Bibliotheca Polyglotta

Nāgārjuna: Vigrahavyāvartanīvṛtti

Complete text

kiṃ cānyat | yadi ca pramāṇatas te teṣāṃ teṣāṃ prasiddhir arthānāṃ |
teṣāṃ punaḥ prasiddhiṃ brūhi kathaṃ te pramāṇānām ||31||

又復有義偈言
若量能成法彼復有量成
汝說何處量而能成此量

’di ltar gźan yaṅ
| gal te khyod kyis don de rnams || tshad ma ñid kyis rab grub na |
| khyod kyis tshad ma de rnams kyaṅ || ji ltar rab tu ’grub par ’gyur |

Furthermore:If such and such objects are established for you through the pramāṇas, tell me how those pramāṇas are established for you.

yadi ca pramāṇatas teṣāṃ teṣām arthānāṃ prameyāṇāṃ prasiddhiṃ manyase yathā mānair meyānām, teṣām idānīṃ pratyakṣānumānopamānāgamānāṃ caturṇāṃ pramāṇānāṃ kutaḥ prasiddhiḥ | yadi tāvan niṣpramāṇānāṃ pramāṇānāṃ syāt prasiddhiḥ, pramāṇato ’rthānāṃ prasiddhir iti hīyate pratijñā | tathāpi | anyair yadi pramāṇaiḥ pramāṇasiddhir bhavet tad anavasthā | yadi punar manyase pramāṇaiḥ prameyānāṃ prasiddhis teṣāṃ pramāṇānāṃ anyaiḥ pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhir evam anavasthāprasaṅgaḥ | anavasthāprasaṅge ko doṣaḥ |

此偈明何義若汝意謂量能成物如量所量現比阿含喻等四量復以何量成此四量若此四量更無量成量自不成若自不成能成物者汝宗則壞若量復有異量成者量則無窮

gal te ’jal bar byed pa rnams kyis gźal bar bya ba dag bźin du khyod kyi don gźal bar bya ba de rnams tshad ma ñid kyis rab tu ’grub pa yin par sems na | ’on da tshad ma rnams pa bźi po mṅon sum daṅ | rjes su dpag pa daṅ | dpes gźal ba daṅ | luṅ de rnams gaṅ gis rab tu ’grub | gal te re źig tshad ma de rnams ni tshad ma gźan rnams kyis yod par ’grub la | don rnams ni tshad mas rab tu ’grub pa yin no źe na | dam bcas pa ñams par ’gyur ro || ’on te yaṅ | gal te tshad ma gźan rnams kyis || tshad ma ’grub na thug pa med || gal te ’di sñam du gźal bar bya ba ni tshad ma rnams kyis ’grub la | tshad ma de rnams kyaṅ tshad ma gźan rnams kyis ’grub par sems na | de lta na yaṅ thug pa med par ’gyur ro || de la thug pa med par gyur na ñes pa ci yod ce na | de la ’di ltar bśad par bya ste |

If you think that such and such ‘objects of true cognition’ are established through the ‘instruments of true cognition’, just as the things to be measured are established through the measuring instruments, [we ask:] How are those ‘instruments of true cognition’, viz., perception, inference, identification and verbal testimony, established? If [you say that] the pramāṇas are established without the help of pramāṇas, then [your] proposition that [all] objects are established through pramāṇas is abandoned. If the pramāṇas are established through other pramāṇas, then there is an infinite series. If you think that the ‘objects of true cognition’ are established through the ‘means of true cognition’ and that those ‘means of true cognition’ are established through other ‘means of true cognition’, then there follows an infinite series - What harm is there if there is an infinite series?

nādeḥ siddhis tatrāsti
naiva madhyasya nāntasya ||32||

若無窮者則
非初成非中後成

| de la daṅ po ’grub min la |
| bar ma min źiṅ tha ma’aṅ min ||

Neither the beginning nor the middle nor the end can then be established.

anavasthāprasaṅga ādeḥ siddhir nāsti | kiṃ kāraṇaṃ | teṣām apihi pramāṇānām anyaiḥ pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhis teṣām anyair iti nāsty ādiḥ | āder asadbhāvāt kuto madhyaṃ kuto ’ntaḥ | tasmāt teṣāṃ pramāṇānām anyaiḥ pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhir iti yad ukataṃ tad nopapadyata iti |

若量能成所量物者彼量復有異量來成彼量復有異量成故如是無初若無初者如是無中若無中者何處有後如是若說彼量復有異量成者是義不然偈言

thug pa med par gyur pa na || daṅ po ’grub par mi ’gyur ro || ci’i phyir źe na | tshad ma de rnams kyaṅ tshad ma gźan rnams kyis rab tu ’grub pa yin la | de rnams kyaṅ gźan rnams kyi yin pas ’di la daṅ po med do || daṅ po med pa’i phyir bar ma yaṅ ga la yod | tha ma yaṅ ga la yod de de’i phyir tshad ma de rnams ni tshad ma gźan rnams kyis rab tu ’grub pa’o źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de mi ’thad do ||

If there is an infinite series, the beginning cannot be established. - Why? - Because those pramāṇas are established through other pramāṇas, and those others again through other pramāṇas. Thus there is no beginning. [And] if there is no beginning, how can there be a middle? How can there be an end? Consequently, the statement that those pramāṇas are established through other pramāṇas is not valid.

teṣāṃ atha pramāṇair vinā prasiddhir vihīyate vādaḥ |
vaiṣamikatvaṃ tasmin viśeṣahetuś ca vaktavyaḥ ||33||

若量離量成汝諍義則失
如是則有過應更說勝因

| ’on te tshad ma med par yaṅ || de rnams ’grub na smra ba ñams |
| mi ’dra ñid de de yin na || gtan tshigs khyad par smra bar gyis |

Now, if [you think that] those pramāṇas are established without pramāṇas, then your philosophic position is abandoned. There is a discordance, and you should state the special reason for that.

atha manyase teṣāṃ pramāṇānāṃ vinā pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhiḥ, prameyāṇāṃ punar arthānāṃ pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhir iti, evaṃ sati yas te vādaḥ pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhir arthānām iti sa hīyate | vaiṣamikatvaṃ ca bhavati keṣāṃcid arthānāṃ pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhiḥ keṣāṃ cin neti | viśeṣahetuś ca vaktavyo yena hetunā keṣāṃcid arthānāṃ pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhiḥ keṣāṃcin neti | sa ca nopadiṣṭaḥ | tasmād iyam api kalpanā nopapanneti | atrāha | pramāṇāny eva svātmānaṃ parātmānaṃ ca prasādhayanti | yathoktaṃdyotayati svātmānaṃ yathā hutāśas tathā parātmānaṃ | svaparātmānāvevaṃ prasādhayanti pramāṇānīti | yathāgniḥ svātmānaṃ parātmānaṃ ca prakāśayati tathaiva pramāṇāni prasādhayanti svātmānaṃ parātmānaṃ ceti | atrocyate |

此偈明何義若汝意謂量離量成所量之物為量成者若如是諍量成所量汝則有過有物量成有不量成若如是者應說勝因若說勝因則可得知何者量成何者不成汝不能示如是分別義不相應此我今說如有人言我所說量自他能成而說偈言猶如火明故能自照照他彼量燎如是自他二俱成此偈明何義如火自照亦能照他量亦如是自成成他我今答彼偈言

’on te tshad ma rnams med par yaṅ tshad ma de rnams rab tu ’grub pa yin la | gźal bar bya ba’i don rnams ni tshad ma rnams kyis rab tu ’grub pa yin no sñam du sems na de lta na ni khyod kyi tshad ma rnams kyis don rnams ’grub po źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de ñams par ’gyur la don kha cig ni tshad ma rnams kyis rab tu ’grub pa yin | kha cig ni ma yin no źes mi ’dra pa ñid du yaṅ ’gyur ro || de lta na ni gtan tshigs gaṅ gis na don kha cig ni tshad ma rnams kyis rab tu ’grub pa yin la | kha cig ni ma yin no źes gtan tshigs kyi khyad par yaṅ smra bar bya ba yin na | de yaṅ ma bstan pas de’i phyir rtog pa ’di yaṅ ’thad pa ma yin no || 4 ’dir smras pa | ji skad du | ji ltar me yis gźan bdag ñid || gsal byed de bźin raṅ ñid ltar || de bźin tshad ma rnams kyaṅ ni || raṅ gźan bdag ñid ’grub ce na || źes bstan pa lta bur tshad ma rnams kyis raṅ gi bdag ñid daṅ | gźan gyi bdag ñid rab tu sgrub par byed pa yin te | ji ltar mes raṅ gi bdag ñid daṅ | gźan gyi bdag ñid gsal bar byed pa de bźin du tshad ma rnams kyaṅ raṅ gi bdag ñid daṅ gźan gyi bdag ñid rab tu sgrub par byed pa yin no źe na | ’dir bśad pa |

Now, if you think: those pramāṇas are established without pramāṇas; the objects to be cognized, however, are established through the pramāṇas, then your position that [all] objects are established through pramāṇas is abandoned. There is, moreover, a discordance, namely that some objects are established through pramāṇas, while some others are not. And you should state the special reason why some objects are established through pramāṇas, while some others are not. But you have not stated that. Thus this assumption, too, is not valid. The opponent replies: The pramāṇas establish themselves as well as other things. As it is said:‘Fire illuminates itself as well as other things. Likewise, the pramāṇas establish themselves as well as other things’. ...Here we observe:

viśamopanyāso ’yaṃ na hy ātmānaṃ prakāśayaty agniḥ |
na hi tasyānupalabdhir dṛṣṭā tamasīva kumbhasya ||34||

汝語言有過非是火自照
以彼不相應如見闇中瓶

smras pa de ni mi mthun te || mun khuṅ gi ni rdza ma ltar |
| de la mi dmigs ma mthoṅ bas || me ni raṅ la gsal byed min |

This is a defective proposition. Fire does not illuminate itself, for its non-perception is not seen to be comparable to that of a pot in darkness.

viṣama evopanyāso ’gnivat pramāṇāni svātmānaṃ ca prasādhayanti parātmānaṃ ca prasādhayantīti | na hy agnir ātmānaṃ prakāśayati | yathā prāg evāgnināprakāśitas tamasi kumbho nopalabhyate ’thottarakālam upalabhyate ’gninā prakāśitaḥ san, evam eva yady aprakāśitaḥ prāg agnis tamasi syād uttarakālam agneḥ prakāśanaṃ syāt, ataḥ svātmānaṃ prakāśayet | na caitad evam | tasmād iyam api kalpanā nopapadyata iti |

此偈明何義彼量如火自他能成難不相應何以故非火自照如初未照闇中瓶等不可得見以火照亡然後得見如是如是若火自照初火應闇後時乃明如是得言火能自照若初火明則不得言火能自照如是分別火自他照義不相應

me daṅ ’dra bar tshad ma rnams kyaṅ raṅ daṅ gźan gyi bdag ñid gñis rab tu sgrub par byed pa yin no źes smras pa de ni mi mthun pa ñid yin te | me ni raṅ las gsal bar byed pa ma yin te | ji ltar me mi ’bar ba’i sṅa rol na mun khuṅ na bum pa mi dmigs pa la | mes gsal bar byas nas phyis dmigs pa de bźin du | gal te gsal bar ma byas pa’i sṅa rol du me mun khuṅ na yod la | phyis mes gsal bar ’gyur na ni de’i phyir raṅ gi bdag ñid gsal bar byed pa yin na | de yaṅ de lta || ma yin pas rtog pa ’di yaṅ ’thad pa ma yin no ||

Your proposition that the pramāṇas establish themselves as well as other things like fire [that illuminates itself as well as other things] is defective. For fire does not illuminate itself. A pot, not illuminated by fire, is first not perceived in darkness. Then, being illuminated by fire, it is perceived. If, in the same manner, fire, not being illuminated, first existed in darkness and then were illuminated, it would be possible to say: it illuminates itself. This, however, is not the case. Thus this assumption, too, is not valid.

kiṃ cānyat
| yadi ca svātmānam ayaṃ tvadvacanena prakāśayaty agniḥ |
param iva nanv ātmānaṃ paridhakṣyaty api hutāśaḥ ||35||

又復有義
偈言又若汝說言火自他能照
如火能燒他何故不自燒

’di ltar gźan yaṅ |
gal te khyod kyi tshig gis ni || me ’dis raṅ bdag gsal byed na
| ’on me yis gźan bźin du || raṅ la sreg pa’aṅ byed par ’gyur |

Furthermore: If, as you say, fire illuminates itself as it illuminates other things, then it will also burn itself.

yadi ca tvadvacanena yathā parātmānaṃ prakāsayaty agnir evam eva svātmānam api prakāśayati, nanu yathā parātmānaṃ dahaty evam eva svātmānam api dhakṣyati | na caitad evam | tatra yad uktam parātmānam iva svātmānam api prakāsayaty agnir iti tad na |

此偈明何義若汝說言如火自照亦能照他如是如是自照照他如是如是既能燒他亦應自燒而實不見有如是事若說彼火自他能照義不相應

gal te khyod zer ba ji ltar mes gźan gyi raṅ bźin gsal bar byed pa de bźin du raṅ gi bdag ñid la yaṅ gsal bar byed do źe na | ’on ni ji ltar gźan gyi bdag ñid sreg par byed pa de bźin du raṅ gi bdag ñid la yaṅ sreg par ’gyur ba źig na | de ni de ltar yaṅ ma yin pas de la me ni gźan gyi bdag ñid la yaṅ gsal bar byed do źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de mi ruṅ ṅo ||

If, as you say, fire illuminates itself just as it illuminates other things, then it will also burn itself just as it burns other things. This, however, is not the case. In these circumstances, your statement that fire illuminates itself as it illuminates other things, is not valid’.

kiṃ cānyat | yadi ca svaparātmānau tvadvacanena prakāśayaty agniḥ |
pracchādayiṣyati tamaḥ svaparātmānau hutāśa iva ||36||

又復有義偈言
又若汝說言火能自他照
闇亦應如是自他二俱覆

’di ltar gźan yaṅ
| gal te khyod kyi tshig gis ni || me yis raṅ gźan bdag gsal byed |
| me bźin du ni mun pa yaṅ || raṅ gźan bdag la bsgrib par ’gyur |

Besides: If, as you say, fire illuminates both other things and itself’, then darkness will cover both other things and itself’.

yadi ca bhavato matena svaparātmānau prakāśayaty agniḥ, nanv idānīṃ tat pratipakṣabhūtaṃ tamo ’pi svaparātmānau chādayet | na caitad dṛṣṭam | tatra yad uktaṃ svaparātmānau prakāśayaty agnir iti tad na |

此偈明何義若汝說言火自他照能……闇者闇何以不自也皆覆而實不見有如是事若說彼火自他照者義不相應

gal te khyod kyi lugs kyis ni me ni raṅ daṅ gźan gyi bdag ñid gñis gsal bar byed pa yin na | ’on ni da gñen por gyur pa mun pa yaṅ raṅ daṅ gźan gyi bdag ñid gñis bsgrib par ’gyur bźig na | de ni de ltar yaṅ ma yin pas de la me ni raṅ daṅ gźan gyis bdag ñid gñis gsal bar byed pa yin no źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de ruṅ ba ma yin no ||

If in your opinion fire illuminates both other things and itself, then its opposite, darkness, too, would cover both other things and itself. This, however, is not seen. In these circumstances, your statement that fire illuminates both other things and itself is not valid.

kiṃ cānyat | nāsti tamaś ca jvalane yatra ca tiṣṭhati parātmani jvalanaḥ |
kurute kathaṃ prakāśaṃ sa hi prakāśo ’ndhakāravadhaḥ ||37||

又復有義偈言
於火中無闇何處自他住
彼闇能殺明火云何有明

’di ltar gźan yaṅ
| gsal byed de ni mun sel te || me daṅ gaṅ na mi gnas pa |
| gźan na’aṅ mun pa yod min na || ji ltar gsal bar byed pa yin |

There is no darkness in fire nor in something else in whichfire stands.How can it [then] illuminate? For illumination is destruction of darkness.

iha cāgnau nāsti tamo nāpi ca yatrāgnis tatrāsti tamaḥ | prakāśaś ca nāma tamasaḥ pratighātaḥ | yasmāc cāgnau nāsti tamo nāpi ca yatrāgnis tatrāsti tamaḥ, tatra kasya tamasaḥ pratighātam agniḥ karoti yasya pratighātād agniḥ svaparātmānau prakāśayatīti | atrāha | nanu yasmād evaṃ nāgnau tamo ’sti nāpi yatrāgnis tatra tamo ’sti, tasmād eva svaparātmānau na prakāśayaty agniḥ kutaḥ | tena hy utpadyamānenaivāgninā tamasaḥ pratighātaḥ | tasmān nāgnau tamo ’sti nāpi yatrāgnis tatra tamo ’sti, yasmād utpadyamāna evobhayaṃ prakāśayaty agniḥ svātmānaṃ parātmānaṃ ceti | atrocyate |

此偈明何義火中無闇火處無闇云何名為明能破闇若彼火中如是無闇何處有闇火能破闇若當無闇可破滅者云何而得自他俱照此我今說若如是者非火中闇非火處闇如是如是火自他照彼火生時即能破闇如是火中無闇火處無闇如是火生能照自他此我今說偈言

’dir me la yaṅ mun pa med la || gaṅ na me yod pa de na yaṅ mun pa med do || gsal bar byed pa źes bya ba ni mun pa sel ba yin pas de’i phyir me la yaṅ mun pa med la | gaṅ na me yod pa de na yaṅ mun pa med na mes gaṅ źig sel bar raṅ daṅ gźan gyi bdag ñid gñis gsal bar byed pa’i mes mun pa gaṅ źig sel bar byed | ’dir smras pa | ’o na gaṅ gi phyir me la yaṅ mun pa med | me gaṅ na yod pa de na yaṅ mun pa med pa de ñid kyi phyir me ni raṅ daṅ gźan gyi bdag ñid gñi ga gsal bar byed pa ma yin nam | me ’byuṅ ba ñid na me des mun pa bsal ba yin te | de la yaṅ mun pa de med | me gaṅ na yod pa de na yaṅ mun pa med de de’i phyir me ’byuṅ ba kho na raṅ gi bdag ñid daṅ | gźan gyi bdag ñid gñi ga gsal bar byed pa yin no źe na | ’dir smras pa |

Here, in fire, there is no darkness. Nor is there any darkness where fire is. Now, illumination is obstruction caused to darkness. But since there is no darkness in fire nor where fire is, what is that darkness which is obstructed by fire, and by virtue of whose obstruction it illuminates both other things and itself The opponent replies: But is it not true that fire illuminates both other things and itself, for this very reason that there is no darkness in fire nor where fire is. For, in the very process of its origination, fire obstructs darkness. If there is no darkness in fire nor where fire is, it is because in the very process of its origination fire illuminates both other things and itself. Here we observe:

utpadyamāna eva prakāśayaty agnir ity asadvādaḥ |
utpadyamāna eva prāpnoti tamo na hi hutāśaḥ ||38||

如是火生時即生時能照
火生即到闇義則不相應

| me ’byuṅ ba na gsal byed pa || yaṅ dag min par smra ba ste |
| me ’byuṅ ba na mun pa daṅ || phrad pa med pa kho na yin |

It is wrong to say that fire illuminates in the very process of its origination. For, in the very process of its origination, fire does not come in contact with darkness.

ayam agnir utpadyamāna eva prakāśayati svātmānaṃ parātmānaṃ ceti nāyam utpapadyate vādaḥ | kasmāt | na hy utpadyamāna evāgnis tamaḥ prāpnoti, aprāptatvān naivopahanti tamasaś cānupaghātān nāsti prakāśaḥ |

此偈明何義若火生時能自他照義不相應何以知之如是初火不能到闇何以知之若未到闇不能破闇若不破闇不得有明

me de ni ’byuṅ ba khon na raṅ gi bdag ñid daṅ gźan gyi bdag ñid gsal bar byed do źes smra ba de ni ’thad pa ma yin no || ci’i phyir źe na | me ’byuṅ ba ñid na mun pa daṅ phrad pa med pa yin te | ma phrad pa’i phyir de sel bar mi byed do || mun pa ma bsal ba’i phyir gsal bar yaṅ mi byed do ||

The opinion that fire, in the very process of its origination, illuminates both other things and itself is not tenable. - Why? - Because, in the very process of its origination, fire does not come in contact with darkness; since it does not come in contact with it, it does not destroy it; and since darkness is not destroyed, there is no illumination.

kiṃ cānyat |
aprāpto ’pi jvalano yadi vā punar andhakāram upahanyāt |
sarveṣu lokadhātuṣu tamo ’yam iha saṃsthito hānyat ||39||

偈言
若火不到闇而能破闇者
火在此處住應破一切闇

’di ltar gźan yaṅ
| yaṅ na me daṅ ma phrad kyaṅ || mun pa sel bar byed na ni |
| ’di na yod pa gaṅ yin pas || jig rten khams kun mun sel ’gyur |

Or, if fire destroyed darkness even without coming in contact with it, then this fire, standing here, would destroy darkness in all the worlds.

athāpi manyase ’prāpto ’py agnir andhakāram upahantīti nanv idānīm iha saṃsthito ’gniḥ sarvalokadhātustham upahaniṣyati tamas tulyam ayam aprāptaḥ | na caitad evaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ | tasmād aprāpyaivāgnir andhakāram upahantīti yad iṣṭaṃ tad na |

此偈明何義若汝意謂火不到闇能破闇者火此處住則應能破一切世間所有處闇何以故俱不到故而實不見有如是事若俱下到云何唯能破此處闇不破世間一切處闇若汝意謂火不到闇而能破闇義不相應

’on te me ni mun pa daṅ phrad par yaṅ sel bar byed do sñam du sems na | ’on ni de ma phrad par ’dra bas ’di na gnas pa’i mes ’jig rten gyi khams thams cad na gnas pa’i mun pa sel bar ’gyur ba źig na | de ni de ltar yaṅ ma yin pas de’i phyir me ni mun pa daṅ ma phrad par sel bar byed par ’dod pa gaṅ yin pa de mi ruṅ ṅo ||

Or, if you think that fire destroys darkness even without coming in contact with it, then this fire, standing here at this moment, will equally destroy the darkness existing in all the worlds, without coming in contact with it. This, however, is not seen to be the case. Thus, your opinion that fire destroys darkness even without coming in contact with it is not valid.

kiṃ cānyat | yadi svataś ca pramāṇasiddhir anapekṣya tava prameyāṇi |
bhavati pramāṇasiddhir na parāpekṣā svataḥ siddhiḥ ||40||

又復有義
偈言若量能自成不待所量成
是則是自成非待他能成

’di ltar gźan yaṅ
| gal te raṅ las tshad ma grub || gźal bya rnams la ma ltos par |
| khyod kyi tshad ma ’grub ’gyur ’dir || gźan la mi ltos raṅ ’grub ’gyur |

Furthermore:If the pramāṇas are self-established, then the ‘means of true cognition’ are established for you independently of the ‘objects of true cognition’. For self-establishment does not require another thing.

yadi cāgnivat svataḥ pramāṇasiddhir iti manyase, anapekṣyāpi prameyān arthān pramāṇānāṃ prasiddhir bhaviṣyati | kiṃ kāraṇaṃ | na hi svataḥ siddhiḥ param apekṣate | athāpekṣate na svataḥ siddhiḥ | atrāha yadi nāpekṣante prameyān arthān pramāṇāni ko doṣo bhaviṣyatīti | atrocyate |

此偈明何義若汝意謂量與所量如火成者量則自成不待所量何以故若自成者則不待他若待他者非自成故此我今說若不相待何不自成若待於他則非自成此我今說若量不待所量之物為有何過此我今說偈言

gal te me bźin du raṅ las tshad ma grub po sñam du sems na | gźal bar bya ba’i don rnams la ma ltos par yaṅ tshad ma rnams rab tu ’grub par ’gyur ro || ci’i phyir źe na | raṅ las grub pa ni gźan la ltos pa ma yin no || ’on te ltos na ni raṅ las grub pa ma yin no || ’dir smras pa | gal te tshad ma rnams gźal bar bya pa’i don rnams la ni | mi ltos na skyon cir ’gyur źe na | ’dir bśad pa |

The opponent replies: What defect will ensue if the ‘means of true cognition’ do not require the objects to be cognised? Here we observe:

Permanent link

http://www2.hf.uio.no/common/apps/permlink/permlink.php?app=polyglotta&context=ctext&uid=1623c2f8-6fec-11df-870c-00215aecadea

Choose languages

Choose images, etc.

Choose languages

Choose display

ā	ī	ū	ṛ	ṝ	ḷ
ḹ	’	ṃ	ḥ	ṅ	ñ
ṭ	ḍ	ṇ	ṣ	ś	ź
š	č	ǰ	γ