa’i tshig kyaṅ ma ’dus pa yin źiṅ mi stoṅ ba’aṅ ma yin la | dṅos po thams cad kyaṅ mi stoṅ ba ma yin no || yaṅ khyod kyis | ’on te tshig de raṅ bźin bcas || khyod kyi dam bcas sṅa ma ñams || mi ’dra ñid de de yin na || gtan tshig khyad par brjod par byos || źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa ’di la bśad par bya ste |

(not complete)There, the artificial man who is prevented is void, and he (the artificial man) who prevents is also void; the magic man who is prevented is void, and he (the magic man) who prevents is also void. In like manner, a negation of the intrinsic nature of all things by my statement is possible, even though this statement is void. In these circumstances, your statement: ‘Because of the voidness of your statement, a negation of the intrinsic nature of all things is not possible’, is not valid. In this way is also prevented the controversial discussion in six points that you spoke of. For, this being so, it is not true that my statement is not included in all things; there is nothing that is non-void; nor are all things non-void. Now about your statement [contained in v. 11 above]:

na svābhāvikam etad vākyaṃ tasmān na vādahānirme |
nāsti ca vaiṣamikatvaṃ viśeṣahetuś cana nigadyaḥ ||24||

言語無自體所說亦無體
我如是無過不須說勝因

| ṅa’i tshig de raṅ bźin med || de phyir smras pa ma ñams la |
| mi ’dra ñid kyaṅ med pas na || gtan tshigs khyad par bśad mi bya |

This statement is not endowed with an intrinsic nature. There is therefore no abandonment of position on my part. There is no discordance, and [hence] there is no special reason to be stated.

na tāvan mamaitad vacanaṃ pratītyasamutpannatvāt svabhāvopapannam | yathā pūrvam uktaṃ svabhāvānupapannatvāc chūnyam iti | yasmāc cedam api madvacanaṃ śūnyaṃ śeṣā api sarvabhāvāḥ śūnyāḥ, tasmānnāsti vaiṣamikatvam | yadi hi vayaṃ brūma idaṃ vacanam aśūnyaṃ śeṣāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ śūnyā iti tato vaiśamikatvaṃ syāt | na caitad evam | tasmān na vaiśamikatvaṃ | yasmāc ca vaiśamikatvaṃ na saṃbhavatīdam vacanam aśūnyaṃ śeṣāḥ punaḥ sarvabhāvāḥ śūnyā iti, tasmād asmābhir viśeṣahetur na vaktavyo ’nena hetunedaṃ vacanaṃ aśūnyaṃ sarvabhāvāḥ punaḥ śūnyā iti | tatra yad bhavatoktaṃ vādahānis te vaiṣamikatvaṃ ca viśeṣahetuś ca tvayā vaktavya iti tad na | yat punar bhavatoktaṃ mā śabdavad ity etat syāt te buddhir na ca etad upapannam | śabdena hy atra satā bhaviṣyato vāraṇaṃ tasyeti || atra brūmaḥ |

此偈明何義我此語言以因緣生非有自體如前所說自體不生故得言空如是得言此語言空餘一切法悉皆是空如是空故我則無過若我說言此語不空餘一切法悉皆空者我則有過我不如是是故無過理實不得語言不空餘一切法皆悉是空我以是故不說勝因若語不空餘一切法皆悉空者可說勝因是故汝言汝諍論壞語則有過應說勝因是義不然又復汝說偈言若謂如勿聲是義則不然聲有能遮聲無聲何能遮此偈我今答偈言

re źig ṅa’i tshig de ni rten ciṅ ’brel par ’byuṅ ba yin pa’i phyir raṅ bźin ’thad pa ma yin te | ji skad du | sṅar raṅ bźin ’thad pa ma yin pa’i phyir stoṅ pa yin no źes bśad pa lta bu’o || gaṅ gi phyir ṅa’i tshig de yaṅ stoṅ pa yin | dṅos po lhag ma rnams kyaṅ stoṅ pa yin pa de’i phyir mi ’dra ba ñid med do || gal te ṅa na re tshig de ni stoṅ pa ma yin la dṅos po lhag ma thams cad ni stoṅ pa yin no źes ’chad ba ni des na mi ’dra ba ñid du yaṅ ’gyur na | de na de lta ma yin pas de’i phyir mi ’dra ba ñid med do || gaṅ gi phyir tshig de ni stoṅ pa ma yin la dṅos po lhag ma thams cad ni stoṅ pa yin no źes mi ’dra ba ñid mi srid pa de’i phyir kho bos gtan tshigs des na tshig de ni stoṅ pa ma yin la | dṅos po thams cad ni stoṅ pa yin no źes gtan tshigs kyi khyad par bśad par mi bya ste | de la khyed kyis smras pa yaṅ ñams la | mi ’dra ba ñid kyaṅ yin pas khyad kyis gtan tshigs khyad par yaṅ brjod par byos śig ces smras pa gaṅ yin pa de mi druṅ ṅo || yaṅ | de sgra ma ’byin lta bu’o | źes || khyod blo sems ni de mi ’thad || ’di la sgra ni yod pa yis || ’byuṅ bar ’gyur ba de bzlog yin || źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa ’di la bśad par bya ste |

This statement of mine, being dependently originated, is not endowed with an intrinsic nature. As previously stated, since it is not endowed with an intrinsic nature, it is void. And since this statement of mine is void, just as all other things are void, there is no discordance. For, there would be a discordance [only] if we said: This statement is non-void, while all other things are void. We, however, do not say that. There is, therefore, no discordance. And since the following discordance, this statement is non-void while all other things are void, does not exist, we do not have to state the special reason: for this reason this statement is non-void while all [other] things are void. - In these circumstances, your statement: ‘There is on your part an abandonment of position, there is a discordance, and you should state the special reason’, is not valid. (noe english)

mā śabdavad iti nāyaṃ dṛṣṭānto yas tvayā samārabdhaḥ |
śabdena tac ca śabdasya vāraṇaṃ naivam evaitat ||25||

汝言勿聲者此非我譬喻
我非以此聲能遮彼聲故

sgra ma ’byin źes bya bźin źes || khyod kyis gaṅ brtsams dpe ’di min |
| de ni sgra yis sgra bzlog pas || ’di ni de lta ma yin no |

The example given by you: ‘It is like “Do not make a sound” is not appropriate. There a sound is prevented by another sound, but the case here is not just the same.

nāpy ayam asmākaṃ dṛṣṭāntaḥ | yathā kaś cin mā śabdaṃ kārṣīr iti bruvan śabdam eva karoti śabdaṃ ca pratiṣedhayati, tadvat tac chūnyaṃ vacanaṃ na śūnyatāṃ pratiṣedhayati | kiṃ kāraṇam | atra hi dṛṣṭānte śabdena śabdasya vyāvartanaṃ kriyate | na caitad evam | vayaṃ brūmo niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā niḥsvabhāvatvāc chūnyā iti | kiṃ kāraṇāṃ |

此偈明何義此非我喻如何人言莫作聲者彼自作聲以聲遮聲聲非不空我則不爾語言亦空遮法亦空何以故譬如彼聲能迥此聲我不如是我如是說一切諸法皆無自體以無自體故得言空何以故

’di ni ṅed kyi dpe ma yin te | ji ltar ’ga’ źig na re | sgra ma ’dzin źes de skad zer ba na sgra ñid ’byin ciṅ sgra zlog par byed pa ltar tshig stoṅ pa de ñid ’gog par mi byed do || ci’i phyir źe na | ’di la dpes sgra zlog par byed pa de ltar ’di ni ma yin te | ṅed ni dṅos po thams cad raṅ bźin med pa yin te | raṅ bźin med pa’i phyir stoṅ pa yin na źes ’chad do || ci’i phyir źe na |

This example, moreover, is not ours. That void statement does not prevent voidness as a person, when he says: ‘Do not make a sound’, makes a sound and at the same time prevents a sound. - Why? - Because, in this example, a sound is prevented by another sound. But the case here is not the same. We say: all things are devoid of an intrinsic nature, and hence void.- Why? -

naiḥsvābhāvyānāṃ cen naiḥsvābhāvyena vāraṇaṃ yadi hi |
naiḥsvābhāvyanivṛttau svābhāvyaṃ hi prasiddhaṃ syāt ||26||

若無體語迥無自體
則一切法皆成自體

| gal te raṅ bźin med ñid kyis || ji ste raṅ bźin med la bzlog |
| raṅ bźin med pa ñid log na || raṅ bźin ñid du rab grub ’gyur |

Because, if things devoid of an intrinsic nature were prevented by something devoid of an intrinsic nature, with the cessation of [their] being devoid of an intrinsic nature would be established [their] being endowed with an intrinsic nature.

yathā mā śabdaṃ kārṣīr iti śabdena śabdasya vyāvartanaṃ kriyate, evaṃ yadi naiḥsvābhāvyena vacanena naiḥsvābhāvyānāṃ bhāvānāṃ vyāvartanaṃ kriyate tato ’yaṃ dṛṣṭānta upapannaḥ syāt | iha tu naiḥsvābhāvyena vacanena bhāvānāṃ svabhāvapratiṣedhaḥ kriyate | yadi naiḥsvābhāvyena vacanena bhāvānāṃ naiḥsvābhāvyapratiṣedhaḥ kriyate naiḥsvābhāvyapratisiddhatvād eva bhāvāḥ sasvabhāvā bhaveyuḥ | sasvabhāvatvād aśūnyāḥ syuḥ | śūnyatāṃ ca vayaṃ bhāvānām ācakṣamahe nāśūnyatām ity adṛṣṭānta evāyam iti |

如言勿聲聲能遮聲如是如是無自體語遮無體法若如是遮無自體者則一切法皆成自體若有自體則一切法皆悉不空我說法空不說不空譬喻如是偈言

ji ltar sgra ma ’byin ces bya ba lta bu sgras zlog par byed pa de bźin du | gal te tshig raṅ bźin med pa ñid kyi dṅos po raṅ bźin med pa rnams la zlog par byed na ni des na dpe ’di ’thad par ’gyur ba źig na | ’dir ni tshig raṅ bźin med pa ñid kyi dṅos po rnams kyi raṅ bźin ’gog par byed do || gal te tshig raṅ bźin med pa ñid kyis dṅos po rnams kyi || raṅ bźin med pa ñid ’gog par byed na ni raṅ bźin med pa ñid bkag pa’i phyir dṅos po rnams raṅ bźin daṅ bcas par ’gyur la | raṅ bźin daṅ bcas pa’i phyir stoṅ pa ma yin par ’gyur ro || kho bo cag ni dṅos po rnams stoṅ pa ñid smra yi | stoṅ pa ñid ma yin par ni smra ba ma yin pas dpe ma yin no ||

This example would be appropriate if by a statement devoid of an intrinsic nature were prevented things devoid of an intrinsic nature - as by the sound: ‘Do not make a sound’ is prevented another sound. Here, however, by a statement devoid of an intrinsic nature is negated the intrinsic nature of the things. If by a statement devoid of an intrinsic nature were negated the things’ being devoid of an intrinsic nature, the things, by the very fact of being negated in their quality of being devoid of an intrinsic nature would be endowed with an intrinsic nature. Being endowed with an intrinsic nature, they would be non-void. We, however, declare that the things are void, not that they are non-void. This, therefore, is a non-example.

athavā nirmitakāyāṃ yathā striyāṃ strīyam ity asadgrāham |
nirmitakaḥ pratihanyāt kasyacid evaṃ bhaved etat ||27||

如或有丈夫妄取化女身
而生於欲心此義亦如是

| yaṅ na kha cig sprul pa yis || bud med la ni bud med sñam |
| log ’dzin ’byuṅ la sprul pa yis || ’gog byed ’di ni de lta yin |

Or suppose that an artificial person should prevent the false notion of somebody who with regard to an artificial woman thinks: ‘This is a woman’. This would be like that.

atha vā yathā kasyacit puruṣasya nirmitakāyāṃ striyāṃ svabhāvaśūnyāyāṃ paramārthataḥ strīyam ity asadgrāhaḥ syāt, evaṃ tasyāṃ tenāsadgrāheṇa sa rāgam utpādayet | tathāgatena vā tathāgataśravakeṇa vā nirmitako nirmitaḥ syāt | tathāgatādhiṣṭhānena vā tathāgataśrāvakādhiṣṭhānena vā sa tasya tam asadgrāhaṃ vinivartayet | evam eva nirmitakopamena śūnyena madvacanena nirmitakastrīsadṛśeṣu sarvabhāveṣu niḥsvabhāveṣu yo ’yaṃ svabhāvagrāhaḥ sa nivartyate | tasmād ayam atra dṛṣṭāntaḥ śūnyatāprasādhanaṃ pratyupapadyamāno netaraḥ |

此偈明何義如化婦女實自體空如或丈夫於化女身生實有想起於欲心彼虛妄取諸法亦爾彼或如來如來弟子聲聞之人為迥彼人虛妄取心或是如來威神之力如來弟子聲聞威力化作化人如是如是語空如化如化婦女無自體空法如是空取法自體能遮令迥如是如是以此空喻能成空義我則相應非汝相應偈言

yaṅ na ji ltar skyes bu kha cig sprul pa’i bud med raṅ bźin gyis stoṅ pa yin pa la don dam par bud med do sñam du log par ’dzin par ’gyur ro || de’i phyir de log par ’dzin pa des de’i ’dod chags bskyed pa la de bźin gśegs pa’am | de bźin gśegs pa’i ñan thos kyis sprul pa źig sprul la | des de’i log par ’dzin pa de zlog par byed do || de bźin du ṅa’i tshig stoṅ pa sprul pa lta bus dṅos po thams cad kyi raṅ bźin med pa sprul pa’i bud med daṅ ’dra ba dag la raṅ bźin yod par ’dzin pa gaṅ yin pa zlog par byed do || de bas na ’dir stoṅ pa ñid du rab tu bsgrub pa la dpe ’di ’thad pa yin gyi | cig śos ni ma yin no ||

Or suppose that in an artificial woman, void of an intrinsic nature, some man should have the false notion that it is really a woman and, as a result of that false notion, should feel desire for her. The Tathāgata or a disciple of the Tathāgata would [then] create an artificial man [and] the latter would dispel the false notion of that man, through the power of the Tathāgata or of the disciple of the Tathāgata. Likewise, by my void statement, comparable to the artificial man, is prevented the idea of an intrinsic nature in all things which are devoid of an intrinsic nature and comparable to the artificial woman. Thus, this is an appropriate example for establishing voidness, not the other one.

atha vā sādhyasamo ’yaṃ hetur na hi vidyate dhvaneḥ sattā |
samvyavahāraṃ ca vayaṃ nānabhyupagamya kathayāmaḥ ||28||

同所成不然響中無因故
我依於世諦故作如是說

| yaṅ na gaṅ phyir bsgrub bya daṅ || gtan tshigs ’di mtshuṅs sgra yod min |
| tha sñad khas rnams ma blaṅs par || ṅed cag ’chad par mi byed do |

Or this reason is similar in nature to the thesis to be established, for sound has no [real] existence. We do not speak, however, without having recourse to the conventional truth.

mā śabdavad iti sādhyasama evāyaṃ hetuḥ | kasmāt | sarvabhāvānāṃ naiḥsvābhāvyenāviśiṣṭatvāt | na hi tasya dhvaneḥ pratītyasamutpannatvāt svabhāvasattā vidyate | tasyāḥ svabhāvasattāyā avidyamānatvād yad uktaṃ śabdena hy atra satā bhaviṣyato vāraṇaṃ tasyeti tad vyāhanyate | api ca na vayaṃ vyavahārasatyam anabhyupagamya vyavahārasatyaṃ pratyākhyāya kathayāmaḥ śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti | na hi vyavahārasatyam anāgamya śakyā dharmadeśanā kartuṃ | yathoktaṃ vyavahāram anāśritya paramārtho na deśyate | paramārtham anāgamya nirvāṇaṃ nādhigamyata iti || tasmān madvacana vac chūnyāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvānāṃ ca niḥsvabhāvatvam ubhayathopapadyamānam iti | yat punar bhavatoktaṃ pratiṣedhapratiṣedho ’pyevam iti mataṃ bhavet tad asad eva evaṃ tava pratijñā lakṣaṇato dūṣyate na mameti || atra brūmaḥ |

此偈明何義若汝或謂如勿聲者因同所成何以故以因不離一切諸法無自體故非彼聲響而有自體以因緣生故無自體若無自體汝說聲有能遮聲者彼義則壞又我所說不違世諦不捨世諦依世諦故能工一切諸法體空若離世諦法不可說佛說偈言若不依世諦不得證真諦若不證真諦不得涅槃證此偈明何義如是諸法非是不空一切諸法皆無自體此二無異又復汝說偈言汝謂遮所遮如是亦不然如是汝宗相自壞則非我此偈我今答偈言

bsgrub par bya ba daṅ | sgra ma ’byin źes bya ba lta bu’o źes bya ba’i gtan tshigs ’di mtshuṅs pa kho na yin no || ci’i phyir źe na | dṅos po thams cad ni raṅ bźin med pa ñid du khyad par med pa ñid kyi phyir sgra de ni rten ciṅ ’brel par ’byuṅ ba ñid yin pa’i phyir raṅ bźin yod pa ma yin no || de lta bas na raṅ źin yod pa ma yin pa ñid kyi phyir | ’di la sgra ni yod pa yis || ’byuṅ bar gyur pa de bzlog yin || źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa bzlog pa yin no || gźan yaṅ tha sñad kyi bden pa khas ma blaṅs śiṅ ma brten par dṅos po thams cad stoṅ pa’o źes mi ’chad do || tha sñad kyi bden pa khas ma blaṅs par ni chos bstan par mi nus te | ji skad du | tha sñad la ni ma brten par || dam pa’i don la mi ston la || dam pa’i don la ma brten par || mya ṅan ’das pa mi rtogs so || źes gsuṅs pa lta bu’o || de lta bas na dṅos po thams cad kyi raṅ bźin med pa ñid du gñi ga ’thad pa na ṅa’i tshig bźin du dṅos po thams cad stoṅ pa yin no || yaṅ khyod kyis | ’gog pa’i ’gog pa’aṅ de lta źes || ’dod na de yaṅ bzaṅ min te || de lta na yaṅ khyod dam bcas || mtshan ñid skyon yod ṅed la med || ces smras pa gaṅ yin pa ’di la bśad par bya ste |

The reason ‘It is like ‘‘Do not make a sound’’’ is of the same nature as the thesis to be established - Why? - Because all things, being devoid of an intrinsic nature, are alike. That sound, being dependently originated, has no existence by its own nature. [And] since it has no existence by its own nature, your statement: ‘For here a sound that is existent prevents the other sound that will be’, is precluded. It is not, however, without having recourse to the conventional truth, it is not by rejecting the conventional truth, that we say: All things are void. For it is not possible to teach the absolute truth without having recourse to the conventional truth. As it is said: ‘The transcendent truth cannot be taught without having recourse to the conventional truth. [And] Nirvāṇa cannot be attained without realizing the transcendent truth’ Thus, all things are void like my statement, and that all things are devoid of an intrinsic nature, follows in both ways [i.e., both by virtue of the ‘reason’ and of the thesis to be established]’. Now about your statement [contained in v. IV]:

yadi kācana pratijñā syān me tata eṣa me bhaved dośa
nāsti ca mama pratijñā tasmān naivāsti me doṣaḥ ||29||

若我宗有者我則是有過
我宗無物故如是不得過

| gal te ṅas dam bcas ’ga’ yod || des na ṅa la skyon de yod |
| ṅa la dam bcas med pas na || ṅa la skyon med kho na yin |

If I had any proposition , then this defect would be mine. I have, however, no proposition. Therefore, there is no defect that is mine.

yadi ca kācin mama pratijñā syāt tato mama pratijñālakṣanaprāptatvāt pūrvako doṣo yathā tvayoktas tathā mama syāt | na mama kācid asti pratijñā | tasmāt sarvabhāveṣu śūnyeṣv atyantopaśānteṣu prakṛtivivikteṣu kutaḥ pratijñā | kutaḥ pratijñālakṣaṇaprāptiḥ | kutaḥ pratijñālakṣaṇaprāptikṛto doṣaḥ | tatra yad bhavatoktaṃ tava pratijñālakṣaṇaprāptatvāt tavaiva doṣa iti tad na | yat punar bhavatoktaṃ pratyakṣeṇa hi tāvad yady upalabhya vinivartayasi bhāvān | tad nāsti pratyakṣaṃ bhāvā yenopalabhyante || anumānaṃ pratyuktaṃ pratyakṣenāgamopamāne ca | anumānāgamasādhyā ye ’rthā dṛṣṭāntasādhyāś ceti || atra vayaṃ brūmaḥ |

此偈明何義若我宗有則有宗相若我有宗有宗相者我則得汝向所說過如是非我有宗如是諸法實寂靜故本性空故何處有宗如是宗相為於處宗相可得我無宗相何得咎我是故汝言汝有宗相得過咎者是義不然又復汝說偈言若彼現是有汝可得有迥彼現亦是無云何得取迥說現比阿含譬喻等四量現比阿含成譬喻亦能成此偈我今答偈言

gal te dam bcas pa ’ga’ źig yod na ni | des na khyod kyis ji skad smras pa bźin du || ṅa la dam bcas pa’i mtshan ñid khas blaṅs pa sṅon du soṅ ba’i skyon yod pa źig na ṅa la dam bcas pa ’ga’ yaṅ med do || de’i phyir dṅos po thams cad stoṅ pa gtan du ñe bar źi ba raṅ bźin gyis dben pa dag la dam bcas pa ga la yod | dam bcas pa’i mtshan ñid kyaṅ ga la yod | dam bcas pa’i mtshan ñid las byuṅ ba’i skyon yaṅ ga la yod de | de la khyod la dam bcas pa’i mtshan ñid kyis thob pa’i phyir khyod la skyon yod do źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de yaṅ med do || yaṅ khyod kyis | re źig dṅos rnams mṅon sum gyis || dmigs nas zlog par byed yin na || gaṅ gis dṅos rnams dmigs ’gyur ba || mṅon sum de ni med pa yin || rjes dpag luṅ daṅ dpes gźal daṅ || rjes dpag luṅ gis bsgrub bya daṅ || dpes bsgrub bya ba’i don gaṅ yin || mṅon sum gyis ni lan btab po || źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa ’di la bśad par bya ste ||

If I had any proposition, then the defect previously stated by you would be mine, because it would affect the specific character of my proposition. [But] I have no proposition. Thus [we observe:] When all things are void, perfectly appeased and by nature isolated, how can there be a proposition? How can something affect the specific character of a proposition? [And] how can there be a defect, caused by the fact of affecting the specific character of a proposition? - In these circumstances, your statement: ‘The defect is only yours because it affects the specific character of your proposition’, is not valid.

yadi kiṃcid upalabheyaṃ pravartayeyaṃ nivartayeyaṃ vā |
pratyakṣādibhir arthais tad abhāvān me ’nupālambhaḥ ||30||

若我取轉迥則須用現等
取轉迥有過不爾云何過

| gal te mṅon sum la sogs pa’i || don gyis ’ga’ źig dmigs na ni |
| bsgrub pa’am bzlog par bya na de || med phyir ṅa la klan ka med |

If I apprehended something with the help of perception, etc., then I would either affirm or deny. [But] since that thing does not exist, I am not to blame.

yady ahaṃ kiṃcid artham upalabheyaṃ pratyakṣānumānopamānāgamaiś caturbhiḥ pramāṇaiś caturṇāṃ vā pramāṇānām anyatamena, ata eva pravartayeyaṃ vā nivartayeyaṃ vā | yathārthamevāhaṃ kaṃ cin nopalabhe tasmān na pravartayāmi na nivartayāmi | tatraivaṃ sati yo bhavatopālambha ukto yadi pratyakṣādīnāṃ pramāṇānām anyatamenopalabhya bhāvān vinivartayasi nanu tāni pramāṇāni na santi taiś ca pramāṇair api gamyā arthā na santīti sa me bhavaty evānupālambhaḥ |

此偈明何義我若如是少有法物則須現比阿含譬喻如是四量復有四量我若如是取轉迥者我則有過我既不取少法轉迥若我如是不轉不迥汝若如是與我過者是義不然若現等量復有量成量則無窮汝如是義不能咎我

gal te ṅas mṅon sum daṅ | rjes su dpag pa daṅ | dpes ’jal ba daṅ | luṅ rnams kyis sam | tshad ma bźi rnams las gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ ba źig gis ’ga’ źig dmigs na ni || de’i phyir sgrub par byed pa’am | don bzlog par bya na ṅas don ji ltar yaṅ ma dmigs pas de’i phyir bsgrub par yaṅ mi bya | bzlog par yaṅ mi bya | de ltar gyur daṅ de la khyod kyis gal te mṅon sum la sogs pa rnams la tshad ma gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ bźig gis dṅos po rnams dmigs nas zlog par byed pa yin na | tshad ma de dag kyaṅ med | de dag gis khoṅ du chud par bya ba’i don yaṅ med pas źes klan ka smra ba gaṅ yin pa’i klan ka de ṅa la mi ’byuṅ ṅo ||

If I apprehended something with the help of the four pramāṇas, viz., perception, inference, identification and verbal testimony, or with the help of one of these, then only would I either affirm or deny. [But] since I do not even apprehend an object of any kind, I neither affirm nor deny. In these circumstances, your criticism: ‘If [you say that] you deny the things after having apprehended them through one of the pramāṇas, viz., perception, etc., [we reply:] those pramāṇas do not exist, nor do exist the objects to be apprehended through them’, does not concern me at all.

kiṃ cānyat | yadi ca pramāṇatas te teṣāṃ teṣāṃ prasiddhir arthānāṃ |
teṣāṃ punaḥ prasiddhiṃ brūhi kathaṃ te pramāṇānām ||31||

又復有義偈言
若量能成法彼復有量成
汝說何處量而能成此量

’di ltar gźan yaṅ
| gal te khyod kyis don de rnams || tshad ma ñid kyis rab grub na |
| khyod kyis tshad ma de rnams kyaṅ || ji ltar rab tu ’grub par ’gyur |

Furthermore:If such and such objects are established for you through the pramāṇas, tell me how those pramāṇas are established for you.

yadi ca pramāṇatas teṣāṃ teṣām arthānāṃ prameyāṇāṃ prasiddhiṃ manyase yathā mānair meyānām, teṣām idānīṃ pratyakṣānumānopamānāgamānāṃ caturṇāṃ pramāṇānāṃ kutaḥ prasiddhiḥ | yadi tāvan niṣpramāṇānāṃ pramāṇānāṃ syāt prasiddhiḥ, pramāṇato ’rthānāṃ prasiddhir iti hīyate pratijñā | tathāpi | anyair yadi pramāṇaiḥ pramāṇasiddhir bhavet tad anavasthā | yadi punar manyase pramāṇaiḥ prameyānāṃ prasiddhis teṣāṃ pramāṇānāṃ anyaiḥ pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhir evam anavasthāprasaṅgaḥ | anavasthāprasaṅge ko doṣaḥ |

此偈明何義若汝意謂量能成物如量所量現比阿含喻等四量復以何量成此四量若此四量更無量成量自不成若自不成能成物者汝宗則壞若量復有異量成者量則無窮

gal te ’jal bar byed pa rnams kyis gźal bar bya ba dag bźin du khyod kyi don gźal bar bya ba de rnams tshad ma ñid kyis rab tu ’grub pa yin par sems na | ’on da tshad ma rnams pa bźi po mṅon sum daṅ | rjes su dpag pa daṅ | dpes gźal ba daṅ | luṅ de rnams gaṅ gis rab tu ’grub | gal te re źig tshad ma de rnams ni tshad ma gźan rnams kyis yod par ’grub la | don rnams ni tshad mas rab tu ’grub pa yin no źe na | dam bcas pa ñams par ’gyur ro || ’on te yaṅ | gal te tshad ma gźan rnams kyis || tshad ma ’grub na thug pa med || gal te ’di sñam du gźal bar bya ba ni tshad ma rnams kyis ’grub la | tshad ma de rnams kyaṅ tshad ma gźan rnams kyis ’grub par sems na | de lta na yaṅ thug pa med par ’gyur ro || de la thug pa med par gyur na ñes pa ci yod ce na | de la ’di ltar bśad par bya ste |

If you think that such and such ‘objects of true cognition’ are established through the ‘instruments of true cognition’, just as the things to be measured are established through the measuring instruments, [we ask:] How are those ‘instruments of true cognition’, viz., perception, inference, identification and verbal testimony, established? If [you say that] the pramāṇas are established without the help of pramāṇas, then [your] proposition that [all] objects are established through pramāṇas is abandoned. If the pramāṇas are established through other pramāṇas, then there is an infinite series. If you think that the ‘objects of true cognition’ are established through the ‘means of true cognition’ and that those ‘means of true cognition’ are established through other ‘means of true cognition’, then there follows an infinite series - What harm is there if there is an infinite series?

nādeḥ siddhis tatrāsti
naiva madhyasya nāntasya ||32||

若無窮者則
非初成非中後成

| de la daṅ po ’grub min la |
| bar ma min źiṅ tha ma’aṅ min ||

Neither the beginning nor the middle nor the end can then be established.

anavasthāprasaṅga ādeḥ siddhir nāsti | kiṃ kāraṇaṃ | teṣām apihi pramāṇānām anyaiḥ pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhis teṣām anyair iti nāsty ādiḥ | āder asadbhāvāt kuto madhyaṃ kuto ’ntaḥ | tasmāt teṣāṃ pramāṇānām anyaiḥ pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhir iti yad ukataṃ tad nopapadyata iti |

若量能成所量物者彼量復有異量來成彼量復有異量成故如是無初若無初者如是無中若無中者何處有後如是若說彼量復有異量成者是義不然偈言

thug pa med par gyur pa na || daṅ po ’grub par mi ’gyur ro || ci’i phyir źe na | tshad ma de rnams kyaṅ tshad ma gźan rnams kyis rab tu ’grub pa yin la | de rnams kyaṅ gźan rnams kyi yin pas ’di la daṅ po med do || daṅ po med pa’i phyir bar ma yaṅ ga la yod | tha ma yaṅ ga la yod de de’i phyir tshad ma de rnams ni tshad ma gźan rnams kyis rab tu ’grub pa’o źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de mi ’thad do ||

If there is an infinite series, the beginning cannot be established. - Why? - Because those pramāṇas are established through other pramāṇas, and those others again through other pramāṇas. Thus there is no beginning. [And] if there is no beginning, how can there be a middle? How can there be an end? Consequently, the statement that those pramāṇas are established through other pramāṇas is not valid.

teṣāṃ atha pramāṇair vinā prasiddhir vihīyate vādaḥ |
vaiṣamikatvaṃ tasmin viśeṣahetuś ca vaktavyaḥ ||33||

若量離量成汝諍義則失
如是則有過應更說勝因

| ’on te tshad ma med par yaṅ || de rnams ’grub na smra ba ñams |
| mi ’dra ñid de de yin na || gtan tshigs khyad par smra bar gyis |

Now, if [you think that] those pramāṇas are established without pramāṇas, then your philosophic position is abandoned. There is a discordance, and you should state the special reason for that.

atha manyase teṣāṃ pramāṇānāṃ vinā pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhiḥ, prameyāṇāṃ punar arthānāṃ pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhir iti, evaṃ sati yas te vādaḥ pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhir arthānām iti sa hīyate | vaiṣamikatvaṃ ca bhavati keṣāṃcid arthānāṃ pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhiḥ keṣāṃ cin neti | viśeṣahetuś ca vaktavyo yena hetunā keṣāṃcid arthānāṃ pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhiḥ keṣāṃcin neti | sa ca nopadiṣṭaḥ | tasmād iyam api kalpanā nopapanneti | atrāha | pramāṇāny eva svātmānaṃ parātmānaṃ ca prasādhayanti | yathoktaṃdyotayati svātmānaṃ yathā hutāśas tathā parātmānaṃ | svaparātmānāvevaṃ prasādhayanti pramāṇānīti | yathāgniḥ svātmānaṃ parātmānaṃ ca prakāśayati tathaiva pramāṇāni prasādhayanti svātmānaṃ parātmānaṃ ceti | atrocyate |

此偈明何義若汝意謂量離量成所量之物為量成者若如是諍量成所量汝則有過有物量成有不量成若如是者應說勝因若說勝因則可得知何者量成何者不成汝不能示如是分別義不相應此我今說如有人言我所說量自他能成而說偈言猶如火明故能自照照他彼量燎如是自他二俱成此偈明何義如火自照亦能照他量亦如是自成成他我今答彼偈言

’on te tshad ma rnams med par yaṅ tshad ma de rnams rab tu ’grub pa yin la | gźal bar bya ba’i don rnams ni tshad ma rnams kyis rab tu ’grub pa yin no sñam du sems na de lta na ni khyod kyi tshad ma rnams kyis don rnams ’grub po źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de ñams par ’gyur la don kha cig ni tshad ma rnams kyis rab tu ’grub pa yin | kha cig ni ma yin no źes mi ’dra pa ñid du yaṅ ’gyur ro || de lta na ni gtan tshigs gaṅ gis na don kha cig ni tshad ma rnams kyis rab tu ’grub pa yin la | kha cig ni ma yin no źes gtan tshigs kyi khyad par yaṅ smra bar bya ba yin na | de yaṅ ma bstan pas de’i phyir rtog pa ’di yaṅ ’thad pa ma yin no || 4 ’dir smras pa | ji skad du | ji ltar me yis gźan bdag ñid || gsal byed de bźin raṅ ñid ltar || de bźin tshad ma rnams kyaṅ ni || raṅ gźan bdag ñid ’grub ce na || źes bstan pa lta bur tshad ma rnams kyis raṅ gi bdag ñid daṅ | gźan gyi bdag ñid rab tu sgrub par byed pa yin te | ji ltar mes raṅ gi bdag ñid daṅ | gźan gyi bdag ñid gsal bar byed pa de bźin du tshad ma rnams kyaṅ raṅ gi bdag ñid daṅ gźan gyi bdag ñid rab tu sgrub par byed pa yin no źe na | ’dir bśad pa |

Now, if you think: those pramāṇas are established without pramāṇas; the objects to be cognized, however, are established through the pramāṇas, then your position that [all] objects are established through pramāṇas is abandoned. There is, moreover, a discordance, namely that some objects are established through pramāṇas, while some others are not. And you should state the special reason why some objects are established through pramāṇas, while some others are not. But you have not stated that. Thus this assumption, too, is not valid. The opponent replies: The pramāṇas establish themselves as well as other things. As it is said:‘Fire illuminates itself as well as other things. Likewise, the pramāṇas establish themselves as well as other things’. ...Here we observe:

viśamopanyāso ’yaṃ na hy ātmānaṃ prakāśayaty agniḥ |
na hi tasyānupalabdhir dṛṣṭā tamasīva kumbhasya ||34||

汝語言有過非是火自照
以彼不相應如見闇中瓶

smras pa de ni mi mthun te || mun khuṅ gi ni rdza ma ltar |
| de la mi dmigs ma mthoṅ bas || me ni raṅ la gsal byed min |

This is a defective proposition. Fire does not illuminate itself, for its non-perception is not seen to be comparable to that of a pot in darkness.

viṣama evopanyāso ’gnivat pramāṇāni svātmānaṃ ca prasādhayanti parātmānaṃ ca prasādhayantīti | na hy agnir ātmānaṃ prakāśayati | yathā prāg evāgnināprakāśitas tamasi kumbho nopalabhyate ’thottarakālam upalabhyate ’gninā prakāśitaḥ san, evam eva yady aprakāśitaḥ prāg agnis tamasi syād uttarakālam agneḥ prakāśanaṃ syāt, ataḥ svātmānaṃ prakāśayet | na caitad evam | tasmād iyam api kalpanā nopapadyata iti |

此偈明何義彼量如火自他能成難不相應何以故非火自照如初未照闇中瓶等不可得見以火照亡然後得見如是如是若火自照初火應闇後時乃明如是得言火能自照若初火明則不得言火能自照如是分別火自他照義不相應

me daṅ ’dra bar tshad ma rnams kyaṅ raṅ daṅ gźan gyi bdag ñid gñis rab tu sgrub par byed pa yin no źes smras pa de ni mi mthun pa ñid yin te | me ni raṅ las gsal bar byed pa ma yin te | ji ltar me mi ’bar ba’i sṅa rol na mun khuṅ na bum pa mi dmigs pa la | mes gsal bar byas nas phyis dmigs pa de bźin du | gal te gsal bar ma byas pa’i sṅa rol du me mun khuṅ na yod la | phyis mes gsal bar ’gyur na ni de’i phyir raṅ gi bdag ñid gsal bar byed pa yin na | de yaṅ de lta || ma yin pas rtog pa ’di yaṅ ’thad pa ma yin no ||

Your proposition that the pramāṇas establish themselves as well as other things like fire [that illuminates itself as well as other things] is defective. For fire does not illuminate itself. A pot, not illuminated by fire, is first not perceived in darkness. Then, being illuminated by fire, it is perceived. If, in the same manner, fire, not being illuminated, first existed in darkness and then were illuminated, it would be possible to say: it illuminates itself. This, however, is not the case. Thus this assumption, too, is not valid.

kiṃ cānyat
| yadi ca svātmānam ayaṃ tvadvacanena prakāśayaty agniḥ |
param iva nanv ātmānaṃ paridhakṣyaty api hutāśaḥ ||35||

又復有義
偈言又若汝說言火自他能照
如火能燒他何故不自燒

’di ltar gźan yaṅ |
gal te khyod kyi tshig gis ni || me ’dis raṅ bdag gsal byed na
| ’on me yis gźan bźin du || raṅ la sreg pa’aṅ byed par ’gyur |

Furthermore: If, as you say, fire illuminates itself as it illuminates other things, then it will also burn itself.

yadi ca tvadvacanena yathā parātmānaṃ prakāsayaty agnir evam eva svātmānam api prakāśayati, nanu yathā parātmānaṃ dahaty evam eva svātmānam api dhakṣyati | na caitad evam | tatra yad uktam parātmānam iva svātmānam api prakāsayaty agnir iti tad na |

此偈明何義若汝說言如火自照亦能照他如是如是自照照他如是如是既能燒他亦應自燒而實不見有如是事若說彼火自他能照義不相應

gal te khyod zer ba ji ltar mes gźan gyi raṅ bźin gsal bar byed pa de bźin du raṅ gi bdag ñid la yaṅ gsal bar byed do źe na | ’on ni ji ltar gźan gyi bdag ñid sreg par byed pa de bźin du raṅ gi bdag ñid la yaṅ sreg par ’gyur ba źig na | de ni de ltar yaṅ ma yin pas de la me ni gźan gyi bdag ñid la yaṅ gsal bar byed do źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de mi ruṅ ṅo ||

If, as you say, fire illuminates itself just as it illuminates other things, then it will also burn itself just as it burns other things. This, however, is not the case. In these circumstances, your statement that fire illuminates itself as it illuminates other things, is not valid’.

kiṃ cānyat | yadi ca svaparātmānau tvadvacanena prakāśayaty agniḥ |
pracchādayiṣyati tamaḥ svaparātmānau hutāśa iva ||36||

又復有義偈言
又若汝說言火能自他照
闇亦應如是自他二俱覆

’di ltar gźan yaṅ
| gal te khyod kyi tshig gis ni || me yis raṅ gźan bdag gsal byed |
| me bźin du ni mun pa yaṅ || raṅ gźan bdag la bsgrib par ’gyur |

Besides: If, as you say, fire illuminates both other things and itself’, then darkness will cover both other things and itself’.

yadi ca bhavato matena svaparātmānau prakāśayaty agniḥ, nanv idānīṃ tat pratipakṣabhūtaṃ tamo ’pi svaparātmānau chādayet | na caitad dṛṣṭam | tatra yad uktaṃ svaparātmānau prakāśayaty agnir iti tad na |

此偈明何義若汝說言火自他照能……闇者闇何以不自也皆覆而實不見有如是事若說彼火自他照者義不相應

gal te khyod kyi lugs kyis ni me ni raṅ daṅ gźan gyi bdag ñid gñis gsal bar byed pa yin na | ’on ni da gñen por gyur pa mun pa yaṅ raṅ daṅ gźan gyi bdag ñid gñis bsgrib par ’gyur bźig na | de ni de ltar yaṅ ma yin pas de la me ni raṅ daṅ gźan gyis bdag ñid gñis gsal bar byed pa yin no źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de ruṅ ba ma yin no ||

If in your opinion fire illuminates both other things and itself, then its opposite, darkness, too, would cover both other things and itself. This, however, is not seen. In these circumstances, your statement that fire illuminates both other things and itself is not valid.

kiṃ cānyat | nāsti tamaś ca jvalane yatra ca tiṣṭhati parātmani jvalanaḥ |
kurute kathaṃ prakāśaṃ sa hi prakāśo ’ndhakāravadhaḥ ||37||

又復有義偈言
於火中無闇何處自他住
彼闇能殺明火云何有明

’di ltar gźan yaṅ
| gsal byed de ni mun sel te || me daṅ gaṅ na mi gnas pa |
| gźan na’aṅ mun pa yod min na || ji ltar gsal bar byed pa yin |

There is no darkness in fire nor in something else in whichfire stands.How can it [then] illuminate? For illumination is destruction of darkness.

iha cāgnau nāsti tamo nāpi ca yatrāgnis tatrāsti tamaḥ | prakāśaś ca nāma tamasaḥ pratighātaḥ | yasmāc cāgnau nāsti tamo nāpi ca yatrāgnis tatrāsti tamaḥ, tatra kasya tamasaḥ pratighātam agniḥ karoti yasya pratighātād agniḥ svaparātmānau prakāśayatīti | atrāha | nanu yasmād evaṃ nāgnau tamo ’sti nāpi yatrāgnis tatra tamo ’sti, tasmād eva svaparātmānau na prakāśayaty agniḥ kutaḥ | tena hy utpadyamānenaivāgninā tamasaḥ pratighātaḥ | tasmān nāgnau tamo ’sti nāpi yatrāgnis tatra tamo ’sti, yasmād utpadyamāna evobhayaṃ prakāśayaty agniḥ svātmānaṃ parātmānaṃ ceti | atrocyate |

此偈明何義火中無闇火處無闇云何名為明能破闇若彼火中如是無闇何處有闇火能破闇若當無闇可破滅者云何而得自他俱照此我今說若如是者非火中闇非火處闇如是如是火自他照彼火生時即能破闇如是火中無闇火處無闇如是火生能照自他此我今說偈言

’dir me la yaṅ mun pa med la || gaṅ na me yod pa de na yaṅ mun pa med do || gsal bar byed pa źes bya ba ni mun pa sel ba yin pas de’i phyir me la yaṅ mun pa med la | gaṅ na me yod pa de na yaṅ mun pa med na mes gaṅ źig sel bar raṅ daṅ gźan gyi bdag ñid gñis gsal bar byed pa’i mes mun pa gaṅ źig sel bar byed | ’dir smras pa | ’o na gaṅ gi phyir me la yaṅ mun pa med | me gaṅ na yod pa de na yaṅ mun pa med pa de ñid kyi phyir me ni raṅ daṅ gźan gyi bdag ñid gñi ga gsal bar byed pa ma yin nam | me ’byuṅ ba ñid na me des mun pa bsal ba yin te | de la yaṅ mun pa de med | me gaṅ na yod pa de na yaṅ mun pa med de de’i phyir me ’byuṅ ba kho na raṅ gi bdag ñid daṅ | gźan gyi bdag ñid gñi ga gsal bar byed pa yin no źe na | ’dir smras pa |

Here, in fire, there is no darkness. Nor is there any darkness where fire is. Now, illumination is obstruction caused to darkness. But since there is no darkness in fire nor where fire is, what is that darkness which is obstructed by fire, and by virtue of whose obstruction it illuminates both other things and itself The opponent replies: But is it not true that fire illuminates both other things and itself, for this very reason that there is no darkness in fire nor where fire is. For, in the very process of its origination, fire obstructs darkness. If there is no darkness in fire nor where fire is, it is because in the very process of its origination fire illuminates both other things and itself. Here we observe:

utpadyamāna eva prakāśayaty agnir ity asadvādaḥ |
utpadyamāna eva prāpnoti tamo na hi hutāśaḥ ||38||

如是火生時即生時能照
火生即到闇義則不相應

| me ’byuṅ ba na gsal byed pa || yaṅ dag min par smra ba ste |
| me ’byuṅ ba na mun pa daṅ || phrad pa med pa kho na yin |

It is wrong to say that fire illuminates in the very process of its origination. For, in the very process of its origination, fire does not come in contact with darkness.

ayam agnir utpadyamāna eva prakāśayati svātmānaṃ parātmānaṃ ceti nāyam utpapadyate vādaḥ | kasmāt | na hy utpadyamāna evāgnis tamaḥ prāpnoti, aprāptatvān naivopahanti tamasaś cānupaghātān nāsti prakāśaḥ |

此偈明何義若火生時能自他照義不相應何以知之如是初火不能到闇何以知之若未到闇不能破闇若不破闇不得有明

me de ni ’byuṅ ba khon na raṅ gi bdag ñid daṅ gźan gyi bdag ñid gsal bar byed do źes smra ba de ni ’thad pa ma yin no || ci’i phyir źe na | me ’byuṅ ba ñid na mun pa daṅ phrad pa med pa yin te | ma phrad pa’i phyir de sel bar mi byed do || mun pa ma bsal ba’i phyir gsal bar yaṅ mi byed do ||

The opinion that fire, in the very process of its origination, illuminates both other things and itself is not tenable. - Why? - Because, in the very process of its origination, fire does not come in contact with darkness; since it does not come in contact with it, it does not destroy it; and since darkness is not destroyed, there is no illumination.

kiṃ cānyat |
aprāpto ’pi jvalano yadi vā punar andhakāram upahanyāt |
sarveṣu lokadhātuṣu tamo ’yam iha saṃsthito hānyat ||39||

偈言
若火不到闇而能破闇者
火在此處住應破一切闇

’di ltar gźan yaṅ
| yaṅ na me daṅ ma phrad kyaṅ || mun pa sel bar byed na ni |
| ’di na yod pa gaṅ yin pas || jig rten khams kun mun sel ’gyur |

Or, if fire destroyed darkness even without coming in contact with it, then this fire, standing here, would destroy darkness in all the worlds.

athāpi manyase ’prāpto ’py agnir andhakāram upahantīti nanv idānīm iha saṃsthito ’gniḥ sarvalokadhātustham upahaniṣyati tamas tulyam ayam aprāptaḥ | na caitad evaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ | tasmād aprāpyaivāgnir andhakāram upahantīti yad iṣṭaṃ tad na |

此偈明何義若汝意謂火不到闇能破闇者火此處住則應能破一切世間所有處闇何以故俱不到故而實不見有如是事若俱下到云何唯能破此處闇不破世間一切處闇若汝意謂火不到闇而能破闇義不相應

’on te me ni mun pa daṅ phrad par yaṅ sel bar byed do sñam du sems na | ’on ni de ma phrad par ’dra bas ’di na gnas pa’i mes ’jig rten gyi khams thams cad na gnas pa’i mun pa sel bar ’gyur ba źig na | de ni de ltar yaṅ ma yin pas de’i phyir me ni mun pa daṅ ma phrad par sel bar byed par ’dod pa gaṅ yin pa de mi ruṅ ṅo ||

Or, if you think that fire destroys darkness even without coming in contact with it, then this fire, standing here at this moment, will equally destroy the darkness existing in all the worlds, without coming in contact with it. This, however, is not seen to be the case. Thus, your opinion that fire destroys darkness even without coming in contact with it is not valid.

kiṃ cānyat | yadi svataś ca pramāṇasiddhir anapekṣya tava prameyāṇi |
bhavati pramāṇasiddhir na parāpekṣā svataḥ siddhiḥ ||40||

又復有義
偈言若量能自成不待所量成
是則是自成非待他能成

’di ltar gźan yaṅ
| gal te raṅ las tshad ma grub || gźal bya rnams la ma ltos par |
| khyod kyi tshad ma ’grub ’gyur ’dir || gźan la mi ltos raṅ ’grub ’gyur |

Furthermore:If the pramāṇas are self-established, then the ‘means of true cognition’ are established for you independently of the ‘objects of true cognition’. For self-establishment does not require another thing.

yadi cāgnivat svataḥ pramāṇasiddhir iti manyase, anapekṣyāpi prameyān arthān pramāṇānāṃ prasiddhir bhaviṣyati | kiṃ kāraṇaṃ | na hi svataḥ siddhiḥ param apekṣate | athāpekṣate na svataḥ siddhiḥ | atrāha yadi nāpekṣante prameyān arthān pramāṇāni ko doṣo bhaviṣyatīti | atrocyate |

此偈明何義若汝意謂量與所量如火成者量則自成不待所量何以故若自成者則不待他若待他者非自成故此我今說若不相待何不自成若待於他則非自成此我今說若量不待所量之物為有何過此我今說偈言

gal te me bźin du raṅ las tshad ma grub po sñam du sems na | gźal bar bya ba’i don rnams la ma ltos par yaṅ tshad ma rnams rab tu ’grub par ’gyur ro || ci’i phyir źe na | raṅ las grub pa ni gźan la ltos pa ma yin no || ’on te ltos na ni raṅ las grub pa ma yin no || ’dir smras pa | gal te tshad ma rnams gźal bar bya pa’i don rnams la ni | mi ltos na skyon cir ’gyur źe na | ’dir bśad pa |

The opponent replies: What defect will ensue if the ‘means of true cognition’ do not require the objects to be cognised? Here we observe:

anapekṣya hi prameyān arthān yadi te pramāṇasiddhir iti |
na bhavanti kasyacid evam imāni tāni pramāṇāni ||41||

不待所量物若汝量得成
如是則無人用量量諸法

| gal te gźal bya’i don rnams la | || ma ltos khyod kyi tshad ma ’grub |
| tshad ma ’di rnams kho na ni || gaṅ gi’aṅ yin par mi ’gyur ro |

If you think that the ‘means of true cognition’ are established independently of the ‘objects to be cognized’, then those are of nothing.

yadi prameyān arthān anapekṣya prasiddhir bhavati pramāṇānām ity evaṃ tānīmāni pramāṇāni na kasyacit pramāṇāni bhavanti | evaṃ doṣaḥ | atha kasyacid bhavanti pramāṇāni naivedānīm anapekṣya prameyān arthān pramāṇāni bhavanti |

此偈明何義若義若汝意謂不待所量而量得成則無有人用量量法有如是過若何等人須用量者不待所量而得量

gal te tshad ma rnams gźal bar bya ba don rnams la mi ltos par rab tu ’grub pa yin no źe na | de lta na ni khyod kyis tshad ma ’di rnams gaṅ gi 2 phyir tshad ma yaṅ ma yin pa’i skyon de lta bur ’gyur ro || ’o na te tshad ma rnams don ’ga’ źig gi yin no źe na | de gźal bar bya ba’i don rnams la mi ltos par tshad ma rnams su ’gyur ba ma yin no ||

If [you think that] the ‘means of true cognition’ are established independently of the ‘objects to be cognized’, then those pramāṇas are pramāṇas of nothing. Thus there is a defect. If, however, the pramāṇas are pramāṇas of something, they do not then become ’means of true cognition’ independently of the ‘objects to be cognized’.

atha matam apekṣya siddhis teṣām ity atra bhavati ko doṣaḥ |
siddhasya sādhanaṃ syān nāsiddho ’pekṣate hy anyat ||42||

若不待成彼得何過則一切法皆不待量若一切法不待量成彼得何過成得言成未成叵成以無待故

| ’on te ltos nas de rnams ’grub || ’dod na de la skyon cir ’gyur |
| ma grub gźan la mi ltos pas || grub pa sgrub par byed pa yin |

[The opponent may reply:] If it is admitted that they are established in relation [to the objects to be cognized], what defect is there? - [The defect is that] what is [already] established is established [again]. For something that is not established does not require something else.

athāpi matam apekṣya prameyan arthān pramāṇānāṃ siddhir bhavatīti, evaṃ siddhasya pramāṇacatuṣṭayasya sādhanaṃ bhavati | kiṃ kāraṇaṃ | na hy asiddhasyārthasyāpekṣaṇaṃ bhavati na hy asiddho devadattaḥ kaṃcid artham apekṣate | na ca siddhasya sādhanam iṣṭaṃ kṛtasya karaṇān upapatter iti |

若汝復謂待所量物量得成者如是四量皆有待成何以故若物未成云何相待物若已成不須相待天得未成則不待物若已成者更不待成如物已作無作因緣

’on te gźal bar bya ba’i don rnams la ltos nas tshad ma rnams ’grub pa yin par ’dod do źe na | de lta na ni don ma grub pa ni ltos pa med pa yin te | lha sbyin ma grub pa na ni don ’ga’ la yaṅ ltos pa ma yin pas khyod kyis tshad ma gźi ’gyur ba ’grub par byed pa yin no || grub pa sgrub par byed pa yaṅ ’dod pa ma yin te | byas pa byed par mi ’thad pa’i phyir ro ||

If it is admitted that the ‘means of true cognition’ are established in relation to the ‘objects to be cognized’, then the four ‘means of true cognition’, which are [already] established, are established [anew].- Why? - Because an object that is not established does not require something else. For instance, Devadatta, who is not [yet] established, does not require anything whatever. But it is not admissible that something that is [already] established be established [anew]. One does not do something that is [already] done.

kiṃ cānyat |
sidhyanti hi prameyāṇy apekṣya yadi sarvathā pramāṇāni |
bhavati prameyasiddhir nāpekṣyaiva pramāṇāni ||43||

又復有義
偈言若所量之物待量而得成
是則所量成待量然後成

’di ltar gźan yaṅ |
gal te yoṅ ye gźal bya la || ltos nas tshad ma grub yin na |
| tshad ma rnams la ma ltos par || gźal bar bya ba ’grub par ’gyur |

Besides: If the pramāṇas are at all events established in relation to the prameyas, the prameyas are not established in relation to the pramāṇas.

yadi prameyāṇy apekṣya pramāṇāni sidhyanti nedānīṃ pramāṇāny apekṣya prameyāṇi sidhyanti | kiṃ kāraṇam | na hi sādhyaṃ sādhanaṃ sādhayati sādhanāni ca kila prameyāṇāṃ pramāṇāni |

此偈明何義若所量覺待量而成是則以量成彼所量何以故所成非成所量

gal te tshad ma rnams ni gźal bar bya ba rnams la ltos nas so źe na | de tshad ma rnams la ltos nas gźal bar bya ba ma grub par mi ’gyur ro || ci’i phyir źe na | bsgrub par bya ba ni sgrub par byed pa sgrub par mi byed la | tshad ma rnams kyis sgrub par byed pa yaṅ gźal bya rnams yin no źes grag go ||

If the pramāṇas are established in relation to the prameyas, then the prameyas are not established in relation to the pramāṇas. - Why? - Because the object to be established does not establish the instrument by which it is established. The pramāṇas, however, it is said, are the instruments by which the prameyas are established.

kiṃ cānyat | yadi ca prameyasiddhir nāpekṣyaiva bhavati pramāṇāni |
kiṃ te pramāṇasiddhyā tani yad arthaṃ prasiddhaṃ tat ||44||

又復有義
偈言若物無量成是則不待量
汝何用量所彼量何所成

’di ltar gźan yaṅ
| gal te tshad ma rnams la ni || ma ltos par yaṅ gźal bya ’grub |
| gaṅ phyir khyod kyi de dgrags pa || tshad ma grub pas ci źig bya |

And if the prameyas are established even independently of the pramāṇas, what do you gain by establishing the pramāṇas? That whose purpose they serve is [already] established.

yadi ca manyase ’napekṣyaiva pramāṇāni prameyāṇāṃ prasiddhir bhavatīti kiṃ idānīṃ te pramāṇasiddhyā paryanviṣṭayā | kiṃ kāraṇam | yad arthaṃ hi tāni pramāṇāni paryanviṣyeran te prameyārthā vināpi pramāṇaiḥ siddhāḥ | tatra kiṃ pramāṇaiḥ kṛtyaṃ |

此偈明何義若汝意謂不待彼量所量成者汝今何用心量而成何以故彼量義者為何所心彼所量物離量成者彼量呵用又復有義偈言

gal te tshad ma rnams la ma ltos par gźal bar bya ba rnams ’grub po sñam du sems na | ci de khyod kyi tshad ma grub par yoṅs su brtag pas ci źig bya || ci’i phyir źe na | gaṅ gi don du khyod kyi tshad ma de rnams yoṅs su brtags pa’i gźal bya ba’i don de rnams ni tshad ma rnams med par yaṅ grub pa yin pas de la khyod kyi tshad ma rnams kyis ci źig bya |

atha tu pramāṇasiddhir bhavaty apekṣyaiva te prameyāṇi |
vyatyaya evaṃ sati te dhruvaṃ pramāṇaprameyāṇāṃ ||45||

若汝彼量成待所量成者
是則量所量如是不相離

| ci ste khyod kyi tshad ma rnams || gźal bya rnams la ltos nas ’grub |
| de ltar khyod kyi tshad ma rnams || gźal bya ṅes par bzlog par ’gyur |

Besides, if you establish the pramāṇas in relation to the prameyas, then there is certainly an interchange of pramāṇas and prameyas.

athāpi manyase ’pekṣyaiva prameyān arthān pramāṇāni bhavantīti mā bhūt pūrvokta doṣa iti kṛtvā, evaṃ te sati vyatyayaḥ pramāṇaprameyāṇāṃ bhavati | pramāṇāni te prameyāṇi bhavanti prameyaiḥ sādhitatvāt | prameyāṇi ca pramāṇāni bhavanti pramāṇānāṃ sādhakatvāt |

此偈明何義若汝意謂待所量物量是故有量畏有前過汝若如是量所量一不得相離汝若如是量即所量何以知之所量成量所量即量量成所量量所量一偈言

ci ste sṅar smras pa’i skyon du ’gyur ba na mi ruṅ ṅo sñam nas tshad ma rnams ni gźal bar bya ba’i don rnams la ltos pa yin no sñam du sems na de lta na ni khyod kyi tshad ma daṅ gźal bar bya ba rnams bzlog par ’gyur te | khyod kyi tshad ma rnams kyaṅ gźal bar bya bar ’gyur ro || gźal bar bya ba rnams kyis rab tu bsgrub pa’i phyir ro || gźal bar bya ba yaṅ tshad ma rnams su ’gyur te | tshad ma rnams sgrub par byed pa yin pa’i phyir ro ||

Moreover, if you think, in order to avoid the defect stated before, that the ‘means of true cognition’ exist only in relation to the ‘objects to be cognized’, then there is an interchange of pramāṇas and prameyas. Your pramāṇas become prameyas, because they are established by the prameyas. And the prameyas become pramāṇas, because they establish the pramāṇas.

atha te pramāṇasiddhyā prameyasiddhiḥ prameyasiddhyā ca |
bhavati pramāṇasiddhir nāsty ubhayasyāpite siddhiḥ ||46||

若量成所量若所量成量
汝若如是者二種俱不成

| ’on te khyod kyis tshad grub pas || gźal bar bya ba ’grub ’gyur la |
| gźal bya grub pas tshad grub na || khyod kyis gñi ga’aṅ ’grub mi ’gyur |

Now, if you think that through the establishment of the pramāṇas are established the prameyas, and that through the establishment of the prameyas are established the pramāṇas, then neither the prameyas nor the pramāṇas are established for you.

atha manyase pramāṇasiddhyā prameyasiddhir bhavati pramāṇāpekṣatvāt prameyasiddhyā ca pramāṇasiddhir bhavati prameyāpekṣatvād iti, evaṃ te saty ubhayasyāpi siddhir na bhavati | kiṃ kāraṇaṃ |

此偈明何義若汝意謂量成所量見待量故所量成量見待所量汝若如是二俱不成何以故偈言

’on te tshad ma grub pas gźal bar bya ba ’grub par ’gyur te | tshad ma la ltos pa’i phyir ro || gźal bar bya ba ’grub pas kyaṅ tshad ma ’grub par ’gyur te | gźal bar bya ba la ltos pa’i phyir ro sñam du sems na | de lta na ni khyod kyis gñi ga yaṅ ’grub par mi ’gyur ro || ci’i phyir źe na |

Now, if you think that through the establishment of the pramāṇas are established the prameyas - because the prameyas require the pramāṇas - and that through the establishment of the prameyas are established the pramāṇas - because the pramāṇas require the prameyas -then neither the prameyas nor the pramāṇas are established. -Why? -

sidhyanti hi pramāṇair yadi prameyāṇitāni tair eva |
sādhyāni ca prameyais tāni kathaṃ sādhayiṣyanti ||47||

量能成所量所量能成量
若義如是者云何能相成

| gal te tshad mas gźal bya ’grub || gźal bya de dag rnams kyis kyaṅ |
| de dag bsgrub par bya yin na || de dag ji ltar bsgrub par ’gyur |

Because, if the prameyas owe their establishment to the pramāṇas, and if those pramāṇas are to be established by those very prameyas, how will the pramāṇas establish [the prameyas]?

yadi hi pramāṇaiḥ prameyāṇi sidhyanti tāni ca pramāṇānitair eva prameyaiḥ sādhayitavyāni nanv asiddheṣu prameyeṣu kāraṇasyāsiddhatvād asiddhāni kathaṃ sādhayiṣyanti prameyāṇi |

此偈明何義若量能成所量之物彼所量物能成量者量自未成因緣不成云何能成所量之物又復有義偈言

gal te tshad ma rnams kyis ni gźal bar bya ba rnams ’grub par byed la | gźal bar bya ba de dag rnams kyis kyaṅ tshad ma de dag bsgrub par bya ba yin no źe na | ’on gźal bar bya ba ma grub pa rnams kyi rgyu rab tu ma grub pa’i phyir gźal bar bya ba ma grub pa dag ji ltar bsgrub par ’gyur |

Because, if the prameyas owe their establishment to the pramāṇas, and if those pramāṇas are to be established by those very prameyas, [we encounter the following difficulty:] the prameyas not having been established, the pramāṇas are not established, for their cause is not established. How, then, will the pramāṇas establish the prameyas?

sidhyanti ca prameyair yadi pramāṇāni tāni tair eva |
sādhyāni ca pramāṇais tāni kathaṃ sādhayiṣyanti ||48||

所量能成量量能成所量
若義如是者云何能相成

| gal te gźal byas tshad ma ’grub | tshad ma de dag rnams kyis kyaṅ |
| de dag bsgrub par bya yin na || de dag ji ltar bsgrub par ’gyur |

And if the pramāṇas owe their establishment to the prameyas, and if those prameyas are to be established by those very pramāṇas, how will the prameyas establish [the pramāṇas]?

yadi ca prameyaiḥ pramāṇāni sidhyanti tāni ca prameyāṇitair eva pramāṇaiḥ sādhayitavyāni nanv asiddheṣu pramāṇeṣu kāraṇasyāsiddhatvād siddhāni kathaṃ sādhayiṣyanti pramāṇāni |

此偈明何義若所量物能成彼量彼量能成所量之物所量未成因緣不成云何成量偈言

gal te yaṅ gźal bar bya ba rnams ’grub par ’gyur la | tshad ma de rnams kyis kyaṅ gźal bar bya ba de dag bsgrub par bya ba yin no źe na | ’on tshad ma ma grub pa || rnams kyi rgyu yin na rgyu rab tu ma grub pa’i phyir tshad ma ma grub pa dag ji ltar bsgrub par ’gyur |

And if the pramāṇas owe their establishment to the prameyas, and if those prameyas are to be established by those very pramāṇas, [we encounter the following difficulty:] the pramāṇas not having been established, the prameyas are not established, for their cause is not established. How, then, will the prameyas establish the pramāṇas?

pitrā yady utpādyaḥ putro yadi tena caiva putreṇa |
utpādyaḥ sa yadi pitā vada tatrotpādayati kaḥ kaṃ ||49||

為是父生子為是子生父
何者是能生何者是所生

| gal te pha yis bu bskyed bya || gal te bu de ñid kyis kyaṅ |
| ci ste pha de bskyed bya na || de ni gaṅ gis gaṅ bskyed smros |

If the son is to be produced by the father, and if that father is to be produced by that very son, tell me which of these produces which other.

yathāpi nāma kaścid brūyāt pitrā putra utpādanīyaḥ sa ca pitātenaiva putrenotpādanīya iti, tatredānīṃ brūhi kena ka utpādayitavya iti | tathaiva khalu bhavān bravīti pramāṇaiḥ prameyāṇi sādhayitavyāni tāny eva ca punaḥ pramāṇāni tair eva prameyair iti, tatredānīṃ te katamaiḥ katamāni sādhayitavyāni |

此偈明何義如有人言父能生子彼若如是子亦生父汝今為說何者能生何者所生汝如是說量成所量所量成量汝成為說何者能成何者所成又復有義偈言

ji ltar ’ga’ źig na re phas bu bskyed par bya ba yin la | pha de yaṅ bu de ñid kyis bskyed par bya ba yin no źes zer na | da de na gaṅ gis gaṅ bskyed par smros śig ces bya ba de bźin du khyod na re tshad ma rnams kyis gźal bar bya ba dag bsgrub par bya ba yin la | tshad ma de dag ñid kyaṅ gźal bar bya ba de dag ñid kyis bsgrub par bya ba yin no źes zer ba | da de na khyod kyis gaṅ dag gis gaṅ dag rab tu bsgrub par bya ba yin no ||

Supposing somebody said: the son is to be produced by the father, and that father is to be produced by that very son, tell me who is to be produced by whom. In exactly the same manner you say: the prameyas are to be established by the pramāṇas, and those very pramāṇas in turn are to be established by those very prameyas. Now, which of these are to be established for you by which others?

kaś ca pitā kaḥ putras tatra tvaṃ brūhi tāv ubhāv api ca |
pitṛputralakṣanadharau yato bhavati no ’tra saṃdehaḥ ||50||

為何者是父為何者是子
汝說此二種父子相可疑

| de dag gñi ga’aṅ pha daṅ bu’i || mtshan ñid ’dzin pas de yi phyir |
| de la kho bo the tshom gyur || de na pha gaṅ bu gaṅ smros |

Tell me which of these is the father, and which other the son. Both of them bear, indeed, the marks of a father and that of a son, wherefore we have a doubt here.

tayoś ca pūrvopadiṣṭayoḥ pitṛputrayoḥ kataraḥ putraḥ kataraḥpitā | ubhāv api tāv utpādakatvāt pitṛlakṣaṇadharāv utpādyatvāc ca putralakṣaṇadharau | atra naḥ saṃdeho bhavati kataras tatra pitā kataraḥ putra iti | evam eva yāny etāni bhavataḥ pramāṇaprameyāṇi tatra katarāni pramāṇāni katarāni prameyaṇi | ubhayāny api hy etāni sādhakatvāt pramāṇāni sādhyatvāt prameyāṇi | atra naḥ saṃdeho bhavati katarāṇy atra pramāṇāni katarāṇi pramāṇeyāṇīti |

此偈明何義前說二種所謂父子何者為父何者為子父子二相若相待生彼則可疑何者為父何者為子如是如是若汝說此量與所量彼何者量何者所量此之二種若能成物可得言量若物可成得言所量則不疑云何者是量何者所量如是能成可得言量如是可成得言所量此則不疑何者是量何者所量偈言

gaṅ gi phyir pha daṅ bu sṅar bstan pa de gñis las | bu ni gaṅ pha ni gaṅ de gñi ga yaṅ skyed par byed pa yin pa’i phyir pha’i mtshan ñid ’dzin par byed pa yin la | bskyed par bya ba yin pa’i phyir bu’i mtshan ñid ’dzin pa yin pas ’di la kho bo the tshom du gyur na de la pha ni gaṅ bu ni gaṅ źes bya ba de bźin du khyod kyis tshad ma daṅ gźal bar bya ba gaṅ dag yin pa de dag kyaṅ de ni tshad ma dag ni gaṅ yin | gźal bar bya ba dag ni gaṅ yin | ’di dag gñi ga yaṅ rab tu sgrub par byed pa yin pa’i phyir tshad ma dag yin la | bsgrub par bya ba dag yin pa’i phyir gźal bar bya ba yin pas ’di la kho bo the tshom du gyur na tshad ma dag ni gaṅ yin gźal bar bya ba dag ni gaṅ yin |

Of that father and that son, mentioned before, which is the son, and which other the father? Both of them, as producers, bear the mark of a father, and, as produced, the mark of a son. We have a doubt here: which of these is the father, and which other the son? In just the same manner, of these pramāṇas and prameyas of yours, which are the pramāṇas, and which others the prameyas? For both of these, as those which establish, are pramāṇas, and as those which are to be established, prameyas. We have a doubt here as to which of these are the pramāṇas, and which others the prameyas.

naiva svataḥ prasidhir na parasparataḥ parapramāṇair vā |
na bhavati na ca prameyair na cāpyakasmāt pramāṇānāṃ ||51||

量非能自成非是自他成
非是異量成非無因緣成

| tshad ma rnams ni raṅ ñid kyis || ’grub min phan tshun gyis min pa’am |
| tshad ma gźan gyis ma yin la || gźal byas ma yin rgyu med min |

The pramāṇas are not established by themselves or by one another or by other pramāṇas. Nor are they established by the prameyas, or accidentally.

na svataḥ prasiddhiḥ pratyakṣasya tenaiva pratyakṣena, anumānasya tenaivānumānena, upamānasya tenaivopamānena, āgamasya tenaivāgamena | nāpi parasparataḥ pratyakṣasyānumānopamānāgamaiḥ, anumānasya pratyakṣopamānāgamaiḥ, upamānasya pratyakṣānumānāgamaiḥ, āgamasya pratyakṣānumānopamānaiḥ | nāpipratyakṣānumānopamānāgamānām anyaiḥ pratyakṣānumānopamānāgamair yathā svam | nāpi prameyaiḥ samastavyastaiḥ svaviṣayaparaviṣayasaṃgṛhītaiḥ | nāpy akasmāt | nāpi samuccyenaiteṣāṃ kāraṇānāṃ pūrvoddiṣṭānāṃ viṃśattriṃśaccatvāriṃśatṣaṭviṃśatyer vā | tatra yad uktaṃ pramāṇādhigamyatvāt prameyānāṃ bhāvānāṃ santi ca te prameyā bhāvās tāni ca pramāṇāni yais te pramāṇaiḥ prameyā bhāvāḥ samadhigatā iti tad na | yat punar bhavatoktam | kuśalānāṃ dharmāṇāṃ dharmāvasthāvidaś ca manyante | kuśalaṃ janāḥ svabhāvaṃ śeṣaṣvapyeṣa viniyoga iti || atra brūmaḥ |

此偈明何義如是量非自成現非現成比非比成喻非喻成阿含亦爾非阿含成比非比成喻非喻成阿含亦爾非阿含成非是自僚迭互相成現非比喻阿含等成比非現喻阿含等成喻非現比阿含等成阿含非現比喻等成非異現比譬喻阿含別有現比譬喻阿含異量來成如量自分和合不成自他境界和合不成非無因成非聚集成此之因緣如先所說二十三十或四五六二十三十四十五十或有六十若汝所說以有量故得言所量有量所量證一切法皆有自體義不相應又復汝說偈言智人知法說善法有自體世人知有體餘法亦如是出法出自體是聖人所說如是不出法不出法自體此偈我今答偈言

raṅ gis te mṅon sum ni mṅon sum de ñid kyis daṅ | rjes su dpag pa ni rjes su dpag pa de ñid kyis daṅ | luṅ ni luṅ de ñid kyis daṅ | dpes gźal ba ni dpes ’jal ba de ñid kyis rab tu mi ’grub la phan tshun gyis te | mṅon sum ni rjes su dpag pa daṅ | dpes ’jal ba daṅ | luṅ rnams kyis daṅ | rjes su dpag pa ni mṅon sum daṅ | dpe ’jal ba daṅ | luṅ rnams kyis daṅ | dpes ’jal ba ni mṅon sum daṅ rje su dpag pa daṅ | luṅ rnams kyis daṅ | luṅ ni mṅon sum daṅ | rjes su dpag pa daṅ | dpes ’jal bas kyaṅ ma yin la | raṅ gi ji lta ba bźin du | mṅon sum daṅ rjes su dpag pa daṅ | dpes ’jal ba daṅ | luṅ rnams kyis ni mṅon sum daṅ | rjes su dpag pa daṅ | dpes ’jal ba daṅ | luṅ gźan rnams kyis kyaṅ ma yin la | gźal bar bya ba raṅ daṅ gźan gyis bsdus pa mtha’ dag daṅ | re res kyaṅ ma yin la | rgyu med pas kyaṅ ma yin la | kun bsdus pas kyaṅ ma yin no || gtan tshigs sṅar bstan pa de dag ni | ñi śu’am | sum cu’am | bźi bcu’am | sum cu rtsa drug gis kyaṅ mi bsgrub na | de la gaṅ khyod kyis gźal bar bya ba’i dṅos po rnams ni tshad mas khoṅ du chud par bya ba yin pa’i phyir dṅos po gźal bar bya ba de dag kyaṅ yod la | khyod kyi tshad ma gaṅ dag gis dṅos po gźal bar bya ba dag yaṅ dag par khoṅ du chud pa’i tshad ma de dag kyaṅ yod do źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de mi ruṅ ṅo || gźan yaṅ khyod kyis | skye bo chos kyi gnas skabs mkhas || dge ba dag gi chos rnams la || dge ba’i raṅ bźin yin par ni || sems śiṅ lhag ma rnams daṅ yaṅ || źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de la bśad par bya ste |

Perception is not established by that very perception, inference is not established by that very inference, identification is not established by that very identification, and testimony is not established by that very testimony. Nor are they established by one another, i.e., perception by inference, identification and testimony, inference by perception, identification and testimony, identification by perception, inference and testimony, and testimony by perception, inference and identification. Nor are perception, inference, identification and testimony established, respectively, by another perception, another inference, another identification, and another testimony. Nor are the pramāṇas established by the prameyas, taken collectively or individually, each pramāṇa being established either by the corresponding prameya or by the other prameyas too. Nor are they established accidentally. Nor again are they established by a combination of the causes mentioned before, whatever their number: twenty, thirty, forty or twenty-six. -In these circumstances, your statement: ‘Because the things to be cognized are to be apprehended through the means of true cognition, those things to be cognized exist as well as those means of true cognition through which those things to be cognized are apprehended’, is not valid.

kuśalānām dharmāṇāṃ dharmāvasthāvido bruvanti yadi |
kuśalaṃ svabhāvam evaṃ pravibhāgenābhidheyaḥ syāt ||52||

若法師所說善法有自體
此善法自體法應分分說

chos kyi gnas skabs rab mkhas pa || dge ba yin ni chos rnams kyi |
| dge ba’i raṅ bźin smra ba gaṅ || de ltar rab phye brjod bya yin |

If people conversant with the state of things say that the good things have a good intrinsic nature, that has to be stated in detail.

此偈明何義若彼法師謂彼善法有自體者應分分說此善自體此之善法如彼善心善心自體如是如是一切諸法不如是見若如是說亦法自體義不相應

chos kyi gnas skabs la mkhas pa dge ba’i chos kyi dge ba’i raṅ gi ṅo bo sems pa de yaṅ khyod kyis rab tu phye ste | 7 ’di ni dge pa’i raṅ gi ṅo bo yin | ’di dag ni dge ba’i chos de dag yin te | ’di ni dge ba de rnam par śes pa yin | ’di ni dge ba de rnam par śes pa’i raṅ gi ṅo bo yin | de bźin du thams cad la bstan par bya ba yin no | de yaṅ de ltar ma bstan pas de’i phyir raṅ || gi ṅo bo ji lta ba bźin du chos rnams kyi raṅ gi ṅo bo bstan to źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de mi ruṅ ṅo ||

People conversant with the state of things think that the good things have a good intrinsic nature. But that has to be stated by you in detail: this is that good intrinsic nature; these are those good things; this is that good consciousness; this is that intrinsic nature of the good consciousness, and so on. This, however, is not seen to be soThus your statement that the intrinsic nature of each individual thing has been explained is not valid.

kiṃ cānyat | yadi ca pratītya kuśalaḥ svabhāva utpadyate sa kuśalānām |
dharmāṇāṃ parabhāvaḥ svabhāva evaṃ kathaṃ bhavati ||53||

又復有義
偈言若善法自體從於因緣
善法是他體云何是自體

’di ltar gźan yaṅ
| gal te dge ba’i chos rnams kyi || dge ba’i raṅ gi ṅo bo de |
| brten nas skye na de lta na || gźan dṅos raṅ ṅor ji ltar ’gyur |

Furthermore:If the good intrinsic nature originates dependently it is an extrinsic nature of the good things.How can it be thus their intrinsic nature?

yadi ca kuśalānāṃ svabhāvo hetupratyayasāmagrīṃ pratītyotpaduyate sa parabhāvād utpannaḥ kuśalānāṃ dharmāṇāṃ kathaṃ svabhāvo bhavati | evam evākuśalaprabhṛtīnām | tatrayad uktaṃ kuślānām dharmāṇāṃ kuśalaḥ svabhāvo ’py upadiṣṭaḥ, evam akuśalādīnāṃ cākuśalādir iti tad na |

此偈明何義若善法體從於因緣和合而生彼是他體善法云何得有自體如善法體餘亦如是若汝說言如彼善法善法自體如是不善不善體等義不相應

2 gal te dge ba’i chos rnams kyi raṅ gi ṅo bo ni rgyu daṅ rkyen tshogs pa la brten nas skye’o źe na | de gźan gyi dṅos po la brten nas skyes pa yin na | dge ba’i chos rnams kyi raṅ gi ṅo bor ji ltar ’gyur | mi dge ba la sogs pa dag la yaṅ de bźin du sbyar ro || de la gaṅ gi phyir dge ba’i chos rnams kyi dge ba’i raṅ gi ṅo bo yaṅ bstan la | de bźin du mi dge ba la sogs pa’i chos rnams kyi mi dge ba la sogs pa’i raṅ gi ṅo bo yaṅ bstan pa yin no źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de mi ruṅ ṅo ||

If the intrinsic nature of the good things originates in dependence upon the cause-condition complex, how can it, being born of an extrinsic nature, be the intrinsic nature of the good things? The same holds true of the bad and other things. – In these circumstances, your statement that the good intrinsic nature of the good things has been explained, as well as the bad intrinsic nature of the bad things, and so on, is not valid.

kiṃ cānyat | atha na pratītya kiṃcit svabhāva utpadyate sa kuśalānām |
dharmāṇām evaṃ syād vāso na brahmacaryasya ||54||

又復有義
偈言若少有善法不從因緣生
善法若如是無住梵行處

| ’di ltar gźan yaṅ
| ’on te dge ba’i chos rnams kyi || raṅ gi ṅo bo de ’ga’ la ’aṅ |
| ma brten skye na de lta na’aṅ || tshaṅs par spyod la gnas mi ’gyur |

Now, if [you think] that intrinsic nature of the good things originates without depending on anything, then there would be no practice of religious life.

atha manyase na kiṃcit pratītya kuśalānāṃ dharmāṇāṃ kuśalaḥsvabhāva utpadyate, evam akuśalānāṃ dharmāṇām akuślaḥ, avyākṛtānām avyākṛta iti, evam satyabrahmacaryavāso bhavati | kiṃ kāraṇaṃ | pratītyasamutpādasya hy evaṃ sati pratyākhyānaṃ bhavati | pratītyasamutpādasya pratyākhyānāt pratītyasamutpādadarśanapratyākhyānaṃ bhavati | na hy avidyamānasya pratītyasamutpādasya darśanam upapadyamānaṃ bhavati | asati pratītyasamutpādadarśane dharmadarśanaṃ na bhavati | uktaṃ hi bhagavatā yo hi bhikṣavaḥ pratītyasamutpādaṃ paśyati sa dharmaṃ paśyatīti | dharmadarśanābhāvād brahmacaryavāsābhāvaḥ | athavā pratītyasamutpādapratyākhyānād duḥkhasamudayapratyākhyānaṃ bhavati | pratītyasamutpādo hi duḥkhasya samudayaḥ | duḥkhasamudayasya pratyākhyānād duḥkhapratyākhyānaṃ bhavati | asati hi samudaye tat kuto duḥkhaṃ samudeṣyati | duḥkhapratyākhyānāt samudayapratyākhyānāc ca duḥkhanirodhasya pratyākhyānaṃ bhavati | asati hi duḥkhasamudaye kasya prahāṇān nirodho bhaviṣyati | [duḥkhanirodhapratyākhyānān mārgasya pratyākhyānaṃ bhavati] | asati hi duḥkhanirodhe kasya prāptaye mārge bhaviṣyati duḥkhanirodhagāmī | evaṃ caturṇām āryasatyānām abhāvaḥ | teṣām abhāvāc chrāmaṇyaphalābhāvaḥ | saty adarśanāc chrāmaṇyaphalāni hi samadhigamyante | śrāmaṇyaphalānām abhāvād abrahmacaryavāsa iti |

此偈明何義若汝意謂少有善法不因緣生如是不善不善自體無記無記自體若當如是無住梵行何以故汝若如是是則捨離十二因緣若當捨離十二因緣是則捨見十二因緣若如是無十二因緣則不得見十二因緣如其不見十二因緣不得見法世尊說言若比丘見十二因緣彼則見法若不見法不住梵行若離如是十二因緣則離苦集十二因緣是苦集故若離苦集是則離苦若無集候何處有苦若無苦者云何有滅若無苦滅當於何處修苦滅道若如是者無四聖諦無四聖諦則亦無有聲聞道果見四聖諦如是則證聲聞道果無聲聞果無住梵行

’on te dge ba’i chos rnams kyi dge ba’i raṅ gi ṅo bo ni ’ga’ la’aṅ ma brten par skye la | mi dge ba la sogs pa dag gi yaṅ de lta bu yin no sñam du sems na | de lta na ni tshaṅs par spyod pa la gnas par mi ’gyur ro || ci’i phyir źe na | de lta yin na ni rten ciṅ ’brel par ’byuṅ ba btaṅ ba yin no || rten ciṅ ’brel bar ’byuṅ ba gtaṅ ba’i phyir | rten ciṅ ’brel par ’byuṅ ba mthoṅ ba btaṅ ba yin te | rten ciṅ ’brel par ’byuṅ ba yod pa ma yin pa ni mthoṅ ba ste | dmigs par ’thad pa ma yin no || rten ciṅ ’brel par ’byuṅ ba mthoṅ ba med na | chos mthoṅ ba med pa yin no || bcom ldan ’das kyis ni dge sloṅ sus rten ciṅ ’brel bar ’byuṅ ba mthoṅ ba des chos mthoṅ ṅo źes gsuṅs so || 7 chos mthoṅ ba med pa’i phyir tshaṅs par spyod pa la gnas pa med pa yin no || yaṅ na rten ciṅ ’brel par ’byuṅ ba btaṅ bas sdug bsṅal kun ’byuṅ ba btaṅ ba yin te | sdug bsṅal kun ’byuṅ ba ni rten ciṅ ’brel par ’byuṅ ba yin pas so || sdug bsṅal kun ’byuṅ ba btaṅ bas sdug bsṅal btaṅ ba yin te | kun ’byuṅ ba med na gaṅ las sdug bsṅal kun ’byuṅ bar ’gyur | sdug bsṅal gtaṅ ba’i phyir daṅ | kun ’byuṅ ba gtaṅ ba’i phyir daṅ | sdug bsṅal ’gog pa btaṅ ba yin te | sdug bsṅal daṅ kun ’byuṅ ba gñis med na gaṅ źig spaṅs pas ’gog par ’gyur bas so || sdug bsṅal ’gog pa med na gaṅ źig thob par bya ba’i phyir sdug bsṅal ’gog par ’gyur ba’i lam du ’gyur | des na ’phags pa’i bden pa bźi dag med par ’gyur te | de med pa’i phyir dge sbyoṅ gi tshul gyi ’bras bu med par ’gyur te | bden pa mthoṅ ba las dge sbyoṅ gi tshul gyi ’bras bu rnams yaṅ dag par ’thob pas so || dge sbyoṅ gi tshul gyi ’bras bu rnams med pas tshaṅs par spyod pa la gnas par mi ’gyur ro ||

Now, if you think that the good intrinsic nature of the good things originates without depending on anything, and that the same is true of the bad intrinsic nature of the bad things and of the indeterminate intrinsic nature of the indeterminate things, then there is no practice of religious life. - Why? - Because, if this is so, one rejects Dependent Origination. By rejecting Dependent Origination, one rejects the vision of Dependent Origination. For if Dependent Origination does not exist, there can be no question of its vision. If there is no vision of Dependent Origination, there is no vision of Dharma. For the Lord has said:‘0 monks, he who sees the pratītyasamutpāda sees the Dharma’. [And] if one does not see the Dharma, there is no practice of religious life. Or, rejecting Dependent Origination, one rejects the origination of sorrow. For Dependent Origination is the origination of sorrow. By rejecting the origination of sorrow, one rejects sorrow. For, if there is no origination, how will that sorrow originate? If sorrow and [its] origination are rejected, then the cessation of sorrow is rejected. For if there is no origination of sorrow, what will come to cease through abandonment? [And] if the cessation of sorrow is rejected, the Way is rejected. For, if there is no cessation of sorrow, for obtaining what will there be a way to the cessation of sorrow? Thus, the Four Noble Truths will cease to exist. If they do not exist, there is no result of monasticism. For it is through the vision of [those.] Truths that the results of monasticism are attained. [And] if the results of monasticism do not exist, there is no practice of religious life.

kiṃ cānyat | nādharmo dharmo vā saṃvyavahārāś calaukikā na syuḥ |
nityāś ca sasvabhāvāḥ syur nityatvād ahetumataḥ ||55||

又復有義偈言
非法非非法世間法亦無
有自體則當常則無因緣

’di ltar gźan yaṅ
| rgyu mi ldan pa rtag pa’i phyir || chos rnams thams cad rtag par ’gyur |
| chos sam chos ma yin med ciṅ || ’jig rten pa yi tha sñad med |

Furthermore:There would be neither merit nor demerit nor the worldly conventions . All things, being endowed with an intrinsic nature, would be permanent - for that which has no cause is permanent.

此偈明何義若當如是離於因緣和合生者汝得多過以不得法及非法故一切世間法皆不可得何以故因緣和合生一切法以一切法皆從因緣和合而生若無因緣和合生者則一切法皆不可得又復自體不從因緣和合而生無因緣有則是常法何以故無因緣法則是常故彼若如是無住梵行又復汝法自有過失何以故世尊所說一切有為皆悉無常彼何自體皆悉無常偈言

de lta yin na rten ciṅ ’brel par ’byuṅ ba gtoṅ ba de la skyon cir ’gyur źe na | chos med pa daṅ | chos ma yin pa med pa daṅ | ’jig rten pa’i tha sñad rnams med par ’gyur ro || ci’i phyir źe na | ’di thams cad ni rten ciṅ ’brel par ’byuṅ ba yin na rten ciṅ ’brel par ’byuṅ ba de med na gaṅ las ’byuṅ bar ’gyur | gźan yaṅ raṅ gi ṅo bo daṅ bcas pa daṅ | rten ciṅ ’brel par ’byuṅ ba ma yin pa daṅ | rgyu med pa las byuṅ ba daṅ rtag par ’gyur te | rgyu med pa rnams ni rtag pa ñid yin pa’i phyir daṅ | de la tshaṅs par spyod pa la gnas pa ma yin pa de ñid du yaṅ ’gyur ro || grub pa’i mtha’ daṅ yaṅ ’gal te | ci’i phyir źe na | bcom ldan ’das kyis ’du byed thams cad ni mi rtag pa’o źes bśad pa yin no || de dag ni raṅ gi ṅo bo ñid daṅ bcas pa’i rtag pa ñid kyis rtag pa yin no ||

If this is so, what defect follows for you who reject DependentOrigination? - There is no merit. There is no demerit. Nor do exist the worldly conventions. - Why? - Because all that is dependently originated; how will it be, if there is no dependent origination? Moreover, being endowed with an intrinsic nature, not dependently originated and devoid of a cause, it would be permanent. - Why? -Because things that have no cause are permanent. - There would thus follow that very non-practice of religious life. And you would contradict your own tenet - Why? - Because the Lord has taught that all conditioned things are impermanent. They become permanent, because they are [Supposed to be] endowed with an intrinsic nature and hence [to be] permanent.

evam akuśaleṣv avyākṛteṣu nairyāṇikādiṣu ca doṣaḥ |
tasmāt sarvaṃ saṃskṛtam asaṃskṛtam te bhavaty eva ||56||

善不善無記一切有為法
如汝說則常汝有如是過

| mi dge ba daṅ luṅ ma bstan || ṅes ’byin stshogs la’aṅ skyon de bźin |
| de bas khyod kyi ’dus byas kun || ’dus ma byas pa ñid du ’gyur |

And the same defect exists also with regard to the bad things, the indeterminate things, those things which lead to emancipation, and so on. Thus, all that is conditioned certainly becomes for you unconditioned.

yaś caiṣa kuśaleṣu dharmeṣu nirdiṣṭaḥ kalpaḥ sa evākuśaleṣu, sa evāvyākṛteṣu, sa eva nairyāṇikaprabhṛtiṣu | tasmāt te sarvam idaṃ saṃskṛtam asaṃskṛtam saṃpadyate | kiṃ kāraṇaṃ | hetau hy asaty utpādasthitibhaṅgā na bhavanti | utpādasthitibhaṅgeṣv asatsu saṃskṛtalakṣaṇābhāvāt sarvaṃ saṃskṛtam asaṃskṛtam saṃpadyate | tatra yad uktaṃ kuśalādīnāṃ bhāvānāṃ svabhāvasadbhāvād aśūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti tad na | yat punar bhavatoktaṃ yadi ca na bhavet svabhāvo dharmāṇāṃ niḥsvabhāva ity eva | nāmāpi bhaven naivaṃ nāma hi nirvastukaṃ nāstīti || atra brūmaḥ |

此偈明何義若說善法有法自體不善無記亦如是說若如是者汝說一切有為法常何以故法若無因無生住滅無生住滅非有為法則一切法皆是無為若說善等一切諸法皆有自體則一切法皆悉不空義不相應又復汝說偈言諸法若無體無體不得名有自體有名唯名云何名此偈我今答偈言

dge ba’i || chos rnams la rtag pa de bstan pa gaṅ yin pa de ñid mi dge ba rnams daṅ | luṅ du ma bstan pa rnams la yaṅ yod | de ñid ṅes par ’byin pa la sogs pa la yaṅ yod do || de bas na khyod kyi ’dus byas ’di thams cad ’dus ma byas su ’gyur ro || ci’i phyir źe na | rgyu med na skye ba daṅ gnas pa daṅ ’jig pa dag med pa’i phyir ro || de med na ’dus byas kyi mtshan ñid med pa’i phyir thams cad ’dus ma byas su ’gyur ro || de la dge ba la sogs pa dag gi dṅos po dag gi raṅ gi ṅo bo yod pa’i phyir dṅos po thams cad stoṅ pa ma yin no źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de mi ruṅ ṅo || bya ba’i miṅ || de yaṅ de bźin med ’gyur te || gźi med miṅ ni med pas so || źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa ’di la bśad par bya ste |

And the same method that has been indicated, concerning the good things, applies also to the bad things, to the indeterminate things, to those things which lead to emancipation, and so on. Thus all that, though conditioned, turns out to be unconditioned for you. - Why? - Because, there being no cause, there is no origination, no subsistence and no destruction. [And] there being no origination, no subsistence and no destruction, all that is conditioned turns out to be unconditioned, because of the absence of the specific character of’ the conditioned. In these circumstances, your statement that all things are non-void because the good and other things have an intrinsic nature, is not valid.

yaḥ sadbhūtaṃ nāmātra brūyāt sasvabhāva ity evam |
bhavatā prativaktavyo nāma brūmaś ca na vayaṃ tat ||57||

若人說有名語言有自體
彼人汝可難語名我不實

| gaṅ źig raṅ bźin bcas pa źes || miṅ ni yod par smra ba la |
| de ltar miṅ gi lan btab kyis || ṅa ni miṅ yod mi smra’o |

He who says that the name is existent, deserves indeed the answer from you: ‘There is an intrinsic nature". We, however, do not say that.

yo nāmātra sadbhūtaṃ brūyāt sasvabhāva iti sa bhavatā prativaktavyaḥ syāt | yasya sadbhūtaṃ nāma svabhāvasya tasmāt tenāpi svabhāvena sadbhūtena bhavitavyam | na punar vayaṃ nāma sadbhūtaṃ brūmaḥ | tad api hi bhāvasvabhāvasyābhāvān nāma niḥsvabhāvaṃ, tasmāc chūnyam, śūnyatvād asadbhūtam | tatra yad bhavatoktaṃ nāma sadbhāvāt sadbhūtaḥ svabhāva iti tad na |

此偈明何義若何人說名有自體彼人如是汝則得難彼人說言有體有名無體無名我不如是說有名體何以知之一切諸法皆無自體若無自體彼得言空彼若空者得言不實若汝有名有自體義不相應

gaṅ źig miṅ ’di raṅ bźin daṅ bcas pa yin no źes miṅ yod par smra ba de la khyod kyis lan gdab par bya ba yin gyi | gal te miṅ can gyi raṅ bźin de med na | de’i phyir miṅ de yaṅ raṅ bźin yod pa ma yin par bya dgos te | yod pa ma yin pa la ni miṅ gi raṅ bźin yod par mi ’gyur bas ṅed cag kyaṅ miṅ gi raṅ bźin yod par mi smra’o || de bas na dṅos po rnams kyi raṅ bźin yaṅ med pa’i phyir miṅ gi raṅ bźin yaṅ med pa yin no || de’i phyir stoṅ pa yin no || stoṅ pa ñid yin pa’i phyir yod pa ma yin pas de la khyod kyis miṅ yod pa’i phyir raṅ gi ṅo bo yod do źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de mi ruṅ ṅo ||

He who says that the name is existent, deserves the answer from you: ‘There is an intrinsic nature’. That intrinsic nature, which is designated by the existent name, must also be, for that reason, existent. For a non-existent intrinsic nature cannot have anexistent name. We, however, do not say that the name is existent. Since the things have no intrinsic nature, that name also is devoid of an intrinsic nature. For that reason, it is void, and, being void, it is non-existent. - In these circumstances, your statement that because of the existence of the name the intrinsic nature I’s existent, is not valid.

kiṃ cānyat |
nāmāsad iti ca yad idaṃ tat kiṃ nu sato bhavaty utāpy asataḥ |
yadi hi sato yady asato dvidhāpi te hīyate vādaḥ ||58||

又復有義偈言
若此名無者則有亦是無
若言有言無汝宗有二失
若此名有者則無亦是有
若言無言有汝諍有二失

| ’di ltar gźan yaṅ | med la miṅ med ces gaṅ ’di || ci de yod pa’am med pa yin |
| gal te yod pa’am med pa yin || khyod kyis smras pa gñi ga’aṅ ñams |

Furthermore:Does this name ‘non-existent’ designate something existent or non-existent. Be it the name of an existent or of a non-existent thing, in both ways your position is abandoned.

yac caitan nāmāsad iti tat kiṃ sato ’sato vā | yadi hi satas tan nāma yady asata ubhayathāpi pratijña hīyate | tatra yadi tāvat sato nāmāsad iti pratijña hīyate | na hīdānīṃ tad asad idānīṃ sat | athāsato ’sad iti nāma, asad bhūtasya nāma na bhavati | tasmād yā pratijñā nāmnaḥ sadbhūtaḥ svabhāva iti sā hinā |

此偈明何義若此名無如是宗失如其是有如導諍失我宗不爾有物有名無物無名如是諸法有自體者義不相應

med pa la miṅ med do źes bya ba gaṅ yin pa ’di ci miṅ med pa de yod pa yin nam ’on te med pa yin | gal te miṅ de yod pa źig gi yin nam | gal te med pa źig gi yin na dam bcas pa gñi ga yaṅ ñams par ’gyur te | de la gal te re źig miṅ med pa źes bya ba’i miṅ yod pa yin no źe na | miṅ med do źes bya ba’i dam bcas pa ñams par ’gyur te | da ni de med pa ma yin te | da ni de yod pas so ci ste miṅ med pa źes bya ba med pa yin no źe na | med pa la ni miṅ med do || de bas na miṅ gi raṅ bźin yod do źes khyod kyis dam bcas pa gaṅ yin pa de ñams pa yin no ||

Does this name ‘non-existent’ designate something existent or non-existent? Be it the name of an existent or of a non-existent thing, in both ways the proposition is abandoned. If [the thing named is] existent, the proposition [‘The name is:] "Non-existent... is abandoned. For the same thing cannot be now non-existent, now existent. If, on the other hand, [you say that] the thing named is non-existent, [it has to be replied:] that which is non-existent has no name.

kiṃ cānyat | sarveṣāṃ bhāvānāṃ śūnyatvaṃ copapāditaṃ pūrvam |
sa upālambhas tasmād bhāvaty ayaṃ cāpratijñāyāḥ ||59||

又復有義偈言
如是我前說一切法皆空
我義宗如是則不得有過

| ’di ltar gźan yaṅ | dṅos po dag ni thams cad kyi || stoṅ pa ñid ni sṅar bstan pas |
| de phyir dam bcas med par yaṅ || klan ka gaṅ yin de tshol byed |

Furthermore:We have already established the voidness of all things. This criticism, therefore, turns out to be one of something which is not a proposition.

iha cāsmābhiḥ pūrvam eva sarveṣāṃ bhāvānāṃ vistarataḥ śūnyatvam upapāditam | tatra prāṅ nāmno ’pi śūnyatvam uktam | sa bhavān aśūnyatvaṃ parigṛhya parivṛtto vaktuṃ yadi bhāvānāṃ svabhāvo na syād asvabhāva iti nāmāpīdaṃ na syād iti tasmād apratijñopālambho ’yaṃ bhavataḥ saṃpadyate | na hi vayaṃnāma sadbhūtam iti brūmaḥ | yat punar bhavatoktaṃ atha vidyate svabhāvaḥ sa ca dharmāṇāṃ na vidyate tasmāt | dharmair vinā svabhāvaḥ sa yasya tad yuktam upadeṣṭum iti || atra brūmaḥ |

此偈明何義我前已說一切法空亦說名空取空名而有所說若一切法皆無自體名亦無體我如是說義宗無過我不說名有自體故又復汝說偈言若離法有名不在於法中說離法有名彼人則可難此偈我今答偈言

’dir ṅed cag gi sṅar dṅos po thams cad kyi stoṅ pa ñid rgya cher bstan pas der miṅ yaṅ stoṅ pa ñid du bstan pa yin no || de’i phyir dam bcas pa med par yaṅ khyod klan ka ’di tshol bar byed kyi | ṅed miṅ yod do źes mi smra’o | gźan yaṅ khyod kyis | ’on te ’di ltar raṅ bźin yod || de ni chos la medce na || chos rnams med par raṅ bźin te || gaṅ gi yin par de bstan rigs || źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa ’di la bśad par bya ste |

Here we have already established in detail the voidness of all things. Even the name has already been stated to be void. Now you, assuming non-voidness, have returned to the charge. If the things had nointrinsic nature, then even the name ‘absence of intrinsic nature’would not exist. Your criticism, therefore, turns out to be one of something which is not a proposition. We do not say, indeed, that the name is existent.

atha vidyate svabhāvaḥ sa ca dharmāṇāṃ na vidyata itīdaṃ |
āśaṅkitaṃ yad uktaṃ bhavaty anāśaṅkitaṃ tac ca ||60||

若別有自體不在於法中
汝慮我故說此則不須慮

| ’on te raṅ bźin źig yod la || de ni chos la med do źes |
| dogs pa bsu na smra ba ’di || dogs pa gaṅ yin de med do |

‘Now [you may say:] There is an intrinsic nature, but that does not belong to the things’ - this suspicion of yours is not shared by us.

na hi vayaṃ dharmāṇāṃ svabhāvaṃ pratiṣedhayāmo dharmavinirmuktasya vā kasyacid arthasya svabhāvam abhyupagacchāmaḥ | nanv evaṃ sati ya upālambho bhavato yadi dharmā niḥsvabhāvāḥ kasya khalv idānīm anyasyārthasya dharmavinirmuktasya svabhāvo bhavati sa yuktam upadeṣṭum iti dūrāpakṛṣṭam evaitad bhavati, upālambho na bhavati | yat punar bhavatoktaṃ sata eva pratiṣedho nāsti ghaṭo geha ity ayaṃ yasmāt | dṛṣtaḥ pratiṣedho ’yaṃ sataḥ svabhāvasya te tasmād iti || atra brūmaḥ |

此偈明何義彼不須慮汝妄難我我則不遮諸法自體我不離法別有物取何人取法彼人須慮我不取法故不遮法云何有過若我取法有自體者則可難言汝不相應我不如是汝難大賒全不相當又復汝說偈言法若有自體可得遮諸法諸法無自體竟為何所遮如有瓶有泥可得遮瓶泥見有物則遮見無物不遮此偈我今答偈言

ṅed ni chos rnams kyi raṅ bźin yaṅ ’gog par mi byed la | chos las ma gtogs pa’i don ’ga’ źig gi raṅ bźin yin par yaṅ khas mi len no || de lta yin na ’on te chos rnams raṅ bźin med pa yin na | raṅ bźin te chos las ma gtogs pa don gźan gaṅ źig gi yin pa de bstan pa’i rigs so źes bya ba’i khyod kyi klan ka thag bsriṅs pa yin pas klan kar mi ’gyur ba ma yin nam | gźan yaṅ khyod kyis | gaṅ phyir khyim na bum pa de || med ces yod pa ñid la ’gog | mthoṅ ste de phyir khyod kyi ’di || yod pa’i raṅ bźin ’gog pa yin || źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa ’di la bśad par bya ste |

We do not, indeed, deny the intrinsic nature of the things. Nor do we affirm the intrinsic nature of a certain object apart from the things. Now, this being so, your criticism: ‘If the things are devoid of an intrinsic nature, you should explain to what other object, apart from thethings, there now happens to belong the intrinsic nature, is thrown far away. It is no criticism at all.

sata eva pratiṣedho yadi śūnyatvaṃ nanu prasiddham idam |
pratiṣedhayate hi bhavān bhāvānāṃ niḥsvabhāvatvam ||61||

若有體得遮若空得言成
若無體無空云何得遮成

| gal te yod la ’gog yin na || ’o na stoṅ ñid rab ’grub ste |
| dṅos rnams raṅ bźin med ñid la || khyod ni ’gog par byed pas so |

If [it is true that] negation is only of an existent, then this voidness is established - for you negate the things’ being devoid of an intrinsic nature.

yadi sata eva pratiṣedho bhavati nāsato bhavāṃś ca sarvabhāvānāṃ niḥsvabhāvatvaṃ pratiṣedhayati, nanu pratisiddhaṃ sarvabhāvānāṃ niḥsvabhāvatvaṃ | tvadvacanena pratiṣedhasadbhāvān niḥsvabhāvatvasya ca sarvabhāvānāṃ pratiṣiddhatvāt prasiddhā śūnyatā |

此偈明何義法若有者則可得遮法若無者則不得遮汝難我言一切諸法皆無自體實如汝言一切諸法皆無自體何以知之以汝遮法無自體成若遮諸法無自體成得言一切諸法皆空偈言

1 || gal te yod pa kho na la ’gog par byed pa yin gyi | med pa la ni ma yin no || khyed kyaṅ dṅos po thams cad kyi raṅ bźin med pa ñid ’gog par byed pa yin pas ’o na dṅos po thams cad kyi raṅ bźin med pa ñid rab tu grub pa ma yin nam | khyod kyi gtan tshigs ’gog par byed pa yod pa’i phyir daṅ | dṅos po thams cad kyi raṅ bźin med pa ñid bkag pa’i phyir stoṅ pa ñid rab tu grub pa yin no ||

If negation is only of the existent and not of the non-existent, and if you negate the being-devoid of-an-intrinsic-nature of all things, then the being-devoid-of-an-intrinsic-nature of all things is established. Since, in virtue of your statement, negation exists’, and since the being-devoid-of-an-intrinsic-nature of all things has been negated, voidness is established.

pratiṣedhayase ’tha tvaṃ śūnyatvaṃ tac ca nāsti śūnyatvam |
pratiṣedhaḥ sata iti te nanv eṣa vihīyate vādaḥ ||62||

汝為何所遮汝所遮則空
法空而有遮如是汝諍失

| stoṅ ñid gaṅ la khyod ’gog pa’i || stoṅ ñid de yaṅ med yin na |
| ’o na yod la ’gog yin źes || smras pa de ñams ma yin nam |

Now, if’ you negate voidness, and if that voidness does not exist, then your position that negation is of an existent is abandoned.

atha pratiṣedhayasi tvaṃ sarvabhāvānāṃ niḥsvabhāvatvaṃ śūnyatvaṃ nāsti tac ca śūnyatvaṃ, yā tar hi te pratijña sataḥ pratiṣedho bhavati nāsata iti sā hīnā |

此偈明何義若一切法遮有自體若無自體彼得言空彼空亦空是故汝言有物得遮無物不遮義不相應

ci ste khyod dṅos po thams cad kyi raṅ bźin med pa ñid de | stoṅ pa ñid ’gog par byed la stoṅ pa de yaṅ med pa yin na | ’o na yod pa la ’gog par byed kyi med pa la ni ma yin no źes khyod kyis dam bcas pa gaṅ yin pa de ñams pa yin no ||

Now, if you negate the being-devoid-of-an-intrinsic-nature of all things, i.e. their voidness, and if that voidness does not exist, then your proposition that negation is of an existent and not of a non-existent, is abandoned’.

kiṃ cānyat | pratiṣedhyāmi nāhaṃ kiṃcit pratiṣedhyam asti na ca kiṃcit |
tasmāt pratiṣedhayasīty adhilaya eṣa tvayā kriyate ||63||

又復有義偈言
我無有少物是故我不遮
如是汝無理 ……橫而難成

’di ltar gźan yaṅ
| dgag bya ci yaṅ med pas na || da ni ci yaṅ mi ’gog go |
| de phyir ’gog par byed do źes || skur pa de ni khyod kyis btab |

Besides:I do not negate anything, nor is there anything to be negated. You, therefore, calumniate me when you say: ‘You negate’.

yady ahaṃ kiṃcit pratiṣedhayāmi tatas tad api tvayā yuktam eva vaktuṃ syāt | na caivāhaṃ kiṃcit pratiṣedhayāmi, yasmān na kiṃcit pratiṣeddhavyam asti | tasmāc chūnyeṣu sarvabhāveṣv avidyamāne pratiṣedhye pratiṣedhe ca pratiṣedhayasīty eṣa tvayā prastuto ’dhilayaḥ kriyata iti | yat punar bhavatoktaṃ atha nāsti sa svabhāvaḥ kiṃ nu pratiṣedhyate tvayānena | vacanena rte vacanāt pratiṣedhaḥ sidhyate hy asata iti || atra brūmaḥ |

此偈明何義若我如是少有物遮汝得難我我無物遮如是無物我無所遮如是無遮一切法空如是無物遮與所遮是故汝向如是難言何所遮者此汝無理……橫難我又復汝說偈言若法無自體言語何所遮若無法得遮無語亦成遮此偈我今答偈言

gal te ṅas ci źig ’gog par byed na ni de’i phyir khyod kyis de skad kyaṅ smra ba’i rigs na gaṅ gi phyir dgag par bya ba ci yaṅ med pas ṅa ni cuṅ zad kyaṅ ’gog par mi byed do || de’i phyir dṅos po thams cad stoṅ pa yin te | dgag par bya ba daṅ | ’gog par byed pa yod pa ma yin pa las ’gog par byed do źes khyod kyis skur pa thog tu ma bab pa de btab bo || gźan yaṅ khyod kyis | ci ste raṅ bźin de med na || khyod kyi tshig des ci źig dgag | med pa yin na tshig med par || ’gog pa rab tu grub pa yin || źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de ’di la bśad par bya ste |

Even that you could rightly say, if I negated something. I, however, do not negate anything, for there is nothing to be negated. Thus, while, all things being void, there is neither a thing to be negated nor a negation, you make an absurd calumny when you say: ‘You negate’.

yac cāha rte vacanād asataḥ pratiṣedhavacanasiddhir iti |
atra jñāpayate vāg asad iti tad na pratinihanti ||64||

汝言語法別此義我今說
無法得說語而我則無過

| tshig med par yaṅ med pa yi || ’gog pa ’grub par ’gyur źes pa |
| de la tshig ni med ces par || go bar byed kyi skye sel min |

Regarding your assertion that the statement of the negation of the non-existent is established without words, we observe: Here speech makes it known as n on-existent, it does not deny it.

yac ca bhavān bravīti, ṛte ’pi vacanād asataḥ pratiṣedhaḥ prasiddhaḥ, tatra kiṃ niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā ity etat tvadvacanaṃ karotīti, atra brūmaḥ | niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāva ity etat khalu vacanaṃ na niḥsvabhāvān eva sarvabhāvān karoti | kiṃ tv asati svabhāve bhāvā niḥsvabhāvā iti jñāpayati | tadyathā kaścid brūyād avidyamānagṛhe devadatte ’sti gṛhe devadatta iti | tatrainaṃ kaścit pratibrūyān nāstīti | na tad vacanaṃ devadattasyāsadbhāvaṃ karoti kiṃ tu jñapayati kevalam asaṃbhavaṃ gṛhe devadattasya | tadvan nāsti svabhāvo bhāvānām ity etad vacanaṃ na bhāvānāṃ niḥsvabhāvatvaṃ karoti kiṃtu sarvabhāveṣu svabhāvasyābhāvaṃ jñāpayati | tatra yad bhavatoktaṃ kiṃ asati svabhāve nāsti svabhāva ity etad vacanaṃ karoti, ṛte ’pi vacanāt prasiddhaḥ svabhāvasyābhāva iti tan na yuktaṃ | anyac ca | bālānām iva mithyā mṛgatṛṣṇāyāṃ yathājalagrāhaḥ | evaṃ mithyāgrāhaḥ syāt te pratiṣedhyato hy asataḥ || ity ādayo yā punaś catasro gāthā bhavatoktā atra brūmaḥ

此偈明何義若汝說言無有言語亦成遮者隨何等法彼一切法皆無自體說彼諸法無自體語非此言語作無自體此我今答若說諸法無自體語此語非作無自體法又復有義以無法體知無法體以有法體知有法體譬如屋中實無天得有人問言有天得不答者言有復有言無答言無者語言不能於彼屋中作天得無但知屋中空無天得如是若說一切諸法無自體者此語不能作一切法無自體無但知諸法自體無體若汝說言若無物者則不得言法無自體以無語故不得成法無自體者義不相應又復汝說偈言如愚癡之人妄取炎為水若汝遮妄取其事亦如是取所取能取遮所遮能遮如是六種義皆悉是有法若無取所取亦無有能取則無遮所遮亦無有能遮若無遮所遮亦無有能遮則一切法成彼自體亦成此四行偈我今答汝偈言

khyod kyi tshig dag med par yaṅ ste | tshig ma gtogs par yaṅ med pa’i ’gog pa ’grub na | de la ci’i dṅos po thams cad raṅ bźin med pa yin no źes smras pa’i khyod kyi tshig des ci źig byed ces smras pa gaṅ yin pa ’di la bśad par bya ste | dṅos po thams cad raṅ bźin med pa’o źes bya ba’i tshig ’di ni dṅos po rnams raṅ bźin med pa ñid du byed pa ma yin gyi | ’on kyaṅ raṅ bźin med pa la dṅos po rnams raṅ bźin med pa’o źes go bar byed pa yin no || dper na ’ga’ źig na re lha sbyin khyim na med bźin du lha sbyin khyim na yod do źes zer ba daṅ | de ni de la kha cig na re med do źes zer ba na | tshig des lha sbyin med par mi byed kyi lha sbyin khyim na mi srid par ston pa ’ba’ źig tu zad do || de bźin du dṅos po rnams kyi raṅ bźin med do źes bya ba’i tshig de yaṅ dṅos po rnams kyi raṅ bźin med pa ñid du byed pa ma yin gyi | ’on kyaṅ dṅos po thams cad raṅ bźin med pa sgyu ma’i skyes bu daṅ ’dra bar skyes bu yaṅ dag pa’i ṅo bo daṅ bral ba rnams la rmoṅs pa’i phyir | byis pa skye bo ma rig pas rmoṅs pa rnams kyi raṅ bźin daṅ bcas pa ñid du sgro btags pa rnams la raṅ bźin yod pa ma yin par go bar byed pa yin pas de la raṅ bźin yod pa ma yin na tshig med par yaṅ ste tshig ma gtogs par yaṅ raṅ bźin yod pa ma yin par rab tu grub pa yin no || raṅ bźin med do źes bya ba’i tshig des ci źig byed ces khyod kyis smras pa gaṅ yin pa de rigs pa ma yin no || gźan yaṅ | byis pa rnams ni smig rgyu la || ji ltar log par chur ’dzin ltar || de bźin khyod kyis log par ’dzin || yod pa yin la dgag par bya || źes bśad pa la sogs pa yaṅ khyod kyis tshigs su bcad pa bźi smras pa gaṅ yin pa ’di la bśad par bya ste |

Regarding your statement: ‘The negation of the non-existent is established even without words; what purpose is, therefore, served by your statement “All things are devoid of an intrinsic nature” we observe: The statement: ‘All things are devoid of an intrinsic nature’, does not make all things devoid of an intrinsic nature. But, since there is no intrinsic nature, it makes known that the things are devoid of an intrinsic nature. Here is an example: While Devadatta is not in the house, somebody says that Devadatta is in the house. On that occasion, somebody tells him in reply: ‘He is not [in the house]’. That statement does not create Devadatta’s non-existence, but only makes known Devadatta’s non-existence in the house. Similarly the statement ‘things have no intrinsic nature’ does not create the being-devoid-of-an-intrinsic-nature of the things, but makes known the absence of an intrinsic nature in all things. - In these circumstances, your statement: ‘If there is no intrinsic nature, what purpose is served by the statement “There is no intrinsic nature”? The absence of an intrinsic nature is established even without words’, is not appropriate.

mṛgatṛṣṇādṛṣṭānte yaḥ punar uktas tvayā mahāṃś carcaḥ |
tatrāpi nirṇayaṃ śṛṇu yathā sa dṛṣṭānta upapannaḥ ||65||

汝說鹿愛喻以明於大義
汝聽我能答如譬喻相應

| smig rgyu’i dpe la khyod kyis khyod || ’gro ba chen pos smras pa gaṅ |
| der yaṅ ci nas dpe de ’thad || gtan la dbab la mñan par gyis |

You have introduced a great deliberation with the example of the mirage. Listen to the decision in that matter also, showing how that example is appropriate.

ya eta tvayā mṛgatṛṣṇādṛṣṭānte mahāṃś carca uktas tatrāpi yo nirṇayaḥ sa śrūyatāṃ yathopapanna eṣa dṛṣṭānto bhavati |

此偈明何義汝若說此鹿愛譬喻以明大義汝聽我答如喻相應偈言

khyod kyis smig rgyu’i dpe de la ’gro ba chen po smras pa gaṅ yin pa der yaṅ dpe de ci nas kyaṅ ’thad pa gtan la dbab pa gaṅ yin pa de ñon cig |

sa yadi svabhāvataḥ syād grāho na syāt pratītya saṃbhūtaḥ |
yaś ca pratītya bhavati grāho nanu śūnyatā saiva ||66||

若彼有自體不須因緣生
若須因緣者如是得言空

| gal te ’dzin de raṅ bźin yod || brten nas ’byuṅ bar mi ’gyur ro |
| ’dzin pa gaṅ źig brten nas ’byuṅ || de ñid stoṅ ñid ma yin nam |

If that perception were by its own nature, it would not be dependently originated. That perception, however, which comes into existence dependently is voidness indeed.If that perception were by its own nature, it would not be dependently originated. That perception, however, which comes into existence dependently is voidness indeed.

yadi mṛgatṛṣṇāyāṃ sa yathā jalagrāhaḥ svabhāvataḥ syān na syāt pratītyasamutpannaḥ | yato mṛgatṛṣṇāṃ ca pratītya viparītaṃ ca darśanaṃ pratītyāyoniśomanaskāraṃ ca pratītya syād udbhūto ’taḥ pratītyasamutpannaḥ | yataś ca pratītyasamutpanno ’taḥ svabhāvataḥ śūnya eva | yathā pūrvam uktaṃ tathā |

此偈明何義若鹿愛中妄取水體非因緣生汝喻相當鹿愛因緣彼顛倒見顛倒見者以不觀察因緣而生如是得言因緣而生若因緣生彼自體空如是之義如前所說

gal te smig rgyu la chu’o sñam du ’dzin pa raṅ bźin gyis yod pa źig yin na | rten ciṅ ’brel par ’byuṅ ba yin par mi ’gyur 1 || ba źig na | gaṅ gi phyir smig rgyu la yaṅ brten | phyin ci log gi lta ba daṅ | tshul bźin ma yin pa’i yid la byed pa la ma brten nas byuṅ ba de’i phyir rten ciṅ ’brel par ’byuṅ ba yin no || gaṅ gi phyir rten ciṅ ’brel bar ’byuṅ ba yin pa de’i phyir raṅ bźin gyis stoṅ pa yin te | sṅar ji skad bstan pa de daṅ ’dra’o ||

If that perception of a mirage as water were by its own nature, it would not be dependently originated. Since, however, it comes into existence in dependence upon the mirage, the wrong sight and the distracted attention, it is dependently originated. And since it is dependently originated, it is indeed void by its own nature - as previously stated.

kiṃ cānyat | yadi ca svabhāvataḥ syād grāhaḥ kastaṃ nivartayed grāhaṃ |
śéṣeṣv apy eṣa vidhis tasmād eṣo ’nupālambhaḥ ||67||

又復有義偈言
若取自體實何人能遮迥
餘者亦如是是故我無過

’di ltar gźan yaṅ
| gal te ’dzin pa raṅ bźin yod || ’dzin pa de la su źig bzlog |
| lhag ma rnams la’aṅ tshul de yin || de phyir klan ka de med do |

Furthermore:If that perception were by its own nature, who would remove that perception? The same method applies to the rest [of the things] too. Hence this is a non-criticism.

yadi ca mṛgatṛṣṇāyāṃ jalagrāhaḥ svabhāvataḥ syāt ka eva taṃ vinivartayet | na hi svabhāvaḥ śakyo vinivartayituṃ yathāgner uṣṇatvam apāṃ dravatvam ākāśasya nirāvaraṇatvaṃ | dṛṣṭaṃ cāsya vinivartanam | tasmāc chūnyasvabhāvo grāhaḥ | yathā caitad evaṃ śeṣeṣv api dharmeṣv eṣa kramaḥ pratyavagantavyo grāhyaprabhṛtiṣu pañcasu | tatra yad bhavatoktaṃ ṣaṭkabhāvād aśūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti tad na | yat punar bhavatoktaṃ hetoś ca te na siddhir naiḥ svābhāvyāt kuto hi te hetuḥ | nirhetukasya siddhir na copapannāsya te ’rthasyeti || atra brūmaḥ |

此偈明何義若鹿愛中取水體實何人能迥若有自體則不可迥如火熱水濕空無障礙見此得迥如是取自體空如是如是餘法中義應如是知如是等如取無實餘五亦爾若汝說彼六法是有如是得言一切諸法皆不空者義不相應又復汝說偈言汝因則不成無體云何因若法無因者云何得言成汝若無因成諸法自體迥我亦無因成諸法有自體若有因無體是義不相應世間無體法則不得言有此偈我今答偈言

gal te smig rgyu la chur ’dzin pa ’di raṅ bźin gyis yod pa źig yin na | de la sus kyaṅ bzlog par mi ’gyur te | ji ltar me’i tsha ba ñid daṅ | chu’i gśer ba ñid daṅ | nam mkha’i mi bsgrib pa ñid bźin du raṅ bźin ni bzlog par mi nus pa yin na de ni bzlog par yaṅ mthoṅ ṅo || de’i phyir ’dzin pa de raṅ bźin gyis med pa yin no || ’di ji lta ba bźin na gzuṅ ba la sogs pa chos lhag ma lṅa po rnams la yaṅ tshul de lta bur rtogs par bya ba yin pas de la drug tshan drug yod pa’i phyir dṅos po thams cad stoṅ pa ma yin no źes smra ba gaṅ yin pa de mi ruṅ ṅo || gźan yaṅ | khyod la gtan tshigs ma grug ste || raṅ bźin med phyir khyod gtan tshigs || gaṅ la yod do khyod don de || gtan tshigs med par ’grub mi ’thad || ces bya ba ’dir bśad par bya ste |

If the perception of water in a mirage were by its own nature, who indeed would remove it? For an intrinsic nature cannot be: e.g., the heat of fire, the fluidity of water, the openness of space’. Its removal, however, is seen. The intrinsic nature of the perception is, therefore, void. The same method is to be understood with regard to the rest of the things, viz., the five things beginning with the object to be perceived - In these circumstances, your statement that all things are non-void because of the existence of’ the aggregate of the six, is not valid.

etena hetv abhāvaḥ pratyuktaḥ pūrvam eva sa samatvāt |
mṛgatṛṣṇādṛṣṭāntavyāvṛttividhau ya uktaḥ prāk ||68||

此無因說者義前已說竟
三時中說因彼平等而說

| ’di la sṅa mas gtan tshigs med || lan btab bsgrub byar mtshuṅs phyir ro |
| sṅa ma smig rgyu’i dpes bzlog pa || bsgrub tshe smras pa gaṅ yin pa’o |

The case being the same, we have already answered by what precedes [the objection of] absence of reason, which was stated in [your] refutation of the example of the mirage.

etena cedānīṃ carcena pūrvoktena hetv abhāvo ’pi pratyukto ’vagantavyaḥ | ya eva hi carcaḥ pūrvasmin hetāv uktaḥ ṣaṭkapratisedhasya sa evehāpi carcayitavyaḥ | yat punar bhavatoktaṃ pūrvaṃ cet pratiṣedhaḥ paścāt pratiṣedhyam ity anupapannam | paścāc cānupapanno yugapac ca yataḥ svabhāvaḥ sann iti || atra brūmaḥ |

此偈明何義如是大義於前已說此則無因應如是知如是論義前因已說遮六種迥彼前論義今於此說又復汝說偈言前遮後所遮如是不相應後遮若俱並如是知有體此偈我今答偈言

da ltar gyi ’gro ba ’di dag daṅ sṅar bstan pas gtan tshigs med pa’i yaṅ lan btab par rigs par bya ste | sṅar gtan tshigs bstan pa drug tshan ’gag par byed pa’i ’gro ba gaṅ yin pa de ñid ’dir yaṅ ’gro bar bya ba yin no || gźan yaṅ | ’di ltar raṅ bźin yod min na || gal te ’gog sṅa dgag ’phyi źes || zer na ’thad pa ma yin la || ’phyi daṅ cig car mi ’thad do || źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa ’di la bśad par bya ste |

It should be understood that by the preceding deliberation we have also answered [the objection of] absence of reason. The same deliberation regarding the negation of the aggregate of the six, which was stated in the preceding reason, should also be considered here.

yas traikālye hetuḥ pratyuktaḥ pūrvaṃ eva sa samatvāt |
traikālyapratihetuś ca śūnyatāvādināṃ prāptaḥ ||69||

若說三時因前如是平等
如是三時因與說空相應

| dus gsum gtan tshigs gaṅ yod sṅar || lan btab de daṅ mtshuṅs phyir ro |
| dus gsum khyed kyi gtan tshigs ni || stoṅ ñid smra ba rnams la ruṅ |

We have already answered [the question relating to] the reason [for a negation] in the three times, for the case is the same. And a counter-reason for the three times is obtained for the upholders of the doctrine of voidness.

ya eva hetus traikālye pratiṣedhavācī sa uktotaraḥ pratyavagantavyaḥ | kasmāt | sādhyasamatvāt | tathā hi tvadvacanena pratiṣedhas traikālye ’nupapannapratiṣedhavat sa pratiṣedho ’pi | tasmāt pratiṣedhapratiṣedhye ’sati yad bhavān manyate pratiṣedhaḥ pratisiddha iti tad na | yas trikālapratiṣedhavācī hetur eṣa eva śūnyatāvādināṃ prāptaḥ sarvabhāvasvabhāvapratiṣedhakatvān na bhavataḥ | atha vā katham etad uktottaram | pratiṣedhayāmi nāhaṃ kiṃcit pratiṣedhyam asti na ca kiṃcit | tasmāt pratiṣedhayasīty adhilaya eṣa tvayā kriyate || iti pratyuktam | atha manyase triṣv api kāleṣu pratiṣedhaḥ iddhaḥ, dṛṣṭaḥ pūrvakālīno ’pi hetuḥ, uttarakālīno ’pi, yugapatkālīno ’pi hetuḥ, tatra pūrvakālīno hetur yathā pitā putrasya, paścāt kālīno yathā śiṣya ācāryasya, yugapatkālīno yathā pradīpaḥ prakāśasyety atra brūmaḥ | na caitad evam, | uktā hy etasmin krame trayaḥ pūrvadoṣāḥ | api ca yady evaṃ, pratiṣedhasadbhāvas tvayābhyupagamyate pratijñāhāniś ca te bhavati | etena krameṇa svabhāvapratiṣedho ’pi siddhaḥ |

此偈明何義若遮此因三時言語此先已答應如是知何以故因平等故如遮三時彼不相應彼語亦在遮所遮中若汝意謂無遮所遮猶故得遮我已遮竟此三時因與說空人言語相應又復云何先已說竟如向偈言我無有少物是故我不遮如是汝無理 ……橫而難我若汝復謂三時遮成見前時因見後時因見俱時因彼前時因如父以子後時因者如師弟子俱時因者如燈以明此我今說此不如是前說三種彼三種中一一復有三種過失此前已說復次第遮汝立宗失如是等自體遮成偈言

gtan tshigs dus gsum ’gog par byed pa źes bya ba gaṅ yin pa de ni lan btab zin te | gaṅ gi phyir źe na bsgrub par bya ba daṅ mtshuṅs pa’i phyir ro || ’di ltar khyod kyi tshig gis ’gog pa dus gsum du yaṅ mi ’thad par ’gyur ba’i ’gog pa bźin du dgag par bya ba yaṅ de yin no || de’i phyir ’gog pa daṅ dgag par bya ba med na ’gog pa bkag go sñam du khyod sems pa gaṅ yin pa de mi ruṅ ṅo || ’gog pa dus gsum la źes bya ba’i gtan tshigs dus gsum ’gog par byed pa źes bya ba gaṅ yin pa de ñid ni dṅos po thams cad ’gog par byed pa źes bya ba gaṅ yin pa’i phyir stoṅ pa ñid smra ba rnams la yod pa ñid yin gyi | khyod la ni med do || yaṅ na ’di ji ltar lan btab pa yin źe na | dgag bya ci yaṅ med pas na || ṅa ni ci yaṅ mi ’gog go || de phyir ’gog par byed do źes || skur ba de ni khyod kyis btab || ces lan btab pa yin no || ’on te dus gsum car du yaṅ ’gog pa grub pa yin pas te | sṅon gyi dus kyi rgyu daṅ | phyi ma’i dus kyi rgyu daṅ | cig car gyi dus kyi rgyu yaṅ mthoṅ bas so || de la sṅon gyi dus kyi rgyu ni ji lta bu’i pha bźin no || phyi ma’i dus kyi ni ji ltar slob dpon gyis slob ma bźin no || cig car gyi dus kyi ni ji ltar snaṅ ba’i sgron ma bźin no sñam du sems na de ni de lta ma yin par tshul ’di la skyon sṅar bstan zin to || gźan yaṅ gal te de lta yin na dgag pa srid par khyod kyis khas blaṅs la | de ni ma grub pas khyod kyis dam bcas pa yaṅ ñams pa yin no || rgyu ’dis raṅ bźin ’gog pa yaṅ grub pa yin no ||

It has to be understood that the question why a negation is possible in the three times has already received. -Why? -Because the reason is of the same nature as the thesis to be established. To explain: In virtue of your statement, a negation is not possible in the three times, and, like the negation, the thing to be negated, also, does not exist. Thus, there being no negation and no object to be negated, your opinion that the negation has been negated, is untenable. That very reason which expresses a negation of the three times is obtained for the upholders of the doctrine of voidness, for they negate the intrinsic nature of all things, - not for you. Or it has been answered in the following way: ‘I do not negate anything, nor is there anything to be negated. You, therefore, calumniate me when you say: “You negate”’. Now, if you think: the negation is established in all the three; we see the antecedent cause, the subsequent cause, and the simultaneous cause: antecedent cause, e.g., the father as the cause of the son; subsequent cause, e.g., the disciple as the cause of the teacher; simultaneous cause, e.g., the lamp as the cause of the light, - we reply: this is not so. For in this way are stated the three former defects. Moreover, if this is so, you admit the existence of a negation, and you abandon your proposition. The negation of an intrinsic nature is also established in this way.

prabhavati ca śūnyateyaṃ yasya prabhavanti tasya sarvārthāḥ |
prabhavati na tasya kiṃ cin na prabhavati śūnyatā yasya ||70||

若人信於空彼人信一切
若人不信空彼不信一切

| gaṅ la stoṅ pa ñid srid pa || de la don rnams thams cad srid |
| gaṅ la stoṅ ñid mi srid pa || de la ci yaṅ mi srid do |

All things prevail for him, for whom prevails this voidness. Nothing prevails for him for whom voidness does not prevail.

yasya śūnyateyaṃ prabhavati tasya sarvārthā laukikalokottarāḥ prabhavanti | kiṃ kāraṇam | yasya hi śūnyatā prabhavati tasya pratītyasamutpādaḥ prabhavati | yasya pratītyasamutpādaḥ prabhavati tasya catvāry āryasatyāni prabhavanti | yasya catvāry āryasatyāni prabhavanti tasya śrāmaṇyaphalāni prabhavanti, sarvaviśeṣādhigamāḥ prabhavanti | yasya sarvaviśeṣādhigamāḥ prabhavanti tasya trīṇi ratnāni buddhadharmasaṃghāḥ prabhavanti | yasya pratītyasamutpādaḥ prabhavati tasya dharmo dharmahetur dharmaphalaṃ ca prabhavanti, tasyādharmo ’dharmahetur adharmaphalaṃ ca prabhavanti | yasya dharmādharmau dharmādharmahetū dharmādharmaphale ca prabhavanti | tasya kleśaḥ kleśasamudayaḥ kleśavastūni ca prabhavanti | yasyaitat sarvaṃ prabhavati pūrvoktaṃ tasya sugatidurgativyavasthā sugatidurgatigamanaṃ sugatidurgatigāmī mārgaḥ sugatidurgativyatikramāṇaṃ sugatidurgativyatikramopāyaḥ sarvasaṃ vyavahārāś ca laukikā vyavasthāpitāḥ | svayam adhigantavyā anayā diśā kiṃcic chakyaṃ vacanenopadeṣṭum iti | bhavati cātrayaḥ śūnyatāṃ pratītyasamutpādaṃ madhyamāṃ pratipadaṃ ca | ekārthāṃ nijagāda praṇamāmi tam apratimabuddham ||

此偈明何義若人信空彼人則信一切世間出世間法何以故若人信空則信因緣和合而生若信因緣和合而生則信四諦若信四諦彼人則信一切勝證若人能信一切勝證則信三寶謂佛法僧若信因緣和合而生彼人則信法因法果若人能信法因法果彼人則信非法因果若人能信法因法果信非法因信非法果則信煩惱煩惱和合煩惱法物彼人如是一切皆信如是前說彼人則信善行惡行若人能信善行惡行彼人則信善惡行法若人能信善惡行法則知方便過三惡道彼人如是能信一切世間諸法如是無量不可說盡空自體因緣三一中道說我歸命禮彼無上大智慧

gaṅ la stoṅ ñid ’di srid pa de la ’jig rten pa daṅ | ’jig rten las ’das pa’i don thams cad srid pa yin no || ci’i phyir źe na | gaṅ la srid pa de la rten ciṅ ’brel par ’byuṅ ba daṅ | ’phags pa’i bden pa bźi daṅ | dge || sbyoṅ gi ’bras bu daṅ | khyad par du rtogs pa thams cad srid do || gaṅ la khyad par du rtogs pa thams cad srid pa de la dkon mchog gsum po || saṅs rgyas daṅ | chos daṅ | dge ’dun srid do || gaṅ la rten ciṅ ’brel bar ’byuṅ pa srid pa de la chos daṅ | chos kyi rgyu daṅ | chos kyi ’bras bu daṅ | chos ma yin pa daṅ | chos ma yin pa’i rgyu daṅ | chos ma yin pa’i ’bras bu srid do || gaṅ la chos daṅ | chos ma yin pa daṅ | rgyu daṅ ’bras bu srid pa de la ñon moṅs pa daṅ ñon moṅs pa kun ’byuṅ ba daṅ | ñon moṅs pa’i gźi rnams srid do || gaṅ la sṅar bstan pa de thams cad srid pa de la bde ’gro daṅ | ṅan ’gro rnam par gźag pa daṅ | bde ’gro daṅ | ṅan ’gror ’gro ba’i sems can daṅ | bde ’gro daṅ | ṅan ’gro las ’da’ ba daṅ | bde ’gro daṅ | ṅan ’gro las ’gro ba’i thabs daṅ | ’jig rten pa’i tha sñad thams cad rnam par gźag pa yin te tshig gis ji sñed cig bstan par nus pas phyogs ’dis raṅ gis rtogs par bya’o || ’dir yaṅ | gaṅ źig stoṅ daṅ rten ’byuṅ dag | dbu ma’i lam du don gcig par || gsuṅ mchog mtshuṅs pa med pa yin || saṅs rgyas de la phyag ’tshal lo ||

For whom this voidness prevails, for him all things - mundane and supramundane - prevail. - Why? - Because Dependent Origination prevails for him for whom voidness prevails. The Four Noble Truths prevail for him for whom Dependent Orignation prevails. The results of monastic life as well as all special acquisitions prevail for him whom the Four Noble Truths prevail. The Three Jewels, viz., the Buddha, the Dharma and the Saṃgha, prevail for him for whom all the special acquisitions prevail. For whom Dependent Origination prevails, for him merit, the cause of merit, the result of merit, demerit, the cause of demerit, the result of demerit, - all these prevail. For whom merit and demerit, the causes of merit and demerit and the results merit and demerit prevail, for him passion, the origination of passion, and the objective grounds of passion prevail. For whom all that prevails, for him the law concerning the happy and the unhappy states, the attainment of those states, the way leading to those states, the act of passing beyond those states, the means of passing beyond those states, and all worldly conventions are established. They are to be understood individually by each person, following this direction: a part [only] can be taught in words. I adore that incomparable Buddha who taught Voidness, Dependent Origination and the Middle Way as equivalent.

iti kṛtir iyam ācāryanāgārjunapādānām ||

釋迴諍論偈義已竟作此論者阿闍梨龍樹菩薩摩訶薩一切論義皆能解釋迴諍論一卷

rtsod pa bzlog pa’i rab tu byed pa’i ’grel pa sa daṅ po rab tu dga’ ba la bźugs pa slob dpon ’phags pa n’a g’a rdzu nas mdzad pa rdzogs so || || yod dam med pa’i rtsod pa smra ba mun bsal te || bstan zab gñis med de bźin ñid chos snaṅ gyur nas || srid pa’i mṅal du skyes pa’i ’jig rten ma lus pa || lha daṅ mi daṅ lha min thams cad dge bar śog | dṅos ’dzin gdon gyis brla mas pa yi || rims nad rtag tu zlog byed ciṅ || ’jig rten ’di yi mun sel ba || dri med mi g-yo rigs ’di yin || || rgya gar gyi mkhan po dzñ’na garbha daṅ | lo ts’a ba dpal brtsegs rakśi tas bsgyur te gtan la phab pa || ||

Here ends this work of the venerable master Nāgārjuna.

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