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Click to Expand/Collapse OptionTitle
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter I
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter II
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter III
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter IV
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter V: De substantia
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter VI: De quantitate
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter VII: De relativis ved ad aliquid
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter VIII: De quali et qualitate
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter IX: De facere et pati
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter X: De oppositis
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter XI
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter XII: De priore
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter XIII: De his quae simul sunt
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter XIV: De motu
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter XV: De habere
ΚΑΤΗΓΟΡΙΑΙ 
Ստորոգութիւնք արիստոտեղի ։ — 
CATEGORIAE 
ܬܘܒ ܡܐܡܪܐ ܕܐܪܝܣܛܘܛܠܝܣ ܡܛܠ ܥܣܪ̈ܐ ܩܛܝܓܘܪ̈ܝܣ 
بسم الّه الرمن رحيم
كتاب ارسطوطاليس المسمى قاطيغورياس أي المقولات 
ANICIUS MANLIUS SEVERINUS BOETIUS: COMMENTAR ZU DEN CATEGORIEN DES ARISTOTELES 
Aristotle’s Categories 
(1a1) Ὁμώνυμα λέγεται ὧν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ (2) τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος,  οἷον ζῷον ὅ τε ἄνθρω(3)πος καὶ τὸ γεγραμμένον·  τούτων γὰρ ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, (4) ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος·  ἐὰν γὰρ (5) ἀποδιδῷ τις τί ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἑκατέρῳ τὸ ζῴῳ εἶναι, ἴδιον (6) ἑκατέρου λόγον ἀποδώσει. 
ա Հոմանո՛ւնք ասի՝ն որոց անուա՛նք միայն հասարա՝կ։ իսկ ըստ անուա՛նն, բա՛ն գոյացութեա՛ն. ա՛յղ։   ո՛րզան։ կենդանի՛, և մարդն, և գրեա՛լն։  քանզի սոցա, անո՛ւն միայն հասարակ։ իսկ ըստ անուա՛նն, բա՛ն գսյացութեան, ա՛յղ։  քանզի եթե բացատրեսցէ՛ ոք. զի՛նչ է՛ նոցա երկաքանշի՛ւր ուրո՛ւք կենդանին գոլ. յատո՛ւկ իւրաքանչի՛ւր ունե՛ք. բա՛ն բացատեսցէ։ 
(1,1) Aequiuoca dicuntur quorum nomen solum commune est, secundum nomen uero (2) substantiae ratio diuersa,  ut animal homo et quod pingitur.  Horum enim (3) solum nomen commune est, secundum nomen uero substantiae ratio (4) diuersa;  si enim quis assignet quid est utrique eorum quo sint (5) animalia, propriam assignabit utriusque rationem. 
ܫ̈ܘܝܝ ܫܡܐ ܡܬܐܡܪܝܢ ܆ ܕܕܝܠܗܘܢ ܫܡܐ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܕܓܘܐ ܆ ܡܠܬܐ ܕܝܢ ܕܐܘܣܝܐ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܐܝܟ ܫܡܐ ܐܚܪܬܐ .  ܕܐܝܟ ܐܝܟܢ . ܚܝܘܬܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܘܗ̇ܘ ܕܨܝܪ .  ܕܗܠܝܢ ܓܝܪ ܫܡܐ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܕܓܘܐ ܆ ܡܠܬܐ ܕܝܢ ܕܐܘܣܝܐ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܐܝܟ ܫܡܐ ܐܚܪܬܐ ܗ̣ܝ .  ܐܢ ܗ̣ܘ ܓܝܪ ܕܝܗ̇ܒ ܐܢܫ: ܕܡܘܢ ܐܝܬܝܗ̇ ܠܟܠ ܚܕ ܚܕ ܡܢܗܘܢ ܒܗ̇ܝ ܕܚܝܘܬܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܆ ܡܠܬܐ ܕܝܠܢܝܬܐ ܕܟܠ ܚܕ ܝܗ̇ܒ ܀ 
المتفقة أسماؤها يقال إنها التي الاسم فقط عام لها فأما قول الجوهر الذي بحسب الاسم فمخالف  ومثال ذلك الإنسان والمصوَّر حيوانا  فإن هذين الاسم فقط عام لهما فأما قول الجوهر الذي بحسب الاسم ' فمخالف  وذلك أن موفّيا إن وفّى في كل واحد منهما ما معنى أنه حيوان ' فإن القول الذي يوفّي في كل واحد منهما خاصي له 
(LIBER PRIMUS)
1. QUID SINT ȨQUIVOCA.
EQUIVOCA DICUNTUR . QUORUM Nomen solum commune est. Tîe sínt kenámmen . déro námo échert keméine . únde gelîh íst. Ratio uero substantiȩ diuersa . secundum nomen. Únde áber úngelîh zála íst . uuáz sîe sîn . démo námen uólgêndo . án démo sîe genámmen sínt. Úberstépfist tû den námen . sô mág sîn gelîh ratio . íro substantiȩ. 
Ut animal homo . et quod pingitur. Hoc est. Ut ȩquivoci sunt . homo uerus . et homo pictus. In latina lingua . sínt kenámmen . homo animal . i. ter lébendo ménnisko . et quod pingitur . i. sîn gelîhnisse.  Ratio uero substantiȩ diuersa secundum nomen. Mán ságet áber úngelîcho uuáz sîe sîn. demo námen uólgendo . dér sîe genámmen máchôt.  Si enim qius assignet . quod est utrumque eorum . propriam rationem assignabit utriusque. Ságet îoman . dáz îouuéderez íst . tér gíbet îouuéderemo súnderîga zála. Hoc modo. Homo animal . est subsantia sensibilis. Tér lébendo . homo íst éin sínnîg tíng. Qui pingitur . imago insensibilis est . et inanis. Ter ' gemâleto . íst éin sínnlôs pílde . únde lîbelôs . Sic in euangelio sunt ȩquiuoci uterque iohannes . sed diuersam suȩ substantiȩ rationem habent secundum nomen. Iohannes únde áber iohannes sínt kenámmen . i. hábent kelîchen námen . únde áber úngelîcha . únde úngemeina diffinitionem. Diffinitio íst . tíudir ságet . uuáz sîe sîn. Eadem est et ratio substantiȩ . in hunc modum. Alter est iohannes baptista . filius zachariȩ . et alter est iohannes euangelista . filius zebedei. Quodsi dixeris . habent et communem diffinitionem . quia uterque iohannes est animal rationale mortale. Uel substantia animata sensibilis . non est hȩc diffinitio iohannis . sed hominis uel animalis . et hoc nomen homo . aut animal . non facit eos ȩquiuocos sed uniuocos. Uuíle dû ín gében gelîcha diffinitionem . dáz nemáht tû nîeht ketûon uólgendo démo námen iohannes . tér sîe genámmen máchôt. Sîe mág man bêde héizin homo únde animal . únde dánnân hábent sîe geméina diffinitionem . sîe nesínt áber dánnân nîeth ȩquiuoci . ' sed uniuoci . táz chît sîe nesínt tánnân gelîhnámîg . súnder éinnámîg . únde geméinnámîg. Mít témo uuéhsele dero diffinitionis . uuérdent ûzer ȩquiuocis uniuoca. De quibus mox subditur. 
When things have only a name in common and the definition of being which corresponds to the name is different, they are called homonymous.  Thus, for example, both a man and a picture are animals.  These have only a name in common and the definition of being which corresponds to the name is different;  for if one is to say what being an animal is for each of them, one will give two distinct definitions. 
συνώνυμα δὲ λέγεται ὧν τό τε (7) ὄνομα κοινὸν καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ὁ αὐτός,  (8) οἷον ζῷον ὅ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ βοῦς·  τούτων γὰρ ἑκάτερον (9) κοινῷ ὀνόματι προσαγορεύεται ζῷον, καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ (10) τῆς οὐσίας ὁ αὐτός·  ἐὰν γὰρ ἀποδιδῷ τις τὸν ἑκατέρου (11) λόγον τί ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἑκατέρῳ τὸ ζῴῳ εἶναι, τὸν αὐτὸν (12) λόγον ἀποδώσει. 
բ Եւ փաղանո՛ւնք ասին, որոց և անո՛ւնն հասարակ։ և ըստ անուանն. բա՛ն գոյացութեան նո՛յն:  հիզան։ կենդանի մա՛րդն, և 108 արջառն։ քանզի մարդն և արջառ.  հասարա՛կ անուանբ առասին, կենդանի և բան գոյացութեան, նո՛յն է։  քանզի եթե բացատրեսցէ՛ ոք զերկաքանչի՛ւր ուրուք զբանն. զի՛նչ է նոցա երկաքանչի՛ւրումեք. կենդանի՛ն գոլ’ զնոյն բացատրեսցէ բա՛ն: 
(6) Uniuoca uero dicuntur quorum et nomen commune est et secundum nomen (7) eadem substantiae ratio,  ut animal homo atque bos.  Communi enim nomine (8) utrique animalia nuncupantur, et est ratio substantiae eadem;  si quis (9) enim assignet utriusque rationem, quid utrique sit quo sint animalia, (10) eandem assignabit rationem. 
ܡܥܪ̈ܙܠܝ ܫܡܐ ܕܝܢ ܡܬܐܡܪܝܢ ܆ ܕܕܝܠܗܘܢ ܘܫܡܐ ܓܘܐ ܘܡܠܬܐ ܗ̣ܝ ܟܕ ܗ̣ܝ .  ܕܐܝܟ ܐܝܟܢ . ܚܝܘܬܐ ܘܒܪܢܫܐ ܘܬܘܪܐ .  ܒܪܢܫܐ ܓܝܪ ܘܬܘܪܐ ܒܫܡܐ ܓܘܢܝܐ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܡܬܟܢܝܢ ܆ ı ܘܡܠܬܐ ܕܝܢ ܕܐܘܣܝܐ ܗ̣ܝ .  ܐܢܗ̣ܘ ܓܝܪ ܕܝܗ̇ܒ ܐܢܫ ܠܡܠܬܐ ܕܟܠ ܚܕ: ܕܡܢ ܐܝܬܝܗ̇ ܠܗ̇ ܒܗ̇ܝ ܕܚܝܬܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܆ ܠܗ̇ ܟܕ ܠܗ̇ ܝܗ̇ܒ ܀ 
والمتواطئة أسماؤها ' يقال إنها التي الاسم عام لها وقول الجوهر الذي بحسب الاسم واحد بعينه أيضا  ومثال ذلك الإنسان والثور حيوان  فإن هذين أعني الإنسان والثور يلقّبان ' باسم عام أعني حيوانا وقول الجوهر واحد بعينه أيضا  وذلك أن موفّيا إن ' وفى في كل واحد منهما ما معنى أنه حيوان فإن القول الذي يوفّي واحد بعينه 
2. QUID SINT UNIUOCA.
Univoca uero dicuntur . quorum et nomen commune est . et secundum nomen eadem substantiȩ ratio. Tíu héizent áber éinnámîg . únde geméinnámîg . téro námo geméine íst . únde nâh temo námen . gelîh zála íst uuáz sîe sîn . i. tíu álso sínt . sô man síu héiset. 
Ut animal homo . atque animal bos bos. Hoc est ut uniuoca sunt homo et bos.  Communi enim nomine utrique . i. homo et bos animalia nuncupantur . et est eadem ratio substantiȩ. Quȩ est illa ratio? utrumque esse animal . sicut et nuncupantur. Sîe héizent keméinlîcho animalia . únde sámogeméine zála íst . táz sîe dáz sîn . subaudis . táz sîe héizint.  Si quis assignet rationem utriusque quid utrique sint . assignabit eandem rationem. Úbe îoman zála gíbit pêdero . uuáz îouuéderiz sî . tér gíbit íro gelîcha zála. Uuáz íst tiu zála? Quo sint animalia. Ér chídit . táz sîe sîn animalia . álsô sîe héizent. Homo únde bos héizent animalia . únde sínt animalia. ' Uaáz íst áber sélbiz animal? Substantia animata sensibilis. Táz íst óuh homo . táz íst óuh bos. Ál dáz animal íst . táz sínt sîniu species . homo et bos. Uuíle dû chéden animal homo et animal bos . hábent úngelîcha diffinitionem in hunc modum. Homo est animal rationale . bos ets animal inrationale . tíu diffinitio neíst animal nîeth . táz íro geméine námo íst . únde íro geméine genus íst . sî íst sélbero specierum hominis et bouis. Mít témo uuéhsele uuérdent ûzer uniuocis aequiuoca.

3. ITEM QUID INTERSIT.
In propriis uuérdent aequiuoca . uuîlôn úngeuuândo . i. fortuito et casu . ut duo aiaces . duo alexandri . duo pirri . uuîlôn uóne gelúbedo . i. placito propter cognationem . ut duo marii pater et filius . uel propter similtudinem ut homo pictus et uerus. Tíu múgen sîn béidiu propria ióh appellatiua. Hic homo uerus et homo pictus sínt propria. Homo uerus et homo pictus . specialiter et communiter . sínt appellatiua. Tôh aristotelis châde uóne aequiuocis . quorum ' nomen commune est . síu sínt tóh tícchôr propria dánne appellatiua et communia. Áber uniuoca uuérdent îo in appellatiuis. Uuîlôn natura ut homo homini uniuocus est bestia bestiȩ. Uuîlôn gente uel partria . ut grecus greco . romanus romano. Uuîlôn professione . ut christianus christiano . laicus laico . clericus clerico. Uuîlôn dignitate . ut rex regi . consul consulí. Uuîlôn fortuna . ut seruus seruo . ingenuus ingenuo. Álso mánigiu appellatiua uuésen múgen . sámománigiu uniuoca múgen uuésen. Sô íst îo díngolîh témo uniuocum . sáment témo iz hábit . éinen námen geméinen . únde éina diffinitionem geméina. Únde áber démo aequiuocum . témo iz hábet gelîchen námen . únde uóne dîu úngemeinen . uuánda iz éin námo neíst . nóh éin diffinitio. Dóh aristoteles châde . quorum nomen commune est . quasi de appellatiuis. 
When things have the name in common and the definition of being which corresponds to the name is the same, they are called synonymous.  Thus, for example, both a man and an ox are animals.  Each of these is called, by a common name, an animal, and the definition of being is also the same;  for if one is to give the definition of each—what being an animal is for each of them — one will give the same definition. 
παρώνυμα δὲ λέγεται ὅσα ἀπό τινος δια(13)φέροντα τῇ πτώσει τὴν κατὰ τοὔνομα προσηγορίαν ἔχει,  (14) οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς γραμματικῆς ὁ γραμματικὸς καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς (15) ἀνδρείας ὁ ἀνδρεῖος. 
գ Եւ յարանո՛ւնք ասի`ն, որք միանգամ յումեքէ՛ տարբերեա՛լք հոլովիւ, զըստ անուանն զառասութի՛ւն ունին։  ո՛րզան։ ի քերականութենէն, քերակա՛նն։ և յարութենէն, արի՛ն։ 
(11) Denominatiua uero dicuntur quaecumque ab aliquo, solo differentia (12) casu, secundum nomen habent appellationem,  ut a grammatica grammaticus (13) et a fortitudine fortis. 
ܒܨܝܪܝ ܫܡܐ ܕܝܢ ܡܬܐܡܪܝܢ ܟܠܗܘܢ ܐܝܠܝܢ ܕܟܕ ܡܢ ܡܕܡ ܡܫܚܠܦܝܢ ܒܡܦܘܠܬܐ ܆ ܠܟܘܢܝܐ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܐܝܹܟ ܫܡܐ ܐܝܬ ܠܗܘܢ .  ܕܐܝܟ ܐܝܟܢ . ܡܢ ܓܪܡܛܝܩܘܬܐ ܓܪܡܛܝܩܘܣ ܘܡܢ ܓܢܒܪܘܬܐ ܓܢܒܪܐ ܀ 
والمشتقة أسماؤها يقال إنها التي لها لقب من شيء بحسب اسمه غير أنها ' مخالفة له في التصريف  ومثال ذلك الفصيح من الفصاحة والشجاع ' من الشجاعة 
4. DE DOMINATIUIS.
Denominatiua uero dicuntur . quȩcumque habent appellationem ab aliquo secundum nomen . solo differente casu. Díu héizent denominatiua . tíu nâh ándermo ' námen genámôt sínt . échert keuuéhselotemo ûzlâze. Nomen a nomine deriuatum . héizet mít réhte denominatiuum . i. námo uóne námen. 
ut a grammatica grammaticus. A fortitudine fortis.

5. RATIO DE HIS TRIBUS . I. QUARE PRȨMISSA SINT.
Fóne dísên drín diffinitionibus íst ze uuízenne . dáz decem predicamenta uóne dîen aristotiles ságen uuíle . gelîchen námen hábent . únde áber úngelîcha diffinitionem. Prȩdicamenta únde genera héizent siu gelîcho . síu sínt áber éin ánderên úngelih. Pe díu sínt siu aequiuoce sô genámôt . náls uniuoce. Tîe sélben námen gébent siu íro speciebus . i. subalternis generibus . mít tîen síu geméina diffinitionem hábent . pe díu sínt siu áber dîen uniuoca . náls ȩquiuoca. Denomiatiua uuírdent áber . dánne substantia . án síh nímit accidens . álde éin ándera substantiam. Nímet homo án síh qualitatem . sô íst er qualis . nímet er án síh quantitatem . sô íst er quantus. Léget er án síh indumentum . sô ist er habens. Fóne dîen állên uuîrdit ' er denominatus . únde dîe námen ér dánnân geuuínnet . tîe héizent denominatiua. Álso iustus fóne iustitia . latus fóne latitudine uestitus fóne ueste. 
When things get their name from something, with a difference of ending, they are called paronymous.  Thus, for example, the grammarian gets his name from grammar, the brave get theirs from bravery. 
(16) Τῶν λεγομένων τὰ μὲν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν λέγεται, τὰ (17) δὲ ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς.  τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ συμπλοκήν, οἷον (18) ἄνθρωπος τρέχει, ἄνθρωπος νικᾷ·  τὰ δὲ ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς, (19) οἷον ἄνθρωπος, βοῦς, τρέχει, νικᾷ. 
դ Յասիցելո՛ցն, է՛ ինչ որ ըստ շարանանութեան ասի, և է՛ ինչ որ առանց շարանանութե՛ան։  արդ ըստ շարանանութե՛անքն: ո՛րզան։ մարդ ընթանա՛յ, մարդ յաղթէ՛։  իսկ արանց շարանանութե՛անքն: ո՛րզան։ մարդ’ արջառ, ընթանա՛յ’, յաղթե՛: 
(2,1) Eorum quae dicuntur alia quidem secundum complexionem dicuntur, alia (2) uero sine complexione.  Et ea quae secundum complexionem dicuntur sunt (3) ut homo currit, homo uincit;  ea uero quae sine complexione, ut homo, (4) bos, currit, uincit. 
ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܡܬܐܡܪܝܢ ܆ ܗܠܝܢ ܡ̇ܢ ܒܥܘܪܙܠܐ ܡܬܐܡܪܝܢ ܆ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܝܢ ܒܠܥܕ ܥܘܪܙܠܐ .  ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܗܟܝܠ ܕܒܥܘܪܙܠܐ ܆ ܕܐܝܟ ܐܝܟܢ . ܒܪܢܫܐ ܪܗ̇ܛ . ܒܪܢܫܐ ܙܟ̇ܐ .  ܗܠܝܢ ܕܝܢ ܕܒܠܥܕ ܥܘܕܙܠܐ ܆ ܕܐܝܟ ܐܝܟܢ .ܒܪܢܫܐ . ܣܘܣܝܐ ܪܗ̇ܛ . ܙܟ̇ܐ . ܀܀ 
التي تقال منها ما يقال بتأليف ومنها ما يقال بغير ' تأليف  فالتي تقال بتأليف كقولك الإنسان يحضر الثور يغلب  والتي تقال بغير تأليف كقولك الإنسان الثور يحضر يغلب 
6. QUȨSTIO.
Nôh tánne sínt mánignámîgiu . i. pluriuoca . ut ensis mucro gladius . marcus tullius cicero . únde míssenámigiu . i. diuersiuoca . ut ignis lapis color. Zíu uersuîgeta er déro? Téro nebedórfta ér . ze díssemo bûoche.

7. DE SINE COMPLEXIONE DICTIS. ET CUM COMPLEXIONE.
Eorum quȩ dicuntur . alia quidem secundum complexionem . alia uero sine complexione. Téro uuórto díu man spríchet . téro uuérdent súmelîchîu gespróchen zesámina gelégitiu . súmelîchîu súnderîgo. 
Et ea quae dicuntur . secundum complexionem sunt. Tíu man spríchet zesámine gelégitiu . díu sínt sús ketân. Ut homo currit homo uincit.  Ea quȩ sine complexione sunt. Tíu man súnderîgo srpíchet . tíu sínt sús ketân. Ut homo bos currit uincit. Uuáz tíu súnderîgen bezéichenên . dáz uuíle ér án dísemo bûoche ságen. Uuáz tíu zesámene gelégetin bezéichenên . dáz ságet er ' háranâh in periermeniis. 
Of things that are said, some involve combination while others are said without combination.  Examples of those involving combination are: man runs, man wins;  and of those without combination: man, ox, runs, wins. 
(20) Τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν καθ’ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται, ἐν (21) ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐδενί ἐστιν,  οἷον ἄνθρωπος καθ’ ὑποκειμένου (22) μὲν λέγεται τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐδενί ἐστιν· (23)  τὰ δὲ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μέν ἐστι, καθ’ ὑποκειμένου δὲ οὐδενὸς (24) λέγεται,  —ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ λέγω ὃ ἔν τινι μὴ ὡς μέρος (25) ὑπάρχον ἀδύνατον χωρὶς εἶναι τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐστίν,—  οἷον ἡ τὶς (26) γραμματικὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μέν ἐστι τῇ ψυχῇ, καθ’ ὑπο(27)κειμένου δὲ οὐδενὸς λέγεται,  καὶ τὸ τὶ λευκὸν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ (28) μέν ἐστι τῷ σώματι, —ἅπαν γὰρ χρῶμα ἐν σώματι,— καθ’ (29) ὑποκειμένου δὲ οὐδενὸς λέγεται·  τὰ δὲ καθ’ ὑποκειμένου τε (1b1) λέγεται καὶ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν,  οἷον ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐν ὑπο(2)κειμένῳ μέν ἐστι τῇ ψυχῇ, καθ’ ὑποκειμένου δὲ λέγεται (3) τῆς γραμματικῆς·  τὰ δὲ οὔτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστὶν οὔτε καθ’ (4) ὑποκειμένου λέγεται, οἷον ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος ἢ ὁ τὶς ἵπ(5)πος,  —οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων οὔτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστὶν (6) οὔτε καθ’ ὑποκειμένου λέγεται·  — ἁπλῶς δὲ τὰ ἄτομα καὶ ἓν (7) ἀριθμῷ κατ’ οὐδενὸς ὑποκειμένου λέγεται, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ (8) ἔνια οὐδὲν κωλύει εἶναι·  ἡ γὰρ τὶς γραμματικὴ τῶν ἐν ὑπο(9)κειμένῳ ἐστίν. 
ե Էակա՛ցն, է՛ ինչ որ զենթակայէ՛ իմենմէ ասի, և նենթակայո՛ւմ; ո՛չ յումեքէ՛:  ո՛րզան։ մարդ զենթակայէ՛ ասի, զումեմնէ՛ մարդոյ’ և նենթակայում, ոչ նումէքէ:  և է՛ որ նենթակայո՛ւմէ, և զենթակայէ ո՛չ զումէքէ ասի:  զ Նենթակայո՛ւմ ասեմ: որ նիմեքըն։ ո՛չ իբր մա՛սն ելով, անկա՛ր զատ գոլ յայնմանէ, յորումէ՛ն:  ո՛րզան։ ոմն քերականութիւն. նենթակայումէ, նանձի՛ն։ և զըստորակայէ՛ ո՛չ զումեքէ ասի:  և ա՛յս ինչ սպիտակ, նենթակայո՛ւմէ ի մարմընի։ քանզի ամենայն գոյն, ի մարմընի՛ է։ իսկ զենթակայէ. ո՛չ զումեքէ ասի:  և է՛ որ զենթայկայէ ասի, և նենթակայո՛ւմ է։  ո՛րզան: մակացութիւն, նենթակայո՛ւմ է, նանձի՛ն: և զենթակայէ ասի’ զքերականութենէ՛:  և է՛ որ ո՛չ նենթակայո՛ւմ է, և ո՛չ զենթակայէ ասի զքերականութենէ՛: ո՛րզան։ ոմն մա՛րդ. և կամ ոմն ձի՛:  քանզի ո՛չ ինչ յայսպիսեացս. ո՛չ նենթակայո՛ւմ է. և ո՛չ զենթակայէ ումեքէ ասի։  է Տի`, միանգամայն պարզաբար անհատքն’ և մի՛ թուով, ո՛չ զումէքէ զենթակայէ ասին: բայց նենթակայումն, ո՛չ ինչ նոցա արգե՛լէ գոլ։  քանզի ոմն քերականութիւն, յայնցանէ է՛ որ նենթայկայո՛ւմնէ։
Գոյացութիւն, ո՛չ նենթակայումն և ո՛չ զենթակայէ։ իսկ պատահումն, ի հարկէ՛ գոլ նենթակայում: քանզի թա՛րց ենթակայի ե՛լ. անկա՛րէ: 
(5) Eorum quae sunt alia de subiecto quodam dicuntur, in subiecto uero (6) nullo sunt,  ut homo de subiecto quidem dicitur aliquo homine, in (7) subiecto uero nullo est;  alia autem in subiecto quidem sunt, de (8) subiecto uero nullo dicuntur  (in subiecto autem esse dico quod, cum in (9) aliquo sit non sicut quaedam pars, impossibile est esse sine eo in quo (10) est),  ut quaedam grammatica in subiecto quidem est in anima, de (11) subiecto uero nullo dicitur,  et quoddam album in subiecto est in (12) corpore (omnis enim color in corpore est);  alia uero et de subiecto (13) dicuntur et in subiecto sunt,  ut scientia in subiecto quidem est in (14) anima, de subiecto uero dicitur de grammatica;  alia uero neque in (15) subiecto sunt neque de subiecto dicuntur, ut aliquis homo uel aliquis (16) equus;  nihil enim horum neque in subiecto est neque de subiecto (17) dicitur.  Simpliciter autem quae sunt indiuidua et numero singularia (18) nullo de subiecto dicuntur, in subiecto autem nihil ea prohibet esse;  (19) quaedam enim grammatica in subiecto est. 
ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܐܝܬܝܣܘܢ ܆ ܗܠܝܢ ܡ̇ܢ ܥܠ ܡܕܡ ܕܣܝܡ ܡܬܐܡܪܝܢ ܆ ܒܗ̇ܘ ܕܝܢ ܕܣܝܡ ܘܠܐ ܒܡܕܡ ܐܝܬܝܣܘܢ .  ܕܐܝܟ ܐܝܟܢ . ܒܪܢܫܐ ܥܠ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܡ̇ܢ ܡܬܐܡܪ ܥܠ ܐܢܫ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܆ ܒܗ̇ܘ ܕܝܢ ܕܣܝܡ ܘܠܐ ܒܐܢܫ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܀  ܗܠܝܢ ܕܝܢ ܒܗ̇ܘ ܡ̇ܢ ܕܣܝܡ ܐܝܬܝܗܘܢ ܆ ܥܠ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܝܢ ܕܣܝܡ ܘܠܐ ܕܡܕܡ ܡܬܐܡܪܝܢ ܀  ܒܗ̇ܘ ܕܝܢ ܕܣܝܡ ܐܡܪ ܐܢܐ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܟܕ ܒܡܕܡ ܆ ܠܘ ܐܝܟ 10 ܡܢܬܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܘܠܐ ܡܫܟܚܐ ܕܒܠܥܕ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܒܗ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܢܣܘܐ .  ܕܐܝܟ ܐܝܟܢ . ܓܪܡܛܝܩܘܘܬܐ ܡܕܡ ܒܗ̇ܘ ܡ̇ܢ ܕܣܝܡ ܐܝܬܝܗ̇ ܒܢܦܫܐ ܆ ܥܠ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܕܝܢ ܘܠܐ ܕܐܢܫ ܡܬܐܡܪܐ .  ܘܚܘܪܐ ܡܕܡ ܒܗ̇ܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܡ̇ܢ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܒܓܘܫܡܐ ܆ܥܠ ܓܘܢܐ ܓܝܪ ܒܓܘܫܡܐ ܆ ܥܠ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܝܢ ܕܣܝܡ ܘܠܐ ܕܡܕܡ ܡܬܐܡܪܐ ܀  ܗܠܝܢ ܕܝܢ ܥܠ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܡܬܐܡܪܝܢ ܘܒܗ̇ܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܐܝܬܝܗܘܢ .  ܕܐܝܟ ܐܝܟܢ . ܝܕܥܬܐ ܒܗ̇ܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܡ̇ܢ ܐܝܬܝܗ̇ ܒܢܦܫܐ ܆ ܥܠ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܝܢ ܕܣܝܡ ܡܬܐܡܪܐ ܥܠ ܓܪܡܛܝܩܘܬܐ .  ܗܠܝܢ ܕܝܢ ܘܠܐ ܒܗ̇ܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܐܝܬܝܗܘܢ ܘܠܐ ܥܠ ı ܗ̇ܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܡܬܐܡܪܝܢ . ܕܐܝܟ ܐܝܟܢ . ܐܢܫ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܘܣܘܣܝܐ ܡܕܡ .   ܘܠܐ ܡܕܡ ܓܝܪ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܐܝܟ ܗܠܝܢ ܘܠܐ ܒܗ̇ܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܐܝܬܝܗܘܢ ܘܠܐ ܥܠ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܡܬܐܡܪܝܢ .  ܦܫܝܛܐܝܬ ܕܝܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܐܛܘ̈ܡܐ ܘܕܒܡܢܝܢܐ ܘܠܐ ܥܠ ܚܕ ܡܕܡ ܕܣܝܡ ܡܬܐܡܪܝܢ ܆ܒܗ̇ܘ ܕܝܢ ܕܣܝܡ ܚܕ̈ܚܕܢܐ ܘܠܐ ܡܕܡ ܟ̇ܠܐ ܕܢܗܘܘܢ .  ܓܪܡܛܝܩܘܬܐ ܓܝܪ ܡܕܡ ܒܗ̇ܘ ܡ̇ܢ ܕܣܝܡ ܐܝܬܝܗ̇ ܒܢܦܫܐ ܆ ܥܠ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܝܢ ܕܣܝܡ ܘܠܐ ܕܡܕܡ ܡܬܐܡܪܐ ܀ ܀ 
الموجودات منها ما يقال على موضوع ما وليست البتة في موضوع ما  كقولك ' الإنسان فقد يقال على إنسان ما وليس هو البتة في موضوع ما  ومنها ما هو في موضوع وليست تقال أصلا على موضوع  وأعني ' بقولي في موضوع الموجود في شيء لا كجزء منه وليس يمكن أن يكون قوامه ' من غير الذي هو فيه  ومثال ذلك نحو ما فإنه في موضوع أي ' في النفس وليس يقال أصلا على موضوع  وبياض ما هو في موضوع أي ' في الجسم إذ كان كل لون في جسم وليس يقال البتة على موضوع ما  ومنها ما يقال على موضوع ما وهي أيضا في موضوع  ومثال ذلك العلم ' فإنه في موضوع أي في النفس ويقال على موضوع أي الكتابة  ومنها ما ليست هي في موضوع ولا تقال على موضوع ومثال ذلك إنسان ما ' أو فرس ما  فإنه ليس شيء من ذلك وما يجري مجراه لا في موضوع ولا يقال على موضوع  وبالجملة الأشخاص والواحد بالعدد لا تقال على موضوع أصلا فأمّا في ' موضوع فليس مانع يمنع أن يكون بعضها موجودا فيه  فإن كتابة ما هي من التي في ' موضوع أي في النفس وليست تقال على موضوع أصلا 
8. DE UNIUERSALI SUBSTANTIA.
Eorum quȩ sunt . alia de subiecto quodam dicuntur . in subiecto uero nullo sunt. Súmelîchiu dero uuésentôn díngo . uuérdent kespróchen fóne demo únderen . tíu dóh nesínt án demo únderen . nóh ín demo únderen. 
Ut homo de subiecto quidem aliquo homine dicitur . in subiecto uero nullo est. Álso ménnisko gespróchen uuírdit fóne demo únderen . ételichemo ménnisken . án démo ér dóh neíst. Uniuersales substantiȩ . dîe in grammatica sínt appellatiuȩ speciei . dîe uuérdent kespróchen fóne singularibus substantiis . tîe áber propriae speciei sínt. Uuér uuíssî uuáz homo uuâre . âne uóne cicerone cantone uuarrone . tîe únder démo námen sínt? Fóne dîen uuírdit homo gespróchen. Áber án ín . nemág ér sîn. Uuîo mág homo sîn in cicerone? Ér íst sélbêr homo. Fóne díu íst proprium uniuersalis substantiȩ de subjecto dici . in subiecto nullo esse. 

9. DE PARTICULARI ACCIDENTE.
Alia autem in subiecto quidem sunt . de subiecto uero nullo dicuntur. ' Táragágene sínt ánderliu . díu ána álde ín demo únderen sínt . s. uuánda síu accidentia sínt . únde uóne únderôrên gespróchen nesínt . s. uuánda síu sínt sélben diu únderôsten. 
In subiecto autem esse dico . quod cum in aliquo sit . non sicut quȩdam pars . inpossibile est esse sine eo in quo est. Faciloir constructio est. Dico autem esse in subiecto quod in aliquo sit . cum tamen non sit sicut quedam pars . nec possit esse sine eo in quo est. Íh chído sô uuésen án demo únderen . táz iz târána íst . únde dóh sîn pars neíst . unde íz îo nîenêr uuésen nemág . nóh sîn nîeht neíst . âne daz úndera.  Ut quȩdam grammatica in subiecto quidem est in anima . de subiecto uero nullo dicitur. Álso éines mánnis grammatica íst in sînero sêlo . únde dóh fóne íro gespróchen neuuírdit. Sláh ten ást ába demo bóume . dés pars er íst . nóh tánne mág er sîn . ním animȩ aristarchi íro grammaticam . sô neíst sî niener . uuánda sî âna sîa uuésen nemág. Ánderiu mág sîn . tísiu íst zeirgángen.  Et quoddam album in subiecto est in corpore. Omnis enim color in corpore est. Unde éin uuîz fáruua íst án ételîchemo dínge . sô alle uárauua sínt. Fóne díu íst kelâzen éinlúzzên accentibus . án éinlúzzên substantiis uuésen . náls áber dóh fóne dîen gespróchen uuérden. ' 

10. DE UNIUERSALI ACCIDENTE.
Alia uero et de subiecto dicuntur . et in subiecto sunt. Ánderiu sínt kespróchen fóne demo únderin . s. uuánda síu uniuersalia sínt . unde sínt óuh ána . álde ín demo únderen . s. uuánda sie accidentia sínt. 
Ut scientia in subiecto quidem est in anima . de subiecto uero dicitur . ut de grammatica. Álso scientia in anima íst íro stûole . únde áber gespróchen uuírdit . fóne grammatica . tíu únder íro námen stât. Taz éina subiectum trégit sîa . ut scientiam anima tregit. Daz ánder óuget sîa . ut grammatica scientiam. Táz íst proprium uniuersalis accidentis. Uuâr máhti iz sîn âne in substantia? Uuér máhti iz uuízen . âne uóne sînen speciebus . tíu úndertân sínt sînemo námin? álso óuh sélbên dien speciebus áber úndertân sínt íro indiuidua.  11. DE PATICULARI SUBSTANTIA. Alia uero nec in subiecto sunt . nec de subiecto predicuntur. Áber dáragágene súmelîchiu . tíudir nesínt án demo únderen . s. uuánda síu sínt substantiȩ . nóh óuh kespróchen fóne dehéinemo íro únderen . s. uuánda síu particularia sínt . únde sélben díu únderôsten sínt. Ut aliqui homo . uel equus. Álso éin mán . álde éin rós.  Nihil horum neque in subiecto est . neque de subiecto dicitur . i. téro éinlúzzôn substantiarum . neíst nehéin lígnde án demo únderen . nóh kespróchen fóne demo únderen.

12. ITEM DE PRECENTIBUS QVATVOR
' Nû sínt in uîeriu getéilt . tíu ér nóh uuíle téilen in zêeniu Téro sínt zuéi uuídeuuártîg . i. uniuersalis substantia . et particulare accidens . únde áber ánderiu zuéi . i. uniuersale accidens . et particularis substantia. 


13. PARTICULARIA QUID COMMUNE HABEANT ET NON COMMUNE.
Simpliciter autem quȩ sunt indiuidua . et numero singularia . de nullo subiecto dicuntur. Tíu éinluzziu sínt . sô aristarchus íst . unde sîn grammatica . tíu neuuérdent kespróchen uóne demo únderen . tâz íst ín geméine . síu sínt sélben díu únderôsten. In subiecto autem nihil ea prohibet esse. Íro súmelîh mág áber án demo únderen sîn . náls áber dóh álliu. Târána sínt siu geskéiden. Uuéliu sint táz? Tie einlúzzen substantiȩ nemúgen iz sîn sô aristarchus íst . íz sínt tíu éinlúzzen accidentia . álso sîn grammatica íst. Uuélez íst táz úndera . án démo síu sínt? Táz sínt tie substntiȩ. Tiu éinlúzzen accidentia . lígent án dîen unde ín dîen éinlúzzên substantiis. Accidens nemág in accidente nîeht lígen . íz líget îo in substantia. Ideo sequitur. 
Quȩdam enim grammatica . s. ut aristarchi . est in subiecto . i. in anima eius. Hábet óuh uniuersale accidens . sô scientia íst . under íro particularia accidentia sô grammatica íst . unde rhetorica . án dîen nelíget sî nîeht . sî uuírdet áber geméinlicho gespróchen uóne ín. ' 
Of things there are: (a) some are said of a subject but are not in any subject.  For example, man is said of a subject, the individual man, but is not in any subject.  (b) Some are in a subject but are not said of any subject.  (By ‘in a subject’ I mean what is in something, not as a part, and cannot exist separately from what it is in.)  For example, the individual knowledge-of-grammar is in a subject, the soul, but is not said of any subject;  and the individual white is in a subject, the body (for all colour is in a body), but is not said of any subject.  (c) Some are both said of a subject and in a subject.  For example, knowledge is in a subject, the soul, and is also said of a subject, knowledge-of-grammar.  (d) Some are neither in a subject nor said of a subject, for example, the individual man or the individual horse  — for nothing of this sort is either in a subject or said of a subject.  Things that are individual and numerically one are, without exception, not said of any subject, but there is nothing to prevent some of them from being in a subject  —the individual knowledge-of-grammar is one of the things in a subject. 
(10) Ὅταν ἕτερον καθ’ ἑτέρου κατηγορῆται ὡς καθ’ ὑποκει(11)μένου, ὅσα κατὰ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου λέγεται, πάντα καὶ (12) κατὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ῥηθήσεται·  οἷον ἄνθρωπος κατὰ τοῦ τι(13)νὸς ἀνθρώπου κατηγορεῖται, τὸ δὲ ζῷον κατὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου· (14)  οὐκοῦν καὶ κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου τὸ ζῷον κατηγορηθήσε(15)ται· ὁ γὰρ τὶς ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι καὶ ζῷον. 
ը Յորժամ ա՛յլ զայլմէ ստորոգիցի. իբր զենթայկայէ։ որքան միանգամ զստորոգիցելոյն ասի ամենայն և զենթակայէ՛ն ճառեսցի  ո՛րզան։ մարդն, զումեմնէ մարդո՛յ ստորոգի։ իսկ կենդանին, զմարդո՛յն:  ապա ուրեմն, և զումեմնէ մարդոյն, կենդանի՛ն ստորոգեսցի։ քանզի ո՛մն և մարդ և կենդանի: 
(3,1) Quando alterum de altero praedicatur ut de subiecto, quaecumque de (2) eo quod praedicatur dicuntur, omnia etiam de subiecto dicentur,  ut (3) homo de quodam homine praedicatur, animal uero de homine,  ergo et de (4) quodam homine animal praedicabitur; quidam enim homo et homo est et (5) animal. 
ܐܡܬܝ ܕܐܚܪܢܐ ܥܠ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܐܝܟ ܕܥܠ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܡܬܩܛܪܓ ܆ ܟܠܗܝܢ ܐܝܠܝܢ ܕܥܠ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܡܬܩܛܪܓ ܡܬܐܡܪܢ ܆ ܟܠܗܝܢ ܘܥܠ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܡܬܐܡܪܢ .  ܕܐܝܟ ܐܝܟܢ . ܒܪܢܫܐ ܥܠ ܐܢܫ ܒܪܐܢܫܐ ܡܬܩܛܪܓ ܆ ܚܘܬܐ ܕܝܢ ܥܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ .   ܡܕܝܢ ܘܥܠ ܐܢܫ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܬܬܩܛܪܓ ܚܘܬܐ . ܐܢܫ ܓܝܪ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܘܒܪܢܫܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܘܚܝܘܬܐ ܐܝܬܘܢܝ ܀ 
متى حمل شيء على شيء حمل المحمول ' على الموضوع قيل كل ما يقال على المحمول على الموضوع أيضا  مثال ذلك ' أن الإنسان يحمل على إنسان ما ويحمل على الإنسان حيوان  فيجب أن يكون الحيوان ' على إنسان ما أيضا محمولا فإن إنسانا ما هو إنسان وهو حيوان 
14. QUOD SUPERIORA TRIBUANT NOMEN SUUM INFERIORIBUS.
Quando alterum de altero praedicatur . ut de subiecto quȩcumque de eo quod predicatur dicuntur . omnia etiam de subiecto dicuntur. Sô daz éina gespróchen uuírdet fóne demo ánderen . álso îo daz óbera tûot fóne sînemo únderen . souuáz tánne fóne demo óberen gespróchen uuírdet . táz uuírdet sâr gespróchen fóne demo únderen. 
Ut homo . s. daz óbera predicatur de quodam homine . i. aristarcho . demo únderen. Fóne demo óberin . i. de homine uuírdet kespróchen animal.  Ergo et de quodam homine animal predicatur. Sâr fóne demo únderen . i. aristarcho . uuírdet óuh animal gespróchen. Quidam enim homo . et homo est et animal. Aristarchus íst péidiu homo ióh animal. Sô gíbet îo daz óbere sînen námen demo únderen . fóne démo iz kespróchen uuírdet. 
Whenever one thing is predicated of another as of a subject, all things said of what is predicated will be said of the subject also.  For example, man is predicated of the individual man, and animal of man;  so animal will be predicated of the individual man also — for the individual man is both a man and an animal. 
(16) τῶν ἑτερογενῶν καὶ μὴ ὑπ’ ἄλληλα τεταγμένων ἕτεραι (17) τῷ εἴδει καὶ αἱ διαφοραί, οἷον ζῴου καὶ ἐπιστήμης·  (18) ζῴου μὲν γὰρ διαφοραὶ τό τε πεζὸν καὶ τὸ πτηνὸν καὶ τὸ (19) ἔνυδρον καὶ τὸ δίπουν, ἐπιστήμης δὲ οὐδεμία τούτων·  οὐ γὰρ (20) διαφέρει ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης τῷ δίπους εἶναι. 
թ Յայլոց սեռիցն, և ո՛չ ընդ միմեամբք դասեցելոցն։ ա՛յլք տեսակքն, և տարբերութի՛ւնքն: ո՛րզան։ կենդանւոյ’ և մակացութե՛ան:  քանզի կենդանւոյն տարբերութի՛ւնքն, հետևա՛կըն, և երկոտանի՛ն, և թռչո՛ւնն, և ‘ղուղա՛կն է: Իսկ մակացութեանն, և ո՛չ մի՛ ինչ յա՛յսցանէ:  քանզի ո՛չ տարբերի. մակացութիւն ի մակացութենէ. երկոտանի՛ գոլ։ 
(6) Diuersorum generum et non subalternatim positorum diuersae secundum (7) speciem et differentiae sunt, ut animalis et scientiae;  animalis (8) quidem differentiae sunt ut gressibile et uolatile et bipes, scientiae (9) uero nulla harum est;  neque enim scientia ab scientia differt in eo (10) quod bipes est. 
ܐܚܪ̈ܢܝܝ ܓܢ̈ܣܐ ܘܕܠܘ ܬܚܝܬ ܚܕ̈ܕܐ ܡܛܟܣܝܢ ܐܚܪ̈ܢܐ ܒܐܕ̈ܫܐ ܘܫܘܚ̈ܠܦܐ ܆ ܐܝܟ ܕܚܝܘܬܐ ܘܕܝܕܥܬܐ .  ܕܚܝܘܬܐ ܡ̇ܢ ܓܝܪ ܫܘ̈ܚܠܦܐ . ܕܐܝܟ ܐܝܟܢ . ܗܠܟܐ ܘܦܪܚܐ ܘܣܚܝܐ ܘܬܪ̈ܝܢܝ ܪ̈ܓܠܐ . ܕܝܕܥܬܐ ܕܝܢ ܘܠܐ ܚܕ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ .  ܠܐ ܓܝܪ ܡܫܚܠܦܐ ܝܕܥܬܐ ܡܢ ܝܕܥܬܐ ܒܗ̇ܝ ܕܬܪܝܢܬ ܪ̈ܓܠܐ ܐܝܬܝܗ̇ .  
الأجناس المختلفة ' التي ليس بعضها مرتبا تحت بعض فإن فصولها أيضا في النوع مختلفة  من ذلك ' أن فصول الحيوان كقولك المشاء والطائر وذو الرجلين والسابح وفصول العلم ' ليست شيئا من هذه  فإنه ليس يخالف علم علما بأنه ذو رجلين 
15. QUOD DUERSA GENERA . DIUERSAS HABEANT DIFFERENTIAS.
Diuersorum generum et non subalternatim positorum . diuersȩ secundum speciem et differentiȩ sunt. Mísselîchero generum unde díu óbe éinên ánderên nestânt . sínt sámomísselîche skídunga . nâh íro specie . s. dáz sie uuúrchint. Ut animalis et scientiȩ . s. mísselîche skídunga sínt. 
Animalis quidem differentiȩ sunt . ut gressibile uolatile. Animalia sínt keskéiden . án díu . dáz íro súmelichiu ' múgen gân . súmelichiu ulîgen. Scientiȩ uero . s. differentiȩ nulla horum est. Mít tîen man skéidet scientiam . táz sínt ándere skídunga . náls tíse.  Neque enim scientia ab scientia differt in eo quod bipes est. Nóh éin scientia neíst ánderro an díu nîeht úngelîh dáz sî zuíbeine sî. 
The differentiae of genera which are different and not subordinate one to the other are themselves different in kind. For example, animal and knowledge:  footed, winged, aquatic, twofooted, are differentiae of animal, but none of these is a differentia of knowledge;  one sort of knowledge does not differ from another by being two-footed. 
τῶν δέ γε (21) ὑπ’ ἄλληλα γενῶν οὐδὲν κωλύει τὰς αὐτὰς διαφορὰς εἶναι·  (22) τὰ γὰρ ἐπάνω τῶν ὑπ’ αὐτὰ γενῶν κατηγορεῖται, ὥστε (23) ὅσαι τοῦ κατηγορουμένου διαφοραί εἰσι τοσαῦται καὶ τοῦ (24) ὑποκειμένου ἔσονται. 
իսկ ըմդ միմեա՛մբքն սեռից, ո՛չ ինչ է արգել նո՛յնք տարբերութիւնք գոլ։  քանզի իվերոյքն զընդինքեամբք սեռիցն ստորոգի՛ն։ մինչ զի որքանք, ստորոգիցելոյն տրամաբերութի՛ւնքըն եմ, ա՛յսքանք և ենթայկայի՛ն եղիցի: 
Subalternorum uero generum nihil prohibet easdem esse (11) differentias;  superiora enim de subterioribus generibus praedicantur, (12) quare quaecumque praedicati differentiae fuerint, eaedem erunt etiam (13) subiecti. 
ܕܗܠܝܢ ܕܝܢ ܓܢ̈ܣܐ ܕܬܚܝܬ ܚܕ̈ܕܐ ܘܠܐ ܡܕܡ ܟ̇ܠܐ ܕܗܢܘܢ ܟܕ ܗܢܘܢ ܫܘܚ̈ܠܦܐ ܢܗܘܘܢ .  ܗܠܝܢ ܓܝܪ ܕܠܥܠ ܕܗܠܝܢ ܓܢ̈ܣܐ ܕܬܚܘܬܝܗܘܢ ܡܬܩܛܪܓܝܢ . ܡܕܝܢ ܟܠܗܘܢ ܫܘܚ̈ܠܦܐ ܕܗ̈ܘ ܕܡܬܩܛܪܓ ܐܝܬܝܗܘܢ ܆ ܗ̣ܘ ܗܟܘܬ ܘܕܗ̇ܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܢܣܘܘܢ ܀ 
فأما الأجناس التي بعضها تحت بعض فليس مانع يمنع من أن تكون فصول بعضها فصول بعض بأعيانها  فإن الفصول التي هي أعلى تحمل أعلى الأجناس التي تحتها حتى تكون جميع فصول الجنس ' المحمول هي بأعيانها فصول الجنس الموضوع 
Subalternorum uero generum . nihil prohibet easdem esse differentias. Óbe éinên ánderên stântero generum . múgen uuóla sîn éine diferentiȩ . sîe mág man gelîcho skídôn.  Superiora enim . de subterioribus generibus predicantur. Táz íst fóne díu . uuánda diu óberen genera gespróchen uuérdint fóne dîen níderên. Substantia íst taz óbera genus . animal íst taz nídera. Fóne animali chídit mán substantia. Quare quȩcumque predicati differentiȩ fuerint . eȩdem etiam erunt subiecti. Pe díu sínt álle dîe skídunga des óberin generis . skídunga des níderen . úbe sie specificiȩ sínt . i. úbe sie specium uuúrchen múgen . sô díe sínt rationale mortale. Tíe sínt tis predicati . i. substantiȩ . tíe sínt óuh tés de quo predicati . i. animalis. Álso súmelîh substantia íst rationalis mortalis . sô íst óuh súmelîh animal rationale mortale. Ándere differentiȩ sínt . tîe diuisiue héizent . tîe nedúrhkânt nîeht fóne demo óberin genere . ze demo ní'derin. Uuánda animal unde auis . sínt óuh subalterna genera. Animalis differentiȩ sínt rationale et inrationale . táz íst taz óbera . tîe nesínt tes níderin . i. auis . uuánda nehéin auis neíst ándermo úngelîh án díu . dáz er rationale sî. 
However, there is nothing to prevent genera subordinate one to the other from having the same differentiae.  For the higher are predicated of the genera below them, so that all differentiae of the predicated genus will be differentiae of the subject also. 
(25) Τῶν κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων ἕκαστον ἤτοι (26) οὐσίαν σημαίνει ἢ ποσὸν ἢ ποιὸν ἢ πρός τι ἢ ποὺ ἢ ποτὲ ἢ (27) κεῖσθαι ἢ ἔχειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν.  ἔστι δὲ οὐσία μὲν ὡς (28) τύπῳ εἰπεῖν οἷον ἄνθρωπος, ἵππος·  ποσὸν δὲ οἷον δίπηχυ, (29) τρίπηχυ·  ποιὸν δὲ οἷον λευκόν, γραμματικόν·  πρός τι δὲ (2a1) οἷον διπλάσιον, ἥμισυ, μεῖζον·  ποὺ δὲ οἷον ἐν Λυκείῳ, ἐν (2) ἀγορᾷ·  ποτὲ δὲ οἷον χθές, πέρυσιν·  κεῖσθαι δὲ οἷον ἀνάκειται, (3) κάθηται·  ἔχειν δὲ οἷον ὑποδέδεται, ὥπλισται·  ποιεῖν δὲ οἷον (4) τέμνειν, καίειν·  πάσχειν δὲ οἷον τέμνεσθαι, καίεσθαι.  ἕκα(5)στον δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων αὐτὸ μὲν καθ’ αὑτὸ ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ κατα(6)φάσει λέγεται, τῇ δὲ πρὸς ἄλληλα τούτων συμπλοκῇ (7) κατάφασις γίγνεται·  ἅπασα γὰρ δοκεῖ κατάφασις ἤτοι (8) ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδὴς εἶναι, τῶν δὲ κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμ(9)πλοκὴν λεγομένων οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε ψεῦδός ἐστιν,  (10) οἷον ἄνθρωπος, λευκόν, τρέχει, νικᾷ. 
ժ Իսկ յա՛յնցանէ, որ և ո՛չ ըստ միում շարամանութեան ասացեա՛լ են, իւրաքանչի՛ւրոք, կամ գոյացութիւն նշանակէ; կամ որա՛կ։ կամքանա՛կ: կամ առի՛նչ: կամ ո՛ւր։ կամ ե՛րբ: կամ կա՛լ: կամ ունե՛լ։ կամ առնե՛լ։ կամ կրել:  և է՛ գոյացութիւնն, իբրու գաղափարաւ’ ասել; ո՛րզան։ մա՛րգ։ ձի՛։  իսկ քանակ; իբրու’ թե երկկանկո՛ւն, եռականգո՛ւն:  և որակ: ո՛րզան։ սպիտ՛կ. քերակա՛ն:   և առինչ, ո՛րզան։ երկպատիկ, կէս, մեծամեծ։  և ո՛ւր: ո՛րզան։ 110 ղ’իկիայ։ ներաստում։  և երք հի՛զան; երէկ։ հերու։  և կա՛լ։ ո՛րզան։ ըլկոլմնեա՛լ է։ նստի՛։  և ո՛ւնել։ հիզան։ ըստիմանի՛։ զինի՛:  և առնե՛լ: ո՛րզան։ հատանե՛լ։ այրե՛լ։  և կրե՛լ։ հի՛զան։ հատանի՛լ։ այրի՛լ:  և իվրաքանչիւրոք յասիցելոցս, ի՛նքն ըստ ինքեան։ և ո՛չ աստ միում ստորասութեամ. կամ բացասութեան ասի։ բայց առ միմեա՛նսն, սոցա՛յց շարամանութեանբ ստորասութիւն. և կամ բացասութիւն լինի։  քանզի ամենա՛յն թուի ստորասութիվն. և բացասութիւն, ճշմարի՛տ, և կամ սո՛ւտ գոլ: իսկ յայնցանէ, որք և ոչ ըստ միում շարամանութեանն ասացեալքն են։ ո՛չ ինչ։ ո՛չ ճշմարիտ, և ո՛չ սուտ է։  որպէս մա՛րդ։ սպիտա՛կ։ ընթանա՛յ։ յաղթէ։ 
(4,1) Eorum quae secundum nullam complexionem dicuntur singulum aut (2) substantiam significat aut quantitatem aut qualitatem aut ad aliquid (3) aut ubi aut quando aut situm aut habitum aut facere aut pati.  Est (4) autem substantia quidem ut figuratim dicatur ut homo, equus;  quantitas (5) ut bicubitum, tricubitum;  qualitas ut album;  ad aliquid ut duplum, (6) maius;  ubi uero ut in Lycio;  quando autem ut heri;  situs uero ut (7) sedet, iacet;  habere autem ut calciatus, armatus;  facere uero ut (8) secare, urere;  pati uero ut secari, uri.  Singula igitur eorum quae (9) dicta sunt ipsa quidem secundum se in nulla affirmatione dicuntur, (10) horum autem ad se inuicem complexione affirmatio fit.  Videtur enim (11) omnis affirmatio uel falsa esse uel uera; eorum autem quae secundum (12) nullam complexionem dicuntur neque uerum quicquam neque falsum est,  ut (13) homo, album, currit. 
ܕܗܠܝܢ ܕܐܦ ܠܐ ܒܚܕ ܥܘܪܙܠܐ ܡܬܐܡܪܝܢ ܟܠܚܕ ܐܘ ܐܘܣܝܐ ܡܫܘܕܥ ܐܘ ܟܡܐ ܐܘ ܐܝܢܐ ܐܘ ܠܘܬ ܡܕܡ ܐܘ ܐܝܟܐ ܐܘ ܐܡܬܝ ܐܘ ܣܝܡ ı ܐܘ ܐܝܬ ܠܗ ܐܘ ܥܒ̇ܕ ܐܘ ܚ̇ܐܫ .   ܐܝܬܝܗ̇ ܕܝܢ ܐܘܣܝܐ ܡ̇ܢ ܐܝܟ ܕܒܛܘܦܣܐ 11 ܠܡܐܡܪ ܕܐܝܟ ܐܝܟܢ ܆ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܣܘܣܝܐ .  ܟܡܐ ܕܝܢ ܕܐܝܟ ܐܝܟܢ . ܬܪܬܝܢ ܐܡ̈ܐ ܬܠܬ ܐܡ̈ܐ .  ܐܝܢܐ ܕܝܢ ܆ ܕܐܝܟ ܐܝܟܐ . ܚܘܪܐ ܓܪܡܛܝܩܘܢ .  ܠܘܬ ܡܕܡ ܕܝܢ ܆ ܕܐܝܟ ܐܝܟܢ . ܥܦܐ ܐܘ ܦܠܓܐ . ܒܪܐ ܐܘ ܐܒܐ . ܪܒܐ ܐܘ ܙܥܘܪܐ .  ܐܝܟܐ ܕܝܢ ܆ ܕܐܝܟ ܐܝܟܢ . ܒܠܘܩܝܣ .  ܐܡܬܝ ܕܝܢ ܆ ܕܐܝܟ ܐܝܟܢ . ܐܬܡܠܝ ܐܫܬܩܕ .  ܣܝܡ ܕܝܢ ܆ ܕܐܝܟ ܐܝܟܢ . ܡܓܣ ܝܬ̇ܒ .   ܐܝܬ ܠܗ ܕܝܢ ܆ ܕܐܝܟ ܐܝܟܢ . ܣܐܝܢ ܡܙܝܢ .  ܥܒ̇ܕ ܕܝܢ . ܕܐܝܟ ܐܝܟܢ . ܦܣ̇ܩ ܡܘܩܕ .  ܚܐٍܫ ܕܝܢ ܕܐܝܟ . ܡܬܦܣܩ ܝܩ̇ܕ .  ܟܠܚܕ ܕܝܢ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܐܡܝܪܝܢ ܗ̣ܘ ܡ̇ܢ ܡܢܗ ܘܠܗ ܘܠܐ ܒܚܕܐ ܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܡܬܐܡܪ ܆ ܒܥܘܪܙܠܐ ܕܝܢ ܕܗܠܝܢ ܕܠܘܬ ܚܕܕ̈ܐ ܗܘ̇ܝܐ ܩܛܦܣܝܣ .  ܟܠ ܓܝܪ ܩܛܦܣܝܣ ܡܣܬܒܪܐ ܕܐܘ ܫܪܝܪܬܐ ܐܘ ܕܓܠܬܐ . ܕܗܠܝܢ ܕܝܢ ܕܐܦ ܠܐ ܒܚܕܐ ܡܥܪܙܠܘܬܐ ܡܬܐܡܪܝܢ ܘܠܐ ܚܕ ܘܠܐ ܫܪܝܪܐ ܘܠܐ ܕܓܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܢ .  ܕܐܝܟ ܐܝܟܢ ܆ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܚܘܪܐ ܪܗ̇ܛ ܀ 
§كل واحد التي تقال بغير تأليف ' أصلا فقد يدل إما على جوهر وإما على كم وإما على كيف وإما على إضافة ' وإما على أين وإما على متى وإما على موضوع وإما على أن يكون له وإما ' على يفعل وإما على ينفعل  فالجوهر على طريق المثال كقولك إنسان فرس  والكم كقولك ذو ذراعين ذو ثلث أذرع  والكيف كقولك أبيض ' كاتب  والإضافة كقولك ضعف نصف  وأين كقولك في لوقين ' في السوق  ومتى كقولك أمس عاما أول  وموضوع كقولك متكئ جالس  وأن يكون له كقولك منتعل متسلح  ويفعل كقولك يقطع يحرق  وينفعل ' كقولك ينقطع يحترق  وكل واحد من هذه التي ذكرت إذا قيل ' مفردا على حياله فلم يقل بإيجاب ولا بسلب أصلا لكن بتأليف بعض هذه إلى بعض ' تحدث الموجبة أو السالبة  فإن كل موجبة أو سالبة يظن أنها إما صادقة وإما ' كاذبة والتي تقال بغير تأليف أصلا فليس منها شيء لا صادقا ولا كاذبا  ومثال ذلك إنسان أبيض يحضر يظفر 
16. QUOT GENERALISSIMAS SIGNIFICATIONES . HABEANT SINGULȨ UOCES.
Singulum eorum quȩ secundum nullam complexionem dicuntur . aut substantiam significat aut quantitatem . aut qualitatem aut ad aliquid aut ubi . aut quando . aut situm . aut habitum . aut facere . aut pati. Álliu éinlúzzíu uuórt . pezéichenent ételîh tírro genámdôn zêeno . i. uuáz iz sî . uuîo míchel . uuîolîh . ze éteuuiu . uuâre . uuénne . kelégnî . ánahábid . tûon dólên. 
Est autem substantia quidem ut figuraliter dicatur ut homo equus. Substantia íst specialiter zeságenne . ménnisco únde rós.  Quantitas . ut bicubitum . tricubitum . zuéiélnîg trîélnîg.  Qualitas ut album.  Ad aliquid ut duplum.  Ubi ut in loco.  Quando autem ut heri.  Situs ut sedet iacet.  Habere ut calciatus armatus.  Facere uero ut secare urere.  Pati ut secari, uri. Tíz sínt generalissima genera . i. tíu érchenôstin genera . tísiu sínt tíu óberôstin . tísiu sínt écchert genera. tíu únder ín sínt . tíu múgin béidiu sîn genra ióh species. Tísiu zêeniu stîez ér beuóre ze uîren. Uuéliu sínt ' tíu uîeriu? Substantia . accidens . uniuersale . particulare. 

17. QUID HȨC SINGULA CONIUNCTA SIGNIFICENT.
Singula igitur eorum quȩ dicta sunt . ipsa quidem secundum se in nulla affirmatione dicuntur. Tísiu díu nû genémmet sínt . tíu netûont túrh síh éinlúzziu nehéina uéstenúnga. Horum autem ad se inuicem complexione affirmatio fit. Áber uóne ín zesámene gelégetên . uuírdet féstenunga. 
Uidetur enim omnis affirmatio uel falsa esse uel uera. Álliu uéstenunga sól be nôte sîn . lúkkiu álde uuâriu. Eorum autem quȩ secundum nullam complexionem dicuntur . neque uerum quicquam . neque falsum est. Tíu áber súnderîgo gespróchen uuérdent . tíu nesínt uuâr nóh lúgi.  Ut homo album currit. Únz hára ságeta ér geméinlîcho uóne állên predicamentis nû ságet er uóne demo êristin . dáz íst substantia . únde uóne íro skídungo. 
Of things said without any combination, each signifies either substance or quantity or qualification or a relative or where or when or being-in-a-position or having or doing or being-affected.  To give a rough idea, examples of substance are man, horse;  of quantity: four-foot, fivefoot;  of qualification: white, grammatical;  of a relative: double, half, larger;  of where: in the Lyceum, in the market-place;  of when: yesterday, last-year;  of being-in-a-position: is-lying, is-sitting;  of having: has-shoes-on, has-armour-on;  of doing: cutting, burning;  of being-affected: being-cut, being-burned.  None of the above is said just by itself in any affirmation, but by the combination of these with one another an affirmation is produced.  For every affirmation, it seems, is either true or false; but of things said without any combination none is either true or false  (e.g. man, white, runs, wins). 
(11) Οὐσία δέ ἐστιν ἡ κυριώτατά τε καὶ πρώτως καὶ μάλι(12)στα λεγομένη, ἣ μήτε καθ’ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται (13) μήτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τινί ἐστιν,  οἷον ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος ἢ ὁ τὶς (14) ἵππος.  δεύτεραι δὲ οὐσίαι λέγονται, ἐν οἷς εἴδεσιν αἱ πρώ(15)τως οὐσίαι λεγόμεναι ὑπάρχουσιν, ταῦτά τε καὶ τὰ τῶν (16) εἰδῶν τούτων γένη·  οἷον ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος ἐν εἴδει μὲν ὑπάρ(17)χει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, γένος δὲ τοῦ εἴδους ἐστὶ τὸ ζῷον·  δεύ(18)τεραι οὖν αὗται λέγονται οὐσίαι, οἷον ὅ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ (19) τὸ ζῷον.  —φανερὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι τῶν καθ’ ὑπο(20)κειμένου λεγομένων ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τοὔνομα καὶ τὸν λόγον (21) κατηγορεῖσθαι τοῦ ὑποκειμένου·  οἷον ἄνθρωπος καθ’ ὑπο(22)κειμένου λέγεται τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου, καὶ κατηγορεῖταί γε (23) τοὔνομα, —τὸν γὰρ ἄνθρωπον κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου κατηγο(24)ρήσεις·  — καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀν(25)θρώπου κατηγορηθήσεται, —ὁ γὰρ τὶς ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄνθρω(26)πός ἐστιν·  — ὥστε καὶ τοὔνομα καὶ ὁ λόγος κατὰ τοῦ (27) ὑποκειμένου κατηγορηθήσεται.  τῶν δ’ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὄντων (28) ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν πλείστων οὔτε τοὔνομα οὔτε ὁ λόγος κατηγο(29)ρεῖται τοῦ ὑποκειμένου·  ἐπ’ ἐνίων δὲ τοὔνομα μὲν οὐδὲν κω(30)λύει κατηγορεῖσθαι τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, τὸν δὲ λόγον ἀδύ(31)νατον·  οἷον τὸ λευκὸν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὂν τῷ σώματι κατη(32)γορεῖται τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, —λευκὸν γὰρ σῶμα λέγεται,—  ὁ (33) δὲ λόγος τοῦ λευκοῦ οὐδέποτε κατὰ τοῦ σώματος κατηγορη(34)θήσεται.  —τὰ δ’ ἄλλα πάντα ἤτοι καθ’ ὑποκειμένων λέγε(35)ται τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἢ ἐν ὑποκειμέναις αὐταῖς ἐστίν.  τοῦτο (36) δὲ φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα προχειριζομένων·  οἷον τὸ (37) ζῷον κατὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατηγορεῖται, οὐκοῦν καὶ κατὰ (38) τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου,  —εἰ γὰρ κατὰ μηδενὸς τῶν τινῶν (2b1) ἀνθρώπων, οὐδὲ κατὰ ἀνθρώπου ὅλως·  — πάλιν τὸ χρῶμα (2) ἐν σώματι, οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν τινὶ σώματι· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐν (3) τινὶ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα, οὐδὲ ἐν σώματι ὅλως·  ὥστε τὰ (4) ἄλλα πάντα ἤτοι καθ’ ὑποκειμένων τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν (5) λέγεται ἢ ἐν ὑποκειμέναις αὐταῖς ἐστίν.  μὴ οὐσῶν οὖν (6) τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀδύνατον τῶν ἄλλων τι εἶναι·  πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἄλλα ἤτοι καθ’ ὑποκειμένων τούτων λέγεται ἢ ἐν ὑποκειμέναις αὐταῖς ἐστίν· ὥστε μὴ οὐσῶν τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀδύνατον τῶν ἄλλων τι εἶναι. 
Յալագս գոյացութեան
ա Գոյացութիւն է, որ իսկագո՛յն, և նախկի՛ն, և մանաւանդ ասի։ որ ո՛չ զենթակայէ՛ ումեքէ ասի, ց ո՛չ նենեթակայոջ ումէ՛ք է՛: 
հի՛զան: ոմն մա՛րդ։ կամ ոմն ձի՛։  և երկրորդ գոյացութիւնք ասին նորում տեոակսն նախապէս գոյացութիւնքն ասացեա՛լքան են։ և ա՛յսոքիկ։ և տեսակացն սոցա, սե՛ռք:  ո՛րզան։ ոմն մարդ’ ընտեսակո՛ջ է. ըն մարդո՛ջ։ և սեռ տեսակին, է՛ կենդանի՛ն։  արդ’ երկակի՛ սոքա ասին գոյացունթինք։ ո՛րզան: մա՛րդն և կենդանին:  Պրակք բ
բ Երևելի՛ է յասիցելոցս, զի զենթակայէ՛, հարկաւո՛ր է, և զանո՛ւնն և զեա՛նն ստորոզիլ զենթակայէն։  
հի՛զան։ մարդ զենթակայէ՛ ասի զումեքե՛ մարդոյ, և ստորոգի անո՛ւնն։ 111 քանզի մա՛րդըն. զումենմէ մարդո՛յ ստորոգեսցի։  և բա՛ն մարդոյն. զումեմնէ մարդոյ ստորոգեսցի ։ քանզի ոմն մարդ. և մարդ և կենդանի՛ է:  ապա ուրեմն, և անո՛ւնն և բա՛նն զենթակայէ՛ն ստորոգեսցի:  իսկ նենթակայո՛ջն, եակաց նակաւելեացն, և ո՛չ զանունն, և ո՛չ զբանն ստորոգեցի զենթակայեն։  Իսկ մակ ոմանցն զանունն, ո՛չ ինչ արգելու, ստորոգիլ զենթակայէն։ իսկ զբանն, անկա՛ր:  ո՛րկէն։ ա՛յսինչ սպիտակ, նենթակայո՛ջէ, մարմընի. և ստորոգի՛ զենթակայէն։ քանզի սպիտա՛կ մարմի՛ն ասի։  իսկ բա՛ն սպիտակին, և ո՛չ երբեք ի’ զմարմընոյ ստորոգեսցի։  Իսկ այլքն ամենայն. կամ զենթակայի՛ց ասի. զառաջնոց գոյացութեանցն, եւ նենթակայս ի նոսա՛ է։  և այս երեւելի՛ է ըստ իւրաքանչիւրումեքէ, նախաձեռեցելոյ:  ո՛րզան։ կենդանի՛ զմադո՛յն ստորոգի։ ապա ուրեմն, և զումէքէ՛ մարդոյ:  քանզի ո՛չ եթե զումէքէ ոմանց մարդկան, և ո՛չ զմարդոյ բոլորովին:  գարձեալ’ և գոյն ընմարմնի։ ապա ուրեմն, և յումե՛մն մարդընի։ քանզի եթե ոչն ումեմն իւրաքանչիւրումն, և ո՛չ ընմարմընի բոլորովին:   ապա ուրեմն ա՛յլքն ամենայնք կամ զենթակայից զառաջնոց գոյացութեանցըն ասին, և կամ նենթակայս ի նոսա՛ է:  իսկ յորժամ ո՛չ իցեն առաջին գոյացութիւնքն, անկա՛րէ այլոցն ումեք գոլ:  քանզի ա՛յլքն ամենայն կամ զենթակայից զսոցանէ ասին, և կամ նենթակա՛յս ի սոսայ եմ: 
(5,1) DE SUBSTANTIA: Substantia autem est, quae proprie et principaliter et maxime dicitur, (2) quae neque de subiecto praedicatur neque in subiecto est,  ut aliqui (3) homo uel aliqui equus.  Secundae autem substantiae dicuntur, in quibus (4) speciebus illae quae principaliter substantiae dicuntur insunt, hae et (5) harum specierum genera;  ut aliquis homo in specie quidem est in (6) homine, genus uero speciei animal est;  secundae ergo substantiae (7) dicuntur, ut est homo atque animal.  Manifestum est autem ex his quae (8) dicta sunt quoniam eorum quae de subiecto dicuntur necesse est et (9) nomen et rationem de subiecto praedicari,  ut homo de subiecto dicitur (10) aliquo homine, et praedicatur nomen; namque hominem de aliquo homine (11) praedicabis.  Ratio quoque hominis de aliquo homine praedicabitur; (12) quidam enim homo et homo est.  Quare et nomen et ratio praedicabitur de (13) subiecto.  Eorum uero quae sunt in subiecto, in pluribus quidem neque (14) nomen de subiecto neque ratio praedicatur,  in quibusdam uero nomen (15) quidem nihil prohibet praedicari, rationem uero impossibile est;  ut (16) album, cum in subiecto sit corpore, praedicatur de subiecto (dicitur (17) enim corpus album),  ratio uero albi numquam de corpore (18) praedicabitur.  Caetera uero omnia aut de subiectis dicuntur primis (19) substantiis aut in eisdem subiectis sunt.  Hoc autem manifestum est ex (20) his quae singulatim proferuntur;  ut animal de homine praedicatur, (21) quare et de aliquo homine praedicabitur;  nam si de nullo aliquorum (22) hominum diceretur, nec de ipso homine praedicaretur omnino.  Rursus (23) color in corpore est; ergo et in aliquo corpore; nam si in nullo esset (24) corporum singulorum, nec in corpore esset omnino.  Quocirca caetera (25) omnia aut de subiectis primis substantiis dicuntur aut in subiectis (26) ipsis sunt.  Si ergo primae substantiae non sunt, impossibile est (27) aliquid esse caeterorum.  Omnia enim alia aut de ipsis subiectis (28) dicuntur aut in subiectis ipsis sunt; quare, si primae substantiae non (29) sunt, impossibile est aliquid esse caeterorum. 
ܡܛܠ ܐܘܣܝܐ .... ܩܦܠܐܘܢ ܕܬܪܝܢ
ܐܘܣܝܐ ܕܝܢ ܐܝܬܝܗ̇ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܣܓܝ ܡܪܢܝܬܐ ܘܝܬܪܐܝܬ ܡܬܐܡܪܐ ܆ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܠܐ ܥܠ ܡܕܡ ܕܣܝܡ ܡܬܐܡܪܐ ܘܠܐ ܒܗ̇ܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܐܝܬܝܗ̇ . 
ܕܐܝܟ ܐܝܟܢ . ܐܢܫ ܒܪܐܢܫܐ ܐܘ ܣܘܣܝܐ ܡܕܡ ܀  ܐܘܣܝ̈ܣ ܕܝܢ ܬܪܝܢܝܬܐ ܡܬܐܡܪܢ ܆ ܕܒܗܘܢ ܒܐܕ̈ܫܐ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܐܘܣܝ̈ܣ ܩܕܡܝ̈ܬܐ ܡܬܐܡܪܢ ܐܝܬܝܗܝܢ . ܗܠܝܢ ܕܝܢ ܘܗܠܝܢ ܕܐܕ̈ ܕܗܠܝܢ ܓܢ̈ܣܐ  ܕܐܝܟ ܐܝܟܢ . ܐܢܫ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܒܐܕܫܐ ܡ̇ܢ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܒܒܪܢܫܐ ܆ ܓܢܣܐ ܕܝܢ ܕܐܕܫܐ ܗܢܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܚܝܘܬܐ .   ܬܪܝܢܐܝܬ ܗܟܝܠ ܗܠܝܢ ܡܬܐܡܪܢ ܐܘܣܝ̈ܣ . ܕܐܝܟ ܐܝܟܢ . ܘܒܐܪܢܫܐ ܘܚܝܘܬܐ .  ܓܠܝܐ ı ܗ̣ܝ ܕܝܢ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܐܬܐܡܪ ܆ ܕܕܗܠܝܢ ܕܥܠ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܡܬܐܡܪܝܢ ܆ ܐܢܢܩܐ ܘܕܫܡܐ ܘܡܠܬܐ ܬܬܩܛܪܓ ܥܠ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܣܝܡ .  ܕܐܝܟ ܐܝܟܢ . ܒܪܐܢܫܐ ܥܠ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܡܬܐܡܪ ܕܐܢܫ ܒܪܐܢܫܐ ܘܡܬܩܛܪܓ ܕܝܢ ܫܡܐ . ܠܒܪܢܫܐ ܕܝܢ ܓܝܪ ܥܠ ܐܢܫ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܡܩܛܪܓ ܐܝܬ .  ܘܡܠܬܐ ܕܝܢ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ ܘܥܠ ܐܢܫ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܬܩܛܪܓ . ܐܢܫ ܓܝܪ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܘܒܪܢܫܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܘܒܪܢܫܐ ܡܬܐܡܪ .  ܡܕܝܢ ܘܫܡܐ ܘܡܠܬܐ ܥܠ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܢܬܩܛܪܓܘܢ ܀  ܕܗܠܝܢ ܕܝܢ ܕܒܗ̇ܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܐܝܬܝܗܘܢ 12 ܥܠ ܣܓܝ̈ܐܐ ܡ̇ܢ ܘܠܐ ܫܡܐ ܘܠܐ ܡܠܬܐ ܡܬܩܬܪܓܐ ܥܠ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܆  ܥܠ ܚܕܚܕܢܐ ܕܝܢ ܫܡܐ ܡ̇ܢ ܘܠܐ ܡܕܡ ܟ̇ܠܐ ܕܢܬܩܛܪܓ . ܡܠܬܐ ܕܝܢ ܠܐ ܡܫܟܚܐ .  ܕܐܝܟ ܐܝܟܢ . ܚܘܪܐ ܟܕ ܒܗ̇ܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܒܓܘܫܡܐ ܆ ܡܬܩܛܪܐ ܥܠ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܣܝܡ . ܓܘܫܡܐܓܝܪ ܚܘܪܐ ܡܬܐܡܪ .  ܡܠܬܐ ܕܝܢ ܕܚܘܪܐ ܠܐ ܡܬܘܡ ܥܠ ܓܘܫܡܐ ܬܬܩܛܪܓ .  ܟܠܗܝܢ ܕܝܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܐܚܪ̈ܢܝܬܐ ܐܘ ܥܠ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܣܝܡܢ ܡܬܐܡܪܢ . ܥܠ ܐܘܣ̈ܝܣ ܩܕܡܝ̈ܬܐ ܐܘ ܐܝܟ ܕܒܗܢܝܢ ܕܣܝܡܢ ܒܗܝܢ ܐܝܬܝܗܝܢ .  ܘܗܕܐ ܓܠܝܐ ܗ̣ܝ ܡܢ ܟܠܚܕܐ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܒܐܝܕܐ ܒܐܝܕܐ ܩܕܡܢ ܡܬܐܡܪܢ .  ܕܐܝܟ ܐܝܟܢ . ܚܝܘܬܐ ܥܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܡܬܩܛܪܓܐ . ܡܕܝܢ ܘܥܠ ܐܢܫ ܒܪܢܫܐ .  ܐܢ ܓܝܪ ܘܠܐ ܥܠ ܚܕ ܡܢ ܒܢܝܢ̈ܫܐ ܆ ܘܠܐ ܥܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܟܠ ܟܠܗ .  ܬܘܒ ܓܘܢܐ ܒܓܘܫܡܐ . ܡܕܝܢ ܘܒܓܘܫܡܐ ܡܕܡ . ܐܢܓܝܪ ܘܠܐ ܒܡܕܡ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܟܠ ܚܕ ܆ ܘܠܐ ܒܓܘܫܡܐ ܟܠ ܟܠܗ .  ܡܕܝܢ ܟܠܗܘܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܐܚܪ̈ܢܐ ܐܘ ܐܝܟ ܕܥܠ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܣܝܡܢ ܥܠ ı ܐܘܣܝ̈ܣ ܩܕܡܝ̈ܬܐ ܡܬܐܡܪܝܢ ܆ ܐܘ ܐܥܟ ܕܒܗܠܝܢ ܕܣܝܡܢ ܠܗܘܢ ܐܝܬܝܗܘܢ .  ܡܕܝܢ ܟܕ ܠܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܝܢ ܐܘܣܝ̈ܣ ܩܕܡܝ̈ܬܐ ܆ ܠܐ ܡܫܟܚܐ ܕܡܕܡ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܐܚܪ̈ܢܐ ܢܗܘܐ .   ܟܠܗܘܢ ܓܝܪ ܗܠܝܢ ܐܚܪ̈ܢܐ ܐܘ ܥܠ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܣܝܡܝܢ ܡܬܐܡܪܝܢ ܥܠ ܐܘܣܝ̈ܣ ܩܕܡ݀ܝ̈ܬܐ ܐܘ ܒܗܠܝܢ ܕܣܝܡܝܢ ܒܗܝܢ ܐܝܬܗܘܢ . ܡܕܝܢ ܟܕ ܠܐ ܝܬܝܗܝܢ ܐܘܣܝ̈ܣ ܩܕܡܝ̈ܬܐ ܆ ܘܠܐ ܡܫܟܚܐ ܕܡܕܡ ܡܢ ܐܚܪ̈ܢܐ ܢܣܘܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ . 
في الجوهر ' فأما الجوهر الموصوف بأنه أولى بالتحقيق والتقديم والتفضيل فهو الذي لا يقال ' على موضوع ما ولا هو في موضوع ما  ومثال ذلك إنسان ما أو فرس ما  فأما الموصوفة بأنها جواهـرُ ثوانٍ فهي الأنواع التي فيها توجد الجواهر الموصوفة بأنها أُوَل . ومع هذه الأجناس هذه الأنواع أيضا .  ومثال ذلك أنّ إنسانا ما هو في نوع ، أي في الإنسان ، وجنسُ هذا النوع الحي.  فهذه الجواهر توصف بأنها ثوانٍ كالإنسان والحيِّ.  وظاهر مما قيل أن التي تقال على موضوع فقد يجب ضرورة أن يُحمَل اسمها، وقولها يقال على ذلك الموضوع.  ومثال ذلك أن الإنسان يقال على موضوع أي على إنسان ما، فاسمه يُحْمَل عليه، فإنّك تحمل الإنسان على إنسان ما،  وقول الإنسان يُحمَل على إنسان ما. فإن إنساناً ما هو إنسانٌ، وهو حيُّ،  فيكون الاسم والقول يحملان على الموضوع.  فأما التي في موضوع ففي أكثرها لا يحمل على الموضوع ، لا اسمها لا حدُّها ،  وفي بعضها ليس مانع يمنع من أن يحمل أسمُها على الموضوع ، فأما قولها فلا يمكن .  مثال ذلك : أن الأبيض هو في موضوع ، أي في الجسم ، وهو يحمل على الموضوع ؛ وذلك أن الجسم قد يوصف بأنه أبيض .  فأما قول الأبيض فليس يحمل في حال من الأحوال على الجسم .  وكل ما سواها فإما أن يكون على موضوعات ، أي يقال على الجواهر الأول ؛ وإما أن يكون في موضوعات ، أي يقال فيها ،  وذلك ظاهر من قِبَل التصفُّح للجزئيات :  مثال ذلك أن الحي يُحْمَل على الإنسان ، فهو أيضا على إنسان ما .  فإنه لم يكن ولا على واحد من أشخاص الناس فليس هو ولا على إنسان أصلا ؛  وأيضا إلى اللون في الجسم ، فهو أيضا في جسم ما ، فإنه إن لم يكن في واحدٍ من الجزئية فليس هو ولا في الجسم أصلا .  فيجب أن يكون كلُّ ما سواها إما أن يكون على موضوعات ، أي يقال على الجواهر الأُوَل ؛ وإما أن يكون في موضوعات ، أي يقال فيها .  فيجب إذًا إن لم يكن الجواهر الأُوَل ألا يكون سبيلٌ إلى أن يوجد شىء من تلك الأُخَر .  وذلك أن كل ما سواها فإما أن يكون على موضوعات ، أي يقال عليها ؛ وإما في موضوعات، أي فيها. 
18. DIUISIO SUBSTANTIARUM . IN PRIMAS ET SECUNDAS.
Substantia autem est . quȩ proprie et principaliter et maxime dicitur . quȩ neque de subiecto predicatur neque in subiecto est. Tíu herôsta substantia . únde díu mít méisten réhte sô héizit . táz íst tíu . díu gespróchen neuuírdt fóne demo únderen . nóh án ímo nelíget . uuánda sî íst tíu níderôsta . fóne déro die óbe'ren substantiȩ gespróchen uuérdint. tîe scundȩ héizint . unde sî trégit álliu accidentia. Tánnân héizet sî substantia . a subtus stando. 
Ut aliqui homo uel aliqui equus. Sô éin ménnisco íst . álde éin rós.  Secundȩ substantiȩ sunt species . in quibus speciebus insunt illȩ substantiȩ . quȩ principaliter dicuntur .  ut aliquis homo in specie quidem est in homine. Species sínt tie ánderen substantiȩ . ín dîen áber éne sínt petân . tíe êristin . die ánasihtîgen . sô éin ménnisco íst. Hȩ . s. species et harum specierum genera. Tísiu species ín dîen primȩ substantiȩ petân sînt . unde íro genra dáz sínt secundȩ substantiȩ. Animal uero genus est speciei . i. hominis. Táz íst genus in démo diu species pegríffen sínt . álso animal begrîfet hominem.  Secundȩ ergo substantiȩ dicuntur . ut est homo atque animal. Homo unde animal tíu in uernúmste sínt . âne gesíht . tíu héizint mít réhte secundȩ substantiȩ. Úbe primȩ neuuârîn . secundarum negeuuûge nîoman. 

19. QUOD UNIUOCE PREDICANTUR SECUNDȨ SUBSTANTIȨ DE PRIMIS . ACCIDENTIA UERO ȨQUIUOCE.
Manifestum est autem ex his quȩ predicta sunt . quoniam eorum quȩ de subiecto dicuntur . necesse est et nomen et rationem de subiecto predicari. Nû skînet uuóla uóne dîen uóre geságetên . tén námin . unde dîa ' diffinitionem secundarum substantiarum . díe de subiecto héizint . pe nôte gespróchen uuérdein uóne primis substantiis . tíe íro subiecta sínt. 
Ut homo dicitur et predicatur de aliquo subiecto homine . s. ut cicero est uel cato. Hominem namque . s. communem . de aliquo homine predicabis . s. indiuiduo ut est cato. Tû sprîchist îo daz appellatiuum . uóne demo proprio.  Ratio quoque hominis . de aliquo homine predicabitur. Diffinitio appellatiui hominis . uuírdit óuh kespróchen . fóne demo proprio homine. Quidam enim homo et homo est. Cicero íst homo álso ér héizit.  Quare et nomen et ratio predicabitur de subiecto. Uóne díu uuírdit péidiu . ióh nomen ióh diffinitio prinȩ substantiȩ kespróchen uóne secunda . únder déro námin sî stât. Sô man chît uóne cicerone . hic homo rhetor est . sô íst ér écchert kehéizen homo. Sô man áber chît cicero íst homo . sô íst ér geságet óuh uuésin homo. Fóne díu sínt primȩ substantiȩ sucundis uniuocȩ.  Eorum uero quȩ sunt in subiecto . in plurimis quidem neque nomen de subiecto . neque ratio predicatur. Áber dero accidentium námo . nah állero . unde íro diffinitio . neuuírdit nîeht kespróchen fóne prima substantia . tíu íro subiectum íst.  In quibusdam uero nomen quidem ' nihil prohibet predicari . rationem uero impossibile est. Tér námo súmelîchero accidentium mág iz sîn . diffinitio nîomer.  Ut album . i. albedo cum in subiecto sit corpore, predicatur de subiecto. Dicitur enim corpus album. Álbum héizit man béidiu . ióh sélba dia uáreuua . ióh tia sácha án déro sî íst.  Ratio uero albi numquam de corpore predicabitur. Án démo sî áber íst . táz nechît nîoman uuésin táz sî íst. Fóne díu héizit táz ȩquiuocatio. 

20. PRIMAS SUBSTANTIAS OMNIBUS CȨTERIS DARE UT SINT.
Cetera uero omnia . s. que preter primas substantias sunt . aut de subiectis eis dicuntur . i. primis substantiis . aut in subiectis eis sunt. Ál dáz tír íst âne primas substantias . táz uuírdet kespróchen uóne ín . álso secundȩ substantiȩ tûont . álde síu lígent án ín . sô accidentia tûont. 
Hoc autem manifestum est ex his . s. exemplis quȩ per singula proponentur. Táz skînet uuóla án dîen exempliis . tíu dés sâr súnderîgo gegében uuérdent . i. súnderîgo uóne secundis substantiis . unde súnderîgo uóne accidentibus.  Ut animal de homine predicatur. Ergo et de aliquo homine predicatur. Táz íst tíz éina exemplum.  Nam si de nullo aliquorum hominum . nec omnino de homine. Neuuúrte animal uóne catone gespróchen . sô neuuúrte iz uóne homine gespróchen.  Rursus color in corpore est. Ergo et in aliquo ' corpore. Táz íst taz ándera exemplum. Nam si non in aliquo singulorum nec omnino in corpore. Neuuâre diu uáreuua án éinlúzzemo dínge . sô diu súnna íst . sô neuuâre sî án nehéinemo dínge.  Quare alia omnia aut de subiectis principalibus substantiis dicuntur . aut in subiectis eis sunt. Ál dáztir íst âna die primas substantias . táz uuírdit kespróchen uóne ín . álde lígit án ín . únde ín ín.  Non ergo existentibus substantiis . s. primis . impossibile est esse aliquid aliorum. Âne sîe nemág ánderis nîeht sîn.  Omnia enim alia aut de subiectis eis dicuntur . aut in subiectis eis sunt. Ál daz ánder . hábit námin uóne ín . álde sízzet án ín. Úbe primȩ substaniȩ neuuârin . secundȩ neuuârîn . accidentia neuuârin. Sîe sínt úndertân secundis substantiis . íro námin trágendo . únde úndertân accidentibus síu sélben trágendo. 
A substance — that which is called a substance most strictly, primarily, and most of all — is that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject,  e.g. the individual man or the individual horse.  The species in which the things primarily called substances are, are called secondary substances, as also are the genera of these species.  For example, the individual man belongs in a species, man, and animal is a genus of the species;  so these — both man and animal — are called secondary substances.  It is clear from what has been said that if something is said of a subject both its name and its definition are necessarily predicated of the subject.  For example, man is said of a subject, the individual man, and the name is of course predicated (since you will be predicating man of the individual man),  and also the definition of man will be predicated of the individual man (since the individual man is also a man).  Thus both the name and the definition will be predicated of the subject.  But as for things which are in a subject, in most cases neither the name nor the definition is predicated of the subject.  In some cases there is nothing to prevent the name from being predicated of the subject, but it is impossible for the definition to be predicated.  For example, white, which is in a subject (the body), is predicated of the subject; for a body is called white.  But the definition of white will never be predicated of the body.  All the other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects or in them as subjects.  This is clear from an examination of cases.  For example, animal is predicated of man and therefore also of the individual man;  for were it predicated of none of the individual men it would not be predicated of man at all.  Again, colour is in body and therefore also in an individual body; for were it not in some individual body it would not be in body at all.  Thus all the other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects or in them as subjects.  So if the primary substances did not exist it would be impossible for any of the other things to exist.   
(7) Τῶν δὲ δευτέρων οὐσιῶν μᾶλλον οὐσία τὸ εἶδος τοῦ (8) γένους· ἔγγιον γὰρ τῆς πρώτης οὐσίας ἐστίν.  ἐὰν γὰρ ἀπο(9)διδῷ τις τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν τί ἐστι, γνωριμώτερον καὶ οἰ(10)κειότερον ἀποδώσει τὸ εἶδος ἀποδιδοὺς ἢ τὸ γένος·  οἷ(11)ον τὸν τινὰ ἄνθρωπον γνωριμώτερον ἂν ἀποδοίη ἄνθρω(12)πον ἀποδιδοὺς ἢ ζῷον,  —τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἴδιον μᾶλλον τοῦ (13) τινὸς ἀνθρώπου, τὸ δὲ κοινότερον,—  καὶ τὸ τὶ δένδρον ἀποδι(14)δοὺς γνωριμώτερον ἀποδώσει δένδρον ἀποδιδοὺς ἢ φυτόν.  (15) ἔτι αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι διὰ τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ὑποκεῖ(16)σθαι καὶ πάντα τὰ ἄλλα κατὰ τούτων κατηγορεῖσθαι ἢ (17) ἐν ταύταις εἶναι διὰ τοῦτο μάλιστα οὐσίαι λέγονται·  ὡς δέ (18) γε αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ἔχουσιν, οὕτω καὶ (19) τὸ εἶδος πρὸς τὸ γένος ἔχει· —ὑπόκειται γὰρ τὸ εἶδος (20) τῷ γένει·  τὰ μὲν γὰρ γένη κατὰ τῶν εἰδῶν κατηγορεῖται, (21) τὰ δὲ εἴδη κατὰ τῶν γενῶν οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει·  — ὥστε καὶ ἐκ (22) τούτων τὸ εἶδος τοῦ γένους μᾶλλον οὐσία.  —αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν εἰ(23)δῶν ὅσα μή ἐστι γένη, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἕτερον ἑτέρου οὐσία (24) ἐστίν·  οὐδὲν γὰρ οἰκειότερον ἀποδώσει κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀν(25)θρώπου τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀποδιδοὺς ἢ κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἵππου (26) τὸν ἵππον.  ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον (27) ἕτερον ἑτέρου οὐσία ἐστίν· οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον ὁ τὶς ἄνθρω(28)πος οὐσία ἢ ὁ τὶς βοῦς. 
Պրակք գ
Իսկ երկրո՛րդ գոյացութեանցն. յաւէտ գոյացութիւն, տեսա՛կն քան զսե՛ռն է: քանզի հպագո՛յն յառաջին գոյացութիւնն է։ 
112 վասնզի էթէ բացատրեսցէ՛ ոք զառաջին գոյացութիւնն, զի՛նչէ։ ճանաւթագո՛յն և ընտանեգո՛յն րացատրեսցէ, զտեսա՛կն բացատրելո՛վ քամ զսեռն։  ո՛րզան զոմն մարդն, ծանաւթագոյն բացատրեսցէ, մարդ բացատրելով’ քամ թե կենդանի։  քանզի սա՛, ո’ւրո՛յն առաւել ուրո՛ւմըն մարդոյ: իսկ սա, հասարակագո՛յն։  և զոմն ծառ բացատրելով, ծանաւթագոյն բացատրեսցէ, ծա՛ռ բացատրելով’ քան թե տունկ։  և ա՛յլ ևս առաջին գոյացաւթիւնքն, վասն ընդայլո՛վքն ամենայնիւ կալ։ եւ զայլսն զամենայս զսոցանէ՛, ստոեոգիլ, կամ ըն սոսայ գոլ: վասն այսորիկ մա՛նաւանդ գոյացութիվնքն առաջինք ասին։  արդ որպէս առաջինք գոյացութիւնքն, առ այլսն ամենայնս ունին, այսպէս և տեսակըն, առ սեռն ունի:  քանզի կա՛յ տեսակն, ընդ սեռի՛ւն: քանզի սեռքն զտեսակա՛ցըն ստորոգին։ իսկ տեսակքըն զսեռիցն ո՛չ հակադարձին։  ապա’ ուրեմն և արտասա՛յց տեսակն քան զսեռըն յաւէտ գոյացութիւն։ —  Պրակք Չորրորդ
Եւ նոցա տեսակցն որքան միանգամ ո՛չ են սերք ո՛չ ինչ առաւել այլ քան զայլ գոյացութի՛ւն է։ 
քանզի ո՛չ ինչ ընտանեգոյն բացատրեսցէ զումեմնէ մարդոյ զմարդն բացատրելով։ կամ զումեքէ ձիոյ. զձի՛ն։  սո՛յնպէս և առաջին գոյացութեանցն, ո՛չ ինչ առաւել’ ա՛յլ քան ա՛յլ զայլ գոյացութիւն է։ քանզի ո՛չ ինչ յաւէտ, ոմն մա՛րդն գոյացութիւն, կամ ոմն արջառն: 
(30) Secundarum uero substantiarum magis est species substantia quam genus; (31) propinquior enim est primae substantiae.  Si enim quis primam (32) substantiam quid sit assignet, euidentius et conuenientius (33) assignabit speciem proferens quam genus,  ut de aliquo homine (34) euidentius assignabit hominem proferens quam animal;  illud enim magis (35) est proprium alicuius hominis, hoc uero communius.  Et aliquam (36) arborem assignans, euidentius assignabit arborem nominans quam (37) plantam.  Amplius primae substantiae, propterea quod aliis omnibus (38) subiacent et omnia caetera uel de ipsis praedicantur uel in ipsis (39) sunt, idcirco maxime substantiae dicuntur.  Quemadmodum autem primae (40) substantiae ad omnia caetera se habent, ita sese species habet ad (41) genus; subiacet enim species generi;  etenim genera de speciebus (42) praedicantur, species uero de generibus non conuertuntur.  Quocirca (43) etiam ex his species genere magis est substantia.  Ipsarum uero (44) specierum quae genera non sunt, nihilo plus alia ab alia substantia (45) est;  nihil enim conuenientius proferetur si quis de aliquo homine (46) hominem reddat quam si de aliquo equo proferat equum.  Similiter autem (47) et in primis substantiis nihilo plus alia ab alia substantia est; (48) nihil enim magis aliquis homo quam aliquis bos substantia est. 
ܡܢ ܐܘܣܝ̈ܣ ܕܝܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܬܪܝܢܝ̈ܬܐ ܝܬܝܪ ܡܢ ܓܢܣܐ ܐܕܫܐ ܐܘܣܝܐ . ܩܪܝܒܐ ܓܝܪ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܕܐܘܣܝܐ ܩܪܡܝܬܐ .  ܐܢ ܗ̣ܘ ܓܝܪ ܕܐܢܫ ܢܬܠ ܡܢܐ ܐܝܬܝܗ̇ ܐܘܣܝܐ ܩܕܡܝܬܐ ܆ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܝܬܝܪ ܝܕܝܥܐ ܘܝܬܝܪ ܒܝܬܝܐ ܟܕ ܢܬܠ ܐܕܫܐ ܐܘ ܓܢܣܐ ܝܗ̇ܒ .  ܕܐܝܟ ܐܝܟܢ . ܐܢ ܗ̣ܘ ܕܠܐܢܫ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܢܬܠ ܆ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܝܬܝܪ ܝܕܝܥܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܢܬܠ ܐܘ ܚܝܘܬܐ .  ܗ̇ܘ ܡ̇ܢ ܓܝܪ ܕܐܢܫ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܝܬܝܪ ܕܝܠܢܝܐ ܆ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܝܢ ܝܬܝܪ ܓܘܢܝܐ .  ܘܟܕ ܢܬܠ ܠܐܝܠܢܐ ܡܕܡ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܝܬܝܪ ܝܕܝܥܐ ܆ ܐܝܠܢܐ ܝܗ̇ܒ ܟܕ ܢܬܠ ܐܘ ܢܨܒܬܐ ܀  ܬܘܒ ܐܘܣܝ̈ܣ ܩܕܡܝ̈ܬܐ ܡܛܠ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܠܟܠܗܘܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܐܚܪ̈ܢܐ ܣܝܡܢ ܆ ܘܟܠܗܘܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܐܚܪ̈ܢܐ ܥܠ ܗܠܝܢ ܡܬܩܛܪܓܝܢ ܐܘ ܒܗܠܝܢ ܐܝܬܝܗܘܢ : ܡܛܠ ܗܕܐ ܝܬܝܪܐܝܬ ܐܘܣܝ̈ܣ ܡܬܐܡܪܢ .  ܐܝܟܢܐ ܘܐܕܫܐ ܠܘܬ ܓܢܣܐ ܐܝܬ ܠܗ . ܣܝܡ ܓܝܪ ܐܕܫܐ ܠܓܢܣܐ .  ܓܢ̈ܣܐ ܡ̇ܢ 13 ܓܝܪ ܥܠ ܐܕ̈ܫܐ ܡܬܩܛܪܓܝܢ . ܐܪ̈ܫܐ ܕܝܢ ܥܠ ܓܢ̈ܣܐ ܠܐ ܗܦܟܝܢ .  ܡܕܝܢ ܘܥܠ ܗܠܝܢ ܐܕܫܐ ܝܬܝܪ ܡܢ ܓܢܣܐ ܐܘܣܝܐ ܀  ܡܢܗܘܢ ܕܝܢ ܕܐܕ̈ܫܐ ܟܠܗܘܢ ܕܠܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܘܢ ı ܓܢ̈ܣܐ ܘܠܐ ܚܕ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܡܢ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܝܬܝܪܝܬ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܐܘܣܝܐ .  ܠܐ ܓܝܪ ܡܕܡ ܕܝܬܝܪ ܒܝܬܝܐ ܝܗ̇ܒ ܥܠ ܐܢܫ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܟܕ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܢܬܠ ܐܘ ܥܠ ܣܘܣܝܐ ܡܕܡ ܠܣܘܣܝܐ .  ܗ̣ܘ ܕܝܢ ܗܟܘܬ ܘܡܢ ܐܘܣܝ̈ܣ ܩܕܡܝܬܐ ܘܠܐ ܡܕܡ ܐܚܪܵܢܐ ܡܢ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܝܬܝܪܐܝܬ ܐܘܣܝܐ . ܘܠܐ ܡܕܡ ܓܝܪ ܝܬܝܪܐܝܬ ܐܢܫ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܐܘܣܝܐ ܐܘ ܬܘܪܐ ܡܕܡ . 
والنوع - من الجواهر الثانية - أَوْلى بأن يوصف جوهرًا من الجنس ، لأنه أقرب من الجوهر الأول .  وذلك أن مُوَفِّيا إن وَفى الجوهر الأول ما هو كان إعطاؤه النوعَ أشدَّ ملائمةً وأبينَ في الدلالة عليه من إعطائه الجنس .  مثال ذلك أنه إن وَفّى إنساناً ما ما هو ، كان إعطاؤه أنه إنسان أبين في الدلالة عليه من إعطائه أنه حي ،  فإن ذلك أخص بإنسان ما ، وهذا أعمّ ،  وإن وَفَّى شجرةً ما ما هي، كان إعطاؤه أنها شجرة أبين في الدلالة عليها من إعطائه أنها نَبْت .  وأيضا فإن الجواهـر الأُوَل لمــا كانـت موضـوعة لسائر الأمور كلها ، وسائرُ الأمور كلها محمولةً عليها أو موجودةً فيها ، فلذلك صارت أَوْلى وأحق بأن تُوصَف جواهر َ.  وقياس الجواهر الأول عند سائر الأمور كلها هو قياس النوع عند الجنس ، إذ كان النوع موضوعا للجنس ،  لأن الأجناس تُحْمَل على الأنواع ، وليس تنعكس الأنواع على الأجناس ،  فيجب من ذلك أيضا أن النوع أَوْلى وأحقُّ بأن يوُصف جوهرًا من الجنس .  وأما ما كان من الأنواع ليس هو جنسا، فليس الواحد منها أَوْلى من الآخر بأن يُوصَف جوهرا ،  إذ كان ليس توفيتك من إنسانٍ ما أنه إنسان أشدّ ملائمة من توفيتك في فرسِ ما أنه فرس .  وكذلك ليس الواحد من الجواهر أَوْلى من الآخر بأن يوصف جوهرا ، إذ كان ليس إنسان ما أولى بأن يوصف جوهرا من فرس ما . 
21. DE DIFFERENTIA SECUNDARUM SUBSTANTIARUM.
Secundarum uero substantiarum . magis substantia est species quam genus. Species íst hartor substantia tánne genus. Propinquior enim est primȩ substantiȩ. Táz íst uóne díu . uúanda iz náhôr stât tero érchehôstûn substantiȩ. 
Si enim primam substantiam quid sit quis assignet . euidentius et conuenientius assignabit . speciem proferens quam genus. Úbe diz éinlúzza díng îoman zéigôt . tér zígôt iz páz mít specie tánne mít genere.  Ut quendam hominem assignando manifestus assignabis hominem assignando quam animal. Álso dû catonem báz zéigôst . hominem ' némmindo . tánne animal.  Illud quidem proprium magis alicuius est hominis . hoc autem communius. Éniu zéiga . i. homo . tíu íst catonis. Tísiu . i. animal . tíu íst hominis.  Et cum aliquam arborem reddideris . manifestius assignabis cum arborem assignabis quam arbustum. Zéigôst tû uuáz éin réba sî . táz tûost tû báz póum chédendo . tánne dáz in érdo stât. An érdo stât óuh chrûit unde spréid.  Amplius. Ferním nóh mêr. Primȩ substantiȩ propterea quod aliis omnibus subiacent . et alia omnia de his omnibus predicentur . aut in eis sunt . idcirco maximȩ substantiȩ dicuntur. Primȩ substanbtiȩ héizint mít méisten réhte substantiȩ . fóne díu dáz sie állero díngo sóllin sínt . únde álliu díng kespróchen uérdint fóne ín . sô secundȩ substantiȩ tûont . álde án ín sínt . sô accidentia sínt.  Sicut autem principales substantiȩ ad alia omnia se habent . sic et species ad genus se habet. Subiacet enim species generi. Specie lígit únder genere . álso prima substntia únder ín béidên lígit . únde nóh tánne sub accidentibus.  Genera namque de speciebus predicantur . species autem de generibus non conuertuntur. Animal spríchit man uóne homine. Homo neuuírdit kespróchen uóne animali.  Quare et ex his species est magis genere proxima substantiȩ. Tánnân skînet óuh . táz homo náhôr stât primȩ substantiȩ . i. catoni dánne animal. '  Ipsarum uero specierum . quȩqumque non sunt genera . nihil magis alia ab alia substantia est. Téro specierum díu genera nesínt . i. tíu ébennâh stânt primȩ substantiȩ . téro nehéin neíst mêr substantia . dánne daz ánder.  Nihil enim familarius asignabis de aliquo homine hominem assignanando . quam de aliquo equo equum. Tû nespríchist nîeht quíssôr hominem uóne catone . dánne rós uóne rhebo.  Similiter autem et principalium substantiarum . nihil magis alterum altero substantia est. Tero éinlúzzôn substantiarum neíst óuh nehéin hártôr substantia . dánne diu ánderíu. Nihil enim magis aliquis homo substantia est . quam aliquis bos. Cato neíst nîeht hártôr substantia . dánne sîn hóhso. 
Of the secondary substances the species is more a substance than the genus, since it is nearer to the primary substance.  For if one is to say of the primary substance what it is, it will be more informative and apt to give the species than the genus.  For example, it would be more informative to say of the individual man that he is a man than that he is an animal  (since the one is more distinctive of the individual man while the other is more general);  and more informative to say of the individual tree that it is a tree than that it is a plant.  Further, it is because the primary substances are subjects for all the other things and all the other things are predicated of them or are in them, that they are called substances most of all.  But as the primary substances stand to the other things, so the species stands to the genus: the species is a subject for the genus  (for the genera are predicated of the species but the species are not predicated reciprocally of the genera).  Hence for this reason too the species is more a substance than the genus.  But of the species themselves — those which are not genera — one is no more a substance than another:  it is no more apt to say of the individual man that he is a man than to say of the individual horse that it is a horse.  And similarly of the primary substances one is no more a substance than another: the individual man is no more a substance than the individual ox. 
(29) Εἰκότως δὲ μετὰ τὰς πρώτας οὐσίας μόνα τῶν ἄλλων (30) τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ γένη δεύτεραι οὐσίαι λέγονται·  μόνα γὰρ (31) δηλοῖ τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν τῶν κατηγορουμένων·  τὸν γὰρ (32) τινὰ ἄνθρωπον ἐὰν ἀποδιδῷ τις τί ἐστιν, τὸ μὲν εἶδος ἢ τὸ (33) γένος ἀποδιδοὺς οἰκείως ἀποδώσει, —καὶ γνωριμώτερον ποιήσει (34) ἄνθρωπον ἢ ζῷον ἀποδιδούς·  — τῶν δ’ ἄλλων ὅ τι ἂν (35) ἀποδιδῷ τις, ἀλλοτρίως ἔσται ἀποδεδωκώς, οἷον λευκὸν ἢ (36) τρέχει ἢ ὁτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων ἀποδιδούς·  ὥστε εἰκότως ταῦτα (37) μόνα τῶν ἄλλων οὐσίαι λέγονται.  ἔτι αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι (38) διὰ τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ὑποκεῖσθαι κυριώτατα οὐσίαι (3a1) λέγονται·  ὡς δέ γε αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα πάντα (2) ἔχουσιν, οὕτω τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ γένη τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν πρὸς (3) τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα ἔχει· κατὰ τούτων γὰρ πάντα τὰ λοιπὰ (4) κατηγορεῖται·  τὸν γὰρ τινὰ ἄνθρωπον ἐρεῖς γραμματικόν, (5) οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄνθρωπον καὶ ζῷον γραμματικὸν ἐρεῖς· ὡσαύ(6)τως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. 
Պրակք հինգերորդ
ե Եւ վայելչաբա՛ր յետ քամ զառաջին գոյացութիւնոն, միայնք պատահըմանցըն այլոցն. տեոա՛կքըն և ոե՛ռքըն երկրո՛րդ գոյացութիւնք ասին: 
քանզի միայնք յայտնեն զառաջին գոյացութիւն զստորոգիցելոցն:  քանզի զո՛մն մարդն. եթե բացատրեսցէ՛ ոք՚ զի՛նչ է, զտեսա՛կն առաւել քան զսեռըն առաւել քան զսեռըն բացատըրելով; րնտանեբա՛ր բացատրեոցէ: և ծանաւթագո՛յն ՚աբասցէ, մա՛րդ քան թե կենդանի րացատրելով:  113 Իսկ յայլոցն, որզինչ և բացատրեոցէ ոք, աւտարաբա՛ր եղիցի բացատուեալն։ հի՛զան՛: սպիտա՛կ, կամ ընթանա՛լ, կամ այլ ինչ յայսպիսեացըս բացատուեալ  ապա ուրեմն, վայելչարա՛ր միայնք սոքա՛յ այլոցն գոյացութիւնք ասին։  Եւ ա՛յլ ևս, առաջին գոյացութիւնքն, վասն ընդ այլովքն ամենեքումրք կալ, տիրագո՛յնք և իսկագոյնք գոյացութիւնք ասին։  և որպէս առաջին գոյացութիւնքն, առայլսն ամենեսին ունին, այսպես և տեսակքն և սեռքն առաջին գոյացութեանցն առ ա՛յլսն ամենեսին ունին։ քանզի զսոցանէ ա՛յլքն ամենեքին ստորոգին:  քանզի զոմն մարդն, ասասցես քերակա՛ն: ապա ուրեմն և զմա՛րդն և զկենդանին քերակա՛ն ասասցես։ սո՛յնպէս և մակայլոցն։ 
(49) Recte autem post primas substantias solae omnium caeterorum species et (50) genera dicuntur secundae esse substantiae;  eorum enim quae (51) praedicantur primas substantias solae significant.  Aliquem enim (52) hominem si quis assignet quid sit, si speciem quam genus protulerit, (53) conuenienter proferet, et manifestum faciet hominem quam animal (54) proferens;  caeterorum uero quicquid protulerit, aliena erit illa (55) prolatio, ut album uel currit uel quodlibet huiusmodi si (56) reddat.  Quare recte hae solae praeter caetera substantiae (57) dicuntur.  Amplius primae substantiae, propterea quod aliis omnibus (58) subiacent, idcirco propriae substantiae dicuntur;  quemadmodum autem (59) primae substantiae ad omnia caetera sese habent, ita primarum (60) substantiarum genera et species ad omnia reliqua sese habent; de istis (61) enim omnibus caetera praedicantur:  aliquem enim hominem dices (62) grammaticum, ergo et hominem et animal grammaticum praedicabis; (63) similiter autem et in aliis. 
ܙܕܩܐܝܬ ܡܢ ܒܬܪ ܗܠܝܢ ܐܘܣܝ̈ܣ ܩܕܡܝ̈ܬܐ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܐܚܪ̈ܢܐ ܐܕ̈ܫܐ ܘܓܢ̈ܣܐ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܐܘܣܝ̈ܣ ܬܪ̈ܝܢܝܬܐ ܡܬܐܡܪܝܢ .  ܗܢܝܢ ܓܝܪ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܡܬܩܛܪܓܝܢ ܡܘܕܥܝܢܢ ܒܐܘܣܝܐ ܩܕܡܝܬܐ .  ܠܐܢܫ ܓܝܪ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܐܢ ܗ̣ܘ ܕܐܢܫ ܢܬܠ ܕܡܢܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܆ ܐܕܫܐ ܡ̇ܢ ܐܘ ܓܢܣܐ ܟܕ ܢܬܠ ܒܝܬܐܝܬ ܝܗ̇ܒ ܘܗ̇ܝ ܕܝܕܝܥܐ ܥܒ̇ܕ ܆ ܟܕ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܐܘ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܢܬܠ .  ܗܠܝܢ ܕܝܢ ܐܚܪ̈ܢܐ ܗ̇ܘ ܡܘܢ ܕܗ̣ܘ ܐܢ ܢܬܠ ܆ ܢܘܟܪܐܝܬ ܢܣܘܐ ܕܝܗ̇ܒ . ܕܐܝܟ ܐܝܟܢ . ܚܘܪܐ ܐܘ ܪܗ̇ܛ ܐܘ ܡܘܢ ܕܗ̣ܘ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܐܝܟ ܗܠܝܢ ܟܕ ܢܬ̇ܠ .  ܡܕܝܢ ܙܕܩܐܝܬ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܐܚܪ̈ܢܐ ܗܠܝܢ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܐܘܣܝ̈ܣ ܡܬܐܡܪܝܢ .   ܬܘܒ ܐܘܣܝ̈ܣ ܩܕܡܝ̈ܬܐ ܡܛܠ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܠܟܠܗܘܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܐܚܪ̈ܢܐ ܣܝܡܢ ܐܘܣܝ̈ܣ ܩܕ̈ܡܝܬܐ ܡܬܐܡܪܢ .  ܐܝܟܢܐ ܓܝܪ ܕܐܘܣܝ̈ܣ ܩܕܡܝ̈ܬܐ ܠܘܬ ܟܠܗܘܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܐܚܪ̈ܢܐ ܐܝܬ ܠܗܝܢ ܆ ܗܟܢܐ ܘܓܢ̈ܣܐ ܘܐܕ̈ܫܐ ܕܐܘܣܝ̈ܣ ܩܕܡܝ̈ܬܐ ܠܘܬ ܟܠܗܘܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܫܪܟܐ ܐܝܬ ܠܗܘܢ . ܥܠ ܗܠܝܢ ܓܝܪ ܟܠܗܘܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܫܪܟܐ ܡܬܩܛܪܓܝܢ .  ܠܐܢܫ ܓܝܪ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܓܪܡܛܝܐ ܐܡ̇ܪ ܐܢܬ . ܡܕܝܢ ܘܠܒܪܢܫܐ ܘܠܚܝܘܬܐ ܓܪܡܛܝܐ ܐܡ̇ܪ ܐܢܬ . ܗ̣ܘ ܗܟܘܬ ܕܝܢ ܘܥܠ ܗܠܝܢ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܀ 
وبالواجب صارت الأنواع والأجناس وحدها دون غيرها تقال بعد الجوهر الأول جواهرَ ثوانَى ،  لأنها وحدها تدل على الجواهر الأُول من بين ما تُحْمل عليه ،  إن مُوَفّيا إن وَفّى إنساناً ما ما هو ، فوفاه بنوعه أو بجنسه كانت توفيته له ملائمة ؛ وإذا وفّاه بأنه إنسانَ كان ذلك أبين في الدلالة عليه من توفيته له بأنه حي ؛  وإن وَفّاه بشيءٍ مما سوى ذلك أيَّ شيءٍ كان ، كانت توفيته له غريبة مُسْـتَنْكَرَة : كما إذا وفى بأنه أبيض أو أنه يُحْضِر أن شيءٍ من أشباه ذلك أيَّ شيء كان .   فبالواجب قيلت هذه دون غيرها جواهر .  وأيضا لأن الجواهر الأُوَل موضوعةٌ لسائر الأمور كلها ، وسائرُ الأمور كلها محمولة عليها ، أو موجودة فيها ، لذلك صارت أَوْلى وأحقَّ بأن توصف جواهرَ .  وقياس الجواهر الأُوَل عند سائر الأمور هو قياسُ أنواع الجواهر الأُوَل وأجناسها عند سائر الأمور الأُخَر كلها، وذلك أن سائر الأمور كلها على هذه تحمل :  فإنك تقول في إنسانٍ ما إنه نحوى ، فأنت إذاً تقول : ” نحويا “ على الإنسان وعلى الحي ؛ كذلك تجري الأمور في سائر ما أبهه. 
Merito ergo post principales substantias . solȩ aliorum omnium dicuntur species et genera secundȩ substantiȩ. Mít réhte héizent species et genera ándere substantiȩ . nâh tîen êristên . álles tés man genémmen mág âne sîe . i. âne die êristen . s. uuánda accidentia nemúgin héizen substantiȩ.  Solȩ enim hæ indicant principalem substantiam eorum quȩ predicantur. Sîe éinen zéigônt primam substantiam . s. âne diu accidentia.  Aliquem enim hominem si quis assignauret quidem . speciem quidem quam genus asignando familarius monstrabit . et manifestius faciet hominem assignando quam animal. Catonem zéigôt man báz mít homine dánne mít animali . i. páz mít specie . dánne mít genere. '  Aliorum uero quicquid assignaverit quilibet . assignabat extranee. Souuáz îoman ánderis spríchit fóne catone . dáz tûot ir míssenémendo. Uelut album aut currit . aut quodcumque talium reddens. Álso dér míssenímet . tér ín héizet album álde currit . álde îeht témo gelîchis.  Ergo merito hæ solæ substantiȩ dicuntur. Pe díu héizent écchert tîe substantiæ . dîe primȩ sínt alde secundȩ.  Amplius. Primȩ substantiȩ . propterea quod aliis omnibus subiacent . idcirco propriȩ substantiæ dicuntur. Quibus omnibus? Secundis substantiis et accentibus. Secundȩ substantiȩ lígint óuh únder dien accentibus . uuánda primȩ únder ín lígint. Úbe cato únde cicero . únder ín nelâgîn . nóh homo nelâge. Netrûegîn sîe siu . sô netrûege sie homo. Netrûege síu homo unde ánderiu species . sô equus íst unde bos . nóh animal netrûege síu. Secundis chúmit iz uóne primis. Nâh primis tîe siu ze uórderôst trágent . trágent siu óuh secundæ in secunde loco. Pe díu sínt îo primȩ . únder tân ze êrist. Únde sélbên dîen úndertânen secundis . sínt primȩ úndertân. Fóne díu chídit ér nû uóne ín . propriȩ dicuntur substantiæ . peuóre chád ér maximȩ dicuntur substantiȩ . i. uuánda sie trágent . únde sínt únder trágentên . pe díu íst ín dér námo éigen . táz sie substantiȩ héizent.  Sicut autem primȩ substantiȩ ad alia omnia se habent . i. ad accidentia . ita species et genera principalium substantiarum . ad reliqua omnia se habent . s. iterum ad accidentia. Álso primȩ substantiȩ stânt únder accentibus . sô stânt óuh secundȩ. De his enim . i. primis et secundis ' reliqua omnia predicantur . s. iterum accidentia. Uuánnân máhtîn qualia únde quanta gespróchen uuérden âne uóne ín? Ideo sequitur.  Aliquem enim hominem dicis grammaticum esse . ergo et hominem et animal grammaticum dicis Aristarchum chîdis tû uuésin grammaticum . sô tûost tû óuh hominem únde animal. Táz íst quale. Íst óuh aritarchus bipedalis táz is quantum . sô íst óuh homo bipedalis . unde animal bipedale. Similiter autem et in aliis . s. qualibus et quantis. 
It is reasonable that, after the primary substances, their species and genera should be the only other things called secondary substances.  For only they, of things predicated, reveal the primary substance.  For if one is to say of the individual man what he is, it will be in place to give the species or the genus (though more informative to give man than animal);  but to give any of the other things would be out of place — for example, to say white or runs or anything like that.  So it is reasonable that these should be the only other things called substances.  Further, it is because the primary substances are subjects for everything else that they are called substances most strictly.  But as the primary substances stand to everything else, so the species and genera of the primary substances stand to all the rest: all the rest are predicated of these.  For if you will call the individual man grammatical, then you will call both a man and an animal grammatical; and similarly in other cases. 
(7) Κοινὸν δὲ κατὰ πάσης οὐσίας τὸ μὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ (8) εἶναι.  ἡ μὲν γὰρ πρώτη οὐσία οὔτε καθ’ ὑποκειμένου λέγε(9)ται οὔτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν.  τῶν δὲ δευτέρων οὐσιῶν (10) φανερὸν μὲν καὶ οὕτως ὅτι οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ·  ὁ γὰρ (11) ἄνθρωπος καθ’ ὑποκειμένου μὲν τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου λέγεται, (12) ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, —οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τινὶ ἀνθρώπῳ ὁ (13) ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν·—  ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ ζῷον καθ’ ὑποκειμένου (14) μὲν λέγεται τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τὸ ζῷον ἐν (15) τῷ τινὶ ἀνθρώπῳ.  ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὄντων τὸ μὲν (16) ὄνομα οὐδὲν κωλύει κατηγορεῖσθαί ποτε τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, (17) τὸν δὲ λόγον ἀδύνατον·  τῶν δὲ δευτέρων οὐσιῶν κατηγορεῖ(18)ται καὶ ὁ λόγος κατὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου καὶ τοὔνομα, —τὸν (19) γὰρ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λόγον κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου κατη(20)γορήσεις καὶ τὸν τοῦ ζῴου.—  ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη οὐσία (21) τῶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ.  —οὐκ ἴδιον δὲ οὐσίας τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ (22) καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ τῶν μὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν·  τὸ γὰρ (23) πεζὸν καὶ τὸ δίπουν καθ’ ὑποκειμένου μὲν λέγεται τοῦ ἀν(24)θρώπου, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, —οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ (25) ἐστὶ τὸ δίπουν οὐδὲ τὸ πεζόν.—  καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ κατηγορεῖται ὁ (26) τῆς διαφορᾶς καθ’ οὗ ἂν λέγηται ἡ διαφορά·  οἷον εἰ τὸ (27) πεζὸν κατὰ ἀνθρώπου λέγεται, καὶ ὁ λόγος τοῦ πεζοῦ (28) κατηγορηθήσεται τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, —πεζὸν γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος.  (29) —μὴ ταραττέτω δὲ ἡμᾶς τὰ μέρη τῶν οὐσιῶν ὡς ἐν ὑπο(30)κειμένοις ὄντα τοῖς ὅλοις, μή ποτε ἀναγκασθῶμεν οὐκ οὐ(31)σίας αὐτὰ φάσκειν εἶναι·  οὐ γὰρ οὕτω τὰ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ (32) ἐλέγετο τὰ ὡς μέρη ὑπάρχοντα ἔν τινι. 
Պրակք վեցերորդ
։զ։ Եւ հասարակ զամենայն գոյացութենէ, ո՛չ նենթակայումըն գոլ։ 
քանզի առաջին գոյացութիւնն ո՛չ նենթակայո՛ջ է, և ո՛չ զենթակայէ՛ ասկ:  Իսկ երկրորդից գոյացութեանցըն, երևելի՛ է և ա՛յսպես: զի և ո‘չ մի է, նենթակայոջ։  քանզի մարդ՚ զենթակայէ՛ ումենմէ՛ մարդոյ ասի՛, և նենթակայոջ ո՛չ է։ քանզի ո՛չ, նումեք նարդոջ մա՛րդ է։  սո՛յնպես, և կենդանի՛ն, զենթակայէ՛ ասի, զումեմնէ՛ մարդոյ։ րայց ո՛չ է կենդանին նումեք մարդոջ։  և այլ ևս, նենթակայոջ էակացն՚ անուանն, ո՛չ ինչ է արգել երդեք ստորոգիլ զենթակայէն։ իսկ րանին, անկարութի՛ւն է։  Իսկ երկրորդից գոյացութեանցն, ստորոգի և բան զեբթակայէն, և անունն։ քանզի զմարդոյն բան։ զումեքէ՛ն մարդոյ, ստորոգեսցե՛ս, և զկենդանւոյն:  ապա ուրեմն ո՛չ է գոյացութիւն, նենթակայոջացն:—  114 Պրակք եւթներորդ:—
է Բայց ո՛չ ուրոյն գոյացութեան է այս, այլ և տարբերութի՛ւնն, ո՛չ նենթակայոջա՛ցն է։ 
քանզի հետևա՛կն, և երկոտանի՛ն, զենթակայէ՛ ասի զմարդոյ։ և նենթակայում ո՛չ է։ քանզի ո՛չ եթե ընմարդո՛ջ է երկոտանին, կամ հետևակն։  և բանն ստորոգի՛ տարբերութեանն, զորմէ ումեքէ՛ ասի՛ տարբերութիւնն։  ո՛րզան: եթե հետևակն. զմարդո՛յ ասիցի. և բա՛ն հետևակին ստորոգեսցի՛ զմարդոյն։ քանզի հետեւա՛կ է մարդն:  Պրակք ութերորդ
Բայց մի՛ խռովեցուսցէ զմեզ մասունք գոյացութեանն, իբրու նենթակա՛յս ընբնոլորսն։ մի. գուցէ հարկեսցո՛ւք. ո՛չ գոյացութիւնս զնոսա ասել գոլ։ 
քանզի ո՛չ այսպէս նենթակայոջքն ասին, իբրու մասո՛նք գոլով, նումեք։ 
(64) Commune est autem omni substantiae in subiecto non esse.  Prima enim (65) substantia nec de subiecto dicitur nec in subiecto est;  secundae uero (66) substantiae sic quoque manifestum est quoniam non sunt in (67) subiecto.  Etenim homo de subiecto quidem aliquo homine dicitur, in (68) subiecto uero nullo est; neque enim in aliquo homine homo (69) est.  Similiter autem et animal de subiecto quidem dicitur de aliquo (70) homine, non est autem animal in aliquo homine.  Amplius eorum quae sunt (71) in subiecto nomen quidem de subiecto aliquotiens nihil prohibet (72) praedicari, rationem uero impossibile est.  Secundarum uero (73) substantiarum de subiectis ratio praedicatur et nomen; rationem enim (74) hominis et animalis de aliquo homine praedicabis.  Quare non erit eorum (75) substantia quae sunt in subiecto.  Non est autem proprium substantiae (76) hoc; sed differentia eorum est quae in subiecto non sunt;  bipes enim (77) et gressibile de subiecto quidem de homine praedicatur, in subiecto (78) uero nullo est; non enim in homine est bipes neque gressibile.  Et (79) ratio quoque differentiae de illo dicitur de quo ipsa differentia (80) praedicatur,  ut si gressibile de homine dicatur, et ratio gressibilis (81) de homine praedicabitur; est enim homo gressibile.  Non nos uero (82) conturbent substantiarum partes quae ita sunt in toto quasi in (83) subiecto sint, ne forte cogamur dicere non eas esse substantias;  non (84) enim sic dicebantur esse ea quae sunt in subiecto ut quasi partes (85) essent. 
ܓܘܢܐܝܬ ܕܝܢ ܘܥܠ ܟܘܠ ı ܐܘܣܝܐ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܠܘ ܒܗ̇ܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܬܗܘܐ .  ܐܘܣܝܐ ܓܝܪ ܩܕܡܝܬܐ ܠܐ ܒܗ̇ܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܘܠܐ ܥܠ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܡܬܐܡܪܐ .  ܡܢ ܐܘܣܝ̈ܣ ܕܝܢ ܬܪ̈ܝܢܝܬܐ ܓܠܝܐ ܡ̇ܢ ܘܗܟܢ ܕܠܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܝܢ ܒܗ̇ܘ ܕܣܝܡ .  ܒܪܢܫܐ ܓܝܪ ܥܠ ܗ̇ܘ ܡ̇ܢ ܕܣܝܡ ܥܠ ܐܢܫ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܡܬܐܡܪ ܆ ܒܗ̇ܘ ܕܝܢ ܕܣܝܡ ܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ . ܠܘ ܓܝܪ ܒܐܢܫ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ .  ܗ̣ܘ ܗܟܘܬ ܕܝܢ ܘܚܝܘܬܐ ܥܠ ܗ̇ܘ ܡ̇ܢ ܕܣܝܡ ܡܬܐܡܪܐ ܥܠ ܐܢܫ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܆ ܠܐ ܕܝܢ ܐܝܬܝܗ̇ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܒܐܢܫ ܒܪܢܫܐ .  ܬܘܒ ܕܝܢ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܒܗ̇ܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܐܝܬܝܗܘܢ ܫܡܐ ܡ̇ܢ ܘܠܐ ܡܕܡ ܟ̇ܠܐ ܕܢܬܩܛܪܓ ܒܙܒܢ ܕܗ̇ܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܆ ܡܠܬܐ ܕܝܢ ܠܐ ܡܫܟܚܐ .14  ܕܐܘܣܝ̈ܣ ܕܝܢ ܬܪܝܢܝܬܐ ܘܡܠܬܐ ܘܫܡܐ ܡܬܩܛܪܓܝܢ ܥܠ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܣܝܡ . ܠܡܠܬܐ ܓܝܪ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ ܘܕܚܝܘܬܐ ܥܠ ܐܢܫ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܡܩܛܪܓ ܐܢܬ .  ܡܕܝܢ ܠܐ ܬܗܘܐ ܐܘܣܝܐ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܒܗ̇ܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܐܝܬܝܗܘܢ ܀  ܠܘ ܕܝܢ ܕܝܠܢܝܐ ܕܐܘܣܝܐ ܗܢܐ ܆ ܐܠܐ ܘܫܘܚܠܦܐ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܠܘ ܒܗ̇ܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ .  ܗܠܟܢ . ܓܝܪ ܘܬܪ̈ܝܢܝ ܪ̈ܓܠܐ ܥܠ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܡ̇ܢ ܡܬܐܡܪ ܥܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܆ ܒܗ̇ܘ ܕܝܢ ܕܣܝܡ ܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ . ܠܘ ܓܝܪ ܒܒܪܫܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܬܪ̈ܢܝ ܪ̈ܓܠܐ ܘܠܐ ܗܠܟܢ .  ܡܠܬܐ ܓܝܪ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܫܘܚܠܦܐ ܡܬܩܛܪܓܐ ܥܠ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܡܬܐܡܪ ܫܘܚܠܦܐ .ܕܐܝܟ ܐܝܟܢ .  ܕܐܢ ܗܠܟܐ ܡܬܐܡܪ ܥܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܆ ܘܡܠܬܐ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܡܗܠܟܐ ܥܠ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܬܬܩܛܪܓ . ܗܠܟܢ ܓܝܪ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܒܪܢܫܐ .  ܠܐ ܕܝܢ ܢܫܓܫܢ ܠܢ ܡܢ̈ܘܬܐ ܕܐܘܣܝ̈ܣ ܕܐܝܟ ܕܒܗܠܝܢ ܕܣܝܡܢ ܒܟܘܠܢܝ̈ܬܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܝܢ ܆ ܕܕܠܡܐ ܡܬܘܡ ܢܬܐܠܨ ܕܠܘ ܐܘܣܝ̈ܣ ܢܐܡܪ ܠܗܠܝܢ ܕܐܝܬܝܗܝܢ .  ܠܘ ܓܝܪ ܗܟܢܐ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܒܗ̇ܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܐܬܐܡܪ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܐܝܟ ܡܢ̈ܘܬܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܝܢ ܒܡܕܡ ܀ 
وقد يَعُمُّ كلَّ جوهر أنه ليس في موضوع ،  فإن الجوهر الأول ليس يقال على موضوع ، ولا هو في موضوع .  والجواهر الثواني قد يظهر بهذا الوجه أنه ليس شيءٌ منها في موضوعْ .  فإن الإنسان يقال على موضوع ، أي على إنسانٍ ما ؛ وليس هو في موضوعٍ ، أي فيه . وذلك أن الإنسان ليس هو في إنسان ما ؛  وكذلك أيضا الحي يقال على الموضوع ، أي على إنسانٍ ما ، وليس الحيُّ في إنسانٍ ما .  وأيضا التي في موضوع ، فليس مانعٌ يمنع من أن يكون أسمُها في حالٍ من الأحوال يُحْمل على موضوع . وأما قولها فلا سبيل إلى أن يُحملَ عليه .  فأما الجواهر الثواني فإنه يّحملَ على الموضوع قولُها واسمُها، فإنك تحمل على إنسانٍ ما قولَ الإنسان وقولَ الحي .  فيجب من ذلك أن الجوهر ليس هو مما في موضوع ،  إلا أنّ هذا ليس بخاصّة للجوهر ، لكن الفصلَ أيضا هو مما ليس في موضوع ،  فإن الماشي وذا الرِّجْلين يقالان على موضوع ، أن على الإنسان ، وليسا في موضوع ، وذلك أن ذا الرِّجْلين ليس هو في الإنسان ، ولا الماشي .  وقول الفصل أيضا محمول على الذي يقال عليه الفصل ،  مثـال ذلك أنّ المَشَّاء أن كان يقال على الإنسان فإن قول ”المَشَّاء“ محمول على الإنسان ، وذلك أن الإنسان مشَّاء  – ولا تُغْلِطْنا أجزاءُ الجواهر فتوهِمَنا أنها موجودة في موضوعات ، أي في كلياتها ، حيى يضطرَّنا الأمر إلى أن نقول إنها ليست جواهر ،  لأنه لم يكن قول ما يقال في موضوعٍ على هذا الطريق على أنه في شيءٍ كجزء منه . 
22. QUOD COMMUNE SIT SUBSTANTIIS . IN SUBIECTO NON ESSE.
Commune est autem omni substantiæ in subiecto non esse. Állên substantiis íst keméine . neuuésin án demo únderin . s. uuánda sie accidentia nesínt. 
Prima enim substantia . nec de subiecto dicitur nec in subiecto est. Tíu níderôsta substantia nehabit únder íro ándera . fóne déro sî uuérde gespróchen . nóh sî nelígit án ánderro . uuánda nehéin substantia nelígit án ánderro.  Constat uero etiam sic quidem . quia nulla secundarum substantiarum est in subiecto. Tánnân skînet táz nehéin secunda in subjecto nelígit . s. uuánda prima nelígit.  Etenim homo de subiecto quidem aliquo homine dicitur . in subiecto nullo est. Táz éina hábit homo âna daz ánder . kespróchen uuírdit ér fóne demo únderin . áber án ímo neíst ér.Neque enim homo est in aliquo homine. nóh homo neíst án cicerone. Ér íst sélbêr homo.  Similiter autem et animal de subiecto quidem dicitur de aliquo homine . non est ' autem animal in aliquo homine. animal hábit óuh taz éina. Íz uuírdit kespróchen uóne cicerone . íz neíst áber án ímo. Cicero trégit íro námin ér netrégit sîe sélben. Sîu uuérdent fóne ímo predicati náls portati.  Amplius Ferním îo nóh . s. uuîo substantiæ geskéiden sîn . uóne dîen díu in subiecto sínt. Eorum quȩ sunt in subiecto . nomen quidem de subiecto aliquoties nihil prohibet predicari . rationem uero impossibile est.  Secundarum uero substantiarum de subiectis ratio predicatur et nomen. Téro námo . díu in subiecto sínt . i. accidentium . mág uuóla uuîlôn gegében uuérden demo subiecto. sô album tûot álbo . diffinitio nîomêr. Áber dér námo . únde díu diffinitio secundarum substantiarum . tíe dóh kelîh sínt témo in subiecto . tíu uuérdint péidiu gegében íro subiecto . i. primȩ substantiȩ. Rationem uero hominis et animalis de aliquo homine predicabis. Diffinitionem hominis únde animalis spríchist tû uóne cicerone. Sensatum corpus . íst íro állero diffinito.  Quare non erit substantia eorum quȩ sunt in subiecto. Sensus est. Prima substantia díu neíst in subiecto . nóh kelîh temo in subiecto . Tóh áber secunda hábe geméine subiectum mít accidentibus tîuder hézent in subiecto . únde ímo dârána gelîh sî . sî neíst tóh nîeht in subiecto. Pe díu neíst nehéin substantia in subiecto. Tísa réda tûot ér nû sûochendo proprium substantiæ. Állero díngolîh pechnâet man îo uóne sînemo proprio. Ér hábitî iz nû ' uúndin .úbe iz fúrder nerúhti. Ideo sequitur. 

23. QUOD NON SOLI SIT SUBSTANTIȨ . IN SUBIECTO NON ESSE.
Non est autem hoc substantiȩ proprium . sed et differentiæ . illud est quod in subiecto non est. Táz nemág nîeht éigin sîn substantȩ . dáz sî án demo únderin neíst . uuánda iz óuh íst differentiȩ. 
Bipes enim et gressibile de subiecto quidem dicitur homine . in subiecto autem nullo est. Fóne homine uuírdit kespróchen îouuederiu differentia . bipes ióh gressible. Íro námin trégit ér . sîa sélbûn netrégit ér. Fóne démo sî uuírdit kespróchen . án démo neíst sî. Non enim in homine est bipes neque gressibile. Án homine neíst bipes nóh gressibile . ér íst iz sélbo.  Ratio quoque differentiæ de eo dicitur . de quo ipsa differentia predicatur. Fóne démo sî gespróchen uuírdit . fóne démo uuírdit óuh íro diffinitio gespróchen.  Uelut si gressibile de homine dicatur . et ratio gressibilis de homine predicatur. Uuírdit tér námo differentiæ gespróchen uóne homine . i. gressibile . sô uuírdit óuh íro diffinitio gespróchen uóne ímo. Gressibilis diffinitio íst . quod per terram pedibus ambulat. Táz íst homo. Ideo sequitur. Est enim homo gressibilis. 

24. PARTES SVBSTANTIARUM NON ESSE ACCIDENTIA QVAMVIS SINT IN SVBIECTO.
Non nos uero conturbent substantiarum partes . quȩ ita sunt in toto quasi in aliquo subiecto . ne forte cogamur aliquando confiteri . eas ' non esse substantias. Únsih nesúlin trîegin . téil án állemo stândiu sámoso síu accidentia sîn . nals substantiȩ. Uuârîn sie accidentia . sô neuuârîn sie partes tero substantiae. Hóubit únde hénde sínt tes lîchámin téil . sô sínt óuh éste des póumis . uuénde des hûses . pe díu sínt kelîcho substantiæ partes unde totum. 
Non enim sic dicebantur esse ea quȩ sunt in subiecto . ut quasi partes essent. Accidentia nechád nîoman uuésin partes subiecti. 
It is a characteristic common to every substance not to be in a subject.  For a primary substance is neither said of a subject nor in a subject.  And as for secondary substances, it is obvious at once that they are not in a subject.  For man is said of the individual man as subject but is not in a subject: man is not in the individual man.  Similarly, animal also is said of the individual man as subject, but animal is not in the individual man.  Further, while there is nothing to prevent the name of what is in a subject from being sometimes predicated of the subject, it is impossible for the definition to be predicated.  But the definition of the secondary substances, as well as the name, is predicated of the subject: you will predicate the definition of man of the individual man, and also that of animal.  No substance, therefore, is in a subject.  This is not, however, peculiar to substance, since the differentia also is not in a subject.  For footed and two-footed are said of man as subject but are not in a subject; neither two-footed nor footed is in man.  Moreover, the definition of the differentia is predicated of that of which the differentia is said.  For example, if footed is said of man the definition of footed will also be predicated of man; for man is footed.  We need not be disturbed by any fear that we may be forced to say that the parts of a substance, being in a subject (the whole substance), are not substances.  For when we spoke of things in a subject we did not mean things belonging in something as parts. 
(33) Ὑπάρχει δὲ ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ ταῖς διαφοραῖς τὸ πάντα (34) συνωνύμως ἀπ’ αὐτῶν λέγεσθαι·  πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ ἀπὸ τούτων (35) κατηγορίαι ἤτοι κατὰ τῶν ἀτόμων κατηγοροῦνται ἢ κατὰ (36) τῶν εἰδῶν.  ἀπὸ μὲν γὰρ τῆς πρώτης οὐσίας οὐδεμία ἐστὶ (37) κατηγορία, —κατ’ οὐδενὸς γὰρ ὑποκειμένου λέγεται·—  τῶν δὲ (38) δευτέρων οὐσιῶν τὸ μὲν εἶδος κατὰ τοῦ ἀτόμου κατηγο(39)ρεῖται, τὸ δὲ γένος καὶ κατὰ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ κατὰ τοῦ ἀτόμου·  (3b1) ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ αἱ διαφοραὶ καὶ κατὰ τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ κατὰ (2) τῶν ἀτόμων κατηγοροῦνται.  καὶ τὸν λόγον δὲ ἐπιδέχονται (3) αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι τὸν τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τὸν τῶν γενῶν, καὶ τὸ (4) εἶδος δὲ τὸν τοῦ γένους.  —ὅσα γὰρ κατὰ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου (5) λέγεται, καὶ κατὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ῥηθήσεται·—  ὡσαύτως (6) δὲ καὶ τὸν τῶν διαφορῶν λόγον ἐπιδέχεται τά τε εἴδη (7) καὶ τὰ ἄτομα·  συνώνυμα δέ γε ἦν ὧν καὶ τοὔνομα κοινὸν (8) καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός.  ὥστε πάντα τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν οὐσιῶν καὶ (9) τῶν διαφορῶν συνωνύμως λέγεται. 
Եւ է՛ գոյացութեանցն, և տարբերութեանցըն, ամէնայն փալանունաբա՛ր ի նոցանէն ասիլ։  քանզի ամէնայնք, իսոցա՛յցն ստորոգուտիւնք, կամ զամհատիցն ստորոգին, կամ զտեսակացն։  քանզի զառաջընմէ՛ գոյացութենէն, և ո՛չ է ստորոգութիւնք։ քանզի և ո՛չ զմիոյ ումեքէ զենթակայէ ասի։  իսկ երկրորդա՛ց գոյացութեանցն, տեսա՛կն, զանհատէ՛ն ստորոգի; և սեռն զտեսակէ՛ն և զանհատէն:  սոյնպէս և տարբերութիւնքն զտեսակա՛ցն և զանհատի՛ցն ստորոգի՝ն։  և զբանն ընդունին առաջինք գոյացութիւնքն, զսեռիցն և զտեսակա՛ցն։ և տեսա՛կքըն զսերիցըն։  քանզի որքան միանգամ զստորոգիցելոյն ասի, եւ զենթակայէ՛ն ճառեսցի։   սո՛յնպէս և զտարբերութեանցըն բան, ընդունի՛ն տեսակքըն և անհատքն։  և փաղանո՛ւն է՚, որոց և անո՛ւնն է հասարա՛կ, 115 և բանն նո՛յն։   ապաուրեմն, ամէնայն գոյացութեանցքն, և տարբերա՛ցքն փաղանունարար ասին: 
(86) Inest autem substantiis et differentiis ab his omnia uniuoce (87) praedicari.  Omnia enim quae ab his praedicamenta sunt aut de (88) indiuiduis praedicantur aut de speciebus.  Et a prima quidem substantia (89) nulla est praedicatio (de nullo enim subiecto dicitur),  secundarum (90) uero sub st antiarum species quidem de in diuiduo praedicatur, genus (91) autem et de specie et de indiuiduo;  similiter autem et differentiae et (92) de speciebus et de indiuiduis praedicantur.  Rationem quoque (93) suscipiunt primae substantiae specierum et generum, et species (94) generis  (quaecumque enim de praedicato dicuntur, eadem et de (95) subiecto dicentur);  similiter autem et differentiarum rationem (96) suscipiunt species et indiuidua;  uniuoca autem erant quorum et nomen (97) commune est et ratio.  Quare omnia a substantiis et differentiis (98) uniuoce praedicantur. 
ܐܝܬܝܗ̇ ܕܝܢ ܠܐܘܣܝ̈ܣ ܘܠܫܘ̈ܚܠܦܐ ܕܟܠܗܘܢ ܡܥܪܙܠܘܬܐ ܫܡܗܐܝܬ ܡܢܗܘܢ ܢܬܐܡܪܘܢ .  ܟܠܗܝܢ ܓܝܪ ܩܛܝܓܘܪ̈ܝܘܣ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܐܘ ܥܠ ܠܐ ܡܬܦܣܘ̈ܢܐ ܡܬܩܛܪܓܢ ı ܐܘ ܥܠ ܐܕ̈ܫܐ .  ܡܢ ܐܘܣܝܐ ܡ̇ܢ ܓܝܪ ܩܕܡܝܬܐ ܘܠܐ ܚܕܐ ܩܛܝܓܘܪܝܐ ܐܝܬܝܗ̇ ܘܠܐ ܓܝܪ ܥܠ ܚܕ ܡܕܡ ܕܣܝܡ ܡܬܐܡܪܐ .  ܡܢ ܐܘܣܝ̈ܣ ܕܝܢ ܬܪ̈ܝܢܝܬܐ ܐܕܫܐ ܡ̇ܢ ܥܠ ܠܐ ܡܬܦܣܩܢܐ ܡܬܩܛܪܓ ܆ ܓܢܣܐ ܕܝܢ ܘܥܠ ܠܐ ܡܬܦܣܩ̈ܢܐ ܘܥܠ ܐܕ̈ܫܐ .  ܗ̣ܘ ܗܟܘܬ ܕܝܢ ܘܫܘܚ̈ܠܦܐ ܘܥܠ ܐܕ̈ܫܐ ܘܥܠ ܠܐ ܡܬܦܣܩ̈ܢܐ ܡܬܩܛܪܓܝܢ .  ܘܠܡܠܬܐ ܕܝܢ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܐܕ̈ܫܐ ܘܕܓܢ̈ܣܐ ܡܩܒܠܢ ܐܘܣܝ̈ܣ ܩܕܡܝ̈ܬܐ ܆ ܘܐܕܫܐ ܕܝܢ ܠܗ̇ܝ ܕܓܢܣܐ .  ܟܠܗܝܢ ܓܝܪ ܕܥܠ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܡܬܩܛܪܓ ܡܬܐܡܪܢ ܘܥܠ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܢܬܐܡܪܢ .  ܗ̣ܘ ܗܟܘܬ ܕܝܢ ܘܠܡܠܬܐ ܕܫܘܚ̈ܠܦܐ ܘܐܕ̈ܫܐ ܘܠܐ ܡܬܦܣܩ̈ܢܐ ܡܩܒܠܝܢ .  ܡܥܪ̈ܙܠܝ ܫܡܐ ܕܝܢ ܐܝܬܝܗܘܢ ܗܘܘ ܗܢܘܢ ܕܕܝܠܗܘܢ ܘܫܡܐ ܓܘܐ ܘܡܠܬܐ ܗ̣ܝ ܟܕ ܗ̣ܝ .  ܡܕܝܢ ܟܠܗܘܢ ܡܢ ܐܘܣܝ̈ܣ ܘܡܢ ܫܘܚ̈ܠܦܐ 15 ܡܥܪܙܠܘܬ ܫܡܗܐܝܬ ܡܬܐܡܪܝܢ ܀ 
ومما يوجد للجواهر وللفصول أن جميع ما يقال منهما إنما يقال على طريق المتواطئة أسماؤها ،  فإنّ كل حَمْلٍ يكون منهما فهو إما أن يحمل على الأشخاص ، وإما على الأنواع ؛  فإنه ليس من الجواهر الأول حَمْلٌ أصلا، إذ كان ليس يقال على موضوعٍ ما ألبتةَ .  فأما ‹في› الجواهر الثواني فالنوع يُحْمل على الشخص ، والجنس على النوع وعلى الشخص .  وكذلك الفصول تحمل على الأنواع وعلى الأشخاص .  الجواهر الأُوَل تقبل قول أنواعها وأجناسها ، والنوع يقبل قولَ جنسه ،  إذ كان كلُّ ما قيل على المحمول فإنه يقال أيضا على الموضوع ؛  وكذلك تقبل الأنواعُ والأشخاصُ قولَ فصولها أيضا .  وقد كانت المتواطئَةُ أسماؤها هي التي الاسمُ عامٌّ لها والقول واحدٌ بعينه أيضا ؛  فيجب أن يكون جميع ما يقال من الجواهر ومن الفصول فإنما يقال على طريق المتواطئة أسماؤها . 
25. ITEM QUID NON SIT SOLI SUBSTANTIAE.
Inest autem substantiis et differentiis . ab his omnia uniuoce predicari. Substantis . s. secundis únde differentiis íst keméine . uóne íro subiectis kespróchen uuérdin uniuoce. 
Omnia enim quȩ ab his predicata sunt aut de indiuiduis predicantur aut de speciebus. Ál dáz tû uóne ín chîst . táz chîst tû fóne íro únderên.  A prima namque substantia nulla predicatio est. De nullo enim subiecto dicitur. Cato nehábit únder ímo nehéin subiectum . fóne démo ér múge gespróchen uuérdin.  Secundarum uero substantiarum . species quidem de indiuiduo predicatur. Fóne ímo uuírdit homo gespróchen. Genus autem et de specie et de indiuiduo. Animal uóne béidên ióh homine ióh catone.  Similiter autem et differentiȩ . et de speciebus et de indiuiduis predicantur. Gressibile chît man óuh fóne béidên ' ióh homine ' ióh catone. Táz íst tíu éina predication . i. nominis.  Rationem quoque suscipiunt primȩ substantiæ specierum et generum, et species generis. Cato dér ze únderôst lígit . hábit diffinitionem déro óberôn . i. hominis et animalis. Uuánda ér íst substantia animata sensibilis. Sô íst óuh homo animalis . táz íst tíu sélba. Tia dû chîst fóne démo óberin . dîa chîst tû uóne demo únderin.  No Althochdeutsch  Similiter autem et differentiarum rationem suscipiunt species et indiuidua. Homo únde cato díu sínt táz . quod pedibus per terram potest ambulare. Táz íst diffinitio gressibilis. Táz íst tíu gemácha predicatio . i. diffinitionis.  Uniuoca autem erunt quorum et nomen commune est et ratio. Tíu sínt îo uniuoca . díu béidiu geméine hábint . nomen ióh rationem . i. diffinitionem.  Quare omnia quȩ a substantiis et differentiis . uniuoce praedicantur. Fóne díu uuízîst . so uuáz man chîd uóne substantiis secundis unde differentiis . táz uuésin geméine . ín únde íro subiectis. Uuízîst óuh differentiam sámint uuésin . substantiam ióh accidens . unde neuuéder dúrh síh. 
It is a characteristic of substances and differentiae that all things called from them are so called synonymously.  For all the predicates from them are predicated either of the individuals or of the species.  (For from a primary substance there is no predicate, since it is said of no subject;  and as for secondary substances, the species is predicated of the individual, the genus both of the species and of the individual.  Similarly, differentiae too are predicated both of the species and of the individuals.)  And the primary substances admit the definition of the species and of the genera, and the species admits that of the genus;  for everything said of what is predicated will be said of the subject also.  Similarly, both the species and the individuals admit the definition of the differentiae.  But synonymous things were precisely those with both the name in common and the same definition.  Hence all the things called from substances and differentiae are so called synonymously. 
(10) Πᾶσα δὲ οὐσία δοκεῖ τόδε τι σημαίνειν.  ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν (11) τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀναμφισβήτητον καὶ ἀληθές ἐστιν ὅτι (12) τόδε τι σημαίνει·  ἄτομον γὰρ καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ τὸ δηλούμε(13)νόν ἐστιν.  ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶν φαίνεται μὲν ὁμοίως (14) τῷ σχήματι τῆς προσηγορίας τόδε τι σημαίνειν, ὅταν εἴπῃ (15) ἄνθρωπον ἢ ζῷον· οὐ μὴν ἀληθές γε, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ποιόν (16) τι σημαίνει,  —οὐ γὰρ ἕν ἐστι τὸ ὑποκείμενον ὥσπερ ἡ πρώτη (17) οὐσία, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πολλῶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος λέγεται καὶ τὸ (18) ζῷον·—  οὐχ ἁπλῶς δὲ ποιόν τι σημαίνει, ὥσπερ τὸ λευκόν·  (19) οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο σημαίνει τὸ λευκὸν ἀλλ’ ἢ ποιόν, τὸ δὲ (20) εἶδος καὶ τὸ γένος περὶ οὐσίαν τὸ ποιὸν ἀφορίζει, —ποιὰν (21) γάρ τινα οὐσίαν σημαίνει.—  ἐπὶ πλεῖον δὲ τῷ γένει ἢ τῷ εἴ(22)δει τὸν ἀφορισμὸν ποιεῖται·  ὁ γὰρ ζῷον εἰπὼν ἐπὶ πλεῖον περι(23)λαμβάνει ἢ ὁ τὸν ἄνθρωπον. 
Պրակք տասներորդ։—
Բայց ամէնայն գոյացութիւն, թուի զա՛յս ինչ նչանակել։ 
արդ՛ մակ առաջնոց գոյացութեանցն, աներկուանալի. և ճշմար՛տ է. զի զա՛յս ինչ նշանակէ։  քանզի անհատ և մի թուով զեկուցեալն է։   իսկ երկըրորդաց գոյացութեանցն երևին, է՛, նմանապէս ձևով առասութեանն զա՛յս ինչ նշանակել։յործամ ասիցէ, մարդ կամ կենդանի։ այլ սակայն ո՛չ ճշմարիտ, այլ առաւել որա՛կ իմն նշանակէ։  քանզի ո՛չ մի է, ենթակայն, որպէս առաջին գոյացութիւնն, այլ զբազմաց մարդն ասի և կենդանին։  ո՛չ վայրաբար որա՛կ ինչ նշանակէ, որպէս սպիտակն։  քանզի ո՛չ այլ ինչ նշանակէ սպիտակն, այղ որա՛կ: իսկ տեսա՛կն և սե՛ռն, առի գոյացութի՛ւնն զորակն իբա՛ցորոշէ։ քանցի որա՛կ իմն, գոյացութիւնն նշանակէ։  բայց մակաւելի, սեռի՛ւն քան տեսակաւն զբացորոշութիւնն առնէ:   քանզի որ կենդանի, է՛, ասէ, մակաւելի՛ բակառէ, քան թե որ զմարդն: 
(99) Omnis autem substantia uidetur hoc aliquid significare.  Et in primis (100) quidem substantiis indubitabile et uerum est quoniam hoc aliquid (101) significat;  indiuiduum enim et unum numero est quod significatur.  In (102) secundis uero substantiis uidetur quidem similiter ad appellationis (103) figuram hoc aliquid significare, quando quis dixerit hominem uel (104) animal; non tamen uerum est sed quale aliquid significat  (neque enim (105) unum est quod subiectum est quemadmodum prima substantia sed de (106) pluribus homo dicitur et animal);  non autem simpliciter qualitatem (107) significat, quemadmodum album  (nihil enim aliud significat album quam (108) qualitatem), genus autem et species circa substantiam qualitatem (109) determinant (qualem enim quandam substantiam significant).  Plus autem (110) genere quam specie determinatio fit:  dicens enim animal plus (111) complectitur quam hominem. 
ܟܠ ܐܘܣܝܐ ܕܝܢ ܡܣܬܒܪܐ ܕܗܢܐ ܡܕܡ ܡܫܘܕܥܐ .  ܥܠ ܐܘܣܝ̈ܣ ܡ̇ܢ ܗܟܝܠ ܩܕܡܝ̈ܬܐ ܠܐ ܡܬܚܪܝܢܝܬܐ ܘܫܪܝܪܬܐ ܐܝܬܝܗ̇ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܗܢܐ ܡܕܡ ܡܫܘܕܥܐ .  ܠܐ ܡܬܦܣܩܢܐ ܓܝܪ ܘܚܕ ܒܡܢܝܢܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܡܬܝܕܥ .  ܡܢ ܐܘܣܝ̈ܣ ܕܝܢ ܬܪ̈ܝܢܝܬܐ ܡܬܚܙܝܐ ܡ̇ܢ ܒܗ̇ ܒܪܡܘܬܐ ܒܐܣܟܝܡܐ ܕܟܘܢܝܐ ܕܗܢܐ ܡܕܡ ܡܫܘܕܥܐ ܆ ܐܡܬܝ ܕܢܐܡܪ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܐܘ ܚܝܘܬܐ . ܠܘ ܕܝܢ ܫܪܝܪܬܐ . ܐܠܐ ܝܬܝܪܐܝܬ ܐܝܢܐ ܡܕܡ ܡܫܘܕܥܐ .  ܠܘ ܓܝܪ ܚܕ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܣܝܡ ܐܟܙܢܐ ܕܐܘܣܝܐ ܩܕܡܝܬܐ ܆ ܐܠܐ ܥܠ ܣܓܝ̈ܐܐ ܡܬܐܡܪ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܘܚܝܘܬܐ .  ܠܘ ܕܝܢ ܦܫܝܛܐܝܬ ܐܝܢܐ ܡܫܘܕܥܝ ܆ ܐܟܙܢܐ ܕܚܘܪܐ .  ܠܐ ܓܝܪ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܡܕܡ ܡܫܘܕܥ ܚܘܪܐ ܆ ܐܠܐ ܐܢ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܐܝܢܐ . ܐܕܫܐ ܕܝܢ ܘܓܢܣܐ ܠܘܬ ܐܘܣܝܐ ܦ̇ܪܫ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܐܝܢܐ . ܐܘܣܝܐ ܓܝܪ ܡܕܡ ܐܝܢܝܬܐ ܡܫܘܕܥ .  ܐܝܟ ܕܒܣܓܝ ܕܝܢ ı ܒܓܢܣܐ ܘܒܐܕܫܐ ܠܦܘܪܫܐ ܥܒ̇ܕ .  ܗ̇ܘ ܓܝܪ ܕܚܝܘܬܐ [ܢܐܡܪ] ܆ ܐܝܟ ܕܒܣܓܝ ܚܒ̇ܫ ܐܘ ܟܕ ܠܒܪܢܫܐ ܀ 
وقد يُظَنُّ بكل جوهر أنه يدل على مقصود إليه بالإشارة .  فأما الجواهر الأول فبالحق الذي لا مِرْيةَ فيه أنها تدلّ على مقصودٍ إليه بالإشارة ،  لأن ما يستـدلّ عليه منها شخصٌ وواحد بالعدد .  وأما الجواهرالثواني فقد يُوهم اشتباهُ شكل اللقب منها أنها تدلّ على مقصودٍ إليه بالإشارة كقولك : الإنسانُ الحيوانُ – وليس ذلك حقا ، بال الأَوْلى أنها تدلّ على أي شىء ،  لأن الموضوع ليس بواحدٍ كالجوهر الأوّل ، لكن الإنسان يقال على كثير ، وكذلك الحيوان –  إلا أنها ليست تدلّ على أي شىء على الإطلاق بمنزلة الأبيض ،  فإن الأبيض ليس يدلّ على شيء غير أي شيء . فأما النوع والجنس فإنهما يقرّران أيّ شيء في الجوهر ؛ وذلك أنهما إنما يدلان على جوهر ثانٍ ما .  إلا أن الإقرار بالجنس يكون أكثَر حصراً من الإقرار بالنوع ،  فإن القائل :”حيوان “ قد جمع بقوله أكثر مما يجمع القائل : ”إنسان“ . 
26. ITEM QUOD INEST SUBSTANTIAE . SED NON OMNI.
Omnis autem substantia uidetur hoc aliquid significare. Mánne dúnchit îo substantia éin díng bezéichnen. 
Et in primis quidem substantiis . indubitabile et uerum est . quoniam hoc aliquid significat.  Indiuiduum enim et unum ' est numero quod significat. Án catone únde án cicerone. íst iz quísso uâr . dáz sî éin bezéichenet. Íro îouuéderis námo bezéichenet éin éinluzze díng únde únspaltîg.  In secundis uero substantiis uidetur quidem similiter appellationis figuram hoc aliquid significare . quando quis dixerit hominem uel animal . non tamen uerum est . sed quale aliquid significat. Án homine unde animali mág mánne dúnchin . uóne déro gelîchi dés éinlúzzen námin . táz siu bezéichenên éinlúzze díng . táz neíst uuâr nîeht . síu bezéchenit mêr uuîolîh díng.  Neque enim unum est quod subiectum est . s. secundȩ substantiæ . quem ad modum prima substantia . s. unum est . sed de pluribus homo dicitur et animal. Táz fóne mánegên gespróchen íst . ut homo et animal . táz neíst éinlúzze nîeht . sô cato íst. Tíu communio . dáz íst qualitas.  Non autem simpliciter qualitatem significat . s. secunda substantia . quemadmodum album.  Nihil enim aliud significat album . quam qualitatem. Homo únde animal nebezéichenent nîeht . sô bárlîcho uuîolîchi. sô uuîzî tûot. Uuîzî nebezéichenet nîeht . âne uuîolichi.Genus autem et species circa substantiam qualitatem determinant. Homo únde animal sézzent íro qualitatem úmbe dia substantiam . i. úmbesézzent . únde úmberíngint míte dia substantiam. Quale enim . s. hominis et animalis . quandam substantiam ' significat. Íro uuîolîchi bezéichenit substantiam . s. tíu án íro subiectis íst. Sî neíst nîeht sô getân sô diu bára . díu lígit àn dero substantia . dísiu úmbegât sia. Sô getân qualitas . héizit substantalis qualitas.  Plus autem in genere in quam specie determinatio fit.  Dicens enim animal plus complectitur quam hominem. Mít animali uuírdit uuîdtôr gemárchôt . tánne mít homine. Tíu márcha gât úmbe álliu lébendiu . únz tára nemárchôt homo nîeht. Éniu communio íst mêra dánne dísiu. Nóh neíst îo nîeht fúnden proprium substantiȩ. Pe díu sûochet ér iz îo nóh. 
Every substance seems to signify a certain ‘this’.  As regards the primary substances, it is indisputably true that each of them signifies a certain ‘this’;  for the thing revealed is individual and numerically one.  But as regards the secondary substances, though it appears from the form of the name — when one speaks of man or animal — that a secondary substance likewise signifies a certain ‘this’, this is not really true; rather, it signifies a certain qualification  — for the subject is not, as the primary substance is, one, but man and animal are said of many things.  However, it does not signify simply a certain qualification, as white does.  White signifies nothing but a qualification, whereas the species and the genus mark off the qualification of substance — they signify substance of a certain qualification.  (One draws a wider boundary with the genus than with the species,  for in speaking of animal one takes in more than in speaking of man.) 
(24) Ὑπάρχει δὲ ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ τὸ μηδὲν αὐταῖς ἐναντίον (25) εἶναι.  τῇ γὰρ πρώτῃ οὐσίᾳ τί ἂν εἴη ἐναντίον; οἷον τῷ (26) τινὶ ἀνθρώπῳ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον, οὐδέ γε τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἢ τῷ (27) ζῴῳ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον.  οὐκ ἴδιον δὲ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ καὶ (28) ἐπ’ ἄλλων πολλῶν οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ·  τῷ γὰρ διπήχει οὐδέν ἐστιν (29) ἐναντίον, οὐδὲ τοῖς δέκα, οὐδὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδενί, εἰ μή τις (30) τὸ πολὺ τῷ ὀλίγῳ φαίη ἐναντίον εἶναι ἢ τὸ μέγα τῷ μικρῷ·  τῶν (31) δὲ ἀφωρισμένων ποσῶν οὐδὲν οὐδενὶ ἐναντίον ἐστίν. 
Պրակք ճա
Բայց է՛ գոյացութեանցն, և ո՛չ ինչ նոցա նէրհականըն գոլ։ 
քանզի նախկին գոյացութեանն, զի՛նչ ինչ լինիցի ներհական: ո՛րզան։ ումեմրն մարդոջ, կամ կենդանւոջն ո՛չ ինչ է մերհական։  բայց ո՛չ է այս ուրոյն գոյացութեան: այլ և մակ այլո՛ցն։ ո՛րցան։ ի վերայ քանակին։  քանզի երկկանկընոջն ո՛չ ինչ է ներհական։ և ո՛չ տասանցն։ և ո՛չ այսպիսեաց, ո՛չ միում 116 ումեք: բայց եթե ոք զշատն, սակաւումն ասասցէ ներհակա՛ն գոլ: կամ զմեծն, փոքո՛ւմն։  իսկ բացորոշեցելոցն, ո՛չ ինչ։ ո՛չ ումեք ներհակա՛ն է: 
(112) Inest autem substantiis et nihil illis esse contrarium.  Primae enim (113) substantiae quid erit contrarium? Ut alicui homini; nihil enim est (114) contrarium; at uero nec homini nec animali nihil est contrarium.  Non (115) est autem hoc substantiae proprium sed etiam multorum aliorum, ut (116) quantitatis;  bicubito enim nihil est contrarium, at uero nec decem nec (117) alicui talium, nisi quis multa paucis dicat esse contraria uel magnum (118) paruo;  determinatorum uero nullum nulli est contrarium. 
ܐܝܬܝܗ̇ ܕܝܢ ܠܐܘ̈ܣܝܣ ܘܗ̇ܝ ܕܐܦ̣ܠܐ ܚܕ ܡܕܡ ܣܩܘܒܠܝܐ ܢܗܘܐ .  ܠܐܘܣܝܐ ܓܝܪ ܩܕܡܝܬܐ ܡ̇ܢ ܡܕܡ ܣܩܘܒܠܝܐ ܢܗܘܢ . ܕܐܝܟ ܐܝܟܢ ܠܐܢܫ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܘܠܐ ܡܕܡ ܓܝܪ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܣܩܘܒܠܝܐ .  ܠܘ ܕܝܢ ܕܝܠܢܝܐ ܕܐܘܣܝܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܗܢܐ ܆ ܐܠܐ ܘܐܦ ܥܠ ܐܚܪ̈ܢܐ ܣܓܝ̈ܐܐ . ܕܐܝܟ ܐܝܟܢ . ܥܠ ܟܡܝܘܬܐ .  ܠܗ̇ܘ ܓܝܪ ܕܬܪ̈ܬܝܢ ܐܡ̈ܐ ܘܠܐ ܡܕܡ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܣܩܘܒܠܝܐ . ܘܠܐ ܕܝܢ ܠܥܣܪܐ ܘܠܐ ܠܡܕܡ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܐܝܟ ܗܠܝܢ . ܐܢ ܗ̣ܘ ܕܐܢܫ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܣܓܝ ܠܗ̇ܘ ܕܒܨܝܪ ܠܐ ܢܐܡܪ ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܣܩܘܒܠܝܐ ܐܘ ܪܒܐ ܠܗ̇ܘ ܙܥܘܪܐ ܀  ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܝܢ ܡܦܪܫܝܢ ܘܠܐ ܡܕܡ ܘܠܐ ܠܚܕ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܣܩܘܒܠܝܐ ܀ 
ومما للجواهر ايضا أنه لا مًضادَّ لها .  فماذا يضاد الجوهر الأوّل ، كإنسانٍ ما ! فإنه لام مضادّ له ؛ ولا للإنسان أيضا ، ولا للحيوان مضادُّ .  خاصا بالجوهر ، لكنه في أشياء أيضا كثيرةٍ غيره ، مثال ذلك في الكم :  فإنه ليس لذي الذراعين مضادٌّ ، ولا للعَشَرة ، ولا لشيء مما يجرى هذا المجرى ، إلا أن يقول قائل : إن القليل ضدّ الكثير ، أو الكبير ضدّ الصغير ،  لكن الكم المنفصل لا مُضادَّ له . 
27. ITEM QUOD INEST OMNI SUBSTANTIȨ . NON AUTEM SOLI.
Inest autem substantiis . et nihil illis esse contrarium. 
Primȩ enim substantiæ quid erit contrarium? Ut alicui homini nihil enim est contrarium. At uero nec homini nec animali nihil est contrarium. Állên substantiis íst keméine uuésin âne uuíderuuártin. Uuáz mág catoni sîn uuíderuuártîg . únde homini únde animali? Tíu héizint contraria . tíu uóne éinemo úrsprínge chómeniu . i. uóne éinemo genere . állero díngo úngelîchesten sínt . únde uérristin . únde únde éin ánderiu tîlegônt. Álso lîb únde tôd . téro genus ad alliquid íst. únde uuîz únde suárz . téro genus qualitas íst. Tíu nemúgin sámint sîn . uuánda íro natûra uuíderuuartîg íst. Sólih neíst substantia nîeht.  Non est autem hoc substantiae proprium . sed etiam multorum aliorum ut quantitatis. Tíz îo nóh nîeht úréiche substantiæ . íz íst óuh quantitatis únde ' ánderro díngo.  Bicubito enim nihil est contrarium. At uero nec decem . nec alicui talium. Táz zuéio élnôn láng . álde bréit íst . álde drîero . álde uîero . uuáz mág témo uuídere sîn? Álde sélbero zálo . sô zêeniu íst . únde zuéinzig? Nisi quis forte multa paucis dicat esse contraria. Uel magnum paruo. Éteuuer nestrîte . mánigiu dien únmánigên . mícheliu dien lúzzelên uuídeuuállôn. Táz sî souuîo iz sî.  Determinatorum uero nullum nulli est contrarium. Téro guíssotôn neíst îo nehéin ándermo uuíderuuártîg. Úmbe dîe úngeuuíssôten mág man strîten . tíu nîeht úrechis nesínt quantitatis . tíu échert quantitatis sínt . tíu nemág nîoman gezîhen dero uuíderuuártîgi. 
Another characteristic of substances is that there is nothing contrary to them.  For what would be contrary to a primary substance? For example, there is nothing contrary to an individual man, nor yet is there anything contrary to man or to animal.  This, however, is not peculiar to substance but holds of many other things also, for example, of quantity.  For there is nothing contrary to four-foot or to ten or to anything of this kind — unless someone were to say that many is contrary to few or large to small;  but still there is nothing contrary to any definite quantity. 
(32) Δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ οὐσία οὐκ ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ (33) ἧττον·  λέγω δὲ οὐχ ὅτι οὐσία οὐσίας οὐκ ἔστι μᾶλλον οὐσία, (34) —τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ εἴρηται ὅτι ἔστιν,—  ἀλλ’ ὅτι ἑκάστη (35) οὐσία τοῦθ’ ὅπερ ἐστὶν οὐ λέγεται μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον·  (36) οἷον εἰ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ οὐσία ἄνθρωπος, οὐκ ἔσται μᾶλλον (37) καὶ ἧττον ἄνθρωπος, οὔτε αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ οὔτε ἕτερος ἑτέ(38)ρου.  οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἕτερος ἑτέρου μᾶλλον ἄνθρωπος, ὥσπερ (4a1) τὸ λευκόν ἐστιν ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον λευκόν, καὶ κα(2)λὸν ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον·  καὶ αὐτὸ δὲ αὑτοῦ μᾶλλον (3) καὶ ἧττον λέγεται, οἷον τὸ σῶμα λευκὸν ὂν μᾶλλον (4) λευκὸν λέγεται νῦν ἢ πρότερον, καὶ θερμὸν ὂν μᾶλ(5)λον θερμὸν καὶ ἧττον λέγεται·  ἡ δέ γε οὐσία οὐδὲν (6) λέγεται, —οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος μᾶλλον νῦν ἄνθρωπος ἢ (7) πρότερον λέγεται, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδέν, ὅσα ἐστὶν (8) οὐσία·—  ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἐπιδέχοιτο ἡ οὐσία τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ (9) ἧττον. 
Պրակք՝։ երկոտասա՛ն։
Բայց թուի, գոյացութիւնն ոչ ընդունել զյաւետն և զնուազն։ 
և զա՛յս ասեմ, իբրու, ո՛չ թե գոյացութիւն քան զգոյացութիւն ո՛չ է առաւել գոյացութիւն։ քանզի զայս ահա ասացեալ է, զի է՛:  այլ զի իւրականչիւր գոյացութիւն, ա՛յս որ ինչ է՛ն, ո՛չ ասի յաւէտ և նուազ։  ո՛րզան։ թե է՛ այս գոյացութիւնըն։ մարդ: ո՛չ եղիցի առաւել և նուազ մարդ։ ո՛չ ինքն ինքեան, և ո՛չ այղ այղոյ։  քանզի ո՛չ է այլ քամ զայլ առաւել նարդ։ որպէս սպիտակն, է՛ այլ քամ զայլ առաել սպիտակ։  և ինքն ինքեան՚ յաւէտ և նուազ ասի: հի՛զան։ նարմին որ սպիտա՛կ է, առաւե՛լ սպիտա՛կ գոլ ասի. այժն քամ թե յառաջագոյն։ և որ ջե՛րմ է, առաւե՛լ ջերմ և նուազ ասի։  իսկ գոյացութիւն, ո՛չ ինչ առաւել ասի։ քանզի և ո՛չ նարդ առաւել այժմ նարդ, քամ թե յաոաջագո՛յն ասի։ և ո՛չ յայլոցն ինչ որք գոյացութիւն են։  ապա ուրեմն ոչ ընկալցի գոյացութիւնն զյաւէտն և զնուազն։ 
(119) Videtur autem substantia non suscipere magis et minus;  dico autem non (120) quoniam substantia non est a substantia magis substantia (hoc enim (121) dictum est quoniam est)  sed quoniam unaquaeque substantia hoc ipsum (122) quod est non dicitur magis et minus;  ut, si est ipsa substantia homo, (123) non erit magis et minus homo, nec ipse a se ipso nec ab altero.  Neque (124) enim est alter altero magis homo, quemadmodum album est alterum altero (125) magis album, et bonum alterum altero magis bonum;  et ipsum se ipso (126) magis et minus dicitur, ut corpus, album cum sit, magis dicitur nunc (127) quam primo, et calidum magis et minus dicitur;  substantia uero non (128) dicitur (neque homo magis dicitur nunc homo quam antea dicitur, nec (129) caeterorum aliquid quae sunt substantia);  quare non suscipiet (130) substantia magis et minus. 
ܡܣܬܒܪܐ ܕܝܢ ܐܘܣܝܐ ܕܠܐ ܡܩܒܠܐ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܝܬܝܪܐ ܘܚܣܝܪܐ .   ܐܡ̇ܪ ܐܢܐ ܕܝܢ ܠܘ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܐܘܣܝܐ ܡܢ ܐܘܣܝܐ ܠܐ ܐܝܬܝܗ̇ ܝܬܝܪܐܝܬ ܐܘܣܝܐ . ܗܕܐ ܡ̇ܢ ܓܝܪ ܐܡܝܪܐ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܝܬܝܗ̇ .   ܐܠܐ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܟܠ ܐܘܣܝܐ ܗ̇ܘ ܡܘܢ ܕܗ̣ܘ ܕܐܝܬܝܗ̇ ܠܐ ܡܬܐܡܪܐ ܝܬܝܪܐ ܐܘ ܚܣܝܪܐ .  ܕܐܝܟ ܐܝܟܢ . ܕܐܢ ܐܝܬܝܗ̇ ܗܕܐ ܐܘܣܝܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܆ ܠܐ ܢܗܘܐ ܝܬܝܪܐ ܘܚܣܝܪܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܘܠܐ ܗ̇ܘ ܡܢܗ 16 ܘܠܐ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܡܢ ܐܚܪܢܐ .  ܠܐ ܓܝܪ ܐܝܬ̇ܘܗܝ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܡܢ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܝܬܝܪܐܝܬ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܆ ܐܝܟܢܐ ܕܚܘܪܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܡܢ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܝܬܝܪܐܝܬ ܚܘܪܐ ܘܛܒܐ ܝܬܝܪܐܝܬ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܡܢ ܐܚܪܢܐ .  ܘܗ̣ܘ ܕܝܢ ܡܢܗ ܝܬܝܪܐ ܘܚܣܝܪܐ ܡܬܐܡܪ . ܕܐܝܟ ܐܝܟܢ . ܓܘܫܡܐ ܟܕ ܚܘܪܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܆ ܝܬܝܪܐܝܬ ܚܘܪܐ ܡܬܐܡܪ ܗܫܐ ܐܘ ܩܕܡܐܝܬ . ܘܟܕ ܚܡܝܡܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܆ ܝܬܝܖܐܝܬ ܘܚܣܝܪܐܝܬ ܡܬܐܡܪ ܚܡܝܡܐ .  ܐܘܣܝܐ ܕܝܢ ܠܐ ܡܬܐܡܪܐ . ܘܠܐ ܒܡܕܡ ܓܝܪ ܒܪܐܢܫܐ ܝܬܝܪܐܝܬ ܗܫܐ ܡܬܐܡܪ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܐܘ ı ܩܕܡܐܝܬ ܆ ܘܠܐ ܚܕ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܐܝܬܝܗܘܢ ܐܘܣܝܐ .  ܡܕܝܢ ܠܐ ܡܩܒܠܐ ܐܘܣܝܐ ܝܬܝܪܘܬܐ ܘܚܣܝܪܘܬܐ ܀ 
وقد يُظنّ بالجوهر أنه لا يقبل الأكثر والأقل .  ولست أقول إنه ليس جوهرٌ بأكثر من جوهر في انه جوهر ، (إن ذلك شيء قد قلنا به)  لكنى أقول : إن ما هو في جوهر جوهرٌ ليس يقال أكثر ولا أقل :  مثال ذلك أن هذا الجوهـر إن كان إنسـانا فليس يـكون إنسـاناً أكثر ولا أقل ، ولا إذا قيس بنفسه ، ولا إذا قيس بغيره ؛  فإنه ليس أحد من الناس إنسانا بأكثر من إنسانٍ غيره ، كما أن الأبيضَ أبيضُ بأكثر مما غيره أبيض ، والخيِّر خيرٌ بأكثر مما غيره خَيِّر .  كما أن الشيء إذا قيس بنفسه أيضا قيل إنه أكثر وأقل ، مثال ذلك أن الجسم إذا كان أبيض فقد يقال إنه في هذا الوقت أبيض بأكثر مما كان قبل ، وإذا كان حارًا فقد يقال إنه حارٌّ بأكثر مما كان أو أقل ؛  فأما الجوهر فليس يقال أكثر ولا أقل : فإنه ليس يقال في الإنسان إنه في هذا الوقت إنسان بأكثر مما كان فيما تقدّم ولا في غيره من سائر الجواهر .  فيكون الجوهر لا يقبل الأكثر والأقل . 
28. ITEM QUOD INEST NON SOLI.
Uidetur autem substantia non suscipere magis et minus. Substantia nemág mêr nóh mínnera sîn dáz sî íst . s. zéinemo mâle dánne ze ándermo. 
Dico autem hoc . non quia substantia non est a substantia magis et minus. Hoc autem dictum est quia est. Íh neuerságo nîeht . éin substantia nesî hártôr substantia dánne ánderiu . Uuánda íh tés keiégen hábo . s. sô prima íst hártôr dánne secunda.  Sed quoniam unaquȩque substantia . hoc ipsum quod est . non dicitur maius et minus. Súnder dáz éin substantia . dáz sî íst zéinemo mâle . dáz mêr neíst . dánne ze ándermo.  Ut est hȩc substantia homo. Álso cato íst. Non est magis et minus homo . neque ipse . neque ' alter ab altero. Ér neuuírdit nîomer mêr ménnisko álde mínnera. Nóh ér ímo sélbemo . nóh ánderêr ímo. Cicero neuuírdit nîomer mêr nóh mínnera homo álde substantia . dánne cato.  Non enim est alter altero magis homo . sicut album altero magis album, et bonum alterum altero magis bonum. Sô uuíz ándermo uuîzera uuírdit . únde gûot ándermo bézzera uuírdit . sô neuuírdit nîomer ménnísko ándermo hártôr ménnisko.  Sed et ipsum a se magis et minus dicitur. Ut corpus cum album sit . magis album esse dicitur quam prius. Et cum calidum sit . magis et minus calidum dicitur. Ióh uuîz sélbiz uuírdit mêr únde mín. Álso uuîz tûoh uuîzera uuírdit . tánne íz êr uuâre. Únde uuárm uuázer uuármera uuírdit . ióh cháltera uuírdit . tánne iz êr uuâre.  Substantia uero non dicitur . s. se ipsa magis et minus. Substantia nelîdit tés nîeht . taz sî uuérde mêr álde mín . dánne si êr uuás. Neque enim homo . magis nunc homo quam primus dicitur. Neque aliorum quicquam quȩ substantiæ sunt. Ménnisko nehéizit îo nû nîeht mêr ménnisko . dánne êr. Nóh téro díngo nehéin . díe substantiæ sínt.  Quapropter non recipiet substantia magis et minus. Pe díu nemág substantia mêr uuérden alde mín dáz sî íst. Nóh circulus nemág nóh duplum . nóh triangulum . unde ándere quantitates. Tes hábit aristoteles fersuîget ' uuánda iz álechúnd íst. Fóne díu uírdit îo nóh ze sûochenne proprium substantiæ. 
Substance, it seems, does not admit of a more and a less.  I do not mean that one substance is not more a substance than another (we have said that it is),  but that any given substance is not called more, or less, that which it is.  For example, if this substance is a man, it will not be more a man or less a man either than itself or than another man.  For one man is not more a man than another, as one pale thing is more pale than another and one beautiful thing more beautiful than another.  Again, a thing is called more, or less, such-and-such than itself; for example, the body that is pale is called more pale now than before, and the one that is hot is called more, or less, hot.  Substance, however, is not spoken of thus. For a man is not called more a man now than before, nor is anything else that is a substance.  Thus substance does not admit of a more and a less. 
(10) Μάλιστα δὲ ἴδιον τῆς οὐσίας δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ (11) ἓν ἀριθμῷ ὂν τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικόν·  οἷον ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν (12) ἄλλων οὐδενὸς ἂν ἔχοι τις προενεγκεῖν [ὅσα μή ἐστιν (13) οὐσία], ὃ ἓν ἀριθμῷ ὂν τῶν ἐναντίων δεκτικόν ἐστιν·  (14) οἷον τὸ χρῶμα, ὅ ἐστιν ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν ἀριθμῷ, οὐκ ἔσται (15) λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν, οὐδὲ ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις καὶ μία τῷ ἀριθμῷ (16) οὐκ ἔσται φαύλη καὶ σπουδαία,  ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν (17) ἄλλων, ὅσα μή ἐστιν οὐσία.  ἡ δέ γε οὐσία ἓν καὶ (18) ταὐτὸν ἀριθμῷ ὂν δεκτικὸν τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστίν·  οἷον ὁ τὶς (19) ἄνθρωπος, εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ὤν, ὁτὲ μὲν λευκὸς ὁτὲ δὲ μέ(20)λας γίγνεται, καὶ θερμὸς καὶ ψυχρός, καὶ φαῦλος καὶ (21) σπουδαῖος.  ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδενὸς φαίνεται τὸ τοιοῦ(22)τον, εἰ μή τις ἐνίσταιτο τὸν λόγον καὶ τὴν δόξαν φά(23)σκων τῶν τοιούτων εἶναι·  ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς λόγος ἀληθής τε (24) καὶ ψευδὴς εἶναι δοκεῖ, οἷον εἰ ἀληθὴς εἴη ὁ λόγος τὸ κα(25)θῆσθαί τινα, ἀναστάντος αὐτοῦ ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος ψευ(26)δὴς ἔσται·  ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς δόξης· εἰ γάρ τις ἀληθῶς (27) δοξάζοι τὸ καθῆσθαί τινα, ἀναστάντος αὐτοῦ ψευδῶς δοξάσει (28) τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχων περὶ αὐτοῦ δόξαν.  εἰ δέ τις καὶ τοῦτο πα(29)ραδέχοιτο, ἀλλὰ τῷ γε τρόπῳ διαφέρει·  τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ (30) τῶν οὐσιῶν αὐτὰ μεταβάλλοντα δεκτικὰ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστίν, —  (31) ψυχρὸν γὰρ ἐκ θερμοῦ γενόμενον μετέβαλεν (ἠλλοίωται (32) γάρ), καὶ μέλαν ἐκ λευκοῦ καὶ σπουδαῖον ἐκ φαύλου,  ὡσ(33)αύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον αὐτὸ μεταβολὴν (34) δεχόμενον τῶν ἐναντίων δεκτικόν ἐστιν·—  ὁ δὲ λόγος καὶ ἡ (35) δόξα αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκίνητα πάντῃ πάντως διαμένει, τοῦ δὲ (36) πράγματος κινουμένου τὸ ἐναντίον περὶ αὐτὰ γίγνεται·  ὁ μὲν (37) γὰρ λόγος διαμένει ὁ αὐτὸς τὸ καθῆσθαί τινα, τοῦ δὲ πρά(4b1)γματος κινηθέντος ὁτὲ μὲν ἀληθὴς ὁτὲ δὲ ψευδὴς γίγνεται· (2) ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς δόξης.  ὥστε τῷ τρόπῳ γε ἴδιον (3) ἂν εἴη τῆς οὐσίας τὸ κατὰ τὴν αὑτῆς μεταβολὴν δεκτικὴν (4) τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι,  —εἰ δή τις καὶ ταῦτα παραδέχοιτο, τὴν (5) δόξαν καὶ τὸν λόγον δεκτικὰ τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι.  οὐκ ἔστι (6) δὲ ἀληθὲς τοῦτο· ὁ γὰρ λόγος καὶ ἡ δόξα οὐ τῷ αὐτὰ δέχε(7)σθαί τι τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικὰ λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῷ περὶ (8) ἕτερόν τι τὸ πάθος γεγενῆσθαι·  —τῷ γὰρ τὸ πρᾶγμα εἶναι (9) ἢ μὴ εἶναι, τούτῳ καὶ ὁ λόγος ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδὴς εἶναι λέ(10)γεται, οὐ τῷ αὐτὸν δεκτικὸν εἶναι τῶν ἐναντίων·  ἁπλῶς γὰρ (11) οὐδὲν ὑπ’ οὐδενὸς οὔτε ὁ λόγος κινεῖται οὔτε ἡ δόξα, ὥστε (12) οὐκ ἂν εἴη δεκτικὰ τῶν ἐναντίων μηδενὸς ἐν αὐτοῖς γιγνο(13)μένου·—  ἡ δέ γε οὐσία τῷ αὐτὴν τὰ ἐναντία δέχεσθαι, τούτῳ (14) δεκτικὴ τῶν ἐναντίων λέγεται·  νόσον γὰρ καὶ ὑγίειαν (15) δέχεται, καὶ λευκότητα καὶ μελανίαν, καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν (16) τοιούτων αὐτὴ δεχομένη τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικὴ λέγεται.  (17) ὥστε ἴδιον ἂν οὐσίας εἴη τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ ὂν δεκτι(18)κὸν εἶναι τῶν ἐναντίων.  περὶ μὲν οὖν οὐσίας τοσαῦτα εἰ(19)ρήσθω. 
Պրակք։ ժգ:
Եւ մանաւանդ զի ուրոյն գոյացութեան թուի գոլ, որ նո՛յն և մի թուովն է։ ներհակացն գոլ ընդունական։ 
ո՛րզան։ քանզի մակայլոցն, ո՛չ զուրուք գըտըցէ ոք յայտնել։ որք միանգամ ո՛չ եմ գոյացութիւնք, որ մի թուով եմ մերհակացն ընդունական.  որզան գոյն որ մի և նոյն է թուով, ոչ է սպիտակ և սեաւ, և ոչ նոյն իրակութիւն, և մի թուով ոչ եղիցի վատթար և 117 առաքինի։  Սոյնպէս և մակ այլոցն, որք միանգամ ոչ եմ գոյացութիւնք։  իսկ գոյացութիւնն՝որ է մի և նոյն թուով, ընդունական մերհակացն է,  որզան՝ ոմն մարդ՝ մի և նոյն ելով, է զի սպիտակ, և է զի սեաւ լինի, և ջերմ և ցուրտ. և վատթար և առաքինի։  իսկ մակ այլոցն ոչ ուրուք երևի այսպիսի ինչ։
Պրակք ժդ
Բայց եթե ոք վիճեսցի՝ զբանն և զկարծիսն ասելով յայսպիսեացն գոլ իբրու ներհակաց ընդունական.  
քանզի նոյն բան և ճշմարիտ և սուտ թուի գոլ. հիզան՝ եթե ճշմարիտ իցէ բանն նստելն ումեք, յարուցելոյ մորա՝ սոյն սա սուտ եըիցի  սոյնպես և կարծիքն. քանզի եթե ճշմարտապէս կածեսցէ ոք նստելն զումեքէ, յարուցելոյ նորա՝ ստաբար կարծեսցէ եղիցի յաղագս նորա։  Ապա եթե ոք զայս առընկալցի, այլ սակտյն յեղանակաւ տարբերէ։   քանզի նակագոյացութեանցն, ա՛յնք յեղափոխեալք. ընդունականք ներհակա՛ցն են:  քանզի ցո՛ւրտ՚ ի ջերնոյ՚ եղեալ շոջեցաւ, քանզի այլայլեցաւ։ և սեաւ, ի սպիտակէ, և առաքինի, ի վատթարէ:  սոյնպէս և նակայլոցը՚ն իւրաքանչիւր, ինքն փոփոխումն ընկալեալ ներհակացն ընդունակա՛նէ:  իսկ բա՛նն և կարծիքն, ինքեանք անշա՛րժք և անխաղացք, ամէնայն, իրաւք ամենեւին կա՛յ մնայ իսկ իրին շարժեցելոյ, ներհական: ընյինքեանս լինին։  քանզի բանն. կա՛յ մնայ. նո՛յն նստելն ումեքն։ իսկ իրին շարժեցելոյ է՛ զի ճշմարիտ, և է՛ զի սո՛ւտ լինի։ սո՛յնպէս և նակակարծեացն։  ապա ուրեմն, յեղանակաւ, ուրո՛յն է գոյացութեանն ըսա իւրոյ փոփոխըմանն. ընդունական ներհակացըն գոլ։   ապեթե ոք և զայսոսիկ առընկալցի, զկարծիսն և զբա՛նն, ընդունականս ներհակա՛ցըն գոլ։  բայց ո՛չ է ճշմարիտ այս։ 118 քանզի բա՛նն և կարծիքն, ո՛չ վասն իւրեանցն ընդունե՛լ ինչ. ներհակա՛ցն գոլ ընդունակա՛նք ասին։ այլ վասն յ՛այլումըն կիրքն եղանելն։  քանզի իրն. գո՛լն կամ չգոլն. ա՛յսուիկ և բանն կամ ճշմարիտ և կամ սո՛ւտ ասի։ այլ ո՛չ վասն իւրն ընդունական գոլ ներհակացն։  բայց միանգամայն պարզաբար, ո՛չ յումեքէ. ո՛չ բանն շարժի. և ո՛չ կարծիքն ապա ուրեմն ո՛չ եղիցի ընդունական ներահակացն. ո՛չ ինչ ուրուք ի նոսա՛յ եղելոյ:  իսկ գոյացութիւն վասն իւրն զներհակա՛նսըն ընդունելոյ։ ա՛յսուիկ ընդունակա՛ն մերհակա՛ցն ասի։  քանզի հիւանդութիւն. և ողջութիւն ընդունի, և սպիտակութիւն. և սևութիւն։ և իւրաքանչիւրոք յայսպիսեացն յինքն ընդունելով. ներհակա՛ցն գոլ ընդունական ասի:  ապա ուրեմն. ուրո՛յն գոյացութեան եղիցի. որ նո՛յն և մի է թուով. ըստ իւրում փոփոխման ընդունակա՛ն գոլ ներհակաց։  և յաղագս գոյացութեան, ա՛յսքան ասասցի։ 
(131) Maxime autem proprium substantiae uidetur esse quod, cum sit idem et (132) unum numero, contrariorum susceptibile est.  Et in aliis quidem nullis (133) hoc quisquam habeat proferre quae non sunt substantiae, quod unum (134) numero contrariorum erit susceptibile;  ut color, quod est unum et idem (135) numero, non erit album et nigrum, nec eadem actio et una numero erit (136) mala et bona;  similiter autem et in aliis quaecumque substantiae non (137) sunt.  Ipsa uero substantia, cum sit una et eadem numero, contrariorum (138) susceptibilis est;  ut quidam homo, unus et idem cum sit, aliquando (139) albus aliquando niger fit, et calidus et frigidus, et improbus et (140) probus.  In aliis uero nullis tale aliquid uidetur, nisi quis opponat (141) orationem et opinionem dicens huiusmodi esse;  eadem enim oratio et (142) uera et falsa esse uidetur, ut, si uera oratio est aliquem sedere, cum (143) ipse surrexerit eadem ipsa erit falsa;  similiter autem et in opinione; (144) si quis enim uere opinabitur sedere aliquem, cum ipse surrexerit false (145) opinabitur, eandem de eo retinens opinionem.  Quod si quis etiam hoc (146) recipiat, at modo ipso differt;  eadem enim quae sunt in substantiis (147) ipsa permutata contrariorum sunt susceptibilia  (frigidum enim ex (148) calido factum permutatum est, et nigrum ex albo et probum ex improbo,  (149) similiter autem et in aliis singula ipsa permutationem suscipientia (150) contrariorum susceptibilia sunt),  oratio uero et opinio ipsa quidem (151) immobilia omnino semperque permanent, re uero mota contrarietas circa (152) ea fit;  oratio enim permanet eadem sedere aliquem, re uero mota (153) aliquotiens quidem uera fit aliquotiens falsa; similiter autem et in (154) opinione.  Quapropter hoc modo proprium erit substantiae ut secundum (155) propriam permutationem susceptibilis contrariorum sit  - si quis etiam (156) hoc suscipiat, opinionem et orationem contrariorum esse susceptibiles;  (157) non est autem hoc uerum; etenim oratio et opinio non quod ea (158) suscipiant aliquid contrariorum esse susceptibilia dicuntur sed quod (159) circa alteram quandam passionem sint.  - Eo enim quo res est uel non (160) est, eo oratio uel uera uel falsa dicitur, non eo quod ipsa (161) susceptibilis est contrarii.  Simpliciter enim nihil neque oratio (162) mouetur neque opinio, quare non erunt susceptiuae contrariorum nullo (163) in eis facto.  Substantia uero, quod ipsa suscipiat contraria, eo (164) dicitur contrariorum susceptibilis.  Aegritudinem enim et sanitatem (165) suscipit, et albedinem et nigredinem; et unumquodque talium ipsa (166) suscipiens contrariorum esse dicitur susceptibilis.  Quare proprium (167) erit substantiae, cum sit idem et unum numero, susceptibilem (168) contrariorum esse.  Et de substantia quidem haec dicta sint. 
ܡܣܬܒܪܐ ܕܝܢ ܕܕܝܠܢܝܐ ܝܬܝܪܐܝܬ ܕܐܘܣܝܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܟܕ ܗ̣ܘ ܟܕ ܗ̣ܘ ܘܚܕ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܒܡܢܝܢܐ ܆ ܡܩܒܠܢܐ ܕܗܠܝܢ ܣܩܘܒܠܝ̈ܐ ܢܗܘܐ .  ܕܐܝܟ ܐܝܟܢ . ܥܠ ܗܠܝܢ ܡ̇ܢ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܘܠܐ ܥܠ ܚܕ ܐܝܬ ܠܗ ܠܐܢܫ ܕܢܩܕܘܡ ܢܝܬܐ ܟܠ ܕܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܐܘܣܝܐ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܟܕ ܚܕ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܒܡܢܝܢܐ ܆ ܡܩܒܠܢܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܕܣܩܘܒܠܝ̈ܐ .  ܕܐܝܟ ܐܝܟܢ . ܓܘܢܐ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܚܕ ܘܗ̣ܘ ܟܕ ܗ̣ܘ ܒܡܢܝܢܐ ܠܐ ܢܗܘܐ ܚܘܪܐ ܘܐܘܟܡܐ . ܘܠܐ ܕܝܢ ܗ̣ܝ ܟܕ ܗ̣ܝ ܣܥܘܪܘܬܐ ܘܚܕܐ ܒܡܢܝܢܐ . ܠܐ ܬܗܘܐ ܫܟܝܪܬܐ ܘܡܝܬܪܬܐ .  ܒܗ̇ ܕܝܢ ܒܕܡܘܬܐ ܘܥܠ ܟܠܗܘܢ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܕܠܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܘܢ ܐܘܣܝ̈ܣ .  ܐܘܣܝܐ ܕܝܢ ܟܕ ܚܕ ܘܗ̣ܘ ܟܕ ܗ̣ܘ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܒܡܢܝܢܐ ܆ ܡܩܒܠܢܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܕܣܩܘܒ̈ܠܝܐ .   ܕܐܝܟ ܐܝܟܢ . ܕܐܢܫ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܟܕ ܚܕ ܘܗ̣ܘ ܟܕ ܗ̣ܘ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܒܙܒܢ ܡ̇ܢ ܚܘܪܐ ܆ ܒܙܒܢ ܕܝܢ ܐܘܟܡܐ ܗ̇ܘܐ ܆ ܘܚܡܝܡܐ ܕܝܢ ܘܩܪܝܪܐ : ܘܫܟܝܪܐ ܘܡܝܬܪܐ .  ܥܠ ܕܝܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܘܠܐ ܥܠ ܚܕ ܡܬܚܙܝܐ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܐܝܟ ܗܟܢ ܆ ܐܢ ܗ̣ܘ ܕܐܢܫ ܟܕ ܡܩܝܡ ܠܐ ܢܐܡܪ ܠܡܠܬܐ ܘܠܫܘܒܚܐ ܕܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܐܝܟ ܗܟܢ ܐܝܬܝܗܘܢ .  ܗ̣ܝ ܓܝܪ ܟܕ ܗ̇ܝ ܡܠܬܐ ܫܪܝܪܬܐ ܘܕܓܠܬܐ ܕܐܝܬܝܗ̇ ܡܣܬܒܪܐ . ܕܐܝܟ ܐܝܟܢ . ܕܐܢ ܫܪܝܪܬܐ ܬܗܘܐ ܡܠܬܐ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܝܬ̇ܒ ܐܢܫ ܆ ܟܕ ܩ̇ܐܡ ܗ̣ܝ ܟܕ ܗ̣ܝ ܗܕܐ ܕܓܠܬܐ ܗܘ̇ܝܐ .  ܗ̣ܘ ܗܟܘܬ ܕܝܢ ܘܥܠ ܫܘܒܚܐ . ܐܢܗ̣ܘ ܓܝܪ ܕܐܢܫ ܫܪܝܪܐܝܬ ܢܫܒܚ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܝܬ̇ܒ ܐܢܫ ܆ ܟܕ ܩ̇ܐܡ ܕܓܠܐܝܬ ܡܫܒܚ ܐܢ ܠܗ ܟܕ ܠܗ ܠܫܘܒܚܐ ı ܡܛܠܬܗ ܐܝܬ ܠܗ .  ܐܢ ܕܝܢ ܐܢܫ ܘܠܗܕܐ ܢܩܒܠ ܆ ܐܠܐ ܡܫܚܠܦܝܢ ܒܙܢܐ .  17 ܗܠܝܢ ܡ̇ܢ ܓܝܪ ܕܥܠ ܐܘܣܝ̈ܣ ܟܕ ܗܢܘܢ ܡܫܬܚܠܦܝܢ ܐܝܬܝܗܘܢ ܡܩ̈ܒܠܢܐ ܕܣܩܘܒܠܝ̈ܐ .  ܩܪܝܪܐ ܓܝܪ ܡ̇ܢ ܚܡܝܡܐ ܟܕ ܐܫܬܚܠܦ ܗ̇ܘܐ ܆ ܡܫܓܢܝ ܓܝܪ ܐܘܟܡܐ ܡܢ ܚܘܪܐ ܘܚܦܝܛܐ ܡܢ ܫܟܝܪܐ .  ܗ̣ܘ ܕܝܢ ܗܟܘܬ ܘܥܠ ܟܠ ܚܕ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܐܚܪ̈ܢܐ ܆ ܗ̣ܘ ܟܕ ܡܩܒܠ ܫܘܚܠܦܐ ܆ ܡܩܒܠܢܐ ܕܣܩܘܒܠܝ̈ܬܐ ܐܝܬܗܝ .  ܡܠܬܐ ܕܝܢ ܘܫܘܒܚܐ ܗܢܘܢ ܡ̇ܢ ܠܐ ܡܬܬܙܝܥܢ̈ܐ ܡܢ ܟܠ ܦܪܘܣ ܒܟܠ ܡܟܬܪܝܢ . ܟܕ ܕܝܢ ܡܬܬܙܝܥ ܣܘܥܪܢܐ ܆ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܣܩܘܒܠܝܐ ܗ̇ܘܝܐ ܠܘܬܗܘܢ .  ܡܠܬܐ ܡ̇ܢ ܓܝܪ ܗ̣ܝ ܡܟܬܪܐ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܐܢܫ ܝܬ̇ܒܝ . ܟܕ ܕܝܢ ܡܬܬܙܝܥ ܣܘܥܪܢܐ ܆ ܒܙܒܢ ܡ̇ܢ ܫܪܝܪܬܐ ܆ ܒܙܒܢ ܕܝܢ ܕܓܠܬܐ ܗ̇ܘܝܐ . ܗ̣ܘ ܗܟܘܬ ܕܝܢ ܘܥܠ ܫܘܒܚܐ .  ܡܕܝܢ ܒܙܢܐ ܡܕܡ ܕܝܠܢܝܐ ܕܐܘܣܝܐ ܢܗܘܐ ܆ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܒܘܚܠܦܐ ܕܝܠܗ̇ ܡܩܒܠܢܐ ܕܗܠܝܢ ܣܩܘܒܠܝ̈ܐ ܢܗܘܐ .  ܐܢ ܘܐܢܫ ܢܩܒܠ ܠܗܠܝܢ ܠܡܠܬܐ ܘܠܫܘܒܚܐ ܕܡܩܒܠܢ̈ܐ ܕܣܩܘܒܠܝ̈ܬܐ ܢܗܘܘܢ ܆  ܠܐ ܕܝܢ ܐܝܬܝܗ̇ ܫܪܝܪܬܐ ܗܕܐ . ܡܠܬܐ ܓܝܪ ܘܫܘܒܚܐ ܠܘ ܒܗ̇ܝ ܕܟܕ ܗܢܘܢ ܡܩܒܠܝܢ ܡܕܡ ܆ ܡܬܐܡܪܝܢ ܕܗܘܝܢ ܡܩܒ̈ܠܢܐ ܕܗܠܝܢ ܣܩܘܒܠܝ̈ܬܐ ܆ ܐܠܐ ܒܗ̇ܝ ܕܥܠ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܚܫܐ ܡܕܡ ܗ̇ܘܐ .  ܒܗ̇ܝ ܓܝܪ ܕܣܘܥܪܢܐ ܢܗܘܐ ܐܘ ܠܐ ܢܗܘܐ ܆ ܒܗܕܐ ܡܠܬܐ ܫܪܝܪܬܐ ܐܘ ܕܓܠܬܐ ܬܗܘܐ ܡܬܐܡܪܐ ܆ ܠܘ ܒܗ̇ܝ ܕܗ̣ܘ ܢܗܘܐ ܡܩܒܠܢܐ ܕܣܩܘܒܠܝ̈ܬܐ .  ܦܫܝܛܐܝܬ ܓܝܪ ܘܠܐ ܡܕܡ ܘܠܐ ܡܠܬܐ ܡܬܬܙܥܐ ܘܠܐ ܫܘܒܚܐ . ܡܕܝܢ ܠܐ ܢܗܘܘܢ ܡܩܒ̈ܠܢܐ ܕܣܩܘܒܠܝ̈ܐ ܆ ܘܠܐ ܕܚܕ ܕܒܗܘܢ ܗ̇ܘܐ .  ܐܘܣܝܐ ܓܝܪ ܒܗ̇ܝ ܕܗ̇ܝ ܡܩܒܠܐ ܠܣܩ̈ܘܒܠܝܐ ܆ ܒܗܕܐ ܡܬܐܡܪܐ ܡܩܒܠܢܝܬܐ ܕܣܩܘܒܠܝ̈ܐ .  ܟܘܪܗܢܐ ܓܝܪ ܘܚܘܠܡܢܐ ܡܩܒܠܐ ܘܚܘܪܘܬܐ ܘܐܘܟܡܘܬܐ . ܘܟܠ ܚܕ ܡܢ ܐܝܠܝܢ ܕܐܝܟ ܗܠܝܢ ܟܕ ܗ̣ܝ ܡܩܒܠܐ ܆ ܕܗܠܝܢ ı ܣܩܘܒܠܝ̈ܬܐ ܬܗܘܐ ܡܩܒܠܢܝܬܐ ܡܬܐܡܪܐ .  ܡܕܝܢ ܕܝܠܝܬܐ ܕܐܘܣܝܐ ܬܗܘܐ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܟܕ ܗ̣ܘ ܟܕ ܗ̣ܘ ܘܚܪ ܒܡܢܝܢܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܆ ܡܩܒܠܢܐ ܕܣܩܘܒܠܝ̈ܐ ܢܗܘܐ .   ܡܛܠ ܡ̇ܢ ܗܟܝܠ ܐܘܣܝܐ ܟܠܗܝܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܢܬܐܡܪܢ ܀ 
وقد يُظَن أن أَوْلى الخواص بالجوهر أن الواحد منه بالعدد هو بعينه قابل للمضادّات ،  والدليل على ذلك أنه لن يقدر أحدٌ انياتي بشيء مما ليس هو جوهرًا ، للواحدُ منه بالعدد هو بعينه قابلٌ للمضادّات ،  مثال ذلك أن اللون الواحد بالعدد هو بعينه لن يكون أبيض وأسود ، والفعل الواحد بالعدد هو بعينه يكون مذموما أو محمودا،  وكذلك نحوُ الأمر في سائر الأشياء مما ليس بجوهر .  فأما الجوهر فإن الواحد منه بالعدد هو بعينه قابل للمضادّات ،  مثال ذلك : ”إنسانٌ ما“ ، فإن هذا الواحد هو بعينه يكون أبيضَ حيناً وأسودَ حينا ، وحارا وباردا ، طالحا وصالحا .  ولن يوجد ما يجري هذا المجرى في شيء مما سوى الجوهر أصلا اللهم إلا أن يَرُدَّ ذلك رادٌ بأن يقول : إن القول والظنّ مما يجري هذا المجرى ،  لأن القول بعينه مظنونٌ صدقا وكذبا ، مثال ذلك أن القول إن صَدَق في جلوس جالس فإنه بعينه يكذب إذا قام ؛  لأن القول بعينه مظنونٌ صدقا وكذبا ، مثال ذلك أن القول إن صَدَق في جلوس جالس فإنه بعينه يكذب إذا قام ؛  فتقول : إن الإنسان – وإن اعترف بذلك - فإن بين الجهتين اختلافا ،  وذلك أن الأشياء في الجواهر إنما هي قابلة للمضادّات بأن تتغير أنفسها ،  لأن الشيء إذا كان حارَّا فصار باردًا فقد تغير ؛ وإذا كان أبيض فصار أسود ، وإذا كان مذموما فصار محمودا ،  وكذلك في سائر الأشياء : كلُّ واحد منها قابلٌ للمتضادّات بأن يقبل بنفسه التغيُّرَ .  فإما القول والظن فإنهما ثابتان غير زائلين لا بنحوٍ من الأنحاء ولا بوجهٍ من الوجوه ، وإنما يحدث المضاد فيهما بزوال الأمر ،  فإن القول جلوس جالسٍ ثابتٌ بحاله ، وإنما يصير صادقا حينا وكاذبا حينا بزوال الأمر . وكذلك القول في الظن أيضا .  فلتكن الجهة التي تخص الجوهَر أنه قابلٌ للمضادّات بتغيره < في> نفسه .  هذا إن اعترف الإنسان بذلك ، اعني أن الظنّ والقول قابلان للمضادّات .  إلا أن ذلك ليس بحق ، لأن القول والظنّ ليس إنما يقال فيهما إنهما قابلان للأضداد من طريق أنهما في أنفسهما يقبلان شيئا ، <لكن> من طريق أن حادثا يحدث في شيء غيرهما ،  وذلك أن القول إنما يقال فيه إنه صادق أو غنه كاذب من طريق أن الأمر موجود أو غير موجـود ، لا من طريق أنه نفسّه قابلٌ للأضداد ،  فإن القول بالجملة لا يقبل الزوال من شيء أصلا ، ولا الظن . فيجب ألا يكونا قابلين للأضداد ، إذ كان ليس يحدث فيهما ضدُّ أصلا ،  فأما الجوهر فيقال فيه إنه قابل للأضداد من طريق أنه نفسه قابلٌ للأضداد ،  وذلك أنه يقبل لمرض والصحة والبياض والسواد . وإنما يقال فيه أنه قابلٌ للأضداد من طريق أنه هو نفسه يقبل كل واحدٍ من هذه وما يجرى مجراها .  فيجب من ذلك أن تكون خاصة الجوهر أن الواحد منه بالعدد هو بعينه قابل للمتضادّات بتغيره في نفسه .  فهذا ، فلكن مبلغ ما نقوله في الجوهر؛ وقد ينبغي الآن أن نتبع ذلك بالقول في الكم . 
29. ITEM QUOD OMNI ET SOLI.
Maxime autem substantiæ proprium uidetur esse . quod cum idem et unum numero sit contrariorum susceptiuum est. Taz quíssista súnderzéichen substantiæ íst táz . táz sî éin uuésintiu . zuéi án síh némen mág uuíderuuartîgiu. 
Et in aliis quidem quidem quȩcumque non sunt substantiæ . non habebit quis quid proferat . quod cum unum sit numero susceptibile contrariorum est. Án dîen accentibus nemág nîoman dáz eruáren . dáz éin uuésende zuéi án síh néme uuíderuuártîgiu.  Uelud colorum quod est idem et unum numero . non erit album et nigrum. Neque eadem actio et una numero . erit praua et studiosa. Álso éin uáreuua nemág uuésin uuîz únde suárz. Nóh éin tât . kôut unde úbel.  Similiter autem et in aliis quȩ non sunt substantiæ. Álso íst iz án dien ánderen accidentibus.  Substantia uero cum unum et idem sit numero . capax contrariorum est. Substanbtia éiniu . mág trágen zuéi uuíderuuaartîgiu.  Ut quidam homo . cum unus atque idem numero sit . aliquando quidem fit niger . aliquando albus . et calidus et frigidus . prauus et studiosus. Álso cato uuésin mág ze êrist uuîz . únde dáranâh suárz . únde uuîlôn uuárm . únde uuîlôn chált . uuîlôn réht uuîlôn ' únreht.  In aliis autem nullis aliquid tale uidetur. Án dien accidentibus neuíndest tû nîeht sóles.

30. NON SIC ORATIONEM ET OPINIONEM CONTRARIIS MUTARI SICUT SUBSTANTIAM.
Nisi forte quis opponat orationem et opinionem esse huiusmodi. Mán nechéde réda . únde uuân . sô getân uuésin. 
Eadem enim oratio et eadem opinio . uerum et falsum esse uidetur. Uuánda éina réda . únde éinen uuân . uíndet man bédiu uuésin . uuâr ióh lúgi. Ueluti si uera sit sedere quendam . surgente eo falsa erit. Álso dánne geskíhet . ube uuâr íst zespréchenne . dáz éin mán sízze . únde iz sâr lúgi íst . sô ér ûfstât.  Similiter autem et de opinione. Úmbe den uuân so sámo. Si quis uere opinari . uel placere sibi putet sedere aliquem . surgente eo falsa uidetur ei idem habenti de eo placitum. So uuér uuânin uuíle dánne iz uuâr íst . táz éin mán sízze . stât ér ûf . uuânit ér is tánne nóh . sô trîugit ín der uuân.  Sed etsi quis hoc suscipiat . sed tamen modo differt. Uuíle óuh táz îoman sô uernémen . únde uúre gelîh háben . sô negât íz tóh nîeht kelîcho.  Nam ea quȩ in substantiis sunt . ipsa motata susceptibilia sunt contrariorum.  Frigidum enim de calido factum . motatum est. Altrum enim factum est. Et nigrum ex albo . et studiosum ex prauo . s. motatum est . et alterum factum est.  Similiter et in aliis . s. substantiis . unumquodque motationem suscipiens ' est susceptibile contrariorum. Sô die substantiȩ síh uuéhselônt . sô nément sîe án síh . álde in síh contraria. Cháltiu sácha uuárm uuótreniu . hábit síh keuuéhselôt . únde íst uuórten ánderiu. Únde suárz sácha uuîz uuórteniu . únde gûot . úbel uuórteniu . hábit síh ál geuuéhselôt. Sô uérit íz úmbe éina îouuélea substantiam . dáz sî síh uuéhselondo . inpfáhet contraria.  Oratio autem et placitum . ipsa quidem inmobilia omnino perseverant. Áber réda únde uuíllo . netûont nîeht sô. Síu stânt únuéruuéhselôt sélbin. Uuâr únde lúgi . neuuehselônt síh nîeht . sô uuîz únde suárz tônt tia substantiam. Cum res mouetur contrarium circa eam fit.  Oratio namque permanet æadem . eo quod sedeat aliquuis. Sô der sízzendo ûfstât . sô skînet án ímo . der uuéhsil . dóh tíu réda úngeuuéhselôt sî . tíudir chît . dáz er sízze. Cum uero res mota sit . aliquando uera . aliquando falsa fit . s. oratio. Úbe man sízzet . álde stát . únde síh sô uuéhselôt . sô uuírdit sî úngeuuehselôtiu . uuâr álde lúgi. Similiter autem et in placito. Sô uérit iz óuh án demo uuâne.  Quapropter modo solius proprium substantiȩ est . eo ' hoc est id quod secundum suam motationem capabilis sit contrariorum. Pe díu íst iz échert éinero déro substantiȩ . dáz sî síh uuéhselôndo . infáhen mág zuei contraria. 

31. ORATIONEM ET OPINIONEM CONTRARIETATIS NON ESSE SUSCEPTIBILEM.
Si quis etiam hȩc recipiat . placitum et orationem dicens susceptibilia esse contrariorum. 
non uerum est hoc. Úbe iz óuh îoman sô háben uuíle . daz oratio únde placitum . i. opinio . án síh némen contraria . dóh síu síh neuuéhselôen . táz neíst îo uuâr nîeht. Oratio namque et placitum non in eo quod ipsa aliquid recipiant . contrariorum susceptibilia esse dicuntur . sed eo quod circa alterum aliqua passio facta sit. Uuân únde réda . dóh man síu héize contrartia . dáz neíst îo be dîu nîeht táz síu in síh álde án síh îeht kenémen mugîn . núbe uóne díu . dáz díu substantia éteuuáz lîdit . s. uuíderuuartîgis.  Nam in eo quod res est aut non est in eo etiam oratio uera . uel falsa dicitur . non in eo quod ipsa capabilis sit contrariorum. Álso îo díu substantia íst álde neíst . álso uuírdit tíu réda uuâriu álse lúkkiu . sî nelîdet îo sélbiu nîeht.  Simpliciter autem a nullo . s. contrariorum . neque oratio neque placitum (moueter). Quapropter non erunt sus'ceptibilia contrariorum cum nulla in eis passio facta sit. Túrh síh neinfíndit nîemer uuân únde réda . déro uuíderuuártigôn. Fóne díu skînet . dáz síu íro nîeht infáhen nemúgin . nóh lîden nemúgin.  Uerum substantia in eo quod ipsa contraria recipiat . in hoc susceptibilis contrariorum esse dicitur. Áber substantia díu síu . i. contraria nímit án síh . tíu hábit tén námen mít réhte.  Languorem enim et sanitatem suscipit . et candorem et nigredinem. Et unumquodque talium ipsa suscipiendo . contrariorum susceptibilis esse dicitur. Sî uuírdit sîehc únde gesúnt . uuîz únde suárz. Únde déro îoételîh an síh ládende . héizet sî mít réhte . díu ánanémiga déro contrariorum.  Quare erit proprium substantiȩ quod cum idem et unum numero sit . secundum suam motationem . contrariorum est susceptibilis. Fóne díu íst táz úreiche substantiȩ . dáz sî síh uuéhselônde . contraria inpfáhen mág.  De substantia quidem hȩc dicta sint.

32. EXPLICIT DE SUBSTANTIA.
Uuîo mág man díutin substantiam únde accidens? Súmelîche chédint substantiam . dázter íst . accidens dáz tarmíte íst. Súmelîche chédint substantiam uóne uuésenne ' uuíst . accidens míteuuíst. Súmelîhe chédint substantiam êht . quod intellegitur îeht . i. aliquid . accidens mít êhte. Uidetur autem esse compositum îeht . et eius negatio nîeht . quod integre dicitur êin êht . únde nehêin êht. Sicut corrupte dicitur îouuíht . et eius negatio nîouuíht. De omni namque re uuíht dicitur. Interrogamus enim dicentes íst târ îouuíht? quasi diceremus íst târ éinuuíht . i. aliquid. Respondemus quoque nîouuíht . i. nehéin uuíht. Unum ergo significant îouuíht únde îeht . et item nîouuíht únde nîeht. De homine quoque dicitur úbiluuíht . pôseuuíht. Ergo . uuíht . êht . îeht . uuíst . taz íst . substantiam significant. Conuenientius tamen uidetur substantiam et accidens dicere . uuíst . únde míteuuíst. Quid autem genus et speciem? Dicamus si placet genus taz keméina . species taz súnderîga. In historicis lectionibus solemus interpretari genus chúnne únde sláhta . speciem bílde únde skôni . únde ánasíht. Facile autem intellegitur generalissimum genus tantum genus esse . et specialissimam speciem tantum speciem esse . genus autem subalternum utrumque esse genus et speciem. Idcirco dicamus genus generalissimum . állero specierum érchenôsta . et speciem specialissimam állero specierum érchenôsta . subalternum uero genus ' éin genus únder ándermo. Transire quoque possumus in legendo . eorum interpretacionem quorum patet intellectus et significatio. Maxime si eorum est laboriosa interpretatio. Sicut et latini angelos . et archangelos . cherubim . et seraphim . patriarchas . et prophetas . quȩ greca nomina sunt . in usu habent. Nec eorum alibi quam in expositionibus interpretationes legunt. Transire úber héuen. In usu habent prûchent. ' 
It seems most distinctive of substance that what is numerically one and the same is able to receive contraries.  In no other case could one bring forward anything, numerically one, which is able to receive contraries.  For example, a colour which is numerically one and the same will not be black and white, nor will numerically one and the same action be bad and good;  and similarly with everything else that is not substance.  A substance, however, numerically one and the same, is able to receive contraries.  For example, an individual man — one and the same — becomes pale at one time and dark at another, and hot and cold, and bad and good.  Nothing like this is to be seen in any other case, unless perhaps someone might object and say that statements and beliefs are like this.  For the same statement seems to be both true and false. Suppose, for example, that the statement that somebody is sitting is true; after he has got up this same statement will be false.  Similarly with beliefs. Suppose you believe truly that somebody is sitting; after he has got up you will believe falsely if you hold the same belief about him.  However, even if we were to grant this, there is still a difference in the way contraries are received.  For in the case of substances it is by themselves changing that they are able to receive contraries.  For what has become cold instead of hot, or dark instead of pale, or good instead of bad, has changed (has altered);  similarly in other cases too it is by itself undergoing change that each thing is able to receive contraries.  Statements and beliefs, on the other hand, themselves remain completely unchangeable in every way; it is because the actual thing changes that the contrary comes to belong to them.  For the statement that somebody is sitting remains the same; it is because of a change in the actual thing that it comes to be true at one time and false at another.  Similarly with beliefs. Hence at least the way in which it is able to receive contraries — through a change in itself — would be distinctive of substance,  even if we were to grant that beliefs and statements are able to receive contraries.  However, this is not true. For it is not because they themselves receive anything that statements and beliefs are said to be able to receive contraries, but because of what has happened to something else.  For it is because the actual thing exists or does not exist that the statement is said to be true or false, not because it is able itself to receive contraries.  No statement, in fact, or belief is changed at all by anything. So, since nothing happens in them, they are not able to receive contraries.  A substance, on the other hand, is said to be able to receive contraries because it itself receives contraries.  For it receives sickness and health, and paleness and darkness; and because it itself receives the various things of this kind it is said to be able to receive contraries.  It is, therefore, distinctive of substance that what is numerically one and the same is able to receive contraries.  This brings to an end our discussion of substance. 
(20) Τοῦ δὲ ποσοῦ τὸ μέν ἐστι διωρισμένον, τὸ δὲ συνεχές·  (21) καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐκ θέσιν ἐχόντων πρὸς ἄλληλα τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς (22) μορίων συνέστηκε, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἐξ ἐχόντων θέσιν.  ἔστι δὲ διω(23)ρισμένον μὲν οἷον ἀριθμὸς καὶ λόγος, συνεχὲς δὲ γραμμή, (24) ἐπιφάνεια, σῶμα, ἔτι δὲ παρὰ ταῦτα χρόνος καὶ τό(25)πος.  —τῶν μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ μορίων οὐδείς ἐστι κοινὸς (26) ὅρος, πρὸς ὃν συνάπτει τὰ μόρια αὐτοῦ·  οἷον τὰ πέντε εἰ (27) ἔστι τῶν δέκα μόριον, πρὸς οὐδένα κοινὸν ὅρον συνάπτει τὰ (28) πέντε καὶ τὰ πέντε, ἀλλὰ διώρισται· καὶ τὰ τρία γε καὶ (29) τὰ ἑπτὰ πρὸς οὐδένα κοινὸν ὅρον συνάπτει·  οὐδ’ ὅλως ἂν (30) ἔχοις ἐπ’ ἀριθμοῦ λαβεῖν κοινὸν ὅρον τῶν μορίων, ἀλλ’ (31) ἀεὶ διώρισται·  ὥστε ὁ μὲν ἀριθμὸς τῶν διωρισμένων ἐστίν.  (32) ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὁ λόγος τῶν διωρισμένων ἐστίν· (ὅτι μὲν (33) γὰρ ποσόν ἐστιν ὁ λόγος φανερόν· καταμετρεῖται γὰρ συλλαβῇ (34) μακρᾷ καὶ βραχείᾳ· λέγω δὲ αὐτὸν τὸν μετὰ φωνῆς λό(35)γον γιγνόμενον)·  πρὸς οὐδένα γὰρ κοινὸν ὅρον αὐτοῦ τὰ (36) μόρια συνάπτει·  οὐ γὰρ ἔστι κοινὸς ὅρος πρὸς ὃν αἱ συλλαβαὶ (37) συνάπτουσιν, ἀλλ’ ἑκάστη διώρισται αὐτὴ καθ’ αὑτήν.  (5a1) —ἡ δὲ γραμμὴ συνεχές ἐστιν·  ἔστι γὰρ λαβεῖν κοινὸν ὅρον (2) πρὸς ὃν τὰ μόρια αὐτῆς συνάπτει, στιγμήν·  καὶ τῆς ἐπι(3)φανείας γραμμήν, —τὰ γὰρ τοῦ ἐπιπέδου μόρια πρός τινα (4) κοινὸν ὅρον συνάπτει.—  ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος (5) ἔχοις ἂν λαβεῖν κοινὸν ὅρον, γραμμὴν ἢ ἐπιφάνειαν, πρὸς (6) ἣν τὰ τοῦ σώματος μόρια συνάπτει.  ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ χρόνος (7) καὶ ὁ τόπος τῶν τοιούτων·  ὁ γὰρ νῦν χρόνος συνάπτει πρός (8) τε τὸν παρεληλυθότα καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα.  πάλιν ὁ τόπος τῶν (9) συνεχῶν ἐστιν·  τόπον γάρ τινα τὰ τοῦ σώματος μόρια κατ(10)έχει, ἃ πρός τινα κοινὸν ὅρον συνάπτει·  οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ τοῦ (11) τόπου μόρια, ἃ κατέχει ἕκαστον τῶν τοῦ σώματος μορίων, (12) πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν ὅρον συνάπτει πρὸς ὃν καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώμα(13)τος μόρια·  ὥστε συνεχὲς ἂν εἴη καὶ ὁ τόπος· πρὸς γὰρ (14) ἕνα κοινὸν ὅρον αὐτοῦ τὰ μόρια συνάπτει. 
                                       
(6,1) DE QUANTITATE: Quantitatis aliud est continuum, aliud disgregatum atque discretum;  et (2) aliud quidem ex habentibus positionem ad se inuicem suis partibus (3) constat, aliud uero ex non habentibus positionem.  Est autem discreta (4) quantitas ut numerus et oratio, continua uero ut linea, superficies, (5) corpus, praeter haec uero tempus et locus.  Partium enim numeri nullus (6) est communis terminus ad quem partes ipsius coniungantur;  ut (7) quinarius, si est pars denarii, ad nullum communem terminum (8) coniunguntur quinque et quinque sed disiuncti sunt; et tres et septem (9) ad nullum communem terminum coniunguntur;  neque omnino aliquis habebit (10) in numero sumere communem terminum partium sed semper discretae sunt;  (11) quare numerus discretorum est.  Similiter est autem et oratio (12) discretorum; (quoniam enim quantitas est et oratio manifestum est; (13) mensuratur enim syllaba longa et breuis; dico uero illam quae fit cum (14) uoce orationem);  ad nullum enim communem terminum partes eius (15) coniunguntur;  neque enim est communis terminus ad quem syllabae (16) coniunguntur sed unaquaeque discreta est secundum se ipsam.  Linea (17) uero continua est;  namque est sumere communem terminum ad quem partes (18) ipsius coniunguntur, hoc est autem punctum,  et superficiei linea (19) (superficiei enim partes ad quendam communem terminum (20) coniunguntur).  Similiter autem et in corpore habebit quis sumere (21) communem terminum, uel lineam uel superficiem, ad quem partes corporis (22) coniunguntur.  Sunt autem talium et tempus et locus;  praesens enim (23) communis est terminus ad quem coniunguntur praeterita uel (24) futura.  Rursus locus continuorum est;  locum enim quendam partes (25) corporis retinent, quae ad quendam communem terminum coniunguntur;  (26) ergo et loci partes, quas tenent singulae partes corporis, ad eundem (27) terminum coniunguntur ad quem et partes corporis iungebantur;  quare (28) continuum est et locus; ad unum enim communem terminum eius partes (29) coniunguntur. 
وأما الكم فمنه منفصل ، ومنه متصل .  وأيضا منه ما هو قائم من أجزاءٍ فيه لها وضعٌ بعضُها عند بعض ، ومنه من أجزاءٍ ليس لها وضع .  فالمنفصل مثلا هو : العدد والقول ؛ والمتصل : الخط ، والبسيط ، والجسم ، وأيضا مما يُطيف بهذه الزمانُ والمكانُ .  فإن أجزاء العدد لا يوجد لها حدٌّ مشترك أصلا يلتئم عنده بعضُ أجزائـه ببعض ،  فإن أجزاء العدد لا يوجد لها حدٌّ مشترك أصلا يلتئم عنده بعضُ أجزائـه ببعض ، مثـال ذلك أن الخمسـة – إذ هي جزء من العشرة - فليس تتصل بحدٍّ مشتركٍ الخمسةُ منها بالخمسة ، لكنها منفصلة . والثلاثة والسبعة أيضا ليس يتصلان بحد مشترك .  وبالجملة ، لست تقدِر في الأعداد على أخذ حَدٍّ مشترك بين أجزائها ، لكنها دائما منفصلة ،  فيكون العدد من المنفصلة .  وكذلك أيضا ”القول“ هو من المنفصلة : فأما أن القولَ كمٌّ فظاهر ، لأنه يُقَدَّر بمقطع ممدود أو مقصور ؛ وإنما أعني ذلك القول الذي يخرج بالصوت ؛  وأجزاؤه ليست تتصل بحدّ مشترك ،  وذلك أنه لا يوجد حدٌّ مشترك تتصل به المقاطع ، لكنَّ كلَّ مقطع منفصلٌ على حِياله .  فأما الخط فمتصل ،  لأنه قد يتهيأ أن يؤخذ حَدٌّ مشترك تتصل به أجزاؤه : كالنقطة ؛  وفي البسيط الخط ، فإن أجزاء السطح قد تتصل بحدٍّ مشترك ،  وكذلك أيضا في الجسم قد تَقْدِر ان تأخذ حدا مشتركا وهو الخط أو البسيط ، تتصل به أجزاءُ الجسم –  ومما يجري هذا المجرى أيضا الزمانُ والمكان .  إن العرض من الزمان يصل ما بين الماضي منه وبين المُسْتَأْنف .  والمكان أيضا من المتصلة ،  لأن أجزاء الجسم تشغل مكانا ، وهي تتصل بحدٍّ ما مشترك ،  فتكون أجزاءُ المكان أيضا التي يشغلها واحِدٌ من أجزاء الجسم تتصل بالحدّ بعينه الذي به تتصل أجزاء الجسم ،  فيجب أن يكون المكان أيضًا متصلا ، إذ كانت أجزاؤه تتصل بحدٍّ واحد مشترك . 
(LIBER SECUNDUS)
1. INCIPIT DE QUANTITATE PRIMA DIUISIO.
QUANTITATIS aliud quidem est continuum . aliud discretum. Súmelîche quantitates hábint síh zesámine . súmelîche sínt únderskéidin. 


2. SECUNDA DIUISIO.
Et aliud quidem constat ex suis partibus . habentibus positionem ad se inuicem . aliud autem ex non habentibus positionem. Únde súmelîche bestânt fóne íro stúcchin . éin ánderên éteuuio lígendên . súmelîche fóne únlígendên. 


3. QUȨ IN PRIAM DIUISIONE SINT DISCRETA . ET CONTINUA.
Est autem discreta quantitas ut numerus et oratio, continuum uero . linea . superficies . corpus. Amplius autem preter hȩc . tempus . et locus. Tíu úndersceidena quantitas . táz íst zála . únde réda. Tíu síh zesámine hábet . táz íst tér réiz . únde díu óbslíhtî . únde díu héui. Únde nóh tánne âne díu zît . únde stát. 


4. RATIO DE DISCRETIS.
Partium etenim numeri . nullus est communis terminus ad quem copules particulas eius. Tíu téil dero zálo . nehábint nehéina geméina márcha . tíu siu zesámine héfte. 
Ut quinque et quinque . si est ad decem particulȩ. Álso uínuiu . únde áber uínuiu . zesámene neháftênt . úbe díu téil zêniu máchônt . i. úbe denarius tarûz uuírdit. Ad nullum communem terminum copulat . i. copulantur .  quinque ' et quinque sed semper discreta et separata sunt. Nehéin geméine márcha nehéftit zesamine uínuiu únde áber uínuiu . síu sínt îomer geskéiden.  Quare numerus discretorum est. Fóne díu íst îo numerus únderskéidin.  Similiter autem et oratio discretorum est. Oratio íst óuh únderskéiden. Quia et quantitas est oratio . manifestum est. Mensuratur enim syllaba breuis et longa. Táz oratio quantitas íst . dáz skînet án déro mâzo dero syllaborum . día man lánge héizet únde chúrze . s. uuánda láng únde chúrz quantitates sint . táz fóne dîen bestât . táz íst óuh quantitas. Dico autum cum uoce orationem prolatam. Íh méino día gespróchenun orationem . s. Nemísseuáh nîeht án demo uuórte. Uuánda logos pezéichenit apud grecos pêdiu . rationem ióh orationem. Álso óuh tûot réda in díutiscun.  Ad nullum enim communem terminum particulȩ eius copulantur. Partes orationis nebíndit nehéin geméine márchunga zesámine.  Non enim communis terminus est . ad quem syllabe copulantur . sed unaquȩque diuisa est . ipsa secundum se ipsam. Tû neuíndest nehéina márcha geméina . tíu zesámine héfte dîe syllabas . tie partes orationis sínt. Síe sínt álle geskéidin . îouuéliu stát túrh síh. ' 

5. RATIO DE CONTINUIS. Linea uero continua est. 
Potes enim sumere communem terminum . ad quem particule eius copulentur . i. punctum. Ter rêiz hábit síh áber zesámene . uuánda ér mág úndirstúpfit uuérdin . únde dér stúpf íst tánne geméine márcha des zéseuuin téilis . únde des uuínsterin . in hunc modum.[] Uuírdit ter réiz ferzórn in míttemin . sô sínt tánne uuórtin zuêne réiza ûzer éinemo . sô sínt ne óuh fóne díu uuórtin zuêne órtstúpfa déro réizo . ûzer démo éinen stúpfe . dér beuuóre uuás keméine in hunc modum.[] Stúpf neíst nehéin téil des réizes . ér íst échirt órt únde márcha. Mít temo stúpfe sólst tû îo zeigôn dîe téila des réizes . uuíle dû den hálben . uuíle dû den drítten . uuíle dû den uîrden. Âne stúpf nemáht tû. Ter réiz hábit léngi âne bréiti . stúpf nehábit neuuéder. Ten réiz hábit léngi âne bréiti . stúpf nehábit neuuéder. Ten réiz máht tû getéilen mít témo stúpfe . áber sélben den stúpf . nemáht tû getéilen. Fóne díu neíst nehéin díng in quantitate . chléinera stúpfe . et nec quantitas . sed initium et terminus quantitatis.  Et superficies lineam . s. potest sumere communem terminum. Plani namque ' particule ad quendam communem terminum particulȩ copulantur. Tiu uéldslíhtî . mág úndermárchôt uuérden mít temo réize . uuánda íro téil hábent síh îo be nôte zesámine . án ételîchero geméinero márcho . tíu geméina márcha íst ter réiz. Sô daz uéld únderrízen uuírdit . sô íst îogelîh réiz keméine márcha . dero stúccho . díudâr in ében lígent . in hunc modum.[] Fáld óuh taz tûoh in zuéi . sô dúrhkât ter uáld in réizis uuîs álla día bréiti des tûochis . únde íst geméine márcha péidero déro téilo . díudâr in ében sínt. Uuíle dû iz án déro stéte in zuéi scrôtin . sô sínt sâr uuórtin zuéi tûoh ûzer éinemo . únde ûzer éinero slíhti zuô . únde sínt uuórtin zuêne dúrhkánga . ûzer démo éinemo . dérdâr beuóre uuás. Dîe síhet man dánne . án dîen scrôtin . in hunc modum.[] Slíhti hábit îo léngi sámint tero bréiti . íro márcha hábit léngi âne bréiti . dáz íst ter réiz . tér márchôt sia in míttemin . dér órtôt sia óuh an dîen énden . túrh táz neíst er nehéin téil dero slíhti.  Similiter autem et in corpore poteris sumere communem terminum lineam uel superficiem . quȩ corporis particulas copulet. Álso máht tû óuh án déro héui némin ze geméinero márcho dén réiz . álde dîa slíhti . tíu zesámine héfte dâr in ébin lígen díu téil déro héui. Héui dáz íst tiu dícchî sámint tero bréiti . álsô dû síhest án éinemo stéine . álde án éinemo blóche. Fíndest tû dehéina ídun in réizis uuîs kâenda . án demo hólze . álde án demo stéine . tiu íst keméinmérche . déro in ébin lígendôn téilo. Spáltet síh án dero ídun der stéin in zuéi . álde daz hólz . sô séhên uuír zuêne dúrhkánga in réizis uuîs ze uórnahtîgemo spálte . dîe beuóre uuâren éin dúrhkáng . únde éin réiz. Únde âne dáz . séhên uuír zuéi níuuiu superficies . tíu álsô bréitit sínt . sô díg daz corpus uuás. Uuánda man díu níuuin superficies fóre nesáh . pe díu skînet . táz tiz corpus peuóre continuum uuás. Uuîo uuírdit áber superficies keméinmérche? Táz tûot iz . úbe dû uíndest áber án stéine . álde án hólze . strîmen ' gâende in strâzo uuîs . tîe héizent superficies . uuánda dâr bréiti sámint téro léngi íst. Tîe strîmen . únde die stâzâ . sínt óuh sâr únder mérche déro in ében lígendôn téilo. Uuír séhên ófto ába óbenahtîgemo bérge nídergân strâzâ . dâr sléipfa álde uuég íst. Uuír séhên uuîza strâza uuóla bréita án demo hímele . quȩ lacteus circulus dicitur . dáz sínt ál úndermérche geméiníu . déro in ében lígendôn téilo . dés hímelis ióh tero érdo. Úbe án míttên dîen strîmôm . únde dîen strâzôn . der bérg scríndet . álde hólz . álde stéin . sô sínt zuéi corpora uuórtin ûzer éinemo . únde ûzer éinero strâzo zuô . dîe dánne skînet án dîen brúchin . in hunc modum.[] Únde áber âne dáz pegínnent skînen zuéi níuuiu superficies . tíu man beuóre nesáh . tô iz éin corpus uuás. Uuíle dû chédin dáz keskíhet án substantia . náls in quantitate . sô uerním dáz uuóla . târ síh tíu corpora téilent . táz síh târ téilent íro quantitates . réiz . únde slíhtî . únde héui. Únde uerním óuh nóh mêr. Úbe díu corpora sô stárh sínt . táz síu uuîchen nemúgen . eruuéget man íro éin téil . sô uuágônt álliu íro téil . álso éin stéin tûot . álde éin chórn. Tánnân skînet îo dáz íro quantitas continue sínt. Úbe iz áber íst éin hûfo stéino . álde éin mútte chórnis . iruuágôt íro éin . túrh táz neuuǵônt síu álliu. Târ skînet táz síu . únde íro quantitates únderskéiden sínt.  Est autem talium . et tempus . et locus. Sólih íst óuh zît . únde stát . i. continua sunt.  Presens enim tempus copulatur . et ad prȩteritum . et ad futurum. Taz kágenuuérta zît . háftet zû demo feruárenên . únde demo chúmftîgin. Únde íst keméinmérche íro zuéio . íst ûzlâz preteriti . ánauáng futuri.  Rursus locus continuorum est. Stát íst óuh téro zesámine háftendôn.  Locum enim quendam corporis particule obtinent . s. quia ipsum corpus quendam locum obtinet. Uuánda sélbiz corpus pehâbit éina stát . fóne díu pehábent óuh sîniu téil éina stát. Quȩ particulȩ ad quen'dam communem terminum copulantur. Tíu téil háftênt zû ételîchero gméinero márcho.  Ergo loci particulȩ quȩ obtinent singulas corporis particulas . ad eundem terminum copulantur . ad quem et corporis particulȩ.  Quapropter continuus est et locus. Ad unum enim communem terminum suas particulas copulat. Tíu téil déro stéte . díu dés corporis téil úmbehábint . tíu háftênt târ zesámine . târ díu téil dés corporis zesámine háftênt. Pe díu íst óuh tíu stát zesáminehábîg . uuánda síu fûoget íro téil zû geméinero márcho . táz chît íro téil uuérdent zesámine gefûoget . mít keméinero márcho. Álso daz hûs éin corpus íst . álso hábit iz óuh éina hûsstát. Únde álso die uuénde téil sínt tes hûses . sô sínt óuh tíe uuántstéte . téil dero hûsstéte. Únde dâr die uuénde zesámine háftênt . târ háftênt óuh tie uuántstéte zesámine. Uuáz íst sélbiu díu stát? Tíu séhsiu . díu állero díngolîh úmbehábint . únde úmbegrîfint. Uuéliu sínt tíu? Taz únder . únde daz óbe . daz fóre . únde daz áfter . daz in ében ze zéseuûn . únde daz daz in ében ze uuínsterûn. Uuáz íst áber zît? Álter dírro uuérelte . fóne êrist únz in énde. 
Quantity is either discrete or continuous.  Moreover, some quantities are such that each part of the whole has a relative position to the other parts: others have within them no such relation of part to part.  Instances of discrete quantities are number and speech; of continuous, lines, surfaces, solids, and, besides these, time and place.  In the case of the parts of a number, there is no common boundary at which they join.  For example: two fives make ten, but the two fives have no common boundary, but are separate; the parts three and seven also do not join at any boundary.  Nor, to generalize, would it ever be possible in the case of number that there should be a common boundary among the parts; they are always separate.  Number, therefore, is a discrete quantity.  The same is true of speech. That speech is a quantity is evident: for it is measured in long and short syllables. I mean here that speech which is vocal.  Moreover, it is a discrete quantity for its parts have no common boundary.  There is no common boundary at which the syllables join, but each is separate and distinct from the rest.  A line, on the other hand, is a continuous quantity,  for it is possible to find a common boundary at which its parts join. In the case of the line, this common boundary is the point;  in the case of the plane, it is the line: for the parts of the plane have also a common boundary.  Similarly you can find a common boundary in the case of the parts of a solid, namely either a line or a plane.  Space and time also belong to this class of quantities.  Time, past, present, and future, forms a continuous whole.  Space, likewise, is a continuous quantity;  for the parts of a solid occupy a certain space, and these have a common boundary;  it follows that the parts of space also, which are occupied by the parts of the solid, have the same common boundary as the parts of the solid.  Thus, not only time, but space also, is a continuous quantity, for its parts have a common boundary. 
(15) Ἔτι τὰ μὲν ἐκ θέσιν ἐχόντων πρὸς ἄλληλα τῶν ἐν (16) αὐτοῖς μορίων συνέστηκεν, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐξ ἐχόντων θέσιν·  (17) οἷον τὰ μὲν τῆς γραμμῆς μόρια θέσιν ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα,  — (18) ἕκαστον γὰρ αὐτῶν κεῖταί που, καὶ ἔχοις ἂν διαλαβεῖν καὶ (19) ἀποδοῦναι οὗ ἕκαστον κεῖται ἐν τῷ ἐπιπέδῳ καὶ πρὸς (20) ποῖον μόριον τῶν λοιπῶν συνάπτει·—  ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὰ (21) τοῦ ἐπιπέδου μόρια θέσιν ἔχει τινά,  —ὁμοίως γὰρ ἂν ἀπο(22)δοθείη ἕκαστον οὗ κεῖται, καὶ ποῖα συνάπτει πρὸς ἄλληλα.—  (23) καὶ τὰ τοῦ στερεοῦ δὲ ὡσαύτως καὶ τὰ τοῦ τόπου.  ἐπὶ δέ (24) γε τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι τις ἐπιβλέψαι ὡς τὰ μόρια (25) θέσιν τινὰ ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ κεῖταί που, ἢ ποῖά γε (26) πρὸς ἄλληλα συνάπτει τῶν μορίων·  οὐδὲ τὰ τοῦ χρόνου· (27) ὑπομένει γὰρ οὐδὲν τῶν τοῦ χρόνου μορίων, ὃ δὲ μή ἐστιν (28) ὑπομένον, πῶς ἂν τοῦτο θέσιν τινὰ ἔχοι;  ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον (29) τάξιν τινὰ εἴποις ἂν ἔχειν τῷ τὸ μὲν πρότερον εἶναι τοῦ (30) χρόνου τὸ δ’ ὕστερον.  καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ δὲ ὡσαύτως, τῷ (31) πρότερον ἀριθμεῖσθαι τὸ ἓν τῶν δύο καὶ τὰ δύο τῶν τριῶν·  (32) καὶ οὕτω τάξιν ἄν τινα ἔχοι, θέσιν δὲ οὐ πάνυ λάβοις (33) ἄν.  καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ ὡσαύτως·  οὐδὲν γὰρ ὑπομένει τῶν (34) μορίων αὐτοῦ,  ἀλλ’ εἴρηταί τε καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἔτι τοῦτο (35) λαβεῖν,  ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη θέσις τῶν μορίων αὐτοῦ, εἴγε μηδὲν (36) ὑπομένει.  —τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐκ θέσιν ἐχόντων τῶν μορίων συν(37)έστηκε, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐξ ἐχόντων θέσιν. 
                               
(30) Amplius alia sunt quae ex habentibus ad se inuicem positionem suis (31) partibus constant;  ut lineae quidem partes habent ad se inuicem (32) positionem  (singulae enim iacent alicubi, et possis cognoscere et (33) designare ubi singulae in superficie iaceant et ad quam caeterarum (34) partium coniungantur);  similiter autem et superficiei partes habent (35) aliquam positionem  (similiter enim designabuntur singulae ubi iacent, (36) et quae ad se inuicem coniunguntur).  Et soliditatis quoque et loci (37) similiter.  In numero uero nullus habet perspicere quemadmodum partes (38) habeant ad se inuicem aliquam positionem uel ubi iaceant uel quae ad (39) quam coniungantur; at uero nec temporis;  nihil enim permanet ex (40) partibus temporis, quod autem non est permanens, quomodo hoc habebit (41) aliquem positionem?  Sed magis ordinem quendam dices retinere idcirco (42) quod temporis hoc quidem prius est, illud uero posterius.  Et in numero (43) quoque eo quod prius numeretur unus quam duo et duo quam tres;  et sic (44) habebunt aliquem ordinem, positionem uero non multum accipies.  Et (45) oratio similiter;  nihil enim eius partium permanet  sed dictum est et (46) non est ultra hoc sumere,  quare non erit ulla positio eius partium (47) cuius permanet nihil.  Igitur alia ex habentibus ad se inuicem partibus (48) positionem constant, alia uero ex non habentibus positionem. 
                               
6. ITEM RATIO DE SECUNDA DIFFERENTIA QUANTITATUM . QUȨ EST HABENTIUM POSITIONEM ET NON HABENTEM. Amplius autem. Ferním áber nóh mêr. Ferním dáz íh nû téilta síben quantitates ín uínuiu . únde in zuéi . nû sól íh sîe ánderêst téilen in uîeriu . únde in dríu. ' Aliȩ quidem constant ex particulis quȩ in eis sunt . positionem ad se inuicem habentibus . aliȩ autem ex non habentibus positionem. Súmelîche quantitates pestânt . fóne íro téilin éin ánderên éteuuîo lígendên . sumelîche fóne únlígendên.  Ut est. Lineȩ quidem particulȩ positionem habent ad se inuicem. Tíu téil des réizis . lígent éin ánderên étuuîo . s. geórto . náls kesîto . in hunc modum.[ Singulae namque eorum situm est alicubi. Îogelîh íro téil . líget éteuuâr. Et habes unde sumas unumquodque . et assignes ubi situm est in plano. Únde habist tû geuuís . uuâr dû sûchest téile gelîchin . únde séigôst uuâr er líge án demo uélde. Et ad quam particulam cȩterarum copuletur. Únde án uuélez iz stôze déro ánderro téilo . s. álsô daz zéseuua téil stôzit án daz uuínstera . únde îo geórto náls gesîto.  Similiter autem et particulȩ plani quandam habent positionem. Tíu téil dero slíhtî lígent óuh éteuuâr . únde lígent péidiu geórto ióh gesîto.  (Similiter namque ostenditur unumquodque ubi iacet. Táz skînet . uuánda man zéigôn mág . uuâr îo gelîchez líge. Et quȩ copulantur ad se inuicem. Únde man zéigôn mág uuéliu án ánderíu stôzên. Sô díu tûont tíu gelégo únde gesîto éin ánderên bechômint . álde geórto . in hunc modum. '[ Sed et soliditatis quoque similiter et loci . s. particulȩ ostenduntur. Sô mág man óuh zéigôn tíu téil dero héui . únde dero stéte. Tiu héui dáz íst tíu hôi . únde diu dícchî ut dictum est. Díu gât îo nídenân ûf. Fóne díu íst quíssíu stát . únde geuuíssêr téil dero hôi . ióh tero dícchî . éin élna fóne érdo . álde zuô. Únde uuîo lígent síu éin anderên? Îo éin óbe ándermo in hunc modum.[] Áber díu stát . úmbegât díu corpora. Fóne díu íst quíssêr téil dero stéte . ze zéigônne . quíssen téil des corporis. Sô dáz íst. Án demo áste des póumis . án déro uuénde des hûsis . án dero ékko der pérgis . án demo hóubete des mánnis . án dero pórto déro búrg. Únde uuîo lígent síu éin ánderên? Súmiu geórto . sô díu geléiche tûont des fíngeris. Súmiu gelégo . sô sélbin die fíngera tûont. Súm éin óbe ándermo . sô daz hóubet tôt óbe demo hálse. ' Uuîo hôo iz sî . dáz zéigôt quíssin téil dero héui. Uuâr iz tarána sî . án uuélemo téile . án uuélemo líde . únde nóh tánne in uuélemo énde . uuélês síndes . uuéder óbenân . álde nídenân . fóre . álde áfter . álde in ében . ôsterhálb . álde uuéster hálb . nórdenân . álde súdenân . táz zéigôt quíssen téil dero stéte. 

7. HUCUSQUE DE HABENTIBUS POSITIONEM . RESTAT DE NON HABENTIBUS.
In numero non potest quis respicere tamquam particulȩ eius positionem aliquam ad se inuicem habeant . aut sit situm alicubi . aut aliquȩ partuculȩ ad se conectantur. Án dîen télen dero zálo . neuíndest tû neuuéder . nóh uuîo síu lígên éin ánderên . s. geórto . álde gesîto . álde óbe éin ánderên . nóh uuâr síu lígên . s. ze zéseuûn . álde ze uuínsterûn . nóh táz síu îenêr zesámine háfteên. Sed neque ea . i. eȩ partes quȩ temporis sunt .s positionem habent. Nóh téil des zîtis nehábent nehéina kelégeni. 
Nihil enim permanet ex partibus temporis Táz íst fóne díu . uuánda sîniu téil nîo stíllo negestânt . síu rínnent hína sámoso uuázer. Táz nû presens íst . táz uuírdit sâr preteritum . únde dáz futurum nû íst . táz uuírdit sâr presens. Quod autem non est permanens, quomodo hoc positionem aliquem habebit? Táz nehéina uuîla úngeuuéhselôt neíst . uuîo mág táz háben státa . álde kelégenî álde sképfada? Uuér mág chéden . sús líget tíz téil énemo téile . sîd síu îo ána in uérte ' sínt? únde nîomêr negestátônt?  Sed magis ordinem quendam particularem dices habere. Tû máht mêr chéden ételîcha órdinháftigî uuésen dero téilo.Idcirco quod temporis hoc quidem prius est . illud uero posterius. Fóne díu dáz éin téil des zîtis êr íst . ánderiz táranâh.  Sed et de numero similiter. Sô máht tû óuh chéden fóne dero zálo . táz sî ordinem hábe. Eo quod privs numeretur unus quam duo . et duo quam tres. Uuánda éin in zálo êr íst tánne zuéi . únde êr zuéi dánne dríu.  Et ita ordinem quendam habebunt . positionem uero non multum . i. non omino accipies. Únde îo sô hábint sîe ordinem . légerstát nehéina.  Sed oratio similiter. Sólih íst óuh oratio.  Particulȩ enim eius partium nihil partiuntur . i. nequaquam permanent. Íro téil nestânt in stéte nîeht . s. dánne síu gespróchen uuérdent.  Sed dictum est et non potest hoc amplius sumi. Núbe hínaíst . sô iz kespróchen uuírdet . nóh tánne nîeht mêr nemág kezéigôt uuérden . uuâr iz sî dáztâr kespróchen uuárd.  Quapropter non erit positio particularum eius . si quidem nihil partiuntur. Pe díu neíst nehéin gelégenî íro téilo . sîd síu neuuérênt. 

8. CONCLUSIO SENTENTIȨ.
Alia itaque constant ex particulis quȩ in eis sunt positionem ad se inuicem habentibus. Alia autem ex non habentibus. Fóne díu íst áleuuâr . dáz súmelîche quantitates pestânt fóne íro téilin . éin ánderên étuuîo lígendên . súmelîch fóne únlígendên. ' 
Quantities consist either of parts which bear a relative position each to each, or of parts which do not.  The parts of a line bear a relative position to each other,  for each lies somewhere, and it would be possible to distinguish each, and to state the position of each on the plane and to explain to what sort of part among the rest each was contiguous.  Similarly the parts of a plane have position,  for it could similarly be stated what was the position of each and what sort of parts were contiguous.  The same is true with regard to the solid and to space.  But it would be impossible to show that the arts of a number had a relative position each to each, or a particular position, or to state what parts were contiguous.  Nor could this be done in the case of time, for none of the parts of time has an abiding existence, and that which does not abide can hardly have position.  It would be better to say that such parts had a relative order, in virtue of one being prior to another.  Similarly with number: in counting, ’one’ is prior to ’two’, and ’two’ to ’three’,  and thus the parts of number may be said to possess a relative order, though it would be impossible to discover any distinct position for each.  This holds good also in the case of speech.  None of its parts has an abiding existence:  when once a syllable is pronounced, it is not possible to retain it,  so that, naturally, as the parts do not abide, they cannot have position.  Thus, some quantities consist of parts which have position, and some of those which have not. 
(38) Κυρίως δὲ ποσὰ ταῦτα μόνα λέγεται τὰ εἰρημένα, (39) τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα κατὰ συμβεβηκός·  εἰς ταῦτα γὰρ (5b1) βλέποντες καὶ τἆλλα ποσὰ λέγομεν,  οἷον πολὺ τὸ λευκὸν (2) λέγεται τῷ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν πολλὴν εἶναι,  καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις μακρὰ (3) τῷ γε τὸν χρόνον πολὺν εἶναι, καὶ ἡ κίνησις πολλή·  οὐ γὰρ (4) καθ’ αὑτὸ ἕκαστον τούτων ποσὸν λέγεται·  οἷον ἐὰν ἀποδιδῷ (5) τις πόση τις ἡ πρᾶξίς ἐστι, τῷ χρόνῳ ὁριεῖ ἐνιαυσίαν ἢ (6) οὕτω πως ἀποδιδούς, καὶ τὸ λευκὸν ποσόν τι ἀποδιδοὺς τῇ (7) ἐπιφανείᾳ ὁριεῖ,  —ὅση γὰρ ἂν ἡ ἐπιφάνεια ᾖ, τοσοῦτον καὶ (8) τὸ λευκὸν φήσει εἶναι·—  ὥστε μόνα κυρίως καὶ καθ’ αὑτὰ (9) ποσὰ λέγεται τὰ εἰρημένα, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδὲν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτό, (10) ἀλλ’ εἰ ἄρα κατὰ συμβεβηκός. 
               
(49) Proprie autem quantitates hae solae sunt quas diximus, alia uero omnia (50) secundum accidens sunt;  ad haec enim aspicientes et alias dicimus (51) quantitates,  ut multum dicitur album eo quod superficies multa sit,  et (52) actio longa eo quod tempus multum et longum sit, et motus multus;  (53) neque enim horum singulum per se quantitas dicitur;  ut, si quis (54) assignet quanta sit actio, tempore definiet, annuam uel sic aliquo (55) modo assignans, et album quantum sit assignans superficie definiet  (56) (quanta enim fuerit superficies, tantum esse album dicet);  quare (57) solae proprie et secundum se ipsae quantitates dicuntur quae dictae (58) sunt, aliorum uero nihil per se sed, si forte, per accidens. 
               
9. QUȨ QUANTITATES NON PROPRIE DICANTUR.
Propriȩ autem quantitates . hȩ solȩ sunt. Échert tíse síbene sínt fúrenómis quantitates. Alia uero omnia secundum accidens. Álliu díu ánderiu . s. díu in ánderên cathegoriis míchelíu álde lúzelíu héizent . tíu héizent nâh tísên. Tísên síbenên sínt keméine námen . magnum . paruum . multum . exiguum . longum . breue. Spríchet man dîe námen fóne ánderên díngen . dîen nesínt síu nîeht éigin . síu sínt nâh tísên dánne sô gehéizen. 
Ad hȩc enim aspicientes . et alias dicimus esse quantitates. Tísiu síbeniu méinende . spréchên uuír dîe námen . óuh fóne ánderên díngen . díu quantitates nîeht nesínt.  Ut multum dicimus album . eo quod superficies multa sit. Álsô uuír chédên míchelâ uuîzi . dâr daz féld mícheliz íst.  Et actio longa . eo quod tempus multum et longum sit. Únde uuir chédên . lángiz uuérh . uuánda díu uríst lángiu íst . únde des zîtis fílo íst. Et motus multus. Únde chédên míchel rûra . dáz íst lángêr lóuft . uuánda daz zît lángiz íst.  Neque enim horum singulum per se quantitas dicitur. Nehéin déro díingo nehéizit túrh síh míchel álde láng.  Ut si quis assignet quanta sit actio . tempore definiet . annuam . uel sic aliquo modo assignans. Álso dârána skînet . táz tér dia lángseimi des uuérchis zéigôt . sîa zéigôt mít temo zîte . únde chît iz éin iâruuérh sî . álde sô éteuuîo. Et album quantum sit assignans . superficie definiet. Únde uuîo fílo dero uuîzi sî ságende . knôtmézôt er daz uéld.  Quanta enim ' superficies fuerit . tantum esse album dicet. Sô míchel daz uéld íst . sô míchela ságêt er uuésen dia uuîzî. 

10. CONCLUSIO.
Quare solȩ proprie . et secundum se ipse quantitates dicuntur . quȩ dictȩ sunt. Fóne díu héizet man sîe síbene dúrh síh quantitates. Aliorum uero nihil per se . sed dicitur forte per accidens. Ánderiu díng nehábint íro námen . únde íro adiectiua nîeht túrh síh . síu hábint sîe sîe fóne ín. Sîe sínt íro accidentia . sîe sínt íro geuérten. Ánderiu díng nemúgen âna sîe sîn. Álsô an substantiis sínt quantitates . sô sínt án quantitatibus qualitates . únde acctiones . únde passiones. Uuíle dû chéden . úbe dáz sô íst . tánne neíst ín quantitas accidens . sîe sínt mêr íro accidentia . táz íst áluuâr. Áber dáz fóne ándermo úngeskéiden íst . táz mág îo héizen sîn accidens. Mán chît óuh in grammatica . dáz persona sî accidens uerbi . uuánda sî fóne ímo úngeskéiden íst. Áfter uuârhéite . sô íst actio . únde passio . dero personȩ accidens . pe díu íst óuh uerbum accidens personȩ. Nû éigin gelírnet táz longa accio . multa ȩgritudo . motus multus . calor magnus . album multum . multa patientia . magna sapientia . timor magnus . fletus multus . únde dáragágene . i. e contrario . parua scientia . exiguum munus . modicus gustus . breuis delectatio . pauca retributio . únde ál dáz sô getâna . síhet ze dîen gezáltên síben quantitatibus. Uuánda sîe sínt magnȩ paruæ . multȩ paucȩ . breues et longȩ . pe díu gébent sîe íz ánderên. 
Strictly speaking, only the things which I have mentioned belong to the category of quantity: everything else that is called quantitative is a quantity in a secondary sense.  It is because we have in mind some one of these quantities, properly so called, that we apply quantitative terms to other things.  We speak of what is white as large, because the surface over which the white extends is large;  we speak of an action or a process as lengthy, because the time covered is long;  these things cannot in their own right claim the quantitative epithet.  For instance, should any one explain how long an action was, his statement would be made in terms of the time taken, to the effect that it lasted a year, or something of that sort.  In the same way, he would explain the size of a white object in terms of surface, for he would state the area which it covered.  Thus the things already mentioned, and these alone, are in their intrinsic nature quantities; nothing else can claim the name in its own right, but, if at all, only in a secondary sense. 
(11) Ἔτι τῷ ποσῷ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον,  (ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν (12) ἀφωρισμένων φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον, οἷον τῷ (13) διπήχει ἢ τριπήχει ἢ τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ ἢ τῶν τοιούτων τινί, (14) —οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἐναντίον),  εἰ μὴ τὸ πολὺ τῷ ὀλίγῳ (15) φαίη τις εἶναι ἐναντίον ἢ τὸ μέγα τῷ μικρῷ.  τούτων δὲ (16) οὐδέν ἐστι ποσὸν ἀλλὰ τῶν πρός τι·  οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ καθ’ (17) αὑτὸ μέγα λέγεται ἢ μικρόν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον ἀναφέ(18)ρεται,  οἷον ὄρος μὲν μικρὸν λέγεται, κέγχρος δὲ με(19)γάλη τῷ τὴν μὲν τῶν ὁμογενῶν μεῖζον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἔλατ(20)τον τῶν ὁμογενῶν·  οὐκοῦν πρὸς ἕτερον ἡ ἀναφορά, ἐπεὶ εἴγε (21) καθ’ αὑτὸ μικρὸν ἢ μέγα ἐλέγετο, οὐκ ἄν ποτε τὸ μὲν (22) ὄρος μικρὸν ἐλέγετο, ἡ δὲ κέγχρος μεγάλη.  πάλιν ἐν μὲν (23) τῇ κώμῃ πολλούς φαμεν ἀνθρώπους εἶναι, ἐν Ἀθήναις δὲ (24) ὀλίγους πολλαπλασίους αὐτῶν ὄντας,  καὶ ἐν μὲν τῇ οἰκίᾳ (25) πολλούς, ἐν δὲ τῷ θεάτρῳ ὀλίγους πολλῷ πλείους ὄντας.—  (26) ἔτι τὸ μὲν δίπηχυ καὶ τρίπηχυ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων (27) ποσὸν σημαίνει, τὸ δὲ μέγα ἢ μικρὸν οὐ σημαίνει ποσὸν (28) ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πρός τι·  πρὸς γὰρ ἕτερον θεωρεῖται τὸ μέγα (29) καὶ τὸ μικρόν· ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ταῦτα τῶν πρός τί ἐστιν.—  (30) ἔτι ἐάν τε τιθῇ τις αὐτὰ ποσὰ εἶναι ἐάν τε μὴ τιθῇ, οὐκ (31) ἔστιν αὐτοῖς ἐναντίον οὐδέν·  ὃ γὰρ μὴ ἔστιν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ (32) λαβεῖν ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον ἀναφέροντα, πῶς ἂν εἴη τού(33)τῳ τι ἐναντίον;  —ἔτι εἰ ἔσται τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν (34) ἐναντία, συμβήσεται τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα τὰ ἐναντία ἐπιδέχεσθαι (35) καὶ αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς εἶναι ἐναντία.  συμβαίνει γὰρ ἅμα τὸ (36) αὐτὸ μέγα τε καὶ μικρὸν εἶναι,  —ἔστι γὰρ πρὸς μὲν τοῦτο (37) μικρόν, πρὸς ἕτερον δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο μέγα·—  ὥστε τὸ αὐ(38)τὸ καὶ μέγα καὶ μικρὸν κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον εἶναι συμβαί(39)νει, ὥστε ἅμα τὰ ἐναντία ἐπιδέχεσθαι·  ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν δοκεῖ (6a1) ἅμα τὰ ἐναντία ἐπιδέχεσθαι·  οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας, δεκτι(2)κὴ μὲν τῶν ἐναντίων δοκεῖ εἶναι,  ἀλλ’ οὔτι γε ἅμα νοσεῖ (3) καὶ ὑγιαίνει, οὐδὲ λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν ἐστὶν ἅμα, οὐδὲ (4) τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν ἅμα τὰ ἐναντία ἐπιδέχεται. 
                                       
(59) Quantitatibus uero nihil est contrarium  (in his enim quae definita (60) sunt manifestum est quoniam nihil est contrarium, ut bicubito uel (61) tricubito uel superficiei uel alicui talium -- nihil enim est (62) contrarium),  nisi multa paucis dicat quis esse contraria uel magnum (63) minori.  Horum autem nihil est quantitas sed ad aliquid;  nihil enim per (64) se ipsum magnum dicitur uel paruum sed ad aliud refertur;  nam mons (65) quidem paruus dicitur, milium uero magnum eo quod hoc quidem sui (66) generis maius sit, illud uero sui generis minus;  ergo ad aliud est (67) eorum relatio; nam, si per se ipsum parurum uel magnum diceretur, (68) numquam mons quidem aliquando paruus, milium uero magnum (69) diceretur.  Rursus in uico quidem plures homines esse dicimus, in (70) ciuitate uero paucos cum sint eorum multiplices,  et in domo quidem (71) multos, in theatro uero paucos cum sint plures.  Amplius bicubitum (72) uel tricubitum et unumquodque talium quantitatem significat, magnum (73) uero uel paruum non significat quantitatem sed magis ad aliquid;  (74) quoniam ad aliud spectatur magnum et paruum; quare manifestum est (75) quoniam haec ad aliquid sunt.  Amplius, siue aliquis ponat ea esse (76) quantitates siue non ponat, nihil illis erit contrarium;  quod enim non (77) est sumere per se ipsum sed ad solam alterius relationem, quomodo huic (78) aliquid erit contrarium?  Amplius, si sunt magnum et paruum (79) contraria, contingit idem simul contraria suscipere et ea ipsa sibi (80) esse contraria.  Contingit enim simul idem paruum esse et magnum  (est (81) enim ad hoc quidem paruum, ad aliud uero hoc idem ipsum magnum);  quare (82) idem paruum et magnum et eodem tempore esse contingit, quare simul (83) contraria suscipiet;  sed nihil est quod uideatur simul contraria posse (84) suscipere;  ut substantia, susceptibilis quidem contrariorum esse (85) uidetur  sed nullus simul sanus est et aeger, nec albus et niger simul; (86) nihilque aliud simul contraria suscipit. 
                                       
11. HINC IAM PROPRIUM QUANTITATIS REQUIRITUR. ' PRIMUM EX EO QUOD NIHIL EI EST CONTRARIUM.
Amplius. Lírne nóh páz pechénnen quantitatem. Quantitati nihil est contrarium. Nîeht neíst uuíderuuártigis quantitati. 
In definitis manifestum est . quoniam nihil est contrarium. Án dîen geuuíssôtên síbenin . íst iz óffen. Ut bicubito et tricubito . uel superficiei . uel alicui talium nihil est contrarium. Álso zuéioélneméze álde drîoélneméze . álde dero óbeslíhti . únde dîen sô getânên . uuíderuuártîgis nîeht neíst. 

12. ADIECTIUA NON ESSE QUANTITATES.
Nisi multa paucis dicat quis esse contraria . uel magnum paruo. Mán nechéde mánig únde únmanig . míchel únde lúzzel . uuésen uuíderuuártîg. 
Horum autem nihil est quantitas . sed magis ad aliquid sunt. Tíu nesínt áber nîeht quantitas . síu sínt ad aliquid.  Nihil enim per se ipsum magnum dicitur . sed ad aliud refertur. Nehéin díng nehéizet túrh síh míchel . íz síhet îo ze éinmo ándermo.  Nam mons quidem paruus dicitur . milium uero magnum. Táz skînet . uuánda man den bérg chît lúzzelin . éin hírsechórn mícheliz. Eo quod hoc quidem . s. milium sui generis maius sit . illud uero . s. mons sui generis minus. Táz íst fóne díu . uuánda der bérg uuíder ánderên lúzzelêr íst . taz hírsechórn uuíder ánderên déro sláhto chórnin mícheliz íst.  Ergo ad aliud est eorum relatio. Târ skînet táz man sie mízet ze ándermo. Nam si per se ipsum . parurum uel magnum diceretur . numquam mons paruus . milium uero magnum diceretur. Uuánda úbe míchel únde lúzzel dúrh síh kespróchen uuírtîn . sô meuuúrte nîomer bérg ke'héizen lúzzelêr . hírsechórn mícheliz. 
Quantities have no contraries.  In the case of definite quantities this is obvious; thus, there is nothing that is the contrary of ’two cubits long’ or of ’three cubits long’, or of a surface, or of any such quantities.  A man might, indeed, argue that ’much’ was the contrary of ’little’, and ’great’ of ’small’.  But these are not quantitative, but relative;  things are not great or small absolutely, they are so called rather as the result of an act of comparison.  For instance, a mountain is called small, a grain large, in virtue of the fact that the latter is greater than others of its kind, the former less.  Thus there is a reference here to an external standard, for if the terms ’great’ and ’small’ were used absolutely, a mountain would never be called small or a grain large.  Again, we say that there are many people in a village, and few in Athens, although those in the city are many times as numerous as those in the village:  or we say that a house has many in it, and a theatre few, though those in the theatre far outnumber those in the house.  The terms ’two cubits long, ’three cubits long,’ and so on indicate quantity, the terms ’great’ and ’small’ indicate relation,  for they have reference to an external standard. It is, therefore, plain that these are to be classed as relative.  Again, whether we define them as quantitative or not, they have no contraries:  for how can there be a contrary of an attribute which is not to be apprehended in or by itself, but only by reference to something external?  Again, if ’great’ and ’small’ are contraries, it will come about that the same subject can admit contrary qualities at one and the same time, and that things will themselves be contrary to themselves.  For it happens at times that the same thing is both small and great.  For the same thing may be small in comparison with one thing, and great in comparison with another,  so that the same thing comes to be both small and great at one and the same time, and is of such a nature as to admit contrary qualities at one and the same moment.  Yet it was agreed, when substance was being discussed, that nothing admits contrary qualities at one and the same moment.  For though substance is capable of admitting contrary qualities,  yet no one is at the same time both sick and healthy, nothing is at the same time both white and black. Nor is there anything which is qualified in contrary ways at one and the same time. 
καὶ (5) αὐτὰ δ’ αὑτοῖς συμβαίνει ἐναντία εἶναι·  εἰ γάρ ἐστι τὸ (6) μέγα τῷ μικρῷ ἐναντίον, τὸ δ’ αὐτό ἐστιν ἅμα μέγα καὶ (7) μικρόν, αὐτὸ αὑτῷ ἂν εἴη ἐναντίον·  ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀδυνάτων (8) ἐστὶν αὐτὸ αὑτῷ εἶναι ἐναντίον.  —οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ μέγα (9) τῷ μικρῷ ἐναντίον, οὐδὲ τὸ πολὺ τῷ ὀλίγῳ,  ὥστε κἂν (10) μὴ τῶν πρός τι ταῦτά τις ἐρεῖ ἀλλὰ τοῦ ποσοῦ, οὐδὲν (11) ἐναντίον ἕξει. 
         
(87) Et eadem sibi ipsis contingit esse contraria;  nam si est magnum et (88) paruum contrarium, ipsum autem idem simul est paruum et magnum, ipsum (89) sibi erit contrarium;  sed impossibile est ipsum sibi esse (90) contrarium.  Non est igitur magnum paruo contrarium nec multa paucis;  (91) quare si quis haec non relatiua esse dicat, quantitas tamen nihil (92) contrarium habebit. 
         
Moreover, if these were contraries, they would themselves be contrary to themselves.  For if ’great’ is the contrary of ’small’, and the same thing is both great and small at the same time, then ’small’ or ’great’ is the contrary of itself.  But this is impossible.  The term ’great’, therefore, is not the contrary of the term ’small’, nor ’much’ of ’little’.  And even though a man should call these terms not relative but quantitative, they would not have contraries. 
(12) —μάλιστα δὲ ἡ ἐναντιότης τοῦ ποσοῦ περὶ τὸν τό(13)πον δοκεῖ ὑπάρχειν·  τὸ γὰρ ἄνω τῷ κάτω ἐναντίον τιθέασι, τὴν (14) πρὸς τὸ μέσον χώραν κάτω λέγοντες,  διὰ τὸ πλείστην τῷ (15) μέσῳ διάστασιν πρὸς τὰ πέρατα τοῦ κόσμου εἶναι.  ἐοίκασι (16) δὲ καὶ τὸν τῶν ἄλλων ἐναντίων ὁρισμὸν ἀπὸ τούτων ἐπιφέρειν·  (17) τὰ γὰρ πλεῖστον ἀλλήλων διεστηκότα τῶν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ (18) γένει ἐναντία ὁρίζονται. 
         
(93) Maxime autem circa locum esse uidetur contrarietas quantitatis;  (94) sursum enim ei quod est deorsum contrarium ponunt, regionem mediam (95) deorsum dicentes  propterea quod multa distantia est medietatis ad (96) mundi terminos.  Videntur autem et aliorum contrariorum definitionem ab (97) his proferre;  quae enim multum a se inuicem distant in eodem genere (98) contraria esse definiunt. 
         
It is in the case of space that quantity most plausibly appears to admit of a contrary.  For men define the term ’above’ as the contrary of ’below’, when it is the region at the centre they mean by ’below’;  and this is so, because nothing is farther from the extremities of the universe than the region at the centre.  Indeed, it seems that in defining contraries of every kind men have recourse to a spatial metaphor,  for they say that those things are contraries which, within the same class, are separated by the greatest possible distance. 
(19) Οὐ δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ ποσὸν ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ (20) ἧττον, οἷον τὸ δίπηχυ,  —οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον (21) δίπηχυ·—  οὐδ’ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, οἷον τὰ τρία τῶν πέντε οὐδὲν (22) μᾶλλον [πέντε ἢ] τρία λέγεται, οὐδὲ τὰ τρία τῶν τριῶν·  οὐδέ γε (23) ὁ χρόνος ἕτερος ἑτέρου μᾶλλον χρόνος λέγεται·  οὐδ’ ἐπὶ τῶν (24) εἰρημένων ὅλως οὐδενὸς τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον λέγεται·  ὥστε (25) τὸ ποσὸν οὐκ ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον. 
           
(99) Non uidetur autem quantitas suscipere magis et minus, ut bicubitum  (100) (neque enim est aliud alio magis bicubitum);  neque in numero, ut (101) ternarius quinario (nihil enim magis tria dicentur,  nec tria potius (102) quam tria); nec tempus aliud alio magis tempus dicitur;  nec in his (103) quae dicta sunt omnino aliquid magis et minus dicitur.  Quare quantitas (104) non suscipit magis et minus. 
           
Quantity does not, it appears, admit of variation of degree. One thing cannot be two cubits long in a greater degree than another.  in a greater degree than another.  Similarly with regard to number: what is ’three’ is not more truly three than what is ’five’ is five; nor is one set of three more truly three than another set.  Again, one period of time is not said to be more truly time than another.  Nor is there any other kind of quantity, of all that have been mentioned, with regard to which variation of degree can be predicated.  The category of quantity, therefore, does not admit of variation of degree. 
(26) Ἴδιον δὲ μάλιστα τοῦ ποσοῦ τὸ ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον λέγε(27)σθαι.  ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν εἰρημένων ποσῶν καὶ ἴσον καὶ (28) ἄνισον λέγεται,  οἷον σῶμα καὶ ἴσον καὶ ἄνισον λέγεται, καὶ ἀριθμὸς καὶ ἴσος καὶ ἄνισος λέγεται, καὶ χρό(29)νος καὶ ἴσος καὶ ἄνισος·  ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων (30) τῶν ῥηθέντων ἕκαστον ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον λέγεται.  τῶν (31) δὲ λοιπῶν ὅσα μή ἐστι ποσόν, οὐ πάνυ ἂν δόξαι ἴσον (32) τε καὶ ἄνισον λέγεσθαι,  οἷον ἡ διάθεσις ἴση τε καὶ ἄνι(33)σος οὐ πάνυ λέγεται ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὁμοία, καὶ τὸ λευκὸν ἴσον (34) τε καὶ ἄνισον οὐ πάνυ, ἀλλ’ ὅμοιον.  ὥστε τοῦ ποσοῦ μάλιστα (35) ἂν εἴη ἴδιον τὸ ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον λέγεσθαι. 
             
(105) Proprium autem maxime quantitatis est quod aequale et inaequale (106) dicitur.  Singulum enim earum quae dictae sunt quantitatum et aequale (107) dicitur et inaequale,  ut corpus aequale et inaequale, et numerus (108) aequalis et inaequalis dicitur, et tempus aequale et inaequale;  (109) similiter autem et in aliis quae dicta sunt e singulis aequale et (110) inaequale dicitur.  In caeteris uero quae quantitatis non sunt, non (111) multum uidebitur aequale et inaequale dici,  namque dispositio aequalis (112) et inaequalis non multum dicitur sed magis similis, et album aequale (113) et inaequale non multum sed simile.  Quare quantitatis proprium est (114) aequale et inaequale nominari. 
             
The most distinctive mark of quantity is that equality and inequality are predicated of it.  Each of the aforesaid quantities is said to be equal or unequal.  For instance, one solid is said to be equal or unequal to another; number, too, and time can have these terms applied to them,  indeed can all those kinds of quantity that have been mentioned.  That which is not a quantity can by no means, it would seem, be termed equal or unequal to anything else.  One particular disposition or one particular quality, such as whiteness, is by no means compared with another in terms of equality and inequality but rather in terms of similarity.  Thus it is the distinctive mark of quantity that it can be called equal and unequal. 
(36) Πρός τι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ὅσα αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν (37) ἑτέρων εἶναι λέγεται ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως πρὸς ἕτερον·  οἷον (38) τὸ μεῖζον τοῦθ’ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρου λέγεται, —τινὸς γὰρ μεῖ(39)ζον λέγεται,—  καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον ἑτέρου λέγεται τοῦθ’ ὅπερ ἐ(6b1)στίν, —τινὸς γὰρ διπλάσιον λέγεται·—  ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα (2) τοιαῦτα.  ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν πρός τι οἷον ἕξις, διά(3)θεσις, αἴσθησις, ἐπιστήμη, θέσις·  πάντα γὰρ τὰ εἰρημένα (4) τοῦθ’ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων λέγεται καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο τι·  ἡ (5) γὰρ ἕξις τινὸς ἕξις λέγεται καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη τινὸς ἐπιστήμη (6) καὶ ἡ θέσις τινὸς θέσις, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὲ ὡσαύτως.  πρός τι (7) οὖν ἐστὶν ὅσα αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων λέγεται, ἢ ὁπωσ(8)οῦν ἄλλως πρὸς ἕτερον·  οἷον ὄρος μέγα λέγεται πρὸς ἕτερον, (9) —πρός τι γὰρ μέγα λέγεται τὸ ὄρος,—  καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον τινὶ ὅμοιον (10) λέγεται, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὡσαύτως πρός τι λέ(11)γεται.  ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀνάκλισις καὶ ἡ στάσις καὶ ἡ καθέ(12)δρα θέσεις τινές, ἡ δὲ θέσις τῶν πρός τι·  τὸ δὲ ἀνακε<κλ>ίσθαι (13) ἢ ἑστάναι ἢ καθῆσθαι αὐτὰ μὲν οὐκ εἰσὶ θέσεις, παρωνύ(14)μως δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν εἰρημένων θέσεων λέγεται. 
                       
(7,1) DE RELATIVIS VEL AD ALIQUID: Ad aliquid uero talia dicuntur quaecumque hoc ipsum quod sunt aliorum (2) dicuntur, uel quomodolibet aliter ad aliud,  ut maius hoc ipsum quod (3) est ad aliud dicitur (aliquo enim maius dicitur),  et duplex ad aliud (4) dicitur hoc ipsum quod est (alicuius enim duplex dicitur);  similiter (5) autem et quaecumque alia talia sunt.  At uero sunt etiam et haec ad (6) aliquid, ut habitus, affectio, scientia, sensus, positio;  haec enim (7) omnia quae dicta sunt hoc ipsum quod sunt aliorum dicuntur et non (8) aliter;  habitus enim alicuius habitus est, et scientia alicuius (9) scientia, et positio alicuius positio, et alia quidem similiter.  Ad (10) aliquid ergo sunt quaecumque id quod sunt aliorum dicuntur uel (11) quomodolibet aliter ad aliud;  ut mons magnus dicitur ad montem alium (12) (magnum enim ad aliquid dicitur),  et simile alicui simile dicitur, et (13) omnia talia similiter ad aliquid dicuntur.  Est autem et accubitus et (14) statio et sessio positiones quaedam, positio uero ad aliquid est;  (15) iacere autem uel stare u el sedere ipsa quidem non sunt positiones, (16) denominatiue uero ex his quae dictae sunt positionibus nominantur. 
                       
Those things are called relative, which, being either said to be of something else or related to something else, are explained by reference to that other thing.  For instance, the word ’superior’ is explained by reference to something else, for it is superiority over something else that is meant.  Similarly, the expression ’double’ has this external reference, for it is the double of something else that is meant.  So it is with everything else of this kind.  There are, moreover, other relatives, e.g. habit, disposition, perception, knowledge, and attitude.  The significance of all these is explained by a reference to something else and in no other way.  Thus, a habit is a habit of something, knowledge is knowledge of something, attitude is the attitude of something. So it is with all other relatives that have been mentioned.  Those terms, then, are called relative, the nature of which is explained by reference to something else, the preposition ’of’ or some other preposition being used to indicate the relation.  Thus, one mountain is called great in comparison with son with another; for the mountain claims this attribute by comparison with something.  Again, that which is called similar must be similar to something else, and all other such attributes have this external reference.  It is to be noted that lying and standing and sitting are particular attitudes, but attitude is itself a relative term.  To lie, to stand, to be seated, are not themselves attitudes, but take their name from the aforesaid attitudes. 
(15) Ὑπάρχει δὲ καὶ ἐναντιότης ἐν τοῖς πρός τι, οἷον (16) ἀρετὴ κακίᾳ ἐναντίον, ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν πρός τι ὄν, καὶ ἐπι(17)στήμη ἀγνοίᾳ.  οὐ πᾶσι δὲ τοῖς πρός τι ὑπάρχει ἐναντίον· (18) τῷ γὰρ διπλασίῳ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον οὐδὲ τῷ τρι(19)πλασίῳ οὐδὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδενί.  —δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ μᾶλ(20)λον καὶ τὸ ἧττον ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὰ πρός τι·  ὅμοιον γὰρ (21) μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον λέγεται, καὶ ἄνισον μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον (22) λέγεται, ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν πρός τι ὄν·  (23) τό τε γὰρ ὅμοιον (24) τινὶ ὅμοιον λέγεται καὶ τὸ ἄνισον τινὶ ἄνισον.  οὐ πάντα (25) δὲ ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον· τὸ γὰρ διπλάσιον (26) οὐ λέγεται μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον διπλάσιον οὐδὲ τῶν τοι(27)ούτων οὐδέν. 
           
(17) Inest autem et contrarietas in relatione, ut uirtus malitiae (18) contrarium est, cum sit utrumque ad aliquid, et scientia (19) inscientiae.  Non autem omnibus relatiuis inest contrarietas; duplici (20) enim nihil est contrarium, neque uero triplici neque ulli (21) talium.  Videntur autem et magis et minus relatiua suscipere;  simile (22) enim magis et minus dicitur, et inaequale magis et minus dicitur, cum (23) utrumque sit relatiuum  (simile enim alicui simile dicitur et inaequale (24) alicui intequale).  Non autem omnia suscipiunt magis et minus; duplex (25) enim non dicitur magis et minus duplex, nec aliquid talium. 
           
It is possible for relatives to have contraries. Thus virtue has a contrary, vice, these both being relatives; knowledge, too, has a contrary, ignorance.  But this is not the mark of all relatives; ’double’ and ’triple’ have no contrary, nor indeed has any such term.  It also appears that relatives can admit of variation of degree.  For ’like’ and ’unlike’, ’equal’ and ’unequal’, have the modifications ’more’ and ’less’ applied to them, and each of these is relative in character:  for the terms ’like’ and ’unequal’ bear ’unequal’ bear a reference to something external.  Yet, again, it is not every relative term that admits of variation of degree. No term such as ’double’ admits of this modification. 
(28) Πάντα δὲ τὰ πρός τι πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται,  οἷον (29) ὁ δοῦλος δεσπότου λέγεται δοῦλος καὶ ὁ δεσπότης δού(30)λου δεσπότης λέγεται,  καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον ἡμίσεος διπλάσιον (31) καὶ τὸ ἥμισυ διπλασίου ἥμισυ, καὶ τὸ μεῖζον ἐλάττονος μεῖζον (32) καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον μείζονος ἔλαττον·  ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν (33) ἄλλων·  πλὴν τῇ πτώσει ἐνίοτε διοίσει κατὰ τὴν λέξιν,  οἷον (34) ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστητοῦ λέγεται ἐπιστήμη καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν (35) ἐπιστήμῃ ἐπιστητόν, καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις αἰσθητοῦ αἴσθησις καὶ (36) τὸ αἰσθητὸν αἰσθήσει αἰσθητόν.  οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ ἐνίοτε οὐ δόξει (37) ἀντιστρέφειν,  ἐὰν μὴ οἰκείως πρὸς ὃ λέγεται ἀποδοθῇ (38) ἀλλὰ διαμάρτῃ ὁ ἀποδιδούς·  οἷον τὸ πτερὸν ἐὰν ἀποδοθῇ (39) ὄρνιθος, οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει ὄρνις πτεροῦ·  οὐ γὰρ οἰκείως τὸ (7a1) πρῶτον ἀποδέδοται πτερὸν ὄρνιθος,  —οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ὄρνις, ταύτῃ (2) τὸ πτερὸν αὐτῆς λέγεται, ἀλλ’ ᾗ πτερωτόν ἐστιν· πολλῶν (3) γὰρ καὶ ἄλλων πτερά ἐστιν ἃ οὐκ εἰσὶν ὄρνιθες·—  ὥστε ἐὰν (4) ἀποδοθῇ οἰκείως, καὶ ἀντιστρέφει,  οἷον τὸ πτερὸν πτερωτοῦ (5) πτερὸν καὶ τὸ πτερωτὸν πτερῷ πτερωτόν.  —ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ὀνο(6)ματοποιεῖν ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον,  ἐὰν μὴ κείμενον ᾖ ὄνομα πρὸς ὃ (7) οἰκείως ἂν ἀποδοθείη·  οἷον τὸ πηδάλιον πλοίου ἐὰν ἀπο(8)δοθῇ, οὐκ οἰκεία ἡ ἀπόδοσις,  —οὐ γὰρ ᾗ πλοῖον (9) ταύτῃ αὐτοῦ τὸ πηδάλιον λέγεται·  ἔστι γὰρ πλοῖα ὧν οὐκ (10) ἔστι πηδάλια·  — διὸ οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει· τὸ γὰρ πλοῖον οὐ λέγε(11)ται πηδαλίου πλοῖον.  ἀλλ’ ἴσως οἰκειοτέρα ἂν ἡ ἀπόδοσις (12) εἴη, εἰ οὕτω πως ἀποδοθείη τὸ πηδάλιον πηδαλιωτοῦ πηδά(13)λιον ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως, —ὄνομα γὰρ οὐ κεῖται·  — καὶ ἀντι(14)στρέφει γε, ἐὰν οἰκείως ἀποδοθῇ· τὸ γὰρ πηδαλιωτὸν (15) πηδαλίῳ πηδαλιωτόν.  ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, (16) οἷον ἡ κεφαλὴ οἰκειοτέρως ἂν ἀποδοθείη κεφαλωτοῦ ἢ ζῴου (17) ἀποδιδομένη·  οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ζῷον κεφαλὴν ἔχει· πολλὰ γὰρ (18) τῶν ζῴων κεφαλὴν οὐκ ἔχει.  οὕτω δὲ ῥᾷστα ἂν ἴσως τις (19) λαμβάνοι οἷς μὴ κεῖται ὀνόματα,  εἰ ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων καὶ (20) τοῖς πρὸς αὐτὰ ἀντιστρέφουσι τιθείη τὰ ὀνόματα,  ὥσπερ (21) ἐπὶ τῶν προειρημένων ἀπὸ τοῦ πτεροῦ τὸ πτερωτὸν καὶ ἀπὸ (22) τοῦ πηδαλίου τὸ πηδαλιωτόν.  πάντα οὖν τὰ πρός τι, ἐάν(23)περ οἰκείως ἀποδιδῶται, πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται·  ἐπεί, (24) ἐάν γε πρὸς τὸ τυχὸν ἀποδιδῶται καὶ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸ ὃ (25) λέγεται, οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει.  —λέγω δὲ ὅτι οὐδὲ τῶν ὁμολο(26)γουμένως πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λεγομένων καὶ ὀνομάτων αὐτοῖς (27) κειμένων οὐδὲν ἀντιστρέφει, ἐὰν πρός τι τῶν συμβεβηκότων (28) ἀποδιδῶται καὶ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸ ὃ λέγεται·  οἷον ὁ δοῦλος (29) ἐὰν μὴ δεσπότου ἀποδοθῇ ἀλλ’ ἀνθρώπου ἢ δίποδος ἢ (30) ὁτουοῦν τῶν τοιούτων, οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει· οὐ γὰρ οἰκεία (31) ἡ ἀπόδοσις. 
                                                           
(26) Omnia autem relatiua ad conuertentia dicuntur,  ut seruus domini seruus (27) dicitur et dominus serui dominus,  et duplum dimidii duplum et (28) dimidium dupli dimidium, et maius minore maius et minus maiore minus;  (29) similiter autem et in aliis;  sed casu aliquotiens differt secundum (30) locutionem,  ut scientia scibilis rei dicitur scientia et scibile (31) scientia scibile, et sensus sensibilis sensus et sensibile sensu (32) sensibile.  At uero aliquotiens non uidebitur conuertere  nisi (33) conuenienter ad quod dicitur assignetur sed peccet is qui assignat;  ut (34) ala si assignetur auis, non conuertitur ut sit auis alae;  neque enim (35) conuenienter prius assignatum est ala auis;  neque enim in eo quod (36) auis, in eo eius ala dicitur sed in eo quod alata est (multorum enim (37) et aliorum alae sunt, quae non sunt aues);  quare si assignetur (38) conuenienter, et conuertitur;  ut ala alati ala, et alatum ala (39) alatum.  Aliquotiens autem forte et nomina fingere necesse erit,  si non (40) fuerit positum nomen ad quod conuenienter assignetur;  ut remus nauis (41) si assignetur, non erit conueniens assignatio  (neque enim in eo quod (42) est nauis, in eo eius remus dicitur;  sunt enim naues quarum remi non (43) sunt);  quare non conuertitur; nauis enim non dicitur remi.  Sed forte (44) conuenientior assignatio erit si sic quodam modo assignetur, remus (45) remitae remus, uel aliquo modo aliter dictum sit (nomen enim non est (46) positum);  conuertitur autem si conuenienter assignetur (remitum enim (47) remo remitum est).  Similiter autem et in aliis, ut caput conuenientius (48) assignabitur capitati quam si animalis assignetur;  neque enim in eo (49) quod animal est caput habet (multa enim sunt animalium capita non (50) habentia).  Sic autem facilius fortasse sumetur quibus nomen non est (51) positum,  si ab his quae prima sunt et [ab] his ad quae conuertuntur (52) nomina ponuntur,  ut in his quae praedicta sunt ab ala alatum, a remo (53) remitum.  Omnia ergo quae ad aliquid dicuntur, si conuenienter (54) assignentur, ad conuertentia dicuntur.  Nam, si ad quodlibet aliud (55) assignentur et non ad illud dicantur, non conuertuntur.  Dico autem (56) quoniam neque in his quae confesse conuersim dicuntur et in quibus (57) nomen est positum, nihil conuertitur, si ad aliquid eorum quae sunt (58) accidentia assignetur et non ad illud dicatur;  ut seruus si non domini (59) assignetur sed hominis uel bipedis uel alicuius talium, non (60) conuertitur (non enim erit conueniens assignatio). 
                                                           
All relatives have correlatives:  by the term ’slave’ we mean the slave of a master, by the term ’master’, the master of a slave;  by ’double’, the double of its hall; by ’half’, the half of its double; by greater’, greater than that which is less; by ’less,’ less than that which is greater.  So it is with every other relative term;  but the case we use to express the correlation differs in some instances.  Thus, by knowledge we mean knowledge the knowable; by the knowable, that which is to be apprehended by knowledge; by perception, perception of the perceptible; by the perceptible, that which is apprehended by perception.  Sometimes, however, reciprocity of correlation does not appear to exist.  This comes about when a blunder is made, and that to which the relative is related is not accurately stated.  If a man states that a wing is necessarily relative to a bird, the connexion between these two will not be reciprocal,  for it will not be possible to say that a bird is a bird by reason of its wings.  The reason is that the original statement was inaccurate, for the wing is not said to be relative to the bird qua bird, since many creatures besides birds have wings, but qua winged creature.  If, then, the statement is made accurate, the connexion will be reciprocal,  for we can speak of a wing, having reference necessarily to a winged creature, and of a winged creature as being such because of its wings.  Occasionally, perhaps, it is necessary to coin words,  if no word exists by which a correlation can adequately be explained.  If we define a rudder as necessarily having reference to a boat, our definition will not be appropriate,  for the rudder does not have this reference to a boat qua boat,  as there are boats which have no rudders.  Thus we cannot use the terms reciprocally, for the word ’boat’ cannot be said to find its explanation in the word ’rudder’.  As there is no existing word, our definition would perhaps be more accurate if we coined some word like ’ruddered’ as the correlative of ’rudder’.  If we express ourselves thus accurately, at any rate the terms are reciprocally connected, for the ’ruddered’ thing is ’ruddered’ in virtue of its rudder.  So it is in all other cases. A head will be more accurately defined as the correlative of that which is ’headed’, than as that of an animal,  for the animal does not have a head qua animal, since many animals have no head.  Thus we may perhaps most easily comprehend that to which a thing is related, when a name does not exist,  if, from that which has a name, we derive a new name, and apply it to that with which the first is reciprocally connected,  as in the aforesaid instances, when we derived the word ’winged’ from ’wing’ and from ’rudder’.  All relatives, then, if properly defined, have a correlative.  I add this condition because, if that to which they are related is stated as haphazard and not accurately, the two are not found to be interdependent.  Let me state what I mean more clearly. Even in the case of acknowledged correlatives, and where names exist for each, there will be no interdependence if one of the two is denoted, not by that name which expresses the correlative notion, but by one of irrelevant significance.  The term ’slave,’ if defined as related, not to a master, but to a man, or a biped, or anything of that sort, is not reciprocally connected with that in relation to which it is defined, for the statement is not exact. 
—ἔτι ἐὰν μὲν οἰκείως ἀποδεδομένον ᾖ πρὸς (32) ὃ λέγεται, πάντων περιαιρουμένων τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα συμ(33)βεβηκότα ἐστίν,  καταλειπομένου δὲ τούτου μόνου πρὸς ὃ (34) ἀπεδόθη οἰκείως, ἀεὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ ῥηθήσεται·  οἷον εἰ ὁ (35) δοῦλος πρὸς δεσπότην λέγεται, περιαιρουμένων ἁπάντων (36) ὅσα συμβεβηκότα ἐστὶ τῷ δεσπότῃ,  οἷον τὸ δίποδι (37) εἶναι, τὸ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικῷ, τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ, καταλειπο(38)μένου δὲ μόνου τοῦ δεσπότην εἶναι, ἀεὶ ὁ δοῦλος (39) πρὸς αὐτὸ ῥηθήσεται·  ὁ γὰρ δοῦλος δεσπότου δοῦλος λέ(7b1)γεται.  ἐὰν δέ γε μὴ οἰκείως ἀποδοθῇ πρὸς ὅ ποτε λέγε(2)ται, περιαιρουμένων μὲν τῶν ἄλλων καταλειπομένου δὲ (3) μόνου τοῦ πρὸς ὃ ἀπεδόθη, οὐ ῥηθήσεται πρὸς αὐτό·  ἀπο(4)δεδόσθω γὰρ ὁ δοῦλος ἀνθρώπου καὶ τὸ πτερὸν ὄρνιθος, (5) καὶ περιῃρήσθω τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ δεσπότῃ αὐτῷ εἶναι·  οὐ (6) γὰρ ἔτι ὁ δοῦλος πρὸς ἄνθρωπον ῥηθήσεται, —μὴ γὰρ ὄντος (7) δεσπότου οὐδὲ δοῦλός ἐστιν·— ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τοῦ ὄρνιθος περι(8)ῃρήσθω τὸ πτερωτῷ εἶναι·  οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἔσται τὸ πτερὸν τῶν (9) πρός τι· μὴ γὰρ ὄντος πτερωτοῦ οὐδὲ πτερὸν ἔσται τινός.—  (10) ὥστε δεῖ μὲν ἀποδιδόναι πρὸς ὅ ποτε οἰκείως λέγεται· κἂν (11) μὲν ὄνομα ᾖ κείμενον ῥᾳδία ἡ ἀπόδοσις γίγνεται, μὴ ὄν(12)τος δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως ὀνοματοποιεῖν.  οὕτω δὲ ἀποδιδο(13)μένων φανερὸν ὅτι πάντα τὰ πρός τι πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα (14) ῥηθήσεται. 
                     
(61) Amplius, si conuenienter assignetur ad id quod dicitur, omnibus (62) aliis circumscriptis quaecumque accidentia sunt,  relicto uero solo (63) illo ad quod assignatum est, semper ad ipsum dicetur;  ut si seruus ad (64) dominum dicitur, circumscriptis omnibus quae sunt accidentia domino,  (65) ut esse bipedem uel scientiae susceptibilem uel hominem, relicto uero (66) solo dominum esse, semper seruus ad illud dicetur;  seruus enim domini (67) seruus dicitur.  Si autem non conuenienter reddatur ad id quod dicitur (68) circumscriptis omnibus aliis, relicto uero solo ad quod redditum est, (69) non dicetur ad illud;  assignetur enim seruus hominis et ala auis, et (70) circumscribatur ab homine esse dominum;  non enim iam seruus ad hominem (71) dicitur (cum enim dominus non sit, seruus non est); similiter autem et (72) de aui, circumscribatur alatam esse;  non enim iam erit ala ad aliquid (73) (cum enim non sit alatum, nec ala erit alicuius).  Quare oportet (74) assignare ad id quod conuenienter dicitur; et si sit nomen positum, (75) facilis erit assignatio; si autem non sit, fortasse erit necessarium (76) nomen fingere.  Quod si ita reddantur, manifestum est quoniam omnia (77) relatiua conuersim dicuntur. 
                     
Further, if one thing is said to be correlative with another, and the terminology used is correct,  then, though all irrelevant attributes should be removed, and only that one attribute left in virtue of which it was correctly stated to be correlative with that other, the stated correlation will still exist.  If the correlative of ’the slave’ is said to be ’the master’, then, though all irrelevant attributes of the said ’master’,  such as ’biped’, ’receptive of knowledge’, ’human’, should be removed, and the attribute ’master’ alone left, the stated correlation existing between him and the slave will remain the same,  for it is of a master that a slave is said to be the slave.  On the other hand, if, of two correlatives, one is not correctly termed, then, when all other attributes are removed and that alone is left in virtue of which it was stated to be correlative, the stated correlation will be found to have disappeared.  For suppose the correlative of ’the slave’ should be said to be ’the man’, or the correlative of ’the wing is the bird’; if the attribute ’master’ be withdrawn from’ the man’,  the correlation between ’the man’ and ’the slave’ will cease to exist, for if the man is not a master, the slave is not a slave. Similarly, if the attribute ’winged’ be withdrawn from ’the bird’, ’the wing’ will no longer be relative;  for if the so-called correlative is not winged, it follows that ’the wing’ has no correlative.  Thus it is essential that the correlated terms should be exactly designated; if there is a name existing, the statement will be easy; if not, it is doubtless our duty to construct names.  When the terminology is thus correct, it is evident that all correlatives are interdependent. 
(15) Δοκεῖ δὲ τὰ πρός τι ἅμα τῇ φύσει εἶναι.  καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν (16) τῶν πλείστων ἀληθές ἐστιν·  ἅμα γὰρ διπλάσιόν τέ ἐστι (17) καὶ ἥμισυ, καὶ ἡμίσεος ὄντος διπλάσιόν ἐστιν,  καὶ δού(18)λου ὄντος δεσπότης ἐστίν· ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὰ (19) ἄλλα.  καὶ συναναιρεῖ δὲ ταῦτα ἄλληλα· μὴ γὰρ ὄντος (20) διπλασίου οὐκ ἔστιν ἥμισυ, καὶ ἡμίσεος μὴ ὄντος οὐκ (21) ἔστι διπλάσιον· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα (22) τοιαῦτα.  —οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων δὲ τῶν πρός τι ἀληθὲς δοκεῖ (23) τὸ ἅμα τῇ φύσει εἶναι·  τὸ γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν τῆς ἐπιστήμης (24) πρότερον ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι· ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ προϋπαρ(25)χόντων τῶν πραγμάτων τὰς ἐπιστήμας λαμβάνομεν· ἐπ’ (26) ὀλίγων γὰρ ἢ ἐπ’ οὐδενὸς ἴδοι τις ἂν ἅμα τῷ ἐπιστητῷ τὴν (27) ἐπιστήμην γιγνομένην.  ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἐπιστητὸν ἀναιρεθὲν συν(28)αναιρεῖ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη τὸ ἐπιστητὸν οὐ συν(29)αναιρεῖ·  ἐπιστητοῦ γὰρ μὴ ὄντος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, —οὐ(30)δενὸς γὰρ ἔτι ἔσται ἐπιστήμη,  — ἐπιστήμης δὲ μὴ οὔσης οὐδὲν (31) κωλύει ἐπιστητὸν εἶναι·  οἷον καὶ ὁ τοῦ κύκλου τετραγω(32)νισμὸς εἴγε ἔστιν ἐπιστητόν, ἐπιστήμη μὲν αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔστιν (33) οὐδέπω, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν ἔστιν.  ἔτι ζῴου μὲν ἀναιρεθέν(34)τος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, τῶν δ’ ἐπιστητῶν πολλὰ ἐνδέχεται (35) εἶναι.  —ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἔχει·  (36) τὸ γὰρ αἰσθητὸν πρότερον τῆς αἰσθήσεως δοκεῖ εἶναι·  τὸ (37) μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητὸν ἀναιρεθὲν συναναιρεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἡ δὲ (38) αἴσθησις τὸ αἰσθητὸν οὐ συναναιρεῖ.  αἱ γὰρ αἰσθήσεις περὶ (39) σῶμα καὶ ἐν σώματί εἰσιν,  αἰσθητοῦ δὲ ἀναιρεθέντος ἀνῄ(8a1)ρηται καὶ σῶμα, —τῶν γὰρ αἰσθητῶν καὶ τὸ σῶμα,—  σώ(2)ματος δὲ μὴ ὄντος ἀνῄρηται καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις,  ὥστε συν(3)αναιρεῖ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τὴν αἴσθησιν.  ἡ δέ γε αἴσθησις τὸ (4) αἰσθητὸν οὔ· ζῴου γὰρ ἀναιρεθέντος αἴσθησις μὲν ἀνῄ(5)ρηται, αἰσθητὸν δὲ ἔσται, οἷον σῶμα, θερμόν, γλυκύ, (6) πικρόν, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ὅσα ἐστὶν αἰσθητά.  ἔτι ἡ μὲν (7) αἴσθησις ἅμα τῷ αἰσθητικῷ γίγνεται, —ἅμα γὰρ ζῷόν τε (8) γίγνεται καὶ αἴσθησις,  — τὸ δέ γε αἰσθητὸν ἔστι καὶ πρὸ (9) τοῦ αἴσθησιν εἶναι,  —πῦρ γὰρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, (10) ἐξ ὧν καὶ τὸ ζῷον συνίσταται, ἔστι καὶ πρὸ τοῦ ζῷον ὅλως (11) εἶναι ἢ αἴσθησιν,  — ὥστε πρότερον ἂν τῆς αἰσθήσεως τὸ αἰσθητὸν (12) εἶναι δόξειεν. 
                                               
(78) Videtur autem ad aliquid simul esse natura.  Et in aliis quidem (79) pluribus uerum est;  simul enim est duplum et dimidium, et cum sit (80) dimidium duplum est,  et cum sit seruus dominus est; similiter autem (81) his et alia.  Simul autem haec auferunt sese inuicem; si enim non sit (82) duplum non est dimidium, et si non sit dimidium duplum non est; (83) similiter et in aliis quaecumque talia sunt.  Non autem in omnibus (84) relatiuis uerum uidetur esse simul naturaliter;  scibile enim (85) scientia prius esse uidebitur; namque in pluribus subsistentibus iam (86) rebus scientias accipimus; in paucis enim uel in nullis hoc quisque (87) perspiciet, simul cum scibili scientiam factam.  Amplius scibile (88) sublatum simul aufert scientiam, scientia uero non simul aufert (89) scibile;  nam, si scibile non sit, non est scientia,  si scientia uero (90) non sit, nihil prohibet esse scibile;  ut circuli quadratura si est (91) scibile, scientia quidem eius nondum est, illud uero scibile (92) est.  Amplius animali quidem sublato non est scientia, scibilium uero (93) plurima esse contingit.  Similiter autem his sese habent et quae in (94) sensu sunt;  sensibile enim prius sensu esse uidetur;  sublatum enim (95) sensibile simul aufert sensum, sensus uero sensibile non simul (96) aufert.  Sensus enim circa corpus et in corpore sunt;  sensibili ergo (97) sublato aufertur corpus (sensibilium enim et corpus est),  cum autem (98) corpus non sit sublatus est sensus;  quare simul aufert sensibile (99) sensum.  Sensus uero sensibile non; sublato enim animali sublatus est (100) sensus, sensibile autem permanet, ut corpus, calidum, dulce, amarum, (101) et alia omnia quaecumque sunt sensibilia.  Amplius sensus quidem simul (102) cum sensato fit (simul enim animal fit et sensus),  sensibile uero ante (103) est quam esset sensus  (ignis enim et aqua et alia huiusmodi, ex quibus (104) ipsum animal constat, ante sunt quam animal sit omnino uel sensus);  (105) quare prius quam sensus sensibile esse uidebitur. 
                                               
Correlatives are thought to come into existence simultaneously.  This is for the most part true,  as in the case of the double and the half. The existence of the half necessitates the existence of that of which it is a half.  Similarly the existence of a master necessitates the existence of a slave, and that of a slave implies that of a master; these are merely instances of a general rule.  Moreover, they cancel one another; for if there is no double it follows that there is no half, and vice versa; this rule also applies to all such correlatives.  Yet it does not appear to be true in all cases that correlatives come into existence simultaneously.  The object of knowledge would appear to exist before knowledge itself, for it is usually the case that we acquire knowledge of objects already existing; it would be difficult, if not impossible, to find a branch of knowledge the beginning of the existence of which was contemporaneous with that of its object.  Again, while the object of knowledge, if it ceases to exist, cancels at the same time the knowledge which was its correlative, the converse of this is not true.  It is true that if the object of knowledge does not exist there can be no knowledge: for there will no longer be anything to know.  Yet it is equally true that, if knowledge of a certain object does not exist, the object may nevertheless quite well exist.  Thus, in the case of the squaring of the circle, if indeed that process is an object of knowledge, though it itself exists as an object of knowledge, yet the knowledge of it has not yet come into existence.  Again, if all animals ceased to exist, there would be no knowledge, but there might yet be many objects of knowledge.  This is likewise the case with regard to perception:  for the object of perception is, it appears, prior to the act of perception.  If the perceptible is annihilated, perception also will cease to exist; but the annihilation of perception does not cancel the existence of the perceptible.  For perception implies a body perceived and a body in which perception takes place.  Now if that which is perceptible is annihilated, it follows that the body is annihilated, for the body is a perceptible thing;  and if the body does not exist, it follows that perception also ceases to exist.  Thus the annihilation of the perceptible involves that of perception.  But the annihilation of perception does not involve that of the perceptible. For if the animal is annihilated, it follows that perception also is annihilated, but perceptibles such as body, heat, sweetness, bitterness, and so on, will remain.  Again, perception is generated at the same time as the perceiving subject, for it comes into existence at the same time as the animal.  But the perceptible surely exists before perception;  for fire and water and such elements, out of which the animal is itself composed, exist before the animal is an animal at all, and before perception.  Thus it would seem that the perceptible exists before perception. 
(13) Ἔχει δὲ ἀπορίαν πότερον οὐδεμία οὐσία τῶν πρός τι (14) λέγεται,  καθάπερ δοκεῖ, ἢ τοῦτο ἐνδέχεται κατά τινας (15) τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶν.  ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀλη(16)θές ἐστιν·  οὔτε γὰρ τὰ ὅλα οὔτε τὰ μέρη πρός τι λέγεται·  ὁ (17) γὰρ τὶς ἄνθρωπος οὐ λέγεται τινός τις ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲ (18) ὁ τὶς βοῦς τινός τις βοῦς·  ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὰ μέρη·  ἡ (19) γὰρ τὶς χεὶρ οὐ λέγεται τινός τις χεὶρ ἀλλὰ τινὸς χείρ,  (20) καὶ ἡ τὶς κεφαλὴ οὐ λέγεται τινός τις κεφαλὴ ἀλλὰ (21) τινὸς κεφαλή.  ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶν, (22) ἐπί γε τῶν πλείστων·  οἷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐ λέγεται τινὸς ἄν(23)θρωπος, οὐδὲ ὁ βοῦς τινὸς βοῦς,  οὐδὲ τὸ ξύλον τινὸς ξύλον, (24) ἀλλὰ τινὸς κτῆμα λέγεται.  ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν τοιούτων φα(25)νερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τῶν πρός τι, ἐπ’ ἐνίων δὲ τῶν δευτέρων (26) οὐσιῶν ἔχει ἀμφισβήτησιν·  οἷον ἡ κεφαλὴ τινὸς λέγεται (27) κεφαλὴ καὶ ἡ χεὶρ τινὸς λέγεται χεὶρ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν (28) τοιούτων, ὥστε ταῦτα τῶν πρός τι δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι.  —εἰ (29) μὲν οὖν ἱκανῶς ὁ τῶν πρός τι ὁρισμὸς ἀποδέδοται, ἢ τῶν πάνυ (30) χαλεπῶν ἢ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστὶ τὸ λῦσαι ὡς οὐδεμία οὐσία (31) τῶν πρός τι λέγεται·  εἰ δὲ μὴ ἱκανῶς, ἀλλ’ ἔστι τὰ πρός τι (32) οἷς τὸ εἶναι ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ πρός τί πως ἔχειν, ἴσως ἂν (33) ῥηθείη τι πρὸς αὐτά.  ὁ δὲ πρότερος ὁρισμὸς παρακολουθεῖ (34) μὲν πᾶσι τοῖς πρός τι, οὐ μὴν τοῦτό γέ ἐστι τὸ πρός τι (35) αὐτοῖς εἶναι τὸ αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων λέγεσθαι.  ἐκ δὲ (36) τούτων δῆλόν ἐστιν ὅτι ἐάν τις εἰδῇ τι ὡρισμένως τῶν πρός τι, (37) κἀκεῖνο πρὸς ὃ λέγεται ὡρισμένως εἴσεται.  φανερὸν (38) μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐστίν·  εἰ γὰρ οἶδέ τις τόδε τι ὅτι (39) τῶν πρός τί ἐστιν, ἔστι δὲ τὸ εἶναι τοῖς πρός τι ταὐτὸ τῷ (8b1) πρός τί πως ἔχειν, κἀκεῖνο οἶδε πρὸς ὃ τοῦτό πως ἔχει·  (2) εἰ γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν ὅλως πρὸς ὃ τοῦτό πως ἔχει, οὐδ’ εἰ (3) πρός τί πως ἔχει εἴσεται.  καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα δὲ δῆ(4)λον τὸ τοιοῦτον·  οἷον τόδε τι εἰ οἶδεν ἀφωρισμένως ὅτι ἔστι (5) διπλάσιον, καὶ ὅτου διπλάσιόν ἐστιν εὐθὺς ἀφωρισμένως οἶ(6)δεν,  —εἰ γὰρ μηδενὸς τῶν ἀφωρισμένων οἶδεν αὐτὸ διπλά(7)σιον, οὐδ’ εἰ ἔστι διπλάσιον ὅλως οἶδεν·—  ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ (8) τόδε τι εἰ οἶδεν ὅτι κάλλιόν ἐστι, καὶ ὅτου κάλλιόν ἐ(9)στιν ἀφωρισμένως ἀναγκαῖον εἰδέναι διὰ ταῦτα,  (οὐκ ἀο(10)ρίστως δὲ εἴσεται ὅτι τοῦτό ἐστι χείρονος κάλλιον· ὑπόληψις (11) γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτο γίγνεται, οὐκ ἐπιστήμη·  οὐ γὰρ ἔτι εἴσεται (12) ἀκριβῶς ὅτι ἐστὶ χείρονος κάλλιον· εἰ γὰρ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, (13) οὐδέν ἐστι χεῖρον αὐτοῦ)·  ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν, (14) ὃ ἂν εἰδῇ τις τῶν πρός τι ὡρισμένως, κἀκεῖνο πρὸς ὃ (15) λέγεται ὡρισμένως εἰδέναι.  τὴν δέ γε κεφαλὴν καὶ τὴν (16) χεῖρα καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων αἵ εἰσιν οὐσίαι αὐτὸ μὲν (17) ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὡρισμένως ἔστιν εἰδέναι, πρὸς ὃ δὲ λέγεται οὐκ (18) ἀναγκαῖον·  τίνος γὰρ αὕτη ἡ κεφαλὴ ἢ τίνος ἡ χεὶρ οὐκ (19) ἔστιν εἰδέναι ὡρισμένως·  ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη ταῦτα τῶν πρός τι·  (20) εἰ δὲ μή ἐστι τῶν πρός τι, ἀληθὲς ἂν εἴη λέγειν ὅτι (21) οὐδεμία οὐσία τῶν πρός τί ἐστιν.  ἴσως δὲ χαλεπὸν περὶ (22) τῶν τοιούτων σφοδρῶς ἀποφαίνεσθαι μὴ πολλάκις ἐπε(23)σκεμμένον, τὸ μέντοι διηπορηκέναι ἐφ’ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν οὐκ (24) ἄχρηστόν ἐστιν. 
                                                               
(106) Habet autem dubitationem an ulla substantia ad aliquid dicatur,  (107) quemadmodum uidetur, an hoc quidem contingit secundum quasdam (108) secundarum substantiarum.  Nam in primis quidem substantiis uerum est;  (109) nam neque totae neque partes ad aliquid dicuntur;  nam aliquis homo non (110) dicitur alicuius aliquis homo, neque aliquis bos alicuius aliquis (111) bos.  Similiter autem et partes;  quaedam enim manus non dicitur (112) alicuius quaedam manus sed alicuius manus,  et quoddam caput non (113) dicitur alicuius quoddam caput sed alicuius caput.  Similiter autem et (114) in secundis substantiis, atque hoc quidem in pluribus;  ut homo non (115) dicitur alicuius homo, nec bos alicuius bos,  nec lignum alicuius (116) lignum sed alicuius possessio dicitur.  Atque in huiusmodi quidem (117) manifestum est quoniam non est ad aliquid; in aliquibus uero secundis (118) substantiis habet aliquam dubitationem;  ut caput alicuius caput (119) dicitur et manus alicuius manus dicitur et singula huiusmodi; quare (120) haec esse fortasse ad aliquid uidebuntur.  Si igitur sufficienter eorum (121) quae sunt ad aliquid definitio assignata est, aut nimis difficile aut (122) impossibile est soluere quoniam nulla substantia eorum quae sunt ad (123) aliquid dicitur;  si autem non sufficienter sed sunt ad aliquid quibus (124) hoc ipsum esse est ad aliquid quodam modo habere, fortasse aliquid (125) contra ista dicetur.  Prior uero definitio sequitur quidem omnia (126) relatiua, non tamen hoc eis est quod sint ad aliquid quod ea ipsa quae (127) sunt aliorum dicuntur.  Ex his ergo manifestum est quod, si quis (128) aliquid eorum quae sunt ad aliquid definite sciet, et illud ad quod (129) dicitur definite sciturus est.  Si manifestum quidem etiam ex ipso est;  (130) nam si quis nouit quoniam hoc eorum quae sunt ad aliquid est, (131) relatiuis autem hoc est esse, ad aliquid quodammodo habere, et illud (132) nouit ad quod hoc aliquo modo habet;  nam si omnino nescit ad quod (133) aliquo modo habet, nec si ad aliquid quodammodo habet sciturus est.  Et (134) in particularibus hoc manifestum est;  ut, si hoc ad aliquid scit (135) definite quoniam duplum est, et cuius duplum est definite nouit  (nam (136) si nullius definite nouit illud esse duplum, nec si omnino duplum est (137) nouit);  similiter autem et hoc [ad] aliquid si nouit quoniam melius (138) est, et quo melius erit definite eum scire necesse est propter haec (139) ipsa quae dicta sunt  (non autem infinite quoniam hoc est peiore (140) melius, opinio enim iam fit huiusmodi, non scientia;  neque enim sciet (141) integre quoniam est peiore melius; nam fortasse contingit nihil eo (142) esse peius);  quare manifestum est quoniam necesse est quod quis (143) nouerit eorum quae sunt ad aliquid definite, etiam illud ad quod (144) dicitur sciturum esse definite.  Caput uero et manum et eorum singula (145) quae substantiae sunt, hoc ipsum quidem quod sunt potest sciri (146) definite, ad quod autem dicantur non necesse est;  cuius enim hoc caput (147) uel cuius haec manus non est dicere definite;  quare haec non erunt (148) eorum quae sunt ad aliquid;  quod si non sunt eorum quae sunt ad (149) aliquid, uerum erit nullam esse substantiam relatiuam.  Fortasse autem (150) difficile sit de huiusmodi rebus confidenter declarare nisi saepius (151) pertractata sint; dubitare autem de singulis non erit inutile. 
                                                               
It may be questioned whether it is true that no substance is relative,  as seems to be the case, or whether exception is to be made in the case of certain secondary substances.  With regard to primary substances, it is quite true that there is no such possibility,  for neither wholes nor parts of primary substances are relative.  The individual man or ox is not defined with reference to something external.  Similarly with the parts:  a particular hand or head is not defined as a particular hand or head of a particular person,  but as the hand or head of a particular person.  It is true also, for the most part at least, in the case of secondary substances;  the species ’man’ and the species ’ox’ are not defined with reference to anything outside themselves.  Wood, again, is only relative in so far as it is some one’s property, not in so far as it is wood.  It is plain, then, that in the cases mentioned substance is not relative. But with regard to some secondary substances there is a difference of opinion;  thus, such terms as ’head’ and ’hand’ are defined with reference to that of which the things indicated are a part, and so it comes about that these appear to have a relative character.  Indeed, if our definition of that which is relative was complete, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to prove that no substance is relative.  If, however, our definition was not complete, if those things only are properly called relative in the case of which relation to an external object is a necessary condition of existence, perhaps some explanation of the dilemma may be found.  The former definition does indeed apply to all relatives, but the fact that a thing is explained with reference to something else does not make it essentially relative.  From this it is plain that, if a man definitely apprehends a relative thing, he will also definitely apprehend that to which it is relative.  Indeed this is self-evident:  for if a man knows that some particular thing is relative, assuming that we call that a relative in the case of which relation to something is a necessary condition of existence, he knows that also to which it is related.  For if he does not know at all that to which it is related, he will not know whether or not it is relative.  This is clear, moreover, in particular instances.  If a man knows definitely that such and such a thing is ’double’, he will also forthwith know definitely that of which it is the double.  For if there is nothing definite of which he knows it to be the double, he does not know at all that it is double.  Again, if he knows that a thing is more beautiful, it follows necessarily that he will forthwith definitely know that also than which it is more beautiful.  He will not merely know indefinitely that it is more beautiful than something which is less beautiful, for this would be supposition, not knowledge.  For if he does not know definitely that than which it is more beautiful, he can no longer claim to know definitely that it is more beautiful than something else which is less beautiful: for it might be that nothing was less beautiful.  It is, therefore, evident that if a man apprehends some relative thing definitely, he necessarily knows that also definitely to which it is related.  Now the head, the hand, and such things are substances, and it is possible to know their essential character definitely, but it does not necessarily follow that we should know that to which they are related.  It is not possible to know forthwith whose head or hand is meant.  Thus these are not relatives,  and, this being the case, it would be true to say that no substance is relative in character.  It is perhaps a difficult matter, in such cases, to make a positive statement without more exhaustive examination, but to have raised questions with regard to details is not without advantage. 
(25) Ποιότητα δὲ λέγω καθ’ ἣν ποιοί τινες λέγονται· 
 
(8,1) DE QUALI ET QUALITATE: Qualitatem uero dico secundum quam quales quidam dicimur. 
 
By ’quality’ I mean that in virtue of which people are said to be such and such. 
ἔστι (26) δὲ ἡ ποιότης τῶν πλεοναχῶς λεγομένων.  ἓν μὲν οὖν (27) εἶδος ποιότητος ἕξις καὶ διάθεσις λεγέσθωσαν.  διαφέρει δὲ (28) ἕξις διαθέσεως τῷ μονιμώτερον καὶ πολυχρονιώτερον εἶναι·  (29) τοιαῦται δὲ αἵ τε ἐπιστῆμαι καὶ αἱ ἀρεταί·  ἥ τε γὰρ ἐπι(30)στήμη δοκεῖ τῶν παραμονίμων εἶναι καὶ δυσκινήτων, ἐὰν καὶ (31) μετρίως τις ἐπιστήμην λάβῃ,  ἐάνπερ μὴ μεγάλη μετα(32)βολὴ γένηται ὑπὸ νόσου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τοιούτου·  ὡσαύτως (33) δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετή· οἷον ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ (34) ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ εὐκίνητον δοκεῖ εἶναι οὐδ’ εὐ(35)μετάβολον.  διαθέσεις δὲ λέγονται ἅ ἐστιν εὐκίνητα καὶ ταχὺ (36) μεταβάλλοντα,  οἷον θερμότης καὶ κατάψυξις καὶ νόσος (37) καὶ ὑγίεια καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα·  διάκειται μὲν γάρ (38) πως κατὰ ταύτας ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ταχὺ δὲ μεταβάλλει ἐκ (39) θερμοῦ ψυχρὸς γιγνόμενος καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν εἰς τὸ νο(9a1)σεῖν·  ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, εἰ μή τις καὶ αὐ(2)τῶν τούτων τυγχάνοι διὰ χρόνου πλῆθος ἤδη πεφυσιωμένη (3) καὶ ἀνίατος ἢ πάνυ δυσκίνητος οὖσα, 
                     
(2) Est autem qualitas eorum quae multipliciter dicuntur.  Et una quidem (3) species qualitatis habitus affectioque dicantur.  Differt autem (4) habitus affectione quod permanentior et diuturnior est;  tales uero (5) sunt scientiae uel uirtutes;  scientia enim uidetur esse permanentium (6) et eorum quae difficile moueantur, si quis uel mediocriter scientiam (7) sumat,  nisi forte grandis permutatio facta sit uel ab aegritudine uel (8) ab aliquo huiusmodi;  similiter autem et uirtus, et iustitia uel (9) castitas et singula talium non uidentur facile posse moueri neque (10) facile permutari.  Affectiones uero dicuntur quae sunt facile mobiles (11) et cito permutabiles,  ut calor et infrictio et aegritudo et sanitas et (12) alia huiusmodi;  affectus est enim quodammodo circa eas homo, cito (13) autem permutatur ut ex calido frigidus fiat et ex sanitate in (14) aegritudinem;  similiter autem et in aliis, nisi forte in his quoque (15) contingit per temporis longitudinem in naturam cuiusque translata et (16) insanabilis uel difficile mobilis, quam iam quilibet habitudinem (17) uocet. 
                     
Quality is a term that is used in many senses.  One sort of quality let us call ’habit’ or ’disposition’.  Habit differs from disposition in being more lasting and more firmly established.  The various kinds of knowledge and of virtue are habits,  for knowledge, even when acquired only in a moderate degree, is, it is agreed, abiding in its character and difficult to displace,  unless some great mental upheaval takes place, through disease or any such cause.  The virtues, also, such as justice, self-restraint, and so on, are not easily dislodged or dismissed, so as to give place to vice.  By a disposition, on the other hand, we mean a condition that is easily changed and quickly gives place to its opposite.  Thus, heat, cold, disease, health, and so on are dispositions.  For a man is disposed in one way or another with reference to these, but quickly changes, becoming cold instead of warm, ill instead of well.  So it is with all other dispositions also, unless through lapse of time a disposition has itself become inveterate and almost impossible to dislodge: 
ἣν ἄν τις ἴσως ἕξιν (4) ἤδη προσαγορεύοι.  φανερὸν δὲ ὅτι ταῦτα βούλονται ἕξεις (5) λέγειν ἅ ἐστι πολυχρονιώτερα καὶ δυσκινητότερα·  τοὺς γὰρ (6) τῶν ἐπιστημῶν μὴ πάνυ κατέχοντας ἀλλ’ εὐκινήτους ὄντας (7) οὔ φασιν ἕξιν ἔχειν,  καίτοι διάκεινταί γέ πως κατὰ τὴν (8) ἐπιστήμην ἢ χεῖρον ἢ βέλτιον.  ὥστε διαφέρει ἕξις διαθέσεως (9) τῷ τὸ μὲν εὐκίνητον εἶναι τὸ δὲ πολυχρονιώτερόν τε καὶ (10) δυσκινητότερον. 
         
(18) Manifestum est autem quoniam haec uolunt habitus nominari,  quae sunt (19) diuturniora et difficile mobilia;  namque in disciplinis non multum (20) retinentes sed facile mobiles dicunt habitum non habere,  quamuis sint (21) ad disciplinam peius meliusue dispositi.  Quare differt habitus (22) affectione, quod hoc quidem facile mobile est, illud uero diuturnius (23) et difficile mobile. 
         
in which case we should perhaps go so far as to call it a habit.  It is evident that men incline to call those conditions habits which are of a more or less permanent type and difficult to displace;  for those who are not retentive of knowledge, but volatile, are not said to have such and such a ’habit’ as regards knowledge,  yet they are disposed, we may say, either better or worse, towards knowledge.  Thus habit differs from disposition in this, that while the latter in ephemeral, the former is permanent and difficult to alter. 
—εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ μὲν ἕξεις καὶ διαθέσεις, αἱ δὲ (11) διαθέσεις οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἕξεις·  οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἕξεις ἔχοντες (12) καὶ διάκεινταί πως κατὰ ταύτας,  οἱ δὲ διακείμενοι οὐ (13) πάντως καὶ ἕξιν ἔχουσιν. 
     
(24) Sunt autem habitus etiam affectiones, affectiones uero non necessario (25) habitus;  qui enim retinent habitum et quodammodo affecti sunt ad ea (26) uel peius uel melius;  qui autem affecti sunt, non omnino retinent (27) habitum. 
     
Habits are at the same time dispositions, but dispositions are not necessarily habits.  For those who have some specific habit may be said also, in virtue of that habit, to be thus or thus disposed;  but those who are disposed in some specific way have not in all cases the corresponding habit. 
(14) Ἕτερον δὲ γένος ποιότητος καθ’ ὃ πυκτικοὺς ἢ δρομι(15)κοὺς ἢ ὑγιεινοὺς ἢ νοσώδεις λέγομεν,  καὶ ἁπλῶς ὅσα (16) κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικὴν ἢ ἀδυναμίαν λέγεται.  οὐ γὰρ τῷ (17) διακεῖσθαί πως ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων λέγεται, ἀλλὰ (18) τῷ δύναμιν ἔχειν φυσικὴν τοῦ ποιῆσαί τι ῥᾳδίως (19) ἢ μηδὲν πάσχειν·  οἷον πυκτικοὶ ἢ δρομικοὶ λέγονται (20) οὐ τῷ διακεῖσθαί πως ἀλλὰ τῷ δύναμιν ἔχειν φυσικὴν (21) τοῦ ποιῆσαί τι ῥᾳδίως,  ὑγιεινοὶ δὲ λέγονται τῷ δύναμιν (22) ἔχειν φυσικὴν τοῦ μηδὲν πάσχειν ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων ῥᾳ(23)δίως, νοσώδεις δὲ τῷ ἀδυναμίαν ἔχειν τοῦ μηδὲν (24) πάσχειν.  ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν καὶ τὸ μαλα(25)κὸν ἔχει·  τὸ μὲν γὰρ σκληρὸν λέγεται τῷ δύναμιν ἔχειν (26) τοῦ μὴ ῥᾳδίως διαιρεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ μαλακὸν τῷ ἀδυναμίαν (27) ἔχειν τοῦ αὐτοῦ τούτου. 
             
(28) Aliud uero genus qualitatis est secundum quod pugillatores uel (29) cursores uel salubres uel insalubres dicimus,  et simpliciter (30) quaecumque secundum potentiam naturalem uel impotentiam (31) dicuntur.  Non enim quoniam sunt affecti aliquo modo, unumquodque (32) huiusmodi dicitur sed quod habeant potentiam naturalem uel facere quid (33) facile uel nihil pati;  ut pugillatores uel cursores dicuntur non quod (34) sint affecti sed quod habeant potentiam hoc facile faciendi,  salubres (35) autem dicuntur eo quod habeant potentiam naturalem ut nihil a (36) quibuslibet accidentibus patiantur, insalubres uero quod habeant (37) impotentiam nihil patiendi.  Similiter autem et durum et molle sese (38) habent;  durum enim dicitur quod habeat potentiam non citius secari, (39) molle uero quod eiusdem ipsius habeat impotentiam. 
             
Another sort of quality is that in virtue of which, for example, we call men good boxers or runners, or healthy or sickly:  in fact it includes all those terms which refer to inborn capacity or incapacity.  Such things are not predicated of a person in virtue of his disposition, but in virtue of his inborn capacity or incapacity to do something with ease or to avoid defeat of any kind.  Persons are called good boxers or good runners, not in virtue of such and such a disposition, but in virtue of an inborn capacity to accomplish something with ease.  Men are called healthy in virtue of the inborn capacity of easy resistance to those unhealthy influences that may ordinarily arise; unhealthy, in virtue of the lack of this capacity.  Similarly with regard to softness and hardness.  Hardness is predicated of a thing because it has that capacity of resistance which enables it to withstand disintegration; softness, again, is predicated of a thing by reason of the lack of that capacity. 
(28) Τρίτον δὲ γένος ποιότητος παθητικαὶ ποιότητες καὶ (29) πάθη·  ἔστι δὲ τὰ τοιάδε οἷον γλυκύτης τε καὶ πικρότης καὶ (30) στρυφνότης καὶ πάντα τὰ τούτοις συγγενῆ, ἔτι δὲ θερμότης (31) καὶ ψυχρότης καὶ λευκότης καὶ μελανία.  ὅτι μὲν οὖν αὗ(32)ται ποιότητές εἰσιν φανερόν·  τὰ γὰρ δεδεγμένα ποιὰ (33) λέγεται κατ’ αὐτάς·  οἷον τὸ μέλι τῷ γλυκύτητα δεδέ(34)χθαι λέγεται γλυκύ, καὶ τὸ σῶμα λευκὸν τῷ λευκότητα δε(35)δέχθαι· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔχει. 
         
(40) Tertium uero genus qualitatis est passibiles qualitates et (41) passiones.  Sunt autem huiusmodi ut dulcedo uel amaritudo et omnia his (42) cognata, amplius calor et frigus et albedo et nigredo.  Et quoniam hae (43) qualitates sunt, manifestum est;  quaecumque enim ista susceperint (44) qualia dicuntur secundum ea;  ut mel, quoniam dulcedinem suscepit, (45) dicitur dulce, et corpus album quod albedinem susceperit; similiter (46) autem sese habet etiam in caeteris. 
         
A third class within this category is that of affective qualities and affections.  Sweetness, bitterness, sourness, are examples of this sort of quality, together with all that is akin to these; heat, moreover, and cold, whiteness, and blackness are affective qualities.  It is evident that these are qualities,  for those things that possess them are themselves said to be such and such by reason of their presence.  Honey is called sweet because it contains sweetness; the body is called white because it contains whiteness; and so in all other cases. 
παθητικαὶ (36) δὲ ποιότητες λέγονται οὐ τῷ αὐτὰ τὰ δεδεγμένα τὰς ποι(9b1)ότητας πεπονθέναι τι·  οὔτε γὰρ τὸ μέλι τῷ πεπονθέναι τι (2) λέγεται γλυκύ, οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν·  ὁμοίως (3) δὲ τούτοις καὶ ἡ θερμότης καὶ ἡ ψυχρότης παθητικαὶ (4) ποιότητες λέγονται οὐ τῷ αὐτὰ τὰ δεδεγμένα πεπον(5)θέναι τι,  τῷ δὲ κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἑκάστην τῶν εἰρη(6)μένων ποιοτήτων πάθους εἶναι ποιητικὴν παθητικαὶ ποιότη(7)τες λέγονται·  ἥ τε γὰρ γλυκύτης πάθος τι κατὰ τὴν γεῦσιν (8) ἐμποιεῖ καὶ ἡ θερμότης κατὰ τὴν ἁφήν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ (9) αἱ ἄλλαι. 
         
(47) Passibiles uero qualitates dicuntur non quo ea quae illas susceperint (48) qualitates aliquid patiantur;  neque enim mel, quoniam aliquid passum (49) sit, idcirco dicitur dulce, nec aliud aliquid huiusmodi;  similiter (50) autem his et calor et frigus passibiles dicuntur non quo ea quae eas (51) suscipiunt qualitates aliquid patiantur  sed quoniam singulum eorum (52) quae dicta sunt secundum sensus qualitatum passionis perfectiua sunt, (53) passibiles qualitates dicuntur;  dulcedo enim passionem quandam (54) secundum gustum efficit, et calor secundum tactum; similiter autem et (55) alia. 
         
The term ’affective quality’ is not used as indicating that those things which admit these qualities are affected in any way.  Honey is not called sweet because it is affected in a specific way, nor is this what is meant in any other instance.  Similarly heat and cold are called affective qualities, not because those things which admit them are affected.  What is meant is that these said qualities are capable of producing an ’affection’ in the way of perception.  For sweetness has the power of affecting the sense of taste; heat, that of touch; and so it is with the rest of these qualities. 
λευκότης δὲ καὶ μελανία καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι χροιαὶ (10) οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τοῖς εἰρημένοις παθητικαὶ ποιότητες (11) λέγονται, ἀλλὰ τῷ αὐτὰς ἀπὸ πάθους γεγενῆσθαι. 
 
(56) Albedo autem et nigredo et alii colores non similiter his quae dicta (57) sunt passibiles qualitates dicuntur sed hoc quod hae ipsae ab (58) aliquibus passionibus innascuntur. 
 
Whiteness and blackness, however, and the other colours, are not said to be affective qualities in this sense, but -because they themselves are the results of an affection. 
ὅτι μὲν (12) οὖν γίγνονται διὰ πάθος πολλαὶ μεταβολαὶ χρωμάτων, δῆ(13)λον·  αἰσχυνθεὶς γάρ τις ἐρυθρὸς ἐγένετο καὶ φοβηθεὶς (14) ὠχρὸς καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων· 
   
(59) Quoniam ergo fiunt propter aliquam passionem multae colorum (60) mutationes, manifestum est;  erubescens enim aliquis rubicundus (61) factus est et timens pallidus et unumquodque talium. 
   
It is plain that many changes of colour take place because of affections.  When a man is ashamed, he blushes; when he is afraid, he becomes pale, and so on. 
ὥστε καὶ εἴ τις φύσει (15) τῶν τοιούτων τι παθῶν πέπονθεν, τὴν ὁμοίαν χροιὰν (16) εἰκός ἐστιν ἔχειν αὐτόν·  ἥτις γὰρ νῦν ἐν τῷ αἰσχυνθῆ(17)ναι διάθεσις τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐγένετο, καὶ κατὰ φυσι(18)κὴν σύστασιν ἡ αὐτὴ γένοιτ’ ἂν διάθεσις, ὥστε φύσει καὶ (19) τὴν χροιὰν ὁμοίαν γίγνεσθαι. 
   
(62) Quare uel si quis naturaliter aliquid talium passionum passus est, (63) similem colorem eum habere oportet;  quae enim affectio nunc ad (64) uerecundiam circa corpus facta est, et secundum naturalem (65) constitutionem eadem affectio fit, quare naturaliter color similis (66) fit. 
   
So true is this, that when a man is by nature liable to such affections, arising from some concomitance of elements in his constitution, it is a probable inference that he has the corresponding complexion of skin.  For the same disposition of bodily elements, which in the former instance was momentarily present in the case of an access of shame, might be a result of a man’s natural temperament, so as to produce the corresponding colouring also as a natural characteristic. 
—ὅσα μὲν οὖν τῶν τοιού(20)των συμπτωμάτων ἀπό τινων παθῶν δυσκινήτων καὶ παρα(21)μονίμων τὴν ἀρχὴν εἴληφε ποιότητες λέγονται·  εἴτε (22) γὰρ ἐν τῇ κατὰ φύσιν συστάσει ὠχρότης ἢ μελανία (23) γεγένηται, ποιότης λέγεται, —ποιοὶ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτας λε(24)γόμεθα,—  εἴτε διὰ νόσον μακρὰν ἢ διὰ καῦμα [τὸ αὐτὸ] (25) συμβέβηκεν ὠχρότης ἢ μελανία, καὶ μὴ ῥᾳδίως ἀποκαθ(26)ίστανται ἢ καὶ διὰ βίου παραμένουσι, ποιότητες καὶ αὐ(27)ταὶ λέγονται,  —ὁμοίως γὰρ ποιοὶ κατὰ ταύτας λεγόμεθα.— 
       
(67) Quaecumque igitur talium casuum ab aliquibus passionibus difficile (68) mobilibus et permanentibus principium ceperunt, qualitates dicuntur;  (69) siue enim [uel] secundum naturalem substantiam pallor aut nigredo (70) facta est, qualitas dicitur (quales enim secundum eas dicimur),  siue (71) propter aegritudinem longam uel propter aestum contingit uel nigredo (72) uel pallor, et non facile praeterit et in uita permanet, qualitates et (73) ipsae dicuntur  (similiter enim quales secundum eas dicimur). 
       
All conditions, therefore, of this kind, if caused by certain permanent and lasting affections, are called affective qualities.  For pallor and duskiness of complexion are called qualities, inasmuch as we are said to be such and such in virtue of them,  not only if they originate in natural constitution, but also if they come about through long disease or sunburn, and are difficult to remove, or indeed remain throughout life.  For in the same way we are said to be such and such because of these. 
(28) ὅσα δὲ ἀπὸ ῥᾳδίως διαλυομένων καὶ ταχὺ ἀποκαθισταμένων (29) γίγνεται πάθη λέγεται·  οὐ γὰρ λέγονται ποιοί τινες (30) κατὰ ταῦτα·  οὔτε γὰρ ὁ ἐρυθριῶν διὰ τὸ αἰσχυνθῆναι (31) ἐρυθρίας λέγεται, οὔτε ὁ ὠχριῶν διὰ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι (32) ὠχρίας,  ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πεπονθέναι τι·  ὥστε πάθη μὲν τὰ (33) τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ποιότητες δὲ οὔ.  —ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις (34) καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν παθητικαὶ ποιότητες καὶ πάθη λέ(35)γεται.  ὅσα τε γὰρ ἐν τῇ γενέσει εὐθὺς ἀπό τινων πα(36)θῶν γεγένηται ποιότητες λέγονται,  οἷον ἥ τε μανικὴ (10a1) ἔκστασις καὶ ἡ ὀργὴ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ποιοὶ γὰρ κατὰ ταύ(2)τας λέγονται, ὀργίλοι τε καὶ μανικοί.  ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὅσαι (3) ἐκστάσεις μὴ φυσικαί, ἀλλ’ ἀπό τινων ἄλλων συμπτωμάτων (4) γεγένηνται δυσαπάλλακτοι ἢ καὶ ὅλως ἀκίνητοι, ποιό(5)τητες καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα·  ποιοὶ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτας λέγονται.  (6) ὅσα δὲ ἀπὸ ταχὺ καθισταμένων γίγνεται πάθη λέγεται,  (7) οἷον εἰ λυπούμενος ὀργιλώτερός ἐστιν·  οὐ γὰρ λέγεται (8) ὀργίλος ὁ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πάθει ὀργιλώτερος ὤν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλ(9)λον πεπονθέναι τι·  ὥστε πάθη μὲν λέγεται τὰ τοιαῦτα, (10) ποιότητες δὲ οὔ. 
                           
(74) Quaecumque uero ex his quae facile soluuntur et cito transeunt fiunt, (75) passiones dicuntur;  non enim dicimur secundum eas quales;  neque enim (76) qui propter uerecundiam rubicundus factus est rubicundus dicitur, nec (77) cui pallor propter timorem uenit pallidus  sed magis quod aliquid (78) passus sit;  quare passiones huiusmodi dicuntur, qualitates uero (79) minime.  Similiter autem his et secundum animam passibiles qualitates (80) et passiones dicuntur.  Quaecumque enim mox in nascendo ab aliquibus (81) passionibus fiunt, qualitates dicuntur,  ut dementia uel ira uel alia (82) huiusmodi; quales enim secundum eas dicimur, id est iracundi et (83) dementes.  Similiter autem et quaecumque alienationes non naturaliter (84) sed ab aliquibus aliis casibus factae sunt difficile praetereuntes et (85) omnino immobiles, etiam huiusmodi qualitates sunt;  quales enim (86) secundum eas dicimur.  Quaecumque enim ex his quae citius praetereunt (87) fiunt, passiones dicuntur,  ut si quis contristatus iracundior est;  non (88) enim dicitur iracundus qui in huiusmodi passione iracundior est sed (89) magis aliquid passus;  quare passiones quidem huiusmodi dicuntur, (90) qualitates uero minime. 
                           
Those conditions, however, which arise from causes which may easily be rendered ineffective or speedily removed, are called, not qualities, but affections:  for we are not said to be such virtue of them.  The man who blushes through shame is not said to be a constitutional blusher, nor is the man who becomes pale through fear said to be constitutionally pale.  He is said rather to have been affected.  Thus such conditions are called affections, not qualities.  In like manner there are affective qualities and affections of the soul.  That temper with which a man is born and which has its origin in certain deep-seated affections is called a quality.  I mean such conditions as insanity, irascibility, and so on: for people are said to be mad or irascible in virtue of these.  Similarly those abnormal psychic states which are not inborn, but arise from the concomitance of certain other elements, and are difficult to remove, or altogether permanent, are called qualities,  for in virtue of them men are said to be such and such.  Those, however, which arise from causes easily rendered ineffective are called affections, not qualities.  Suppose that a man is irritable when vexed:  he is not even spoken of as a bad-tempered man, when in such circumstances he loses his temper somewhat, but rather is said to be affected.  Such conditions are therefore termed, not qualities, but affections. 
(11) Τέταρτον δὲ γένος ποιότητος σχῆμά τε καὶ ἡ περὶ (12) ἕκαστον ὑπάρχουσα μορφή, ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις εὐθύτης (13) καὶ καμπυλότης καὶ εἴ τι τούτοις ὅμοιόν ἐστιν·  καθ’ ἕκα(14)στον γὰρ τούτων ποιόν τι λέγεται· τῷ γὰρ τρίγωνον ἢ τε(15)τράγωνον εἶναι ποιόν τι λέγεται, καὶ τῷ εὐθὺ ἢ καμπύλον.  (16) καὶ κατὰ τὴν μορφὴν δὲ ἕκαστον ποιόν τι λέγεται. 
     
(91) Quartum uero genus qualitatis est forma et circa aliquid constans (92) figura; ad haec quoque rectitudo uel curuitas, et si quid his simile (93) est;  secundum enim unumquodque eorum quale quid dicitur; quod enim est (94) triangulum uel quadratum quale quid dicitur, et quod est rectum uel (95) curuum.  Et secundum figuram uero unumquodque quale dicitur. 
     
The fourth sort of quality is figure and the shape that belongs to a thing; and besides this, straightness and curvedness and any other qualities of this type; each of these defines a thing as being such and such.  each of these defines a thing as being such and such. Because it is triangular or quadrangular a thing is said to have a specific character, or again because it is straight or curved;  in fact a thing’s shape in every case gives rise to a qualification of it. 
τὸ δὲ (17) μανὸν καὶ τὸ πυκνὸν καὶ τὸ τραχὺ καὶ τὸ λεῖον δόξειε (18) μὲν ἂν ποιὸν σημαίνειν,  ἔοικε δὲ ἀλλότρια τὰ τοιαῦτα (19) εἶναι τῆς περὶ τὸ ποιὸν διαιρέσεως·  θέσιν γάρ τινα μᾶλλον (20) φαίνεται τῶν μορίων ἑκάτερον δηλοῦν·  πυκνὸν μὲν γὰρ τῷ (21) τὰ μόρια σύνεγγυς εἶναι ἀλλήλοις, μανὸν δὲ τῷ διεστάναι (22) ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων·  (23) καὶ λεῖον μὲν τῷ ἐπ’ εὐθείας πως τὰ μόρια (24) κεῖσθαι, τραχὺ δὲ τῷ τὸ μὲν ὑπερέχειν τὸ δὲ ἐλλείπειν.  — (25) ἴσως μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλος ἄν τις φανείη τρόπος ποιότητος, ἀλλ’ (26) οἵ γε μάλιστα λεγόμενοι σχεδὸν τοσοῦτοί εἰσιν. 
           
(96) Rarum uero et spissum uel asperum uel lene putabitur quidem qualitatem (97) significare,  uidentur autem aliena esse huiusmodi a qualitatis (98) diuisione;  quandam enim quodammodo positionem uidetur partium (99) utrumque monstrare;  spissum quidem eo quod partes sibi ipsae (100) propinquae sint, rarum uero quod distent a se inuicem;  et lene (101) quidem quod in rectum sibi partes iaceant, asperum uero cum haec (102) quidem pars superet, illa uero sit inferior.  Et fortasse alii quoque (103) appareant qualitatis modi sed qui maxime dicuntur hi sunt. 
           
Rarity and density, roughness and smoothness, seem to be terms indicating quality:  yet these, it would appear, really belong to a class different from that of quality.  For it is rather a certain relative position of the parts composing the thing thus qualified which, it appears, is indicated by each of these terms.  A thing is dense, owing to the fact that its parts are closely combined with one another; rare, because there are interstices between the parts;  smooth, because its parts lie, so to speak, evenly; rough, because some parts project beyond others.  There may be other sorts of quality, but those that are most properly so called have, we may safely say, been enumerated. 
(27) Ποιότητες μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αἱ εἰρημέναι, ποιὰ δὲ τὰ κατὰ (28) ταύτας παρωνύμως λεγόμενα ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως ἀπ’ αὐ(29)τῶν. 
 
(104) Qualitates ergo sunt haec quae dicta sunt, qualia uero quae secundum (105) haec denominatiue dicuntur, uel quomodolibet ab his. 
 
These, then, are qualities, and the things that take their name from them as derivatives, or are in some other way dependent on them, are said to be qualified in some specific way. 
ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πλείστων καὶ σχεδὸν ἐπὶ πάντων παρ(30)ωνύμως λέγεται,  οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς λευκότητος ὁ λευκὸς καὶ ἀπὸ (31) τῆς γραμματικῆς ὁ γραμματικὸς καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης ὁ (32) δίκαιος, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.  ἐπ’ ἐνίων δὲ διὰ (33) τὸ μὴ κεῖσθαι ταῖς ποιότησιν ὀνόματα οὐκ ἐνδέχεται παρ(34)ωνύμως ἀπ’ αὐτῶν λέγεσθαι·  οἷον ὁ δρομικὸς ἢ ὁ πυκτικὸς (35) ὁ κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικὴν λεγόμενος ἀπ’ οὐδεμιᾶς ποιότητος (10b1) παρωνύμως λέγεται·  οὐ γὰρ κεῖται ὀνόματα ταῖς δυνάμεσι (2) καθ’ ἃς οὗτοι ποιοὶ λέγονται,  ὥσπερ καὶ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις καθ’ (3) ἃς πυκτικοὶ ἢ παλαιστρικοὶ οἱ κατὰ διάθεσιν λέγονται,  —πυ(4)κτικὴ γὰρ ἐπιστήμη λέγεται καὶ παλαιστρική, ποιοὶ δὲ ἀπὸ (5) τούτων παρωνύμως οἱ διακείμενοι λέγονται.—  ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ (6) ὀνόματος κειμένου οὐ λέγεται παρωνύμως τὸ κατ’ αὐτὴν (7) ποιὸν λεγόμενον,  οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ὁ σπουδαῖος·  τῷ γὰρ (8) ἀρετὴν ἔχειν σπουδαῖος λέγεται, ἀλλ’ οὐ παρωνύμως ἀπὸ (9) τῆς ἀρετῆς·  οὐκ ἐπὶ πολλῶν δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν.  ποιὰ οὖν (10) λέγεται τὰ παρωνύμως ἀπὸ τῶν εἰρημένων ποιοτήτων λεγόμενα (11) ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως ἀπ’ αὐτῶν. 
                       
(106) In pluribus quidem et paene in omnibus denominatiue dicuntur,  ut ab (107) albedine albus et a grammatica grammaticus et a iustitia iustus, (108) similiter autem et in caeteris.  In aliquibus uero propterea quod (109) qualitatibus nomina non sunt posita impossibile est ab his (110) denominatiue dici,  ut cursor uel pugillator, si secundum potentiam (111) naturalem dicitur, a nulla qualitate denominatiue dicitur;  neque (112) enim positum est nomen illis potestatibus: secundum quas isti quales (113) dicuntur,  quemadmodum etiam in disciplinis secundum quas uel (114) pugillatores uel palaestrici secundum affectionem dicuntur  (115) (pugillatoria enim disciplina dicitur et palaestrica, quales uero ab (116) his denominatiue qui ad eas sunt affecti dicuntur).  Aliquando autem et (117) posito nomine denominatiue non dicitur id quod secundum ipsam quale (118) quid dicitur,  ut a uirtute probus dicitur;  hoc enim quod habet (119) uirtutem probus dicitur sed non denominatiue a uirtute;  non est autem (120) hoc in multis.  Qualia ergo dicuntur quaecumque ex his quae dictae sunt (121) qualitatibus denominatiue dicuntur uel quolibet alio ab ipsis modo. 
                       
In most, indeed in almost all cases, the name of that which is qualified is derived from that of the quality.  Thus the terms ’whiteness’, ’grammar’, ’justice’, give us the adjectives ’white’, ’grammatical’, ’just’, and so on.  There are some cases, however, in which, as the quality under consideration has no name, it is impossible that those possessed of it should have a name that is derivative.  For instance, the name given to the runner or boxer, who is so called in virtue of an inborn capacity, is not derived from that of any quality;  for those capacities have no name assigned to them.  In this, the inborn capacity is distinct from the science, with reference to which men are called, e.g. boxers or wrestlers.  Such a science is classed as a disposition; it has a name, and is called ’boxing’ or ’wrestling’ as the case may be, and the name given to those disposed in this way is derived from that of the science.  Sometimes, even though a name exists for the quality, that which takes its character from the quality has a name that is not a derivative.  For instance, the upright man takes his character from the possession of the quality of integrity,  but the name given him is not derived from the word ’integrity’.  Yet this does not occur often.  We may therefore state that those things are said to be possessed of some specific quality which have a name derived from that of the aforesaid quality, or which are in some other way dependent on it. 
(12) Ὑπάρχει δὲ καὶ ἐναντιότης κατὰ τὸ ποιόν, οἷον δι(13)καιοσύνη ἀδικίᾳ ἐναντίον καὶ λευκότης μελανίᾳ καὶ τἆλλα (14) ὡσαύτως,  καὶ τὰ κατ’ αὐτὰς δὲ ποιὰ λεγόμενα, οἷον τὸ (15) ἄδικον τῷ δικαίῳ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν τῷ μέλανι.  οὐκ ἐπὶ πάν(16)των δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον· τῷ γὰρ πυῤῥῷ ἢ ὠχρῷ ἢ ταῖς τοιαύ(17)ταις χροιαῖς οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον ποιοῖς οὖσιν. 
     
(122) Inest autem et contrarietas secundum qualitatem, ut iustitia (123) iniustitiae contrarium est et albedo nigredini et alia similiter;  et (124) secundum eas qualia quae dicuntur, ut iustum iniusto et album (125) nigro.  Non autem hoc in omnibus est; rubeo enim et pallido et (126) huiusmodi coloribus nihil est contrarium cum qualitates sint. 
     
One quality may be the contrary of another; thus justice is the contrary of injustice, whiteness of blackness, and so on.  The things, also, which are said to be such and such in virtue of these qualities, may be contrary the one to the other; for that which is unjust is contrary to that which is just, that which is white to that which is black.  This, however, is not always the case. Red, yellow, and such colours, though qualities, have no contraries. 
—ἔτι ἐὰν (18) τῶν ἐναντίων θάτερον ᾖ ποιόν, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἔσται ποιόν.  τοῦ(19)το δὲ δῆλον προχειριζομένῳ τὰς ἄλλας κατηγορίας,  οἷον εἰ ἔστιν (20) ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῇ ἀδικίᾳ ἐναντίον, ποιὸν δὲ ἡ δικαιοσύνη, (21) ποιὸν ἄρα καὶ ἡ ἀδικία·  οὐδεμία γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων κατηγο(22)ριῶν ἐφαρμόζει τῇ ἀδικίᾳ, οὔτε ποσὸν οὔτε πρός τι (23) οὔτε πού, οὐδ’ ὅλως τι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν ἀλλ’ ἢ ποιόν·  (24) ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν ἐναν(25)τίων. 
         
(127) Amplius: si ex contrariis unum fuerit quale, et reliquum erit (128) quale.  Hoc autem manifestum est omnia alia praedicamenta proferenti,  (129) ut si est iustitia iniustitiae contrarium, qualitas est autem (130) iustitia, nihilo minus qualitas erit iniustitia;  nullum enim aliud (131) praedicamentum conuenit iniustitiae, nec quantitas nec relatio nec ubi (132) nec omnino aliquid huiusmodi, nisi sola qualitas;  similiter autem et (133) in aliis secundum qualitatem contrariis. 
         
If one of two contraries is a quality, the other will also be a quality.  This will be evident from particular instances, if we apply the names used to denote the other categories;  for instance, granted that justice is the contrary of injustice and justice is a quality, injustice will also be a quality:  neither quantity, nor relation, nor place, nor indeed any other category but that of quality, will be applicable properly to injustice.  So it is with all other contraries falling under the category of quality. 
(26) Ἐπιδέχεται δὲ καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον τὰ ποιά·  (27) λευκὸν γὰρ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἕτερον ἑτέρου λέγεται, καὶ (28) δίκαιον ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον.  καὶ αὐτὸ δὲ ἐπίδοσιν λαμβά(29)νει, —λευκὸν γὰρ ὂν ἔτι ἐνδέχεται λευκότερον γενέσθαι·—  οὐ (30) πάντα δέ, ἀλλὰ τὰ πλεῖστα·  δικαιοσύνη γὰρ δικαιοσύνης (31) εἰ λέγεται μᾶλλον ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις,  ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ (32) ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων διαθέσεων.  ἔνιοι γὰρ διαμφισβητοῦσι περὶ (33) τῶν τοιούτων·  δικαιοσύνην μὲν γὰρ δικαιοσύνης οὐ πάνυ (34) φασὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον λέγεσθαι, οὐδὲ ὑγίειαν ὑγιείας,  (35) ἧττον μέντοι ἔχειν ἕτερον ἑτέρου ὑγίειάν φασι, καὶ δικαιοσύ(11a1)νην ἧττον ἕτερον ἑτέρου,  ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ γραμματικὴν καὶ τὰς (2) ἄλλας διαθέσεις.  ἀλλ’ οὖν τά γε κατὰ ταύτας λεγόμενα ἀναμ(3)φισβητήτως ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον·  γραμματι(4)κώτερος γὰρ ἕτερος ἑτέρου λέγεται καὶ δικαιότερος καὶ (5) ὑγιεινότερος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡσαύτως. 
                       
(134) Suscipit autem qualitas magis et minus;  album et enim magis et minus (135) alterum altero dicitur, et iustum alterum altero magis.  Et idem ipsum (136) sumit intentionem (album enim cum sit, contingit illud fieri albius);  (137) hoc autem in omnibus non est sed in pluribus;  dubitabit enim quis an (138) iustitia magis esse iustitia dicatur;  similiter autem et in aliis (139) affectionibus.  Quidam uero in hoc dubitant;  dicunt enim iustitiam (140) iustitia non nimis magis uel minus dici, nec sanitatem sanitate;  minus (141) autem habere alterum altero sanitatem dicunt, et iustitiam minus (142) alterum altero habere,  similiter et grammaticam et alias (143) disciplinas.  Sed secundum eas qualia quae dicuntur indubitate (144) suscipiunt magis et minus;  magis enim grammaticus alter altero dicitur (145) et iustior et sanior, et in aliis similiter. 
                       
Qualities admit of variation of degree.  Whiteness is predicated of one thing in a greater or less degree than of another. This is also the case with reference to justice.  Moreover, one and the same thing may exhibit a quality in a greater degree than it did before: if a thing is white, it may become whiter.  Though this is generally the case, there are exceptions.  For if we should say that justice admitted of variation of degree, difficulties might ensue,  and this is true with regard to all those qualities which are dispositions.  There are some, indeed, who dispute the possibility of variation here.  They maintain that justice and health cannot very well admit of variation of degree themselves,  but that people vary in the degree in which they possess these qualities,  and that this is the case with grammatical learning and all those qualities which are classed as dispositions.  However that may be, it is an incontrovertible fact that the things which in virtue of these qualities are said to be what they are vary in the degree in which they possess them;  for one man is said to be better versed in grammar, or more healthy or just, than another, and so on. 
τρίγωνον δὲ καὶ (6) τετράγωνον οὐ δοκεῖ τὸ μᾶλλον ἐπιδέχεσθαι, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλ(7)λων σχημάτων οὐδέν· 
 
(146) Triangulum uero et quadratum non uidetur magis suscipere, nec aliquid (147) aliarum formarum. 
 
The qualities expressed by the terms ’triangular’ and ’quadrangular’ do not appear to admit of variation of degree, nor indeed do any that have to do with figure. 
τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιδεχόμενα τὸν τοῦ τρι(8)γώνου λόγον καὶ τὸν τοῦ κύκλου πάνθ’ ὁμοίως τρίγωνα ἢ (9) κύκλοι εἰσίν, τῶν δὲ μὴ ἐπιδεχομένων οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἑτέρου (10) μᾶλλον ῥηθήσεται·  οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ τετράγωνον τοῦ ἑτε(11)ρομήκους κύκλος ἐστίν· οὐδέτερον γὰρ ἐπιδέχεται τὸν τοῦ κύκλου (12) λόγον.  ἁπλῶς δέ, ἐὰν μὴ ἐπιδέχηται ἀμφότερα τὸν τοῦ (13) προκειμένου λόγον, οὐ ῥηθήσεται τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου μᾶλλον.  (14) οὐ πάντα οὖν τὰ ποιὰ ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον.  (15) Τῶν μὲν οὖν εἰρημένων οὐδὲν ἴδιον ποιότητος, ὅμοια δὲ (16) καὶ ἀνόμοια κατὰ μόνας τὰς ποιότητας λέγεται· 
         
(148) Quaecumque enim definitionem trianguli suscipiunt et circuli, omnia (149) similiter triangula uel circuli sunt, de his autem quae non suscipiunt (150) nihil magis alterum altero dicitur;  nihil enim quadratum magis quam (151) parte altera longior forma circulus est; nullum enim ipsorum suscipit (152) circuli rationem.  Simpliciter autem, si utraque non suscipiunt (153) propositi rationem, non dicitur alterum altero magis.  Non igitur omnia (154) qualia suscipiunt magis et minus.  Ex his ergo quae dicta sunt nihil (155) est proprium qualitatis. 
         
For those things to which the definition of the triangle or circle is applicable are all equally triangular or circular. Those, on the other hand, to which the same definition is not applicable, cannot be said to differ from one another in degree;  the square is no more a circle than the rectangle, for to neither is the definition of the circle appropriate.  In short, if the definition of the term proposed is not applicable to both objects, they cannot be compared. Thus it is not all qualities which admit of variation of degree.  Thus it is not all qualities which admit of variation of degree.  Whereas none of the characteristics I have mentioned are peculiar to quality, the fact that likeness and unlikeness can be predicated with reference to quality only, gives to that category its distinctive feature. 
ὅμοιον (17) γὰρ ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ οὐκ ἔστι κατ’ ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἢ καθ’ ὃ ποιόν (18) ἐστιν.  ὥστε ἴδιον ἂν εἴη ποιότητος τὸ ὅμοιον ἢ ἀνόμοιον (19) λέγεσθαι κατ’ αὐτήν. 
   
(156) Simile autem et dissimile secundum solas dicuntur qualitates; simile (157) enim alterum alteri non est secundum aliud nisi secundum hoc quod (158) quale est.  Quare proprium erit qualitatis secundum eam simile et (159) dissimile dici. 
   
One thing is like another only with reference to that in virtue of which it is such and such; thus this forms the peculiar mark of quality.  thus this forms the peculiar mark of quality. 
(20) Οὐ δεῖ δὲ ταράττεσθαι μή τις ἡμᾶς φήσῃ ὑπὲρ ποι(21)ότητος τὴν πρόθεσιν ποιησαμένους πολλὰ τῶν πρός τι (22) συγκαταριθμεῖσθαι·  τὰς γὰρ ἕξεις καὶ τὰς διαθέσεις τῶν πρός (23) τι εἶναι.  σχεδὸν γὰρ ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων τὰ γένη (24) πρός τι λέγεται, τῶν δὲ καθ’ ἕκαστα οὐδέν·  ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐπι(25)στήμη, γένος οὖσα, αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρου λέγεται, —τινὸς (26) γὰρ ἐπιστήμη λέγεται.—  τῶν δὲ καθ’ ἕκαστα οὐδὲν αὐτὸ ὅπερ (27) ἐστὶν ἑτέρου λέγεται,  οἷον ἡ γραμματικὴ οὐ λέγεται τινὸς (28) γραμματικὴ οὐδ’ ἡ μουσικὴ τινὸς μουσική, ἀλλ’ εἰ ἄρα (29) κατὰ τὸ γένος καὶ αὗται πρός τι λέγεται·  οἷον ἡ γραμ(30)ματικὴ λέγεται τινὸς ἐπιστήμη, οὐ τινὸς γραμματική, (31) καὶ ἡ μουσικὴ τινὸς ἐπιστήμη, οὐ τινὸς μουσική·  ὥστε (32) αἱ καθ’ ἕκαστα οὐκ εἰσὶ τῶν πρός τι. 
               
(160) At uero non decet conturbari ne quis nos dicat de qualitate (161) propositionem facientes multa de relatiuis interposuisse;  (162) habitudines enim et affectiones eorum quae sunt ad aliquid esse (163) diximus.  Paene enim ea quae sunt in omnibus his generibus ad aliquid (164) dicuntur, eorum uero quae sunt singulatim nihil;  scientia enim, quae (165) genus est, hoc ipsum quod est alterius dicitur (alicuius enim scientia (166) dicitur),  singulorum uero nihil hoc ipsum quod est alterius dicitur,  (167) ut grammatica non dicitur alicuius grammatica nec musica alicuius (168) musica sed si forte secundum genus proprium et istae dicuntur (169) alicuius;  ut grammatica alicuius dicitur scientia, non alicuius (170) grammatica, et musica alicuius scientia, non alicuius musica;  quare (171) singula non sunt relatiua. 
               
We must not be disturbed because it may be argued that, though proposing to discuss the category of quality, we have included in it many relative terms.  We did say that habits and dispositions were relative.  In practically all such cases the genus is relative, the individual not.  Thus knowledge, as a genus, is explained by reference to something else, for we mean a knowledge of something.  But particular branches of knowledge are not thus explained.  The knowledge of grammar is not relative to anything external, nor is the knowledge of music, but these, if relative at all, are relative only in virtue of their genera;  thus grammar is said be the knowledge of something, not the grammar of something; similarly music is the knowledge of something, not the music of something.  Thus individual branches of knowledge are not relative. 
λεγόμεθα δὲ ποιοὶ (33) ταῖς καθ’ ἕκαστα·  ταύτας γὰρ καὶ ἔχομεν,  —ἐπιστήμονες γὰρ (34) λεγόμεθα τῷ ἔχειν τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα ἐπιστημῶν τινά·—  ὥστε (35) αὗται ἂν καὶ ποιότητες εἴησαν αἱ καθ’ ἕκαστα, καθ’ ἅς (36) ποτε καὶ ποιοὶ λεγόμεθα· αὗται δὲ οὐκ εἰσὶ τῶν πρός τι.— 
       
(172) Dicimur autem quales secundum singula;  haec enim et habemus  (scientes (173) enim dicimur quod habemus singulas scientias);  quare haec erunt etiam (174) qualitates, quae singulatim sunt, secundum quas et quales dicimur; (175) haec autem non sunt eorum quae sunt ad aliquid. 
       
And it is because we possess these individual branches of knowledge that we are said to be such and such.  It is these that we actually possess:  we are called experts because we possess knowledge in some particular branch.  Those particular branches, therefore, of knowledge, in virtue of which we are sometimes said to be such and such, are themselves qualities, and are not relative. 
(37) ἔτι εἰ τυγχάνει τὸ αὐτὸ ποιὸν καὶ πρός τι ὄν, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον (38) ἐν ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς γένεσιν αὐτὸ καταριθμεῖσθαι. 
 
(176) Amplius si contingat idem et quale esse et relatiuum, nihil est (177) inconueniens in utrisque hoc generibus annumerare. 
 
Further, if anything should happen to fall within both the category of quality and that of relation, there would be nothing extraordinary in classing it under both these heads. 
(11b1) Ἐπιδέχεται δὲ καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἐναντιό(2)τητα καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον·  τὸ γὰρ θερμαίνειν (3) τῷ ψύχειν ἐναντίον καὶ τὸ θερμαίνεσθαι τῷ ψύχεσθαι καὶ (4) τὸ ἥδεσθαι τῷ λυπεῖσθαι·  ὥστε ἐπιδέχεται ἐναντιότητα.  καὶ (5) τὸ μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἧττον·  θερμαίνειν γὰρ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧτ(6)τον ἔστι, καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, καὶ λυπεῖσθαι (7) μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον·  ἐπιδέχεται οὖν τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον (8) τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πάσχειν. (9)  (10) [Ὑπὲρ μὲν οὖν τούτων τοσαῦτα λέγεται· 
             
(9,1) DE FACERE ET PATI: Suscipit autem et facere et pati contrarietatem et magis et minus;  (2) calefacere enim et frigidum facere contraria sunt, et calefieri et (3) frigidum fieri, et delectari et contristari;  quare suscipit (4) contrarietatem facere et pati.  Et magis autem et minus;  est enim (5) calefacere et magis et minus, et calefieri magis et minus, et (6) contristari.  Suscipiunt ergo et magis et minus facere et pati.  Ac de (7) his quidem haec dicta sunt. 
             
Action and affection both admit of contraries and also of variation of degree.  Heating is the contrary of cooling, being heated of being cooled, being glad of being vexed. Thus they admit of contraries.  They also admit of variation of degree:  for it is possible to heat in a greater or less degree;  also to be heated in a greater or less degree.  Thus action and affection also admit of variation of degree.  So much, then, is stated with regard to these categories. 
εἴρηται δὲ καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ κεῖσθαι (11) ἐν τοῖς πρός τι, ὅτι παρωνύμως ἀπὸ τῶν θέσεων λέγεται.  ὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν, (12) τοῦ τε ποτὲ καὶ τοῦ ποὺ καὶ τοῦ ἔχειν, διὰ τὸ προφανῆ εἶναι οὐδὲν ὑπὲρ (13) αὐτῶν ἄλλο λέγεται ἢ ὅσα ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐῤῥήθη, ὅτι τὸ ἔχειν μὲν σημαίνει τὸ (14) ὑποδεδέσθαι, τὸ ὡπλίσθαι, τὸ δὲ ποὺ οἷον ἐν Λυκείῳ, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὲ ὅσα (15) ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἐῤῥήθη.  —ὑπὲρ μὲν οὖν τῶν προτεθέντων γενῶν ἱκανὰ τὰ εἰρη(16)μένα· 
     
(8) Dictum est autem et de situ in relatiuis, quoniam denominatiue a (9) positionibus dicitur.  De reliquis uero, id est quando et ubi et (10) habere, propterea quod manifesta sunt, nihil de his ultra dicitur quam (11) quod in principio dictum est, quod habere significat calciatum esse (12) uel armatum, ubi uero in Lycio, uel alia quaecumque de his dicta sunt.  (13) Igitur de his generibus quae proposuimus sufficienter dictum est. 
     
We spoke, moreover, of the category of position when we were dealing with that of relation, and stated that such terms derived their names from those of the corresponding attitudes.  As for the rest, time, place, state, since they are easily intelligible, I say no more about them than was said at the beginning, that in the category of state are included such states as ’shod’, ’armed’, in that of place ’in the Lyceum’ and so on, as was explained before.  The proposed categories have, then, been adequately dealt with. 
περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, ποσαχῶς εἴωθε ἀντιτίθεσθαι, ῥητέον.]  (17) Λέγεται δὲ ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ ἀντικεῖσθαι τετραχῶς, ἢ (18) ὡς τὰ πρός τι, ἢ ὡς τὰ ἐναντία, ἢ ὡς στέρησις καὶ ἕξις, (19) ἢ ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις.  ἀντίκειται δὲ ἕκαστον τῶν (20) τοιούτων, ὡς τύπῳ εἰπεῖν, ὡς μὲν τὰ πρός τι οἷον τὸ διπλά(21)σιον τῷ ἡμίσει, ὡς δὲ τὰ ἐναντία οἷον τὸ κακὸν τῷ ἀγαθῷ,  (22) ὡς δὲ κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ ἕξιν οἷον τυφλότης καὶ ὄψις, (23) ὡς δὲ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις οἷον κάθηται —οὐ κάθηται. 
       
(10,1) DE OPPOSITIS: Quotiens solent opponi, dicendum est.  Dicitur autem alterum alteri (2) opponi quadrupliciter, aut ut ad aliquid, aut ut contraria, aut ut (3) habitus et priuatio, aut ut affirmatio et negatio.  Opponitur autem (4) unumquodque istorum, ut sit figuratim dicere, ut relatiua ut duplum (5) medio, ut contraria ut bonum malo,  ut secundum priuationem et habitum (6) ut caecitas et uisus, ut affirmatio et negatio ut sedet -- non sedet. 
       
We must next explain the various senses in which the term ’opposite’ is used.  Things are said to be opposed in four senses: (i) as correlatives to one another, (ii) as contraries to one another, (iii) as privatives to positives, (iv) as affirmatives to negatives.  Let me sketch my meaning in outline. An instance of the use of the word ’opposite’ with reference to correlatives is afforded by the expressions ’double’ and ’half’; with reference to contraries by ’bad’ and ’good’.  Opposites in the sense of ’privatives’ and ’positives’ are’ blindness’ and ’sight’; in the sense of affirmatives and negatives, the propositions ’he sits’, ’he does not sit’. 
(24) Ὅσα μὲν οὖν ὡς τὰ πρός τι ἀντίκειται αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶ (25) τῶν ἀντικειμένων λέγεται ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως πρὸς αὐτά·  (26) οἷον τὸ διπλάσιον τοῦ ἡμίσεος αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶ διπλάσιον (27) λέγεται·  καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη δὲ τῷ ἐπιστητῷ ὡς τὰ πρός τι (28) ἀντίκειται, καὶ λέγεταί γε ἡ ἐπιστήμη αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶ (29) τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦ·  καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν δὲ αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ (30) ἀντικείμενον λέγεται τὴν ἐπιστήμην· τὸ γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν τινὶ (31) λέγεται ἐπιστητὸν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ. 
       
(7) Quaecumque igitur ut relatiua opponuntur, ea ipsa quae sunt (8) oppositorum dicuntur, aut quomodolibet aliter ad ea;  ut duplum medii, (9) hoc ipsum quod est, dicitur duplum;  et scientia scibilis rei scientia (10) ut ad aliquid opponitur, et dicitur scientia, hoc ipsum quod est, (11) scibilis;  et scibile, hoc ipsum quod est, ad oppositum dicitur, (12) scilicet scientiam (scibile enim aliqua scientia scibile dicitur). 
       
(i) Pairs of opposites which fall under the category of relation are explained by a reference of the one to the other, the reference being indicated by the preposition ’of’ or by some other preposition.  Thus, double is a relative term, for that which is double is explained as the double of something.  Knowledge, again, is the opposite of the thing known, in the same sense;  and the thing known also is explained by its relation to its opposite, knowledge. For the thing known is explained as that which is known by something, that is, by knowledge. 
(32) Ὅσα οὖν ἀντίκειται ὡς τὰ πρός τι αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶ τῶν ἀντι(33)κειμένων ἢ ὁπωσδήποτε πρὸς ἄλληλα λέγεται· 
 
(13) Quaecumque ergo opponuntur ut ad aliquid, ea ipsa quae sunt (14) oppositorum uel alio quolibet modo ad se inuicem dicuntur. 
 
Such things, then, as are opposite the one to the other in the sense of being correlatives are explained by a reference of the one to the other. 
τὰ δὲ ὡς (34) τὰ ἐναντία, αὐτὰ μὲν ἅπερ ἐστὶν οὐδαμῶς πρὸς ἄλληλα λέ(35)γεται, ἐναντία μέντοι ἀλλήλων λέγεται·  οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἀγα(36)θὸν τοῦ κακοῦ λέγεται ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ’ ἐναντίον, οὔτε τὸ λευκὸν (37) τοῦ μέλανος λευκόν, ἀλλ’ ἐναντίον.  ὥστε διαφέρουσιν αὗται (38) αἱ ἀντιθέσεις ἀλλήλων. 
     
(15) Illa uero quae ut contraria, ipsa quidem quae sunt nullo modo ad (16) inuicem dicuntur, contraria uero sibi inuicem dicuntur;  neque enim (17) bonum mali dicitur bonum sed contrarium; nec album nigri album sed (18) contrarium.  Quare differunt istae oppositiones inuicem. 
     
(ii) Pairs of opposites which are contraries are not in any way interdependent, but are contrary the one to the other.  The good is not spoken of as the good of the bad, but as the contrary of the bad, nor is white spoken of as the white of the black, but as the contrary of the black.  These two types of opposition are therefore distinct. 
—ὅσα δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων τοιαῦτά ἐστιν (12a1) ὥστε ἐν οἷς πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι ἢ ὧν κατηγορεῖται ἀναγκαῖον (2) αὐτῶν θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, τούτων οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀνὰ μέσον·  [ὧν δέ (3) γε μὴ ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, τούτων ἔστι τι ἀνὰ μέσον (4) πάντως.]  οἷον νόσος καὶ ὑγίεια ἐν σώματι ζῴου πέφυκε (5) γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ἀναγκαῖόν γε θάτερον ὑπάρχειν τῷ τοῦ ζῴου (6) σώματι ἢ νόσον ἢ ὑγίειαν·  καὶ περιττὸν δὲ καὶ ἄρτιον ἀριθ(7)μοῦ κατηγορεῖται, καὶ ἀναγκαῖόν γε θάτερον τῷ ἀριθμῷ (8) ὑπάρχειν ἢ περιττὸν ἢ ἄρτιον·  καὶ οὐκ ἔστι γε τούτων οὐδὲν (9) ἀνὰ μέσον, οὔτε νόσου καὶ ὑγιείας οὔτε περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου.  ὧν (10) δέ γε μὴ ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, τούτων ἔστι τι ἀνὰ (11) μέσον·  οἷον μέλαν καὶ λευκὸν ἐν σώματι πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι, (12) καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖόν γε θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν τῷ σώματι, — (13) οὐ γὰρ πᾶν ἤτοι λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν ἐστίν·—  καὶ φαῦλον δὲ καὶ (14) σπουδαῖον κατηγορεῖται μὲν καὶ κατ’ ἀνθρώπου καὶ κατ’ (15) ἄλλων πολλῶν,  οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον δὲ θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν (16) ἐκείνοις ὧν κατηγορεῖται·  οὐ γὰρ πάντα ἤτοι φαῦλα ἢ σπου(17)δαῖά ἐστιν.  καὶ ἔστι γέ τι τούτων ἀνὰ μέσον, οἷον τοῦ μὲν (18) λευκοῦ καὶ τοῦ μέλανος τὸ φαιὸν καὶ ὠχρὸν καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα (19) χρώματα,  τοῦ δὲ φαύλου καὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου τὸ οὔτε φαῦλον οὔτε (20) σπουδαῖον.  ἐπ’ ἐνίων μὲν οὖν ὀνόματα κεῖται τοῖς ἀνὰ μέσον, (21) οἷον λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος τὸ φαιὸν καὶ ὠχρόν·  ἐπ’ ἐνίων δὲ (22) ὀνόματι μὲν οὐκ εὔπορον τὸ ἀνὰ μέσον ἀποδοῦναι, τῇ δὲ (23) ἑκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων ἀποφάσει τὸ ἀνὰ μέσον ὁρίζεται, (24) οἷον τὸ οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν καὶ οὔτε δίκαιον οὔτε (25) ἄδικον.  (26) Στέρησις δὲ καὶ ἕξις λέγεται μὲν περὶ ταὐτόν τι, οἷον (27) ἡ ὄψις καὶ ἡ τυφλότης περὶ ὀφθαλμόν·  καθόλου δὲ εἰπεῖν, ἐν (28) ᾧ πέφυκεν ἡ ἕξις γίγνεσθαι, περὶ τοῦτο λέγεται ἑκάτερον (29) αὐτῶν.  ἐστερῆσθαι δὲ τότε λέγομεν ἕκαστον τῶν τῆς ἕξεως (30) δεκτικῶν, ὅταν ἐν ᾧ πέφυκεν ὑπάρχειν καὶ ὅτε πέφυκεν (31) ἔχειν μηδαμῶς ὑπάρχῃ·  νωδόν τε γὰρ λέγομεν οὐ τὸ μὴ (32) ἔχον ὀδόντας, καὶ τυφλὸν οὐ τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὄψιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ (33) ἔχον ὅτε πέφυκεν ἔχειν·  τινὰ γὰρ ἐκ γενετῆς οὔτε ὄψιν (34) οὔτε ὀδόντας ἔχει, ἀλλ’ οὐ λέγεται νωδὰ οὐδὲ τυφλά. 
                                     
(19) Quaecumque uero contrariorum talia sunt ut in quibus nata sunt fieri (20) et de quibus praedicantur, necessarium sit alterum ipsorum inesse, (21) nihil eorum medium est  (quorum autem non est necessarium alterum (22) inesse, horum omnium est aliquid medium);  ut aegritudo et sanitas in (23) corpore animalis nata est fieri, et necesse est alterum ipsorum inesse (24) animalis corpori, aut aegritudinem aut sanitatem;  et par quidem et (25) impar de numero praedicatur, et necesse est horum alterum numero (26) inesse, uel par uel impar;  et non est horum aliquid medium, neque (27) aegritudinis neque sanitatis, neque imparis neque paris.  Quorum autem (28) nor est necessarium alterum inesse, horum est aliquid medium;  ut album (29) et nigrum in corpore natum est fieri, et non est necesse alterum eorum (30) inesse corpori (non enim omne corpus uel album uel nigrum est);  et (31) probum et improbum dicitur quidem de homine et de aliis pluribus,  non (32) est autem necesse alterum inesse his de quibus praedicatur;  non enim (33) omnia aut proba sunt aut improba.  Et est aliquid horum medium, ut albi (34) et nigri uenetum uel pallidum uel quicumque alii colores sunt,  foedi (35) uero et pulchri quod neque pulchrum est neque foedum.  In aliquibus (36) quidem medietatibus posita sunt nomina, ut albi et nigri uenetum et (37) pallidum;  in aliquibus uero non est nomine assignare medietatem, (38) utriusque uero negatione definitur, ut nec bonum nec malum, nec iustum (39) nec iniustum.  (40) Priuatio uero et habitus dicuntur quidem circa idem aliquid, ut uisio (41) et caecitas circa oculum;  uniuersaliter autem dicere est in quo (42) nascitur habitus fieri, circa hoc dicitur utrumque eorum.  (43) Priuari uero tunc dicimus unumquodque habitus susceptibilium, quando (44) in quo natum est inesse uel quando natum est habere nullo modo habet.  (45) Edentulum enim dicimus non qui non habet dentes, nec caecum qui non (46) habet uisionem sed qui, quando contigit habere, non habet  (multa enim (47) ex natiuitate neque dentes habent neque uisionem sed non dicuntur (48) edentula neque caeca). 
                                     
Those contraries which are such that the subjects in which they are naturally present, or of which they are predicated, must necessarily contain either the one or the other of them, have no intermediate,  but those in the case of which no such necessity obtains, always have an intermediate.  Thus disease and health are naturally present in the body of an animal, and it is necessary that either the one or the other should be present in the body of an animal.  Odd and even, again, are predicated of number, and it is necessary that the one or the other should be present in numbers.  Now there is no intermediate between the terms of either of these two pairs.  On the other hand, in those contraries with regard to which no such necessity obtains, we find an intermediate.  Blackness and whiteness are naturally present in the body, but it is not necessary that either the one or the other should be present in the body, inasmuch as it is not true to say that everybody must be white or black.  Badness and goodness, again, are predicated of man, and of many other things,  but it is not necessary that either the one quality or the other should be present in that of which they are predicated:  it is not true to say that everything that may be good or bad must be either good or bad.  These pairs of contraries have intermediates: the intermediates between white and black are grey, sallow, and all the other colours that come between;  the intermediate between good and bad is that which is neither the one nor the other.  Some intermediate qualities have names, such as grey and sallow and all the other colours that come between white and black;  in other cases, however, it is not easy to name the intermediate, but we must define it as that which is not either extreme, as in the case of that which is neither good nor bad, neither just nor unjust.  (iii) ’privatives’ and ’Positives’ have reference to the same subject. Thus, sight and blindness have reference to the eye.  It is a universal rule that each of a pair of opposites of this type has reference to that to which the particular ’positive’ is natural.  We say that that is capable of some particular faculty or possession has suffered privation when the faculty or possession in question is in no way present in that in which, and at the time at which, it should naturally be present.  We do not call that toothless which has not teeth, or that blind which has not sight, but rather that which has not teeth or sight at the time when by nature it should.  For there are some creatures which from birth are without sight, or without teeth, but these are not called toothless or blind. 
(35) τὸ δὲ ἐστερῆσθαι καὶ τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ἕξιν οὐκ ἔστι στέρησις καὶ (36) ἕξις·  ἕξις μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ὄψις, στέρησις δὲ ἡ τυφλότης, (37) τὸ δὲ ἔχειν τὴν ὄψιν οὐκ ἔστιν ὄψις, οὐδὲ τὸ τυφλὸν εἶναι (38) τυφλότης·  στέρησις γάρ τις ἡ τυφλότης ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ τυφλὸν (39) εἶναι ἐστερῆσθαι, οὐ στέρησίς ἐστιν. 
     
(49) Priuari uero et habere habitum non est habitus et priuatio;  habitus (50) enim est uisus, priuatio uero caecitas, habere autem uisum non est (51) uisus, nec caecum esse caecitas  (priuatio enim quaedam est caecitas, (52) caecum uero esse priuari, non priuatio est). 
     
To be without some faculty or to possess it is not the same as the corresponding ’privative’ or ’positive’.  ’Sight’ is a ’positive’, ’blindness’ a ’privative’, but ’to possess sight’ is not equivalent to ’sight’, ’to be blind’ is not equivalent to ’blindness’.  Blindness is a ’privative’, to be blind is to be in a state of privation, but is not a ’privative’. 
ἔτι εἰ ἦν ἡ τυφλότης (40) ταὐτὸν τῷ τυφλὸν εἶναι, κατηγορεῖτο ἂν ἀμφότερα κατὰ (41) τοῦ αὐτοῦ· ἀλλὰ τυφλὸς μὲν λέγεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τυφλότης (12b1) δὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐδαμῶς λέγεται. 
 
(53) Nam si idem esset caecitas et caecum esse, utraque de eodem (54) praedicarentur; nunc uero minime sed caecus quidem dicitur homo, (55) caecitas uero nullo modo dicitur. 
 
Moreover, if ’blindness’ were equivalent to ’being blind’, both would be predicated of the same subject; but though a man is said to be blind, he is by no means said to be blindness. 
ἀντικεῖσθαι δὲ καὶ ταῦτα (2) δοκεῖ, τὸ ἐστερῆσθαι καὶ τὸ τὴν ἕξιν ἔχειν ὡς στέρησις καὶ (3) ἕξις· ὁ γὰρ τρόπος τῆς ἀντιθέσεως ὁ αὐτός·  ὡς γὰρ ἡ τυ(4)φλότης τῇ ὄψει ἀντίκειται, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τυφλὸν εἶναι τῷ (5) ὄψιν ἔχειν ἀντίκειται. 
   
(56) Opponi quidem et ista uidentur, priuari scilicet et habere habitum, (57) quemadmodum priuatio et habitus; idem enim modus est oppositionis;  () 
   
To be in a state of ’possession’ is, it appears, the opposite of being in a state of ’privation’, just as ’positives’ and ’privatives’ themselves are opposite.  There is the same type of antithesis in both cases; for just as blindness is opposed to sight, so is being blind opposed to having sight. 
(οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν κατάφασιν (6) καὶ ἀπόφασιν κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις·  (7) ἡ μὲν γὰρ κατάφασις (8) λόγος ἐστὶ καταφατικὸς καὶ ἡ ἀπόφασις λόγος ἀποφατι(9)κός,  τῶν δὲ ὑπὸ τὴν κατάφασιν ἢ ἀπόφασιν οὐδέν ἐστι (10) λόγος.  λέγεται δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ἀντικεῖσθαι ἀλλήλοις ὡς κα(11)τάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις·  καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτων ὁ τρόπος τῆς (12) ἀντιθέσεως ὁ αὐτός·  (13) ὡς γάρ ποτε ἡ κατάφασις πρὸς τὴν (14) ἀπόφασιν ἀντίκειται, οἷον τὸ κάθηται—οὐ κάθηται,  οὕτω (15) καὶ τὸ ὑφ’ ἑκάτερον πρᾶγμα ἀντίκειται, τὸ καθῆσθαι—μὴ (16) καθῆσθαι.) 
             
(58) Non est autem nec quod sub affirmatione uel negatione est negatio uel (59) affirmatio;  affirmatio enim oratio est affirmatiua et negatio oratio (60) negatiua,  eorum uero quae sunt sub affirmatione uel negatione nihil (61) est oratio.  Dicuntur autem et ista sibi opponi ut affirmatro et (62) negatio;  nam etiam in his modus oppositionis idem est;  quemadmodum (63) enim affirmatio ad negationem opponitur, ut sedet - non sedet,  sic (64) res quae sub utrisque est sibi opponitur sedere et non sedere. 
             
That which is affirmed or denied is not itself affirmation or denial.  By ’affirmation’ we mean an affirmative proposition, by ’denial’ a negative.  Now, those facts which form the matter of the affirmation or denial are not propositions;  yet these two are said to be opposed in the same sense as the affirmation and denial,  for in this case also the type of antithesis is the same.  For as the affirmation is opposed to the denial, as in the two propositions ’he sits’, ’he does not sit’,  so also the fact which constitutes the matter of the proposition in one case is opposed to that in the other, his sitting, that is to say, to his not sitting. 
—ὅτι δὲ ἡ στέρησις καὶ ἡ ἕξις οὐκ ἀντίκειται ὡς (17) τὰ πρός τι, φανερόν· οὐ γὰρ λέγεται αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀντι(18)κειμένου·  ἡ γὰρ ὄψις οὐκ ἔστι τυφλότητος ὄψις, οὐδ’ ἄλλως (19) οὐδαμῶς πρὸς αὐτὸ λέγεται· ὡσαύτως δὲ οὐδὲ ἡ τυφλότης (20) λέγοιτ’ ἂν τυφλότης ὄψεως, ἀλλὰ στέρησις μὲν ὄψεως ἡ (21) τυφλότης λέγεται, τυφλότης δὲ ὄψεως οὐ λέγεται.  ἔτι τὰ (22) πρός τι πάντα πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται, ὥστε καὶ ἡ τυ(23)φλότης εἴπερ ἦν τῶν πρός τι, ἀντέστρεφεν ἂν κἀκεῖνο πρὸς (24) ὃ λέγεται·  ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει·  οὐ γὰρ λέγεται ἡ ὄψις (25) τυφλότητος ὄψις. 
         
(65) Quoniam autem priuatio et habitus non sic opponuntur ut ad aliquid, (66) manifestum est; neque enim dicitur hoc ipsum quod est oppositi;  uisus (67) enim non est caecitatis uisus, nec alio ullo modo ad ipsum dicitur; (68) similiter autem nec caecitas dicitur caecitas uisus sed priuatio uisus (69) caecitas dicitur <...>.  Amplius omnia quaecumque ad aliquid dicuntur (70) conuersim dicuntur, quare etiam caecitas, si esset eorum quae sunt ad (71) aliquid, conuerteretur illud ad quod dicitur;  sed non conuertuntur;  (72) neque enim dicitur uisus caecitatis. 
         
It is evident that ’positives’ and ’privatives’ are not opposed each to each in the same sense as relatives. The one is not explained by reference to the other;  sight is not sight of blindness, nor is any other preposition used to indicate the relation. Similarly blindness is not said to be blindness of sight, but rather, privation of sight.  Relatives, moreover, reciprocate; if blindness, therefore, were a relative, there would be a reciprocity of relation between it and that with which it was correlative.  But this is not the case.  Sight is not called the sight of blindness. 
(26) Ὅτι δὲ οὐδ’ ὡς τὰ ἐναντία ἀντίκειται τὰ κατὰ στέρη(27)σιν λεγόμενα καὶ ἕξιν ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον.  τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐναν(28)τίων, ὧν μηδέν ἐστιν ἀνὰ μέσον, ἀναγκαῖον, ἐν οἷς πέφυκε (29) γίγνεσθαι ἢ ὧν κατηγορεῖται, θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν ἀεί·  (30) τούτων γὰρ οὐδὲν ἦν ἀνὰ μέσον, ὧν θάτερον ἀναγκαῖον ἦν τῷ (31) δεκτικῷ ὑπάρχειν,  οἷον ἐπὶ νόσου καὶ ὑγιείας καὶ περιττοῦ (32) καὶ ἀρτίου·  ὧν δὲ ἔστι τι ἀνὰ μέσον, οὐδέποτε ἀνάγκη παντὶ (33) ὑπάρχειν θάτερον·  οὔτε γὰρ λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν ἀνάγκη πᾶν (34) εἶναι τὸ δεκτικόν, οὔτε θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρόν, —τούτων γὰρ (35) ἀνὰ μέσον τι οὐδὲν κωλύει ὑπάρχειν·—  ἔτι δὲ καὶ τού(36)των ἦν τι ἀνὰ μέσον ὧν μὴ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν θάτερον ὑπάρχειν (37) τῷ δεκτικῷ,  εἰ μὴ οἷς φύσει τὸ ἓν ὑπάρχει,  οἷον τῷ (38) πυρὶ τὸ θερμῷ εἶναι καὶ τῇ χιόνι τὸ λευκῇ·  —ἐπὶ δὲ (39) τούτων ἀφωρισμένως ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, καὶ οὐχ (40) ὁπότερον ἔτυχεν·  οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πῦρ ψυχρὸν εἶναι (41) οὐδὲ τὴν χιόνα μέλαιναν·—  ὥστε παντὶ μὲν οὐκ ἀνάγκη (13a1) τῷ δεκτικῷ θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν,  ἀλλὰ μόνον οἷς φύ(2)σει τὸ ἓν ὑπάρχει,  καὶ τούτοις ἀφωρισμένως τὸ ἓν καὶ οὐχ (3) ὁπότερον ἔτυχεν. 
                           
(73) Quoniam autem neque ut contraria opponuntur ea quae secundum (74) priuationem et habitum dicuntur, ex his manifestum est.  Quorum enim (75) contrariorum nihil est medium, necesse est, in quibus nata sunt fieri (76) aut de quibus praedicari, alterum ipsorum inesse semper;  horum enim (77) nihil erat medium, quorum necesse erat alterum inesse eorum (78) susceptibili,  ut in aegritudine et sanitate et impari atque (79) pari.  Quorum autem est aliquid medium nunquam necesse est omni inesse (80) alterum;  nam neque album aut nigrum necesse est omne esse eorum (81) susceptibili, nec frigidum nec calidum (nihil enim prohibet aliquam (82) ipsorum inesse medietatem);  erat etiam istorum medietas, quorum non (83) necesse esset alterum inesse eorum susceptibili,  nisi forte (84) aliquibus naturaliter contigerit unum ipsorum inesse,  ut igni (85) calidum esse et niui album  (in his autem necesse est definite unum (86) ipsorum inesse, et non hoc aut illud;  neque enim potest ignis esse (87) frigidus nec nix esse nigra);  quare non necesse est omnibus eorum (88) susceptibilibus alterum horum inesse  sed solis his quibus (89) naturaliter unum inest,  et his definite unum, non autem hoc aut (90) illud. 
                           
That those terms which fall under the heads of ’positives’ and ’privatives’ are not opposed each to each as contraries, either, is plain from the following facts:  Of a pair of contraries such that they have no intermediate, one or the other must needs be present in the subject in which they naturally subsist, or of which they are predicated;  for it is those, as we proved,’ in the case of which this necessity obtains, that have no intermediate.  Moreover, we cited health and disease, odd and even, as instances.  But those contraries which have an intermediate are not subject to any such necessity.  It is not necessary that every substance, receptive of such qualities, should be either black or white, cold or hot,  for something intermediate between these contraries may very well be present in the subject.  We proved, moreover, that those contraries have an intermediate in the case of which the said necessity does not obtain.  Yet when one of the two contraries is a constitutive property of the subject, as it is a constitutive property of fire to be hot, of snow to be white,  it is necessary determinately that one of the two contraries, not one or the other, should be present in the subject;  for fire cannot be cold, or snow black.  Thus, it is not the case here that one of the two must needs be present in every subject receptive of these qualities,  but only in that subject of which the one forms a constitutive property.  Moreover, in such cases it is one member of the pair determinately, and not either the one or the other, which must be present. 
ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς στερήσεως καὶ τῆς ἕξεως οὐδέ(4)τερον τῶν εἰρημένων ἀληθές·  οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀεὶ τῷ δεκτικῷ ἀναγ(5)καῖον θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν,  —τὸ γὰρ μήπω πεφυκὸς (6) ὄψιν ἔχειν οὔτε τυφλὸν οὔτε ὄψιν ἔχειν λέγεται,  ὥστε οὐκ ἂν (7) εἴη ταῦτα τῶν τοιούτων ἐναντίων ὧν οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀνὰ μέσον·—  (8) ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ὧν τι ἔστιν ἀνὰ μέσον·  ἀναγκαῖον γάρ ποτε παντὶ (9) τῷ δεκτικῷ θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν·  ὅταν γὰρ ἤδη πε(10)φυκὸς ᾖ ἔχειν ὄψιν, τότε ἢ τυφλὸν ἢ ἔχον ὄψιν ῥηθήσεται,  (11) καὶ τούτων οὐκ ἀφωρισμένως θάτερον, ἀλλ’ ὁπότερον ἔτυχεν,  (12) —οὐ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τυφλὸν ἢ ὄψιν ἔχον εἶναι, ἀλλ’ ὁπό(13)τερον ἔτυχεν·—  ἐπὶ δέ γε τῶν ἐναντίων, ὧν ἔστιν ἀνὰ μέσον τι, (14) οὐδέποτε ἀναγκαῖον ἦν παντὶ θάτερον ὑπάρχειν,  ἀλλὰ τισίν, (15) καὶ τούτοις ἀφωρισμένως τὸ ἕν.  ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι κατ’ οὐδέτερον (16) τῶν τρόπων ὡς τὰ ἐναντία ἀντίκειται τὰ κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ (17) ἕξιν ἀντικείμενα. 
                       
(91) In priuatione uero et habitu neutrum uerum est eorum quae dicta sunt,  (92) neque enim semper eorum susceptibili necesse est alterum ipsorum (93) inesse;  quod enim nondum natum est habere uisum neque caecum neque (94) uisum habere dicitur,  ()  ()  ()  ... habens uisum dicitur;  et horum non (95) definite alterum sed aut hoc aut illud  (neque enim necesse est aut (96) caecum aut habentem uisum esse sed aut hoc aut illud);  in contrariis (97) uero, quorum est medietas, numquam necesse est omni alterum inesse  (98) sed aliquibus, et his definite unum.  Quare manifestum est quoniam (99) secundum neutrum modum quemadmodum contraria opponuntur [ita sibi (100) sunt] ea quae sunt secundum priuationem et habitum opposita. 
                       
In the case of ’positives’ and ’privatives’, on the other hand, neither of the aforesaid statements holds good.  For it is not necessary that a subject receptive of the qualities should always have either the one or the other;  that which has not yet advanced to the state when sight is natural is not said either to be blind or to see.  Thus ’positives’ and ’privatives’ do not belong to that class of contraries which consists of those which have no intermediate.  On the other hand, they do not belong either to that class which consists of contraries which have an intermediate.  For under certain conditions it is necessary that either the one or the other should form part of the constitution of every appropriate subject.  For when a thing has reached the stage when it is by nature capable of sight, it will be said either to see or to be blind,  and that in an indeterminate sense, signifying that the capacity may be either present or absent;  for it is not necessary either that it should see or that it should be blind, but that it should be either in the one state or in the other.  Yet in the case of those contraries which have an intermediate we found that it was never necessary that either the one or the other should be present in every appropriate subject,  but only that in certain subjects one of the pair should be present, and that in a determinate sense.  It is, therefore, plain that ’positives’ and ’privatives’ are not opposed each to each in either of the senses in which contraries are opposed. 
—ἔτι ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἐναντίων ὑπάρχοντος τοῦ (18) δεκτικοῦ δυνατὸν εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολὴν γενέσθαι,  εἰ μή (19) τινι φύσει τὸ ἓν ὑπάρχει, (20) οἷον τῷ πυρὶ τὸ θερμῷ εἶναι·  καὶ γὰρ (21) τὸ ὑγιαῖνον δυνατὸν νοσῆσαι καὶ τὸ λευκὸν μέλαν γενέσθαι (22) καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν θερμόν, καὶ ἐκ σπουδαίου γε φαῦλον καὶ ἐκ (23) φαύλου σπουδαῖον δυνατὸν γενέσθαι·  —ὁ γὰρ φαῦλος εἰς βελ(24)τίους διατριβὰς ἀγόμενος καὶ λόγους κἂν μικρόν γέ τι ἐπι(25)δοίη εἰς τὸ βελτίω εἶναι·  ἐὰν δὲ ἅπαξ κἂν μικρὰν ἐπίδοσιν (26) λάβῃ, φανερὸν ὅτι ἢ τελείως ἂν μεταβάλοι ἢ πάνυ πολλὴν ἂν (27) ἐπίδοσιν λάβοι·  ἀεὶ γὰρ εὐκινητότερος πρὸς ἀρετὴν γίγνεται, (28) κἂν ἡντινοῦν ἐπίδοσιν εἰληφὼς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ᾖ,  ὥστε καὶ πλείω (29) εἰκὸς ἐπίδοσιν λαμβάνειν·  καὶ τοῦτο ἀεὶ γιγνόμενον τε(30)λείως εἰς τὴν ἐναντίαν ἕξιν ἀποκαθίστησιν, ἐάνπερ μὴ χρόνῳ (31) ἐξείργηται·—  ἐπὶ δέ γε τῆς στερήσεως καὶ τῆς ἕξεως ἀδύνα(32)τον εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολὴν γενέσθαι·  ἀπὸ μὲν γὰρ τῆς ἕξεως (33) ἐπὶ τὴν στέρησιν γίγνεται μεταβολή,  ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς στε(34)ρήσεως ἐπὶ τὴν ἕξιν ἀδύνατον·  οὔτε γὰρ τυφλὸς γενόμενός (35) τις πάλιν ἔβλεψεν,  οὔτε φαλακρὸς ὢν κομήτης ἐγένετο,  οὔτε (36) νωδὸς ὢν ὀδόντας ἔφυσεν. 
                           
(101) Amplius in contrariis, cum sit eorum susceptibile, potest fieri in (102) alterna mutatio,  nisi cui naturaliter unum insit, ut igni calido esse;  (103) quod enim sanum est potest aegrescere, et album nigrum fieri, et (104) frigidum calidum, et ex probo improbum et ex improbo probum fieri (105) potest  (improbus enim in meliorem consuetudinem sermonemque perductus (106) uel parum sese dabit in melius;  sin uero uel semel paruam intentionem (107) sumat, manifestum est quoniam aut perfectissime permutetur aut (108) magnam sumat intentionem;  semper enim mobilior ad uirtutem fit, si (109) quamlibet a principio sumpserit intentionem,  quare erit possibile (110) maiorem illum intentionem sumere;  et hoc saepius factum perfecte in (111) contrariam habitudinem consistere, nisi tempore prohibeatur).  In (112) priuatione uero et habitu impossibile est ad inuicem fieri mutationem;  (113) ab habitu enim ad priuationem fit permutatio,  a priuatione uero ad (114) habitum impossibile est;  neque enim factus aliquis caecus rursus (115) uidit,  nec caluus rursus crinitus factus est,  nec edentulus dentes (116) creauit. 
                           
Again, in the case of contraries, it is possible that there should be changes from either into the other, while the subject retains its identity,  unless indeed one of the contraries is a constitutive property of that subject, as heat is of fire.  For it is possible that that that which is healthy should become diseased, that which is white, black, that which is cold, hot, that which is good, bad, that which is bad, good.  The bad man, if he is being brought into a better way of life and thought, may make some advance, however slight,  and if he should once improve, even ever so little, it is plain that he might change completely, or at any rate make very great progress;  for a man becomes more and more easily moved to virtue, however small the improvement was at first.  It is, therefore, natural to suppose that he will make yet greater progress than he has made in the past;  and as this process goes on, it will change him completely and establish him in the contrary state, provided he is not hindered by lack of time.  In the case of ’positives’ and ’privatives’, however, change in both directions is impossible.  There may be a change from possession to privation,  but not from privation to possession.  The man who has become blind does not regain his sight;  the man who has become bald does not regain his hair;  the man who has lost his teeth does not grow a new set. 
(37) Ὅσα δὲ ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις ἀντίκειται, φανε(13b1)ρὸν ὅτι κατ’ οὐδένα τῶν εἰρημένων τρόπων ἀντίκειται·  (2) ἐπὶ μόνων γὰρ τούτων ἀναγκαῖον ἀεὶ τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς τὸ δὲ (3) ψεῦδος αὐτῶν εἶναι.  οὔτε γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐναντίων ἀναγκαῖον (4) ἀεὶ θάτερον μὲν ἀληθὲς εἶναι θάτερον δὲ ψεῦδος, οὔτε ἐπὶ τῶν (5) πρός τι, οὔτε ἐπὶ τῆς ἕξεως καὶ στερήσεως·  οἷον ὑγίεια (6) καὶ νόσος ἐναντία, καὶ οὐδέτερόν γε οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε ψεῦδός (7) ἐστιν·  ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ τὸ ἥμισυ ὡς τὰ πρός τι (8) ἀντίκειται,  καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῶν οὐδέτερον οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε ψεῦ(9)δος·  οὐδέ γε τὰ κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ ἕξιν, οἷον ἡ ὄψις καὶ ἡ (10) τυφλότης·  ὅλως δὲ τῶν κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων (11) οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε ψεῦδός ἐστιν·  πάντα δὲ τὰ εἰρη(12)μένα ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς λέγεται. 
                 
(117) Quaecumque uero ut affirmatio et negatio opponuntur, manifestum est (118) quoniam secundum nullum modum eorum qui dict sunt opponuntur;  in his (119) enim solis necesse est hoc quidem esse uerum illud uero falsum.  Nam (120) neque in contrariis necesse est semper alterum esse uerum, alterum (121) uero falsum, nec in relatiuis, neque in habitu et priuatione;  ut (122) sanitas et aegritudo contraria sunt sed neutrum ipsorum neque uerum (123) neque falsum est;  similiter autem et duplum et medium quae ut ad (124) aliquid opponuntur,  non est eorum alterum falsum alterum uerum;  nec (125) uero ea quae secundum habitum et priuationem sunt, ut uisus et (126) caecitas.  Omnino autem nihil eorum quae secundum nullam complexionem (127) dicuntur aut uerum aut falsum est;  omnia autem quae diximus sine (128) complexione dicuntur. 
                 
(iv) Statements opposed as affirmation and negation belong manifestly to a class which is distinct,  for in this case, and in this case only, it is necessary for the one opposite to be true and the other false.  Neither in the case of contraries, nor in the case of correlatives, nor in the case of ’positives’ and ’privatives’, is it necessary for one to be true and the other false.  Health and disease are contraries: neither of them is true or false.  ’Double’ and ’half’ are opposed to each other as correlatives:  neither of them is true or false.  The case is the same, of course, with regard to ’positives’ and ’privatives’ such as ’sight’ and ’blindness’.  In short, where there is no sort of combination of words, truth and falsity have no place,  and all the opposites we have mentioned so far consist of simple words. 
οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ μάλιστα δό(13)ξειεν ἂν τὸ τοιοῦτο συμβαίνειν ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν ἐναν(14)τίων λεγομένων,  —τὸ γὰρ ὑγιαίνειν Σωκράτη τῷ νοσεῖν Σω(15)κράτη ἐναντίον ἐστίν,—  ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἐπὶ τούτων ἀναγκαῖον ἀεὶ (16) θάτερον μὲν ἀληθὲς θάτερον δὲ ψεῦδος εἶναι·  ὄντος μὲν γὰρ (17) Σωκράτους ἔσται τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος, μὴ ὄντος δὲ (18) ἀμφότερα ψευδῆ·  οὔτε γὰρ τὸ νοσεῖν Σωκράτη οὔτε τὸ (19) ὑγιαίνειν ἀληθὲς αὐτοῦ μὴ ὄντος ὅλως τοῦ Σωκράτους.  (20) ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς στερήσεως καὶ τῆς ἕξεως μὴ ὄντος γε ὅλως (21) οὐδέτερον ἀληθές,  ὄντος δὲ οὐκ ἀεὶ θάτερον ἀληθές·  (22) τὸ γὰρ ὄψιν ἔχειν Σωκράτη τῷ τυφλὸν εἶναι Σωκράτη ἀντί(23)κειται ὡς στέρησις καὶ ἕξις,  καὶ ὄντος γε οὐκ ἀναγ(24)καῖον θάτερον ἀληθὲς εἶναι ἢ ψεῦδος,  —ὅτε γὰρ μήπω (25) πέφυκεν ἔχειν, ἀμφότερα ψευδῆ,—  μὴ ὄντος δὲ ὅλως τοῦ (26) Σωκράτους καὶ οὕτω ψευδῆ ἀμφότερα, καὶ τὸ ὄψιν αὐτὸν (27) ἔχειν καὶ τὸ τυφλὸν εἶναι. 
                     
(129) At uero magis hoc uidetur contingere in his quae secundum complexionem (130) dicuntur  (sanum enim esse Socratem et aegrotare Socratem contraria (131) sunt)  sed nec in his quoque necesse est semper alterum uerum esse, (132) alterum autem falsum;  cum enim sit Socrates, est hoc quidem uerum (133) illud uero falsum, cum autem non sit, utraque falsa sunt;  nam neque (134) aegrotare neque sanum esse uerum est cum ipse Socrates non sit (135) omnino.  In priuatione uero, cum non sit, neutrum uerum est,  et cum (136) sit, non semper alterum uerum est;  uisum enim habere Socratem et (137) caecum esse Socratem opponuntur ut habitus et priuatio  et cum sit, (138) non est necesse alterum uerum esse uel falsum  (quando enim non est (139) natus ut habeat, utraque falsa sunt),  cum autem non sit omnino (140) Socrates, sic quoque utraque falsa sunt, et habere eum uisum et eum (141) esse caecum. 
                     
At the same time, when the words which enter into opposed statements are contraries, these, more than any other set of opposites, would seem to claim this characteristic.  ’Socrates is ill’ is the contrary of ’Socrates is well’,  but not even of such composite expressions is it true to say that one of the pair must always be true and the other false.  For if Socrates exists, one will be true and the other false, but if he does not exist, both will be false;  for neither ’Socrates is ill’ nor ’Socrates is well’ is true, if Socrates does not exist at all.  In the case of ’positives’ and ’privatives’, if the subject does not exist at all, neither proposition is true,  but even if the subject exists, it is not always the fact that one is true and the other false.  For ’Socrates has sight’ is the opposite of ’Socrates is blind’ in the sense of the word ’opposite’ which applies to possession and privation.  Now if Socrates exists, it is not necessary that one should be true and the other false,  for when he is not yet able to acquire the power of vision, both are false,  as also if Socrates is altogether non-existent. 
ἐπὶ δέ γε τῆς καταφάσεως (28) καὶ τῆς ἀποφάσεως ἀεί, ἐάν τε ᾖ ἐάν τε μὴ ᾖ, τὸ μὲν ἕτε(29)ρον ἔσται ψεῦδος τὸ δὲ ἕτερον ἀληθές·  τὸ γὰρ νοσεῖν Σωκρά(30)τη καὶ τὸ μὴ νοσεῖν Σωκράτη, ὄντος τε αὐτοῦ φανερὸν ὅτι (31) τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος,  καὶ μὴ ὄντος ὁμοίως·  (32) τὸ μὲν γὰρ νοσεῖν μὴ ὄντος ψεῦδος, τὸ δὲ μὴ νοσεῖν ἀλη(33)θές·  ὥστε ἐπὶ μόνων τούτων ἴδιον ἂν εἴη τὸ ἀεὶ θάτερον αὐ(34)τῶν ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος εἶναι, ὅσα ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφα(35)σις ἀντίκειται. 
         
(142) In affirmatione uero uel negatione semper, uel si sit uel si non sit, (143) alterum ipsorum uerum, alterum falsum erit;  aegrotare enim Socratem et (144) non aegrotare Socratem, cum sit idem ipse, manifestum est quoniam (145) alterum eorum uerum uel falsum est,  cum non sit, similiter  (namque (146) aegrotum esse, cum non sit, falsum est, non aegrotare uero uerum (147) est).  Quare in solis his erit semper alterum ipsorum uerum esse uel (148) falsum, quaecumque ut affirmatio et negatio opponuntur. 
         
But in the case of affirmation and negation, whether the subject exists or not, one is always false and the other true.  For manifestly, if Socrates exists, one of the two propositions ’Socrates is ill’, ’Socrates is not ill’, is true, and the other false.  This is likewise the case if he does not exist;  for if he does not exist, to say that he is ill is false, to say that he is not ill is true.  Thus it is in the case of those opposites only, which are opposite in the sense in which the term is used with reference to affirmation and negation, that the rule holds good, that one of the pair must be true and the other false. 
(36) Ἐναντίον δέ ἐστιν ἀγαθῷ μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης κακόν,  —τοῦτο δὲ (37) δῆλον τῇ καθ’ ἕκαστον ἐπαγωγῇ,  οἷον ὑγιείᾳ νόσος καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ (14a1) ἀδικία καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ δειλία,  ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων,—  κακῷ (2) δὲ ὁτὲ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον ἐστίν, ὁτὲ δὲ κακόν·  τῇ γὰρ ἐνδείᾳ (3) κακῷ ὄντι ἡ ὑπερβολὴ ἐναντίον κακὸν ὄν·  ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ (4) μεσότης ἐναντία ἑκατέρῳ οὖσα ἀγαθόν.  ἐπ’ ὀλίγων δ’ ἂν (5) τὸ τοιοῦτον ἴδοι τις, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πλείστων ἀεὶ τῷ κακῷ τὸ (6) ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον ἐστίν. 
               
(11,1) Contrarium autem est bono quidem ex necessitate malum  (hoc autem (2) manifestum est ex unaqunque inductione,  ut sanitati aegritudo et (3) iustitiae iniustitia et fortitudini timiditas,  similiter autem et in (4) aliis),  malo uero aliquotiens bonum contrarium est, aliquotiens malum  (5) (diminutioni enim, quae mala est, superfluitas quae et ipsa mala est (6) contrarium est).  ()  In paucis autem hoc aliquis uidebit, in pluribus (7) autem semper malo bonum contrarium est. 
               
That the contrary of a good  is an evil is shown by induction:  the contrary of health is disease, of courage, cowardice,  and so on.  But the contrary of an evil is sometimes a good, sometimes an evil.  For defect, which is an evil, has excess for its contrary, this also being an evil,  and the mean, which is a good, is equally the contrary of the one and of the other.  It is only in a few cases, however, that we see instances of this: in most, the contrary of an evil is a good. 
—ἔτι τῶν ἐναντίων οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, ἐὰν (7) θάτερον ᾖ, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν εἶναι·  (8) ὑγιαινόντων γὰρ ἁπάντων ὑγίεια (9) μὲν ἔσται, νόσος δὲ οὔ·  ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ λευκῶν ὄντων ἁπάν(10)των λευκότης μὲν ἔσται, μελανία δὲ οὔ.  ἔτι εἰ τὸ Σωκράτη (11) ὑγιαίνειν τῷ Σωκράτη νοσεῖν ἐναντίον ἐστίν,  μὴ ἐνδέχεται (12) δὲ ἅμα ἀμφότερα τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχειν,  οὐκ ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο τοῦ (13) ἑτέρου τῶν ἐναντίων ὄντος καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν εἶναι·  ὄντος γὰρ τοῦ (14) Σωκράτη ὑγιαίνειν οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ νοσεῖν Σωκράτη. 
             
(8) Amplius in contrariis non est necesse, si alterum fuerit, et reliquum (9) esse;  sanis enim omnibus, sanitas quidem erit, aegritudo uero minime;  (10) similiter et albis omnibus albedo quidem erit, nigredo uero non (11) erit.  Amplius, si Socratem sanum esse et Socratem aegrotare (12) contrarium est,  et non contingit simul eidem utraque inesse,  numquam (13) continget, cum alterum contrariorum sit, reliquum esse;  nam cum sit (14) sanum esse Socratem, non erit aegrotare Socratem. 
             
In the case of contraries, it is not always necessary that if one exists the other should also exist:  for if all become healthy there will be health and no disease,  and again, if everything turns white, there will be white, but no black.  Again, since the fact that Socrates is ill is the contrary of the fact that Socrates is well,  and two contrary conditions cannot both obtain in one and the same individual at the same time,  both these contraries could not exist at once:  for if that Socrates was well was a fact, then that Socrates was ill could not possibly be one. 
(15) Δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ περὶ ταὐτὸν ἢ εἴδει ἢ γένει πέφυκε (16) γίγνεσθαι τὰ ἐναντία·  νόσος μὲν γὰρ καὶ ὑγίεια ἐν σώματι ζῴου,  (17) λευκότης δὲ καὶ μελανία ἁπλῶς ἐν σώματι,  δικαιοσύνη δὲ καὶ (18) ἀδικία ἐν ψυχῇ. 
       
(15) Manifestum est autem quoniam circa idem uel specie uel genere nata (16) sunt fieri contraria;  aegritudo namque et sanitas circa corpus (17) animalis,  albedo uero et nigredo simpliciter circa corpus,  et iustitia (18) et iniustitia in anima. 
       
it is plain that contrary attributes must needs be present in subjects which belong to the same species or genus.  Disease and health require as their subject the body of an animal;  white and black require a body, without further qualification;  justice and injustice require as their subject the human soul. 
(19) ἀνάγκη δὲ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία ἢ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει (20) εἶναι ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις γένεσιν, ἢ αὐτὰ γένη εἶναι·  λευκὸν (21) μὲν γὰρ καὶ μέλαν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει, —χρῶμα γὰρ αὐτῶν (22) τὸ γένος,—  δικαιοσύνη δὲ καὶ ἀδικία ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις (23) γένεσιν,  —τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετή, τοῦ δὲ κακία τὸ γένος,— ἀγα(24)θὸν δὲ καὶ κακὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν γένει,  ἀλλ’ αὐτὰ τυγχάνει γένη (25) τινῶν ὄντα. 
         
(19) Necesse est autem omnia contraria aut in eodem genere esse aut in (20) contrariis generibus, uel ipsa esse genera;  album quidem et nigrum (21) in eodem genere (color enim ipsorum genus est),  iustitia uero et (22) iniustitia in contrariis generibus  (huius enim uirtus, huius uitium (23) genus est);  bonum uero et malum non sunt in aliquo genere sed ipsa (24) sunt genera. 
         
Moreover, it is necessary that pairs of contraries should in all cases either belong to the same genus or belong to contrary genera or be themselves genera.  White and black belong to the same genus, colour;  justice and injustice, to contrary genera, virtue and vice;  while good and evil do not belong to genera,  but are themselves actual genera, with terms under them. 
(26) Πρότερον ἕτερον ἑτέρου λέγεται τετραχῶς·  πρῶτον μὲν (27) καὶ κυριώτατα κατὰ χρόνον,  καθ’ ὃ πρεσβύτερον ἕτε(28)ρον ἑτέρου καὶ παλαιότερον λέγεται,  —τῷ γὰρ τὸν χρόνον πλείω (29) εἶναι καὶ πρεσβύτερον καὶ παλαιότερον λέγεται·— 
       
(12,1) DE PRIORE: Prius alterum altero dicitur quadrupliciter.  Primo quidem et proprie (2) secundum tempus,  secundum quod scilicet antiquius alterum altero et (3) senius dicimus  (eo enim quod plus est temporis longaeuius et antiquius (4) dicitur). 
       
There are four senses in which one thing can be said to be ’prior’ to another.  Primarily and most properly the term has reference to time:  in this sense the word is used to indicate that one thing is older or more ancient than another,  for the expressions ’older’ and ’more ancient’ imply greater length of time. 
δεύτερον (30) δὲ τὸ μὴ ἀντιστρέφον κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν, οἷον (31) τὸ ἓν τῶν δύο πρότερον·  δυεῖν μὲν γὰρ ὄντων ἀκολουθεῖ (32) εὐθὺς τὸ ἓν εἶναι, ἑνὸς δὲ ὄντος οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον δύο εἶναι,  (33) ὥστε οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἡ ἀκολούθησις τοῦ εἶναι τὸ (34) λοιπόν,  πρότερον δὲ δοκεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶναι ἀφ’ οὗ μὴ ἀντι(35)στρέφει ἡ τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησις. 
       
(5) Secundo quod non conuertitur secundum subsistendi consequentiam, ut (6) unus duobus prius est  (cum enim duo sint, consequitur mox unum esse, (7) cum uero sit unum non est necesse duo esse;  quare non conuertitur ab (8) uno consequentia alterius subsistentiae);  prius autem uidetur esse (9) illud a quo non conuertitur subsistentiae consequentia. 
       
Secondly, one thing is said to be ’prior’ to another when the sequence of their being cannot be reversed. In this sense ’one’ is ’prior’ to ’two’.  For if ’two’ exists, it follows directly that ’one’ must exist, but if ’one’ exists, it does not follow necessarily that ’two’ exists:  thus the sequence subsisting cannot be reversed.  It is agreed, then, that when the sequence of two things cannot be reversed, then that one on which the other depends is called ’prior’ to that other. 
τρίτον δὲ κατά τινα τάξιν (36) πρότερον λέγεται, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ τῶν λό(37)γων·  ἔν τε γὰρ ταῖς ἀποδεικτικαῖς ἐπιστήμαις ὑπάρχει τὸ πρότε(38)ρον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον τῇ τάξει,  —τὰ γὰρ στοιχεῖα πρότερα τῶν (14b1) διαγραμμάτων τῇ τάξει,  καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γραμματικῆς τὰ στοιχεῖα (2) πρότερα τῶν συλλαβῶν,—  ἐπί τε τῶν λόγων ὁμοίως, —τὸ γὰρ (3) προοίμιον τῆς διηγήσεως πρότερον τῇ τάξει ἐστίν.— 
         
(10) Tertio uero secundum quendam ordinem prius dicitur, quemadmodum et in (11) disciplinis et in orationibus;  in demonstratiuis enim disciplinis (12) inest prius et posterius secundum ordinem  (elementa enim priora sunt (13) descriptionibus secundum ordinem,  et in grammatica elementa priora (14) sunt syllabis),  et in orationibus similiter (exordium enim narratione (15) prius est ordine). 
         
In the third place, the term ’prior’ is used with reference to any order, as in the case of science and of oratory.  For in sciences which use demonstration there is that which is prior and that which is posterior in order;  in geometry, the elements are prior to the propositions;  in reading and writing, the letters of the alphabet are prior to the syllables  Similarly, in the case of speeches, the exordium is prior in order to the narrative. 
ἔτι (4) παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ τιμιώτερον πρότερον (5) εἶναι τῇ φύσει δοκεῖ·  εἰώθασι δὲ καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ τοὺς (6) ἐντιμοτέρους καὶ μᾶλλον ἀγαπωμένους ὑπ’ αὐτῶν προ(7)τέρους φάσκειν εἶναι·  ἔστι μὲν δὴ σχεδὸν ἀλλοτριώτατος (8) τῶν τρόπων οὗτος. 
     
(16) Amplius praeter haec omnia, quod melius et honorabilius est, prius (17) natura esse uidetur;  solent autem plures honoratiores [magis] et (18) quos ipsi maxime uenerantur priores esse dicere;  est autem hic modus (19) paene alienissimus. 
     
Besides these senses of the word, there is a fourth. That which is better and more honourable is said to have a natural priority.  In common parlance men speak of those whom they honour and love as ’coming first’ with them.  This sense of the word is perhaps the most far-fetched. 
(9) Οἱ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενοι τοῦ προτέρου τρόποι τοσοῦτοί (10) εἰσιν. 
 
(20) Atque hi quidem qui dicuntur modi prioris isti sunt. 
 
Such, then, are the different senses in which the term ’prior’ is used. 
δόξειε δ’ ἂν καὶ παρὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους ἕτερος (11) εἶναι προτέρου τρόπος·  τῶν γὰρ ἀντιστρεφόντων κατὰ τὴν τοῦ (12) εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν τὸ αἴτιον ὁπωσοῦν θατέρῳ τοῦ εἶναι πρότε(13)ρον εἰκότως φύσει λέγοιτ’ ἄν.  ὅτι δ’ ἔστι τινὰ τοιαῦτα, (14) δῆλον·  τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἄνθρωπον ἀντιστρέφει κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶ(15)ναι ἀκολούθησιν πρὸς τὸν ἀληθῆ περὶ αὐτοῦ λόγον·  εἰ γὰρ (16) ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἀληθὴς ὁ λόγος ᾧ λέγομεν ὅτι ἔστιν ἄν(17)θρωπος·  καὶ ἀντιστρέφει γε, —εἰ γὰρ ἀληθὴς ὁ λόγος ᾧ λέ(18)γομεν ὅτι ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος·—  ἔστι δὲ ὁ μὲν ἀλη(19)θὴς λόγος οὐδαμῶς αἴτιος τοῦ εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα, τὸ μέντοι (20) πρᾶγμα φαίνεταί πως αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι ἀληθῆ τὸν λόγον·  (21) τῷ γὰρ εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ μὴ ἀληθὴς ὁ λόγος ἢ ψευ(22)δὴς λέγεται.  ὥστε κατὰ πέντε τρόπους πρότερον ἕτερον ἑτέρου (23) λέγοιτ’ ἄν. 
                 
(21) Videtur autem praeter eos qui dicti sunt alter esse prioris modus;  (22) eorum enim quae conuertuntur secundum essentiae consequentiam, quod (23) alterius quomodolibet causa est digne prius natura dicitur.  Quoniam (24) autem sunt quaedam talia, manifestum est;  nam esse hominem conuertitur (25) secundum subsistentiae consequentiam ad uerum de eo sermonem;  nam, si (26) est homo, uerus sermo est quo dicimus quoniam est homo,  et conuertitur (27) (nam, si uerus est: sermo quo dicimus quoniam est homo, hominem esse (28) necesse est);  est autem uerus sermo nullo modo causa subsistendi rem, (29) res autem uidetur quodammodo causa esse ut sermo uerus sit;  nam, (30) quoniam est res uel non est, uerus sermo uel falsus dicitur.  Quare (31) secundum quinque modos prius alterum altero dicitur. 
                 
Yet it would seem that besides those mentioned there is yet another.  For in those things, the being of each of which implies that of the other, that which is in any way the cause may reasonably be said to be by nature ’prior’ to the effect.  It is plain that there are instances of this.  The fact of the being of a man carries with it the truth of the proposition that he is, and the implication is reciprocal:  for if a man is, the proposition wherein we allege that he is true,  and conversely, if the proposition wherein we allege that he is true, then he is.  The true proposition, however, is in no way the cause of the being of the man, but the fact of the man’s being does seem somehow to be the cause of the truth of the proposition,  for the truth or falsity of the proposition depends on the fact of the man’s being or not being.  Thus the word ’prior’ may be used in five senses. 
(24) Ἅμα δὲ λέγεται ἁπλῶς μὲν καὶ κυριώτατα ὧν ἡ γέ(25)νεσις ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ·  οὐδέτερον γὰρ πρότερον οὐδὲ (26) ὕστερόν ἐστιν· ἅμα δὲ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον ταῦτα λέγεται. 
   
(13,1) DE HIS QUAE SIMUL SUNT: Simul autem dicuntur simpliciter et proprie quorum generatio in (2) eodem tempore est;  neutrum enim neutro prius est aut posterius; simul (3) autem secundum tempus ista dicuntur. 
   
The term ’simultaneous’ is primarily and most appropriately applied to those things the genesis of the one of which is simultaneous with that of the other;  for in such cases neither is prior or posterior to the other. Such things are said to be simultaneous in point of time. 
(27) φύσει δὲ ἅμα ὅσα ἀντιστρέφει μὲν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι (28) ἀκολούθησιν,  μηδαμῶς δὲ αἴτιον θάτερον θατέρῳ τοῦ εἶναί (29) ἐστιν,  οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ διπλασίου καὶ τοῦ ἡμίσεος·  ἀντιστρέφει μὲν (30) γὰρ ταῦτα,  —διπλασίου γὰρ ὄντος ἐστὶν ἥμισυ, καὶ ἡμίσεος (31) ὄντος διπλάσιόν ἐστιν, (32)  — οὐδέτερον δὲ οὐδετέρῳ αἴτιον τοῦ (33) εἶναί ἐστιν. 
           
(4) Naturaliter autem simul sunt quaecumque conuertuntur quidem secundum (5) subsistendi consequentiam,  si nullo modo alterum alteri subsistendi (6) causa sit,  ut duplum et medium;  conuertuntur enim ista  (nam cum sit (7) duplum est medium, et cum sit medium est duplum),  neutrum uero neutri (8) subsistendi causa est. 
           
Those things, again, are ’simultaneous’ in point of nature, the being of each of which involves that of the other,  while at the same time neither is the cause of the other’s being.  This is the case with regard to the double and the half,  for these are reciprocally dependent,  since, if there is a double, there is also a half, and if there is a half, there is also a double,  while at the same time neither is the cause of the being of the other. 
καὶ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους ἀντιδιῃρημένα ἀλλή(34)λοις ἅμα τῇ φύσει λέγεται.  ἀντιδιῃρῆσθαι δὲ λέγεται (35) ἀλλήλοις τὰ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν διαίρεσιν, οἷον τὸ πτηνὸν τῷ (36) πεζῷ καὶ τῷ ἐνύδρῳ·  ταῦτα γὰρ ἀλλήλοις ἀντιδιῄρηται ἐκ (37) τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους ὄντα·  τὸ γὰρ ζῷον διαιρεῖται εἰς ταῦτα, εἴς (38) τε τὸ πτηνὸν καὶ τὸ πεζὸν καὶ τὸ ἔνυδρον,  καὶ οὐδέν γε (39) τούτων πρότερον ἢ ὕστερόν ἐστιν,  ἀλλ’ ἅμα τῇ φύσει τὰ (15a1) τοιαῦτα δοκεῖ εἶναι· 
           
(9) Et ea quae ex eodem genere in contrarium diuiduntur simul natura esse (10) dicuntur.  In contrarium uero diuidi dicuntur secundum eandem (11) diuisionem, ut uolatile, gressibile et aquatile;  haec enim in (12) contrarium diuiduntur, cum ex eodem genere sint;  animal enim diuiditur (13) in uolatile, gressibile et aquatile,  et nullum horum prius est uel (14) posterius  sed simul haec uidentur esse natura. 
           
Again, those species which are distinguished one from another and opposed one to another within the same genus are said to be ’simultaneous’ in nature.  I mean those species which are distinguished each from each by one and the same method of division. Thus the ’winged’ species is simultaneous with the ’terrestrial’ and the ’water’ species.  These are distinguished within the same genus, and are opposed each to each,  for the genus ’animal’ has the ’winged’, the ’terrestrial’, and the ’water’ species,  and no one of these is prior or posterior to another;  on the contrary, all such things appear to be ’simultaneous’ in nature. 
(διαιρεθείη δ’ ἂν καὶ ἕκαστον τού(2)των εἰς εἴδη πάλιν, οἷον τὸ πεζὸν καὶ τὸ πτηνὸν καὶ τὸ (3) ἔνυδρον.)  ἔσται οὖν κἀκεῖνα ἅμα τῇ φύσει, ὅσα ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ (4) γένους κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν διαίρεσίν ἐστιν·  τὰ δὲ γένη τῶν εἰ(5)δῶν ἀεὶ πρότερα·  οὐ γὰρ ἀντιστρέφει κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι (6) ἀκολούθησιν·  οἷον ἐνύδρου μὲν ὄντος ἔστι ζῷον, ζῴου δὲ ὄντος (7) οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἔνυδρον εἶναι.  (8) —ἅμα οὖν τῇ φύσει λέγεται ὅσα (9) ἀντιστρέφει μὲν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν,  μηδαμῶς δὲ (10) αἴτιον τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ τοῦ εἶναί ἐστιν,  καὶ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ (11) γένους ἀντιδιῃρημένα ἀλλήλοις·  ἁπλῶς δὲ ἅμα, ὧν ἡ γένεσις ἐν (12) τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ. 
                 
(15) Diuiditur autem et unumquodque eorum in species iterum secundum eandem (16) diuisionem, ut gressibile animal et uolatile et aquatile.  Erunt igitur (17) et illa simul natura, quaecumque ex eodem ipso genere secundum eandem (18) subdiuisionem sunt,  genera autem semper priora sunt;  non enim (19) conuertuntur secundum substantiae consequentiam,  ut aquatile quidem (20) cum sit est animal, animal uero cum sit, non necesse est esse (21) aquatile.  Simul ergo natura esse dicuntur quaecumque conuertuntur (22) quidem secundum essentiae consequentiam,  nullo autem modo alterum (23) alteri subsistendi causa est,  et ex eodem genere quae in contrarium (24) sibi diuiduntur;  simpliciter autem simul sunt quorum generatio in (25) eodem tempore est. 
                 
Each of these also, the terrestrial, the winged, and the water species, can be divided again into subspecies.  Those species, then, also will be ’simultaneous’ point of nature, which, belonging to the same genus, are distinguished each from each by one and the same method of differentiation.  But genera are prior to species,  for the sequence of their being cannot be reversed.  If there is the species ’water-animal’, there will be the genus ’animal’, but granted the being of the genus ’animal’, it does not follow necessarily that there will be the pecies ’water-animal’.  Those things, therefore, are said to be ’simultaneous’ in nature, the being of each of which involves that of the other,  while at the same time neither is in any way the cause of the other’s being;  those species, also, which are distinguished each from each and opposed within the same genus.  Those things, moreover, are ’simultaneous’ in the unqualified sense of the word which come into being at the same time. 
(13) Κινήσεως δέ ἐστιν εἴδη ἕξ·  γένεσις, φθορά, αὔξησις, (14) μείωσις, ἀλλοίωσις, κατὰ τόπον μεταβολή.  αἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλαι (15) κινήσεις φανερὸν ὅτι ἕτεραι ἀλλήλων εἰσίν·  οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ (16) γένεσις φθορὰ οὐδέ γε ἡ αὔξησις μείωσις οὐδὲ ἡ κατὰ τόπον (17) μεταβολή†, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι· 
       
(14,1) DE MOTU: Motus uero sunt species sex:  generatio, corruptio, crementum, (2) diminutio, commutatio, secundum locum translatio.  Alii quidem motus (3) manifestum est quoniam a se inuicem diuersi sunt;  neque enim est (4) generatio corruptio, nec crementum diminutio nec secundum locum (5) translatio; similiter autem et caeterae. 
       
There are six sorts of movement:  generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, and change of place.  It is evident in all but one case that all these sorts of movement are distinct each from each.  Generation is distinct from destruction, increase and change of place from diminution, and so on. 
(18) ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἀλλοιώσεως ἔχει (19) τινὰ ἀπορίαν, μήποτε ἀναγκαῖον ᾖ τὸ ἀλλοιούμενον κατά τινα τῶν (20) λοιπῶν κινήσεων ἀλλοιοῦσθαι.  τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἀληθές ἐστιν·  σχεδὸν (21) γὰρ κατὰ πάντα τὰ πάθη ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα ἀλλοιοῦσθαι συμβέβη(22)κεν ἡμῖν οὐδεμιᾶς τῶν ἄλλων κινήσεων κοινωνοῦσιν·  οὔτε (23) γὰρ αὔξεσθαι ἀναγκαῖον τὸ κατὰ πάθος κινούμενον οὔτε (24) μειοῦσθαι, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων,  ὥσθ’ ἑτέρα ἂν (25) εἴη παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας κινήσεις ἡ ἀλλοίωσις·  εἰ γὰρ ἦν ἡ (26) αὐτή, ἔδει τὸ ἀλλοιούμενον εὐθὺς καὶ αὔξεσθαι ἢ μειοῦσθαι (27) ἤ τινα τῶν ἄλλων ἀκολουθεῖν κινήσεων·  ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀνάγκη.  (28) ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ αὐξόμενον ἤ τινα ἄλλην κίνησιν κι(29)νούμενον ἀλλοιοῦσθαι· 
               
(6) In commutatione uero est aliqua dubitatio, ne forte necesse sit quod (7) commutatur secundum aliquem reliquorum motuum commutari.  Hoc autem non (8) est uerum;  paene enim secundum omnes passiones uel multas commutari (9) nobis contingit nullo aliorum motuum communicante;  nam neque crescere (10) necesse est quod secundum passionem mouetur nec diminui, similiter (11) autem et in aliis:  quare diuersus erit motus ab aliis commutationibus  (12) (nam si idem esset, oporteret omne quod commutatur mox aut crescere (13) aut minui aut aliquem aliorum motuum consequi;  sed non est (14) necesse).  Similiter autem et quod crescit uel secundum quemlibet (15) alterum motum mutatur. 
               
But in the case of alteration it may be argued that the process necessarily implies one or other of the other five sorts of motion.  This is not true,  for we may say that all affections, or nearly all, produce in us an alteration which is distinct from all other sorts of motion,  for that which is affected need not suffer either increase or diminution or any of the other sorts of motion.  Thus alteration is a distinct sort of motion;  for, if it were not, the thing altered would not only be altered, but would forthwith necessarily suffer increase or diminution or some one of the other sorts of motion in addition;  which as a matter of fact is not the case.  Similarly that which was undergoing the process of increase or was subject to some other sort of motion would, if alteration were not a distinct form of motion, necessarily be subject to alteration also. 
ἀλλ’ ἔστι τινὰ αὐξανόμενα ἃ οὐκ (30) ἀλλοιοῦται·  οἷον τὸ τετράγωνον γνώμονος περιτεθέντος ηὔ(31)ξηται μέν, ἀλλοιότερον δὲ οὐδὲν γεγένηται·  ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ (32) ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων.  ὥσθ’ ἕτεραι ἂν εἴησαν αἱ κι(33)νήσεις ἀλλήλων. 
       
(16) Sed sunt quaedam quae crescunt et non commutantur,  ut quadratum (17) circumposito gnomone creuit quidem sed commutatum non est;  similiter (18) autem et in aliis huiusmodi.  Quare a se inuicem motus isti diuersi (19) sunt. 
       
But there are some things which undergo increase but yet not alteration.  The square, for instance, if a gnomon is applied to it, undergoes increase but not alteration,  and so it is with all other figures of this sort.  Alteration and increase, therefore, are distinct. 
(15b1) Ἔστι δὲ ἁπλῶς μὲν κίνησις ἠρεμίᾳ ἐναντίον·  ταῖς δὲ (2) καθ’ ἕκαστα, γενέσει μὲν φθορά, αὐξήσει δὲ μείωσις·  (3) τῇ δὲ κατὰ τόπον μεταβολῇ ἡ κατὰ τόπον ἠρεμία μά(4)λιστα ἔοικεν ἀντικεῖσθαι,  καὶ εἰ ἄρα ἡ εἰς τὸν ἐναντίον (5) τόπον μεταβολή,  οἷον τῇ κάτωθεν ἡ ἄνω, τῇ ἄνωθεν ἡ (6) κάτω. 
         
(20) Simpliciter autem motus quieti contrarius est;  singulis uero motibus, (21) generationi quidem corruptio, diminutio uero cremento,  secundum locum (22) translationi secundum locum quies.  Maxime autem uidetur opponi in (23) contrarium locum permutatio,  ut de eo quod est deorsum ad id quod est (24) sursum et de eo quod est sursum ad id quod est deorsum. 
         
Speaking generally, rest is the contrary of motion.  But the different forms of motion have their own contraries in other forms; thus destruction is the contrary of generation, diminution of increase,  rest in a place, of change of place.  As for this last, change in the reverse direction would seem to be most truly its contrary;  thus motion upwards is the contrary of motion downwards and vice versa. 
τῇ δὲ λοιπῇ τῶν ἀποδοθεισῶν κινήσεων οὐ ῥᾴδιον (7) ἀποδοῦναι τί ποτέ ἐστιν ἐναντίον,  ἔοικε δὲ οὐδὲν εἶναι αὐτῇ (8) ἐναντίον,  εἰ μή τις καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτης τὴν κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν ἠρε(9)μίαν ἀντιθείη <ἢ> τὴ<ν> εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τοῦ ποιοῦ μεταβολή<ν>,  (10) καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς κατὰ τόπον μεταβολῆς τὴν κατὰ (11) τόπον ἠρεμίαν ἢ τὴν εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τόπον μεταβολήν,  —ἔστι (12) γὰρ ἡ ἀλλοίωσις μεταβολὴ κατὰ τὸ ποιόν·— 
         
(25) Reliquo uero de his qui assignati sunt motui non est facile assignare (26) quid sit contrarium,  uidetur autem neque esse aliquid ei contrarium,  (27) nisi quis opponat secundum qualitatem quietem secundum qualitatem (28) translationi quae in contrarium,  quemadmodum etiam in ea quae est (29) secundum locum translatione secundum locum quietem uel in contrarium (30) locum translationem  (est enim commutatio translatio secundum (31) qualitatem). 
         
In the case of that sort of motion which yet remains, of those that have been enumerated, it is not easy to state what is its contrary.  It appears to have no contrary,  unless one should define the contrary here also either as ’rest in its quality’ or as ’change in the direction of the contrary quality’,  just as we defined the contrary of change of place either as rest in a place or as change in the reverse direction.  For a thing is altered when change of quality takes place; 
ὥστε ἀντίκει(13)ται τῇ <κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν κινήσει ἡ> κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν ἠρεμία (14) <ἢ> ἡ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τοῦ ποιοῦ μεταβολή,  οἷον τὸ λευκὸν γί(15)γνεσθαι τῷ μέλαν γίγνεσθαι·  ἀλλοιοῦται γὰρ εἰς τὰ ἐναντία (16) τοῦ ποιοῦ μεταβολῆς γιγνομένης. 
     
(32) Quare opponitur ei secundum qualitatem quies uel in contrarium (33) qualitatis translatio,  ut album fieri quod est nigrum;  commutatur (34) enim, in contrarium qualitatis facta translatione. 
     
therefore either rest in its quality or change in the direction of the contrary may be called the contrary of this qualitative form of motion.  In this way becoming white is the contrary of becoming black;  there is alteration in the contrary direction, since a change of a qualitative nature takes place. 
(17) Τὸ ἔχειν κατὰ πλείονας τρόπους λέγεται·  ἢ γὰρ (18) ὡς ἕξιν καὶ διάθεσιν ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ ποιότητα,  —λε(19)γόμεθα γὰρ ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν καὶ ἀρετήν·—  ἢ ὡς ποσόν, (20) οἷον ὃ τυγχάνει τις ἔχων μέγεθος,  —λέγεται γὰρ τρίπη(21)χυ μέγεθος ἔχειν ἢ τετράπηχυ·—  ἢ ὡς τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα, (22) οἷον ἱμάτιον ἢ χιτῶνα·  ἢ ὡς ἐν μορίῳ, οἷον ἐν χειρὶ δα(23)κτύλιον·  ἢ ὡς μέρος, οἷον χεῖρα ἢ πόδα·  ἢ ὡς ἐν ἀγγείῳ, (24) οἷον ὁ μέδιμνος τοὺς πυροὺς ἢ τὸ κεράμιον τὸν οἶνον,  —οἶνον (25) γὰρ ἔχειν τὸ κεράμιον λέγεται, καὶ ὁ μέδιμνος πυρούς·  (26) ταῦτ’ οὖν ἔχειν λέγεται ὡς ἐν ἀγγείῳ·—  ἢ ὡς κτῆμα· (27) ἔχειν γὰρ οἰκίαν καὶ ἀγρὸν λεγόμεθα.  λεγόμεθα δὲ καὶ (28) γυναῖκα ἔχειν καὶ ἡ γυνὴ ἄνδρα·  ἔοικε δὲ ἀλλοτριώτατος ὁ νῦν (29) ῥηθεὶς τρόπος τοῦ ἔχειν εἶναι·  οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο τῷ ἔχειν γυ(30)ναῖκα σημαίνομεν ἢ ὅτι συνοικεῖ.  ἴσως δ’ ἂν καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς (31) φανείησαν τοῦ ἔχειν τρόποι,  οἱ δὲ εἰωθότες λέγεσθαι σχεδὸν (32) ἅπαντες κατηρίθμηνται. 
                                 
(15,1) DE HABERE: Habere secundum plures modos dicitur  aut enim ut habitum uel (2) affectionem uel aliam aliquam qualitatem  (dicimur enim scientiam (3) habere et uirtutem);  aut ut quantitatem, ut quam quisque habet (4) magnitudinem  (dicitur enim bicubitam uel tricubitam habere (5) magnitudinem);  aut circa corpus uestitum aut tunicam;  aut in parte (ut (6) in manu anulum);  aut partem (ut manum uel pedem);  aut in uase (ut (7) modius triticum uel dolium uinum;  uinum enim dolium habere dicitur, et (8) modius triticum;  haec igitur habere dicuntur ut in uase);  uel ut (9) possessionem (habere enim domum uel agrum dicimur).  Dicimur uero et (10) habere uxorem et uxor uirum;  uidetur autem alienissimus esse habendi (11) modus qui nunc dictus est;  nihil enim aliud habere uxorem significat (12) quam cohabitare.  Fortasse autem et alii habendi modi uidebuntur;  qui (13) autem solent dici paene omnes sunt annumerati. 
                                 
The term ’to have’ is used in various senses.  in the first place it is used with reference to habit or disposition or any other quality,  for we are said to ’have’ a piece of knowledge or a virtue.  Then, again, it has reference to quantity, as, for instance, in the case of a man’s height;  for he is said to ’have’ a height of three or four cubits.  It is used, moreover, with regard to apparel, a man being said to ’have’ a coat or tunic;  or in respect of something which we have on a part of ourselves, as a ring on the hand:  or in respect of something which is a part of us, as hand or foot.  The term refers also to content, as in the case of a vessel and wheat, or of a jar and wine;  a jar is said to ’have’ wine, and a corn-measure wheat.  The expression in such cases has reference to content.  Or it refers to that which has been acquired; we are said to ’have’ a house or a field.  A man is also said to ’have’ a wife, and a wife a husband,  and this appears to be the most remote meaning of the term,  for by the use of it we mean simply that the husband lives with the wife.  Other senses of the word might perhaps be found,  but the most ordinary ones have all been enumerated. 
 
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