Vos quoque, o terrena animalia, tenui licet imagine vestrum tamen principium somniatis verumque illum beatitudinis finem licet minime perspicaci qualicumque tamen cogitatione prospicitis
eoque vos et ad verum bonum naturalis ducit intentio et ab eodem multiplex error abducit.
Considera namque an per ea quibus se homines adepturos beatitudinem putant ad destinatum finem valeant pervenire.
Si enim vel pecuniae vel honores ceteraque tale quid afferunt cui nihil bonorum abesse videatur, nos quoque fateamur fieri aliquos horum adeptione felices.
Quod si neque id valent efficere quod promittunt bonisque pluribus carent, nonne liquido falsa in eis beatitudinis species deprehenditur?
Primum igitur te ipsum qui paulo ante divitiis affluebas, interrogo: Inter illas abundantissimas opes numquamne animum tuum concepta ex qualibet iniuria confudit anxietas?”
“Atqui,” inquam, “libero me fuisse animo quin aliquid semper angerer reminisci non queo.”
“Nonne quia vel aberat quod abesse non velles vel aderat quod adesse noluisses?”
“Ita est,” inquam.
“Illius igitur praesentiam huius absentiam desiderabas?”
“Confiteor,” inquam.
“Eget vero,” inquit, “eo quod quisque desiderat?”
“Eget,” inquam.
“Qui vero eget aliquo, non est usquequaque sibi ipse sufficiens?”
“Minime,” inquam.
“Tu itaque hanc insufficientiam plenus,” inquit, “opibus sustinebas?”
“Quidni?” inquam.
“Opes igitur nihilo indigentem sufficientemque sibi facere nequeunt et hoc erat quod promittere videbantur.
Atqui hoc quoque maxime considerandum puto quod nihil habeat suapte natura pecunia ut his a quibus possidetur invitis nequeat auferri.”
“Fateor,” inquam.
“Quidni fateare, cum eam cotidie valentior aliquis eripiat invito?
Unde enim forenses querimoniae nisi quod vel vi vel fraude nolentibus pecuniae repetuntur ereptae?”
“Ita est,” inquam.
“Egebit igitur,” inquit, “extrinsecus petito praesidio quo suam pecuniam quisque tueatur?”
“Quis id,” inquam, “neget?”
“Atqui non egeret eo, nisi possideret pecuniam quam posset amittere?”
“Dubitari,” inquam, “nequit.”
“In contrarium igitur relapsa res est; nam quae sufficientes sibi facere putabantur opes, alieno potius praesidio faciunt indigentes.
Quis autem modus est quo pellatur divitiis indigentia?
Num enim divites esurire nequeunt? Num sitire non possunt?
Num frigus hibernum pecuniosorum membra non sentiunt?
Sed adest, inquies, opulentis quo famem satient, quo sitim frigusque depellant.
Sed hoc modo consolari quidem divitiis indigentia potest, auferri penitus non potest.
Nam si haec hians semper atque aliquid poscens opibus expletur, maneat necesse est quae possit expleri.
Taceo quod naturae minimum, quod avaritiae nihil satis est.
Quare si opes nec submovere possunt indigentiam et ipsae suam faciunt, quid est quod eas sufficientiam praestare credatis?
Vos quoque o terrena animalia . licet tenui imagine . somniatis tamen uestrum principium. Sô tûont óuh ír ménnisken . an so-uuîo éccherôdemo bílde iz sî dóh keséhent ir îo . sâmo-so dúrh tróum . íuuêr ánagénne. Prima preuaricatio hábet ménniskôn dáz penómen . tóh sie sûochên íro principium . dáz sie iz uuóla bechénnen nemúgen. Uerumque illum finem beatitudinis prospicitis . qualicumque cogitatione . licet minime perspicaci. Únde uuártênt ír ále réhto fúre ze demo sâligen ûzlâze . so-uuîo ír iz mít úndúrh síhtîgemo mûote tûênt.
Euoque ducit uos naturalis intentio ad uerum bonum . et multiplex error abducit uos ab eodem. Fóne díu . s. uuánda diu natura stárh íst . sô léitet si íuuih ále-réhto râmendo ad summum bonum . únde uuánda sî geâuuártôt íst . pedíu mísseléitet íuuih áber der írredo.
28. PROBANDUM DICIT ARGUMENTIS . AN PER HAEC QUINQUE . QUOD DESIDERATUR UALEAT ADIPISCI.
Considera namque . an per ea quibus se putant homines adepturos beatitudinem . ualeant peruenire ad destinatum finem. Nû chíus tir . úbe sie mít tîen fínuen . mít tîen sie trûuuênt sâldâ guuínnen . dára-chómen múgîn . dára sie râmênt.
Si enim uel pecunia . uel honores . cȩteraque . tale quid afferunt . cui nihil bonorum abesse uideatur . nos quoque fateamur . aliquos fieri felices . horum adeptione. Múgen díu sô getânen . sô scáz íst . únde êra . îomanne dés kehélfen . dáz ímo nehéines kûotes nebréste . sô iéhên dîen dero sâlighéite . dîe déro dehéin guuínnên.
Quodsi neque id ualent efficere quod promittunt . bonisque pluribus carent . nonne liquido deprehenditur . in eis falsa species beatitudinis ? Nemúgen siu áber geléisten dáz siu gehéizent . únde brístet ín mániges kûotes . sô sínt siu óffeno lúkkez pílde dero sâlighéite.
29. PRIMA PROBATIO IN DIUITIIS.
Primum igitur te ipsum interrogo . qui paulo ante diuitiis affluebas. Nû ze êrest ságe dû mír . dû míttúndes rîche uuâre. Inter illas abundantissimas opes . numquamne confundit animum tuum anxietas concepta ex qualibet iniuria? Tô du rîchesto uuâre . geskáh tír îeht ángestliches . fóne îomannes scúlden . dáz tîn mûot írti ?
.Atqui inquam . non queo me reminisci fuisse libero animo . quin aliquid semper angerer. Ze uuâre chád ih . íh neuuárt nîo dés íh kehúge . sô inbúnden mînes mûotes . íh neángesti úmbe éteuuáz.
Nonne quia uel aberat . quod non uelles abesse . uel aderat . quod adesse noluisses ? Neuuás táz pedíu chád si . dáz tír ételiches lîebes mángta . tés tu dír neuuóltîst méngen . álde dír léid hábetôst . táz tu háben neuuóltîst ?
Ita est inquam. Táz íst álso chád ih.
Illius igitur desiderabas presentiam . huius absentiam. Tô gérotôst tû chád si . dés er gérôt.
.
.
Eget inquam. Túrftîg chád ih.
Qui uero eget aliquo . non est usquequaque sibi ipse sifficiens. Tér îehtes túrftîg íst chád si . tér neíst álles tínges nîeht cnúhtig.
Minime inquam. Sô neíst chád íh. Táz íst argumentum a parte. Quasi diceret. Non habet totum . cui partes desunt.
Tu itaque sustinebas inquit hanc insufficientiam plenus opibus ? Líte dû chád si . díse dúrfte . tô du hárto rîche uuâre ?
Quidni inquam. Uuîo ánderes chád ih.
Opes igitur . nequeunt facere nihilo indigentem . sifficientemque sibi. Úbe díz sús íst chád si . sô nemúgen ôt-uualâ nîomêr úndúrftîgen getûon . nóh cnúhtîgen. Et hoc erat quod promittere uidebantur. Únde dés kelîh tâten sie dóh.
30. ITEM.
Atqui . hoc quoque maxime considerandum puto . quod pecunia nihil habeat suapte natura . ut his inuitis a quibus possidetur nequeat auferri. Táz íst óuh cnôto ze bedénchenne . táz ter scáz tero túgede án ímo sélbemo nîeht nehábet . ín nemúge man úndánches némen dîen . déro er íst.
Fateor inquam. Tés iího ih chád ih.
Quidni fateare? Zíu nesólti dû is iéhen chád si ? Cum aliquis ualentior eripiat eam cottodie inuito? Tánne ín tágoliches . îo dér báz mág . ándermo úndánches néme ?
Unde enim forenses querimonie ? Uuánnân chóment ánderes . tîe dínglichen chlágâ ? únde dîe dínglichen rûofta ? Nisi quod repetuntur pecuniȩ . ereptȩ nolentibus . uel ui . uel fraude? Âne dáz tîe mít nôte . álde mít úndríuuôn genómenen scázza neuuéllentên . uuídere geéiscôt uuérdent ?
Ita est inquam. Táz íst sô chád ih.
Egebit igitur inquit quisque petio extrinsecus presidio . quo suam pecuniam tueatur. Fóne díu íst chád si . mánnolîh túrftîg ánderes mánnes hélfo . sînen scáz ze gehéienne . únde ze iruuérrenne.
Quis in inquam neget? Uuér chád íh mág tes kelóugenen ?
Atqui . non egeret eo . s. presidio . nisi possideret pecuniam . quam posset amittere. Nû neuuâre ímo déro hélfo nehéin dúrft chád si . úbe er dén scáz nehábeti . dén er fúrhtet ferlîesen.
Dubitari inquam nequit. Nehéin zuîuel neíst tés chád ih.
In contrarium igitur relapsa est res. Úbe díz sús íst chád si . sô íst taz tíng uuíderuuártîgo bechêret. Nam opes quȩ putabantur facere sufficientes sibi . indigentes potius faciunt alieno presidio. Íh méino dâr-ána . uuánda der rîhtûom dér sie gnúhtîge tûon sólta . íro sélbero hálb . tér tûot sie dúrftîge ánderro hélfo. Táz íst argumentum ab euentu. Sámo sî cháde. Quia diuites euenit egere . ideo diuitiȩ sunt causa egestasis.
31. ITEM.
Quis autem modus est . quo pellatur diuitiis indigentia? Ze uuélero uuîs múgen dánne dúrfte úberuuúnden uuérden mít rîhtûome ?
Nim enim diuites esurire nequeunt? Nim sitire non possunt? Nemág tie rîchen nîeht húngeren nóh túrsten na ?
Num membra pecuniosorum . non sentiunt frigus hibernum? Neinfíndent tero rîchôn líde des fróstes nîeht na ?
Sed adest inquies opulentis . quo famem satient . quo sitim frigusque depellant. Sô hábent sîe gezíug chîst tu . mít tíu sie gebûozên den húnder . únde den dúrst . ióh ten fróst.
Sed hoc modo consolari quidem potest indigentia diuitiis . auferri penitus non potest. Ze déro uuîs chído áber ih . mág téro dúrfto ételîh trôst uuérden.
Nam si hȩc hians semper . atque aliquid poscens . expletur opibus . maneat necesse est quȩ possit expleri. Úbe indigentia îo gîêt . únde îo gérôt . únde mít sáchôn erscóben uuírt . sô uuérêt sî nôte îo ze dero fúlli. Sîd tiu fúlli sîa netîligôt . sô uuázer fíur tûot . únde sî échert stíllêt . sô íst si îo . sô nezegât si. Uuúrte si mít opibus fertîligôt . sô neuuâre si. Argumentum a minori ad maius. Minus est enim reprimere quam extinguere.
32. ITEM.
Taeco quod naturȩ minimum . quod auaritiȩ nihil satis est. Íh uuíle dés fersuîgen . dáz tero naturȩ lúzzel gnûoget . únde dero fréchi nîonêr ána gnûoge neíst. Fames únde sitis . únde nuditas . máchônt mánolichen egenum. Tia indigentiam múgen opes kebûozen . án dien únfréchên. Tîe áber fréh sínt . uuánda ín nîehtes fóllûn nedúnchet . pedíu sínt sie îo árm . únde îo dúrftîg.
Quare si opes nec summouere possunt indigentiam . et ipsȩ suam faciunt . i. addunt . quid est quod credatis eas prestare sifficientiam? Fóne díu ságe dû mír chád si . úbe rîhtûom dúrfte fertîligôn nemág . únde er ióh túrfte máchôt . uuélicha gnúht mág er dánne gében . uuânent ír ? Argumentum a contrariis. Quasi diceret. Opes que indigentiam gignunt . quomodo sufficientiam que eis contraria est gignant ?
Certez aussi vous hommes, qui estez bestez terriennes, songiéz toutevois, ja soit ce que par petite ymaginacion, vostre commencement et, par quelque maniere de pensee – ja soit ce que elle ne soit pas bien clere – regardéz toutevois de loing ycelle vraie fin de beneurté
et pour ce neis vous maine vostre naturel entencion au vray bien et de celui bien vous retraient maintez erreurs.
Or regarde tu meismes se li homme par ces choses par les queles il cuident aconsuivre beneurté, savoir mon, se il peuent venir a celle fin ou il cuident venir par nature.
Car se deniers ou honneurs et ces autrez chosez dessus ditez aportent a homme tel bien que nulz des biens ne li defaille ne ne li semble defaillir, certez, nous recognoistrons lors que aucuns sont faiz beneuréz pour ce qu’il ont ces choses aquisez.
Mais se elles ne peuent ce faire que elles prometent et pluseurs biens leur defaillent encores, n’apert il clerement que fausse semblance de beneurté est en eus cogneue et reprise ?
Or demande je donques premierement a toi meismes qui de richecez habondaies n’a mie encore passé lonc temps, se tu, entre ces tres habondans richecez, fus onques en ton courage dolans et angoisseus d’aucun tort ou d’aucun grief qui venist de quelque part ?
– Certez, dis je, je ne me puis pas remembrer que je fusse onques de si delivre courage que je ne fusse touz jours angoisseus d’aucune chose.
– Ne te failloit il pas aucune chose que tu ne vousissez mie que te fausist, ou avoies tu ce que tu ne vousissez pas avoir ?
– Ainsi est, dis je.
– Donques desiroies tu la presence de l’une et la defaillance de l’autre ?
– Je le recognois, dis je.
– Certez, dist elle, chascuns a souffraite de ce qu’il desire.
– Souffraite en a il, dis je.
– Certes cil qui a souffraite de aucune chose, il n’est pas du tout suffisant a soi meismez.
– Certes, dis je, non.
– Ceste faute donques de suffisance et ceste souffraite soutenoiez tu quant tu estoies plains de richeces ?
– Pour quoy non ? Je les soutenoie voirement.
– Donques ne peuent pas richeces faire que homme ne soit souffreteus ne que il soit suffisans a soi meismes ; et ce estoit ce que elles prometoient, si comme il est avis aus hommes.
Et certes encorez cuit je que ce fait mout a regarder que pecune n’a riens de sa propre nature par quoi elle ne puisse estre tolue a ceulz qui la tiennent malgré euls.
– Je le recognois, dis je.
– Pour quoi ne le recognoistroiez tu, comme li plus fors la toille chascun jour au plus foible malgré lui ?
Car dont viennent donquez les complaintez des plaiz fors que de ce que les pecunes sont requisez qui ont esté tolues a ceulz qui les avoient, par force ou par barat malgré eulz ?
– Ainsi est, dis je.
– Donques aura mestier, dist elle, chascuns de l’aide requise par dehors pour quoy il deffende sa pecune ?
– Qui nieroit ce ? dis je.
– Certes il n’en eust pas mestier s’il n’eust la pecune que il peust perdre ?
– De ce ne puet, dis je, nulz doubter.
– Or est donques la chose tournee en contraire : que les richeces, que li homme cuidoient que elles les feissent suffisans, les font plus avoir besoing de estrange aide.
Mais quelle est la maniere de peccune par quoy souffraite puisse estre ostee par richeces ?
Ne peuent pas li riche homme avoir fain ? Ne peuent il pas avoir soif ?
O membres des richez hommes ne sentent il pas le froit de yver ?
Mais tu diras que li riches ont asséz de quoy il saoulent leur fain et ostent la soif et le froit.
Mais certez en ceste maniere puet bien souffraite estre confortee, mais du tout ne puet elle pas estre ostee.
Car se ceste souffraite, touz jours baians et requerans aucune chose dehors, est raemplie ou saoulee par richeces, donques couvient il qu’elle demeure et soit permanant, si que elle puisse estre raemplie.
Encores me tais je de ce que trop pou de chosez souffist a nature, mais a avarice nulle chose ne li souffist.
Par quoy richeces, se elles ne puent oster souffraite et elles meismes font la leur, quelles chosez ont elles en eulz pour quoy vous créez qu’elles vous doignent suffisance ?
Certes also ye men, that ben ertheliche beestes, dremen alwey youre beginninge , al-though it be with a thinne imaginacioun; and by a maner thoughte, al be it nat cleerly ne parfitly, ye loken fram a-fer to thilke verray fyn of blisfulnesse;
and ther-fore naturel entencioun ledeth you to thilke verray good, but many maner errours mis-torneth you ther-fro.
Consider now yif that by thilke thinges, by whiche a man weneth to geten him blisfulnesse, yif that he may comen to thilke ende that he weneth to come by nature.
For yif that moneye or honours, or thise other forseyde thinges bringen to men swich a thing that no good ne fayle hem ne semeth fayle, certes than wole I graunte that they ben maked blisful by thilke thinges that they han geten.
But yif so be that thilke thinges ne mowen nat performen that they bi-heten, and that ther be defaute of manye goodes, sheweth it nat thanne cleerly that fals beautee of blisfulnesse is knowen and ateint in thilke thinges?
First and forward thou thy-self, that haddest habundaunces of richesses nat long agon, I axe yif that, in the habundaunce of alle thilke richesses, thou were never anguissous or sory in thy corage of any wrong or grevaunce that bi-tidde thee on any syde?’
‘Certes,’ quod I, ‘it ne remembreth me nat that evere I was so free of my thought that I ne was alwey in anguissh of somwhat.’
‘And was nat that ,’ quod she, ‘for that thee lakked som-what[ ] that thou noldest nat han lakked, or elles thou haddest that thou noldest nat han had?’
‘Right so is it,’ quod I.
‘Thanne desiredest thou the presence of that oon and the absence of that other?’
‘I graunte wel,’ quod I.
‘Forsothe,’ quod she, ‘than nedeth ther som-what that every man desireth?’
‘Ye, ther nedeth,’ quod I.
‘Certes,’ quod she, ‘and he that hath lakke or nede of aught nis nat in every wey suffisaunt to himself?’
‘No,’ quod I.
‘And thou,’ quod she, ‘in al the plentee of thy richesses haddest thilke lakke of suffisaunse?’
‘What elles?’ quod I.
‘Thanne may nat richesses maken that a man nis nedy, ne that he be suffisaunt to him-self; and that was it that they bi-highten, as it semeth.
And eek certes I trowe, that this be gretly to considere, that moneye ne hath nat in his owne kinde that it ne may ben bi-nomen of hem that han it, maugre hem?’
‘I bi-knowe it wel,’ quod I.
‘Why sholdest thou nat bi-knowen it,’ quod she, ‘whan every day the strenger folk bi-nemen it fro the febler , maugre hem?
For whennes comen elles alle thise foreyne compleyntes or quereles of pletinges, but for that men axen ayein here moneye that hath ben bi-nomen hem by force or by gyle, and alwey maugre hem ?’
‘Right so is it,’ quod I.
‘Than,’ quod she, ‘hath a man nede to seken him foreyne helpe by whiche he may defende his moneye?’
‘Who may sey nay?’ quod I.
‘Certes,’ quod she; ‘and him nedede non help, yif he ne hadde no moneye that he mighte lese?’
‘That is douteles,’ quod I.
‘Than is this thinge torned in-to the contrarye,’ quod she. ‘For richesses , that men wenen sholde make suffisaunce, they maken a man rather han nede of foreyne help!
Which is the manere or the gyse,’ quod she, ‘that richesse may dryve awey nede?
Cannot the rich feel hunger? Cannot they thirst?
Thise riche men, may they fele no cold on hir limes on winter?
But thou wolt answeren, that riche men han y-now wher-with they may staunchen hir hunger, slaken hir thurst , and don a-wey cold.
n this wyse may nede be counforted by richesses; but certes, nede ne may nat all outrely ben don a-wey.
For though this nede, that is alwey gapinge and gredy, be fulfild with richesses, and axe any thing, yit dwelleth thanne a nede that mighte be fulfild .
I holde me stille, and telle nat how that litel thing suffiseth to nature; but certes to avarice y-nough ne suffiseth no-thing.
For sin that richesses ne may nat al don awey nede, but richesses maken nede, what may it thanne be, that ye wenen that richesses mowen yeven you suffisaunce?
“You allso o erthly wightes, though by single figure doo dreame of your own beginning, & that true end of blissed-nes perceaue, tho with no playne yet with som thought, vnderstand.
And thither bringes you a naturall instinct to true goodnes, and increasing errour leades you from the same.
Consider therfore, whither men can obtayne their end desyrd, by those meanes that men suppose gettes happynes.
For if eyther monny, honors, or such lyke can bring such thinges to 8 whom nothing is lacking of, best, let vs then confesse that some men may be happy by their obteyning.
For if neyther they can doo that they promise & wantes greatest good, is it not euident that they haue but a false show of blessidnes?
First therfore let me ask thè, that a little afore aboundedst in riches, Among thy flowing heaps, did not conceyte of conceauid iniury amase thy mynde?
"I can not remember," quoth I, "that euer my mynde was so free but somewhat greeuid it."
"Was it not because that was a waye that thou woldest not forgo, or was with thè that thou caredst not for?"
I answerd, "so it is."
"Then thou desyredst the ones presence, and the others want?"
I confesse.
"Does any man neede than," quoth she, "that euery man wantes & needs?”
.
He that Iackes is not wholly content.
No, sure.
When thou hadst welth ynough, hadst thou not this want?"
"What els?" said I.
"Then Riches can not make a man lack nothing, nor yet content himself.
And this is that promise they seemed. This I suppose ought most be considered, that monny of his own nature hath nothing that he can not be spoyled of that
possesses it."
I confesse it.
"Why shouldst thou not confesse yt. Whan a mightyer takes it away from the vnwilling.
Whence come these Courtes complayntes? but that coyne is taken away from the losers by force or guyle?
.
He shall haue neede therfore of outward help by which his monny he 32
may keepe.
Who can this deny?
He should not neede such help that possest of monny lose he wold not.
This is doutles.
The matter is fallen otherwise now, for such riches as were thought sufficient of them selves, are needy of others ayde.
But what is the way to dryve away lack from ryches?
for rych men can they not honger, Can they not thirst,
nor can not somtyme the cold wynter hurt the lymmes of the rich man?
But you will say, they haue ynough, thurst & colde to dryue away.
But by this meanes you may saye the lack of rich men may be comforted, neuer take away.
For if she euer gape & serch for somthing els, tho fild with ryches ynough, it must be that ther somthing reinayues that it should be filld withall.
I neede not tell you that Nature with lest, & Auarice with nothing is contented.
Wherfore if nether Riches can take away their lack, & they make their own neede, why should we think them sufficient?
Complete text
Book I: THE SORROWS OF BOETHIUS