Bibliotheca Polyglotta

ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗ Α

المقالة الأولى من كتاب أرسطوطالس المسمى ريطوريقا أي الخطابة

LIBER PRIMUS INCIPIT

BOOK I

(1354a1)1. Ἡ ῥητορική ἐστιν ἀντίστροφος τῇ διαλεκτικῇ· ἀμφότεραι (2) γὰρ περὶ τοιούτων τινῶν εἰσιν ἃ κοινὰ τρόπον τινὰ ἁπάντων (3) ἐστὶ γνωρίζειν καὶ οὐδεμιᾶς ἐπιστήμης ἀφωρισμένης· διὸ καὶ (4) πάντες τρόπον τινὰ μετέχουσιν ἀμφοῖν· πάντες γὰρ μέχρι (5) τινὸς καὶ ἐξετάζειν καὶ ὑπέχειν λόγον καὶ ἀπολογεῖσθαι (6) καὶ κατηγορεῖν ἐγχειροῦσιν.

إن الريطورية ترجع على الديالقطيقية وكلتاهما توجدان من أجل شيء واحد وتشتركان في نحو من الأنحاء وقد توجد معرفتهما لكل إذ ليست واحدة منها علما من العلوم منفردا ولذلك ما توجد جميع العلوم مشاركة لهما في نحو فكل الناس في نحو وحتى الشيء فقط يستعملون الفحص وتقليد الكلام والاعتذار والشكاية فيصدقون

Rethorica quidem conuertitur arti topice et utreque sunt unius rei gratia et communicant in aliquo modorum et inuenitur utrarumque noticia omnibus cum neutra ipsarum sit aliqua scientiarum separatim siue singulariter. Et hinc est quod omnes scientie inueniuntur communicare eis in modo. Averrosd. Ambe enim intendunt unum finem, et est sermo ad alterum. Non enim utitur eis homo ad se ipsum, ut est in demonstratiuis, sed tantum ad alterum, et conueniunt quodam modo in subiecto¹ uno. Ambiunt enim omnia et omnes homines intromittunt se naturaliter de sermonibus topicis et² rhetoricis : neutra ergo harum est separatim et singulariter scientia. Quelibet enim scientia certum et proprium habet subiectum et proprium artificem, et (66ra) quilibet hominum modo aliquo et usquequo utitur rethoricalibus, accusatione uidelicet et defensione, et ceteris que circa particularia existunt. Aristoteles. In sermone deliberatione et commendatione. Omnes igitur homines modo aliquo et usquequo utuntur et accusatione et recusatione³ et aliqualiter attingunt quod intendunt.

1. subiecto PF : facto T. 2. et PF : in T. 3. fort. debemus legere in Hermanni translatione omnes igitur homines modo aliquo et usquequo utuntur in sermone deliberatione et commendatione et accusatione et recusatione

Rethorica est convertibilis dialetice; utreque enim de quibusdam huiusmodi sunt que communia quodam modo omnium est cognoscere et nullius scientie determinate; ideoque et omnes secundum aliquem modum participant utramque; omnes enim usque ad aliquid et perscrutari et percipere sermonem et respondere et accusare argumentantur.

Rethorica assecutiva dialetice est; ambe enim de talibus quibusdam sunt que communiter quodammodo omnium est cognoscere et nullius scientie determinate; propter quod et ornnes modo quodam participant ambabus; omnes enim usque ad aliquid et exquirere et sustinere sermonem et defendere et accusare conantur.

Part 1. Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic. Both alike are concerned with such things as come, more or less, within the general ken of all men and belong to no definite science. Accordingly all men make use, more or less, of both; for to a certain extent all men attempt to discuss statements and to maintain them, to defend themselves and to attack others.

τῶν μὲν οὖν πολλῶν οἱ μὲν εἰκῇ (7) ταῦτα δρῶσιν, οἱ δὲ διὰ συνήθειαν ἀπὸ ἕξεως· ἐπεὶ δ’ ἀμ(8)φοτέρως ἐνδέχεται, δῆλον ὅτι εἴη ἂν αὐτὰ καὶ ὁδῷ ποιεῖν· (9) δι’ ὃ γὰρ ἐπιτυγχάνουσιν οἵ τε διὰ συνήθειαν καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ (10) τοῦ αὐτομάτου τὴν αἰτίαν θεωρεῖν ἐνδέχεται, τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον (11) ἤδη πάντες ἂν ὁμολογήσαιεν τέχνης ἔργον εἶναι.

فمن العامة من يفعل ذلك هملا ومنهم من يفعل ذلك بالاعتياد عن قنية راسخة وإذ كان هذا ممكنا أن يكون من هاتين الجهتين فهو معلوم أن هذا النحو أرشد وأصوب ولذلك قد ينجح الذين يفعلون هذا بالاعتياد والذين يستطيعون أن يبصروا العلة فيه من تلقاء أنفسهم والعلماء مقرّون بأن هذا فعل الصناعة والحذق بها

Quidam ergo uulgarium faciunt hec imperfecte; alii uero ex assuetudine et⁴ habitu stabilito. Cumque sit possibile fieri hec utroque istorum modorum, scitum est quoniam modus hic scilicet sedulus(?) melior est et rectior. Ideo perficiunt qui faciunt hec ex assuetudine ⁵ et qui potentes perspicere causam in hoc per seipsos et communiter conceditur istud esse ex opere artis et peritia ipsius.

4. fort. in Hermanni translatione ab 5. Add. P in margine magis proficiunt

Horum quidem igitur plurium hii quidem vane agunt, hii vero per consuetudinem ab habitu; quoniam autem utrimque contingens sit, palam quod erit utique eadem et declarare; ex eo quod adipiscuntur hii quidem per consuetudinem hii uera subito huius causam conuenit scire, hoc autem omnes utique confitebuntur opus artis esse.

Multorum quidem igitur hii quidem fortuito hec agunt, hii autem propter consuetudinem ab habitu; quoniam autem utroque modo contingit, palam quia erit utique ipsa et dirigere; propter quod enim adipiscuntur et hii propter consuetudinem et hii a casu huius causam considerare contingit, talc autem omnes utique iam confitebuntur artis opus esse.

Ordinary people do this either at random or through practice and from acquired habit. Both ways being possible, the subject can plainly be handled systematically, for it is possible to inquire the reason why some speakers succeed through practice and others spontaneously; and every one will at once agree that such an inquiry is the function of an art.

νῦν μὲν (12) οὖν οἱ τὰς τέχνας τῶν λόγων συντιθέντες οὐδὲν ὡς εἰπεῖν πεπο(13)ρίκασιν αὐτῆς μόριον (οἱ γὰρ πίστεις ἔντεχνόν εἰσι μόνον, τὰ δ’ (14) ἄλλα προσθῆκαι), οἱ δὲ περὶ μὲν ἐνθυμημάτων οὐδὲν λέγου(15)σιν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ σῶμα τῆς πίστεως, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἔξω τοῦ πρά(16)γματος τὰ πλεῖστα πραγματεύονται· διαβολὴ γὰρ καὶ (17) ἔλεος καὶ ὀργὴ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ περὶ τοῦ (18) πράγματός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν δικαστήν· ὥστ’ εἰ περὶ πά(19)σας ἦν τὰς κρίσεις καθάπερ ἐν ἐνίαις γε νῦν ἐστι τῶν πό(20)λεων καὶ μάλιστα ταῖς εὐνομουμέναις, οὐδὲν ἂν εἶχον ὅ τι (21) λέγωσιν· ἅπαντες γὰρ οἱ μὲν οἴονται δεῖν οὕτω τοὺς νόμους (22) ἀγορεύειν, οἱ δὲ καὶ χρῶνται καὶ κωλύουσιν ἔξω τοῦ πρά(23)γματος λέγειν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ, ὀρθῶς τοῦτο (24) νομίζοντες· οὐ γὰρ δεῖ τὸν δικαστὴν διαστρέφειν εἰς ὀργὴν (25) προάγοντας ἢ φθόνον ἢ ἔλεον· ὅμοιον γὰρ κἂν εἴ τις ᾧ (26) μέλλει χρῆσθαι κανόνι, τοῦτον ποιήσειε στρεβλόν.

فأما هؤلاء الذين يؤلفون صناعة الكلام الآن فلم يتخلصوا إلى أن يضعوا لها جزءا أو قسما من الأقسام لأن التصديقات إنما هي أمر صناعي فقط وأما تلك الأخرى فزيادات ولن يقولوا في التفكيرات التي هي عمود التصديق لكنهم قالوا وأكثروا في هذه التي هي خارجة عن الأمر نفسه فإن الخوف والرحمة والغضب وما أشبه ذلك من الآلام المعترية للنفس ليست في الأمر نفسه لكنها نحو الفاحص فلو كانت الريطورية توجد عند جميع الحكام على مثل ما هي عليه الآن في خواص من المدائن وإن قد كن تدبرن تدبيرا حسنا لم يكن لهؤلاء مقال فإن أهل المواضع كلها في ذلك فريقان فمنهم من يرى أنه ينبغي أن يلخص على السنن هذا التلخيص ومنهم من يمتنع ويمنع من ذكر شيء خارج عن الأمر نفسه كما يصنع أهل اريوس فاغوس وذلك صواب من رأي أولئك فلعمري ما ينبغي للفاحص أن يرد على المتكلمين إذا تقدموا فصاروا إلى الغضب أو إلى الخوف أو الرحمة فإن هذا القانون مشبه وإن امرؤ صار إلى استعماله صيّره ذلك لبيبا اريبا

Illi uero qui nunc artem loquendi complectuntur non attingunt⁶ ad hoc partem ei ponerent ante ⁷ aliquam suarum partitionum.⁸ Solum enim fidem facientia⁹ res sunt artificialis, illa autem alia additamenta¹⁰ sunt. Neque ad hec ut loquerentur ¹¹ in enthimematibus que columpna sunt credulitatis, sed ipsi locuti sunt multiplicantes sermonem in his que extranea sunt ad rem ipsam. Nam timor ¹² et modestia et ira et consimiles his anime accidentia passi(66rb)ones non sunt in re ipsa, sed modus ordinantis locutionum ¹³ scrutatoris ¹⁴ uel inquisitoris uel oboratoris. Si ergo inueniatur rethorica apud uniuersos iudices secundum hoc quod nunc est in quibusdam ciuitatum et ille regantur ut qui reguntur regimine decenti, non habebunt illi quid dicant.¹⁵ Omnium autem istorum locorum habitatores in hec bipertiti sunt. Quidam nempe eorum uident quoniam determinandum sit hac determinatione in iudiciis. Alii uero abstinent et prohibent ne fiat mentio cuiuspiam extranei a re ipsa quemadmodum procedunt illi de arbos et agros¹⁶ , et hoc rectum est ex illorum opinione. Per vitam autem xx non oportet scrutatorem redarguere allegantes quoniam antecedunt et inducunt ad iram aut timorem aut modestiam. Canon est enim iste fortassis si quis incedat ad utendum eo reddet elegantis peritie et leporis.

6. attingunt T : contingunt P 7. fortas. in Hermanni uersione : aut (Ar. aw). 8. artificialiter in margine P 9. id est argumenta inter lineas P 10. id est adminicula inter lineas P 11. scilicet attingunt inter lin. P 12. id est pictura sermonis et habitudine proponentis vel respondentis et inclinatione auditorum in marg. P 13. modus ordinantis locutionum P : apud scrutatorem modus T 14. id est ordinationis locutionum in marg. P 15. P add. id est non est aliqua necessitas dicenti illorum 16. arbos et agros P : arbor et agor T

Nunc quidem igitur artes sermonum componentes nullam, ut dicam, attribuerunt eiusdem partem; fides namque artificiale solum, alia vero additiones. hii vero de entimematibus nichil dicunt, quod est corpus fidei, de hiis vero que sunt extra causam maxime negotiantur; impetus enim, misericordia et ira et huiusmodi passiones anime non sunt de causa, sed penes iudicem; quare si circa omnia iudicia essent quemadmodum in quibusdam nunc sunt civitatibus et maxime in bene ordinatis legibus, nichil utique possent quod dicant; omnes enim hii quidem extimant oportere sic leges dicere, alii autem et utuntur et prohibent extra causam dicere, quemadmodum et in Ariopago, recte hoc considerantes; non enim oportet iudicem perverti ad iram tendentem aut timorem aut odium; simile enim si quis canonem quo debet uti, hunc faciat obliquum.

Nunc quidem igitur qui artes sermonum componunt modicam adepti sunt ipsius partem; persuasiones enim sunt solum artificiale, alia autem adiectiones, hii autem de enthymematibus quidem nichil dicunt, quod quidem est corpus persuasionis, de extrinsecis autem rei plurima negotiantur; commotio enim et misericordia et ira et tales passiones anime non sunt de re, sed ad iudicem; quare si circa omnia essent iudicia sicut in quibusdam civitatum nunc est et maxime in bene ordinatis legibus, nichil utique haberent quod dicerent; omnes enim hii quidem putant oportere sic leges promulgare, hii autem et utuntur et prohibent extra rem dicere, sicut et in Ariopago recte hoc putantes; non enim oportet iudicem pervertere ad iram provocantes aut timorem aut inimicitiam; simile enim et si quis qua debet uti regula, hanc faciat distortam.

Now, the framers of the current treatises on rhetoric have constructed but a small portion of that art. The modes of persuasion are the only true constituents of the art: everything else is merely accessory. These writers, however, say nothing about enthymemes, which are the substance of rhetorical persuasion, but deal mainly with non—essentials. The arousing of prejudice, pity, anger, and similar emotions has nothing to do with the essential facts, but is merely a personal appeal to the man who is judging the case. Consequently if the rules for trials which are now laid down in some states — especially in well—governed states — were applied everywhere, such people would have nothing to say. All men, no doubt, think that the laws should prescribe such rules, but some, as in the court of Areopagus, give practical effect to their thoughts and forbid talk about non—essentials. This is sound law and custom. It is not right to pervert the judge by moving him to anger or envy or pity — one might as well warp a carpenter’s rule before using it.

ἔτι δὲ (27) φανερὸν ὅτι τοῦ μὲν ἀμφισβητοῦντος οὐδέν ἐστιν ἔξω τοῦ δεῖξαι (28) τὸ πρᾶγμα ὅτι ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἢ γέγονεν ἢ οὐ γέγονεν· εἰ δὲ (29) μέγα ἢ μικρόν, ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, ὅσα μὴ ὁ νομοθέτης (30) διώρικεν, αὐτὸν δή που τὸν δικαστὴν δεῖ γιγνώσκειν καὶ οὐ (31) μανθάνειν παρὰ τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων.

ثم هو معلوم أن الذي يُري أو يُثبت ¹ ليس له أكثر من أن يثبت أن الأمر موجود أو غير موجود وأنه كان أو لم يكن فأما أن يكون عظيما أو يسيرا أو عدلا أو جورا فإنه ما لم يكن واضع السنة حد وفصل فقد ينبغي للفاحص ألا يقصر في استعلامه واستفهامه من الذي يُري

1. يُرى B and MS read. AB : pace L (?) and GlossGA (yarā). The Greek ἀμφισβητέω – here used about opposing parties in a lawsuit – means both to ”argue against“ and ”argue that“ (LSJ), the Arabic is a hendiadys translation of the latter: ”the one which shows or demonstrates“.

Deinde scitum est quoniam ei qui monstrat aut affirmat non pertinet amplius quam ut rem esse aut fuisse aut non fuisse confirmet. Esse autem eam grandem aut exiguam aut iustam aut iniustam cum non diffiniuit aut distinxit legislator oportet ne sit contentus scrutator¹⁷ quin exigat probatorem ad sciendum hec et (66va) intelligendum ab eo qui monstrat.

17. P in margine : uel inquisitor uel obuiator

Adhuc autem manifestum quoniam quidem questionantis non est extra demonstrare causa quod est aut non est, aut facta aut non facta; si vero parva aut magna, aut iusta aut iniusta, et quecumque legislator non determinavit, oportet utique ipsum quidem iudicem cognoscere et non doceri a questionantibus.

Adhuc autem manifestum quod litigantis quidem nichil est nisi ostendere rem quia est aut non est, aut facta est aut facta non est; si autem magna aut parva, aut iusta aut iniusta, quecumque legislator non determinavit, ipsum utique iudicem oportet cognoscere et non addiscere a litigantibus.

Again, a litigant has clearly nothing to do but to show that the alleged fact is so or is not so, that it has or has not happened. As to whether a thing is important or unimportant, just or unjust, the judge must surely refuse to take his instructions from the litigants: he must decide for himself all such points as the law—giver has not already defined for him.

μάλιστα μὲν οὖν (32) προσήκει τοὺς ὀρθῶς κειμένους νόμους, ὅσα ἐνδέχεται, πάντα (33) διορίζειν αὐτούς, καὶ ὅτι ἐλάχιστα καταλείπειν ἐπὶ τοῖς κρί(34)νουσι, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἕνα λαβεῖν καὶ ὀλίγους ῥᾷον ἢ πολλοὺς (1354b1) εὖ φρονοῦντας καὶ δυναμένους νομοθετεῖν καὶ δικάζειν· ἔπειθ’ (2) αἱ μὲν νομοθεσίαι ἐκ πολλοῦ χρόνου σκεψαμένων γίνονται, (3) αἱ δὲ κρίσεις ἐξ ὑπογυίου, ὥστε χαλεπὸν ἀποδιδόναι τὸ δί(4)καιον καὶ τὸ συμφέρον καλῶς τοὺς κρίνοντας.

وقد ينبغي بزيادة أن تحد السنن المستقيم وضعها وتفوض الأمور اليسيرة إلى الذي يحكم واّول ذلك لاّن وجدان واحد او قليل ايسر من وجدان كثير ذوی صحّة رای وقدرة علی وضع السنن والحكومة وذلك اّن وضع السنن اّنما يكون فی طول الزمان عن رؤية وتثبّت. فاّما الاحكام فتحدث من زمان الی زمان وقد يصعب لذلك ان يفوّض الی الحكّام النظر فی معنى العدل او المنفعة اى هل هو عدل وهل هو نافع

Oportet autem ut affirmant uel determinent hec quarum recta est positio. Res uero faciles et exigue relinquantur industrie iudicis. Primo quidem quoniam inuentio unius aut paucorum facilior est inuentione plurium sane opinionis et potentie in positione legum et sententiarum. Legum namque constitutio exigit longitudinem temporis et firmitudinem consilii et profundationem inuestigationis. Iudicia uero contingunt de tempore in tempus, ideoque graue est ut iudicum commitatur industrie consideratio in re iuris aut [36rc] potioris aut utilitatis.

Maxime quidem igitur decens est ipsas recte statutas leges, quecumque conveniunt, omnia determinare, et quia minima dimittantur indicantibus, primum quidem quod unum aut paucos accipere facilius est qumn multos bene sapientes et patentes legem ferre et iudicare; quoniam autem positiones legum a providentibus multo tempore fiunt, iudicia vera ex recenti, quare difficile est bene iudicantes assignare iustum et conferens.

Maxime quidem igitur convenit recte positas leges, quecu1nquc contingit, omnia determinare ipsas, et quam paucissima committere iudicantibus, primum quidem quia unum habere et paucos facilius qumn multos bene sapientes et patentes leges ferre et iudicare; deinde legislationes quidem ex multo tempore consideratis fiunt, iudicia autem ex suborto; quare difficile assignare iustum et expediens bene iudicantes.

Now, it is of great moment that well—drawn laws should themselves define all the points they possibly can and leave as few as may be to the decision of the judges; and this for several reasons. First, to find one man, or a few men, who are sensible persons and capable of legislating and administering justice is easier than to find a large number. Next, laws are made after long consideration, whereas decisions in the courts are given at short notice, which makes it hard for those who try the case to satisfy the claims of justice and expediency.

τὸ δὲ πάντων (5) μέγιστον, ὅτι ἡ μὲν τοῦ νομοθέτου κρίσις οὐ κατὰ μέ(6)ρος, ἀλλὰ περὶ μελλόντων τε καὶ καθόλου ἐστίν, ὁ δ’ (7) ἐκκλησιαστὴς καὶ δικαστὴς ἤδη περὶ παρόντων καὶ (8) ἀφωρισμένων κρίνουσιν· πρὸς οὓς καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν ἤδη καὶ (9) τὸ μισεῖν καὶ τὸ ἴδιον συμφέρον συνήρτηται πολλάκις, (10) ὥστε μηκέτι δύνασθαι θεωρεῖν ἱκανῶς τὸ ἀληθές, ἀλλ’ (11) ἐπισκοτεῖν τῇ κρίσει τὸ ἴδιον ἡδὺ ἢ λυπηρόν.

واعظم من ذلك كلّه انّ حكم واضع السنّة ليس يجرى فى الأفراد الجزئيّة لكنّه فى الكلّ وفيما هو آت. فامّا رئيس الجمع والحاكم فانّما يحكم فى الأمور الحاضرة المفردة ولهذا تعرض المحبّة والبغضة والسرور والحزن

Et maius hoc toto est quoniam sententia legislatoris non uersatur contra singularia presentia hoc contra uniuersale, et id quod futurum est. Princeps autem collegii alicuius uel unius uersitatis et iudex non iudicat quidem nisi in rebus presentibus singularibus. Et propter has siquidem res accidit amor et odium et gaudium et tristitia.

Et omnium maximum, quia legislatoris iudicium non est particulare, sed de futuris quidem et universali, orator vera et iudex utique de presentibus et determinatis iudicant; apud quos et amare utique et odire et proprium conferens multociens commiscentur propter id quod non possunt inspicere sufficienter verum, sed conturbare iudicio et proprium delectabile aut tristabile.

Omnium autem maximum, quia iudicium quidem legislatoris non secundum partem, sed de futuris et universalibus est, prefectus autem et iudex iam de presentibus et detenninatis iudicant; ad quos et amare iam et odire et proprium commodum adnexa sunt sepe, ut non adhuc possint videre sufficienter verum, sed attendere in iudicio proprium delectabile aut triste.

The weightiest reason of all is that the decision of the lawgiver is not particular but prospective and general, whereas members of the assembly and the jury find it their duty to decide on definite cases brought before them. They will often have allowed themselves to be so much influenced by feelings of friendship or hatred or self—interest that they lose any clear vision of the truth and have their judgement obscured by considerations of personal pleasure or pain.

περὶ μὲν οὖν (12) τῶν ἄλλων, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, δεῖ ὡς ἐλαχίστων ποιεῖν κύ(13)ριον τὸν κριτήν, περὶ δὲ τοῦ γεγονέναι ἢ μὴ γεγονέναι, (14) ἢ ἔσεσθαι ἢ μὴ ἔσεσθαι, ἢ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι, ἀνάγκη ἐπὶ (15) τοῖς κριταῖς καταλείπειν· οὐ γὰρ δυνατὸν ταῦτα τὸν νο(16)μοθέτην προϊδεῖν.

فتلك الأخرى كما ذكرنا ، لانّها يسيرة قد ينبغى ان تجعل فى ملك الحكّام ، اعنى النظر فى الأمر هل هو البتّة ام لا وهل كان ام لم يكن وهل هو كائن ام لا يكون ممّا ينبغى ان يفوّض الى الحكّام لا محالة لاّن واضع السنّة لا يقدر على ان يتقدّم فيعرف هذا ٠

Illa ergo alia que sunt leuia ut diximus oportet ut ponantur in potestate iudicis, scilicet consideratio in re an est aut non est penitus, et an fuit aut non fuit, et an est fiens (66vb) aut non est, de his que oportet commiti industrie iudicis procul dubio, eo quod legislator non potest antecedere et cognoscere istud.

De aliis quidem igitur, sicut diximus, oportet tamquam de minimis facere iudicem principalem, de eo autem quod factum est aut non factum, aut erit aut non erit, aut esse aut non esse, econverso a iudicibus relinquendum est; non enim possibile est legislatorem hec providere.

De aliis quidem igitur, ut diximus, oportet quam paucissimis facere dominum iudicem, de eo autem quod est factum esse aut non factum esse, aut fore aut non fore, aut esse aut non esse, necesse iudicibus committere; non enim possibile hec legislatorem previdere.

In general, then, the judge should, we say, be allowed to decide as few things as possible. But questions as to whether something has happened or has not happened, will be or will not be, is or is not, must of necessity be left to the judge, since the lawgiver cannot foresee them.

εἰ δὲ ταῦθ’ οὕτως ἔχει, φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ (17) ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος τεχνολογοῦσιν ὅσοι τἆλλα διορίζου(18)σιν, οἷον τί δεῖ τὸ προοίμιον ἢ τὴν διήγησιν ἔχειν, καὶ τῶν (19) ἄλλων ἕκαστον μορίων· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἄλλο πρα(20)γματεύονται πλὴν ὅπως τὸν κριτὴν ποιόν τινα ποιήσωσιν, (21) περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐντέχνων πίστεων οὐδὲν δεικνύουσιν, τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν (22) ὅθεν ἄν τις γένοιτο ἐνθυμηματικός.

وإذا كان هذا هكذا فهو معلوم أن الذين يحدون تلك الأخر إنما يخبرون فى صفاتهم عن صفحة الأمر وظاهره كقولهم فيما ينبغى أن يستعد به فى مقدمات الكلام او فى الاقتصاص وسائر الأجزاء الأخر فاّنهم ليس يفيدون بذلك شيئا اكثر من ان يضعوا كيف يصيّرون الحاكم بحال ما. فاّما التصديقات التى تكون بالصناعة فلا يخبرون عنها بشىء وهذه انّما تكون من قبل التفكير.

Cumque hec ita sit notum est quod illi qui diffiniunt partes illas assignant in suis notionibus hoc quod est in superficie et apparentia rei, ut est dictio eorum in eo quod oportet preparari in prohemio orationis aut narratione et ceteris eius partibus. Ipsi enim per hoc nichil amplius acquirere faciunt quam quod notificant qualiter conuertatur iudex ad dispositionem aliquam de credulitatibus uero que fiunt per artem et qualiter fiant non enuntiant quippiam et hoc quidem fit quidem ex parte enthimematum.

Si vero hoc sic se habet, manifestum est quoniam extra causam artificialiter sermocinantur quicumque alia determinant, ut quid oportet prohemium aut narrationem habere, et de aliis quibuslibet partibus (nichil enim aliud in hiis negotiantur nisi ut iudicem qualem quendam faciant), de fide vero artificiali nichil demonstrant, hoc autem est unde utique aliquis fiet entimematicus.

Si itaque hec ita se habent, manifestum quod que extra negotium tegnologizant quicumque alia determinant, puta quid oportet prohemium aut narrationcm habere et aliarum unamquamque partium (nichil enim aliud in ipsis negotiantur nisi quomodo iudicem qualem quendam faciant), de artificialibus autem persuasionibus nichil determinant, hoc autem est, unde utique aliquis fiet enthymematicus.

If this is so, it is evident that any one who lays down rules about other matters, such as what must be the contents of the ‘introduction’ or the ‘narration’ or any of the other divisions of a speech, is theorizing about non—essentials as if they belonged to the art. The only question with which these writers here deal is how to put the judge into a given frame of mind. About the orator’s proper modes of persuasion they have nothing to tell us; nothing, that is, about how to gain skill in enthymemes.

διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς αὐτῆς (23) οὔσης μεθόδου περὶ τὰ δημηγορικὰ καὶ δικανικά, καὶ καλ(24)λίονος καὶ πολιτικωτέρας τῆς δημηγορικῆς πραγματείας (25) οὔσης ἢ τῆς περὶ τὰ συναλλάγματα, περὶ μὲν ἐκείνης οὐδὲν (26) λέγουσι, περὶ δὲ τοῦ δικάζεσθαι πάντες πειρῶνται τεχνολο(27)γεῖν, ὅτι ἧττόν ἐστι πρὸ ἔργου τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος λέγειν (28) ἐν τοῖς δημηγορικοῖς καὶ ἧττόν ἐστι κακοῦργον ἡ δημηγορία (29) δικολογίας, ὅτι κοινότερον. ἐνταῦθα μὲν γὰρ ὁ κριτὴς (30) περὶ οἰκείων κρίνει, ὥστ’ οὐδὲν ἄλλο δεῖ πλὴν ἀποδεῖξαι ὅτι (31) οὕτως ἔχει ὥς φησιν ὁ συμβουλεύων· ἐν δὲ τοῖς δικανικοῖς (32) οὐχ ἱκανὸν τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ πρὸ ἔργου ἐστὶν ἀναλαβεῖν τὸν ἀκροα(33)τήν· περὶ ἀλλοτρίων γὰρ ἡ κρίσις, ὥστε πρὸς τὸ αὑτῶν σκο(34)πούμενοι καὶ πρὸς χάριν ἀκροώμενοι διδόασι τοῖς ἀμφισβη(1355a1)τοῦσιν, ἀλλ’ οὐ κρίνουσιν.

ومن اجل هذا ما يقول على انّ الحيلة او الصناعة فى التفسير و التشاجر واحدة وانّه اذا كان التشاجر فوليطيّا اى مدينيّا فهو خير واشرف مذهبا من التفسير الذى يجرى في الاخذ والاعطاء . فامّا هؤلاء فلم يقولوا فى التفسير شيئا لكنّهم يتكلّفون بتزويق الكلام ان يضعوا الحكم فى كلّ شىء من الأشياء واقتصاص الخارجة من الأمر فى التفسير قبل العمل امر خسيس ٠ ثم التفسير على ذوى الجنايات أخس من كلام العدل فى الحكومة وهو أكثر وأعم فالحاكم هاهنا انّما يحكم فى الأمور الأهليّة فليس يحتاج المثبت الى شىء الكثر من ان يثبت انّ الامر هكذا اى على ما وصفه المشير فامّا فى التشاجر فليس يكتفى بهذا لكن من بوادى العمل فى ذلك ان يتحفّظ الذى ينصت فانّ الحكم هاهنا فى الغريبة ويتأمّل ما يكون منهما فانّهم اذا سمعوا من المتكلّمين قد يسلمون الذى يثبت تبرّعا ولا يستعملون الحكم

Auerroes. Et quoniam nos uidemus enthimemata columnam huius artis esse¹⁸ , credimus orationem rhetoricam que est in contentionibus et litigiis¹⁹ ante iudices et eam que est in deliberationibus uni et eidem arti pertinere, et est ars ista. Illos autem consequemur²⁰ necessario ut²¹ non sit hec ars²² nisi de iudiciali genere cause tantum, nec de hoc toto, sed de uiliore parte ipsius, scilicet de hoc quod forensi strepitu ante tribunal iudicum²³ litigatorie tractatur. De condendis autem legibus et iuribus statuendis²⁴ in nullo profecerunt per ea que conscripserunt²⁵ de hac arte. (67ra) Habere autem usum rerum que quasi extrinsecus aminiculantur ad artem et non earum que intrinsece sunt²⁶ et essentiales arti, illaudabile est. Et propter hoc est quod nos dicimus quoniam ars in deliberatione et in contentione una est. Cum sit contentio legalis id est ciuilis melioris et honoratioris uie quam ars rethoricalis que uersatur contra acceptionem et dationem. Illi itaque non dixerunt in enthimemate quicquam sed conati sunt picturam sermonis ut notificent iudicium in omni rerum et narratio extranei a re in deliberatione ante opus res est uilis. Deinde deliberatio de flagitiosis ²⁷ vilior est sermone juris in judiciis. Et est plus et communior judex quia hic judicat quidem in rebus familiaribus. Et non eget ille qui affirmat aliquo amplius quam ut probet quoniam res sic est prout dixit deliberator. In contentione autem non sufficit istud sed ex principiis operationis in hoc est ut observet [interligne P : vel caveat] is qui animadvertit. Est etenim judicium hoc in rebus extraneis. Et diligenter consideret que sit ab eis. Ipsi enim quando audiunt allegantes interdum favent ²⁸ ei probat vitio/ultimo et non utuntur judicio.

18. huius artis esse P : esse huius artis TF 19. litigiis FP : litigiis cum T 20. consequemur PT : consequimur F 21. ut PT : ubi F 22. hec ars PT : ars F 23. iudicum PT : iudicis F 24. autem legibus et iuribus statuendis om. T 25. conscripserunt PT : scripserunt F 26. que quasi extrinsecus aminiculantur ad artem et non earum que intrinsece sunt P : que quasi extrinsecus aminiculantur ad artem et non earum que intrinsece sunt T : que intrinsece sunt F 27. interligne P : vel sceleratis 28. inter lineas P : vel concedunt

Propter hoc enim eadem disciplina existente circa perorabilia et iudicialia, et existente meliore et civiliore causa perorabili eo quod est circa permutabilia, de illo quidem nichil dicunt, de iudicare autem omnia temptant artificialiter sermocinari, quoniam minus est pre opere ea que sunt extra causam dicere in perorabilibus et minus malum opus est peroratio quam disceptatio, sed communius. Hic quidem iudex de propriis iudicat, quare nichil aliud oportet nisi demonstrare quod ita se habet sicut dixit deliberans; in iudicialibus autem non sufficit hoc, sed pre opere est assumere auditorem; de alienis enim iudicium; quare id quod eorum est intendentes et per gratiam audientes exhibent disceptantibus, sed non iudicant.

Propter hoc enim eadem existente methodo circa contionalia et iudicialia, et pulcriori et magis civili contionali negotio quam id quod circa commutationes, de illo quidem nichil dicunt, de disceptare autem omnia temptant artificialiter disserere, quia minus est pre opere que extra rem dicere in contionalibus et minus est fraudulentum contionatio disceptatione, quia communius. Hie quidem enim iudex de convenientibus iudicat, quare nichil aliud oportet nisi ostendere quod sic habet ut ait consilians; in iudicialibus autem non sufficiens hoc, sed pre opere est per singula captare auditorem; de alienis enim iudicium; quare ad id quod ipsorum intendentes et ad gratiam audientes donant litigantibus, sed non iudicant.

Hence it comes that, although the same systematic principles apply to political as to forensic oratory, and although the former is a nobler business, and fitter for a citizen, than that which concerns the relations of private individuals, these authors say nothing about political oratory, but try, one and all, to write treatises on the way to plead in court. The reason for this is that in political oratory there is less inducement to talk about nonessentials. Political oratory is less given to unscrupulous practices than forensic, because it treats of wider issues. In a political debate the man who is forming a judgement is making a decision about his own vital interests. There is no need, therefore, to prove anything except that the facts are what the supporter of a measure maintains they are. In forensic oratory this is not enough; to conciliate the listener is what pays here. It is other people’s affairs that are to be decided, so that the judges, intent on their own satisfaction and listening with partiality, surrender themselves to the disputants instead of judging between them.

διὸ καὶ πολλαχοῦ, ὥσπερ πρό(2)τερον εἶπον, ὁ νόμος κωλύει λέγειν ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος· ἐκεῖ (3) δ’ αὐτοὶ οἱ κριταὶ τοῦτο τηροῦσιν ἱκανῶς.

ولذلك ما تمنع السنّة في مواضع كثيرة ان يتكلّم بشىء سوى ما فى الكتاب فامّا هناك فانّ الحكّام يبالغون فى التحفّظ

Et ideo prohibet lex in locis pluribus ne allegetur aliquid preter id quod fuerit in [67rb] scripto. Illic autem usque ad ultimum quidem proveniunt in cautela.

Ideo multociens, quemadmodum prius diximus, lex prohibet non dicere extra causam; illic autem ipsi iudices hoc observant sufficienter.

Propter quod in multis locis, sicut et prius diximus, lex prohibet quidem dicere extra rem; ibi autem ipsi iudices hoc servant sufficienter.

Hence in many places, as we have said already, irrelevant speaking is forbidden in the law—courts: in the public assembly those who have to form a judgement are themselves well able to guard against that.

ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερόν (4) ἐστιν ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἔντεχνος μέθοδος περὶ τὰς πίστεις ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ (5) πίστις ἀπόδειξίς τις τότε γὰρ πιστεύομεν μάλιστα ὅταν (6) ἀποδεδεῖχθαι ὑπολάβωμεν), ἔστι δ’ ἀπόδειξις ῥητορικὴ ἐν(7)θύμημα, καὶ ἔστι τοῦτο ὡς εἰπεῖν ἁπλῶς κυριώτατον τῶν πί(8)στεων, τὸ δ’ ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμός τις, περὶ δὲ συλλογισμοῦ (9) ὁμοίως ἅπαντος τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἐστιν ἰδεῖν, ἢ αὐτῆς ὅλης ἢ (10) μέρους τινός, δῆλον ὅτι ὁ μάλιστα τοῦτο δυνάμενος θεω(11)ρεῖν, ἐκ τίνων καὶ πῶς γίνεται συλλογισμός, οὗτος καὶ ἐν(12)θυμηματικὸς ἂν εἴη μάλιστα, προσλαβὼν περὶ ποῖά τέ ἐστι (13) τὸ ἐνθύμημα καὶ τίνας ἔχει διαφορὰς πρὸς τοὺς λογικοὺς (14) συλλογισμούς.

ومن اجل انّه معلوم انّ هذه الحيلة الصناعيّة انّما توجّه نحو التصديقات والتصديق انّما يكون بالتثبت فانّا انّما نقرّ بالشىء اذا ظننا انّه قد يثبت عندنا والتثبيت الريطورىّ هو التفكير لانّ هذا في الجملة هو الأصل المتقدّم للتصديقات. والتفكير شىء من السلجسة والسلجسة قد ترى انّها من الديالقطيقيّة امّا فى الكلّ من هذه الحيلة وامّا فى الجزء فهو واضح بيّن انّ الذي هو بنفسه اقدر على ان ينظر ممّا ومن كم يكون السلوجسموس هو التفكيرىّ بزيادة القادر على التفكير ثمّ الذى يزيد فينظر نحو ماذا يكون التفكير وما الفصول بينه وبين السلوجسمات المنطقيّة

Quoniam autem scitum est quod istud ingenium artificiale rendit quidem ad inducendum credulitates et credulitas quidem fit per probationem. Nos etenim tunc certe assentimus in rem quando putaverimus quod jam probata sit nobis, et probatio rethorica est enthimema, eo quod istud omnino est radix preexistens ad credulitates et enthimema pars est sillogismi. Et sillogismus videtur esse pars dialectice aut in toto hujus ingenii aut in parte : est manifestum et clarum quoniam ille qui per semetipsum potentior est considerare ex quibus et ex quot fit sillogismus. Est plus enthimematicus. Potens inquam enthimematis. Deinde ille qui addit et considerat ad quid sit enthimema et que sit differentia inter ipsum et inter sillogismos logicos, scilicet est pars enthimematicus.

Quoniam autem manifestum est quoniam quidem artificialis methodus circa fidem est, fides autem demonstratio (tunc enim credimus maxime cum demonstratum esse arbitramur), est autem demonstratio rethortica entimerna, et est hoc ut dicam simpliciter magis proprium fidei, entimema vera sillogismus quidam, de sillogismo autern similiter omne dialetice est scire, aut eiusdem omnis aut cuiusdam partis, manifestum quoniam qui maxime hoc potest scire, ex quibus et qualiter fit sillogismus, hie et entimematicus utique erit maxime, opinans circa qualia quedam est entimema et quales habet differentias ad sermocinales sillogismos.

Quoniam autem manifestum est quod artificialis quidem methodus circa persuasiones est, persuasio autem demonstratio (tunc enim credimus maxime quando ostensum esse existimamus), est autem ostensio rethorica enthymema, et est hoc ut est dicere simpliciter principalissimum persuasionum, enthymema autem sillogismus quidam, de sillogismo autem similiter omnis dialetice est videre, aut ipsius totius aut partis alicuius, palam quia qui maxime hoc potest considerare, ex qui bus et quomodo fit sillogismus, iste et enthymematicus utique erit maxime, coassumens circa qualia quedam est enthymema et quas habet differentias ad logicos sillogismos.

It is clear, then, that rhetorical study, in its strict sense, is concerned with the modes of persuasion. Persuasion is clearly a sort of demonstration, since we are most fully persuaded when we consider a thing to have been demonstrated. The orator’s demonstration is an enthymeme, and this is, in general, the most effective of the modes of persuasion. The enthymeme is a sort of syllogism, and the consideration of syllogisms of all kinds, without distinction, is the business of dialectic, either of dialectic as a whole or of one of its branches. It follows plainly, therefore, that he who is best able to see how and from what elements a syllogism is produced, will also be best skilled in the enthymeme, when he has further learnt what its subject—matter is and in what respects it differs from the syllogism of strict logic.

τό τε γὰρ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ἀληθεῖ (15) τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστι δυνάμεως ἰδεῖν, ἅμα δὲ καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι (16) πρὸς τὸ ἀληθὲς πεφύκασιν ἱκανῶς καὶ τὰ πλείω τυγχά(17)νουσι τῆς ἀληθείας· διὸ πρὸς τὰ ἔνδοξα στοχαστικῶς ἔχειν (18) τοῦ ὁμοίως ἔχοντος καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειάν ἐστιν.

فانّ للقوّة الواحدة بعينها ان ترى الحقّ نفسه وما هو شبيه بالحقّ ثمّ الناس مع هذا مهيّئون كلّ التهيئة نحو الحقّ وهم اكثر ذلك يأمّونه ويقصدون قصده والمحمودات قد تدخل فى علم الحقّ من قبل انّها شبيهة به

Etenim potentie unius ejusdem est videre ipsummet verum et quod est simile vero. Deinde homines toto apparatu parati sunt ad verum et sunt plus hoc conantes hec ad ipsum et intendentes eius intentioni. Probabilia autem ingrediuntur [36va] scientiam veri ex hoc quod assimilatur ei.

Verum namque et verisimile eiusdern potentie est scire, simul autem et homines ad verum innati sunt sufficienter et plurimum veritatis adipiscuntur; unde ad opinabilia coniecturaliter se habere similiter habentis se et ad veritatem est.

Verum enim et quod simile vero eiusdem est potentie videre, simul autem et homines ad veritatem apti nati sunt sufficientcr et in pluribus adipiscuntur veritatem; propter quod ad probabilia coniecturahiliter se habere est et ad veritatem similiter se habentis.

The true and the approximately true are apprehended by the same faculty; it may also be noted that men have a sufficient natural instinct for what is true, and usually do arrive at the truth. Hence the man who makes a good guess at truth is likely to make a good guess at probabilities.

(19) ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος οἱ ἄλλοι τεχνολογοῦσι, (20) καὶ διότι μᾶλλον ἀπονενεύκασι πρὸς τὸ δικολογεῖν, φανερόν· (21) χρήσιμος δέ ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορικὴ διά τε τὸ φύσει εἶναι κρείττω (22) τἀληθῆ καὶ τὰ δίκαια τῶν ἐναντίων, ὥστε ἐὰν μὴ κατὰ τὸ (23) προσῆκον αἱ κρίσεις γίγνωνται, ἀνάγκη δι’ αὑτῶν ἡττᾶσθαι, (24) τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν ἄξιον ἐπιτιμήσεως, ἔτι δὲ πρὸς ἐνίους οὐδ’ εἰ τὴν (25) ἀκριβεστάτην ἔχοιμεν ἐπιστήμην, ῥᾴδιον ἀπ’ ἐκείνης πεῖσαι (26) λέγοντας· διδασκαλίας γάρ ἐστιν ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην λόγος, (27) τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, ἀλλ’ ἀνάγκη διὰ τῶν κοινῶν ποιεῖσθαι τὰς (28) πίστεις καὶ τοὺς λόγους, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς ἐλέ(29)γομεν περὶ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐντεύξεως.

فقد استبان اذاً انّ هؤلاء انّما يزخرفون القول فى صفحة الأمر وظاهره وانّهم مالوا بزيادة الى ان ينطقوا بالعدل فقط والريطوريّة ذات غناء ومنفعة لانّ الصادقات العادلات المنفعة افضل فى الطبيعة من اضدادها. ثمّ انّه اذا لم تضبط الأحكام على ما ينبغى فالمرء فيها مغلوب مقهور لا محالة. وهذا امر يستحقّ التأنيب والتوبيخ ثمّ انّ من الناس صنفا ليس ينبغى ان نستعمل فيما بيننا وبينهم العلم الصحيح المستقصى لانّه يسهل علينا ان نقنع المتكلّم من مذهبه وطريقه وذلك انّ الكلام الذى يحمل على العلم المستقصى انّما هو للتعليم وهذا ممّا لا يمكن تكلفه في تلك الحال لكنّه قد نضطرّ الى ان نجعل التصديق والكلام <بـ>ـالمشتركات بيننا وبين المخاطب كالذى وصفنا فى كتاب طوبيقا عند قولنا فيما تلفى به وجوه شتّى

Patet igitur quoniam illi picturant orationem in superficie rei et ejus apparentia. Averroes. Et non [67va] attingunt quod est tamquam constitutivum et essentiale rei, et si putentur per hoc incessisse via recta et justa, et quoniam ipsi declinant amplius ad hoc ut ratiocinentur justum tantum. Rethorica autem utilis est et proficiens eo quod veracia secundum justum meliora sunt suis contrariis. Quando etenim non fiunt judicia contenta secundum quod oportet vincuntur ab hujus rebus necessario, et istud est res que meretur redargutionem et increpationem. Averroes. Rhetorica duas habet utilitates, quarum una est quod instigat cives ad operationes nobiles. Homines enim naturaliter proni sunt ad contrarium operationum justitie . Quando igitur non retinentur per sermones rhetoricos, vincunt eos illicita desideria et operantur contraria operibus justitie. Inquit interpres idem : veritates rerum operandarum pertinentium justitie sequende sunt et respuende falsitates desideriorum illicitorum, et ad has veritates conatur rhetorica et ad redargutiones et increpationes propter opposita. Deinde eo quod aliquis modus hominum contra quos in eo quod est inter nos et ipsos non oportet ut utamur scientia certa exquisita, cum sit facile nobis per[67vb]suadere colloquenti ex sua via et incessa. Sermo enim qui inducitur in scientia exquisita pertinet quidem doctrine et hujus non est possibilis conatus in hac dispositione. Immo constringimur ad hoc ut ponamus persuasiva et sermonem per ea que communia sunt nobis et ei ad quem sermocinamur prout diximus in topicis ubi locuti fuimus de diversis modis obviandi.

Quoniam quidem igitur ea que sunt extra negotium alii artificialiter sermocinantur et propter quid magis diverterunt ad litigandum manifestum; utilis autem est rethorica propter id quod meliora sunt natura vera et iusta contrariis, quare si utique non ad conveniens indicia fiant, necesse per se ipsa diminui, hoc autem dignum est increpatione. Amplius autem apud quosdam non oportet certissimam habere scientiam, facile ab ea persuaderi dicentes; doctrina enim est sermo qui est secundum scientiam, hoc autem impossibile, sed necessarium per communia fieri fidem et sermones, quemadmodum et in Topicis diximus de obviatione ad multos.

Quod quidem igitur que extra rem alii negotiantur, et quia magis diverterunt ad litigare, manifestum; utilis autem est rethorica propterea quod vera et iusta sunt natura meliora contrariis, quare si non secundum conveniens iudicia fiant, necesse per ipsa vinci, hoc autem est dignum increpatione. Adhuc autem ad quosdam neque si certissimam habeamus scientiam, facile ab illa persuadere loquentes; doctrine enim est qui secundum scientiam sermo, hoc autem impossibile, sed necesse per communia fieri persuasiones et orationes, sicut et in Topicis dicebamus de ea que ad multos obviatione.

It has now been shown that the ordinary writers on rhetoric treat of non—essentials; it has also been shown why they have inclined more towards the forensic branch of oratory. Rhetoric is useful (1) because things that are true and things that are just have a natural tendency to prevail over their opposites, so that if the decisions of judges are not what they ought to be, the defeat must be due to the speakers themselves, and they must be blamed accordingly. Moreover, (2) before some audiences not even the possession of the exactest knowledge will make it easy for what we say to produce conviction. For argument based on knowledge implies instruction, and there are people whom one cannot instruct. Here, then, we must use, as our modes of persuasion and argument, notions possessed by everybody, as we observed in the Topics when dealing with the way to handle a popular audience.

ἔτι δὲ τἀναντία (30) δεῖ δύνασθαι πείθειν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς, οὐχ (31) ὅπως ἀμφότερα πράττωμεν (οὐ γὰρ δεῖ τὰ φαῦλα πείθειν), ἀλλ’ (32) ἵνα μὴ λανθάνῃ πῶς ἔχει, καὶ ὅπως ἄλλου χρωμένου τοῖς λόγοις (33) μὴ δικαίως αὐτοὶ λύειν ἔχωμεν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ἄλλων (34) τεχνῶν οὐδεμία τἀναντία συλλογίζεται, ἡ δὲ διαλεκτικὴ (35) καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ μόναι τοῦτο ποιοῦσιν· ὁμοίως γάρ εἰσιν ἀμ(36)φότεραι τῶν ἐναντίων. τὰ μέντοι ὑποκείμενα πράγματα (37) οὐχ ὁμοίως ἔχει, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ τἀληθῆ καὶ τὰ βελτίω τῇ φύσει (38) εὐσυλλογιστότερα καὶ πιθανώτερα ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν.

وقد يمكن الإقناع فى المتضادّين كما يمكن السلجسة فانا قد نقنع على ذى الجناية ليس لنعقد الأمرين جميعا بل لكيلا يخفا علينا المذهب فى ذلك وكيف نستطيع اذا المتكلّم تكلّم بغير العدل ان ننقض عليه فاما سائر الصناعات فليس شىء منها يسلجس فى المتضادين انّما يفعل ذلك الديالقطيقية والريطورية فقط فانهما جميعا متهيئان للمتضادين كليهما بحال واحدة ٠ فاما الأشياء الموضوعة لهما اى الأمور التى فيها يعملان فليست شبيهة بعضها ببعض لكنّها اذا كانت من اللاتى هى اصدق وافضل فى الطبيعة كانت السلجسة والإقناع افضل واشفا.

Et est possibilis persuasio in duobus contrariis sicut possibilis est sillogizatio. Averroes. Pecasse ipsum et non peccasse, sed non hec duo simul, sed modo hoc modo illud. Aristoteles. Nos enim interdum persuademus de flagitioso non ut connectamus utrasque res simul, sed ut non lateat nos via in hac et qualiter possimus quando quis locutus fuerit id quod preter justum est et contradicere ei. At vero nichil reliquarum artium sillogizat duo contraria, sed faciunt hoc quidem ars topica et rethorica tantum. Vtraque enim istarum apta est ad utrumque contrariorum secundum dispositionem unam. Ea vero que subjecta sunt eis, id est res in quas operantur, non sunt consimiles ad se invicem, sed quando fuerint ex eis que veraciora sint et nobiliora in natura erit sillogizatio et persuasio nobilior et sufficientior.

Amplius autem contraria oportet posse persuaderi, quemadmodum et in sillogismis, non quod utraque operamur (non enim oportet mala persuadere), sed quod non lateat nos quomodo se habeant, et qualiter alius utentis non iuste sermones nos ipsi dissolvere possimus. Nulla igitur aliarum artium contraria sillogizat, dialetica vero et rethorica sole hoc faciunt; pariter enim est utraque de contrariis. Subiective autem cause non similiter se habent, sed semper vera et optima natura sillogizabilia et probabilia ut vere dicam.

Adhuc contraria oportet posse persuadere, sicut et in sillogismis, non ut ambo agamus (non enim oportet prava agere), sed ut non lateat qualiter habet, et ut alia utente non iuste orationibus ipsi solvere habeamus. Aliarum quidem igitur artium nulla contraria sillogizat, dialetica autem et rethorica sole hoc faciunt; similiter enim sunt am be contrariorum. Res tamen subiecte non similiter habent, sed semper vera et meliora natura sillogizabiliora et persuasibiliora sunt ut vere est dicere.

Further, (3) we must be able to employ persuasion, just as strict reasoning can be employed, on opposite sides of a question, not in order that we may in practice employ it in both ways (for we must not make people believe what is wrong), but in order that we may see clearly what the facts are, and that, if another man argues unfairly, we on our part may be able to confute him. No other of the arts draws opposite conclusions: dialectic and rhetoric alone do this. Both these arts draw opposite conclusions impartially. Nevertheless, the underlying facts do not lend themselves equally well to the contrary views. No; things that are true and things that are better are, by their nature, practically always easier to prove and easier to believe in.

πρὸς (39) δὲ τούτοις ἄτοπον εἰ τῷ σώματι μὲν αἰσχρὸν μὴ δύνασθαι (1355b1) βοηθεῖν ἑαυτῷ, λόγῳ δ’ οὐκ αἰσχρόν· ὃ μᾶλλον ἴδιόν ἐστιν (2) ἀνθρώπου τῆς τοῦ σώματος χρείας. εἰ δ’ ὅτι μεγάλα βλά(3)ψειεν ἂν ὁ χρώμενος ἀδίκως τῇ τοιαύτῃ δυνάμει τῶν λό(4)γων, τοῦτό γε κοινόν ἐστι κατὰ πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν πλὴν (5) ἀρετῆς, καὶ μάλιστα κατὰ τῶν χρησιμωτάτων, οἷον ἰσχύος (6) ὑγιείας πλούτου στρατηγίας· τούτοις γὰρ ἄν τις ὠφελήσειεν τὰ (7) μέγιστα χρώμενος δικαίως καὶ βλάψειεν ἀδίκως.

ومع هذا فليس جميلا ان يكون قد يقبح بالبدن ان يعجز عن نصرة نفسه ولا يقبح ذلك بالكلام الذى هو اخص بالإنسان من جميع ذوات البدن اعنى ان يعجز ان يضر الضرر العظيم مستعملا بالجور لهذه القوة فى الكلام وهذا شىء يوجد عاما فى جميع الخيرات سوى الفضيلة ولا سيما فى الامور النافعة النفيسة مثل الجلد والصحة واليسار والسلطان فكل هذا ونحوه مما قد ينتفع به المرء المنفعة العظيمة اذا استعمل العدل وكذلك يضر اذا جار.

Et preterea non decet tempore repu[68ra]tari ex parte corporis pigritari a tuitione sui ipsius, et non reputari hoc tempore ex parte sermonis qui est magis proprius homini omnibus instrumentis corporalibus, videlicet pigritari ab illatione dampnii eximii usitando circa injuriam hac potentia in sermone, et istud est res que invenitur communiter in omnibus bonis preter quam in virtute, et precipue in rebus utilibus pretiosis ut robore et sanitate et opibus et potestate. Omnia ergo hec et hujusmodi magnam conferunt viro utilitatem in utendo justitia et similiter nocet per hoc in injuriando.

Adhuc autem inconveniens si quidem malum est non posse iuvare ipso corpore, sermone vero non malum, quod magis proprium est hominis iuvamento corporis. Si vero quoniam maxime leserit utique utens iniuste eadem potentia sermonum, hoc autem commune est secundum omnia bona preter virtutem, et maxime optima, ut fortitudinem sanitatem divitias militiam; hiis enim si quis iuverit maxime utens iuste et leserit iniuste.

Ad hec autem inconveniens si corpore quidem non posse adiuvare se ipsum sit turpe, oratione autem non turpe, quod magis proprium est hominis corporis oportunitate. Si antem quam magna nocebit utique qui utitur iniuste tali potentia orationum, hoc et commune est de omnibus bonis exceptis virtutibus, et maxime de oportunissimis, puta robore, sanitate, divitiis, militia; talibus enim utique quis proderit rnaxime utens iuste et nocebit iniuste.

Again, (4) it is absurd to hold that a man ought to be ashamed of being unable to defend himself with his limbs, but not of being unable to defend himself with speech and reason, when the use of rational speech is more distinctive of a human being than the use of his limbs. And if it be objected that one who uses such power of speech unjustly might do great harm, that is a charge which may be made in common against all good things except virtue, and above all against the things that are most useful, as strength, health, wealth, generalship. A man can confer the greatest of benefits by a right use of these, and inflict the greatest of injuries by using them wrongly.

(8) ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν οὐθενός τινος γένους ἀφωρισμένου (9) ἡ ῥητορική, ἀλλὰ καθάπερ ἡ διαλεκτική, καὶ ὅτι χρήσιμος, φα(10)νερόν, καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ πεῖσαι ἔργον αὐτῆς, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἰδεῖν τὰ ὑπάρ(11)χοντα πιθανὰ περὶ ἕκαστον, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις (12) τέχναις πάσαις (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἰατρικῆς τὸ ὑγιᾶ ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ (13) μέχρι οὗ ἐνδέχεται, μέχρι τούτου προαγαγεῖν· ἔστιν γὰρ καὶ (14) τοὺς ἀδυνάτους μεταλαβεῖν ὑγιείας ὅμως θεραπεῦσαι καλῶς)· (15) πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὅτι τῆς αὐτῆς τό τε πιθανὸν καὶ τὸ φαινό(16)μενον ἰδεῖν πιθανόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς συλλο(17)γισμόν τε καὶ φαινόμενον συλλογισμόν· ἡ γὰρ σοφιστικὴ (18) οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει ἀλλ’ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει· πλὴν ἐνταῦθα μὲν (19) ἔσται ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ὁ δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν (20) ῥήτωρ, ἐκεῖ δὲ σοφιστὴς μὲν κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν, διαλεκτι(21)κὸς δὲ οὐ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν.

فقد استبان اذا ان الريطورية ليست جنسا لشيء واحد مفرد لكنها بمنزلة الديالقطيقية وانها جد نافعة وانه ليس عملها ان تقنع لكن ان تعرف المقنعات في كل امر من الامور كما يوجد في صناعات اخر فان الطب ايضا ليس عمله ان يؤتى الشفاء لكن ان يبلغ من ذلك حيث يستطاع ان يبلغ وقد يشترك الضعفاء ايضا في الشفاء ولكن الشفاء بالصواب الصناعة ثم في الريطورية ايضا مقنع وما يرى مقنعا كمثل ما الديالقطيقية مسلجس وما يُرى مسلجسا فاما السوفسطي فليس بالقوة يكون سوفسطيا لكن بالمشيئة. فليكن الريطوريون هاهنا اما بعض فمن جهة العلم واما بعض فمن جهة المشيئة. فأما هناك فالسوفسطي من جهة المشيئة وأما الديالقطيقي فليس من جهة المشيئة لكن من جهة القوة

Iam ergo patuit quoniam rethorica non est alicujus unius generis singularis sed quoniam est ad modum dialectice, et quoniam ipsa est utilis valde, et quoniam opus ejus non est ut persuadeat sed ut doceat persuasione in qualibet rerum, quemadmodum invenitur in aliis artibus. Neque enim opus est medicine ut compleat medicationem, sed ut pertingat in hoc usque potest perveniri. Et jam quoque participant medicationem etiam imperfecti vel debiles, verumptamen medicatio secundum rectitudinem artis est. Deinde in rethorica quidem etiam est persuasivum et quod videtur persuasivum, prout est in disputativa quod est sillo[68rb]gizans et quod videtur sillogizans. Sophistica vero non est secundum facilitatem soph[36vb]istica sed secundum voluntatem. Sit igitur quidem hic rethorice quiddam ex parte scientie et quiddam ex parte voluntatis. Illic autem sophicus quidem ex parte voluntatis disputativa vero non ex parte voluntatis at ex parte facultatis.

Quoniam quidem igitur rethorica non sit alicuius generis determinati, sed quemadmodum dialetica, et quoniam utilis, manifestum est, et quod non est opus ipsius probare, sed scire que sunt probabilia circa unumquodque, sicut et in aliis artibus (non enim est medicine sanitatem facere, sed quousque contingit, usque ad hoc ducere; est enim et impossibiles assumere sanitatem tamen curare bene), adhuc autem quod eiusdem est scire probabile et apparens probabile scire, quemadmodum et in dialetica sillogismum quidem et apparentem sillogismum; sophistica enim non in potentia, sed in voluntate est; verum hic est hic quidem secundum scientiam, hic vero secundum voluntatem rethor, illic vero sophista quidem secundum voluntatem, dialeticus autem non secundum voluntatem, sed secundum potentiam.

Quod quidem igitur non est neque unius alicuius generis determinati rethorica, sed quemadmodum dialetica, et quia utilis, manifestum, et quod non est opus ipsius persuadere, sed videre existentia persuasibilia circa unumquodque, sicut et in aliis artibus (non enim est rnedicinalis sanitates efficere, sed usque quo contingit usque ad hoc perducere; est enim et eos qui non possunt recipere sanitatem tamen medicari bene), ad hec autem quod eiusdem persuasibile videre et apparens persuasibile, sicut et in dialetica sillogismum et apparentem sillogismum; sophistica enim non in potentia, sed in electione est; verumptamen hic erit iste quidem secundum scientiam, ille autem secundum electionem rethor, ibi autem sophysta quidem secundum electionem, dialeticus autem non secundum electionem, sed secundum potentiam.

It is clear, then, that rhetoric is not bound up with a single definite class of subjects, but is as universal as dialectic; it is clear, also, that it is useful. It is clear, further, that its function is not simply to succeed in persuading, but rather to discover the means of coming as near such success as the circumstances of each particular case allow. In this it resembles all other arts. For example, it is not the function of medicine simply to make a man quite healthy, but to put him as far as may be on the road to health; it is possible to give excellent treatment even to those who can never enjoy sound health. Furthermore, it is plain that it is the function of one and the same art to discern the real and the apparent means of persuasion, just as it is the function of dialectic to discern the real and the apparent syllogism. What makes a man a ‘sophist’ is not his faculty, but his moral purpose. In rhetoric, however, the term ‘rhetorician’ may describe either the speaker’s knowledge of the art, or his moral purpose. In dialectic it is different: a man is a ‘sophist’ because he has a certain kind of moral purpose, a ‘dialectician’ in respect, not of his moral purpose, but of his faculty.

(22) περὶ δὲ αὐτῆς ἤδη τῆς μεθόδου πειρώμεθα λέγειν, πῶς τε καὶ (23) ἐκ τίνων δυνησόμεθα τυγχάνειν τῶν προκειμένων. πάλιν οὖν (24) οἷον ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς ὁρισάμενοι αὐτὴν τίς ἐστι, λέγωμεν τὰ λοιπά.

فللقول في هذه الحيلة ² قصدنا من أول هذا الكلام وأن نخبر أى وكيف نستطيع أن نصيب بها الأمور المطلوبة غير انا حين نعود فنستانف القول كالابتدا نبدا فنحد هذه الحيلة ³ ونخبر ما هى ونحو ماذا ثُم نخبر عن سائر تلك الاخر

2. الحيلة em. L : الجمله MS 3. الحيلة em. L : الجمله MS

Dicere ergo de hoc ingenio intendimus a principio hujus sermonis et determinare quomodo aut qualiter possimus invenire per ipsum res quesitas. Revertamur igitur quasi resumentes a principio et diffinimus istud ingenium dicentes quid est et ad quid est, deinde pronuntiabimus de illis residuis.

De ipsa autem scientia temptemus dicere, quomodo et ex quibus possimus invenire subiecta. Rursus igitur sicut a principio determinantes ipsam quid est, dicimus autem reliqua.

De ipsa autem iam methodo temptemus dicere, qualiterque et ex quibus poterimus adipisci proposita. Rursum igitur velut a principio diffinientes ipsam que est, dicamus reliqua.

Let us now try to give some account of the systematic principles of Rhetoric itself — of the right method and means of succeeding in the object we set before us. We must make as it were a fresh start, and before going further define what rhetoric is.

2. (25) Ἔστω δὴ ἡ ῥητορικὴ δύναμις περὶ ἕκαστον τοῦ θεωρῆσαι (26) τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν.

فالريطورية قوة تتكلف الإقناع الممكن في كل واحد من الأمور المفردة

.

Est autem rethorica potentia circa unumquodque ad sciendum conveniens probabile.

Est itaque rethorica potentia circa unumquodque considerandi contingens persuasibile.

Part 2. Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion.

τοῦτο γὰρ οὐδεμιᾶς ἑτέρας ἐστὶ (27) τέχνης ἔργον· τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων ἑκάστη περὶ τὸ αὑτῇ ὑπο(28)κείμενόν ἐστιν διδασκαλικὴ καὶ πειστική, οἷον ἰατρικὴ περὶ (29) ὑγιεινῶν καὶ νοσερῶν, καὶ γεωμετρία περὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα (30) πάθη τοῖς μεγέθεσι, καὶ ἀριθμητικὴ περὶ ἀριθμῶν, ὁμοίως δὲ (31) καὶ αἱ λοιπαὶ τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν· ἡ δὲ ῥητορικὴ (32) περὶ τοῦ δοθέντος ὡς εἰπεῖν δοκεῖ δύνασθαι θεωρεῖν τὸ πιθα(33)νόν, διὸ καί φαμεν αὐτὴν οὐ περί τι γένος ἴδιον ἀφωρισμέ(34)νον ἔχειν τὸ τεχνικόν.

وهذا ليس عمل شى من الصناعات الأخرى لان تلك الاخر انما تكون كل واحد منها معلمة ومقنعة فى الامور تحتها فالطب يعلم ويقنع فى انواع الصحة والمرض والهندسة فى الاشكال التى تحدث فى الاجسام و الحساب في ضروب الاعداد وكذلك سائر الصناعات والعلوم الاخر فأما الريطورية فقد يظن أنها هي التي تتكلف الإقناع في الأمر يعرض كائنا ما كان ولذلك ما لا ننتسبها ⁴ إلى جنس أصلي منفرد حتى تكون لها تلك الصناعة خاصة

4. ننتَسبها MS read. AB : ننسبها MS read. B : ينسب بها em. L.

. . . .

Hoc enim nullius alterius artis est opus; unaqueque enim aliarum artium de proprio subiecto est docibilis et credibilis ut medicina circa sana et egra, et geometria circa passiones accidentes magnitudinibus, arismetica circa numeros, similiter autem et relique artium et scientiarum; rethorica vero circa traditum ut dicam videtur posse videre probabile; ideoque diximus ipsam non circa genus proprium determinatum habere artificiale.

Hoc enim nullius alterius artis opus est; aliarum enim unaqueque circa suum subiectum est doctrinativa et fidemfactiva, puta medicinalis de sanis et egris, et geometria circa passiones accidentes magnitudinibus, et arithmetica circa numerum, similiter autem et relique artium et scientiarum; rethorica autem de data ut est dicere videtur posse considerare persuasibile, propter quod et dicimus ipsam non circa aliquod genus proprium determinatum habere artificialitatem.

This is not a function of any other art. Every other art can instruct or persuade about its own particular subject—matter; for instance, medicine about what is healthy and unhealthy, geometry about the properties of magnitudes, arithmetic about numbers, and the same is true of the other arts and sciences. But rhetoric we look upon as the power of observing the means of persuasion on almost any subject presented to us; and that is why we say that, in its technical character, it is not concerned with any special or definite class of subjects.

(35) τῶν δὲ πίστεων αἱ μὲν ἄτεχνοί εἰσιν αἱ δ’ ἔντεχνοι. ἄτεχνα (36) δὲ λέγω ὅσα μὴ δι’ ἡμῶν πεπόρισται ἀλλὰ προϋπῆρχεν, οἷον (37) μάρτυρες βάσανοι συγγραφαὶ καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἔντεχνα δὲ (38) ὅσα διὰ τῆς μεθόδου καὶ δι’ ἡμῶν κατασκευασθῆναι δυνατόν, (39) ὥστε δεῖ τούτων τοῖς μὲν χρήσασθαι, τὰ δὲ εὑρεῖν.

فأما التصديقات فمنها بصناعة ومنها بغير صناعة وقد أعني باللاتي ⁵ بغير صناعة تلك اللاتي ⁶ ليست تكون بحيلة منا لكن بأمور متقدمة كمثل الشهود والعذاب والكتب والصكاك وما أشبه ذلك وأما اللاتي بالصناعة فما أمكن إعداده وتثبيته على ما ينبغي بالحيلة وبأنفسنا فمن هذه الآن ما ينبغي أن يستعمل استعمالا ومنها ما ينبغي أن يستخرج استخراجا

5. بالاتى MS 6. الاتى MS

. . . .

Fidei vero hec quidem est inartificialis, hec vero artificialis. Inartificialia dico quecumque non per nos inveniuntur, sed ante fuerunt, ut testes tormenta conscripture et quot huiusmodi, artificiales vero quecumque per scientiam et per nos construi possibile, quare oportet horum hiis quidem uti, hcc autem invenire.

Persuasionum autem hee quidem inartificiales sunt, hee autem artificiales. Inartificialia autem dico quecumque non per nos acquisita sunt, sed preextiterunt, ut puta testes extorta conscriptiones et quecumque talia, artificialia autem quecumque per methodum et per nos effici possibile est; quare oportet horum hiis quidem uti, hec autem invenire.

Of the modes of persuasion some belong strictly to the art of rhetoric and some do not. By the latter I mean such things as are not supplied by the speaker but are there at the outset—witnesses, evidence given under torture, written contracts, and so on. By the former I mean such as we can ourselves construct by means of the principles of rhetoric. The one kind has merely to be used, the other has to be invented.

(1356a1) τῶν δὲ διὰ τοῦ λόγου ποριζομένων πίστεων τρία εἴδη (2) ἔστιν· αἱ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἐν τῷ ἤθει τοῦ λέγοντος, αἱ δὲ (3) ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατὴν διαθεῖναί πως, αἱ δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ (4) λόγῳ διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι ἢ φαίνεσθαι δεικνύναι. διὰ μὲν (5) οὖν τοῦ ἤθους, ὅταν οὕτω λεχθῇ ὁ λόγος ὥστε ἀξιό(6)πιστον ποιῆσαι τὸν λέγοντα· τοῖς γὰρ ἐπιεικέσι πιστεύομεν (7) μᾶλλον καὶ θᾶττον, περὶ πάντων μὲν ἁπλῶς, ἐν οἷς δὲ τὸ (8) ἀκριβὲς μὴ ἔστιν ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀμφιδοξεῖν, καὶ παντελῶς.

فأما التصديقات التي يحتال لها بالكلام فإنها أنواع ثلاثة فمنها ما يكون بكيفية المتكلم وسمته ⁷ ومنها ما يكون بتهيئة للسامع واستدراجه نحو الأمر ومنها ما يكون بالكلام نفسه قبل التثبيت فأما بالكيفية والسمت فأن يكون الكلام بنحو يجعل المتكلم أهلا أن يصدق ويقبل قوله والصالحون هم المصدقون سريعا بالأكثر في جميع الأمور الظاهرة فأما التي ليس فيها أمر قاطع ولكن وقوف بين ظنين

7. المتكلم وسمته MS read. AB pace B and L

. . . . .

Fidei autem per sermones procedentis tres species sunt; hec quidem sunt in consuetudine sermonis, hec vero in disponendo auditorem qualiter, hec vero in ipso sermone propter demonstrare aut apparere demonstrare. Per consuetudinem quidem, quando utique sic dicitur sermo quod dicentem faciat fide dignum; modestis namque credimus magis et minus, de omnibus quidem manifeste, in quibus vero certum non est sed utrumlibet opinari, et omnino.

Earum autem que per orationem acquiruntur fidierum tres species sunt; hec quidem enim sunt in more loquentis, hec autem in eo quod est auditorem disponi aliqualiter, hee vera in ipsa oratione per hoc quod ostendit aut videtur ostendere. Per morem quidem, cum sic dicatur oratio ut faciat dicentem dignum fide; modestis enim credimus magis et celerius, de omnibus quidem simpliciter, in quibus autem certitudo non est, sed utrimque opinari, et penitus.

Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word there are three kinds. The first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker; the second on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind; the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself. Persuasion is achieved by the speaker’s personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible. We believe good men more fully and more readily than others: this is true generally whatever the question is, and absolutely true where exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided.

δεῖ (9) δὲ καὶ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν διὰ τοῦ λόγου, ἀλλὰ μὴ διὰ τοῦ (10) προδεδοξάσθαι ποιόν τινα εἶναι τὸν λέγοντα· οὐ γάρ, ὥσπερ (11) ἔνιοι τῶν τεχνολογούντων τιθέασιν ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ καὶ τὴν ἐπι(12)είκειαν τοῦ λέγοντος, ὡς οὐδὲν συμβαλλομένην πρὸς τὸ πιθα(13)νόν, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν κυριωτάτην ἔχει πίστιν τὸ ἦθος.

فإن هذا النحو أيضا مما ينبغي أن يكون تثبيته بالكلام لا بما ذكرنا آنفا من كيفية المتكلم وسمته غير أنه ليس كما ظن أناس من الحذاق بالكلام حين أضافوا الأناة إلى باب التشجع كأنه لا غناء فيها عند الإقناع بل الكيفية والسمت قريب من أن يكون له التصديق بالحقيقة

. . .

Oportet autem et hoc contingere per sermonem, sed propter hoc quod non existimamus prius qualem esse quendam dicentem; non enim, quemadmodum quidam sermocinantium artificialiter apposuerunt in arte modestiam dicentis, sicut non proficientem ad probabile, sed fere ut dicam magis propriam habet fidem consuetudo.

Oportet autem et hoc accidere non per orationem, sed propter preopinari qualem quendam esse dicentem; non enim sicut quidam orationum artem tradentium apponunt in arte modestiam dicentis, tamquam nichil conferentem ad persuasibilitatem, sed fere ut est dicere principalissimam habet fidem mos.

This kind of persuasion, like the others, should be achieved by what the speaker says, not by what people think of his character before he begins to speak. It is not true, as some writers assume in their treatises on rhetoric, that the personal goodness revealed by the speaker contributes nothing to his power of persuasion; on the contrary, his character may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion he possesses.

(14) διὰ δὲ τῶν ἀκροατῶν, ὅταν εἰς πάθος ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου προ(15)αχθῶσιν· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀποδίδομεν τὰς κρίσεις λυπούμενοι (16) καὶ χαίροντες, ἢ φιλοῦντες καὶ μισοῦντες· πρὸς ὃ καὶ μόνον (17) πειρᾶσθαί φαμεν πραγματεύεσθαι τοὺς νῦν τεχνολογοῦντας. (18) περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων δηλωθήσεται καθ’ ἕκαστον, ὅταν περὶ τῶν (19) παθῶν λέγωμεν,

وأما بتهيئة السامع فحين يستميله الكلام إلى شيء من الآلام المعترية فإنه ليس إعطاؤنا الأحكام في حال الفرح والحزن ومع المحبة والبغضة سواء ذلك هو الذى نزعم أن هؤلاء الحذاق بالكلام قصدوا له فقط بالمشيئة والحيلة ونحن مبينون عن هذه المعاني شيئا شيئا عند قولنا في الآلام المعترية

. . . .

Per auditores autem, cum utique ad passionem a sermone deferuntur; non enim similiter tradimus indicia tristabiles et gaudentes, aut amantes et odientes; ad quod et solum, [et] dicimus, nituntur negotiari artificialiter sermocinantes. De hiis igitur explanabitur unumquodque, cum de passionibus dicemus;

Per auditores autem, cum in passionem per orationem perducti fuerint; non enim similiter reddimus iudicia tristes et gaudentes, vel amantes et odientes; ad quod et solum dicimus eos qui orationum artem tradiderunt temptasse negotiari. De hiis quidem igitur declarabitur secundum unumquodque, quando de passionibus dicemus;

Secondly, persuasion may come through the hearers, when the speech stirs their emotions. Our judgements when we are pleased and friendly are not the same as when we are pained and hostile. It is towards producing these effects, as we maintain, that present—day writers on rhetoric direct the whole of their efforts. This subject shall be treated in detail when we come to speak of the emotions.

διὰ δὲ τοῦ λόγου πιστεύουσιν, ὅταν ἀληθὲς (20) ἢ φαινόμενον δείξωμεν ἐκ τῶν περὶ ἕκαστα πιθανῶν. (20) ἐπεὶ (21) δ’ αἱ πίστεις διὰ τούτων εἰσί, φανερὸν ὅτι ταύτας ἐστὶ λαβεῖν (22) τοῦ συλλογίσασθαι δυναμένου καὶ τοῦ θεωρῆσαι περὶ τὰ (23) ἤθη καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τρίτον [τοῦ] περὶ τὰ πάθη, τί τε (24) ἕκαστόν ἐστιν τῶν παθῶν καὶ ποῖόν τι, καὶ ἐκ τίνων ἐγγίνεται (25) καὶ πῶς, ὥστε συμβαίνει τὴν ῥητορικὴν οἷον παραφυές τι (26) τῆς διαλεκτικῆς εἶναι καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἤθη πραγματείας, ἣν (27) δίκαιόν ἐστι προσαγορεύειν πολιτικήν. διὸ καὶ ὑποδύεται (28) ὑπὸ τὸ σχῆμα τὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς ἡ ῥητορικὴ καὶ οἱ ἀντι(29)ποιούμενοι ταύτης τὰ μὲν δι’ ἀπαιδευσίαν, τὰ δὲ δι’ ἀλαζο(30)νείαν, τὰ δὲ καὶ δι’ ἄλλας αἰτίας ἀνθρωπικάς· ἔστι γὰρ μόριόν (31) τι τῆς διαλεκτικῆς καὶ ὁμοίωμα, καθάπερ καὶ ἀρχόμενοι εἴπομεν· (32) περὶ οὐδενὸς γὰρ ὡρισμένου οὐδετέρα αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη (33) πῶς ἔχει, ἀλλὰ δυνάμεις τινὲς τοῦ πορίσαι λόγους.

وأما ما يكون من التصديق من قبل الكلام نفسه فحين نثبت حقا أو ما يرى حقا من الإقناعات فى الأمور المفردة وإذ كانت التصديقات تكون بهذه الوجوه فهو معلوم أنه إنما يقدر على تناول هذه الذى يستطيع ان يفعل السلجسة والذى يبصر مذاهب الأخلاق والفضائل والثالثة معرفة الآلام وذلك أن يعرف كل واحد من الآلام ما هو وأى شيء وممَ يكون وكيف يكون فقد يعرض للريطورية أن تكون بمنزلة التركيب من الديالقطيقية والصناعة الخليقية التى قد تستحق أن تسمى الفوليطية فإن الريطورية قد تدخل فى شكل الفوليطية وقد يعلقها الذين علقوها أما بعض فمن عدم الأدب وأما بعض فمن الخيلاء والأبهة مع علل أخرى إنسية فهي كما وصفنا فى مبتدأ قولنا جزء من الديالقطيقية وشبيهة بها من قبل أنها فى الكل فأما فى شيء واحد محدود كالعلم المحيط بكمية ما هو عليه فليست واحدة منهما كذلك لكن قوة تتلطف للكلام

. . . . . . .

per sermones quidem credunt, quando utique verum aut apparens demonstrabimus [et] ex probabilibus circa unumquodque. Cum autem fides per hec sint, palam quoniam hec tria est accipere habendi potentiam sillogizandi et sciendi que sunt circa consuetudines et virtutes et tertium que circa passiones, quid autem sit quelibet passionum et quale quid, et ex quibus fiunt et quomodo, sicut contingit rethoricam tamquam innatam partem quandam dialetice esse et negotii quod est circa consuetudinem, quam iustum est appellare civilem. Ideoque induitur rethorica habitum eius que est civilis et qui contradicunt hanc hec quidem per ignorantiam, hec quidem per superbiam, hec autem et per alias causas humanas; est enim pars quedam dialetice et similis, quemadmodum et incipientes diximus; nullius enim determinati neutra istarum scientia quomodo se habet, sed paten tie quedam habundandi sermonibus.

per orationes autem credimus, quando verum aut apparens ostenderimus ex probabilibus circa singula. Quoniam autem persuasiones per hec sunt, manifestum quod hec tria est accipere eius qui sillogizare potest et considerare que circa mores et virtutes et tertio que circa passiones, quid sit unaqueque passionum et quale quid, et ex quibus fiat et quomodo; quare accidit rethoricam velut adnatam partem quandam dialetice esse et negotii quod circa mores, quod iustum est appellare politicum. Propter quod et induit figuram politice rethorica et contrafacti huius quantum ad hec quidem propter ineruditionem, et quantum ad alia propter iactantiam, quantum ad alia vero et propter alias causas humanas; est enim pars quedam dialetice et similis, sicut et incipientes diximus; de nullo enim determinato neutra harum est scientia qualiter habet, sed quedam potentie optinendi orationes.

Thirdly, persuasion is effected through the speech itself when we have proved a truth or an apparent truth by means of the persuasive arguments suitable to the case in question. There are, then, these three means of effecting persuasion. The man who is to be in command of them must, it is clear, be able (1) to reason logically, (2) to understand human character and goodness in their various forms, and (3) to understand the emotions — that is, to name them and describe them, to know their causes and the way in which they are excited. It thus appears that rhetoric is an offshoot of dialectic and also of ethical studies. Ethical studies may fairly be called political; and for this reason rhetoric masquerades as political science, and the professors of it as political experts — sometimes from want of education, sometimes from ostentation, sometimes owing to other human failings. As a matter of fact, it is a branch of dialectic and similar to it, as we said at the outset. Neither rhetoric nor dialectic is the scientific study of any one separate subject: both are faculties for providing arguments.

(34) περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτῶν, καὶ πῶς ἔχουσι (35) πρὸς ἀλλήλας, εἴρηται σχεδὸν ἱκανῶς· τῶν δὲ διὰ τοῦ δει(36)κνύναι ἢ φαίνεσθαι δεικνύναι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς δια(1356b1)λεκτικοῖς τὸ μὲν ἐπαγωγή ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ συλλογισμός, τὸ δὲ (2) φαινόμενος συλλογισμός, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ὁμοίως· ἔστιν γὰρ τὸ μὲν (3) παράδειγμα ἐπαγωγή, τὸ δ’ ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμός, τὸ δὲ φαι(4)νόμενον ἐνθύμημα φαινόμενος συλλογισμός.

أما فى قوتهن ومنزلة إحداهن من الأخرى فقد قلنا بالقرب قولا كافيا ونحن قائلون الآن في التثبيت وما يرى تثبيتا فالتثبيت كما هو في الديالقطيقية منه الايفاغوغي وهو الاعتبار ومنه ما يرى اعتبارا ومنه السلجسة ومنه ما يرى سلجسة وبهذه الحال يوجد هاهنا أيضا فان البرهان شيء من الاعتبار والتفكير شيء من السلجسة والتفكير الذي يرى سلجسة ترى

. . .

De potentia quidem igitur ipsarum, et qualiter se habeant ad invicem, dictum est fere sufficienter; eorum vero que sunt per demonstrare aut apparere demonstrate, sicut et in dialeticis hoc quidem inductio est, hoc vera sillogismus, aliud autem apparens sillogismus, et hie similiter;

De potentia quidem igitur ipsarum, et quomodo habent ad invicem, dictum est fere sufficienter. Earum autem que per ostendere aut apparere ostendere, sicut et in dialeticis hoc quidem inductio est, hoc autem sillogismus, est enim exemplum quidem inductio, enthymema autem sillogismus.

This is perhaps a sufficient account of their scope and of how they are related to each other. With regard to the persuasion achieved by proof or apparent proof: just as in dialectic there is induction on the one hand and syllogism or apparent syllogism on the other, so it is in rhetoric. The example is an induction, the enthymeme is a syllogism, and the apparent enthymeme is an apparent syllogism.

καλῶ δ’ ἐνθύ(5)μημα μὲν ῥητορικὸν συλλογισμόν, παράδειγμα δὲ ἐπαγωγὴν (6) ῥητορικήν.

و قد أعني بالتفكير السلوجسموس الريطوري و البرهان الاعتبار الريطوري

.

Voco enim entimema quidem rethoricum sillogismum, exemplum vero inductionem rethoricam.

Voco autem enthymema quidem rethoricum sillogismum, exemplum autem rethoricam inductionem.

I call the enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, and the example a rhetorical induction.

πάντες δὲ τὰς πίστεις ποιοῦνται διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι (7) ἢ παραδείγματα λέγοντες ἢ ἐνθυμήματα, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα (8) οὐδέν· ὥστ’ εἴπερ καὶ ὅλως ἀνάγκη ἢ συλλογιζόμενον ἢ (9) ἐπάγοντα δεικνύναι ὁτιοῦν [ἢ ὁντινοῦν] (δῆλον δ’ ἡμῖν τοῦτο (10) ἐκ τῶν Ἀναλυτικῶν), ἀναγκαῖον ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν ἑκατέρῳ (11) τούτων τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι.

فقد يفعلون التصديقات كلها بالتثبيت و ذلك إما بإحضار البرهان و إما بالتفكير لا في شيء آخر سوى في هذين كي يكونوا في الجملة سلجسة فعلوا أو اعتبارا إما أن يثبتوا شيئا وإما أن يكون الشيء موجودا فيثبتوه وهذا بين واضح في كتاب أنولوطيقى فلا بد اضطرار أن يكون كل واحدة من هاتين تحكي كل واحدة من هاتين بل هي فهي ⁸

8. L em. : MS وهى

. .

Omnes autem fidem faciunt propter demonstrare aut exempla dicentes aut entimemata, et extra hec nichil; quare et si universaliter necesse est sillogizantem aut inducentem demonstrate quia igitur aut aliquem igitur (manifestum autem nobis hoc ab Analeticis), necessarium utrumque horum utrique horum idem esse.

Omnes autem persuasiones faciunt per ostendere aut exempla dicentes aut enthymemata, et preter hec nichil; quare si quidem et totaliter necesse sillogizantem aut inducentem ostendere quodcumque aut quemcumque (palam autem nobis hoc ex Analeticis), necessarium utrumque ipsorum utrique horum idem esse.

Every one who effects persuasion through proof does in fact use either enthymemes or examples: there is no other way. And since every one who proves anything at all is bound to use either syllogisms or inductions (and this is clear to us from the Analytics), it must follow that enthymemes are syllogisms and examples are inductions.

(12) τίς δ’ ἐστὶν διαφορὰ παραδείγματος καὶ ἐνθυμήματος, φανε(13)ρὸν ἐκ τῶν Τοπικῶν (ἐκεῖ γὰρ περὶ συλλογισμοῦ καὶ ἐπαγωγῆς (14) εἴρηται πρότερον), ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ πολλῶν καὶ ὁμοίων δείκνυ(15)σθαι ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει ἐκεῖ μὲν ἐπαγωγή ἐστιν ἐνταῦθα δὲ παρά(16)δειγμα, τὸ δὲ τινῶν ὄντων ἕτερόν τι διὰ ταῦτα συμβαίνειν (17) παρὰ ταῦτα τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι ἢ καθόλου ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ (18) ἐκεῖ μὲν συλλογισμὸς ἐνταῦθα δὲ ἐνθύμημα καλεῖται.

فأما معنى السلوجسموس ما هو وما الفصل بينه وبين البرهان فمعلوم من كتاب طوبيقا فإنا قد أنبأنا هناك عن السلوجيسموس وعن الاعتبار فالنحو الذي يكون بإثبات أن هذا هكذا في شيئين متشابهين هو هناك اعتبارا وهو هاهنا برهان والنحو الذى يكون بأن يكون شيء موضوع يحدث من أجله شيء آخر سوى ذلك الموضوع بذلك الموضوع نفسه إما بالكلية وإما بالأكثر فهو هناك سلوجسموس وهو هاهنا يسمى تفكيرا

. . .

Quod autem est differentia exempli et entimematis, manifestum ex Topicis (illic enim de sillogismo et induetione dictum est prius), quoniam quidem in demonstrando in pluribus et paucis quod sic se habet ibi enim inductio est, hie autem exemplum, hoc autem quibusdam entibus alterum aliquid preter hec accidere propter ista eo quod hec sint universaliter aut ut in pluribus ibi quidem sillogismus, hie autem enthymema vacatur.

Que autem est difierentia exempli et enthymematis, manifestum ex Topicis (ibi enim de sillogismo et inductione dictum est prius), quia hoc quidem in multis et similibus ostendere quod sic habet ibi quidem inductio est, hic autem exemplum, quibusdam autem existentibus aliud aliquid per hec aeeidere et propter hec esse hee universalia aut ut in pluribus illic quidem sillogismus hic autem entimema vacatur.

The difference between example and enthymeme is made plain by the passages in the Topics where induction and syllogism have already been discussed. When we base the proof of a proposition on a number of similar cases, this is induction in dialectic, example in rhetoric; when it is shown that, certain propositions being true, a further and quite distinct proposition must also be true in consequence, whether invariably or usually, this is called syllogism in dialectic, enthymeme in rhetoric.

φα(19)νερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἑκάτερον ἔχει ἀγαθὸν τὸ εἶδος τῆς (20) ῥητορείας· καθάπερ γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς μεθοδικοῖς εἴρηται, καὶ ἐν (21) τούτοις ὁμοίως ἔχει· εἰσὶν γὰρ αἱ μὲν παραδειγματώδεις ῥη(22)τορεῖαι αἱ δὲ ἐνθυμηματικαί, καὶ ῥήτορες ὁμοίως οἱ μὲν (23) παραδειγματώδεις οἱ δὲ ἐνθυμηματικοί.

فهو معلوم أن فيهما جميعا نوعا ريطوريا وكما يوجد هذان الأمران في هذه الحيل التي ذكرنا كذلك يوجد في هذه الحيلة أيضا فإن الريطوريات منهن برهانيات ومنهن تفكيرات وكذلك توجد البرهانيات فإن هذه أيضا منها برهانية ومنها تفكيرية

. . .

Manifestum autem quoniam utrum que habet bonum species rethorice; sicut in disciplinalibus dictum est, et in hiis similiter se habet; sunt enim hec quidem exemplares rethorice, hec vero entimematice, et rethores similiter hii quidem exemplares, hii vero entimematici.

Manifestum autem et quod utrumque habet species rethoric; sicut autem et in methodicis dictum est, et in hiis similiter habet; sunt enim hec quidem exemplares rethorie, hec autem enthymematice, et rethores similiter hii quidem exemplares, hii autem enthymematici.

It is plain also that each of these types of oratory has its advantages. Types of oratory, I say: for what has been said in the Methodics applies equally well here; in some oratorical styles examples prevail, in others enthymemes; and in like manner, some orators are better at the former and some at the latter.

πιθανοὶ μὲν οὖν οὐχ (24) ἧττον οἱ λόγοι οἱ διὰ τῶν παραδειγμάτων, θορυβοῦνται δὲ (25) μᾶλλον οἱ ἐνθυμηματικοί· τὴν δ’ αἰτίαν [αὐτῶν], καὶ πῶς (26) ἑκατέρῳ χρηστέον, ἐροῦμεν ὕστερον· νῦν δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων (27) μᾶλλον διορίσωμεν καθαρῶς.

وأما الإقناع خاصة فقد يكون فيه من الكلام على جهة البرهان غير قليل وإنما يكون الشغب الأكثر في تلك التفكيرات فأما البيان عن علتها وكيف ينبغي أن يستعملا جميعا فنحن صائرون إليه بآخرة فأما الآن فإنا بالحري أن نجرد القول في تحديدهما

. . .

Probabiles autem nichilominus sermones qui sunt per exempla, perturbantur vero magis et qui entimematici; causam autem ipsorum, et qualiter utroque utendum, dicemus posterius; nunc autem de hiis huiusmodi magis determinemus sincere.

Persuasibiles quidem igitur non minus orationes que per exempla, turbantur autem magis enthymematice; causam autem ipsorum, et quomodo utroque utendum, dicemus posterius; nunc autem de ipsis hiis magis determinemus liquido.

Speeches that rely on examples are as persuasive as the other kind, but those which rely on enthymemes excite the louder applause. The sources of examples and enthymemes, and their proper uses, we will discuss later. Our next step is to define the processes themselves more clearly.

(28) ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ πιθανὸν τινὶ πιθανόν ἐστι, καὶ τὸ μὲν εὐθὺς (29) ὑπάρχει δι’ αὑτὸ πιθανὸν καὶ πιστὸν τὸ δὲ τῷ δείκνυσθαι δοκεῖν (30) διὰ τοιούτων, οὐδεμία δὲ τέχνη σκοπεῖ τὸ καθ’ ἕκαστον, οἷον ἡ (31) ἰατρικὴ τί Σωκράτει τὸ ὑγιεινόν ἐστιν ἢ Καλλίᾳ, ἀλλὰ τί τῷ (32) τοιῷδε ἢ τοῖς τοιοῖσδε (τοῦτο γὰρ ἔντεχνον, τὸ δὲ καθ’ ἕκαστον (33) ἄπειρον καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστητόν), οὐδὲ ἡ ῥητορικὴ τὸ καθ’ ἕκαστον (34) ἔνδοξον θεωρήσει, οἷον Σωκράτει ἢ Ἱππίᾳ, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοισδί, (35) καθάπερ καὶ ἡ διαλεκτική.

فإن المقنع يكون مقنعا لمرئ من الناس فمنه ما يكون من ساعته التصديق للسامع ومنه ما يكون بالتثبيت فانه هكذى وليس هكذى ومنه ما يكون من قبل أن المخاطب يرى هذه المفردات والجزئيات من الصناعة كقول القائل إن علاج كذى شفى لسوقراطيس أو لقيلياس غير أنا إذا قلنا لكذى ومثل كذى فتلك حينئذ صناعة فأما التي لكل واحد فإنها غير متناهية ولا معلومة وليست أيضا صفة الريطورية أنها التي تبصر المحمودات عند كل واحد من الناس مثل سقراطيس أو إيفياس لكن المحمود على ما هو للديالقطيقية

. . . . .

Quoniam enim probabile cuidam probabile est, et rectum quidem per se ipsum probabile et credibile, hoc autem quod videtur demonstrari per huiusmodi; nulla vero ars scrutatur singulare ut medicina quid Socrati sanum est aut Callie, sed quid huic [quidem hiis] aut quid hiis (hoe enim artificiale, singulare vera infinitum nec scibile) nec rethorica singulare opinabile inquirit, ut Socrati aut Yppie, sed quid hiis autem, sicut dialetica.

Quoniam enim persuasibile alicui persuasibile est, et hoc quidem confestim existit propter se persuasibile et credibile, hoc autem eo quod videatur ostendi per talia, nulla autem ars considerat particulare, puta medicinalis quid Socrati sanum est aut Callie, sed quid tali aut talibus (hoc enim artificiale, quod autem secundum unumquodque infinitum et non scibile), neque rethorica quod secundum unumquemque probabile considerabit, ut Socrati vel Ippie, sed quod talibus, sicut dialetica.

A statement is persuasive and credible either because it is directly self—evident or because it appears to be proved from other statements that are so. In either case it is persuasive because there is somebody whom it persuades. But none of the arts theorize about individual cases. Medicine, for instance, does not theorize about what will help to cure Socrates or Callias, but only about what will help to cure any or all of a given class of patients: this alone is business: individual cases are so infinitely various that no systematic knowledge of them is possible. In the same way the theory of rhetoric is concerned not with what seems probable to a given individual like Socrates or Hippias, but with what seems probable to men of a given type; and this is true of dialectic also.

καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνη συλλογίζεται οὐκ (36) ἐξ ὧν ἔτυχεν (φαίνεται γὰρ ἄττα καὶ τοῖς παραληροῦσιν), (37) ἀλλ’ ἐκείνη μὲν ἐκ τῶν λόγου δεομένων, ἡ δὲ ῥητορικὴ ἐκ (1357a1) τῶν ἤδη βουλεύεσθαι εἰωθότων.

فإنها هي أيضا تفعل السلجسة ليس من أي شيء كان فإن هذا النحو مما قد نراه وقد ننطق بما شئنا وهوينا لكل تلك يحتاج فيها إلى ذوات المنطق فأما الريطورية فيحتاج فيها إلى الاتي قد اعتيد قبولها والتصديق بها من قبل

. .

Et enim ipsa sillogizat non ex quibus contingit (videntur autem quedam et fatuis), sed illa quidern ex convenientibus sermoni, rethorica vero ex consuetis utique deliberare.

Et enim ilia sillogizat non ex quibuscumque (videntur enim quedam et deliris), sed ilia quidem ex rationi oportunis, rethorica autem ex iam consuetis consiliari.

Dialectic does not construct its syllogisms out of any haphazard materials, such as the fancies of crazy people, but out of materials that call for discussion; and rhetoric, too, draws upon the regular subjects of debate.

[I.2.12] ἔστιν δὲ τὸ ἔργον αὐτῆς περί (2) τε τοιούτων περὶ ὧν βουλευόμεθα καὶ τέχνας μὴ ἔχομεν, (3) καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀκροαταῖς οἳ οὐ δύνανται διὰ πολλῶν (4) συνορᾶν οὐδὲ λογίζεσθαι πόρρωθεν. βουλευόμεθα δὲ περὶ τῶν (5) φαινομένων ἐνδέχεσθαι ἀμφοτέρως ἔχειν· περὶ γὰρ τῶν (6) ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἢ γενέσθαι ἢ ἔσεσθαι ἢ ἔχειν οὐδεὶς βου(7)λεύεται οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνων· οὐδὲν γὰρ πλέον.

فإن عملها ⁹ فيما كان هكذا من الكلام أي فيما قد نتعمد ولا ¹⁰ تكون لنا فيه صناعة وفي هذا النحو من السامعين أى الذين لا يستطيعون أن يبصروا الأمور عن مراتب كثيرة ولا يفعلوا السلجسة من بُعد وأما المشورة فإنها تكون فيما يمكن أن يرى على جهتين فأما المشاور فيما لا يمكن أن يكون بحال أخرى فلا فضل فيه فيما أحسب

9. عملها em. L : علمها MS 10. ولا em. L : الا MS.

. . .

Est autem opus ipsius de hiis de quibus deliberamus et artes non habemus, et in hiis auditores qui non possunt per multa conspicere neque delonge sillogizare. Deliberamus autern de apparentibus contingenter utrimque se habere, de impossibilibus enim aliter aut fieri aut esse aut se habere nullus deliberat sic existimans. Non enim plura.

Est autem opus ipsius et de talibus de quibus consiliamur et artes non habemus, et inter tales auditores qui non possunt per multa conspicere neque ratiocinari a longe. Consiliamur autem de hiis que videntur contingere utroque modo se habere; de impossibilibus enim aliter aut facta esse aut fore aut habere nullus consiliatur ita existirnans; nichil enim plus;

The duty of rhetoric is to deal with such matters as we deliberate upon without arts or systems to guide us, in the hearing of persons who cannot take in at a glance a complicated argument, or follow a long chain of reasoning. The subjects of our deliberation are such as seem to present us with alternative possibilities: about things that could not have been, and cannot now or in the future be, other than they are, nobody who takes them to be of this nature wastes his time in deliberation.

[I.2.13] ἐνδέχεται (8) δὲ συλλογίζεσθαι καὶ συνάγειν τὰ μὲν ἐκ συλλελογισμέ(9)νων πρότερον, τὰ δ’ ἐξ ἀσυλλογίστων μέν, δεομένων δὲ συλ(10)λογισμοῦ διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἔνδοξα, ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτων τὸ μὲν (11) μὴ εἶναι εὐεπακολούθητον διὰ τὸ μῆκος (ὁ γὰρ κριτὴς ὑπό(12)κειται εἶναι ἁπλοῦς), τὰ δὲ μὴ πιθανὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐξ ὁμο(13)λογουμένων εἶναι μηδ’ ἐνδόξων, ὥστ’ ἀναγκαῖον τό τε ἐνθύ(14)μημα εἶναι καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα περί τε τῶν ἐνδεχομένων (15) ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ἔχειν ἄλλως, τὸ μὲν παράδειγμα ἐπαγω(16)γὴν τὸ δ’ ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμόν, καὶ ἐξ ὀλίγων τε καὶ (17) πολλάκις ἐλαττόνων ἢ ἐξ ὧν ὁ πρῶτος συλλογισμός· ἐὰν γὰρ (18) ᾖ τι τούτων γνώριμον, οὐδὲ δεῖ λέγειν· αὐτὸς γὰρ τοῦτο προσ(19)τίθησιν ὁ ἀκροατής, οἷον ὅτι Δωριεὺς στεφανίτην ἀγῶνα νενίκη(20)κεν· ἱκανὸν γὰρ εἰπεῖν ὅτι Ὀλύμπια νενίκηκεν, τὸ δ’ ὅτι στεφανί(21)της τὰ Ὀλύμπια οὐδὲ δεῖ προσθεῖναι· γιγνώσκουσι γὰρ πάντες.

وقد يمكن أن يكون فعل السلجسة والجمع حسنا مجازا أما في بعض فمن اللاتي قد كانت سلوجسمية أولا وأما في بعض فمن اللاتي لم تكن سلوجسمية وهى محتاجة إلى السلوجسموس بما أنها لم تكن محمودة ولا بد اضطرارا أن يكون فى هذه ما لا يسهل تأليفه وتوصيله من أجل الطول والكثرة فإن الحاكم يشكر على أن يكون الكلام بسيطا مرسلا وأما لا مقنع فالذى لا يقر به ¹¹ أنه كائن أو محمود فلا محالة إذا إن التفكير والبرهان معا يكونان فى الأمور التى إذ هي بحال ما قد يمكن أن تكون أخرى مثلهما بغير تلك الحال فأما البرهان فالاعتبار وأما التفكير فالسلوجسموس ثم من القلائل والوجوه أكثر ذلك أو من اللاتي منها السلوجسموس أو الشكل الأول فإن كان شيء مما يستدل عليه بالمعنى المقول فليس ينبغي أن يذكر البتة كأن ¹² السامع يفطن بذلك فيضيفه إلى المعنى وذلك كما قيل إن داريوس كان يظفر ظفرا مكللا فقد كان يكتفي بأن يقال ظفرا فأما المكلل فلم يكن ينبغى أن يزاد إليه لأنهم جميعا يعرفون ذلك

11. يقر به : H's exemplar or H's reading has نعرفه (nescimus). 12. كأن MS : فإن em L.

. . . . . . . . . .

Contingit autem sillogizare et congregare hec quidem ex sillogizatis prius, hec vero ex non sillogizatis, indigentibus autem sillogismo ex eo quod non sunt opinabilia, necesse autem horum hec quidem non esse bene consequentia propter longitudinem (iudex enim supponitur esse universaliter), hec vera non probabilia ex eo quod non ex confessis sunt neque opinabilibus, quare necessarium est entimema esse et exemplum de contingentibus autem sicut in plnribus se habere, sed exemplum quidem tamquam inductionem, entimema quidem sicut sillogismum, et ex paucis autem et multociens minimis aut ex quibus primus sillogismus; si enim fuerit aliquid horum cognitum, non oportet dicere; ipse enim auditor hoc proponit, ut, quod Dorieus coronatur in agone vicit; sufficiens est dicere quoniam Olimpia vicit, quod coronatur in Olimpiadibus non oportet proponi; cognoscunt enim omnes.

aut sic: contingit consiliari et concludere hec quidem ex sillogizatis prius, hec autem ex non sillogizatis, oportunis autem sillogismo propterea quod non sunt opinata, necesse autem horum hec quidem non esse bene assequibilia propter longitudinem (iudex enim supponitur esse simplex), hec autem non persuasibilia propterea quod neque ex confessis sint neque ex opinabilibus, quare necessarium enthymema esse et exemplum de contingentibus aliter se habere ut multa, exemplum quidem inductionem, enthymema autem sillogismum, et ex paucis et sepe paucioribus quam ex quibus primus sillogismus; si enim sit aliquid horum notum, nichil oportet dicere; ipse enim auditor hoc apponit, puta quod Dorieus coronalem agonem devicit; cognoscunt enim omnes. sufficiens dicere quod Olympia enim devicit, hoc autem quod coronalis Olympia nichil oportet apponere; cognoscunt enim omnes.

It is possible to form syllogisms and draw conclusions from the results of previous syllogisms; or, on the other hand, from premisses which have not been thus proved, and at the same time are so little accepted that they call for proof. Reasonings of the former kind will necessarily be hard to follow owing to their length, for we assume an audience of untrained thinkers; those of the latter kind will fail to win assent, because they are based on premisses that are not generally admitted or believed. The enthymeme and the example must, then, deal with what is in the main contingent, the example being an induction, and the enthymeme a syllogism, about such matters. The enthymeme must consist of few propositions, fewer often than those which make up the normal syllogism. For if any of these propositions is a familiar fact, there is no need even to mention it; the hearer adds it himself. Thus, to show that Dorieus has been victor in a contest for which the prize is a crown, a fact which everybody knows. it is enough to say ‘For he has been victor in the Olympic games’, without adding ‘And in the Olympic games the prize is a crown’, for everybody knows it.

[I.2.14] (22) ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστὶν ὀλίγα μὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐξ ὧν οἱ ῥητορικοὶ (23) συλλογισμοί εἰσι (τὰ γὰρ πολλὰ περὶ ὧν αἱ κρίσεις καὶ αἱ (24) σκέψεις ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν· περὶ ὧν μὲν γὰρ πράτ(25)τουσι βουλεύονται καὶ σκοποῦσι, τὰ δὲ πραττόμενα πάντα (26) τοιούτου γένους ἐστί, καὶ οὐδὲν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἐξ ἀνάγκης (27) τούτων), τὰ δ’ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ συμβαίνοντα καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα (28) ἐκ τοιούτων ἀνάγκη ἑτέρων συλλογίζεσθαι, τὰ δ’ ἀναγκαῖα (29) ἐξ ἀναγκαίων· δῆλον δ’ ἡμῖν καὶ τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν Ἀναλυτι(30)κῶν, φανερὸν ὅτι ἐξ ὧν τὰ ἐνθυμήματα λέγεται, τὰ μὲν (31) ἀναγκαῖα ἔσται, τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, τὰ δ’ (32) ἐνθυμήματα ἐξ εἰκότων καὶ ἐκ σημείων, ὥστε ἀνάγκη τούτων (33) ἑκάτερον ἑκατέρῳ ταὐτὸ εἶναι.

ومن أجل أنه قل ما تكون السلوجسمات الريطورية من الاضطراريات فإن أكثر ما تجري فيه الأحكام والفحص مما قد يمكن أن يكون بحال أخرى وذلك أنه إنما يتشاور المتشاورون فيما يفعلون والمفعولات كلها من هذا الجنس وليس يمكن فى القول ¹³ أن يكون شيء مما يعطي هؤلاء يعرض اضطرارا فلا ¹⁴ بد حينئذ أن يسلجس ¹⁵ من هذه الأخرى فأما الاضطرارية فمن الاضطراريات وهذا بين واضح فى كتاب انولوطيقى فهو معلوم الآن أن من هذه التي تسمى تفكيرات ما هو اضطراري فإن كثيرا منها مما يوجد بالأكثر وقد يؤتى بالتفكيرات من الصادقات ومن الدلائل كي تكون لا محالة كل واحدة من هاتين هي واحدة من تينك

13. after وليس ... القول dittogr. (cancelled, single line). 14. τὰ ... ἐνδεχόμενα not translated. 15. أن يسلجس em AB : من سلجس MS.

. . . . . .

Quoniam autem pauca quidem sunt necessaria ex quibus rethorici sillogismi sunt (plura enim de quibus iudicia et inspectiones contingit et aliter se habere; de quibus autem agunt volunt et provident, quecumque autem aguntur huius generis sunt, et non ut dicam ex necessitate horum), bee vera ut in pluribus accidentia et contingentia ex talibus necesse est aliis sillogizari, necessaria vera ex necessariis (manifestum autem est nobis et hoc ex Analeticis), palam quoniam ex qui bus entimemata dicuntur, entimemata vera ex ycotibus et signis, quare necesse est harum utrumque utrique idem esse.

Quoniam autem sunt pauca quidem necessaria ex quibus rethorici sillogismi sunt (multa enim de quibus iudicia et considerationes contingit et aliter habere; de hiis enim que agunt consiliantur et tractant, que autem aguntur omnia talis generis sunt, et nichil horum ut consequens est dicere ex necessitate), ut in pluribus autem accidentia et contingentia ex talibus alteris necesse sillogizari, necessaria autem ex necessariis (palam aut em nobis et hoc ex Analeticis), manifestum quia ex quibus enthymemata dicuntur, hec quidem necessaria erunt, plurima autem ut in pluribus dicuntur, enthymemata autem ex ykotibus et signis, quare necesse horum utrumque utrique idem esse.

There are few facts of the ‘necessary’ type that can form the basis of rhetorical syllogisms. Most of the things about which we make decisions, and into which therefore we inquire, present us with alternative possibilities. For it is about our actions that we deliberate and inquire, and all our actions have a contingent character; hardly any of them are determined by necessity. Again, conclusions that state what is merely usual or possible must be drawn from premisses that do the same, just as ‘necessary’ conclusions must be drawn from ‘necessary’ premisses; this too is clear to us from the Analytics. It is evident, therefore, that the propositions forming the basis of enthymemes, though some of them may be ‘necessary’, will most of them be only usually true. Now the materials of enthymemes are Probabilities and Signs, which we can see must correspond respectively with the propositions that are generally and those that are necessarily true.

[I.2.15] (34) τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἰκός ἐστι τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γινόμενον, οὐχ (35) ἁπλῶς δὲ καθάπερ ὁρίζονταί τινες, ἀλλὰ τὸ περὶ τὰ ἐν(36)δεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὕτως ἔχον πρὸς ἐκεῖνο πρὸς ὃ εἰκὸς (1357b1) ὡς τὸ καθόλου πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος·

فأما تلك فصادقة وأما هذه فتكون بالأكثر وليس ذلك مرسلا كما حد أناس لكن التي توجد بغير حال الممكنة فتكون منزلتها من تلك كمنزلة الصادقة منها أي كمنزلة الكلية من الجزئية

. .

Ycos enim est sicut in pluribus fiendum, non universaliter quemadmodum determinant, sed circa contingentia aliter se habere sic se habens ad illud ad quod ycos sicut universale ad particulare;

Ykos quidem enim est quod ut in pluribus fit, non simpliciter autem sicut diffiniunt quidam, sed quod circa contingentia aliter habere sic se habet ad illud ad quod ykos ut universale ad particulare;

A Probability is a thing that usually happens; not, however, as some definitions would suggest, anything whatever that usually happens, but only if it belongs to the class of the ‘contingent’ or ‘variable’. It bears the same relation to that in respect of which it is probable as the universal bears to the particular.

[I.2.16] τῶν δὲ σημείων τὸ (2) μὲν οὕτως ἔχει ὡς τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστόν τι πρὸς τὸ καθόλου, (3) τὸ δὲ ὡς τῶν καθόλου τι πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος. τούτων δὲ (4) τὸ μὲν ἀναγκαῖον τεκμήριον, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον ἀνώνυ(5)μόν ἐστι κατὰ τὴν διαφοράν.

فالدلائل منها ما هو بمنزلة الجزء من الكل ¹⁶ وما كان من هذا النحو اضطراريا فهو دلالة وما كان منه غير اضطراري فليس يسمى كالفصل من الفصول

16. τὸ ... μέρος not translated.

. .

signorum autem hoc quidem sic se habet sicut quiddam particularium ad universale, hoc sicut aliquid universalium ad particulare. Horum autem quod necessarium est tecmirium, quod vero non necessarium innominatum est secundum differentiam.

signorum autem hoc quidem sic habet ut aliquod singularium ad universale, hoc autem ut aliquod universalium ad particulare. Horum autem quod quidem necessarium tecmerium, quod autem non necessarium innominatum est secundum differentiam.

Of Signs, one kind bears the same relation to the statement it supports as the particular bears to the universal, the other the same as the universal bears to the particular. The infallible kind is a ‘complete proof’; the fallible kind has no specific name.

[I.2.17] ἀναγκαῖα μὲν οὖν λέγω ἐξ (6) ὧν γίνεται συλλογισμός· διὸ καὶ τεκμήριον τὸ τοιοῦτον τῶν (7) σημείων ἐστίν· ὅταν γὰρ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι οἴωνται λῦσαι τὸ (8) λεχθέν, τότε φέρειν οἴονται τεκμήριον ὡς δεδειγμένον καὶ (9) πεπερασμένον· τὸ γὰρ τέκμαρ καὶ πέρας ταὐτόν ἐστι κατὰ (10) τὴν ἀρχαίαν γλῶτταν.

وقد أعني بالاضطرارية تلك التي تكون منها السلوجسمات وما كان من الدلائل هكذا فهو دلالة فإنهم إذا ظنوا أنهم لا يستطيعون نقض القول المقول رأوا أنه ينبغي أن يأتوا بدلالة هي له مبيّنة محصورة فيه ...¹⁷

17. τὸ ... γλῶτταν not translated.

. . . .

Necessaria quidem igitur dico ex quibus fit sillogismus; ideoque tecmirion huiusmodi signorum est, cum enim non contingere opinantur dissolvere predictum, tunc ferre arbitrantur tecmirium sicut demonstratum et perconclusum. Tecmar quidem et terminus idem sunt secundum antiquam linguam.

Necessaria quidem igitur dico ex quibus fit sillogismus; propter quod et tecmerium est quod tale signarum; quando enim putant non contingere solvere quod dictum est, tunc ferre putant tecmerium tamquam ostensum et terminatum; tecmar enim et terminus idem est secundum antiquam linguam.

By infallible signs I mean those on which syllogisms proper may be based: and this shows us why this kind of Sign is called ‘complete proof’: when people think that what they have said cannot be refuted, they then think that they are bringing forward a ‘complete proof’, meaning that the matter has now been demonstrated and completed; for the word ‘peras’ has the same meaning (of ‘end’ or ‘boundary’) as the word ‘tekmar’ in the ancient tongue.

[I.2.18] ἔστιν δὲ τῶν σημείων τὸ μὲν ὡς (11) τὸ καθ’ ἕκαστον πρὸς τὸ καθόλου ὧδε, οἷον εἴ τις εἴπειεν (12) σημεῖον εἶναι ὅτι οἱ σοφοὶ δίκαιοι, Σωκράτης γὰρ σοφὸς (13) ἦν καὶ δίκαιος. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν σημεῖον, λυτὸν δέ, κἂν (14) ἀληθὲς ᾖ τὸ εἰρημένον (ἀσυλλόγιστον γὰρ), τὸ δέ, οἷον εἴ (15) τις εἴπειεν σημεῖον ὅτι νοσεῖ, πυρέττει γάρ, ἢ τέτοκεν, ὅτι (16) γάλα ἔχει, ἀναγκαῖον.

ومن الرواسم كالجزئي ومنها كالكلي فلتكن للرواسم هاهنا كما لو قال قائل إن الحكماء عدول لأن سقراطس كان حكيما وعدلا فهذا الآن رسم وهو له إن كان هذا القول حقا وليس باضطراري لأنه ليس سلوجسميا وأما ذاك الآخر فكقول القائل في الكد والحمى وقوله ولدت لأن لها لبنا

. . . .

Sunt autem signorum hoc quidem sicut particulare ad universale, ut si quis dicat signum esse quod sapientes iusti, Socrates quidem sapiens igitur iustus. Hoc quidem igitur signum, solubile enim, et verum erit dictum (non sillogizabile enim), hoc vera, ut si quis dicat signum quoniam egrotat, febricitat enim, aut peperit, quoniam lac habet, necessarium est.

Adhuc autem signorum hoc quidem ut singulare ad universale sic, ut si quis dicat signum esse quod sapientes sint iusti, Socrates enim et sapiens erat et iustus. Hoc quidem igitur signum, solvendum autem quod dictum est, et si verum sit (insillogizabile enim), hoc autem, ut si quis dicat signum quod egrotat, febricitat enim, vel peperit, quia lac habet, necessarium.

Now the one kind of Sign (that which bears to the proposition it supports the relation of particular to universal) may be illustrated thus. Suppose it were said, ‘The fact that Socrates was wise and just is a sign that the wise are just’. Here we certainly have a Sign; but even though the proposition be true, the argument is refutable, since it does not form a syllogism. Suppose, on the other hand, it were said, ‘The fact that he has a fever is a sign that he is ill’, or, ‘The fact that she is giving milk is a sign that she has lately borne a child’.

ὅπερ τῶν σημείων τεκμήριον μόνον (17) ἐστίν· μόνον γάρ, ἂν ἀληθὲς ᾖ, ἄλυτόν ἐστιν. τὸ δὲ ὡς τὸ (18) καθόλου πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἔχον, οἷον εἴ τις εἴπειεν ὅτι (19) πυρέττει σημεῖον εἶναι, πυκνὸν γὰρ ἀναπνεῖ. λυτὸν δὲ καὶ (20) τοῦτο, κἂν ἀληθὲς ᾖ· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ καὶ μὴ πυρέττοντα (21) πνευστιᾶν.

فهذا أشد اضطرارا من الرسوم لأنه دلالة للرواسم وهو وحده الصحيح غير المنتقض فأما التي ليست له المفردات المفندات البتة فكما لو قال قائل توسم الحميات أو الرواسم في الولاد أنه يتنفس نفسا متتابعا فهذا أيضا له وإن كان صادقا فقد يمكن أن يكون الإنسان يتنفس نفسا متتابعا وإن لم تكن به حمى وإن المرأة تتنفس نفسا متتابعا وإن لم تكن ولدت

. . . .

Quod signorum tecmirium solum est ; solum enim utique verum erit, et insolubile est. Hoc vero sicut universale ad particulare se habet, ut puta si quis dicat quoniam febricitat signum esse, dense respirat. Solubile enim et hoc, quamquam verum sit; contingit autem et non febricitanti pneustian.

Quod quidem signorum solum tecmerium est; solum enim, cum verum sit, insolubile est. Hoc autem ut universale ad particulare se habet, ut si quis dicat quod febricitat signum esse, spissim enim respirat. Solubile enim et hoc, et si verum sit; contingit enim et non febricitantem spissim respirare.

Here we have the infallible kind of Sign, the only kind that constitutes a complete proof, since it is the only kind that, if the particular statement is true, is irrefutable. The other kind of Sign, that which bears to the proposition it supports the relation of universal to particular, might be illustrated by saying, ‘The fact that he breathes fast is a sign that he has a fever’. This argument also is refutable, even if the statement about the fast breathing be true, since a man may breathe hard without having a fever.

τί μὲν οὖν εἰκός ἐστι καὶ τί σημεῖον καὶ (22) τεκμήριον, καὶ τί διαφέρουσιν, εἴρηται μὲν καὶ νῦν, μᾶλ(23)λον δὲ φανερῶς καὶ περὶ τούτων, καὶ διὰ τίν’ αἰτίαν τὰ (24) μὲν ἀσυλλόγιστά ἐστι τὰ δὲ συλλελογισμένα, ἐν τοῖς Ἀνα(25)λυτικοῖς διώρισται περὶ αὐτῶν.

أما ما الصادق وما الرواسم وما الدلالة وما الفرق بينهن فقد بينا عنه هاهنا أيضا وأما كنه البيان وحقيقته ففي أنولوطيقى وأخبرنا أن من هذه أيضا ما هو لعلة من العلل غير ذي سلوجسموس ومنها ما هو مسلجس وحددنا ذلك وبيناه

. .

Quid igitur ycos est et quid signum et quid tecmirium, et quid differant, dictum est quidem nunc, et magis autem manifestum et de hiis, et propter quam causam hec quidem sillogizabilia sunt, hec quidem sillogizata, in Analeticis determinatum est de ipsis.

Quid igitur est ykos et quid signum et quid tecmerium, et quid differunt, dictum est quidem et nunc, magis autem manifeste et de hiis, et propter quam causam hec quidem insillogizabilia sunt, hec autem sillogizata, in Analeticis determinatum est de ipsis.

It has, then, been stated above what is the nature of a Probability, of a Sign, and of a complete proof, and what are the differences between them. In the Analytics a more explicit description has been given of these points; it is there shown why some of these reasonings can be put into syllogisms and some cannot.

(26) παράδειγμα δὲ ὅτι μέν ἐστιν ἐπαγωγὴ καὶ περὶ ποῖα ἐπαγωγή, (27) εἴρηται· ἔστι δὲ οὔτε ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον οὔθ’ ὡς ὅλον πρὸς (28) μέρος οὔθ’ ὡς ὅλον πρὸς ὅλον, ἀλλ’ ὡς μέρος πρὸς μέρος, ὅμοιον (29) πρὸς ὅμοιον —ὅταν ἄμφω μὲν ᾖ ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος, γνωριμώτε(30)ρον δὲ θάτερον ᾖ θατέρου, παράδειγμά ἐστιν· οἷον ὅτι ἐπ(31)εβούλευε τυραννίδι Διονύσιος αἰτῶν τὴν φυλακήν· καὶ γὰρ Πεισί(32)στρατος πρότερον ἐπιβουλεύων ᾔτει φυλακὴν καὶ λαβὼν ἐτυράν(33)νησε, καὶ Θεαγένης ἐν Μεγάροις· καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσους ἴσασι, (34) παράδειγμα πάντες γίγνονται τοῦ Διονυσίου, ὃν οὐκ ἴσασίν (35) πω εἰ διὰ τοῦτο αἰτεῖ. πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ καθόλου, (36) ὅτι ὁ ἐπιβουλεύων τυραννίδι φυλακὴν αἰτεῖ.

وأما البرهان فقد بينا أنه اعتبار وأي نحو هو من الاعتبار فإنه ليس كالجزء إلى الكل ولا كالكل إلى الجزء لكن كالجزء إلى الجزء والشبيه إلى الشبيه إذا كانا جميعا يكونان ¹⁸ تحت ذلك الجنس بعينه ولم يكن واحد منهما يدل على أنه برهان للآخر وذلك كما قالوا أن ديانوسيس حين يسئل الحرس والحفظة إنما يمكر ليفتك لأن فسستراطس من قبل قد مكر بأن سأل الحرس فلما أعطى فتك وتمرد وثاغانيس أيضا بماغارا وآخرون يعرفونهم يتخذونهم برهانا في ديانسوس الذي لم يعرفوه بعد أن كانوا داخلين في هذا الكل أعني أن الذي يمكر ليفتك يسئل الحرس

18. MS يمكنان

. . . . . . .

Exemplum autem quoniam est inductio, dictum est; est autem neque sicut pars ad totum neque sicut totum ad partem neque sicut totum ad totum, sed sicut pars ad partem, simile enim ad simile, cum utique utraque quidem erunt in eadem genere, notius autem utrumque utriusque, exemplum erit; ut quoniam insidiatur tyrannidi Dyonisius petens custodiam; et enim Pesistratus prius insidians petebat custodiam et accipiens tyrannizavit, et Theagenes in Megaris; et alii, quoscumque possunt, exemplum omnes fiunt Dyonisii, quem non produxerunt per hoc petere. Omnia autem hec sub eodem universali, quoniam qui insidiatur tyrannidi custodiam petit.

Exemplum autem quod quidem sit inductio et qualis inductio, dictum est; est autem neque ut pars ad totum neque ut totum ad partem neque ut totum ad totum, sed ut pars ad partem, simile ad simile, cum ambo quidem sint sub eadem genere, notius autem altero sit alterum, exemplum est; puta quod insidiatur tyrannidi Dionisius expetens munitionem; et enim Peisistratus prius insidians expetebat munltlonem et accipiens tyrannizavit, et Theagenes in Megaris; et alii quoscumque sciunt, exemplum omnes fiunt Dionisii, quem nondum sciunt si propter hoc expetit. Omnia autem hec sub eodem universali, quia insidians tyrannidi munitionem expetit.

The ‘example’ has already been described as one kind of induction; and the special nature of the subject—matter that distinguishes it from the other kinds has also been stated above. Its relation to the proposition it supports is not that of part to whole, nor whole to part, nor whole to whole, but of part to part, or like to like. When two statements are of the same order, but one is more familiar than the other, the former is an ‘example’. The argument may, for instance, be that Dionysius, in asking as he does for a bodyguard, is scheming to make himself a despot. For in the past Peisistratus kept asking for a bodyguard in order to carry out such a scheme, and did make himself a despot as soon as he got it; and so did Theagenes at Megara; and in the same way all other instances known to the speaker are made into examples, in order to show what is not yet known, that Dionysius has the same purpose in making the same request: all these being instances of the one general principle, that a man who asks for a bodyguard is scheming to make himself a despot.

(1358a1) ἐξ ὧν μὲν οὖν λέγονται αἱ δοκοῦσαι εἶναι πίστεις ἀποδεικτι(2)καί, εἴρηται.

وأما ما كان من هذه التي تقال لها التصديقات يظن أفودقطيقيا فقد قيل عنه

.

Ex quibus quidem igitur dicitur apparens fides esse demonstrativa, dictum est.

Ex quibus quidem igitur dicuntur que putantur persuasiones esse demonstrative, dictum est.

We have now described the sources of those means of persuasion which are popularly supposed to be demonstrative.

[1.2.20] τῶν δὲ ἐνθυμημάτων μεγίστη διαφορὰ καὶ (3) μάλιστα λεληθυῖα σχεδὸν παρὰ πᾶσίν ἐστιν ἥπερ καὶ περὶ τὴν (4) διαλεκτικὴν μέθοδον τῶν συλλογισμῶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν (5) ἐστι κατὰ τὴν ῥητορικὴν ὥσπερ καὶ κατὰ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν (6) μέθοδον τῶν συλλογισμῶν, τὰ δὲ κατ’ ἄλλας τέχνας καὶ (7) δυνάμεις, τὰς μὲν οὔσας τὰς δ’ οὔπω κατειλημμένας· διὸ (8) καὶ λανθάνουσίν τε τοὺς ἀκροατὰς καὶ [μᾶλλον] ἁπτόμενοι (9) κατὰ τρόπον μεταβαίνουσιν ἐξ αὐτῶν.

وأما التفكيرات فإن الفصل فيها عظيم وهو أخفى وأغمض من غيره لأنها تكون من كل كمثل السلوجسمات في الحيلة الديالقطيقية لكن منها ما هو على حذو الريطورية كما يوجد في الديالقطيقية ومنها ما هو على حذو صناعات وقوات أخرى منها موجودة ومنها غير موجودة لأنها لم تدرك بعد ولذلك ما قد يخفى إذا أوردنا على السامعين تلك التي تخالف نحوهم أو حذوهم

. . .

Entimematum maxima differentia et maxime solubilia fere circa omnes est que et circa dialeticam disciplinam sillogismorum; hec quidem ipsorum sunt secundum rethoricam sicut et secundum dialeticam, bee vero secundum alias artes et potentias, has quidem entes, has vero non iam sumptas; ideoque latent et auditores et magis tangentes secundum modum transgrediuntur ex ipsis.

Enthymematum autem maxima differentia et que maxime latuit omnes fere est que quidem et circa dialeticam methodum sillogismorum; hec quidem enim ipsorum sunt secundum rethoricam sicut et secundum dialeticam methodum sillogismorum, hec autem secundum alias artes et potentias, has quidem existentes, has autem nondum comprehensas; propter quod et latent auditores et magis tangentes secundum modum transeunt ex ipsis.

There is an important distinction between two sorts of enthymemes that has been wholly overlooked by almost everybody — one that also subsists between the syllogisms treated of in dialectic. One sort of enthymeme really belongs to rhetoric, as one sort of syllogism really belongs to dialectic; but the other sort really belongs to other arts and faculties, whether to those we already exercise or to those we have not yet acquired. Missing this distinction, people fail to notice that the more correctly they handle their particular subject the further they are getting away from pure rhetoric or dialectic.

μᾶλλον δὲ σαφὲς (10) ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον διὰ πλειόνων ῥηθέν.

وقد يكون القول المقول بزيادة بائنا مؤكدا إذا كان مقولا في أشياء كثيرة

.

Magis autem manifesturn erit quod dicitur per plura dictum.

Magis autem planum erit quod dicitur per plura dictum.

This statement will be clearer if expressed more fully.

[I.2.21] λέγω γὰρ δια(11)λεκτικούς τε καὶ ῥητορικοὺς συλλογισμοὺς εἶναι περὶ ὧν τοὺς (12) τόπους λέγομεν· οὗτοι δ’ εἰσὶν οἱ κοινοὶ περὶ δικαίων καὶ (13) φυσικῶν καὶ περὶ πολιτικῶν καὶ περὶ πολλῶν διαφερόν(14)των εἴδει, οἷον ὁ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον τόπος· οὐδὲν γὰρ (15) μᾶλλον ἔσται ἐκ τούτου συλλογίσασθαι ἢ ἐνθύμημα εἰπεῖν (16) περὶ δικαίων ἢ περὶ φυσικῶν ἢ περὶ ὁτουοῦν· καίτοι ταῦτα εἴδει (17) διαφέρει.

فقد أزعم أن المواضع أكثر من السلجسموس الريطوري والديالقطيقي لأن هذه توجد عامة في العادلات وفي الطبيعيات وفي الفوليطيات وأشياء كثيرة مختلفة كمثل المواضع في الأقل والأكثر فإنه ليس شيء من هذا يفعل فيه السلجسة والتفكير في العادلات فقط أو في الطبيعيات أو في أي شيء كائنا ما كان من اللاتي هن منفصلات بأنفسهن

. . . . .

Dico enim dialeticos et rethoricos sillogismos esse de quibus locos dicimus; hii autem sunt quat communes de iustis et de naturalibus et de civilibus et de multis differentibus specie, ut qui est a maiori et minori locus; non enim magis erit ex hoc sillogizari aut entimema dicere de iustis [autem] aut naturalibus aut de quolibet, et quid huiusmodi species differunt.

Dico enim dialeticos et rethoricos sillogismos esse de quibus locos dicimus; hii autem sunt qui communes de iustis et de naturalibus et politicis et de multis differentibus specie, ut puta locus a maiori et minori; nichil enim magis erit ex hoc sillogizare aut enthymema dicere de iustis vel de naturalibus vel de quocumque, quamvis hec specie differant.

I mean that the proper subjects of dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms are the things with which we say the regular or universal Lines of Argument are concerned, that is to say those lines of argument that apply equally to questions of right conduct, natural science, politics, and many other things that have nothing to do with one another. Take, for instance, the line of argument concerned with ‘the more or less’. On this line of argument it is equally easy to base a syllogism or enthymeme about any of what nevertheless are essentially disconnected subjects — right conduct, natural science, or anything else whatever. .

ἴδια δὲ ὅσα ἐκ τῶν περὶ ἕκαστον εἶδος καὶ γέ(18)νος προτάσεών ἐστιν, οἷον περὶ φυσικῶν εἰσι προτάσεις ἐξ (19) ὧν οὔτε ἐνθύμημα οὔτε συλλογισμὸς ἔστι περὶ τῶν ἠθικῶν, (20) καὶ περὶ τούτων ἄλλαι ἐξ ὧν οὐκ ἔσται περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν· (21) ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτ’ ἔχει ἐπὶ πάντων.

بل كل ما يقال فيها من نوع وجنس إنما هو من القضايا التي هي المفردات كمثل ما يوجد في القضايا في الطبيعيات التي لا يكون بها سلوجسموس ولا تفكير في الأخلاق وكذلك تلك الأخر لا يكون فيها هذا في الطبيعيات فإذا كان هذا هكذا فكذلك هو في الجميع

. .

Propria autem quecumque ex propositionibus circa unamquamque speciem aut genus sunt, ut de naturalibus sunt propositiones ex quibus neque entimema neque sillogismus est de ethicis, et de hiis alia ex qui bus non est de na turalibus ; similiter autem hec sic se habent in omnibus.

Propria autem quecumque ex propositionibus que circa unamquamque speciem aut genus sunt, ut puta de naturalibus sunt propositiones ex quibus neque enthymema neque sillogismus est de moralibus, et de hiis alie ex quibus non erit de naturalibus; similiter aute1n hoc se habet in omnibus.

But there are also those special Lines of Argument which are based on such propositions as apply only to particular groups or classes of things. Thus there are propositions about natural science on which it is impossible to base any enthymeme or syllogism about ethics, and other propositions about ethics on which nothing can be based about natural science. The same principle applies throughout.

κἀκεῖνα μὲν οὐ ποιήσει (22) περὶ οὐδὲν γένος ἔμφρονα· περὶ οὐδὲν γὰρ ὑποκείμενόν ἐστιν· (23) ταῦτα δὲ ὅσῳ τις ἂν βέλτιον ἐκλέγηται [τὰς προτάσεις], (24) λήσει ποιήσας ἄλλην ἐπιστήμην τῆς διαλεκτικῆς καὶ ῥητο(25)ρικῆς· ἂν γὰρ ἐντύχῃ ἀρχαῖς, οὐκέτι διαλεκτικὴ οὐδὲ ῥη(26)τορικὴ ἀλλ’ ἐκείνη ἔσται ἧς ἔχει τὰς ἀρχάς.

فأما تلك فإنها لا تجمع شيئا ولا إلى جنس واحد وذلك أن الذي يتصور في الوهم هنالك ليس يتناهى إلى شيء محدود وأما هذه فإنه إن قال قائل إنها قضايا محققة فاضلة كان ذلك ضلالة لأنه يفعل حينئذ علما آخر سوى الديالقطيقية والريطورية وذلك أنها إن كانت تلفي البوادئ فليست ريطورية ولا ديالقطيقية بل هي تلك التي لها تلك المبادئ

. . .

Illa autem non faciunt circa nullum genus bene scibilia; circa nullum enim subiectum sunt; hec autem in quantum quis utique melius eliget propositiones, faciens aliam scientiam dialetice et rethorice; si enim attingat principia, non adhuc dialetica neque rethorica sed illa erit cuius habebit principia.

Et illa quidem non facient circa nullum genus sapientem; circa nullum enim subiectum sunt; hec a utero quanto quis utique melius elegerit propositiones, latebit faciens aliam scientiam dialetica et rethorica; si enim inciderit principiis, non adhuc dialetica neque rethorica, sed illa erit cuius habet principia.

The general Lines of Argument have no special subject—matter, and therefore will not increase our understanding of any particular class of things. On the other hand, the better the selection one makes of propositions suitable for special Lines of Argument, the nearer one comes, unconsciously, to setting up a science that is distinct from dialectic and rhetoric. One may succeed in stating the required principles, but one’s science will be no longer dialectic or rhetoric, but the science to which the principles thus discovered belong.

[1.2.22] ἔστι δὲ τὰ (27) πλεῖστα τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων ἐκ τούτων τῶν εἰδῶν λεγόμενα, (28) τῶν κατὰ μέρος καὶ ἰδίων, ἐκ δὲ τῶν κοινῶν ἐλάττω. (29) καθάπερ οὖν καὶ ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς, καὶ ἐνταῦθα διαιρετέον (30) τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων τά τε εἴδη καὶ τοὺς τόπους ἐξ ὧν ληπτέον. (31) λέγω δ’ εἴδη μὲν τὰς καθ’ ἕκαστον γένος ἰδίας προτάσεις, (32) τόπους δὲ τοὺς κοινοὺς ὁμοίως πάντων.

فقد يوجد أكثر التفكيرات مقولا من هذه الأنواع التي هي للجزئيات الخواص والعوام ومن العوام التي تكون بحال واحدة فكما قسمنا في طوبيقا كذلك ينبغي أن نقسم هاهنا الأنواع والمواضع في التفكيرات التي منها نأخذ التصديقات وقد أعني بالأنواع تلك التي تكون عن الأجناس المفردة في القضايا الخواص وبالمواضع تلك العوام للكل بحال واحدة

. . .

Sunt autem plura entimematum ex hiis speciebus dicta, de particulari et propriis, ex communibus autem minora. Quemadmodum igitur et in Topicis, et hie dividendum entimematum species et locos ex quibus sumendum. Dico autem species quidem propositiones proprias que sunt circa unumquodque genus, locos autem communes pariter omnium.

Sunt autem plurima enthymematum que dicuntur ex hiis speciebus, scilicet particularibus et propriis, ex comrnunibus autem pauciora. Quemadmodum igitur et in Topicis, et hic dividendum en thymematum species et locos ex quibus surnendum. Dico autem species quidem eas que secundum unumquodque genus proprias propositiones, locos autem communes similiter omnium.

Most enthymemes are in fact based upon these particular or special Lines of Argument; comparatively few on the common or general kind. As in the Topologies therefore, so in this work, we must distinguish, in dealing with enthymemes, the special and the general Lines of Argument on which they are to be founded. By special Lines of Argument I mean the propositions peculiar to each several class of things, by general those common to all classes alike.

πρότερον οὖν εἴπωμεν (33) περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν· πρῶτον δὲ λάβωμεν τὰ γένη τῆς ῥητορι(34)κῆς, ὅπως διελόμενοι πόσα ἐστίν, περὶ τούτων χωρὶς λαμ(35)βάνωμεν τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ τὰς προτάσεις.

فلنقل أولا في الأنواع ونبدأ فنتخذ أجناس الريطورية فإذا بينا كم هي أخذنا الحروف أي الأسطقسات والقضايا على حدة

. .

Primo quidem igitur dicamus de speciebus; prima quidem assumamus genera rethorice, quomodo dividentes quot sunt, de hiis divisim assumimus elementa et propositiones.

Prius quidern igitur dicamus de speciebus; primo autem accipiamus genera rethorice, quatinus dividentes quat sunt de hiis sigillatim accipiamus elementa et propositiones.

We may begin with the special Lines of Argument. But, first of all, let us classify rhetoric into its varieties. Having distinguished these we may deal with them one by one, and try to discover the elements of which each is composed, and the propositions each must employ.

[1.3.1] (36) Ἔστιν δὲ τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἴδη τρία τὸν ἀριθμόν· τοσοῦτοι (37) γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἀκροαταὶ τῶν λόγων ὑπάρχουσιν ὄντες.

قد توجد أنواع الريطورية ثلاثة عددا وكذلك يوجد السامعون للكلام

.

Sunt autem rethorice species tres numero; tot enim et auditores sermonum sunt.

Sunt itaque rethorice species tres numero; tot enim et auditores orationum existunt entes.

Part 3. Rhetoric falls into three divisions, determined by the three classes of listeners to speeches.

σύγ(38)κειται μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τριῶν ὁ λόγος, ἔκ τε τοῦ λέγοντος καὶ (1358b1) περὶ οὗ λέγει καὶ πρὸς ὅν, καὶ τὸ τέλος πρὸς τοῦτόν ἐστιν, (2) λέγω δὲ τὸν ἀκροατήν.

والكلام نفسه مركب من ثلاثة من القائل ومن المقول فيه ومن الذي إليه القول والغاية إنما هي نحو هذا أعني السامع

.

Constat enim ex tribus sermo, ex dicente quidem et de quo dicit et ad quem, et finis apud hunc, dico autem auditorem.

Componitur quidem enim ex tribus oratio, ex dicente et de quo dicit et ad quem, et finis ad hunc est, dico autem auditorem.

For of the three elements in speech-making – speaker, subject, and person addressed –it is the last one, the hearer, that determines the speech’s end and object.

[1.3.2] ἀνάγκη δὲ τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἢ θεωρὸν (3) εἶναι ἢ κριτήν, κριτὴν δὲ ἢ τῶν γεγενημένων ἢ τῶν μελ(4)λόντων.

فالسامع لا محالة إما نظار وإما حاكم والحاكم إما في المستقبلات وإما في اللاتي قد كن

.

Necesse autem auditorem aut scientem esse aut iudicem, iudicem autem aut factorum aut futurorum.

Necesse autem auditorem aut speculatorem esse aut iudicem, iudicem autem aut factorum aut futurorum.

The hearer must be either a judge, with a decision to make about things past or future, or an observer.

ἔστιν δ’ ὁ μὲν περὶ τῶν μελλόντων κρίνων ὁ ἐκ(5)κλησιαστής, ὁ δὲ περὶ τῶν γεγενημένων [οἷον] ὁ δικαστής, ὁ (6) δὲ περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως ὁ θεωρός, ὥστ’ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἂν εἴη (7) τρία γένη τῶν λόγων τῶν ῥητορικῶν, συμβουλευτικόν, δικα(8)νικόν, ἐπιδεικτικόν.

فالذي يحكم في المستقبلات كرئيس الجمع والذي يحكم في اللاتي قد كنّ كالفاحص وأمّا الناظر فللقوّة فمن الاضطرار إذا يكون الكلام الريطوري ثلاثة أجناس مشوريّ ومشاجريّ وتثبيتيّ

. .

Est autem qui de futuris iudicat ut orator, de factis vero iudex, qui vero circa potentiam sciens, quare ex necessitate utique erunt tria genera sermonum rethoricorum, deliberativum, iudiciale, demonstrativum.

Est autem qui quidem de futuris discernit velut capitaneus, qui autem de factis velut iudicator, qui vero de potentia vel ut speculator; quare ex necessitate tria utique erunt genera orationum rethoricarum, deliberativum, disceptativum, exclamativum.

A member of the assembly decides about future events, a juryman about past events: while those who merely decide on the orator’s skill are observers. From this it follows that there are three divisions of oratory — (1) political, (2) forensic, and (3) the ceremonial oratory of display.

συμβουλῆς δὲ τὸ μὲν προτροπή, τὸ (9) δὲ ἀποτροπή· ἀεὶ γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἰδίᾳ συμβουλεύοντες καὶ οἱ (10) κοινῇ δημηγοροῦντες τούτων θάτερον ποιοῦσιν. δίκης δὲ τὸ μὲν (11) κατηγορία, τὸ δ’ ἀπολογία· τούτων γὰρ ὁποτερονοῦν ποιεῖν (12) ἀνάγκη τοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντας. ἐπιδεικτικοῦ δὲ τὸ μὲν ἔπ(13)αινος τὸ δὲ ψόγος.

فأمّا المشير فمنه إذن ومنه منع فإنّ الذين يشيرون في الخواص والذين يشيرون العوام معا إنّما يفعلون أبدا واحدة من هاتين وأمّا التشاجر فمنه شكاية ومنه اعتذار فإنّ الذين يتشاجرون لا محالة إنّما يفعلون أبدا واحدة من هاتين وأمّا المُرى أو المُثبت فمنه مدح ومنه ذم

. . . . .

Deliberationis quidem hoc dissuasum, aliud vero persuasum; semper enim deliberantes propria et communia perorantes horum alterum faciunt. Iudicialis quidem hoc quidem accusatio, alterum vero responsio; horum enim utrum igitur facere necesse questionantes. Demonstrativi quidem hoc quidem laus, hoc vero vituperium.

Deliberationis autem hoc quidem exhortatio, hoc autem dehortatio; semper enim qui singulariter consulunt et qui communiter contionantur horum alterum faciunt. Disceptationis autem hoc quidem accusatio, hoc autem defensio; horum enim alterutrum facere necesse litigantes. Exclamativi autem hoc quidem laus, hoc autem vituperium.

Political speaking urges us either to do or not to do something: one of these two courses is always taken by private counsellors, as well as by men who address public assemblies. Forensic speaking either attacks or defends somebody: one or other of these two things must always be done by the parties in a case. The ceremonial oratory of display either praises or censures somebody.

χρόνοι δὲ ἑκάστου τούτων εἰσὶ τῷ μὲν (14) συμβουλεύοντι ὁ μέλλων (περὶ γὰρ τῶν ἐσομένων συμβου(15)λεύει ἢ προτρέπων ἢ ἀποτρέπων), τῷ δὲ δικαζομένῳ ὁ γε(16)νόμενος (περὶ γὰρ τῶν πεπραγμένων ἀεὶ ὁ μὲν κατηγορεῖ, (17) ὁ δὲ ἀπολογεῖται), τῷ δ’ ἐπιδεικτικῷ κυριώτατος μὲν ὁ (18) παρών (κατὰ γὰρ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἐπαινοῦσιν ἢ ψέγουσιν (19) πάντες), προσχρῶνται δὲ πολλάκις καὶ τὰ γενόμενα ἀνα (20)μιμνήσκοντες καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα προεικάζοντες.

والوقت أو الزمان لكلّ واحد من هذه أمّا الذي يشير فالمستقبل لأنه إنّما يشير المشير فيما هو مستقبل فيأذن أو يمنع فأمّا الذي ينازع فالذي قد كان فأمّا الآن فإنّما يذكر ليفصل النافع وكذلك تلك الأخرى وإنّما يكون أبدا واحد يشكو وواحد يعتذر في اللاتي قد فعلن وأمّا المرى أو المثبت فإنّ الذي هو أولى الزمان به ذلك القريب الحاضر فإنّ الناس جميعا إنما يمدحون ويذمّون على حسب ما هو موجود قائم وقد يستعملون الأرب أحيانا فإذا ذكروا النافعات تقدّموا فأشاروا في المستقبلات

. . . .

Tempora autem uniuscuiusque istorum sunt deliberanti quidem futurum (de futuris enim deliberat qui persuadet aut dissuadet), iudiciali vero factum (de factis enim semper hic quidem accusat, alter vero respondet), demonstrativo valde proprium est presens (secundum enim existentia laudant aut vituperant omnes), utuntur autem multociens et preterita commemorantes et futura preponentes.

Tempora autem uniuscuiusque horum sunt deliberauti quidem futurum (de futuris enim deliberat qui exhortatur aut dehortatur), disceptanti autem preteritum (de actis enim semper hic quidem accusat, hic autem defendit), exclamativo autem principalissimum quidem presens (secundum existentia enim laudant aut vituperant omnes), coutuntur autem sepe et facta rememorantes et futura preconicientes.

These three kinds of rhetoric refer to three different kinds of time. The political orator is concerned with the future: it is about things to be done hereafter that he advises, for or against. The party in a case at law is concerned with the past; one man accuses the other, and the other defends himself, with reference to things already done. The ceremonial orator is, properly speaking, concerned with the present, since all men praise or blame in view of the state of things existing at the time, though they often find it useful also to recall the past and to make guesses at the future.

(20) τέλος δὲ (21) ἑκάστοις τούτων ἕτερόν ἐστι, καὶ τρισὶν οὖσι τρία, τῷ μὲν (22) συμβουλεύοντι τὸ συμφέρον καὶ βλαβερόν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ (23) προτρέπων ὡς βέλτιον συμβουλεύει, ὁ δὲ ἀποτρέπων ὡς (24) χείρονος ἀποτρέπει, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα πρὸς τοῦτο συμπαραλαμ(25)βάνει, ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, ἢ καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν· τοῖς δὲ (26) δικαζομένοις τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα καὶ οὗτοι (27) συμπαραλαμβάνουσι πρὸς ταῦτα· τοῖς δ’ ἐπαινοῦσιν καὶ (28) ψέγουσιν τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσχρόν, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα καὶ οὗτοι (29) πρὸς ταῦτα ἐπαναφέρουσιν.

وأما الغاية من كل واحد من هذه فمختلفة وهي ثلاث لثلاثة أما للمشير فالنافع والضارّ فإنّ الذي يشير يأذن في التي هي أفضل ويمنع من تلك الأخسّ وقد تستعمل تلك الأخر أيضا في هذا المعنى أعني العادلة والجائرة أو الصالحة أو السعيدة وأما المشاجري فالعادلة أو الجائرة

. . . . . .

Horum autem unicuique finis alius est, et cum sint tria tres, deliberanti quidem utile et inutile; qui enim persuadet sicut melius consulit, qui vero dissuadet sicut deterius dissuadet, alia vero cum hoc assumit, aut iustum aut iniustum, aut bonum aut malum; iudicantibus vero iustum et iniustum, et alia et hii assumunt ad hec; laudantibus et vituperantibus bonum et malum, alia vero ad hec et hii referunt.

Singulis autem horum finis alius est, et tribus existentibus tres, deliberanti quidem conferens et nocivum; qui enim exhortatur tamquam melius consulit, qui autem dehortatur tamquam deterius dissuadet, alia autem ad hoc coassumit, aut iustum vel iniustum aut pulcrum vel turpe; disceptantibus autem iustum et iniustum, alia autem et hii coassumunt ad hec; laudantibus vera et vituperantibus pulcrum et turpe, alia autem ad hec et hii referunt.

Rhetoric has three distinct ends in view, one for each of its three kinds. The political orator aims at establishing the expediency or the harmfulness of a proposed course of action; if he urges its acceptance, he does so on the ground that it will do good; if he urges its rejection, he does so on the ground that it will do harm; and all other points, such as whether the proposal is just or unjust, honourable or dishonourable, he brings in as subsidiary and relative to this main consideration. Parties in a law—case aim at establishing the justice or injustice of some action, and they too bring in all other points as subsidiary and relative to this one. Those who praise or attack a man aim at proving him worthy of honour or the reverse, and they too treat all other considerations with reference to this one.

σημεῖον δ’ ὅτι τὸ εἰρημένον (30) ἑκάστοις τέλος· περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνίοτε οὐκ ἂν (31) ἀμφισβητήσαιεν, οἷον ὁ δικαζόμενος ὡς οὐ γέγονεν ἢ (32) οὐκ ἔβλαψεν· ὅτι δ’ ἀδικεῖ οὐδέποτ’ ἂν ὁμολογήσειεν· (33) οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἔδει δίκης.

والرسم لكل واحد منهما هو الغاية التي ذكرت وأما تلك الأخرى فربما لم يكن فيها مكاس ومعاسرة /و/كما ينازع المنازع في أنه قد كان أو أنه لم يكن فاما أنه ظلم فلا يقرّ بذلك البتّة فربما لم تكن به حاجة إلى المشاجرة

. . . .

Signum quidem quoniam dictum unicuique finis est; de aliis enim aliquotiens non dubitabunt, ut iudex quomodo non factum est aut quomodo non lesit; quoniam autem iniustificat non utique confitebitur; non enim verebatur iustitiam.

Signum autem quod id quod dictum est singulis sit finis; de aliis quidem enim numquam utique litigabunt, puta qui diiudicatur quomodo non fuerit factum aut quomodo non nocuerit; quod autem iniuriam fecerit non utique confitebitur; nichil enim utique opus esset disceptatione.

That the three kinds of rhetoric do aim respectively at the three ends we have mentioned is shown by the fact that speakers will sometimes not try to establish anything else. Thus, the litigant will sometimes not deny that a thing has happened or that he has done harm. But that he is guilty of injustice he will never admit; otherwise there would be no need of a trial.

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ συμβουλεύοντες (34) τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πολλάκις προΐενται, ὡς δὲ ἀσύμφορα συμ(35)βουλεύουσιν ἢ ἀπ’ ὠφελίμων ἀποτρέπουσιν οὐκ ἂν ὁμολογή(36)σαιεν· ὡς δ’ [οὐκ] ἄδικον τοὺς ἀστυγείτονας καταδουλοῦσθαι (37) καὶ τοὺς μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντας, πολλάκις οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν.

وكذلك الذين يشيرون قد يقدّمون هذه الأخر كثيرا ويشيرون بما لا ينفع ويمنعون من النافعات غير أنهم لا يقرّون بذلك كمثل ما قالوا إنه ليس جور منهم أن يقهروا مدينة في جوارهم وما لم يجوروا عليه وليس ينبغي أن يعنيهم شيء من أمره

. .

Similiter autem et deliberantes alia quidem multociens pretermittunt, sicut inhonesta deliberant aut ab utilibus dissuadent non utique confitebuntur; sicut non iniustum cives vicinos servos facere et nichil iniustificantes, multociens non curant.

Similiter autem et deliberantes alia quidem sepe fatentur, quod autem inutilia consuluerint aut a proficuis dissuaserint non utique confitebuntur; quasi autem non iniustum vicinos in servitutem redigere et eos qui nichil iniuriabantur, sepe nichil curant.

So too, political orators often make any concession short of admitting that they are recommending their hearers to take an inexpedient course or not to take an expedient one. The question whether it is not unjust for a city to enslave its innocent neighbours often does not trouble them at all.

(38) ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ οἱ ψέγοντες οὐ σκοποῦσιν (1359a1) εἰ συμφέροντα ἔπραξεν ἢ βλαβερά, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἐπαίνῳ (2) πολλάκις τιθέασιν ὅτι ὀλιγωρήσας τοῦ αὑτῷ λυσιτελοῦντος (3) ἔπραξεν ὅ τι καλόν, οἷον Ἀχιλλέα ἐπαινοῦσιν ὅτι ἐβοήθησε (4) τῷ ἑταίρῳ Πατρόκλῳ εἰδὼς ὅτι δεῖ αὐτὸν ἀποθανεῖν ἐξὸν ζῆν.

وكذلك الذين يمدحون ويذمون لا ينـظرون كثيرا في أنه فعل فيما ينفع أو يضرّ لكنهم يضعون الاتي يكون بها المدح أكثر ذلك فإن المرء قد يتهاون بالذي ينفعه ويفعل مع ذلك كل حسن كما يمدح أخيلوس حين نصر فطروقلوس صاحبه وهو يعلم أنه يموت بسببه ولا يحيا

. .

Similiter autem et laudantes et vituperantes non considerant aut honesta egerint aut inhonesta, sed in laude posuerunt quoniam despicientes quod proficit eis multociens operati sunt bonum aliquod, ut Achillem laudant quoniam auxiliatus est alteri Patroclo sciens quoniam oportet ipsum mori quam vivere.

Similiter autem et laudantes et vituperantes nichil considerant si conferentia egerunt aut nociva, sed et in laude sepe ponunt quod parvi pendens quod ipsi erat pretiosum egit quod pulcrum, Achillem laudant quod adiuvit amicum Patroclum sciens quod oportebat ipsum mori cum posset vivcre.

In like manner those who praise or censure a man do not consider whether his acts have been expedient or not, but often make it a ground of actual praise that he has neglected his own interest to do what was honourable. Thus, they praise Achilles because he championed his fallen friend Patroclus, though he knew that this meant death, and that otherwise he need not die:

(5) τούτῳ δὲ ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος θάνατος κάλλιον, τὸ δὲ ζῆν συμφέρον.

فالموت لهذا هاهنا أحسن والحياة هي النافعة له

.

Huic autem huiusmodi mors melior est, vivere vero honestum.

Huic autem talis mors pulcrior erat, vivere autem conferens.

yet while to die thus was the nobler thing for him to do, the expedient thing was to live on.

(6) φανερὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι ἀνάγκη περὶ τού(7)των ἔχειν πρῶτον τὰς προτάσεις· τὰ γὰρ τεκμήρια καὶ (8) τὰ εἰκότα καὶ τὰ σημεῖα προτάσεις εἰσὶν ῥητορικαί· ὅλως (9) μὲν γὰρ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ προτάσεών ἐστιν, τὸ δ’ ἐνθύμημα (10) συλλογισμός ἐστι συνεστηκὼς ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων προτάσεων. (11) ἐπεὶ δὲ οὔτε πραχθῆναι οἷόν τε οὔτε πεπρᾶχθαι τὰ ἀδύ(12)νατα ἀλλὰ τὰ δυνατά, οὐδὲ τὰ μὴ γενόμενα ἢ μὴ ἐσό(13)μενα [οὐχ] οἷόν τε τὰ μὲν πεπρᾶχθαι, τὰ δὲ πραχθήσεσθαι, (14) ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τῷ συμβουλεύοντι καὶ τῷ δικαζομένῳ καὶ (15) τῷ ἐπιδεικτικῷ ἔχειν προτάσεις περὶ δυνατοῦ καὶ ἀδυνάτου, (16) καὶ εἰ γέγονεν ἢ μή, καὶ εἰ ἔσται ἢ μή.

فهو معلوم من قبل ما قد قيل أنه من الاضطرار أن يكون في هذا النحو من الكلام قضية مقدّمة فالدلائل والصدق والرواسم هن مقدمات الريطورية لأن السلوجسموس بأسره من المقدمات فأما التفكير فسلوجسموس يكون من هذه المقدمات التي ذُكرت ومن أجل أن الاتي هن لا ممكنات لا يستطاع أن يفعلن في الحاضر ولا في المستقبل فانه لا الاتي لم يكنّ ولا الاتي لا يكنّ فيما يستقبل يستطاع أن يكنّ مفعولات أو يكنّ سيفعلن فلا بد للذي يشير والذي ينازع والذي يرى أو يثبت من أن تكون له قضايا في الأمر يمكن ولا يمكن وهل كان أو لم يكن ويكون أو لا يكون

. . . .

Manifestum autem ex dictis quod necesse est de hiis habere prius propositiones; tecmiria enim et ycota et signa propositiones sunt rethorice; universaliter quidem enim sillogismus ex propositionibus est, entimema quidem sillogismus quidam sensibilis ex predictis. Quoniam autem neque fieri arbitrantur neque facta sunt impossibilia sed possibilia, neque non fienda aut futura non arbitrantur hec quidem facta sunt, hec vero fient, necessarium est et deliberanti et iudicanti et demonstranti habere propositiones de possibili et impossibili, et si factum est aut non, aut erit aut non.

Manifestum autem ex dictis quod necesse de hiis habere primum propositiones; tecmeria enim et ykota et signa propositiones sunt rethorice; totaliter quidem enim sillogismus ex propositionibus est, enthymema autem sillogismus est constans ex dictis propositionibus. Quoniam autem neque acta esse neque agenda possibile est impossibilia, sed possibilia, neque que non fiebant aut futura erant non possibile est hcc quidem acta esse in preterito, hec autem agi in futuro, necessarium et deliberanti et clisceptanti et exclamativo habere propositiones de possibili et impossibili, et si factum fuit aut non, et si erit aut non.

It is evident from what has been said that it is these three subjects, more than any others, about which the orator must be able to have propositions at his command. Now the propositions of Rhetoric are Complete Proofs, Probabilities, and Signs. Every kind of syllogism is composed of propositions, and the enthymeme is a particular kind of syllogism composed of the aforesaid propositions. Since only possible actions, and not impossible ones, can ever have been done in the past or the present, and since things which have not occurred, or will not occur, also cannot have been done or be going to be done, it is necessary for the political, the forensic, and the ceremonial speaker alike to be able to have at their command propositions about the possible and the impossible, and about whether a thing has or has not occurred, will or will not occur.

ἔτι δὲ ἐπεὶ ἅπαν(17)τες, καὶ ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ ψέγοντες, καὶ προτρέποντες καὶ (18) ἀποτρέποντες, καὶ κατηγοροῦντες καὶ ἀπολογούμενοι, οὐ μόνον (19) τὰ εἰρημένα δεικνύναι πειρῶνται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι μέγα ἢ (20) μικρὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ κακόν, ἢ τὸ καλὸν ἢ τὸ αἰσχρόν, (21) ἢ τὸ δίκαιον ἢ τὸ ἄδικον, ἢ καθ’ αὑτὰ λέγοντες ἢ πρὸς (22) ἄλληλα ἀντιπαραβάλλοντες, δῆλον ὅτι δέοι ἂν καὶ περὶ (23) μεγέθους καὶ μικρότητος καὶ τοῦ μείζονος καὶ τοῦ ἐλάττονος (24) προτάσεις ἔχειν, καὶ καθόλου καὶ περὶ ἑκάστου, οἷον τί μεῖ(25)ζον ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἔλαττον ἢ ἀδίκημα ἢ δικαίωμα· ὁμοίως δὲ (26) καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων. περὶ ὧν μὲν οὖν ἐξ ἀνάγκης δεῖ (27) λαβεῖν τὰς προτάσεις, εἴρηται·

ثم أن جميع المتكلمين يمدحون ويذمّون ويأذنون ويمنعون ويشكون ويعتذرون وليس هذا فقط يتكلفون بل ان الأمر حسن أو قبيح أو عدل أو جور اما حين يضعون الأمور مفردة بأنفسها واما حين يقيسون بعضها ببعض فهو معلوم أنه ينبغي أن تكون عندهم قضايا في أن الأمر عظيم أو يسير وفي الأفضل والأخسّ وفي الكليات والمفردات كما يقال في شيء من الخير إنه فاضل أو خسيس وإنه جور أو واجب وكذلك تلك الأخرى أما الاتي ينبغي اضطرارا أن تستعمل في القضايا فقد وصفناها

. .

Amplius autem quoniam omnes, et laudantes et vituperantes, et persuadentes et dissuadentes, et accusantes et respondentes, non solum predicta demonstrare temptant, sed et quoniam magnum aut parvum bonum aut malum, aut iustum aut iniustum, ad invicem aut secundum se aut ad alia intromittuntur, palam quoniam oportebit et de magnitudine et de parvitate et maiori et minori propositiones habere, et de universali et particulari, ut puta quid maius bonum aut quid minus aut iustificatio aut iniustificatio; similiter autem et de aliis. De quibus quidem igitur ex necessitate oportet dicere propositiones, dictum est;

Adhuc autem quoniam omnes, et laudantes et vituperantes, et exhortantes et dehortantes, et accusantes et defendentes, non solum ea que dicta sunt ostendere temptant, sed et quod magnum aut parvum bonum aut malum, vel pulcrum aut turpe, vel iustum aut iniustum, vel secundum se dicentes aut ad invicem comparantes, palam quia oportebit utique et de magnitudine et parvitatc et de maiori et minori propositiones habere, et universaliter et de unoquoque, puta quid maius bonum aut quid minus vel iniustitia aut iustitia; similiter autem et de aliis. De quibus quidem igitur ex necessitate oportet dicere propositiones, dictum est.

Further, all men, in giving praise or blame, in urging us to accept or reject proposals for action, in accusing others or defending themselves, attempt not only to prove the points mentioned but also to show that the good or the harm, the honour or disgrace, the justice or injustice, is great or small, either absolutely or relatively; and therefore it is plain that we must also have at our command propositions about greatness or smallness and the greater or the lesser—propositions both universal and particular. Thus, we must be able to say which is the greater or lesser good, the greater or lesser act of justice or injustice; and so on. Such, then, are the subjects regarding which we are inevitably bound to master the propositions relevant to them.

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα διαιρετέον (28) ἰδίᾳ περὶ ἑκάστου τούτων, οἷον περὶ ὧν συμβουλὴ καὶ περὶ (29) ὧν οἱ ἐπιδεικτικοὶ λόγοι, τρίτον δὲ περὶ ὧν αἱ δίκαι.

وأما بعد هذا فإنه ينبغي أن نقسم على حدة كل واحدة من هذه الاتي فيها تكون المشورة والكلام /و/المثبت والثالثة الاتي فيها يكون التشاجر

.

post hec autem dividendum est propria de unoquoque istorum, ut puta de quibus deliberatio et de quibus demonstrativi sermones, tertio autem et de quibus iudicia.

Post hec autem dividendum singulariter de unoquoque horum, puta de quibus deliberatio et de quibus exclamative orationes, tertio autem de qui bus disceptationes.

We must now discuss each particular class of these subjects in turn, namely those dealt with in political, in ceremonial, and lastly in legal, oratory.

4. (30) Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ληπτέον περὶ ποῖα ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ (31) ὁ συμβουλεύων συμβουλεύει, ἐπειδὴ οὐ περὶ ἅπαντα ἀλλ’ (32) ὅσα ἐνδέχεται καὶ γενέσθαι καὶ μή, ὅσα δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ (33) ἔστιν ἢ ἔσται, ἢ ἀδύνατον ἢ εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι, περὶ δὲ τούτων (34) οὐκ ἔστι συμβουλή.

فأما أول ذلك فإنه ينبغي أن ننظر من أجل أي الخير يشير المشير ومن أجل أنه ليس في كل شيء تكون المشورة لكن في الذي يسطاع أن يكون وأن لا يكون فأما الاتي من الاضطرار أن تكون أو لا يستطاع أن تكون فليست فيهم مشورة

. . .

Primum quidem igitur sumendum est circa que bona aut mala consultans deliberat, quoniam utique non circa omnia, sed quecumque contingit fieri et non; quecumque vero ex necessitate aut sunt aut erunt, aut impossibile est esse aut fieri, de hiis autem non est consultatio.

Prima quidem igitur accipiendum circa qualia bona aut mala deliberans consulit, quoniam non circa omnia, sed quecumque contingit et fieri et non, quecumque autem ex necessitate aut sunt aut erunt, vel impossibile esse aut fieri, de biis non est consilium.

Part 4. First, then, we must ascertain what are the kinds of things, good or bad, about which the political orator offers counsel. For he does not deal with all things, but only with such as may or may not take place. Concerning things which exist or will exist inevitably, or which cannot possibly exist or take place, no counsel can be given.

οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ἁπάντων· (35) ἔστιν γὰρ καὶ φύσει ἔνια καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης γινόμενα ἀγαθὰ (36) τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ γίγνεσθαι καὶ μή, περὶ ὧν οὐδὲν πρὸ (37) ἔργου τὸ συμβουλεύειν· ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ὅσων ἐστὶν τὸ (38) βουλεύεσθαι.

ولا في كل الممكنات أيضا فان من الخيرات خيرات هن في الطبيعة وقد تكون بالعرض مما يمكن أن يكون وأن لا يكون فليست المشورة فيهم من مقدمات العمل فقد استبان ووضح في مقدار كم تكون المشورة

. . .

Neque utique de contingentibus omnibus; sunt enim et natura quedam et a fortuna fienda bona contingentium et fieri et non, de qui bus non est pre opere deliberare; sed manifestum quod de quibuscumque consultare.

Neque etiam de contingentibus omnibus; sunt enim et a natura quedam et a fortuna fiunt bona contingentium et fieri et non, de quibus nichil pre opere consiliari; sed palam quia de quibuscumque est consiliari,

Nor, again, can counsel be given about the whole class of things which may or may not take place; for this class includes some good things that occur naturally, and some that occur by accident; and about these it is useless to offer counsel. Clearly counsel can only be given on matters about which people deliberate;

τοιαῦτα δ’ ἐστὶν ὅσα πέφυκεν ἀνάγεσθαι εἰς (39) ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἐστιν· μέχρι γὰρ τού (1359b1) του σκοποῦμεν, ἕως ἂν εὕρωμεν εἰ ἡμῖν δυνατὰ ἢ ἀδύνατα πρᾶξαι.

وذلك في جميع الاتي يمكن أن تفعل بنا والاتي بدو كونها من قبلنا فانا قد ننظر في الأشياء حتى يتبين لنا أنها مما لا يمكن أن تفعل إن كانت كذلك

. .

Hec autem sunt quecumque possunt reduci ad nos, et quorum principium generationis in nobis est; usque ad hoc consideramus, quousque inveniamus si a nobis possunt agi.

talia sunt quecumque nata sunt reduci in nos, et quorum principium generationis in nobis est; usque ad hoc enim aspicimus, donec inveniamus si nobis possibilia agere.

matters, namely, that ultimately depend on ourselves, and which we have it in our power to set going. For we turn a thing over in our mind until we have reached the point of seeing whether we can do it or not.

(2) καθ’ ἕκαστον μὲν οὖν ἀκριβῶς διαριθμήσασθαι καὶ (3) διαλαβεῖν εἰς εἴδη περὶ ὧν εἰώθασι χρηματίζειν, ἔτι (4) δ’ ὅσον ἐνδέχεται περὶ αὐτῶν διορίσαι κατὰ τὴν ἀλή(5)θειαν, οὐ δεῖ κατὰ τὸν παρόντα καιρὸν ζητεῖν διὰ τὸ (6) μήτε τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἶναι τέχνης, ἀλλ’ ἐμφρονεστέρας καὶ (7) μᾶλλον ἀληθινῆς, πολλῷ τε πλείω δεδόσθαι καὶ νῦν αὐτῇ (8) τῶν οἰκείων θεωρημάτων· ὅπερ γὰρ καὶ πρότερον εἰρηκότες (9) τυγχάνομεν ἀληθές ἐστιν, ὅτι ἡ ῥητορικὴ σύγκειται μὲν (10) ἔκ τε τῆς ἀναλυτικῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἤθη πο(11)λιτικῆς, ὁμοία δ’ ἐστὶν τὰ μὲν τῇ διαλεκτικῇ τὰ δὲ τοῖς (12) σοφιστικοῖς λόγοις. ὅσῳ δ’ ἄν τις ἢ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ἢ (13) ταύτην μὴ καθάπερ ἂν δυνάμεις ἀλλ’ ἐπιστήμας πειρᾶται (14) κατασκευάζειν, λήσεται τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν ἀφανίσας τῷ μετα(15)βαίνειν ἐπισκευάζων εἰς ἐπιστήμας ὑποκειμένων τινῶν πρα(16)γμάτων, ἀλλὰ μὴ μόνον λόγων. ὅμως δὲ ὅσα πρὸ ἔργου μέν (17) ἐστι διελεῖν, ἔτι δ’ ὑπολείπει σκέψιν τῇ πολιτικῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, (18) εἴπωμεν καὶ νῦν.

فأما إحصاء كل واحدة منها والإحاطة بها من قبل الأنواع التي اعتيد أن يوقّع عليها والتحديد لها والبيان عنها بمبلغ الطاقة فليس ينبغي تكلفه بالحقيقة والاستقصاء في هذا الوقت الحاضر لأنّ هذا ليس من شأن الصناعة الريطورية ولكن من شأن تلك التي لها الفضل في الفهم وهي بالحوى أن تكون أصحّ وأصدق والقول فيها أكثر ولا الذى يتكلف هاهنا أيضا أبواب وقوانين أهلية فالذي ذكرنا آنفا قد وجد حقّا أعني قولنا أن الريطورية مركبة من الأنالوطيقي ومن الفوليطية التي في الأخلاق وقد تشبه في شيء الديالقطيقية وفي أشياء أخر الكلام السوفسطي وذلك بأن يتكلف متكلف تهيئة هذه الديالقطيقية فيوصل طبيعتهن ويلغي ما فيهن من الاختلاف ويهيئون نحو العلم إذ يجعل الموضوع لها ليس أمورا ما لكن الكلام فقط وذلك في قدرها من بدو العمل ان تفصل وتميز ثم على أنها قد تدع للعلم الفوليطي موضع نظر وتدبر في مثل هذا الذي نحن ذاكرون

. . . .

Unumquodque igitur diligenter dinumerare et assumere in species de quibus consueverunt vivere, amplius autem quantum contingit de ipsis determinare secundum veritatem, non oportet secundum presens tempus inquirere pro eo quod non est rethorice artis, sed manifestioris et verioris, multo magis attribuitur et nunc eidem a propriis speculationibus; quod et prima dicentes adipiscimur, verum est, quoniam rethorica componitur ex dialetica scientia et ex civili que est circa consuetudines, similia autem sunt hec quidem dialetice, hec autem sophisticis sermonibus. Quantum autem si quis aut dialeticam aut hanc non tamquam potentias, sed scientias temptat construere, solvet naturam ipsorum destruens pertranseundo construens ad scientias aliquarurn subiectarum quidem rerum, sed non solum sermonum. Tamen quecumque pre opere est quidem dividere, adhuc autem relinquit inquisitionem civili scientie, dicamus et nunc.

Per singula quidem igitur diligenter dinumerare et distinguere in species de quibus consueverunt negotiari, adhuc autem quantum contingit de ipsis determinare secundum veritatem, non oportet secundum presens tempus inquirere propterea quod non est artis rethorice, sed illustrioris et magis vere, et quia multo plura attributa sunt et nunc ipsi quam sint propria theoremata. Quod enim et prius dicentes extitimus verum est, quod rethorica componitur quidem ex dialetica scientia et ex ea que circa mores politica, similis antem est quantum ad hec quidem dialetice, quantum ad alia autem sophisticis sennonibus. Quanto autem utique quis vel dialeticam vel hanc non' quemadmodum uti que potentias, sed ut scientias temptaverit constituere, latebit naturam ipsarum exterminans eo quod transgrediatur insuper instituendo ad scientias quarundam rerum subiectarum et non solum orationum. Attamen quecumque pre opere quidem est dividere, relinquunt autem considerationem adhuc politice scientie, dicamus et nunc.

Now to enumerate and classify accurately the usual subjects of public business, and further to frame, as far as possible, true definitions of them is a task which we must not attempt on the present occasion. For it does not belong to the art of rhetoric, but to a more instructive art and a more real branch of knowledge; and as it is, rhetoric has been given a far wider subject—matter than strictly belongs to it. The truth is, as indeed we have said already, that rhetoric is a combination of the science of logic and of the ethical branch of politics; and it is partly like dialectic, partly like sophistical reasoning. But the more we try to make either dialectic rhetoric not, what they really are, practical faculties, but sciences, the more we shall inadvertently be destroying their true nature; for we shall be re—fashioning them and shall be passing into the region of sciences dealing with definite subjects rather than simply with words and forms of reasoning. Even here, however, we will mention those points which it is of practical importance to distinguish, their fuller treatment falling naturally to political science.

(19) σχεδὸν γάρ, περὶ ὧν βουλεύονται πάντες καὶ περὶ ὧν ἀγο(20)ρεύουσιν οἱ συμβουλεύοντες, τὰ μέγιστα τυγχάνει πέντε τὸν (21) ἀριθμὸν ὄντα· ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶν περί τε πόρων, καὶ πολέμου καὶ (22) εἰρήνης, ἔτι δὲ περὶ φυλακῆς τῆς χώρας, καὶ τῶν εἰσαγομένων (23) καὶ ἐξαγομένων, καὶ νομοθεσίας· ὥστε περὶ μὲν πόρων τὸν (24) μέλλοντα συμβουλεύειν δέοι ἂν τὰς προσόδους τῆς πόλεως εἰδέναι (25) τίνες καὶ πόσαι, ὅπως εἴτε τις παραλείπεται προστεθῇ καὶ (26) εἴ τις ἐλάττων αὐξηθῇ, ἔτι δὲ τὰς δαπάνας τῆς πόλεως (27) ἁπάσας, ὅπως εἴ τις περίεργος ἀφαιρεθῇ καὶ εἴ τις μείζων (28) ἐλάττων γένηται· οὐ γὰρ μόνον πρὸς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα προσ(29)τιθέντες πλουσιώτεροι γίγνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀφαιροῦντες τῶν (30) δαπανημάτων.

فقد يوجد قريبا من أن تكون جميع الأمور الجسيمة التي يتشاور فيها المتشاورون ويتكلم فيها ويثبتها المشيرون خمسة عددا فقر تكون المشورة في العدة وفي الحرب وفي السلم وفي حفظ البلد وفيما يدخل ويخرج فقي وضع السنن فالذي يشير في العدة حقيق أن يعرف غلات المدينة ما هي وأي وكم كيما إن قصر شيء زيد فيه وإن نقص مد وكثر وعرف مع ذلك نفقات المدينة كلها وإن كان فيها إنسان بطال أو متعطل نحى وإن كان عظيم المروءة حط عن تلك المرتبة فإنهم ليس في الزيادة في المال فقط يزدادون لكن بالنقصان من النفقة أيضا

. . . . .

Fere enim, de quibus consultant omnes et circa que agunt consultantes, maxime autem inveniunt quinque numero entia; hec autem sunt de expensis, et de bello et pace, amplius autem et de custodia loci, et inducendis et extrahendis, et legum positione; quare de expensis quidem debentem deliberare oportet utique introitus civitatis considerare et quot et quales, quomodo si aliqua deficit restauretur et si quis minor augeatur, amplius autem consumptiones civitatis omnes, quomodo si qua superflua auferatur et si qua maior minor fiat; non enim apponentes super existentibus ditiores fiunt, sed auferentes a consumptionibus.

Fere enim de quibus consiliantur omnes et circa que pronuntiant deliberantes, maxime quinque numero existunt entia; hec autem sunt de proventibus, et de bello et pace, adhuc autem et de custodia regionis, et de hiis que inferuntur et educuntur, et de legislatione; quare de proventibus quidem debentem consiliari oportebit utique introitus civitatis scire et qui et quanti, quatinus si quis deficit apponatur et si quis minor augeatur, adhuc autem expensas civitatis omnes, quatinus si que superflue auferantur et si que maiores minores fiant; non enim solum apponentes ad existentia ditiores fiunt, sed et auferentes ab expensis.

The main matters on which all men deliberate and on which political speakers make speeches are some five in number: ways and means, war and peace, national defence, imports and exports, and legislation. As to Ways and Means, then, the intending speaker will need to know the number and extent of the country’s sources of revenue, so that, if any is being overlooked, it may be added, and, if any is defective, it may be increased. Further, he should know all the expenditure of the country, in order that, if any part of it is superfluous, it may be abolished, or, if any is too large, it may be reduced. For men become richer not only by increasing their existing wealth but also by reducing their expenditure.

ταῦτα δ’ οὐ μόνον ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἴδια ἐμ(31)πειρίας ἐνδέχεται συνορᾶν, ἀλλ’ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ἄλ(32)λοις εὑρημένων ἱστορικὸν εἶναι πρὸς τὴν περὶ τούτων συμβουλήν. (33) περὶ δὲ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης τὴν δύναμιν εἰδέναι (34) τῆς πόλεως, ὁπόση τε ὑπάρχει ἤδη καὶ πόσην ἐνδέχε(35)ται ὑπάρξαι, καὶ ποία τις ἥ τε ὑπάρχουσά ἐστιν καὶ (36) ἥτις ἐνδέχεται προσγενέσθαι, ἔτι δὲ πολέμους πῶς καὶ τίνας (37) πεπολέμηκεν. οὐ μόνον δὲ τῆς οἰκείας πόλεως ἀλλὰ (38) καὶ τῶν ὁμόρων ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖον εἰδέναι, καὶ πρὸς οὓς (39) ἐπίδοξον πολεμεῖν, ὅπως πρὸς μὲν τοὺς κρείττους εἰρηνεύηται, (1360a1) πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἥττους ἐφ’ αὑτοῖς ᾖ τὸ πολεμεῖν, καὶ τὰς δυ(2)νάμεις, πότερον ὅμοιαι ἢ ἀνόμοιαι· ἔστιν γὰρ καὶ ταύτῃ πλεον(3)εκτεῖν ἢ ἐλαττοῦσθαι.

وهذا مما قد يقدر على معرفته ليس من التجارب في الأمور الخواص فقط ولكن من قبل الاضطرار أيضا وينبغي أن يكون عالما بالأخبار التي يتحدث بها عن آخرين فأما في الحرب والسلم فأن يعرف قوة الأمور وقدره وحال المدينة وكم هي في تلك الحال وكم تستطيع أن يكون وبأي نحو هي تستطيع أن تقبل زيادة شيء وأن يعرف مع ذلك شيئا من الحروب وكيف حارب من حارب وقد يحتاج إلى أن يعرف ليس حال أهل مدينته فقط ولكن حال من في تخومه وما يليه أيضا وان لم يعلم إلى أي المحمودات تؤدي المحاربة no Arabic وأن يعرف حال الاجناد أيضا متشابهون هم أم غير متشابهين فإنهم ربما تناسلوا وأكثروا

. . . . . .

. sed necessarium est et ab inventis ab aliis ystoriatum esse ad consultationern circa hoc. De bello vero et pace potentiam videre civitatis, quanta fuit iam et quantam contingit esse, et qualis quedam est que presens est et si qua contingit ante fieri, amplius autem bella quedam et quomodo pugnaverunt. Non solum proprie civitatis sed et aliorum hec necesse scire, aut apud quos arbitrandum bellare, quomodo ad meliores quidem pacificant, apud minores quidem in ipsis erit bellare, et potentias quidem utrum equales aut inequales; est autem et in hac excellere et deficere (superhabundam et minorificari).

Hec autem non solum ex ea que circa propria experientia contingit conspicere, sed necessarium et inventorum aput alios scientem esse ad eam que de hoc deliberationem. De bello autem et pace scire potentiam civitatis, quanta est iam et quantam contingit fore, et qualis quedam et que existit et que potest ad venire, adhuc autem bella que et qualiter preliati sunt. Non solum autem proprie civitatis sed et conterminalium hec necessarium scire, aut et ad quos dubii eventus sit pugnare, quatinus ad meliores quidem pacem habeant, ad deteriores autem in ipsis sit pugnare, et potentie utrum similes aut dissimiles; est enim et hiis excedere et minorari.

A comprehensive view of these questions cannot be gained solely from experience in home affairs; in order to advise on such matters a man must be keenly interested in the methods worked out in other lands. As to Peace and War, he must know the extent of the military strength of his country, both actual and potential, and also the mature of that actual and potential strength; and further, what wars his country has waged, and how it has waged them. He must know these facts not only about his own country, but also about neighbouring countries; and also about countries with which war is likely, in order that peace may be maintained with those stronger than his own, and that his own may have power to make war or not against those that are weaker. He should know, too, whether the military power of another country is like or unlike that of his own; for this is a matter that may affect their relative strength.

ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα μὴ μόνον τοὺς (4) οἰκείους πολέμους τεθεωρηκέναι ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς τῶν ἄλλων, πῶς (5) ἀποβαίνουσιν· ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν ὁμοίων τὰ ὅμοια γίγνεσθαι πέφυκεν.

وقد ينبغي له مع ذلك ألا يكون ينظر في حروبه فقط ولكن في حروب غيره إلى ما آلت لأن الشبيهات ممكنة أن تكون من الشبيهات

. .

Necesse vero et ad hec non solum propria bella providere, sed et ea que sunt aliorurn, quomodo contingunt; a similibus enim similia fieri apta nata sunt.

Necessarium autem et ad hec non sol urn tua prelia considerasse sed et ea que aliorum, qualiter eveniunt; a similibus enim similia fieri nata sunt.

With the same end in view he must, besides, have studied the wars of other countries as well as those of his own, and the way they ended; similar causes are likely to have similar results.

(6) ἔτι δὲ περὶ φυλακῆς τῆς χώρας μὴ λανθάνειν πῶς (7) φυλάττεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἰδέναι τῆς φυλακῆς καὶ (8) τὸ εἶδος καὶ τοὺς τόπους τῶν φυλακτηρίων (τοῦτο δ’ ἀδύ(9)νατον μὴ ἔμπειρον ὄντα τῆς χώρας), ἵν’ εἴ τ’ ἐλάττων ἡ φυ(10)λακὴ προστεθῇ καὶ εἴ τις περίεργος ἀφαιρεθῇ καὶ τοὺς ἐπι(11)τηδείους τόπους τηρῶσι μᾶλλον.

ثم في حفظ البالد أيضا فإنه ينبغي أن لا يذهب عليه حفظ البلاد وكيف ينبغي أن تحفظ وأن يعرف مبلغ الحفظ ونوعه ومواضع المسالح وهذا يمكنه وإن لم يكن بالبلاد خبر فإن كان في الحفظة قليلا زاد فيهم وإن كان فيهم ذو إرب ومكر نحّاه ونبغي له أن يحفظ بزيادة المواضع التي ينتفع بحفظها

. . .

Amplius autem de custodia loci, quod non la teat nos quomodo custoditur, sed necesse multitudinem videre custodie et speciem et loca custodiarum (hoc autem impossibile, si non est expertus loci), ut si minor fuerit custodia addatur et si superflua auferatur et apta loca custodiunt magis.

Adhuc autem de munitione regionis non latere qualiter custoditur, sed multitudinem scire custodie et speciem et loca munitionum (hoc autem impossibile non expertum existentem regionis), ut si minor sit custodia apponatur et si qua superflua auferatur et loca ydonea observent magis.

With regard to National Defence: he ought to know all about the methods of defence in actual use, such as the strength and character of the defensive force and the positions of the forts — this last means that he must be well acquainted with the lie of the country — in order that a garrison may be increased if it is too small or removed if it is not wanted, and that the strategic points may be guarded with special care.

(12) ἔτι δὲ περὶ τροφῆς, πόση [δαπάνη] ἱκανὴ τῇ πόλει καὶ ποία, (13) ἡ αὐτοῦ τε γιγνομένη καὶ <ἡ> εἰσαγώγιμος, καὶ τίνων τ’ ἐξ(14)αγωγῆς δέονται καὶ τίνων <καὶ παρὰ τίνων> εἰσαγωγῆς, ἵνα (15) πρὸς τούτους καὶ συνθῆκαι καὶ συμβολαὶ γίγνωνται· πρὸς δύο (16) γὰρ διαφυλάττειν ἀναγκαῖον ἀνεγκλήτους τοὺς πολίτας, πρός (17) τε τοὺς κρείττους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς εἰς ταῦτα χρησίμους.

وأن يعرف أيضا مبلغ القوت وبكم من النزل تكتفي المدينة وكم الحاضر الموجود فيها من ذلك وهل أدخل ذلك وأحرز وما الأشياء التي ينبغي أن تدحل لتكون مشورته وما يعهد به على حسب ذلك فإنه قد يحتاج المرء إلى أن يحفظ أهل مدينته لأمرين للأفاضل ولذوي الغنى منهم

. . .

Amplius autem de nutrimento, quanta consumptio sufficiens est civitati et quantum ibidem factum et quantum introducendum, et quorum extraductione indigent et quorum inductione, quod ad hos consultationes et compositiones fiant; penes duo enim necessarium custodire cives non querulos, penes rnaiores et penes ad hec utiles.

Adhuc antem de alimento, quantus sumptus sufficiens civitati et quantum ibidem factum et quantum adducibile, et quorum eductione incligent et quorum adductione, ut ad hec et consilia et statuta fiant; ad duo enim necessarium cives conservare sine querela, ad potentiores et ad eos qui ad ista sunt utiles.

With regard to the Food Supply: he must know what outlay will meet the needs of his country; what kinds of food are produced at home and what imported; and what articles must be exported or imported. This last he must know in order that agreements and commercial treaties may be made with the countries concerned. There are, indeed, two sorts of state to which he must see that his countrymen give no cause for offence, states stronger than his own, and states with which it is advantageous to trade.

(18) εἰς δ’ ἀσφάλειαν ἅπαντα μὲν ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖον δύνασθαι θε(19)ωρεῖν, οὐκ ἐλάχιστον δὲ περὶ νομοθεσίας ἐπαΐειν· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς νό(20)μοις ἐστὶν ἡ σωτηρία τῆς πόλεως, ὥστ’ ἀναγκαῖον εἰδέναι πόσα (21) τέ ἐστι πολιτειῶν εἴδη, καὶ ποῖα συμφέρει ἑκάστῃ, καὶ ὑπὸ (22) τίνων φθείρεσθαι πέφυκεν καὶ οἰκείων τῆς πολιτείας καὶ (23) ἐναντίων.

وقد يحتاج في الحفظ إلى أن يكون مشرفا بعلمه على هذا كله ثم ليس النظر في وضع السنن بيسير فإن أمر المدينة إنما يخلص ويقوم بالسن فقد ينبغى إذًا أن يعلم واضع السنة كم أنواع المدينيات و *اي* ينتفع بكل واحدة منها وممن يخاف عليها الفساد وقد يخاف ذلك من أهل تلك المدينة ومن الأضداد معا

. . .

Ad roborationem autem omnia hec necesse est posse inspicere, nichilominus autem de legum positione dicere; in legibus enim est salus civitatis, quare necessarium est scire quat sunt civilitatum species, et que expediunt unicuique, et ex quibus corrumpi contingit et de propriis civilitatis et contrariis.

Ad securitatem autem omnia quidem hec necessarium posse considerare, non minimum autem de legislatione audire; in legibus enim est salus civitatis; quare necessarium scire quat sunt civilitatum species, et quales conferunt unicuique, et a quibus corrumpi nate sunt et propriis civilitatis et contrariis.

But while he must, for security’s sake, be able to take all this into account, he must before all things understand the subject of legislation; for it is on a country’s laws that its whole welfare depends. He must, therefore, know how many different forms of constitution there are; under what conditions each of these will prosper and by what internal developments or external attacks each of them tends to be destroyed.

λέγω δὲ τὸ ὑπὸ οἰκείων φθείρεσθαι, ὅτι ἔξω τῆς (24) βελτίστης πολιτείας αἱ ἄλλαι πᾶσαι καὶ ἀνιέμεναι καὶ (25) ἐπιτεινόμεναι φθείρονται, οἷον δημοκρατία οὐ μόνον ἀνιεμένη (26) ἀσθενεστέρα γίγνεται ὥστε τέλος ἥξει εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν, ἀλλὰ (27) καὶ ἐπιτεινομένη σφόδρα· ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ γρυπότης καὶ ἡ σιμό(28)της οὐ μόνον ἀνιέμενα ἔρχεται εἰς τὸ μέσον, ἀλλὰ καὶ (29) σφόδρα γρυπὰ γινόμενα ἢ σιμὰ οὕτως διατίθεται ὥστε μηδὲ (30) μυκτῆρα δοκεῖν εἶναι.

وقد أعني بالفساد من أهلها أن مراتب التدبير كلها المدينية المحكمة قد تفسد اذا قصرت فاسترخت واذا أفرطت فاشتدت كما أن التدبير الذي يسمى الديمقراطية وهو تدبير المدينة قد يضعف ويؤول إلى النحو الذي يسمى خساسة الرياسة ليس اذا استرخى قط وضعف لكن اذا اشتد أيضا وعنف جدا وذلك بمنزلة الفطس فان الفطس ليس اذا قل وضعف قط يقرب من الاعتدال ولكن اذا أفرط وتفاقم أيضا فإنه يصير إلى أن يظن أنه لا أنف هناك

. . .

Dico autem a propriis corrumpi, quoniam extra optimam civilitatem alie omnes remisse et intense corrumpuntur, ut puta regimen populi non solum remissum infirmius fit et finiet ad parvum dominium, sed tensum vehementer, quemadmodum et curvitas et simitas non solum remisse ad medium veniunt, sed vehementer curva facta sic disponunt quare non nares habere videantur.

Dico autem a propriis corrumrpi quia excepta optima civilitate alie omnes et remisse et intense corrumpuntur, puta dermocratia non solum rernissa debilior fit et terminabitur in oligarchiam, sed et intensa valde; sicut et aquilinitas et simitas non solum remisse in medium veniunt, sed et valde aquila facta aut sirna ita disponunt nasum, ut neque nasus videatur esse.

When I speak of destruction through internal developments I refer to the fact that all constitutions, except the best one of all, are destroyed both by not being pushed far enough and by being pushed too far. Thus, democracy loses its vigour, and finally passes into oligarchy, not only when it is not pushed far enough, but also when it is pushed a great deal too far; just as the aquiline and the snub nose not only turn into normal noses by not being aquiline or snub enough, but also by being too violently aquiline or snub arrive at a condition in which they no longer look like noses at all.

χρήσιμον δὲ πρὸς τὰς νομοθεσίας (31) τὸ μὴ μόνον ἐπαΐειν τίς πολιτεία συμφέρει, ἐκ τῶν παρ(32)εληλυθότων θεωροῦντα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις (33) εἰδέναι, αἱ ποῖαι τοῖς ποίοις ἁρμόττουσιν· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι (34) πρὸς μὲν τὴν νομοθεσίαν αἱ τῆς γῆς περίοδοι χρήσιμοι (ἐν(35)τεῦθεν γὰρ λαβεῖν ἔστιν τοὺς τῶν ἐθνῶν νόμους), πρὸς δὲ τὰς (36) πολιτικὰς συμβουλὰς αἱ τῶν περὶ τὰς πράξεις γραφόντων ἱστο(37)ρίαι· ἅπαντα δὲ ταῦτα πολιτικῆς ἀλλ’ οὐ ῥητορικῆς ἔργον ἐστίν.

وقد ينتفع في وضع السنن ليس بأن يتخلص الواضع إلى وضع النافعات للمدينية فقط إذ يعتبر ذلك على ما يرى ولكن بأن يعرف النافعات عند آخرين فيعلم أيها يشاكل أيها وقد استبان اذًا معرفة حالات البلاد مما ينتفع به عند وضع السنن فإنه من هاهنا يمكن أن تنتزع سنن الأمم وأما أصناف المشورة في الأعداء فإن القصص المكتوبة في الأمور تخبر عن ذلك فكل هذا من عمل الفوليطية وليس من عمل الريطورية

. . . . .

Utile autem in legum positionibus non solum considerare que conveniunt civilitati a preteritis, sed eas que sunt ab aliis scire, que quibus conveniunt; quare manifestum, quoniam ad legum positionem terre periodi sunt utiles (exinde enim est accipere gentium leges), ad civiles autem consultationes circa operationes scribentium hystorias; hec autem omnia civilis et non rethorice opus est.

Utile autem ad legislationes non solum attendere que civilitati expediunt, ex preteritis consideranti, sed et eas que apnt alios scire, quales quibus congruant; quare palam quod ad legislationem quidem terre descriptiones sunt utiles (hinc enim est accipere gentium leges), ad civilia autem consilia ystorie scribentiurn gesta; omnia autem hec politice, sed non rethorice opus sunt.

It is useful, in framing laws, not only to study the past history of one’s own country, in order to understand which constitution is desirable for it now, but also to have a knowledge of the constitutions of other nations, and so to learn for what kinds of nation the various kinds of constitution are suited. From this we can see that books of travel are useful aids to legislation, since from these we may learn the laws and customs of different races. The political speaker will also find the researches of historians useful. But all this is the business of political science and not of rhetoric.

(38) περὶ ὧν μὲν οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ <τὰς προτάσεις> τὸν μέλλον (1360b1) τα συμβουλεύειν, τὰ μέγιστα τοσαῦτά ἐστιν· ἐξ ὧν δὲ δεῖ καὶ (2) περὶ τούτων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων προτρέπειν ἢ ἀποτρέπειν (3) λέγωμεν πάλιν.

وهذه هي الأمور العظمى التي فيها يشير المشير وفيما أنبأنا به عن هذه دلالة على تلك الأخر

. .

De quibus quidem oportet habere debentem consultare, maxima tot sunt; ex quibus autem oportet et de hiis et aliis persuadere aut dissuadere rursum dicamus.

De quibus quidem igitur oportet habere debentem consiliari, que maxima tot sunt. Ex quibus autem oportet et de hiis et de aliis exhortari et dehortari dicamus iterum.

These, then, are the most important kinds of information which the political speaker must possess. Let us now go back and state the premisses from which he will have to argue in favour of adopting or rejecting measures regarding these and other matters.

5. (4) Σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστῳ καὶ κοινῇ πᾶσι σκοπός (5) τις ἔστιν οὗ στοχαζόμενοι καὶ αἱροῦνται καὶ φεύγουσιν· καὶ (6) τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν ἥ τ’ εὐδαιμονία καὶ τὰ μόρια (7) αὐτῆς· ὥστε παραδείγματος χάριν λάβωμεν τί ἐστιν ὡς (8) ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ ἐκ τίνων τὰ μόρια ταύ(9)της· περὶ γὰρ ταύτης καὶ τῶν εἰς ταύτην συντεινόντων (10) καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων ταύτῃ αἵ τε προτροπαὶ καὶ αἱ ἀποτροπαὶ (11) πᾶσαί εἰσιν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ παρασκευάζοντα ταύτην ἢ τῶν μορίων (12) τι, ἢ μεῖζον ἀντ’ ἐλάττονος ποιοῦντα, δεῖ πράττειν, τὰ δὲ (13) φθείροντα ἢ ἐμποδίζοντα ἢ τὰ ἐναντία ποιοῦντα μὴ πράττειν.

ثم نحن قائلون أيضا في الإذن والمنع فإن ذلك قريب أو شبيه أن يكون لكل واحد من الناس خاصا وللكل عاما اربا مغتزيا ليس على أنهم يعرفون الحق فيختارونه ويجتنبون بمعرفته ذلك في الجملة صلاح الحال واجزاؤه فقد ينبغي إذا في تعت التثبيت أو الوصف أن ننظـر ما صلاح الحال عاما وممَّ يكون ونخبر عن هذه الجملة وما يغنى عنها ونخبر عن أضدادها وعن الإذن والمنع في كم نحو يكون فإن الذين يضعون إلى ذلك شيئا من الأجزاء يرون أنه ينبغي أن يكون المتكلم يجعل الشيء إما مكان الكبير صغيرا وإما مكان الصغير كبيرا فأما الاتي يفسدن أو يعقن يجاوزن فلا ينبغي أن يفعلهن

. . . . . .

Fere utique et propria unicuique et communis omnibus intentio quedam est quam inspicientes et appetunt et fugiunt; . . . . .

Fere itaque et singulariter unicuique et communiter omnibus finis quida1n est quem coniectantes et eligunt et fugiunt; . . . . .

Part 5. It may be said that every individual man and all men in common aim at a certain end which determines what they choose and what they avoid. This end, to sum it up briefly, is happiness and its constituents. Let us, then, by way of illustration only, ascertain what is in general the nature of happiness, and what are the elements of its constituent parts. For all advice to do things or not to do them is concerned with happiness and with the things that make for or against it; whatever creates or increases happiness or some part of happiness, we ought to do; whatever destroys or hampers happiness, or gives rise to its opposite, we ought not to do.

(14) ἔστω δὴ εὐδαιμονία εὐπραξία μετ’ ἀρετῆς, ἢ αὐτάρκεια (15) ζωῆς, ἢ ὁ βίος ὁ μετὰ ἀσφαλείας ἥδιστος, ἢ εὐθενία κτημάτων (16) καὶ σωμάτων μετὰ δυνάμεως φυλακτικῆς τε καὶ πρακτικῆς (17) τούτων· σχεδὸν γὰρ τούτων ἓν ἢ πλείω τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν (18) ὁμολογοῦσιν εἶναι ἅπαντες. [I.5.4] (19) εἰ δή ἐστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τοιοῦτον, ἀνάγκη αὐτῆς εἶναι μέρη (20) εὐγένειαν, πολυφιλίαν, χρηστοφιλίαν, πλοῦτον, εὐτεκνίαν, πολυ(21)τεκνίαν, εὐγηρίαν· ἔτι τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἀρετάς (οἷον ὑγίειαν, (22) κάλλος, ἰσχύν, μέγεθος, δύναμιν ἀγωνιστικήν), δόξαν, τιμήν, (23) εὐτυχίαν, ἀρετήν [ἢ καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῆς φρόνησιν, ἀνδρείαν, (24) δικαιοσύνην, σωφροσύνην]· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν αὐταρκέστατός <τις> (25) εἴη, εἰ ὑπάρχοι αὐτῷ τά τ’ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά· (26) οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄλλα παρὰ ταῦτα.

فليكن صلاح الحال حسن الفعال مع الفضيلة أو منتهى العمر أو محيا الذيذ مع التوقي أو السعة في المال والعقد مع القوة الحافظة والفاعلة لهذه فإن العامة مقرون بأن صلاح الحال شيء قريب من هذا وإن كان صلاح الحال هكذا فإنّ أجزاءه لا محالة كرم الحسب وكثرة الإخوان واليسار وحسن الفعال الشيخوخة الصالحة ثم فضائل الجسد أيضا مثل الصحة والجمال والجلد والجزالة والبطش والمجد والجلالة والسعادة والفضيلة وأجزاءها من العقل الشجاعة والعفاف والبر فإنه هكذا أحرى أن يكون الإنسان موفورا مكتفيا أعني إذا كانت له حال الخير التي يكون فيه مع التي من خارج وليس يكون شيء آخر سوى هذه

. . . . . .

We may define happiness as prosperity combined with virtue; or as independence of life; or as the secure enjoyment of the maximum of pleasure; or as a good condition of property and body, together with the power of guarding one’s property and body and making use of them. That happiness is one or more of these things, pretty well everybody agrees. From this definition of happiness it follows that its constituent parts are: — good birth, plenty of friends, good friends, wealth, good children, plenty of children, a happy old age, also such bodily excellences as health, beauty, strength, large stature, athletic powers, together with fame, honour, good luck, and virtue. A man cannot fail to be completely independent if he possesses these internal and these external goods; for besides these there are no others to have.

ἔστι δ’ ἐν αὐτῷ μὲν τὰ (27) περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ τὰ ἐν σώματι, ἔξω δὲ εὐγένεια καὶ φίλοι (28) καὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμή, ἔτι δὲ προσήκειν οἰόμεθα δυνάμεις (29) ὑπάρχειν καὶ τύχην· οὕτω γὰρ ἀσφαλέστατος ὁ βίος.

فأما التي تكون فيه فهي التي للنفس والتي للجسد وأما التي من خارج فالحسب الكريم والإخوان والمال والكرامة ثم قد يظن أنه يلزم مع ذلك القوة والسعادة فقد يكون محيا المرء ومنقلبه في خاصة نفسه مسلما مهذبا بهذه التي ذكرنا

. .

Goods of the soul and of the body are internal. Good birth, friends, money, and honour are external. Further, we think that he should possess resources and luck, in order to make his life really secure.

λάβωμεν (30) τοίνυν ὁμοίως καὶ τούτων ἕκαστον τί ἐστιν. (31) εὐγένεια μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἔθνει μὲν καὶ πόλει τὸ αὐτό(32)χθονας ἢ ἀρχαίους εἶναι, καὶ ἡγεμόνας τοὺς πρώτους ἐπι(33)φανεῖς, καὶ πολλοὺς ἐπιφανεῖς γεγονέναι ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐπὶ (34) τοῖς ζηλουμένοις· ἰδίᾳ δὲ εὐγένεια ἢ ἀπ’ ἀνδρῶν ἢ ἀπὸ (35) γυναικῶν, καὶ γνησιότης ἀπ’ ἀμφοῖν, καί, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ πόλεως, (36) <τὸ> τούς τε πρώτους γνωρίμους ἢ ἐπ’ ἀρετῇ ἢ πλούτῳ ἢ (37) ἄλλῳ τῳ τῶν τιμωμένων εἶναι, καὶ πολλοὺς ἐπιφανεῖς ἐκ τοῦ (38) γένους καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ νέους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους. (39) εὐτεκνία δὲ καὶ πολυτεκνία οὐκ ἄδηλα.

ولننظر الآن بهذا النحو من النظر في كل واحدة من هذه ما هي أمّا الحسب فانّه في القوم او في المدينة ان يكونوا بكناء او قدماء او حكماء او رؤساء او مذكورين وذوى كثرة واحرارا ، ويكون فيهم من قد نال الأمور الجميلة المغبوطة. فامّا التبيين عن الحسب ، من قبل الرجال هو ام من قبل النساء، فانّه يتفّرع منهما جميعا ، كما انّه يكون الرؤساء والأحرار معروفين في المدينة اذا اشتهروا بالفضيلة او اليسار او غير ذلك من الأمور المكرمّة ، ويكون اَخرون معروفين من ذلك الجنس بعينه ثم من ذلك الجنس بعينه غلمان واشياخ. (٥) فامّا كثرة الأولاد وحسن الأولاد فليس ممّا به من خفاء ,

. . . . . .

As we have already ascertained what happiness in general is, so now let us try to ascertain what of these parts of it is. Now good birth in a race or a state means that its members are indigenous or ancient: that its earliest leaders were distinguished men, and that from them have sprung many who were distinguished for qualities that we admire. The good birth of an individual, which may come either from the male or the female side, implies that both parents are free citizens, and that, as in the case of the state, the founders of the line have been notable for virtue or wealth or something else which is highly prized, and that many distinguished persons belong to the family, men and women, young and old. The phrases ‘possession of good children’ and ‘of many children’ bear a quite clear meaning.

ἔστιν δὲ τῷ κοινῷ (1361a1) μὲν [εὐτεκνία], νεότης ἂν ᾖ πολλὴ καὶ ἀγαθή, ἀγαθὴ δὲ (2) κατ’ ἀρετὴν σώματος, οἷον μέγεθος, κάλλος, ἰσχύν, δύνα(3)μιν ἀγωνιστικήν· ψυχῆς δὲ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία νέου (4) ἀρεταί· ἰδίᾳ δὲ εὐτεκνία καὶ πολυτεκνία τὸ τὰ ἴδια τέκνα (5) πολλὰ καὶ τοιαῦτα εἶναι, καὶ θήλεα καὶ ἄρρενα· θηλειῶν (6) δὲ ἀρετὴ σώματος μὲν κάλλος καὶ μέγεθος, ψυχῆς δὲ (7) σωφροσύνη καὶ φιλεργία ἄνευ ἀνελευθερίας.

وحسن الولد امّا من للعامّة فكثرة الفتيان وصلاحهم في فضائل الجسد كالجزالة والجمال والشدّة والبطش وامّا في ذوات النفس فانّ فضائل الغلام العفاف والشجاعة . وامّا للخاصّة فحسن الولد وكثرة الأولاد . من الذكور والإناث . وفضيلة الإناث امّا في الجسد فالجمال والعبالة وامّا في النفس فالعفاف و حبّ الألفة وحبّ الكدّ ,

. . . .

Applied to a community, they mean that its young men are numerous and of good a quality: good in regard to bodily excellences, such as stature, beauty, strength, athletic powers; and also in regard to the excellences of the soul, which in a young man are temperance and courage. Applied to an individual, they mean that his own children are numerous and have the good qualities we have described. Both male and female are here included; the excellences of the latter are, in body, beauty and stature; in soul, self—command and an industry that is not sordid.

ὁμοίως δὲ (8) καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ κοινῇ, καὶ κατ’ ἄνδρας καὶ κατὰ γυναῖκας, δεῖ (9) ζητεῖν ἕκαστον ὑπάρχειν τῶν τοιούτων· ὅσοις γὰρ τὰ κατὰ (10) γυναῖκας φαῦλα ὥσπερ Λακεδαιμονίοις, σχεδὸν κατὰ τὸ (11) ἥμισυ οὐκ εὐδαιμονοῦσιν.

وذلك وجد عامّا وخاصّا في الرجال وفي النسا ء بحال واحدة . وقد ينبغي ان ننظر في كلّ واحد منهم هل هو هكذا , علىّ انّ الذين يزنّون بالريبة في النساء , كمثل اللقدمنين , ليس لهم كالنصف من صلاح الحال .

. .

Communities as well as individuals should lack none of these perfections, in their women as well as in their men. Where, as among the Lacedaemonians, the state of women is bad, almost half of human life is spoilt.

(12) πλούτου δὲ μέρη νομίσματος πλῆθος <καὶ> γῆς, χωρίων (13) κτῆσις πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει καὶ κάλλει διαφερόντων, ἔτι δὲ (14) ἐπίπλων κτῆσις καὶ ἀνδραπόδων καὶ βοσκημάτων πλήθει καὶ (15) κάλλει διαφερόντων, ταῦτα δὲ πάντα <οἰκεῖα> καὶ ἀσφαλῆ (16) καὶ ἐλευθέρια καὶ χρήσιμα. ἔστιν δὲ χρήσιμα μὲν μᾶλλον τὰ (17) κάρπιμα, ἐλευθέρια δὲ τὰ πρὸς ἀπόλαυσιν (κάρπιμα δὲ (18) λέγω ἀφ’ ὧν αἱ πρόσοδοι, ἀπολαυστικὰ δὲ ἀφ’ ὧν μηδὲν (19) παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν γίγνεται ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον). ὅρος δὲ ἀσφα(20)λείας μὲν τὸ ἐνταῦθα καὶ οὕτω κεκτῆσθαι ὥστ’ ἐφ’ αὑτῷ (21) εἶναι τὴν χρῆσιν αὐτῶν, τοῦ δὲ οἰκεῖα εἶναι ἢ μὴ ὅταν ἐφ’ αὑτῷ (22) ᾖ ἀπαλλοτριῶσαι· λέγω δὲ ἀπαλλοτρίωσιν δόσιν καὶ πρᾶσιν. λέγω δὲ ἀπαλλοτρίωσιν δόσιν καὶ πρᾶσιν. (23) ὅλως δὲ τὸ πλουτεῖν ἐστιν ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ κεκτῆ(24)σθαι· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐνέργειά ἐστι τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἡ χρῆσις πλοῦτος.

فامّا اجزاء اليسار فكثرة الدنانير والأرضين والمال والعقد وجميع الأشياء المختلفة في النفاسة والحسن , ثم اقتناء اثاث البيت واللقط والأمتعة والمواشى الكثيرة المختلفة في الحسن والكثرة, وكلّ ذلك في توقٍّ وحرّيّة ونحو التنعّم . ثم من النافعة ايضا ملك الثماريّات ومنها الغلّات , فقد استلذّ من الغلاّت ما يجتنيه قانيه بلا نصب , وحدّ التحرّز او التحفّظ هو ان يكون اقتناؤه في الموضع على النحو الذي تكون منفعته قنية له . فامّا ان تكون اهليّة له او لا , فإذا كان الإغراب اليه , وقد اعنى بلإغراب الإعطاء والبيع . . .

. . . . . .

The constituents of wealth are: plenty of coined money and territory; the ownership of numerous, large, and beautiful estates; also the ownership of numerous and beautiful implements, live stock, and slaves. All these kinds of property are our own, are secure, gentlemanly, and useful. The useful kinds are those that are productive, the gentlemanly kinds are those that provide enjoyment. ... By ‘disposing of it’ I mean giving it away or selling it. By ‘disposing of it’ I mean giving it away or selling it. Wealth as a whole consists in using things rather than in owning them; it is really the activity — that is, the use — of property that constitutes wealth.

(25) εὐδοξία δ’ ἐστὶν τὸ ὑπὸ πάντων σπουδαῖον ὑπολαμβάνε(26)σθαι ἢ τοιοῦτόν τι ἔχειν οὗ πάντες ἐφίενται ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ ἢ (27) οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἢ οἱ φρόνιμοι. (28) τιμὴ δ’ ἐστὶν μὲν σημεῖον εὐεργετικῆς εὐδοξίας, τιμῶνται δὲ (29) δικαίως μὲν καὶ μάλιστα οἱ εὐεργετηκότες, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τιμᾶται (30) καὶ ὁ δυνάμενος εὐεργετεῖν· εὐεργεσία δὲ ἢ εἰς σωτηρίαν καὶ ὅσα (31) αἴτια τοῦ εἶναι, ἢ εἰς πλοῦτον, ἢ εἴς τι τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν, (32) ὧν μὴ ῥᾳδία ἡ κτῆσις ἢ ὅλως ἢ ἐνταῦθα ἢ τότε· πολλοὶ (33) γὰρ διὰ μικρὰ δοκοῦντα τιμῆς τυγχάνουσιν, ἀλλ’ οἱ τόποι (34) καὶ οἱ καιροὶ αἴτιοι. μέρη δὲ τιμῆς θυσίαι, μνῆμαι ἐν (35) μέτροις καὶ ἄνευ μέτρων, γέρα, τεμένη, προεδρίαι, τάφοι, (36) εἰκόνες, τροφαὶ δημόσιαι, τὰ βαρβαρικά, οἷον προσκυνήσεις (37) καὶ ἐκστάσεις, δῶρα τὰ παρ’ ἑκάστοις τίμια. καὶ γὰρ τὸ (38) δῶρόν ἐστι κτήματος δόσις καὶ τιμῆς σημεῖον, διὸ καὶ οἱ (39) φιλοχρήματοι καὶ οἱ φιλότιμοι ἐφίενται αὐτῶν· ἀμφ(1361b1)οτέροις γὰρ ἔχει ὧν δέονται· καὶ γὰρ κτῆμά ἐστιν οὗ ἐφίεν(2)ται οἱ φιλοχρήματοι, καὶ τιμὴν ἔχει οὗ οἱ φιλότιμοι.

. . . . . . . . .

Fame means being respected by everybody, or having some quality that is desired by all men, or by most, or by the good, or by the wise. Honour is the token of a man’s being famous for doing good. it is chiefly and most properly paid to those who have already done good; but also to the man who can do good in future. Doing good refers either to the preservation of life and the means of life, or to wealth, or to some other of the good things which it is hard to get either always or at that particular place or time — for many gain honour for things which seem small, but the place and the occasion account for it. The constituents of honour are: sacrifices; commemoration, in verse or prose; privileges; grants of land; front seats at civic celebrations; state burial; statues; public maintenance; among foreigners, obeisances and giving place; and such presents as are among various bodies of men regarded as marks of honour. For a present is not only the bestowal of a piece of property, but also a token of honour; which explains why honour—loving as well as money—loving persons desire it. The present brings to both what they want; it is a piece of property, which is what the lovers of money desire; and it brings honour, which is what the lovers of honour desire.

(3) σώματος δὲ ἀρετὴ ὑγίεια, αὕτη δὲ οὕτως ὥστε ἀνόσους (4) εἶναι χρωμένους τοῖς σώμασιν· πολλοὶ γὰρ ὑγιαίνουσιν, ὥσπερ (5) Ἡρόδικος λέγεται, οὓς οὐδεὶς ἂν εὐδαιμονίσειε τῆς ὑγιείας (6) διὰ τὸ πάντων ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἢ τῶν πλείστων. (7) κάλλος δὲ ἕτερον καθ’ ἑκάστην ἡλικίαν ἐστίν. νέου μὲν οὖν (8) κάλλος τὸ πρὸς τοὺς πόνους χρήσιμον ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα τούς (9) τε πρὸς δρόμον καὶ πρὸς βίαν, ἡδὺν ὄντα ἰδεῖν πρὸς ἀπό(10)λαυσιν· διὸ οἱ πένταθλοι κάλλιστοι, ὅτι πρὸς βίαν καὶ (11) πρὸς τάχος ἅμα πεφύκασιν· ἀκμάζοντος δὲ πρὸς μὲν (12) πόνους τοὺς πολεμικούς, ἡδὺν δ’ εἶναι δοκεῖν μετὰ φοβερό(13)τητος· γέροντος δὲ πρὸς μὲν πόνους τοὺς ἀναγκαίους ἱκανόν, (14) ἄλυπον δὲ διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν ὧν τὸ γῆρας λωβᾶται. (15) ἰσχὺς δ’ ἐστὶ μὲν δύναμις τοῦ κινεῖν ἕτερον ὡς βούλεται, (16) ἀνάγκη δὲ κινεῖν ἕτερον ἢ ἕλκοντα ἢ ὠθοῦντα ἢ αἴροντα (17) ἢ πιέζοντα ἢ συνθλίβοντα, ὥστε ὁ ἰσχυρὸς ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τού(18)των τισίν ἐστιν ἰσχυρός. μεγέθους δὲ ἀρετὴ τὸ ὑπάρχειν (19) κατὰ μῆκος καὶ βάθος καὶ πλάτος τῶν πολλῶν τοσούτῳ (20) μείζον’ ὥστε μὴ βραδυτέρας ποιεῖν τὰς κινήσεις διὰ τὴν (21) ὑπερβολήν. ἀγωνιστικὴ δὲ σώματος ἀρετὴ σύγκειται ἐκ (22) μεγέθους καὶ ἰσχύος καὶ τάχους (καὶ γὰρ ὁ ταχὺς ἰσχυρός (23) ἐστιν)· ὁ γὰρ δυνάμενος τὰ σκέλη ῥιπτεῖν πως καὶ κινεῖν (24) ταχὺ καὶ πόρρω δρομικός, ὁ δὲ θλίβειν καὶ κατέχειν πα(25)λαιστικός, ὁ δὲ ὦσαι τῇ πληγῇ πυκτικός, ὁ δ’ ἀμφοτέροις (26) τούτοις παγκρατιαστικός, ὁ δὲ πᾶσι πένταθλος.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The excellence of the body is health; that is, a condition which allows us, while keeping free from disease, to have the use of our bodies; for many people are ‘healthy’ as we are told Herodicus was; and these no one can congratulate on their ‘health’, for they have to abstain from everything or nearly everything that men do. Beauty varies with the time of life. In a young man beauty is the possession of a body fit to endure the exertion of running and of contests of strength; which means that he is pleasant to look at; and therefore all-round athletes are the most beautiful, being naturally adapted both for contests of strength and for speed also. For a man in his prime, beauty is fitness for the exertion of warfare, together with a pleasant but at the same time formidable appearance. For an old man, it is to be strong enough for such exertion as is necessary, and to be free from all those deformities of old age which cause pain to others. Strength is the power of moving some one else at will; to do this, you must either pull, push, lift, pin, or grip him; thus you must be strong in all of those ways or at least in some. Excellence in size is to surpass ordinary people in height, thickness, and breadth by just as much as will not make one’s movements slower in consequence. Athletic excellence of the body consists in size, strength, and swiftness; swiftness implying strength. He who can fling forward his legs in a certain way, and move them fast and far, is good at running; he who can grip and hold down is good at wrestling; he who can drive an adversary from his ground with the right blow is a good boxer: he who can do both the last is a good pancratiast, while he who can do all is an ‘all-round’ athlete.

(27) εὐγηρία δ’ ἐστὶ βραδυτὴς γήρως μετ’ ἀλυπίας· οὔτε γὰρ (28) εἰ ταχὺ γηράσκει, εὔγηρως, οὔτ’ εἰ μόγις μὲν λυπηρῶς δέ. ἔστιν (29) δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἀρετῶν καὶ <ἐκ> τύχης· μὴ ἄνοσος (30) γὰρ ὢν μηδὲ ἰσχυρὸς οὐκ ἔσται ἀπαθὴς οὐδ’ ἄλυπος, καὶ πολυ(31)χρόνιος οὐκ ἄνευ τύχης διαμείνειεν ἄν. ἔστιν δέ τις καὶ (32) χωρὶς ἰσχύος καὶ ὑγιείας ἄλλη δύναμις μακροβιότητος· (33) πολλοὶ γὰρ ἄνευ τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἀρετῶν μακρόβιοί εἰσιν· (34) ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν ἡ ἀκριβολογία χρήσιμος ἡ περὶ τούτων εἰς τὰ νῦν.

. . . . . . .

Happiness in old age is the coming of old age slowly and painlessly; for a man has not this happiness if he grows old either quickly, or tardily but painfully. It arises both from the excellences of the body and from good luck. If a man is not free from disease, or if he is strong, he will not be free from suffering; nor can he continue to live a long and painless life unless he has good luck. There is, indeed, a capacity for long life that is quite independent of health or strength; for many people live long who lack the excellences of the body; but for our present purpose there is no use in going into the details of this.

(35) πολυφιλία δὲ καὶ χρηστοφιλία οὐκ ἄδηλα, τοῦ φίλου (36) ὡρισμένου, ὅτι ἔστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος φίλος ὅστις ἃ οἴεται ἀγαθὰ (37) εἶναι ἐκείνῳ, πρακτικός ἐστιν αὐτῶν δι’ ἐκεῖνον. ᾧ δὴ πολ(38)λοὶ τοιοῦτοι, πολύφιλος, ᾧ δὲ καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς ἄνδρες, χρηστόφιλος.

. . .

The terms ‘possession of many friends’ and ‘possession of good friends’ need no explanation; for we define a ‘friend’ as one who will always try, for your sake, to do what he takes to be good for you. The man towards whom many feel thus has many friends; if these are worthy men, he has good friends.

(39) εὐτυχία δέ ἐστιν, ὧν ἡ τύχη ἀγαθῶν αἰτία, ταῦτα (1362a1) γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὑπάρχειν ἢ πάντα ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα ἢ τὰ (2) μέγιστα. αἰτία δ’ ἐστὶν ἡ τύχη ἐνίων μὲν καὶ ὧν αἱ τέχναι, (3) πολλῶν δὲ καὶ ἀτέχνων, οἷον ὅσων ἡ φύσις (ἐνδέχεται δὲ (4) καὶ παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι)· ὑγιείας μὲν γὰρ τέχνη αἰτία, κάλ(5)λους δὲ καὶ μεγέθους φύσις. ὅλως δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀγα(6)θῶν ἐστιν ἀπὸ τύχης ἐφ’ οἷς ἐστιν ὁ φθόνος. ἔστιν δὲ καὶ (7) τῶν παρὰ λόγον ἀγαθῶν αἰτία τύχη, οἷον εἰ οἱ ἄλλοι (8) ἀδελφοὶ αἰσχροί, ὁ δὲ καλός, ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι μὴ εἶδον τὸν (9) θησαυρόν, ὁ δ’ εὗρεν, ἢ εἰ τοῦ πλησίον ἔτυχεν τὸ βέλος, (10) τούτου δὲ μή, ἢ εἰ μὴ ἦλθε μόνος, ἀεὶ φοιτῶν, οἱ δὲ ἅπαξ (11) ἐλθόντες διεφθάρησαν· πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα εὐτυχήματα (12) δοκεῖ εἶναι.

. . . . . . . . . .

’Good luck’ means the acquisition or possession of all or most, or the most important, of those good things which are due to luck. Some of the things that are due to luck may also be due to artificial contrivance; but many are independent of art, as for example those which are due to nature — though, to be sure, things due to luck may actually be contrary to nature. Thus health may be due to artificial contrivance, but beauty and stature are due to nature. All such good things as excite envy are, as a class, the outcome of good luck. Luck is also the cause of good things that happen contrary to reasonable expectation: as when, for instance, all your brothers are ugly, but you are handsome yourself; or when you find a treasure that everybody else has overlooked; or when a missile hits the next man and misses you; or when you are the only man not to go to a place you have gone to regularly, while the others go there for the first time and are killed. All such things are reckoned pieces of good luck.

(13) περὶ δὲ ἀρετῆς ἐπείπερ οἰκειότατος ὁ περὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους τό(14)πος, ὅταν περὶ ἐπαίνου ποιώμεθα τὸν λόγον, τότε διοριστέον.

.

As to virtue, it is most closely connected with the subject of Eulogy, and therefore we will wait to define it until we come to discuss that subject.

6.(15) Ὧν μὲν οὖν δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι προτρέποντα ὡς ἐσομέ(16)νων ἢ ὑπαρχόντων, καὶ ὧν ἀποτρέποντα, φανερόν· τὰ γὰρ (17) ἐναντία τούτων ἐστίν.

.

Part 6. It is now plain what our aims, future or actual, should be in urging, and what in depreciating, a proposal; the latter being the opposite of the former.

ἐπεὶ δὲ πρόκειται τῷ συμβουλεύοντι (18) σκοπὸς τὸ συμφέρον (βουλεύονται γὰρ οὐ περὶ τοῦ τέλους, ἀλλὰ (19) περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶ τὰ συμφέροντα κατὰ (20) τὰς πράξεις, τὸ δὲ συμφέρον ἀγαθόν), ληπτέον ἂν εἴη τὰ στοι(21)χεῖα περὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ συμφέροντος ἁπλῶς.

. . .

Now the political or deliberative orator’s aim is utility: deliberation seeks to determine not ends but the means to ends, i.e. what it is most useful to do. Further, utility is a good thing. We ought therefore to assure ourselves of the main facts about Goodness and Utility in general.

ἔστω δὴ ἀγα(22)θὸν ὃ ἂν αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα ᾖ αἱρετόν, καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα ἄλλο (23) αἱρούμεθα, καὶ οὗ ἐφίεται πάντα, ἢ πάντα τὰ αἴσθησιν (24) ἔχοντα ἢ νοῦν ἢ εἰ λάβοι νοῦν, καὶ ὅσα ὁ νοῦς ἂν ἑκάστῳ (25) ἀποδοίη, καὶ ὅσα ὁ περὶ ἕκαστον νοῦς ἀποδίδωσιν ἑκάστῳ· (26) τοῦτό <γάρ> ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ ἀγαθόν, καὶ οὗ παρόντος εὖ διάκει(27)ται καὶ αὐτάρκως ἔχει, καὶ τὸ αὔταρκες, καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν ἢ (28) φυλακτικὸν τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ᾧ ἀκολουθεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ (29) τὰ κωλυτικὰ τῶν ἐναντίων καὶ τὰ φθαρτικά.

. . . . . .

We may define a good thing as that which ought to be chosen for its own sake; or as that for the sake of which we choose something else; or as that which is sought after by all things, or by all things that have sensation or reason, or which will be sought after by any things that acquire reason; or as that which must be prescribed for a given individual by reason generally, or is prescribed for him by his individual reason, this being his individual good; or as that whose presence brings anything into a satisfactory and self—sufficing condition; or as self—sufficiency; or as what produces, maintains, or entails characteristics of this kind, while preventing and destroying their opposites.

ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ (30) διχῶς (ἢ γὰρ ἅμα ἢ ὕστερον, οἷον τῷ μὲν μανθάνειν τὸ (31) ἐπίστασθαι ὕστερον, τῷ δὲ ὑγιαίνειν τὸ ζῆν ἅμα), καὶ τὰ (32) ποιητικὰ τριχῶς, τὰ μὲν ὡς τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ὑγιείας, τὰ δὲ (33) ὡς σιτία ὑγιείας, τὰ δὲ ὡς τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι, ὅτι ὡς ἐπὶ (34) τὸ πολὺ ποιεῖ ὑγίειαν.

. . .

One thing may entail another in either of two ways — (1) simultaneously, (2) subsequently. Thus learning entails knowledge subsequently, health entails life simultaneously. Things are productive of other things in three senses: first as being healthy produces health; secondly, as food produces health; and thirdly, as exercise does — i.e. it does so usually.

τούτων δὲ κειμένων ἀνάγκη τάς τε (35) λήψεις τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθὰς εἶναι καὶ τὰς τῶν κακῶν (36) ἀποβολάς· ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ τῷ μὲν τὸ μὴ ἔχειν τὸ κακὸν (37) ἅμα, τῷ δὲ τὸ ἔχειν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὕστερον.

. .

All this being settled, we now see that both the acquisition of good things and the removal of bad things must be good; the latter entails freedom from the evil things simultaneously, while the former entails possession of the good things subsequently.

καὶ ἡ ἀντ’ ἐλάτ(38)τονος ἀγαθοῦ μείζονος λῆψις καὶ ἀντὶ μείζονος κακοῦ ἐλάτ (1362b1) τονος· ᾧ γὰρ ὑπερέχει τὸ μεῖζον τοῦ ἐλάττονος, τούτῳ γίνε(2)ται τοῦ μὲν λῆψις τοῦ δ’ ἀποβολή.

. .

The acquisition of a greater in place of a lesser good, or of a lesser in place of a greater evil, is also good, for in proportion as the greater exceeds the lesser there is acquisition of good or removal of evil.

καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς δὲ (3) ἀνάγκη ἀγαθὸν εἶναι (κατὰ γὰρ ταύτας εὖ τε διάκεινται (4) οἱ ἔχοντες, καὶ ποιητικαὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν εἰσι καὶ πρακτικαί· (5) περὶ ἑκάστης δὲ καὶ τίς καὶ ποία χωρὶς ῥητέον), καὶ τὴν (6) ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· πάντα γὰρ ἐφίεται τὰ ζῷα αὐτῆς τῇ (7) φύσει· ὥστε καὶ τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλὰ ἀνάγκη ἀγαθὰ (8) εἶναι· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡδονῆς ποιητικά, τῶν δὲ καλῶν τὰ μὲν (9) ἡδέα τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ καθ’ ἑαυτὰ αἱρετά ἐστιν.

. . . . . . . . .

The virtues, too, must be something good; for it is by possessing these that we are in a good condition, and they tend to produce good works and good actions. They must be severally named and described elsewhere. Pleasure, again, must be a good thing, since it is the nature of all animals to aim at it. Consequently both pleasant and beautiful things must be good things, since the former are productive of pleasure, while of the beautiful things some are pleasant and some desirable in and for themselves.

(10) ὡς δὲ καθ’ ἓν εἰπεῖν, ἀνάγκη ἀγαθὰ εἶναι τάδε. εὐδαιμονία· (11) καὶ γὰρ καθ’ αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν καὶ αὔταρκες, καὶ ἕνεκα αὐτῆς (12) τἆλλα αἱρούμεθα. δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη, μεγαλο(13)ψυχία, μεγαλοπρέπεια, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι αἱ τοιαῦται ἕξεις· ἀρεταὶ (14) γὰρ ψυχῆς.

. . .

The following is a more detailed list of things that must be good. Happiness, as being desirable in itself and sufficient by itself, and as being that for whose sake we choose many other things. Also justice, courage, temperance, magnanimity, magnificence, and all such qualities, as being excellences of the soul.

καὶ ὑγίεια καὶ κάλλος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· (15) ἀρεταὶ γὰρ σώματος καὶ ποιητικὰ πολλῶν, οἷον ὑγίεια (16) καὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ τοῦ ζῆν, διὸ καὶ ἄριστον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὅτι (17) δύο τῶν τοῖς πολλοῖς τιμιωτάτων αἴτιόν ἐστιν, ἡδονῆς καὶ (18) τοῦ ζῆν.

. . .

Further, health, beauty, and the like, as being bodily excellences and productive of many other good things: for instance, health is productive both of pleasure and of life, and therefore is thought the greatest of goods, since these two things which it causes, pleasure and life, are two of the things most highly prized by ordinary people.

πλοῦτος· ἀρετὴ γὰρ κτήσεως καὶ ποιητικὸν πολ(19)λῶν.

.

Wealth, again: for it is the excellence of possession, and also productive of many other good things.

φίλος καὶ φιλία· καὶ γὰρ καθ’ αὑτὸν αἱρετὸς ὁ (20) φίλος καὶ ποιητικὸς πολλῶν.

.

Friends and friendship: for a friend is desirable in himself and also productive of many other good things.

τιμή, δόξα· καὶ γὰρ ἡδέα (21) καὶ ποιητικὰ πολλῶν, καὶ ἀκολουθεῖ αὐταῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ (22) πολὺ τὸ ὑπάρχειν ἐφ’ οἷς τιμῶνται.

.

So, too, honour and reputation, as being pleasant, and productive of many other good things, and usually accompanied by the presence of the good things that cause them to be bestowed.

δύναμις τοῦ λέγειν, (23) τοῦ πράττειν· ποιητικὰ γὰρ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγαθῶν.

.

The faculty of speech and action; since all such qualities are productive of what is good.

ἔτι (24) εὐφυΐα, μνήμη, εὐμάθεια, ἀγχίνοια, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα· (25) ποιητικαὶ γὰρ αὗται ἀγαθῶν αἱ δυνάμεις εἰσίν.

.

Further — good parts, strong memory, receptiveness, quickness of intuition, and the like, for all such faculties are productive of what is good.

ὁμοίως δὲ (26) καὶ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι πᾶσαι καὶ αἱ τέχναι.

.

Similarly, all the sciences and arts.

καὶ τὸ ζῆν· εἰ γὰρ (27) μηδὲν ἄλλο ἕποιτο ἀγαθόν, καθ’ αὑτὸ αἱρετόν ἐστιν.

.

And life: since, even if no other good were the result of life, it is desirable in itself.

καὶ (28) τὸ δίκαιον· συμφέρον γάρ τι κοινῇ ἐστιν.

.

And justice, as the cause of good to the community.

(29) ταῦτα μὲν οὖν σχεδὸν τὰ ὁμολογούμενα ἀγαθά ἐστιν· ἐν δὲ (30) τοῖς ἀμφισβητησίμοις ἐκ τῶνδε οἱ συλλογισμοί.

. .

The above are pretty well all the things admittedly good. In dealing with things whose goodness is disputed, we may argue in the following ways:

ᾧ τὸ ἐναντίον (31) κακόν, τοῦτ’ ἀγαθόν.

.

— That is good of which the contrary is bad.

καὶ οὗ τὸ ἐναντίον τοῖς ἐχθροῖς συμ(32)φέρει· οἷον εἰ τὸ δειλοὺς εἶναι μάλιστα συμφέρει τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, (33) δῆλον ὅτι ἀνδρεία μάλιστα ὠφέλιμον τοῖς πολίταις.

. .

That is good the contrary of which is to the advantage of our enemies; for example, if it is to the particular advantage of our enemies that we should be cowards, clearly courage is of particular value to our countrymen.

καὶ (34) ὅλως ὃ οἱ ἐχθροὶ βούλονται ἢ ἐφ’ ᾧ χαίρουσι, τοὐναντίον (35) τούτου ὠφέλιμον φαίνεται· διὸ εἴρηται (35)
ἦ κεν γηθήσαι Πρίαμος.

. .

And generally, the contrary of that which our enemies desire, or of that at which they rejoice, is evidently valuable. Hence the passage beginning: Surely would Priam exult.

(36) ἔστι δ’ οὐκ ἀεὶ τοῦτο, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει (37) ἐνίοτε ταὐτὸ συμφέρειν τοῖς ἐναντίοις· ὅθεν λέγεται ὡς τὰ (1363a1) κακὰ συνάγει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ὅταν ᾖ ταὐτὸ βλαβερὸν ἀμφοῖν.

. . .

This principle usually holds good, but not always, since it may well be that our interest is sometimes the same as that of our enemies. Hence it is said that ‘evils draw men together’; that is, when the same thing is hurtful to them both.

(2) καὶ οὗ μὴ ἔστιν ὑπερβολή, τοῦτο ἀγαθόν, ὃ δ’ ἂν ᾖ μεῖζον ἢ (3) δεῖ, κακόν. καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα πολλὰ πεπόνηται ἢ δεδαπάνηται· (4) φαινόμενον γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἤδη, καὶ ὡς τέλος τὸ τοιοῦτον ὑπολαμ(5)βάνεται, καὶ τέλος πολλῶν, τὸ δὲ τέλος ἀγαθόν.

. . .

Further: that which is not in excess is good, and that which is greater than it should be is bad. That also is good on which much labour or money has been spent; the mere fact of this makes it seem good, and such a good is assumed to be an end — an end reached through a long chain of means; and any end is a good.

ὅθεν ταῦτ’ εἴρηται (6) “κὰδ δέ κεν εὐχωλὴν Πριάμῳ” καὶ “αἰσχρόν τοι δηρόν τε (7) μένειν”. καὶ ἡ παροιμία δὲ τὸ ἐπὶ θύραις τὴν ὑδρίαν.

. .

Hence the lines beginning: And for Priam (and Troy—town’s folk) should they leave behind them a boast; and Oh, it were shame to have tarried so long and return empty—handed as erst we came; and there is also the proverb about ‘breaking the pitcher at the door’.

καὶ οὗ <οἱ> (8) πολλοὶ ἐφίενται, καὶ τὸ περιμάχητον φαινόμενον· οὗ γὰρ πάντες (9) ἐφίενται, τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν ἦν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ὥσπερ πάντες φαίνον(10)ται. καὶ τὸ ἐπαινετόν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἀγαθὸν ἐπαινεῖ.

. . .

That which most people seek after, and which is obviously an object of contention, is also a good; for, as has been shown, that is good which is sought after by everybody, and ‘most people’ is taken to be equivalent to ‘everybody’. That which is praised is good, since no one praises what is not good.

(11) καὶ ὃ οἱ ἐχθροὶ καὶ οἱ φαῦλοι ἐπαινοῦσιν· ὥσπερ γὰρ (12) πάντες ἤδη ὁμολογοῦσιν, εἰ καὶ οἱ κακῶς πεπονθότες· διὰ γὰρ (13) τὸ φανερὸν ὁμολογοῖεν ἄν, ὥσπερ καὶ φαῦλοι οὓς οἱ φί(14)λοι ψέγουσι καὶ [ἀγαθοὶ] οὓς οἱ ἐχθροὶ μὴ ψέγουσιν (διὸ λελοι(15)δορῆσθαι ὑπέλαβον Κορίνθιοι ὑπὸ Σιμωνίδου ποιήσαντος
(16) Κορινθίοις δ’ οὐ μέμφεται τὸ Ἴλιον).

. . . .

So, again, that which is praised by our enemies, or by the worthless, for when even those who have a grievance think a thing good, it is at once felt that every one must agree with them; our enemies can admit the fact only because it is evident, just as those must be worthless whom their friends censure and their enemies do not. For this reason the Corinthians conceived themselves to be insulted by Simonides when he wrote: Against the Corinthians hath Ilium no complaint.

(17) καὶ ὃ τῶν φρονίμων τις ἢ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἢ γυναι(18)κῶν προέκρινεν, οἷον Ὀδυσσέα Ἀθηνᾶ καὶ Ἑλένην Θησεὺς καὶ (19) Ἀλέξανδρον αἱ θεαὶ καὶ Ἀχιλλέα Ὅμηρος.

.

Again, that is good which has been distinguished by the favour of a discerning or virtuous man or woman, as Odysseus was distinguished by Athena, Helen by Theseus, Paris by the goddesses, and Achilles by Homer.

καὶ ὅλως τὰ προ(20)αιρετά· προαιροῦνται δὲ πράττειν τά τε εἰρημένα καὶ τὰ τοῖς (21) ἐχθροῖς κακὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς φίλοις ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ δυνατά· ταῦτα (22) δὲ διχῶς ἐστιν, τά τε γενόμενα ἂν καὶ τὰ ῥᾳδίως γιγνό(23)μενα· ῥᾴδια δὲ ὅσα ἢ ἄνευ λύπης ἢ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ· τὸ (24) γὰρ χαλεπὸν ὁρίζεται ἢ λύπῃ ἢ πλήθει χρόνου.

. . . .

And, generally speaking, all things are good which men deliberately choose to do; this will include the things already mentioned, and also whatever may be bad for their enemies or good for their friends, and at the same time practicable. Things are ‘practicable’ in two senses: (1) it is possible to do them, (2) it is easy to do them. Things are done ‘easily’ when they are done either without pain or quickly: the ‘difficulty’ of an act lies either in its painfulness or in the long time it takes.

καὶ (25) ἐὰν ὡς βούλονται· βούλονται δὲ ἢ μηδὲν κακὸν ἢ ἔλαττον (26) τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ (τοῦτο δὲ ἔσται, ἐὰν ἢ λανθάνῃ ἢ ἡ τιμωρία μι(27)κρὰ ᾖ).

. .

Again, a thing is good if it is as men wish; and they wish to have either no evil at it or at least a balance of good over evil. This last will happen where the penalty is either imperceptible or slight.

καὶ τὰ ἴδια, καὶ ἃ μηδείς, καὶ τὰ περιττά· τιμὴ (28) γὰρ οὕτω μᾶλλον.

. .

Good, too, are things that are a man’s very own, possessed by no one else, exceptional; for this increases the credit of having them.

καὶ τὰ ἁρμόττοντα αὐτοῖς· τοιαῦτα δὲ (29) τά τε προσήκοντα κατὰ γένος καὶ δύναμιν, καὶ ὧν ἐλλείπειν (30) οἴονται καὶ ἂν μικρὰ ᾖ· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἧττον προαιροῦνται ταῦτα (31) πράττειν. καὶ τὰ εὐκατέργαστα. δυνατὰ γὰρ καὶ ῥᾴδια· (32) εὐκατέργαστα δὲ ἃ πάντες ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ ἢ οἱ ὅμοιοι ἢ οἱ (33) ἥττους κατώρθωσαν.

. . . . . .

So are things which befit the possessors, such as whatever is appropriate to their birth or capacity, and whatever they feel they ought to have but lack — such things may indeed be trifling, but none the less men deliberately make them the goal of their action. And things easily effected; for these are practicable (in the sense of being easy); such things are those in which every one, or most people, or one’s equals, or one’s inferiors have succeeded.

καὶ ἃ χαριοῦνται τοῖς φίλοις, ἢ (34) ἃ ἀπεχθήσονται τοῖς ἐχθροῖς. καὶ ὅσα οὓς θαυμάζουσι (35) προαιροῦνται πράττειν. καὶ πρὸς ἃ εὐφυεῖς εἰσιν καὶ ἔμπει(36)ροι· ῥᾷον γὰρ κατορθώσειν οἴονται. καὶ ἃ μηδεὶς φαῦλος· (37) ἐπαινετὰ γὰρ μᾶλλον. καὶ ὧν ἐπιθυμοῦντες τυγχάνουσιν, (38) οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἡδὺ ἀλλὰ καὶ βέλτιον φαίνεται.

. . . . . . . .

Good also are the things by which we shall gratify our friends or annoy our enemies; and the things chosen by those whom we admire: and the things for which we are fitted by nature or experience since we think we shall succeed more easily in these: and those in which no worthless man can succeed, for such things bring greater praise: and those which we do in fact desire, for what we desire is taken to be not only pleasant but also better.

καὶ μάλιστα (1363b1) ἕκαστοι πρὸς ἃ φιλοτοίουτοι, οἷον οἱ φιλόνικοι εἰ νίκη (2) ἔσται, οἱ φιλότιμοι εἰ τιμή, οἱ φιλοχρήματοι εἰ χρήματα, καὶ (3) οἱ ἄλλοι ὡσαύτως.

. .

Further, a man of a given disposition makes chiefly for the corresponding things: lovers of victory make for victory, lovers of honour for honour, money—loving men for money, and so with the rest.

περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ συμφέρον(4)τος ἐκ τούτων ληπτέον τὰς πίστεις.

.

These, then, are the sources from which we must derive our means of persuasion about Good and Utility.

7. (5) Ἐπεὶ δὲ πολλάκις ὁμολογοῦντες ἄμφω συμφέρειν (6) περὶ τοῦ μᾶλλον ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ἐφεξῆς ἂν εἴη λεκτέον (7) περὶ τοῦ μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ μᾶλλον συμφέροντος.

.

Part 7. Since, however, it often happens that people agree that two things are both useful but do not agree about which is the more so, the next step will be to treat of relative goodness and relative utility.

ἔστω (8) δὴ ὑπερέχον μὲν τὸ τοσοῦτον καὶ ἔτι, ὑπερεχόμενον δὲ τὸ (9) ἐνυπάρχον, καὶ μεῖζον μὲν ἀεὶ καὶ πλεῖον πρὸς ἔλαττον, (10) μέγα δὲ καὶ μικρὸν καὶ πολὺ καὶ ὀλίγον πρὸς τὸ τῶν (11) πολλῶν μέγεθος, καὶ ὑπερέχον μὲν τὸ μέγα, τὸ δὲ μι(12)κρὸν ἐλλεῖπον, καὶ πολὺ καὶ ὀλίγον ὡσαύτως.

. . .

A thing which surpasses another may be regarded as being that other thing plus something more, and that other thing which is surpassed as being what is contained in the first thing. Now to call a thing ‘greater’ or ‘more’ always implies a comparison of it with one that is ‘smaller’ or ‘less’, while ‘great’ and ‘small’, ‘much’ and ‘little’, are terms used in comparison with normal magnitude. The ‘great’ is that which surpasses the normal, the ‘small’ is that which is surpassed by the normal; and so with ‘many’ and ‘few’.

ἐπεὶ οὖν (13) ἀγαθὸν λέγομεν τό τε αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου (14) αἱρετόν, καὶ οὗ πάντ’ ἐφίεται, καὶ ὃ νοῦν ἂν καὶ φρόνησιν (15) λαβόντα ἕλοιτο, καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν καὶ τὸ φυλακτικόν, ἢ (16) ᾧ ἕπεται τὰ τοιαῦτα, [τὸ δ’ οὗ ἕνεκα τὸ τέλος ἐστίν,] τέλος (17) δέ ἐστιν οὗ ἕνεκα τὰ ἄλλα, αὐτῷ δὲ ἀγαθὸν τὸ πρὸς αὐτὸν (18) ταῦτα πεπονθός, ἀνάγκη τά γε πλείω τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ τῶν (19) ἐλαττόνων, συναριθμουμένου τοῦ ἑνὸς ἢ τῶν ἐλαττόνων, μεῖ(20)ζον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· ὑπερέχει γάρ, τὸ δὲ ἐνυπάρχον ὑπερ(21)έχεται.

. . . . . .

Now we are applying the term ‘good’ to what is desirable for its own sake and not for the sake of something else; to that at which all things aim; to what they would choose if they could acquire understanding and practical wisdom; and to that which tends to produce or preserve such goods, or is always accompanied by them. Moreover, that for the sake of which things are done is the end (an end being that for the sake of which all else is done), and for each individual that thing is a good which fulfils these conditions in regard to himself. It follows, then, that a greater number of goods is a greater good than one or than a smaller number, if that one or that smaller number is included in the count; for then the larger number surpasses the smaller, and the smaller quantity is surpassed as being contained in the larger.

καὶ ἐὰν τὸ μέγιστον τοῦ μεγίστου ὑπερέχῃ, καὶ αὐτὰ (22) αὐτῶν· καὶ ὅσα αὐτὰ αὐτῶν, καὶ τὸ μέγιστον τοῦ μεγίστου· (23) οἷον εἰ ὁ μέγιστος ἀνὴρ γυναικὸς τῆς μεγίστης μείζων, καὶ (24) ὅλως οἱ ἄνδρες τῶν γυναικῶν μείζους, καὶ εἰ οἱ ἄνδρες (25) ὅλως τῶν γυναικῶν μείζους, καὶ ἀνὴρ ὁ μέγιστος τῆς με(26)γίστης γυναικὸς μείζων· ἀνάλογον γὰρ ἔχουσιν αἱ ὑπερ(27)οχαὶ τῶν γενῶν καὶ τῶν μεγίστων ἐν αὐτοῖς.

. . . . .

Again, if the largest member of one class surpasses the largest member of another, then the one class surpasses the other; and if one class surpasses another, then the largest member of the one surpasses the largest member of the other. Thus, if the tallest man is taller than the tallest woman, then men in general are taller than women. Conversely, if men in general are taller than women, then the tallest man is taller than the tallest woman. For the superiority of class over class is proportionate to the superiority possessed by their largest specimens.

καὶ ὅταν τόδε (28) μὲν τῷδε ἕπηται, ἐκεῖνο δὲ τούτῳ μή, ἕπηται δὲ ἢ τῷ (29) ἅμα ἢ τῷ ἐφεξῆς ἢ τῇ δυνάμει· ἐνυπάρχει γὰρ ἡ χρῆ(30)σις ἡ τοῦ ἑπομένου ἐν τῇ θατέρου.

. .

Again, where one good is always accompanied by another, but does not always accompany it, it is greater than the other, for the use of the second thing is implied in the use of the first. A thing may be accompanied by another in three ways, either simultaneously, subsequently, or potentially.

ἕπεται δὲ ἅμα μὲν τῷ (31) ὑγιαίνειν τὸ ζῆν, τούτῳ δὲ ἐκεῖνο οὔ, ὕστερον δὲ τῷ μανθά(32)νειν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι, δυνάμει δὲ τῷ ἱεροσυλεῖν τὸ ἀποστερεῖν· (33) ὁ γὰρ ἱεροσυλήσας κἂν ἀποστερήσειεν.

. . . .

Life accompanies health simultaneously (but not health life), knowledge accompanies the act of learning subsequently, cheating accompanies sacrilege potentially, since a man who has committed sacrilege is always capable of cheating.

καὶ τὰ ὑπερέχοντα (34) τοῦ αὐτοῦ μείζονι μείζω· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ὑπερέχειν καὶ τοῦ (35) μείονι. καὶ τὰ μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ ποιητικὰ μείζω· τοῦτο (36) γὰρ ἦν τὸ μείζονος ποιητικῷ εἶναι. καὶ οὗ τὸ ποιητικὸν (37) μεῖζον, ὡσαύτως· εἰ γὰρ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν αἱρετώτερον τοῦ ἡδέος (38) καὶ μεῖζον ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια τῆς ἡδονῆς μείζων. καὶ (1364a1) αἱρετώτερον τὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ τοῦ μὴ καθ’ αὑτό, οἷον ἰσχὺς ὑγιει(2)νοῦ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ οὐχ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα, τὸ δὲ αὑτοῦ, ὅπερ ἦν (3) τὸ ἀγαθόν. κἂν ᾖ τὸ μὲν τέλος, τὸ δὲ μὴ τέλος· τὸ μὲν (4) γὰρ ἄλλου ἕνεκα, τὸ δὲ αὑτοῦ, οἷον τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι τοῦ εὖ (5) ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα. καὶ τὸ ἧττον προσδεόμενον θατέρου [ἢ] ἑ(6)τέρων· αὐταρκέστερον γάρ· ἧττον δὲ προσδεῖται τὸ ἐλαττόνων (7) ἢ ῥᾳόνων προσδεόμενον. καὶ ὅταν τόδε μὲν ἄνευ τοῦδε μὴ (8) ᾖ, ἢ μὴ δυνατὸν ᾖ γενέσθαι, θάτερον δὲ ἄνευ τούτου, αὐταρ(9)κέστερον [δὲ] τὸ μὴ δεόμενον, ὥστε φαίνεται μεῖζον ἀγαθόν. (10) κἂν ᾖ ἀρχή, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀρχή, κἂν ᾖ αἴτιον, τὸ δ’ οὐκ (11) αἴτιον, διὰ τὸ αὐτό· ἄνευ γὰρ αἰτίου καὶ ἀρχῆς ἀδύνατον (12) εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι. καὶ δυοῖν ἀρχαῖν τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς μείζονος ἀρχῆς (13) μεῖζον, καὶ δυοῖν αἰτίοιν τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ μείζονος αἰτίου μεῖ(14)ζον. καὶ ἀνάπαλιν δὲ δυοῖν ἀρχαῖν ἡ τοῦ μείζονος ἀρχὴ (15) μείζων, καὶ δυοῖν αἰτίοιν τὸ τοῦ μείζονος αἴτιον μεῖζον.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Again, when two things each surpass a third, that which does so by the greater amount is the greater of the two; for it must surpass the greater as well as the less of the other two. A thing productive of a greater good than another is productive of is itself a greater good than that other. For this conception of ‘productive of a greater’ has been implied in our argument. Likewise, that which is produced by a greater good is itself a greater good; thus, if what is wholesome is more desirable and a greater good than what gives pleasure, health too must be a greater good than pleasure. Again, a thing which is desirable in itself is a greater good than a thing which is not desirable in itself, as for example bodily strength than what is wholesome, since the latter is not pursued for its own sake, whereas the former is; and this was our definition of the good. Again, if one of two things is an end, and the other is not, the former is the greater good, as being chosen for its own sake and not for the sake of something else; as, for example, exercise is chosen for the sake of physical well—being. And of two things that which stands less in need of the other, or of other things, is the greater good, since it is more self—sufficing. (That which stands ‘less’ in need of others is that which needs either fewer or easier things.) So when one thing does not exist or cannot come into existence without a second, while the second can exist without the first, the second is the better. That which does not need something else is more self—sufficing than that which does, and presents itself as a greater good for that reason. Again, that which is a beginning of other things is a greater good than that which is not, and that which is a cause is a greater good than that which is not; the reason being the same in each case, namely that without a cause and a beginning nothing can exist or come into existence. Again, where there are two sets of consequences arising from two different beginnings or causes, the consequences of the more important beginning or cause are themselves the more important; and conversely, that beginning or cause is itself the more important which has the more important consequences.

δῆ(16)λον οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι ἀμφοτέρως μεῖζον ἔστιν φαίνεσθαι· (17) καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἀρχή, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀρχή, δόξει μεῖζον εἶναι, καὶ εἰ (18) μὴ ἀρχή, τὸ δὲ ἀρχή· τὸ γὰρ τέλος μεῖζον καὶ οὐχ <ἡ> ἀρχή, (19) ὥσπερ ὁ Λεωδάμας κατηγορῶν ἔφη Καλλιστράτου τὸν βου(20)λεύσαντα τοῦ πράξαντος μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν πρα(21)χθῆναι μὴ βουλεύσαντος· πάλιν δὲ καὶ Χαβρίου, τὸν πρά(22)ξαντα τοῦ βουλεύσαντος· οὐ γὰρ ἂν γενέσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἦν ὁ (23) πράξων· τούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα ἐπιβουλεύειν, ὅπως πράξωσιν.

. . . . . . . .

Now it is plain, from all that has been said, that one thing may be shown to be more important than another from two opposite points of view: it may appear the more important (1) because it is a beginning and the other thing is not, and also (2) because it is not a beginning and the other thing is — on the ground that the end is more important and is not a beginning. So Leodamas, when accusing Callistratus, said that the man who prompted the deed was more guilty than the doer, since it would not have been done if he had not planned it. On the other hand, when accusing Chabrias he said that the doer was worse than the prompter, since there would have been no deed without some one to do it; men, said he, plot a thing only in order to carry it out.

καὶ (24) τὸ σπανιώτερον τοῦ ἀφθόνου, οἷον χρυσὸς σιδήρου, ἀχρη(25)στότερος ὤν· μεῖζον γὰρ ἡ κτῆσις διὰ τὸ χαλεπωτέρα (26) εἶναι.

. . .

Further, what is rare is a greater good than what is plentiful. Thus, gold is a better thing than iron, though less useful: it is harder to get, and therefore better worth getting.

(ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον τὸ ἄφθονον τοῦ σπανίου, ὅτι ἡ χρῆσις (27) ὑπερέχει· τὸ γὰρ πολλάκις τοῦ ὀλιγάκις ὑπερέχει, ὅθεν λέγεται ἄριστον μὲν ὕδωρ.) (28) καὶ ὅλως τὸ χαλεπώτερον τοῦ ῥᾴονος· σπανιώτερον γάρ. ἄλλον (29) δὲ τρόπον τὸ ῥᾷον τοῦ χαλεπωτέρου· ἔχει γὰρ ὡς βουλόμεθα. (30) καὶ ᾧ τὸ ἐναντίον μεῖζον, καὶ οὗ ἡ στέρησις μείζων. καὶ (31) ἀρετὴ μὴ κακίας καὶ κακία μὴ ἀρετῆς μείζων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ (32) τέλη, τὰ δ’ οὐ τέλη.

. . . . . . .

Reversely, it may be argued that the plentiful is a better thing than the rare, because we can make more use of it. For what is often useful surpasses what is seldom useful, whence the saying:The best of things is water. More generally: the hard thing is better than the easy, because it is rarer: and reversely, the easy thing is better than the hard, for it is as we wish it to be. That is the greater good whose contrary is the greater evil, and whose loss affects us more. Positive goodness and badness are more important than the mere absence of goodness and badness: for positive goodness and badness are ends, which the mere absence of them cannot be.

καὶ ὧν τὰ ἔργα καλλίω ἢ αἰσχίω, μείζω (33) αὐτά, καὶ ὧν αἱ κακίαι καὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ μείζους, καὶ τὰ ἔργα (34) μείζω, ἐπείπερ ὡς τὰ αἴτια καὶ αἱ ἀρχαί, καὶ τὰ ἀπο(35)βαίνοντα, καὶ ὡς τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα, καὶ τὰ αἴτια καὶ αἱ (36) ἀρχαί.

. . . .

Further, in proportion as the functions of things are noble or base, the things themselves are good or bad: conversely, in proportion as the things themselves are good or bad, their functions also are good or bad; for the nature of results corresponds with that of their causes and beginnings, and conversely the nature of causes and beginnings corresponds with that of their results.

καὶ ὧν ἡ ὑπεροχὴ αἱρετωτέρα ἢ καλλίων, οἷον τὸ (37) ἀκριβῶς ὁρᾶν αἱρετώτερον τοῦ ὀσφραίνεσθαι (καὶ γὰρ ὄψις (1364b1) ὀσφρήσεως), καὶ τὸ φιλεταιρώτερον εἶναι τοῦ φιλοχρηματώ(2)τερον [μᾶλλον] κάλλιον, ὥστε καὶ φιλεταιρία φιλοχρηματίας.

. . .

Moreover, those things are greater goods, superiority in which is more desirable or more honourable. Thus, keenness of sight is more desirable than keenness of smell, sight generally being more desirable than smell generally; and similarly, unusually great love of friends being more honourable than unusually great love of money, ordinary love of friends is more honourable than ordinary love of money.

(3) καὶ ἀντικειμένως δὲ τῶν βελτιόνων αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ βελτίους (4) καὶ <αἱ> καλλιόνων καλλίους. καὶ ὧν αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι καλλίους ἢ (5) βελτίους· αἱ γὰρ μείζους ὀρέξεις μειζόνων εἰσίν. καὶ τῶν (6) καλλιόνων δὲ ἢ βελτιόνων αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι βελτίους καὶ (7) καλλίους διὰ τὸ αὐτό. καὶ ὧν αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι καλλίους ἢ (8) σπουδαιότεραι, καὶ τὰ πράγματα καλλίω καὶ σπουδαιότερα· (9) ὡς γὰρ ἔχει ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τὸ ἀληθές· κελεύει δὲ τὸ (10) αὑτῆς ἑκάστη. καὶ τῶν σπουδαιοτέρων δὲ καὶ καλλιόνων αἱ (11) ἐπιστῆμαι ἀνάλογον διὰ τὸ αὐτό. καὶ ὃ κρίνειαν ἂν ἢ κε(12)κρίκασιν οἱ φρόνιμοι ἢ πάντες ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ ἢ οἱ πλείους ἢ (13) οἱ κράτιστοι ἀγαθὸν μεῖζον, ἀνάγκη οὕτως ἔχειν, ἢ ἁπλῶς (14) ἢ ᾗ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν ἔκριναν.

. . . . . . . . . .

Conversely, if one of two normal things is better or nobler than the other, an unusual degree of that thing is better or nobler than an unusual degree of the other. Again, one thing is more honourable or better than another if it is more honourable or better to desire it; the importance of the object of a given instinct corresponds to the importance of the instinct itself; and for the same reason, if one thing is more honourable or better than another, it is more honourable and better to desire it. Again, if one science is more honourable and valuable than another, the activity with which it deals is also more honourable and valuable; as is the science, so is the reality that is its object, each science being authoritative in its own sphere. So, also, the more valuable and honourable the object of a science, the more valuable and honourable the science itself is — in consequence. Again, that which would be judged, or which has been judged, a good thing, or a better thing than something else, by all or most people of understanding, or by the majority of men, or by the ablest, must be so; either without qualification, or in so far as they use their understanding to form their judgement.

ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο κοινὸν καὶ (15) κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων· καὶ γὰρ τὶ καὶ ποσὸν καὶ ποιὸν οὕτως (16) ἔχει ὡς ἂν ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ φρόνησις εἴποι. ἀλλ’ ἐπ’ (17) ἀγαθῶν εἰρήκαμεν· ὥρισται γὰρ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ὃ λαβὸν (18) [τὰ πράγματα] φρόνησιν ἕλοιτ’ ἂν ἕκαστον· δῆλον οὖν ὅτι (19) καὶ μεῖζον ὃ μᾶλλον ἡ φρόνησις λέγει.

. . . .

This is indeed a general principle, applicable to all other judgements also; not only the goodness of things, but their essence, magnitude, and general nature are in fact just what knowledge and understanding will declare them to be. Here the principle is applied to judgements of goodness, since one definition of ‘good’ was ‘what beings that acquire understanding will choose in any given case’: from which it clearly follows that that thing is better which understanding declares to be so.

καὶ τὸ τοῖς βελ(20)τίοσιν ὑπάρχον, ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ ᾗ βελτίους, οἷον ἡ ἀνδρεία ἰσχύος. (21) καὶ ὃ ἕλοιτ’ ἂν ὁ βελτίων, ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ ᾗ βελτίων, οἷον τὸ (22) ἀδικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀδικεῖν· τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ δικαιότερος ἂν (23) ἕλοιτο. καὶ τὸ ἥδιον τοῦ ἧττον ἡδέος· τὴν γὰρ ἡδονὴν (24) πάντα διώκει, καὶ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα τοῦ ἥδεσθαι ὀρέγονται, ὥρι(25)σται δὲ τούτοις τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ τέλος· ἥδιον δὲ τό τε (26) ἀλυπότερον καὶ τὸ πολυχρονιώτερον ἡδύ. καὶ τὸ κάλλιον (27) τοῦ ἧττον καλοῦ· τὸ γὰρ καλόν ἐστιν ἤτοι τὸ ἡδὺ ἢ τὸ (28) καθ’ αὑτὸ αἱρετόν. καὶ ὅσων αὐτοὶ αὑτοῖς ἢ φίλοις βού(29)λονται αἴτιοι εἶναι μᾶλλον, ταῦτα μείζω ἀγαθά, ὅσων (30) δὲ ἧττον, μείζω κακά. (30) καὶ τὰ πολυχρονιώτερα τῶν ὀλιγο(31)χρονιωτέρων καὶ τὰ βεβαιότερα τῶν ἀβεβαιοτέρων· (32) ὑπερέχει γὰρ ἡ χρῆσις τῶν μὲν τῷ χρόνῳ τῶν δὲ τῇ (33) βουλήσει· ὅταν γὰρ βούλωνται, ὑπάρχει μᾶλλον ἡ τοῦ βε(34)βαίου.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

That, again, is a better thing which attaches to better men, either absolutely, or in virtue of their being better; as courage is better than strength. And that is a greater good which would be chosen by a better man, either absolutely, or in virtue of his being better: for instance, to suffer wrong rather than to do wrong, for that would be the choice of the juster man. Again, the pleasanter of two things is the better, since all things pursue pleasure, and things instinctively desire pleasurable sensation for its own sake; and these are two of the characteristics by which the ‘good’ and the ‘end’ have been defined. One pleasure is greater than another if it is more unmixed with pain, or more lasting. Again, the nobler thing is better than the less noble, since the noble is either what is pleasant or what is desirable in itself. And those things also are greater goods which men desire more earnestly to bring about for themselves or for their friends, whereas those things which they least desire to bring about are greater evils. And those things which are more lasting are better than those which are more fleeting, and the more secure than the less; the enjoyment of the lasting has the advantage of being longer, and that of the secure has the advantage of suiting our wishes, being there for us whenever we like.

καὶ ὡς ἂν ἓν τῶν συστοίχων καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων πτώ(35)σεων, καὶ τἆλλ’ ἀκολουθεῖ, οἷον εἰ τὸ ἀνδρείως κάλλιον καὶ (36) αἱρετώτερον τοῦ σωφρόνως, καὶ ἀνδρεία σωφροσύνης αἱρετω(37)τέρα καὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι τοῦ σωφρονεῖν. καὶ ὃ πάντες (38) αἱροῦνται τοῦ μὴ ὃ πάντες. καὶ ὃ οἱ πλείους ἢ ὃ οἱ ἐλάττους· (1365a1) ἀγαθὸν γὰρ ἦν οὗ πάντες ἐφίενται, ὥστε καὶ μεῖζον οὗ (2) μᾶλλον.

. . . . . .

Further, in accordance with the rule of co—ordinate terms and inflexions of the same stem, what is true of one such related word is true of all. Thus if the action qualified by the term ‘brave’ is more noble and desirable than the action qualified by the term ‘temperate’, then ‘bravery’ is more desirable than ‘temperance’ and ‘being brave’ than ‘being temperate’. That, again, which is chosen by all is a greater good than that which is not, and that chosen by the majority than that chosen by the minority. For that which all desire is good, as we have said; and so, the more a thing is desired, the better it is.

καὶ ὃ οἱ ἀμφισβητοῦντες ἢ οἱ ἐχθροί, ἢ οἱ κρίνον(3)τες ἢ οὓς οὗτοι κρίνουσιν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἂν εἰ πάντες φαῖέν (4) ἐστι, τὸ δὲ οἱ κύριοι καὶ οἱ εἰδότες. καὶ ὁτὲ μὲν οὗ πάντες (5) μετέχουσι μεῖζον· ἀτιμία γὰρ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν· ὁτὲ δὲ οὗ (6) μηδεὶς ἢ οὗ ὀλίγοι· σπανιώτερον γάρ.

. . . .

Further, that is the better thing which is considered so by competitors or enemies, or, again, by authorized judges or those whom they select to represent them. In the first two cases the decision is virtually that of every one, in the last two that of authorities and experts. And sometimes it may be argued that what all share is the better thing, since it is a dishonour not to share in it; at other times, that what none or few share is better, since it is rarer.

καὶ τὰ ἐπαινετώτερα· (7) καλλίω γάρ. καὶ ὧν αἱ τιμαὶ μείζους, ὡσαύτως· ἡ γὰρ (8) τιμὴ ὥσπερ ἀξία τίς ἐστιν. καὶ ὧν αἱ ζημίαι μείζους. καὶ (9) τὰ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων ἢ φαινομένων μεγάλων μείζω.

. . . . .

The more praiseworthy things are, the nobler and therefore the better they are. So with the things that earn greater honours than others — honour is, as it were, a measure of value; and the things whose absence involves comparatively heavy penalties; and the things that are better than others admitted or believed to be good.

(10) καὶ διαιρούμενα δὲ εἰς τὰ μέρη τὰ αὐτὰ μείζω φαίνεται. (11) πλεῖον γὰρ ὑπερέχειν φαίνεται, ὅθεν καὶ ὁ ποιητής φησι (12) πεῖσαι τὸν Μελέαγρον ἀναστῆναι (13)
ὅσσα κάκ’ ἀνθρώποισι πέλει τῶν ἄστυ ἁλώῃ·
(14) λαοὶ μὲν φθινύθουσι, πόλιν δέ τε πῦρ ἀμαθύνει,
(15) τέκνα δέ τ’ ἄλλοι ἄγουσιν.

. . .

Moreover, things look better merely by being divided into their parts, since they then seem to surpass a greater number of things than before. Hence Homer says that Meleager was roused to battle by the thought of All horrors that light on a folk whose city is ta’en of their foes, When they slaughter the men, when the burg is wasted with ravening flame, When strangers are haling young children to thraldom, (fair women to shame.)

(16) καὶ τὸ συντιθέναι δὲ καὶ ἐποικοδομεῖν, ὥσπερ Ἐπίχαρμος, (17) διά τε τὸ αὐτὸ τῇ διαιρέσει (ἡ γὰρ σύνθεσις ὑπεροχὴν (18) δείκνυσι πολλήν) καὶ ὅτι ἀρχὴ φαίνεται μεγάλων καὶ αἴ(19)τιον.

. . . .

The same effect is produced by piling up facts in a climax after the manner of Epicharmus. The reason is partly the same as in the case of division (for combination too makes the impression of great superiority), and partly that the original thing appears to be the cause and origin of important results.

ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον καὶ σπανιώτερον μεῖζον, (20) καὶ οἱ καιροὶ καὶ αἱ ἡλικίαι καὶ οἱ τόποι καὶ οἱ χρόνοι καὶ (21) αἱ δυνάμεις ποιοῦσι μεγάλα· εἰ γὰρ παρὰ δύναμιν καὶ (22) παρὰ ἡλικίαν καὶ παρὰ τοὺς ὁμοίους, καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἢ (23) ἐνταῦθα ἢ τότε, ἕξει μέγεθος καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ (24) δικαίων καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων, ὅθεν καὶ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα τῷ (25) ὀλυμπιονίκῃ·
(26) πρόσθε μὲν ἀμφ’ ὤμοισιν ἔχων τραχεῖαν ἄσιλλαν
(27) ἰχθῦς ἐξ Ἄργους εἰς Τεγέαν ἔφερον,
(28) καὶ ὁ Ἰφικράτης αὑτὸν ἐνεκωμίαζε λέγων ἐξ ὧν ὑπῆρξεν (29) ταῦτα. καὶ τὸ αὐτοφυὲς τοῦ ἐπικτήτου· χαλεπώτερον γάρ. (30) ὅθεν καὶ ὁ ποιητής φησιν
“αὐτοδίδακτος δ’ εἰμί.” καὶ τὸ (31) μεγάλου μέγιστον μέρος, οἷον Περικλῆς τὸν ἐπιτάφιον (32) λέγων, τὴν νεότητα ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀνῃρῆσθαι ὥσπερ τὸ ἔαρ (33) ἐκ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ εἰ ἐξαιρεθείη.

. . . . . . .

And since a thing is better when it is harder or rarer than other things, its superiority may be due to seasons, ages, places, times, or one’s natural powers. When a man accomplishes something beyond his natural power, or beyond his years, or beyond the measure of people like him, or in a special way, or at a special place or time, his deed will have a high degree of nobleness, goodness, and justice, or of their opposites. Hence the epigram on the victor at the Olympic games: In time past, hearing a Yoke on my shoulders, of wood unshaven, I carried my loads of fish from, Argos to Tegea town. So Iphicrates used to extol himself by describing the low estate from which he had risen. Again, what is natural is better than what is acquired, since it is harder to come by. Hence the words of Homer: I have learnt from none but myself. And the best part of a good thing is particularly good; as when Pericles in his funeral oration said that the country’s loss of its young men in battle was ‘as if the spring were taken out of the year’.

καὶ τὰ ἐν χρείᾳ μείζονι (34) χρήσιμα, οἷον τὰ ἐν γήρᾳ καὶ νόσοις. καὶ δυοῖν τὸ ἐγγύ(35)τερον τοῦ τέλους. καὶ τὸ αὐτῷ τοῦ ἁπλῶς. καὶ τὸ δυνα(36)τὸν τοῦ ἀδυνάτου· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ, τὸ δ’ οὔ. καὶ τὰ ἐν (37) τέλει τοῦ βίου· τέλη γὰρ μᾶλλον τὰ πρὸς τῷ τέλει.

. . . . . .

So with those things which are of service when the need is pressing; for example, in old age and times of sickness. And of two things that which leads more directly to the end in view is the better. So too is that which is better for people generally as well as for a particular individual. Again, what can be got is better than what cannot, for it is good in a given case and the other thing is not. And what is at the end of life is better than what is not, since those things are ends in a greater degree which are nearer the end.

καὶ (1365b1) τὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν τῶν πρὸς δόξαν· ὅρος δὲ τοῦ πρὸς δόξαν, (2) ὃ λανθάνειν μέλλων οὐκ ἂν ἕλοιτο· διὸ καὶ τὸ εὖ πάσχειν (3) τοῦ εὖ ποιεῖν δόξειεν ἂν αἱρετώτερον εἶναι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ κἂν (4) λανθάνῃ αἱρήσεται, ποιεῖν δ’ εὖ λανθάνων οὐ δοκεῖ ἂν ἑλέ(5)σθαι. καὶ ὅσα εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ δοκεῖν βούλονται· πρὸς (6) ἀλήθειαν γὰρ μᾶλλον· διὸ καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην φασὶ μι(7)κρὸν εἶναι, ὅτι δοκεῖν ἢ εἶναι αἱρετώτερον· τὸ δὲ ὑγιαίνειν (8) οὔ. καὶ τὸ πρὸς πολλὰ χρησιμώτερον, οἷον τὸ πρὸς τὸ (9) ζῆν καὶ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὸ πράττειν τὰ καλά· (10) διὸ ὁ πλοῦτος καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια μέγιστα δοκεῖ εἶναι· (11) ἅπαντα γὰρ ἔχει ταῦτα. καὶ τὸ ἀλυπότερον καὶ μεθ’ (12) ἡδονῆς· πλείω γὰρ ἑνός, ὅτι ὑπάρχει καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ [ἀγα(13)θὸν] καὶ ἡ ἀλυπία. καὶ δυοῖν ὃ τῷ αὐτῷ προστιθέμενον (14) μεῖζον τὸ ὅλον ποιεῖ. καὶ ἃ μὴ λανθάνει παρόντα ἢ ἃ λαν(15)θάνει· πρὸς ἀλήθειαν γὰρ τείνει ταῦτα· διὸ τὸ πλουτεῖν (16) φανείη ἂν μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν τοῦ δοκεῖν.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

What aims at reality is better than what aims at appearance. We may define what aims at appearance as what a man will not choose if nobody is to know of his having it. This would seem to show that to receive benefits is more desirable than to confer them, since a man will choose the former even if nobody is to know of it, but it is not the general view that he will choose the latter if nobody knows of it. What a man wants to be is better than what a man wants to seem, for in aiming at that he is aiming more at reality. Hence men say that justice is of small value, since it is more desirable to seem just than to be just, whereas with health it is not so. That is better than other things which is more useful than they are for a number of different purposes; for example, that which promotes life, good life, pleasure, and noble conduct. For this reason wealth and health are commonly thought to be of the highest value, as possessing all these advantages. Again, that is better than other things which is accompanied both with less pain and with actual pleasure; for here there is more than one advantage; and so here we have the good of feeling pleasure and also the good of not feeling pain. And of two good things that is the better whose addition to a third thing makes a better whole than the addition of the other to the same thing will make. Again, those things which we are seen to possess are better than those which we are not seen to possess, since the former have the air of reality. Hence wealth may be regarded as a greater good if its existence is known to others.

καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητόν, (17) καὶ τοῖς μὲν μόνον <ὂν> τοῖς δὲ μετ’ ἄλλων· διὸ καὶ οὐκ ἴση (18) ζημία, ἄν τις τὸν ἑτερόφθαλμον τυφλώσῃ καὶ τὸν δύ’ ἔχον(19)τα· ἀγαπητὸν γὰρ ἀφῄρηται.

. . .

That which is dearly prized is better than what is not — the sort of thing that some people have only one of, though others have more like it. Accordingly, blinding a one—eyed man inflicts worse injury than half—blinding a man with two eyes; for the one—eyed man has been robbed of what he dearly prized.

ἐκ τίνων μὲν οὖν δεῖ τὰς πίστεις (20) φέρειν ἐν τῷ προτρέπειν καὶ ἀποτρέπειν, σχεδὸν εἴρηται.

.

The grounds on which we must base our arguments, when we are speaking for or against a proposal, have now been set forth more or less completely.

8. (21) Μέγιστον δὲ καὶ κυριώτατον ἁπάντων πρὸς τὸ δύνα(22)σθαι πείθειν καὶ καλῶς συμβουλεύειν <τὸ> τὰς πολιτείας ἁ(23)πάσας λαβεῖν καὶ τὰ ἑκάστης ἤθη καὶ νόμιμα καὶ συμ(24)φέροντα διελεῖν.

.

Part 8. The most important and effective qualification for success in persuading audiences and speaking well on public affairs is to understand all the forms of government and to discriminate their respective customs, institutions, and interests.

πείθονται γὰρ ἅπαντες τῷ συμφέροντι, (25) συμφέρει δὲ τὸ σῶζον τὴν πολιτείαν.

.

For all men are persuaded by considerations of their interest, and their interest lies in the maintenance of the established order.

ἔτι δὲ κυρία μέν (26) ἐστιν ἡ τοῦ κυρίου ἀπόφανσις, τὰ δὲ κύρια διῄρηται κατὰ (27) τὰς πολιτείας· ὅσαι γὰρ αἱ πολιτεῖαι, τοσαῦτα καὶ τὰ (28) κύριά ἐστιν. εἰσὶν δὲ πολιτεῖαι τέτταρες, δημοκρατία, ὀλι(29)γαρχία, ἀριστοκρατία, μοναρχία, ὥστε τὸ μὲν κύριον καὶ τὸ (30) κρῖνον τούτων τι ἂν εἴη μόριον ἢ ὅλον τούτων. (30) ἔστιν δὲ δημο(31)κρατία μὲν πολιτεία ἐν ᾗ κλήρῳ διανέμονται τὰς ἀρχάς, (32) ὀλιγαρχία δὲ ἐν ᾗ οἱ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, ἀριστοκρατία δὲ ἐν (33) ᾗ κατὰ τὴν παιδείαν· παιδείαν δὲ λέγω τὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου (34) κειμένην. οἱ γὰρ ἐμμεμενηκότες ἐν τοῖς νομίμοις ἐν τῇ (35) ἀριστοκρατίᾳ ἄρχουσιν. ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτους φαίνεσθαι ἀρίστους, (36) ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα εἴληφεν τοῦτο. μοναρχία δ’ ἐστὶν κατὰ (1366a1) τοὔνομα ἐν ᾗ εἷς ἁπάντων κύριός ἐστιν· τούτων δὲ ἡ μὲν (2) κατὰ τάξιν τινὰ βασιλεία, ἡ δ’ ἀόριστος τυραννίς.

. . . . . . . . . .

Further, it rests with the supreme authority to give authoritative decisions, and this varies with each form of government; there are as many different supreme authorities as there are different forms of government. The forms of government are four — democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy. The supreme right to judge and decide always rests, therefore, with either a part or the whole of one or other of these governing powers. A Democracy is a form of government under which the citizens distribute the offices of state among themselves by lot, whereas under oligarchy there is a property qualification, under aristocracy one of education. By education I mean that education which is laid down by the law; for it is those who have been loyal to the national institutions that hold office under an aristocracy. These are bound to be looked upon as ‘the best men’, and it is from this fact that this form of government has derived its name (’the rule of the best’). Monarchy, as the word implies, is the constitution a in which one man has authority over all. There are two forms of monarchy: kingship, which is limited by prescribed conditions, and ‘tyranny’, which is not limited by anything.

τὸ δὴ (3) τέλος ἑκάστης πολιτείας οὐ δεῖ λανθάνειν· αἱροῦνται γὰρ τὰ (4) πρὸς τὸ τέλος. ἔστι δὲ δημοκρατίας μὲν τέλος ἐλευθερία, (5) ὀλιγαρχίας δὲ πλοῦτος, ἀριστοκρατίας δὲ τὰ περὶ παιδείαν (6) καὶ τὰ νόμιμα, τυραννίδος δὲ φυλακή. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τὰ (7) πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἑκάστης ἤθη καὶ νόμιμα καὶ συμφέροντα (8) διαιρετέον, εἴπερ αἱροῦνται πρὸς τοῦτο ἐπαναφέροντες. ἐπεὶ (9) δὲ οὐ μόνον αἱ πίστεις γίνονται δι’ ἀποδεικτικοῦ λόγου, ἀλλὰ (10) καὶ δι’ ἠθικοῦ (τῷ γὰρ ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα (11) πιστεύομεν, τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν ἂν ἀγαθὸς φαίνηται ἢ εὔνους ἢ (12) ἄμφω), δέοι ἂν τὰ ἤθη τῶν πολιτειῶν ἑκάστης ἔχειν ἡμᾶς· (13) τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἑκάστης ἦθος πιθανώτατον ἀνάγκη πρὸς ἑκάστην (14) εἶναι.

. . . . . . .

We must also notice the ends which the various forms of government pursue, since people choose in practice such actions as will lead to the realization of their ends. The end of democracy is freedom; of oligarchy, wealth; of aristocracy, the maintenance of education and national institutions; of tyranny, the protection of the tyrant. It is clear, then, that we must distinguish those particular customs, institutions, and interests which tend to realize the ideal of each constitution, since men choose their means with reference to their ends. But rhetorical persuasion is effected not only by demonstrative but by ethical argument; it helps a speaker to convince us, if we believe that he has certain qualities himself, namely, goodness, or goodwill towards us, or both together. Similarly, we should know the moral qualities characteristic of each form of government, for the special moral character of each is bound to provide us with our most effective means of persuasion in dealing with it.

ταῦτα δὲ ληφθήσεται διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ (15) ἤθη φανερὰ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ἀνα(16)φέρεται πρὸς τὸ τέλος. (17) ὧν μὲν οὖν δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι προτρέποντας ὡς ἐσομένων (18) ἢ ὄντων, καὶ ἐκ τίνων δεῖ τὰς περὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος πίστεις (19) λαμβάνειν, ἔτι δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἠθῶν καὶ νομίμων (20) διὰ τίνων τε καὶ πῶς εὐπορήσομεν, ἐφ’ ὅσον ἦν τῷ παρόντι (21) καιρῷ σύμμετρον, εἴρηται· διηκρίβωται γὰρ ἐν τοῖς Πολιτι(22)κοῖς περὶ τούτων.

. . . .

We shall learn the qualities of governments in the same way as we learn the qualities of individuals, since they are revealed in their deliberate acts of choice; and these are determined by the end that inspires them. We have now considered the objects, immediate or distant, at which we are to aim when urging any proposal, and the grounds on which we are to base our arguments in favour of its utility. We have also briefly considered the means and methods by which we shall gain a good knowledge of the moral qualities and institutions peculiar to the various forms of government — only, however, to the extent demanded by the present occasion; a detailed account of the subject has been given in the Politics.

9. (23) μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα λέγωμεν περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας καὶ (24) καλοῦ καὶ αἰσχροῦ· οὗτοι γὰρ σκοποὶ τῷ ἐπαινοῦντι καὶ ψέ(25)γοντι· συμβήσεται γὰρ ἅμα περὶ τούτων λέγοντας κἀκεῖνα (26) δηλοῦν ἐξ ὧν ποιοί τινες ὑποληφθησόμεθα κατὰ τὸ ἦθος, (27) ἥπερ ἦν δευτέρα πίστις· ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ ἡμᾶς τε καὶ ἄλλον (28) ἀξιόπιστον δυνησόμεθα ποιεῖν πρὸς ἀρετήν.

. . . .

Part 9. We have now to consider Virtue and Vice, the Noble and the Base, since these are the objects of praise and blame. In doing so, we shall at the same time be finding out how to make our hearers take the required view of our own characters — our second method of persuasion. The ways in which to make them trust the goodness of other people are also the ways in which to make them trust our own.

ἐπεὶ δὲ συμβαίνει (29) καὶ χωρὶς σπουδῆς καὶ μετὰ σπουδῆς ἐπαινεῖν πολλάκις οὐ μόνον (30) ἄνθρωπον ἢ θεὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄψυχα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων τὸ τυχόν, (31) τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ περὶ τούτων ληπτέον τὰς προτάσεις, (32) ὥστε ὅσον παραδείγματος χάριν εἴπωμεν καὶ περὶ τούτων.

. .

Praise, again, may be serious or frivolous; nor is it always of a human or divine being but often of inanimate things, or of the humblest of the lower animals. Here too we must know on what grounds to argue, and must, therefore, now discuss the subject, though by way of illustration only.

(33) καλὸν μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ὃ ἂν δι’ αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν ὂν ἐπ(34)αινετὸν ᾖ, ἢ ὃ ἂν ἀγαθὸν ὂν ἡδὺ ᾖ, ὅτι ἀγαθόν· εἰ δὲ (35) τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ καλόν, ἀνάγκη τὴν ἀρετὴν καλὸν εἶναι· (36) ἀγαθὸν γὰρ ὂν ἐπαινετόν ἐστιν.

. . .

The Noble is that which is both desirable for its own sake and also worthy of praise; or that which is both good and also pleasant because good. If this is a true definition of the Noble, it follows that virtue must be noble, since it is both a good thing and also praiseworthy.

ἀρετὴ δ’ ἐστὶ μὲν δύ(37)ναμις ὡς δοκεῖ ποριστικὴ ἀγαθῶν καὶ φυλακτική, καὶ (38) δύναμις εὐεργετικὴ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων, καὶ πάντων (1366b1) περὶ πάντα· μέρη δὲ ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρεία, σωφρο(2)σύνη, μεγαλοπρέπεια, μεγαλοψυχία, ἐλευθεριότης, φρόνησις, (3) σοφία.

. . .

Virtue is, according to the usual view, a faculty of providing and preserving good things; or a faculty of conferring many great benefits, and benefits of all kinds on all occasions. The forms of Virtue are justice, courage, temperance, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, gentleness, prudence, wisdom.

ἀνάγκη δὲ μεγίστας εἶναι ἀρετὰς τὰς τοῖς ἄλλοις (4) χρησιμωτάτας, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ δύναμις εὐεργετική, (5) <καὶ> διὰ τοῦτο τοὺς δικαίους καὶ ἀνδρείους μάλιστα τιμῶ(6)σιν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐν πολέμῳ, ἡ δὲ καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν εἰ(7)ρήνῃ χρήσιμος ἄλλοις.

. . .

If virtue is a faculty of beneficence, the highest kinds of it must be those which are most useful to others, and for this reason men honour most the just and the courageous, since courage is useful to others in war, justice both in war and in peace.

εἶτα ἐλευθεριότης· προΐενται γὰρ (8) καὶ οὐκ ἀνταγωνίζονται περὶ τῶν χρημάτων, ὧν μάλιστα (9) ἐφίενται ἄλλοι.

. .

Next comes liberality; liberal people let their money go instead of fighting for it, whereas other people care more for money than for anything else.

ἔστι δὲ δικαιοσύνη μὲν ἀρετὴ δι’ ἣν τὰ αὑτῶν (10) ἕκαστοι ἔχουσι, καὶ ὡς ὁ νόμος· ἀδικία δὲ δι’ ἣν τὰ ἀλλό(11)τρια, οὐχ ὡς ὁ νόμος.

. .

Justice is the virtue through which everybody enjoys his own possessions in accordance with the law; its opposite is injustice, through which men enjoy the possessions of others in defiance of the law.

ἀνδρεία δὲ δι’ ἣν πρακτικοί εἰσι τῶν (12) καλῶν ἔργων ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις, καὶ ὡς ὁ νόμος κελεύει, καὶ (13) ὑπηρετικοὶ τῷ νόμῳ· δειλία δὲ τοὐναντίον.

. .

Courage is the virtue that disposes men to do noble deeds in situations of danger, in accordance with the law and in obedience to its commands; cowardice is the opposite.

σωφροσύνη δὲ (14) ἀρετὴ δι’ ἣν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς τὰς τοῦ σώματος οὕτως ἔχουσιν (15) ὡς ὁ νόμος κελεύει· ἀκολασία δὲ τοὐναντίον.

.

Temperance is the virtue that disposes us to obey the law where physical pleasures are concerned; incontinence is the opposite.

ἐλευθεριότης (16) δὲ περὶ χρήματα εὐποιητική, ἀνελευθερία δὲ τοὐναντίον.

.

Liberality disposes us to spend money for others’ good; illiberality is the opposite.

(17) μεγαλοψυχία δὲ ἀρετὴ μεγάλων ποιητικὴ εὐεργετημάτων (18) [μικροψυχία δὲ τοὐναντίον], μεγαλοπρέπεια δὲ ἀρετὴ ἐν δαπα(19)νήμασι μεγέθους ποιητική, μικροψυχία δὲ καὶ μικρο(20)πρέπεια τἀναντία.

. . .

Magnanimity is the virtue that disposes us to do good to others on a large scale; [its opposite is meanness of spirit]. Magnificence is a virtue productive of greatness in matters involving the spending of money. The opposites of these two are smallness of spirit and meanness respectively.

φρόνησις δ’ ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ διανοίας καθ’ (21) ἣν εὖ βουλεύεσθαι δύνανται περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν τῶν (22) εἰρημένων εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν.

.

Prudence is that virtue of the understanding which enables men to come to wise decisions about the relation to happiness of the goods and evils that have been previously mentioned.

(23) περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας καθόλου καὶ περὶ τῶν μο(24)ρίων εἴρηται κατὰ τὸν ἐνεστῶτα καιρὸν ἱκανῶς, περὶ δὲ τῶν (25) ἄλλων οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν· φανερὸν γὰρ ὅτι ἀνάγκη τά τε ποιη (26)τικὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς εἶναι καλά (πρὸς ἀρετὴν γάρ) καὶ τὰ ἀπ’ ἀρε(27)τῆς γινόμενα, τοιαῦτα δὲ τά τε σημεῖα τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τὰ (28) ἔργα· ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ σημεῖα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἅ ἐστιν ἀγαθοῦ ἔργα (29) ἢ πάθη καλά, ἀνάγκη ὅσα τε ἀνδρείας ἔργα ἢ σημεῖα ἀν(30)δρείας ἢ ἀνδρείως πέπρακται καλὰ εἶναι, καὶ τὰ δίκαια (31) καὶ τὰ δικαίως ἔργα (πάθη δὲ οὔ· ἐν μόνῃ γὰρ ταύτῃ τῶν (32) ἀρετῶν οὐκ ἀεὶ τὸ δικαίως καλόν, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τοῦ ζημιοῦ(33)σθαι αἰσχρὸν τὸ δικαίως μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀδίκως), καὶ κατὰ (34) τὰς ἄλλας δὲ ἀρετὰς ὡσαύτως.

. . . . . .

The above is a sufficient account, for our present purpose, of virtue and vice in general, and of their various forms. As to further aspects of the subject, it is not difficult to discern the facts; it is evident that things productive of virtue are noble, as tending towards virtue; and also the effects of virtue, that is, the signs of its presence and the acts to which it leads. And since the signs of virtue, and such acts as it is the mark of a virtuous man to do or have done to him, are noble, it follows that all deeds or signs of courage, and everything done courageously, must be noble things; and so with what is just and actions done justly. (Not, however, actions justly done to us; here justice is unlike the other virtues; ‘justly’ does not always mean ‘nobly’; when a man is punished, it is more shameful that this should be justly than unjustly done to him). The same is true of the other virtues.

καὶ ἐφ’ ὅσοις τὰ ἆθλα (35) τιμή, καλά. καὶ ἐφ’ ὅσοις τιμὴ μᾶλλον ἢ χρήματα. (36) καὶ ὅσα μὴ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα πράττει τις τῶν αἱρετῶν, καὶ τὰ (37) ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά, ὅσα τε ὑπὲρ πατρίδος τις ἐποίησεν παρ(38)ιδὼν τὸ αὑτοῦ, καὶ τὰ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθά, καὶ ἃ μὴ αὐτῷ (1367a1) ἀγαθά· αὑτοῦ γὰρ ἕνεκα τὰ τοιαῦτα.

. .

Again, those actions are noble for which the reward is simply honour, or honour more than money. So are those in which a man aims at something desirable for some one else’s sake; actions good absolutely, such as those a man does for his country without thinking of himself; actions good in their own nature; actions that are not good simply for the individual, since individual interests are selfish.

καὶ ὅσα τεθνεῶτι (2) ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν μᾶλλον ἢ ζῶντι· τὸ γὰρ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα (3) μᾶλλον ἔχει τὰ ζῶντι.

.

Noble also are those actions whose advantage may be enjoyed after death, as opposed to those whose advantage is enjoyed during one’s lifetime: for the latter are more likely to be for one’s own sake only.

καὶ ὅσα ἔργα τῶν ἄλλων ἕνεκα· (4) ἧττον γὰρ αὑτοῦ. καὶ ὅσαι εὐπραγίαι περὶ ἄλλους ἀλλὰ (5) μὴ περὶ αὑτόν, καὶ <αἱ> περὶ τοὺς εὖ ποιήσαντας· δίκαιον γάρ. (6) καὶ τὰ εὐεργετήματα· οὐ γὰρ εἰς αὑτόν.

. . .

Also, all actions done for the sake of others, since less than other actions are done for one’s own sake; and all successes which benefit others and not oneself; and services done to one’s benefactors, for this is just; and good deeds generally, since they are not directed to one’s own profit.

καὶ τὰ ἐναντία (7) ἢ ἐφ’ οἷς αἰσχύνονται· τὰ γὰρ αἰσχρὰ αἰσχύνονται καὶ (8) λέγοντες καὶ ποιοῦντες καὶ μέλλοντες, ὥσπερ καὶ Σαπφὼ (9) πεποίηκεν, εἰπόντος τοῦ Ἀλκαίου (10) θέλω τι εἰπῆν, ἀλλά με κωλύει
(11) αἰδώς,
(12) αἱ δ’ ἦχες ἐσθλῶν ἵμερον ἢ καλῶν
(13) καὶ μή τι εἰπῆν γλῶσσ’ ἐκύκα κακόν
(14) αἰδώς κέν σε οὐκ εἶχεν ὄμματ’,
(15) ἀλλ’ ἔλεγες περὶ τῶ δικαίω.

. . .

And the opposites of those things of which men feel ashamed, for men are ashamed of saying, doing, or intending to do shameful things. Sappho wrote, when Alcaius said: Something I fain would say to thee,Only shame restraineth me,If for things good and noble thou wert yearning,If to speak baseness were thy tongue not burning,No load of shame would on thine eyelids weigh;What thou with honour wishest thou wouldst say.

(16) καὶ περὶ ὧν ἀγωνιῶσι μὴ φοβούμενοι· περὶ γὰρ τῶν πρὸς (17) δόξαν φερόντων ἀγαθῶν τοῦτο πάσχουσιν. καὶ αἱ τῶν φύσει (18) σπουδαιοτέρων ἀρεταὶ καλλίους καὶ τὰ ἔργα, οἷον ἀνδρὸς ἢ (19) γυναικός.

. .

Those things, also, are noble for which men strive anxiously, without feeling fear; for they feel thus about the good things which lead to fair fame. Again, one quality or action is nobler than another if it is that of a naturally finer being: thus a man’s will be nobler than a woman’s.

καὶ αἱ ἀπολαυστικαὶ ἄλλοις μᾶλλον ἢ αὐτοῖς· (20) διὸ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καλόν.

.

And those qualities are noble which give more pleasure to other people than to their possessors; hence the nobleness of justice and just actions.

καὶ τὸ τοὺς (21) ἐχθροὺς τιμωρεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ καταλλάττεσθαι· τό τε γὰρ (22) ἀνταποδιδόναι δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον καλόν, καὶ ἀνδρείου τὸ μὴ (23) ἡττᾶσθαι.

. .

It is noble to avenge oneself on one’s enemies and not to come to terms with them; for requital is just, and the just is noble; and not to surrender is a sign of courage.

καὶ νίκη καὶ τιμὴ τῶν καλῶν· αἱρετά (24) τε γὰρ ἄκαρπα ὄντα, καὶ ὑπεροχὴν ἀρετῆς δηλοῖ. καὶ τὰ (25) μνημονευτά, καὶ τὰ μᾶλλον μᾶλλον.

. . .

Victory, too, and honour belong to the class of noble things, since they are desirable even when they yield no fruits, and they prove our superiority in good qualities. Things that deserve to be remembered are noble, and the more they deserve this, the nobler they are.

καὶ ἃ μὴ ζῶντι (26) ἕπεται, καὶ οἷς τιμὴ ἀκολουθεῖ, καὶ τὰ περιττά, καὶ τὰ (27) μόνῳ ὑπάρχοντα, καλλίω· εὐμνημονευτότερα γάρ. καὶ (28) κτήματα ἄκαρπα· ἐλευθεριώτερα γάρ. καὶ τὰ παρ’ ἑκά(29)στοις δὲ ἴδια καλά, καὶ ὅσα σημεῖά ἐστιν τῶν παρ’ ἑκάστοις (30) ἐπαινουμένων, οἷον ἐν Λακεδαίμονι κομᾶν καλόν· ἐλευθέρου (31) γὰρ σημεῖον· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν κομῶντα ῥᾴδιον οὐδὲν ποιεῖν ἔργον (32) θητικόν.

. . . .

So are the things that continue even after death; those which are always attended by honour; those which are exceptional; and those which are possessed by one person alone—these last are more readily remembered than others. So again are possessions that bring no profit, since they are more fitting than others for a gentleman. So are the distinctive qualities of a particular people, and the symbols of what it specially admires, like long hair in Sparta, where this is a mark of a free man, as it is not easy to perform any menial task when one’s hair is long.

καὶ τὸ μηδεμίαν ἐργάζεσθαι βάναυσον τέχνην· (33) ἐλευθέρου γὰρ τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἄλλον ζῆν.

.

Again, it is noble not to practise any sordid craft, since it is the mark of a free man not to live at another’s beck and call.

ληπτέον δὲ καὶ τὰ (34) σύνεγγυς τοῖς ὑπάρχουσιν ὡς ταὐτὰ ὄντα καὶ πρὸς ἔπ(35)αινον καὶ πρὸς ψόγον, οἷον τὸν εὐλαβῆ ψυχρὸν καὶ ἐπίβου(36)λον καὶ τὸν ἠλίθιον χρηστὸν ἢ τὸν ἀνάλγητον πρᾶον, καὶ (37) ἕκαστον δ’ ἐκ τῶν παρακολουθούντων ἀεὶ κατὰ τὸ βέλτιστον, (38) οἷον τὸν ὀργίλον καὶ τὸν μανικὸν ἁπλοῦν καὶ τὸν αὐθάδη (1367b1) μεγαλοπρεπῆ καὶ σεμνόν, καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς ὡς (2) ἐν ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ὄντας, οἷον τὸν θρασὺν ἀνδρεῖον καὶ τὸν (3) ἄσωτον ἐλευθέριον· δόξει τε γὰρ τοῖς πολλοῖς, καὶ ἅμα (4) παραλογιστικὸν [ἐκ] τῆς αἰτίας. εἰ γὰρ οὗ μὴ ἀνάγκη κιν(5)δυνευτικός, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἂν δόξειεν ὅπου καλόν, καὶ εἰ (6) προετικὸς τοῖς τυχοῦσι, καὶ τοῖς φίλοις· ὑπερβολὴ γὰρ (7) ἀρετῆς τὸ πάντας εὖ ποιεῖν.

. . . . . . . . . .

We are also to assume when we wish either to praise a man or blame him that qualities closely allied to those which he actually has are identical with them; for instance, that the cautious man is cold—blooded and treacherous, and that the stupid man is an honest fellow or the thick—skinned man a good—tempered one. We can always idealize any given man by drawing on the virtues akin to his actual qualities; thus we may say that the passionate and excitable man is ‘outspoken’; or that the arrogant man is ‘superb’ or ‘impressive’. Those who run to extremes will be said to possess the corresponding good qualities; rashness will be called courage, and extravagance generosity. That will be what most people think; and at the same time this method enables an advocate to draw a misleading inference from the motive, arguing that if a man runs into danger needlessly, much more will he do so in a noble cause; and if a man is open—handed to any one and every one, he will be so to his friends also, since it is the extreme form of goodness to be good to everybody.

σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ παρ’ οἷς ὁ (8) ἔπαινος· ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔλεγεν, οὐ χαλεπὸν Ἀθη(9)ναίους ἐν Ἀθηναίοις ἐπαινεῖν. δεῖ δὲ τὸ παρ’ ἑκάστοις τίμιον (10) ὂν λέγειν ὡς ὑπάρχει, οἷον ἐν Σκύθαις ἢ Λάκωσιν ἢ φιλοσό(11)φοις.

. . .

We must also take into account the nature of our particular audience when making a speech of praise; for, as Socrates used to say, ‘it is not difficult to praise the Athenians to an Athenian audience.’ If the audience esteems a given quality, we must say that our hero has that quality, no matter whether we are addressing Scythians or Spartans or philosophers.

καὶ ὅλως δὲ τὸ τίμιον ἄγειν εἰς τὸ καλόν, ἐπείπερ (12) γε δοκεῖ γειτνιᾶν. καὶ ὅσα κατὰ τὸ προσῆκον, οἷον εἰ ἄξια (13) τῶν προγόνων καὶ τῶν προϋπηργμένων· εὐδαιμονικὸν γὰρ (14) καὶ καλὸν καὶ τὸ προσεπικτᾶσθαι τιμήν.

. . .

Everything, in fact, that is esteemed we are to represent as noble. After all, people regard the two things as much the same. All actions are noble that are appropriate to the man who does them: if, for instance, they are worthy of his ancestors or of his own past career. For it makes for happiness, and is a noble thing, that he should add to the honour he already has.

καὶ εἰ παρὰ τὸ προσ(15)ῆκον ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ κάλλιον, οἷον εἰ εὐτυχῶν (16) μὲν μέτριος, ἀτυχῶν δὲ μεγαλόψυχος, ἢ μείζων γιγνό(17)μενος βελτίων καὶ καταλλακτικώτερος.

. . .

Even inappropriate actions are noble if they are better and nobler than the appropriate ones would be; for instance, if one who was just an average person when all went well becomes a hero in adversity, or if he becomes better and easier to get on with the higher he rises.

τοιοῦτον δὲ τὸ τοῦ (18) Ἰφικράτους, “ἐξ οἵων εἰς οἷα”, καὶ τὸ τοῦ ὀλυμπιονίκου
(19) πρόσθε μὲν ἀμφ’ ὤμοισιν ἔχων τραχεῖαν, (20) καὶ τὸ τοῦ Σιμωνίδου
(21) ἣ πατρός τε καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀδελφῶν τ’ οὖσα τυράννων.

. . .

Compare the saying of Iphicrates, ‘Think what I was and what I am’; and the epigram on the victor at the Olympic games, In time past, bearing a yoke on my shoulders, of wood unshaven, and the encomium of Simonides, A woman whose father, whose husband, whose brethren were princes all.

(22) ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐκ τῶν πράξεων ὁ ἔπαινος, ἴδιον δὲ τοῦ σπουδαίου (23) τὸ κατὰ προαίρεσιν, πειρατέον δεικνύναι πράττοντα κατὰ (24) προαίρεσιν, χρήσιμον δὲ τὸ πολλάκις φαίνεσθαι πεπρα(25)χότα· διὸ καὶ τὰ συμπτώματα καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης ὡς (26) ἐν προαιρέσει ληπτέον· ἂν γὰρ πολλὰ καὶ ὅμοια προ(27)φέρηται, σημεῖον ἀρετῆς εἶναι δόξει καὶ προαιρέσεως.

. . .

Since we praise a man for what he has actually done, and fine actions are distinguished from others by being intentionally good, we must try to prove that our hero’s noble acts are intentional. This is all the easier if we can make out that he has often acted so before, and therefore we must assert coincidences and accidents to have been intended. Produce a number of good actions, all of the same kind, and people will think that they must have been intended, and that they prove the good qualities of the man who did them.

(28) ἔστιν δ’ ἔπαινος λόγος ἐμφανίζων μέγεθος ἀρετῆς. δεῖ οὖν (29) τὰς πράξεις ἐπιδεικνύναι ὡς τοιαῦται.

. .

Praise is the expression in words of the eminence of a man’s good qualities, and therefore we must display his actions as the product of such qualities.

τὸ δ’ ἐγκώμιον τῶν ἔρ(30)γων ἐστίν (τὰ δὲ κύκλῳ εἰς πίστιν, οἷον εὐγένεια καὶ παι(31)δεία· εἰκὸς γὰρ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ τὸν οὕτω τραφέντα (32) τοιοῦτον εἶναι), διὸ καὶ ἐγκωμιάζομεν πράξαντας.

. . . .

Encomium refers to what he has actually done; the mention of accessories, such as good birth and education, merely helps to make our story credible — good fathers are likely to have good sons, and good training is likely to produce good character. Hence it is only when a man has already done something that we bestow encomiums upon him.

τὰ δ’ (33) ἔργα σημεῖα τῆς ἕξεώς ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ ἐπαινοῖμεν ἂν καὶ μὴ πε(34)πραγότα, εἰ πιστεύοιμεν εἶναι τοιοῦτον. μακαρισμὸς δὲ καὶ (35) εὐδαιμονισμὸς αὑτοῖς μὲν ταὐτά, τούτοις δ’ οὐ ταὐτά, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ (36) ἡ εὐδαιμονία τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ ὁ εὐδαιμονισμὸς περιέχει ταῦτα. (37) ἔχει δὲ κοινὸν εἶδος ὁ ἔπαινος καὶ αἱ συμβουλαί. (38) ἃ γὰρ ἐν τῷ συμβουλεύειν ὑπόθοιο ἄν, ταῦτα μετατεθέντα (1368a1) τῇ λέξει ἐγκώμια γίγνεται.

. . . . . .

Yet the actual deeds are evidence of the doer’s character: even if a man has not actually done a given good thing, we shall bestow praise on him, if we are sure that he is the sort of man who would do it. To call any one blest is, it may be added, the same thing as to call him happy; but these are not the same thing as to bestow praise and encomium upon him; the two latter are a part of ‘calling happy’, just as goodness is a part of happiness. To praise a man is in one respect akin to urging a course of action. The suggestions which would be made in the latter case become encomiums when differently expressed.

ἐπεὶ οὖν ἔχομεν ἃ δεῖ πράτ(2)τειν καὶ ποῖόν τινα εἶναι δεῖ, ταῦτα ὡς ὑποθήκας λέγοντας (3) τῇ λέξει μετατιθέναι δεῖ καὶ στρέφειν, οἷον ὅτι οὐ δεῖ (4) μέγα φρονεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς διὰ τύχην ἀλλὰ τοῖς δι’ αὑτόν. (5) οὕτω μὲν οὖν λεχθὲν ὑποθήκην δύναται, ὡδὶ δ’ ἔπαινον “μέγα (6) φρονῶν οὐκ <ἐπὶ> τοῖς διὰ τύχην ὑπάρχουσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς δι’ (7) αὑτόν”. ὥστε ὅταν ἐπαινεῖν βούλῃ, ὅρα τί ἂν ὑπόθοιο· καὶ ὅταν (8) ὑποθέσθαι, ὅρα τί ἂν ἐπαινέσειας. ἡ δὲ λέξις ἔσται ἀντικειμένη (9) ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὅταν τὸ μὲν κωλῦον τὸ δὲ μὴ κωλῦον μετατεθῇ.

. . . . . . .

When we know what action or character is required, then, in order to express these facts as suggestions for action, we have to change and reverse our form of words. Thus the statement ‘A man should be proud not of what he owes to fortune but of what he owes to himself’, if put like this, amounts to a suggestion; to make it into praise we must put it thus, ‘Since he is proud not of what he owes to fortune but of what he owes to himself.’ Consequently, whenever you want to praise any one, think what you would urge people to do; and when you want to urge the doing of anything, think what you would praise a man for having done. Since suggestion may or may not forbid an action, the praise into which we convert it must have one or other of two opposite forms of expression accordingly.

(10) χρηστέον δὲ καὶ τῶν αὐξητικῶν πολλοῖς, οἷον εἰ μό(11)νος ἢ πρῶτος ἢ μετ’ ὀλίγων ἢ καὶ [ὃ] μάλιστα πεποίηκεν· (12) ἅπαντα γὰρ ταῦτα καλά.

. .

There are, also, many useful ways of heightening the effect of praise. We must, for instance, point out that a man is the only one, or the first, or almost the only one who has done something, or that he has done it better than any one else; all these distinctions are honourable.

καὶ τῷ ἐκ τῶν χρόνων καὶ (13) τῶν καιρῶν· τούτῳ δ’ εἰ παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον. καὶ εἰ πολ(14)λάκις τὸ αὐτὸ κατώρθωκεν· μέγα γὰρ καὶ οὐκ ἀπὸ (15) τύχης ἀλλὰ δι’ αὑτοῦ ἂν δόξειεν. καὶ εἰ τὰ προτρέποντα (16) καὶ τιμῶντα διὰ τοῦτον εὕρηται καὶ κατεσκευάσθη, καὶ εἰς (17) τοῦτον πρῶτον ἐγκώμιον ἐποιήθη, οἷον εἰς Ἱππόλοχον, καὶ <εἰς> (18) Ἁρμόδιον καὶ Ἀριστογείτονα τὸ ἐν ἀγορᾷ σταθῆναι· ὁμοίως δὲ (19) καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐναντίων. κἂν μὴ καθ’ αὑτὸν εὐπορῇς, πρὸς (20) ἄλλους ἀντιπαραβάλλειν, ὅπερ Ἰσοκράτης ἐποίει διὰ τὴν (21) ἀσυνήθειαν τοῦ δικολογεῖν. δεῖ δὲ πρὸς ἐνδόξους συγκρίνειν· (22) αὐξητικὸν γὰρ καὶ καλόν, εἰ σπουδαίων βελτίων. πίπτει δ’ (23) εὐλόγως ἡ αὔξησις εἰς τοὺς ἐπαίνους· ἐν ὑπεροχῇ γάρ ἐστιν, (24) ἡ δ’ ὑπεροχὴ τῶν καλῶν· διὸ κἂν μὴ πρὸς τοὺς ἐνδόξους, (25) ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους δεῖ παραβάλλειν, ἐπείπερ ἡ ὑπεροχὴ (26) δοκεῖ μηνύειν ἀρετήν.

. . . . . . . . . . . .

And we must, further, make much of the particular season and occasion of an action, arguing that we could hardly have looked for it just then. If a man has often achieved the same success, we must mention this; that is a strong point; he himself, and not luck, will then be given the credit. So, too, if it is on his account that observances have been devised and instituted to encourage or honour such achievements as his own: thus we may praise Hippolochus because the first encomium ever made was for him, or Harmodius and Aristogeiton because their statues were the first to be put up in the market—place. And we may censure bad men for the opposite reason. Again, if you cannot find enough to say of a man himself, you may pit him against others, which is what Isocrates used to do owing to his want of familiarity with forensic pleading. The comparison should be with famous men; that will strengthen your case; it is a noble thing to surpass men who are themselves great. It is only natural that methods of ‘heightening the effect’ should be attached particularly to speeches of praise; they aim at proving superiority over others, and any such superiority is a form of nobleness. Hence if you cannot compare your hero with famous men, you should at least compare him with other people generally, since any superiority is held to reveal excellence.

ὅλως δὲ τῶν κοινῶν εἰδῶν ἅπασι τοῖς (27) λόγοις ἡ μὲν αὔξησις ἐπιτηδειοτάτη τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς (τὰς (28) γὰρ πράξεις ὁμολογουμένας λαμβάνουσιν, ὥστε λοιπὸν μέ(29)γεθος περιθεῖναι καὶ κάλλος)· τὰ δὲ παραδείγματα τοῖς (30) συμβουλευτικοῖς (ἐκ γὰρ τῶν προγεγονότων τὰ μέλλοντα (31) καταμαντευόμενοι κρίνομεν)· τὰ δ’ ἐνθυμήματα τοῖς δικα(32)νικοῖς (αἰτίαν γὰρ καὶ ἀπόδειξιν μάλιστα δέχεται τὸ γε(33)γονὸς διὰ τὸ ἀσαφές).

. . . .

And, in general, of the lines of argument which are common to all speeches, this ‘heightening of effect’ is most suitable for declamations, where we take our hero’s actions as admitted facts, and our business is simply to invest these with dignity and nobility. ‘Examples’ are most suitable to deliberative speeches; for we judge of future events by divination from past events. Enthymemes are most suitable to forensic speeches; it is our doubts about past events that most admit of arguments showing why a thing must have happened or proving that it did happen.

ἐκ τίνων μὲν οὖν οἱ ἔπαινοι καὶ οἱ (34) ψόγοι λέγονται σχεδὸν πάντες, καὶ πρὸς ποῖα δεῖ βλέ(35)ποντας ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ψέγειν, καὶ ἐκ τίνων τὰ ἐγκώμια γί(36)γνεται καὶ τὰ ὀνείδη, ταῦτ’ ἐστίν· ἐχομένων γὰρ τούτων τὰ (37) ἐναντία τούτοις φανερά· ὁ γὰρ ψόγος ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστίν.

. . . .

The above are the general lines on which all, or nearly all, speeches of praise or blame are constructed. We have seen the sort of thing we must bear in mind in making such speeches, and the materials out of which encomiums and censures are made. No special treatment of censure and vituperation is needed. Knowing the above facts, we know their contraries; and it is out of these that speeches of censure are made.

10. (1368b1) Περὶ δὲ κατηγορίας καὶ ἀπολογίας, ἐκ πόσων καὶ (2) ποίων ποιεῖσθαι δεῖ τοὺς συλλογισμούς, ἐχόμενον ἂν εἴη λέ(3)γειν.

.

Part 10. We have next to treat of Accusation and Defence, and to enumerate and describe the ingredients of the syllogisms used therein.

δεῖ δὴ λαβεῖν τρία, ἓν μὲν τίνων καὶ πόσων ἕνεκα ἀδι(4)κοῦσι, δεύτερον δὲ πῶς αὐτοὶ διακείμενοι, τρίτον δὲ τοὺς ποίους (5) καὶ πῶς ἔχοντας.

. . . .

There are three things we must ascertain first, the nature and number of the incentives to wrong—doing; second, the state of mind of wrongdoers; third, the kind of persons who are wronged, and their condition.

διορισάμενοι οὖν τὸ ἀδικεῖν λέγωμεν ἑξῆς. (6) ἔστω δὴ τὸ ἀδικεῖν τὸ βλάπτειν ἑκόντα παρὰ τὸν (7) νόμον. νόμος δ’ ἐστὶν ὁ μὲν ἴδιος ὁ δὲ κοινός· λέγω (8) δὲ ἴδιον μὲν καθ’ ὃν γεγραμμένον πολιτεύονται, κοινὸν δὲ (9) ὅσα ἄγραφα παρὰ πᾶσιν ὁμολογεῖσθαι δοκεῖ. ἑκόντες δὲ (10) ποιοῦσιν ὅσα εἰδότες καὶ μὴ ἀναγκαζόμενοι. ὅσα μὲν οὖν (11) εἰδότες, οὐ πάντα προαιρούμενοι, ὅσα δὲ προαιρούμενοι, εἰδό(12)τες ἅπαντα· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὃ προαιρεῖται ἀγνοεῖ.

. . . . . . . .

We will deal with these questions in order. But before that let us define the act of ‘wrong—doing’. We may describe ‘wrong—doing’ as injury voluntarily inflicted contrary to law. ‘Law’ is either special or general. By special law I mean that written law which regulates the life of a particular community; by general law, all those unwritten principles which are supposed to be acknowledged everywhere. We do things ‘voluntarily’ when we do them consciously and without constraint. Not all voluntary acts are deliberate, but all deliberate acts are conscious — no one is ignorant of what he deliberately intends.

δι’ ἃ δὲ (13) προαιροῦνται βλάπτειν καὶ φαῦλα ποιεῖν παρὰ τὸν νόμον (14) κακία ἐστὶν καὶ ἀκρασία· ἐὰν γάρ τινες ἔχωσιν μοχθηρίαν (15) ἢ μίαν ἢ πλείους, περὶ τοῦτο ὃ μοχθηροὶ τυγχάνουσιν (16) ὄντες καὶ ἄδικοί εἰσιν· οἷον ὁ μὲν ἀνελεύθερος περὶ χρή(17)ματα, ὁ δ’ ἀκόλαστος περὶ τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἡδονάς, ὁ δὲ (18) μαλακὸς περὶ τὰ ῥάθυμα, ὁ δὲ δειλὸς περὶ τοὺς κινδύνους (19) (τοὺς γὰρ συγκινδυνεύοντας ἐγκαταλιμπάνουσι διὰ τὸν φό(20)βον), ὁ δὲ φιλότιμος διὰ τιμήν, ὁ δ’ ὀξύθυμος δι’ ὀργήν, (21) ὁ δὲ φιλόνικος διὰ νίκην, ὁ δὲ πικρὸς διὰ τιμωρίαν, ὁ δ’ (22) ἄφρων διὰ τὸ ἀπατᾶσθαι περὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἄδικον, ὁ (23) δ’ ἀναίσχυντος δι’ ὀλιγωρίαν δόξης· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων (24) ἕκαστος περὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὑποκειμένων.

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

The causes of our deliberately intending harmful and wicked acts contrary to law are (1) vice, (2) lack of self—control. For the wrongs a man does to others will correspond to the bad quality or qualities that he himself possesses. Thus it is the mean man who will wrong others about money, the profligate in matters of physical pleasure, the effeminate in matters of comfort, and the coward where danger is concerned — his terror makes him abandon those who are involved in the same danger. The ambitious man does wrong for sake of honour, the quick—tempered from anger, the lover of victory for the sake of victory, the embittered man for the sake of revenge, the stupid man because he has misguided notions of right and wrong, the shameless man because he does not mind what people think of him; and so with the rest — any wrong that any one does to others corresponds to his particular faults of character.

(25) ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων δῆλον, τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς (26) εἰρημένων, τὰ δ’ ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰ πάθη ῥηθησομένων· λοιπὸν (27) δ’ εἰπεῖν τίνος ἕνεκα καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες ἀδικοῦσι καὶ τίνας. (28) πρῶτον μὲν οὖν διελώμεθα τίνων ὀρεγόμενοι καὶ ποῖα φεύ(29)γοντες ἐγχειροῦσιν ἀδικεῖν· δῆλον γὰρ ὡς τῷ μὲν κατηγο(30)ροῦντι πόσα καὶ ποῖα τούτων ὑπάρχει τῷ ἀντιδίκῳ σκεπτέον, (31) ὧν ἐφιέμενοι πάντες τοὺς πλησίον ἀδικοῦσι, τῷ δὲ ἀπο(32)λογουμένῳ ποῖα καὶ πόσα τούτων οὐχ ὑπάρχει.

. . . .

However, this subject has already been cleared up in part in our discussion of the virtues and will be further explained later when we treat of the emotions. We have now to consider the motives and states of mind of wrongdoers, and to whom they do wrong. Let us first decide what sort of things people are trying to get or avoid when they set about doing wrong to others. For it is plain that the prosecutor must consider, out of all the aims that can ever induce us to do wrong to our neighbours, how many, and which, affect his adversary; while the defendant must consider how many, and which, do not affect him.

πάντες δὴ (33) πάντα πράττουσι τὰ μὲν οὐ δι’ αὑτοὺς τὰ δὲ δι’ αὑτούς. τῶν (34) μὲν οὖν μὴ δι’ αὑτοὺς τὰ μὲν διὰ τύχην πράττουσι τὰ δ’ (35) ἐξ ἀνάγκης, τῶν δ’ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ μὲν βίᾳ τὰ δὲ φύ(36)σει, ὥστε πάντα ὅσα μὴ δι’ αὑτοὺς πράττουσι, τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ (37) τύχης τὰ δὲ φύσει τὰ δὲ βίᾳ. ὅσα δὲ δι’ αὑτούς, καὶ ὧν (1369a1) αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι, τὰ μὲν δι’ ἔθος τὰ δὲ δι’ ὄρεξιν, τὰ μὲν (2) διὰ λογιστικὴν ὄρεξιν τὰ δὲ δι’ ἄλογον· ἔστιν δ’ ἡ μὲν (3) βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ ὄρεξις (οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται ἀλλ’ ἢ ὅταν (4) οἰηθῇ εἶναι ἀγαθόν), ἄλογοι δ’ ὀρέξεις ὀργὴ καὶ ἐπιθυμία· (5) ὥστε πάντα ὅσα πράττουσιν ἀνάγκη πράττειν δι’ αἰτίας (6) ἑπτά, διὰ τύχην, διὰ φύσιν, διὰ βίαν, δι’ ἔθος, διὰ λο(7)γισμόν, διὰ θυμόν, δι’ ἐπιθυμίαν. τὸ δὲ προσδιαιρεῖσθαι (8) καθ’ ἡλικίαν ἢ ἕξεις ἢ ἀλλ’ ἄττα τὰ πραττόμενα περί(9)εργον· εἰ γὰρ συμβέβηκεν τοῖς νέοις ὀργίλοις εἶναι ἢ ἐπι(10)θυμητικοῖς, οὐ διὰ τὴν νεότητα πράττουσι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀλλὰ δι’ (11) ὀργὴν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν. οὐδὲ διὰ πλοῦτον καὶ πενίαν, ἀλλὰ (12) συμβέβηκε τοῖς μὲν πένησι διὰ τὴν ἔνδειαν ἐπιθυμεῖν χρη(13)μάτων, τοῖς δὲ πλουσίοις διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἐπιθυμεῖν τῶν (14) μὴ ἀναγκαίων ἡδονῶν· ἀλλὰ πράξουσι καὶ οὗτοι οὐ διὰ (15) πλοῦτον καὶ πενίαν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν.

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

Now every action of every person either is or is not due to that person himself. Of those not due to himself some are due to chance, the others to necessity; of these latter, again, some are due to compulsion, the others to nature. Consequently all actions that are not due to a man himself are due either to chance or to nature or to compulsion. All actions that are due to a man himself and caused by himself are due either to habit or to rational or irrational craving. Rational craving is a craving for good, i.e. a wish — nobody wishes for anything unless he thinks it good. Irrational craving is twofold, viz. anger and appetite. Thus every action must be due to one or other of seven causes: chance, nature, compulsion, habit, reasoning, anger, or appetite. It is superfluous further to distinguish actions according to the doers’ ages, moral states, or the like; it is of course true that, for instance, young men do have hot tempers and strong appetites; still, it is not through youth that they act accordingly, but through anger or appetite. Nor, again, is action due to wealth or poverty; it is of course true that poor men, being short of money, do have an appetite for it, and that rich men, being able to command needless pleasures, do have an appetite for such pleasures: but here, again, their actions will be due not to wealth or poverty but to appetite.

ὁμοίως δὲ (16) καὶ οἱ δίκαιοι καὶ οἱ ἄδικοι, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἱ λεγόμενοι κατὰ (17) τὰς ἕξεις πράττειν, διὰ ταῦτα πράξουσιν· ἢ γὰρ διὰ (18) λογισμὸν ἢ διὰ πάθος· ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν διὰ ἤθη καὶ πάθη (19) χρηστά, οἱ δὲ διὰ τἀναντία. συμβαίνει μέντοι ταῖς μὲν (20) τοιαύταις ἕξεσι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκολουθεῖν, ταῖς δὲ τοιαῖσδε (21) τὰ τοιάδε· εὐθὺς γὰρ ἴσως τῷ μὲν σώφρονι διὰ τὸ σώ(22)φρονα εἶναι δόξαι τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι χρησταὶ ἐπακολουθοῦσι (23) περὶ τῶν ἡδέων, τῷ δ’ ἀκολάστῳ αἱ ἐναντίαι περὶ τῶν (24) αὐτῶν τούτων· διὸ τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας διαιρέσεις ἐατέον, σκε(25)πτέον δὲ ποῖα ποίοις εἴωθεν ἕπεσθαι· εἰ μὲν γὰρ λευκὸς (26) ἢ μέλας, ἢ μέγας ἢ μικρός, οὐδὲν τέτακται τῶν τοιούτων (27) ἀκολουθεῖν, εἰ δὲ νέος ἢ πρεσβύτης, ἢ δίκαιος ἢ ἄδικος, ἤδη (28) διαφέρει· καὶ ὅλως ὅσα τῶν συμβαινόντων ποιεῖ διαφέρειν (29) τὰ ἤθη τῶν ἀνθρώπων, οἷον πλουτεῖν δοκῶν ἑαυτῷ ἢ πένεσθαι (30) διοίσει τι, καὶ εὐτυχεῖν ἢ ἀτυχεῖν.

. . . . . . . .

Similarly, with just men, and unjust men, and all others who are said to act in accordance with their moral qualities, their actions will really be due to one of the causes mentioned — either reasoning or emotion: due, indeed, sometimes to good dispositions and good emotions, and sometimes to bad; but that good qualities should be followed by good emotions, and bad by bad, is merely an accessory fact — it is no doubt true that the temperate man, for instance, because he is temperate, is always and at once attended by healthy opinions and appetites in regard to pleasant things, and the intemperate man by unhealthy ones. So we must ignore such distinctions. Still we must consider what kinds of actions and of people usually go together; for while there are no definite kinds of action associated with the fact that a man is fair or dark, tall or short, it does make a difference if he is young or old, just or unjust. And, generally speaking, all those accessory qualities that cause distinctions of human character are important: e.g. the sense of wealth or poverty, of being lucky or unlucky.

ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὕστερον (31) ἐροῦμεν, νῦν δὲ περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν εἴπωμεν πρῶτον.

.

This shall be dealt with later — let us now deal first with the rest of the subject before us.

(32) ἔστι δ’ ἀπὸ τύχης μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα γιγνόμενα, ὅσων ἥ τε (33) αἰτία ἀόριστος καὶ μὴ ἕνεκά του γίγνεται καὶ μήτε ἀεὶ (34) μήτε ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ μήτε τεταγμένως (δῆλον δ’ ἐκ τοῦ (35) ὁρισμοῦ τῆς τύχης περὶ τούτων), φύσει δὲ ὅσων ἥ τ’ αἰτία (1369b1) ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ τεταγμένη· ἢ γὰρ ἀεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ (2) ὡσαύτως ἀποβαίνει. τὰ γὰρ παρὰ φύσιν οὐδὲν δεῖ ἀκριβο(3)λογεῖσθαι πότερα κατὰ φύσιν ἤ τινα ἄλλην αἰτίαν (4) γίγνεται· δόξειε δ’ ἂν καὶ ἡ τύχη αἰτία εἶναι τῶν τοιού(5)των.

. . . . . .

The things that happen by chance are all those whose cause cannot be determined, that have no purpose, and that happen neither always nor usually nor in any fixed way. The definition of chance shows just what they are. Those things happen by nature which have a fixed and internal cause; they take place uniformly, either always or usually. There is no need to discuss in exact detail the things that happen contrary to nature, nor to ask whether they happen in some sense naturally or from some other cause; it would seem that chance is at least partly the cause of such events.

βίᾳ δὲ ὅσα παρ’ ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ τοὺς λογισμοὺς γίγνε(6)ται [δι’] αὐτῶν τῶν πραττόντων. ἔθει δὲ ὅσα διὰ τὸ πολ(7)λάκις πεποιηκέναι ποιοῦσιν. διὰ λογισμὸν δὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα (8) συμφέρειν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀγαθῶν ἢ ὡς τέλος ἢ ὡς (9) πρὸς τὸ τέλος, ὅταν διὰ τὸ συμφέρειν πράττηται· ἔνια (10) γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἀκόλαστοι συμφέροντα πράττουσιν, ἀλλ’ οὐ διὰ (11) τὸ συμφέρειν ἀλλὰ δι’ ἡδονήν. διὰ θυμὸν δὲ καὶ ὀργὴν (12) τὰ τιμωρητικά.

. . . . . .

Those things happen through compulsion which take place contrary to the desire or reason of the doer, yet through his own agency. Acts are done from habit which men do because they have often done them before. Actions are due to reasoning when, in view of any of the goods already mentioned, they appear useful either as ends or as means to an end, and are performed for that reason: ‘for that reason,’ since even licentious persons perform a certain number of useful actions, but because they are pleasant and not because they are useful. To passion and anger are due all acts of revenge.

διαφέρει δὲ τιμωρία καὶ κόλασις· ἡ μὲν γὰρ (13) κόλασις τοῦ πάσχοντος ἕνεκά ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ τιμωρία τοῦ ποιοῦν(14)τος, ἵνα πληρωθῇ. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ὀργή, δῆλον ἔσται (15) ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῶν παθῶν. δι’ ἐπιθυμίαν δὲ πράττεται (16) ὅσα φαίνεται ἡδέα. ἔστιν δὲ καὶ τὸ σύνηθες καὶ τὸ ἐθιστὸν (17) ἐν τοῖς ἡδέσιν· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν φύσει μὴ ἡδέων, ὅταν (18) συνεθισθῶσιν, ἡδέως ποιοῦσιν· ὥστε συλλαβόντι εἰπεῖν, ὅσα δι’ (19) αὑτοὺς πράττουσιν ἅπαντ’ ἐστὶν ἢ ἀγαθὰ ἢ φαινόμενα (20) ἀγαθά, ἢ ἡδέα ἢ φαινόμενα ἡδέα.

. . . . . . .

Revenge and punishment are different things. Punishment is inflicted for the sake of the person punished; revenge for that of the punisher, to satisfy his feelings. (What anger is will be made clear when we come to discuss the emotions.) Appetite is the cause of all actions that appear pleasant. Habit, whether acquired by mere familiarity or by effort, belongs to the class of pleasant things, for there are many actions not naturally pleasant which men perform with pleasure, once they have become used to them. To sum up then, all actions due to ourselves either are or seem to be either good or pleasant.

ἐπεὶ δ’ ὅσα δι’ αὑτοὺς (21) ἑκόντες πράττουσιν, οὐχ ἑκόντες δὲ ὅσα μὴ δι’ αὑτούς, πάντ’ (22) ἂν εἴη ὅσα ἑκόντες πράττουσιν ἢ ἀγαθὰ ἢ φαινόμενα (23) ἀγαθά, ἢ ἡδέα ἢ φαινόμενα ἡδέα· τίθημι γὰρ καὶ τὴν (24) τῶν κακῶν ἢ φαινομένων κακῶν ἢ ἀπαλλαγὴν ἢ ἀντὶ (25) μείζονος ἐλάττονος μετάληψιν ἐν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς (αἱρετὰ γάρ (26) πως), καὶ τὴν τῶν λυπηρῶν ἢ φαινομένων <λυπηρῶν> ἢ ἀπαλ(27)λαγὴν ἢ μετάληψιν ἀντὶ μειζόνων ἐλαττόνων ἐν τοῖς ἡδέ(28)σιν ὡσαύτως. ληπτέον ἄρα τὰ συμφέροντα καὶ τὰ ἡδέα, (29) πόσα καὶ ποῖα. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐν τοῖς (30) συμβουλευτικοῖς εἴρηται πρότερον, περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἡδέος (31) εἴπωμεν νῦν.

. . . . .

Moreover, as all actions due to ourselves are done voluntarily and actions not due to ourselves are done involuntarily, it follows that all voluntary actions must either be or seem to be either good or pleasant; for I reckon among goods escape from evils or apparent evils and the exchange of a greater evil for a less (since these things are in a sense positively desirable), and likewise I count among pleasures escape from painful or apparently painful things and the exchange of a greater pain for a less. We must ascertain, then, the number and nature of the things that are useful and pleasant. The useful has been previously examined in connexion with political oratory; let us now proceed to examine the pleasant.

δεῖ δὲ νομίζειν ἱκανοὺς εἶναι τοὺς ὅρους ἐὰν (32) ὦσι περὶ ἑκάστου μήτε ἀσαφεῖς μήτε ἀκριβεῖς.

.

Our various definitions must be regarded as adequate, even if they are not exact, provided they are clear.

11. (33) Ὑποκείσθω δὴ ἡμῖν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησίν τινα τῆς (34) ψυχῆς καὶ κατάστασιν ἀθρόαν καὶ αἰσθητὴν εἰς τὴν ὑπάρ(35)χουσαν φύσιν, λύπην δὲ τοὐναντίον.

.

Part 11. We may lay it down that Pleasure is a movement, a movement by which the soul as a whole is consciously brought into its normal state of being; and that Pain is the opposite.

εἰ δ’ ἐστὶν ἡδονὴ τὸ (1370a1) τοιοῦτον, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡδύ ἐστι τὸ ποιητικὸν τῆς εἰρημένης (2) διαθέσεως, τὸ δὲ φθαρτικὸν ἢ τῆς ἐναντίας καταστάσεως (3) ποιητικὸν λυπηρόν.

. .

If this is what pleasure is, it is clear that the pleasant is what tends to produce this condition, while that which tends to destroy it, or to cause the soul to be brought into the opposite state, is painful.

ἀνάγκη οὖν ἡδὺ εἶναι τό τε εἰς τὸ κατὰ (4) φύσιν ἰέναι ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν ἀπειλη(5)φότα ᾖ τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν τὰ κατ’ αὐτὴν γιγνόμενα, καὶ τὰ (6) ἔθη (καὶ γὰρ τὸ εἰθισμένον ὥσπερ πεφυκὸς ἤδη γίγνεται· (7) ὅμοιον γάρ τι τὸ ἔθος τῇ φύσει· ἐγγὺς γὰρ καὶ τὸ πολλάκις (8) τῷ ἀεί, ἔστιν δ’ ἡ μὲν φύσις τοῦ ἀεί, τὸ δὲ ἔθος τοῦ πολ(9)λάκις), καὶ τὸ μὴ βίαιον (παρὰ φύσιν γὰρ ἡ βία, διὸ τὸ (10) ἀναγκαῖον λυπηρόν, καὶ ὀρθῶς εἴρηται
(10) πᾶν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον πρᾶγμ’ ἀνιαρὸν ἔφυ), (11) τὰς δ’ ἐπιμελείας καὶ τὰς σπουδὰς καὶ τὰς συντονίας λυπηράς· (12) ἀναγκαῖα γὰρ καὶ βίαια ταῦτα, ἐὰν μὴ ἐθισθῶσιν· οὕτω δὲ τὸ (13) ἔθος ποιεῖ ἡδύ.

. . . . . . . . . . .

It must therefore be pleasant as a rule to move towards a natural state of being, particularly when a natural process has achieved the complete recovery of that natural state. Habits also are pleasant; for as soon as a thing has become habitual, it is virtually natural; habit is a thing not unlike nature; what happens often is akin to what happens always, natural events happening always, habitual events often. Again, that is pleasant which is not forced on us; for force is unnatural, and that is why what is compulsory, painful, and it has been rightly said: All that is done on compulsion is bitterness unto the soul. So all acts of concentration, strong effort, and strain are necessarily painful; they all involve compulsion and force, unless we are accustomed to them, in which case it is custom that makes them pleasant.

τὰ δ’ ἐναντία ἡδέα· διὸ αἱ ῥαθυμίαι καὶ αἱ (14) ἀπονίαι καὶ αἱ ἀμέλειαι καὶ αἱ παιδιαὶ καὶ αἱ ἀναπαύσεις καὶ (15) ὁ ὕπνος τῶν ἡδέων· οὐδὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἀνάγκην τούτων.

. . .

The opposites to these are pleasant; and hence ease, freedom from toil, relaxation, amusement, rest, and sleep belong to the class of pleasant things; for these are all free from any element of compulsion.

καὶ οὗ (16) ἂν ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἐνῇ, ἅπαν ἡδύ· ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος (17) ἐστὶν ὄρεξις. τῶν δὲ ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν ἄλογοί εἰσιν αἱ δὲ (18) μετὰ λόγου.

. . .

Everything, too, is pleasant for which we have the desire within us, since desire is the craving for pleasure. Of the desires some are irrational, some associated with reason.

λέγω δὲ ἀλόγους ὅσας μὴ ἐκ τοῦ ὑπο(19)λαμβάνειν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν (εἰσὶν δὲ τοιαῦται ὅσαι εἶναι λέ(20)γονται φύσει, ὥσπερ αἱ διὰ τοῦ σώματος ὑπάρχουσαι, οἷον (21) ἡ τροφῆς δίψα καὶ πεῖνα, καὶ καθ’ ἕκαστον εἶδος τροφῆς (22) εἶδος ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ αἱ περὶ τὰ γευστὰ καὶ ἀφροδίσια καὶ (23) ὅλως τὰ ἁπτά, καὶ περὶ ὀσμὴν [εὐωδίας] καὶ ἀκοὴν καὶ (24) ὄψιν), μετὰ λόγου δὲ ὅσας ἐκ τοῦ πεισθῆναι ἐπιθυμοῦσιν· (25) πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ θεάσασθαι καὶ κτήσασθαι ἐπιθυμοῦσιν (26) ἀκούσαντες καὶ πεισθέντες.

. . . . . .

By irrational I mean those which do not arise from any opinion held by the mind. Of this kind are those known as ‘natural’; for instance, those originating in the body, such as the desire for nourishment, namely hunger and thirst, and a separate kind of desire answering to each kind of nourishment; and the desires connected with taste and sex and sensations of touch in general; and those of smell, hearing, and vision. Rational desires are those which we are induced to have; there are many things we desire to see or get because we have been told of them and induced to believe them good.

ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστὶν τὸ ἥδεσθαι ἐν τῷ (27) αἰσθάνεσθαί τινος πάθους, ἡ δὲ φαντασία ἐστὶν αἴσθησίς τις (28) ἀσθενής, ἀεὶ ἐν τῷ μεμνημένῳ καὶ τῷ ἐλπίζοντι ἀκολουθοῖ (29) ἂν φαντασία τις οὗ μέμνηται ἢ ἐλπίζει· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, δῆλον (30) ὅτι καὶ ἡδοναὶ ἅμα μεμνημένοις καὶ ἐλπίζουσιν, ἐπείπερ (31) καὶ αἴσθησις· ὥστ’ ἀνάγκη πάντα τὰ ἡδέα ἢ ἐν τῷ αἰσθά(32)νεσθαι εἶναι παρόντα ἢ ἐν τῷ μεμνῆσθαι γεγενημένα ἢ ἐν (33) τῷ ἐλπίζειν μέλλοντα· αἰσθάνονται μὲν γὰρ τὰ παρόντα, (34) μέμνηνται δὲ τὰ γεγενημένα, ἐλπίζουσι δὲ τὰ μέλλοντα.

. . . . . .

Further, pleasure is the consciousness through the senses of a certain kind of emotion; but imagination is a feeble sort of sensation, and there will always be in the mind of a man who remembers or expects something an image or picture of what he remembers or expects. If this is so, it is clear that memory and expectation also, being accompanied by sensation, may be accompanied by pleasure. It follows that anything pleasant is either present and perceived, past and remembered, or future and expected, since we perceive present pleasures, remember past ones, and expect future ones.

τὰ (1370b1) μὲν οὖν μνημονευτὰ ἡδέα ἐστὶν οὐ μόνον ὅσα ἐν τῷ παρ(2)όντι, ὅτε παρῆν, ἡδέα ἦν, ἀλλ’ ἔνια καὶ οὐχ ἡδέα, ἂν ᾖ (3) ὕστερον καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο· ὅθεν καὶ τοῦτ’ εἴρηται,
ἀλλ’ ἡδύ τοι σωθέντα μεμνῆσθαι πόνων,
(4) καὶ
(5) μετὰ γάρ τε καὶ ἄλγεσι τέρπεται ἀνὴρ
(6) μνημένος ὅστις πολλὰ πάθῃ καὶ πολλὰ ἐόργῃ· (7) τούτου δ’ αἴτιον ὅτι ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν κακόν· τὰ δ’ ἐν (8) ἐλπίδι ὅσα παρόντα ἢ εὐφραίνειν ἢ ὠφελεῖν φαίνεται μεγάλα, (9) καὶ ἄνευ λύπης ὠφελεῖν.

. . . .

Now the things that are pleasant to remember are not only those that, when actually perceived as present, were pleasant, but also some things that were not, provided that their results have subsequently proved noble and good. Hence the words Sweet ‘tis when rescued to remember pain, and Even his griefs are a joy long after to one that remembers All that he wrought and endured. The reason of this is that it is pleasant even to be merely free from evil. The things it is pleasant to expect are those that when present are felt to afford us either great delight or great but not painful benefit.

ὅλως δὲ ὅσα παρόντα εὐφραίνει, καὶ (10) ἐλπίζοντας καὶ μεμνημένους ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ· διὸ καὶ τὸ ὀργί(11)ζεσθαι ἡδύ, ὥσπερ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐποίησε περὶ τοῦ θυμοῦ
(12) ὅς τε πολὺ γλυκίων μέλιτος καταλειβομένοιο (13) (οὐθεὶς γὰρ ὀργίζεται τῷ ἀδυνάτῳ φαινομένῳ τιμωρίας τυχεῖν, (14) τοῖς δὲ πολὺ ὑπὲρ αὑτοὺς τῇ δυνάμει ἢ οὐκ ὀργίζονται ἢ (15) ἧττον)· καὶ ἐν ταῖς πλείσταις ἐπιθυμίαις ἀκολουθεῖ τις (16) ἡδονή· ἢ γὰρ μεμνημένοι ὡς ἔτυχον ἢ ἐλπίζοντες ὡς τεύξονται (17) χαίρουσίν τινα ἡδονήν, οἷον οἵ τ’ ἐν τοῖς πυρετοῖς ἐχόμενοι (18) ταῖς δίψαις καὶ μεμνημένοι ὡς ἔπιον καὶ ἐλπίζοντες πιεῖσθαι (19) χαίρουσιν, καὶ οἱ ἐρῶντες καὶ διαλεγόμενοι καὶ γράφοντες (20) καὶ ποιοῦντές τι ἀεὶ περὶ τοῦ ἐρωμένου χαίρουσιν· ἐν ἅπασι (21) γὰρ τοῖς τοιούτοις μεμνημένοι οἷον αἰσθάνεσθαι οἴονται τοῦ (22) ἐρωμένου.

. . . . . . . . . .

And in general, all the things that delight us when they are present also do so, as a rule, when we merely remember or expect them. Hence even being angry is pleasant — Homer said of wrath that Sweeter it is by far than the honeycomb dripping with sweetness — for no one grows angry with a person on whom there is no prospect of taking vengeance, and we feel comparatively little anger, or none at all, with those who are much our superiors in power. Some pleasant feeling is associated with most of our appetites we are enjoying either the memory of a past pleasure or the expectation of a future one, just as persons down with fever, during their attacks of thirst, enjoy remembering the drinks they have had and looking forward to having more. So also a lover enjoys talking or writing about his loved one, or doing any little thing connected with him; all these things recall him to memory and make him actually present to the eye of imagination.

καὶ ἀρχὴ δὲ τοῦ ἔρωτος αὕτη γίγνεται πᾶσιν, (23) ὅταν μὴ μόνον παρόντος χαίρωσιν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπόντος (24) μεμνημένοις [ἐρῶσιν] λύπη προσγένηται τῷ μὴ παρ(25)εῖναι, καὶ ἐν πένθεσι καὶ θρήνοις ὡσαύτως ἐπιγίγνεταί τις (26) ἡδονή· ἡ μὲν γὰρ λύπη ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, ἡδονὴ δ’ ἐν (27) τῷ μεμνῆσθαι καὶ ὁρᾶν πως ἐκεῖνον καὶ ἃ ἔπραττεν καὶ (28) οἷος ἦν· διὸ καὶ τοῦτ’ εἰκότως εἴρηται
(29) ὧς φάτο, τοῖσι δὲ πᾶσιν ὑφ’ ἵμερον ὦρσε γόοιο.

. . . .

Indeed, it is always the first sign of love, that besides enjoying some one’s presence, we remember him when he is gone, and feel pain as well as pleasure, because he is there no longer. Similarly there is an element of pleasure even in mourning and lamentation for the departed. There is grief, indeed, at his loss, but pleasure in remembering him and as it were seeing him before us in his deeds and in his life. We can well believe the poet when he says He spake, and in each man’s heart he awakened the love of lament.

(30) καὶ τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι ἡδύ. οὗ γὰρ τὸ μὴ τυγχάνειν λυπηρόν, τὸ (31) τυγχάνειν ἡδύ· οἱ δ’ ὀργιζόμενοι λυποῦνται ἀνυπερβλήτως μὴ (32) τιμωρούμενοι, ἐλπίζοντες δὲ χαίρουσιν.

. . .

Revenge, too, is pleasant; it is pleasant to get anything that it is painful to fail to get, and angry people suffer extreme pain when they fail to get their revenge; but they enjoy the prospect of getting it.

καὶ τὸ νικᾶν ἡδύ, οὐ (33) μόνον τοῖς φιλονίκοις ἀλλὰ πᾶσιν· φαντασία γὰρ ὑπεροχῆς (34) γίγνεται, οὗ πάντες ἔχουσιν ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ ἠρέμα ἢ μάλα. ἐπεὶ (35) δὲ τὸ νικᾶν ἡδύ, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰς παιδιὰς ἡδείας εἶναι τὰς (1371a1) μαχητικὰς καὶ τὰς ἐριστικάς (πολλάκις γὰρ ἐν ταύταις (2) γίγνεται τὸ νικᾶν), καὶ ἀστραγαλίσεις καὶ σφαιρίσεις καὶ (3) κυβείας καὶ πεττείας.

. . . . .

Victory also is pleasant, and not merely to ‘bad losers’, but to every one; the winner sees himself in the light of a champion, and everybody has a more or less keen appetite for being that. The pleasantness of victory implies of course that combative sports and intellectual contests are pleasant since in these it often happens that some one wins and also games like knuckle—bones, ball, dice, and draughts.

καὶ περὶ τὰς ἐσπουδασμένας δὲ (4) παιδιὰς ὁμοίως· αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἡδεῖαι γίγνονται ἄν τις ᾖ (5) συνήθης, αἱ δ’ εὐθὺς ἡδεῖαι, οἷον κυνηγία καὶ πᾶσα θηρευ(6)τική· ὅπου γὰρ ἅμιλλα, ἐνταῦθα καὶ νίκη ἔστιν· διὸ (7) καὶ ἡ δικανικὴ καὶ ἡ ἐριστικὴ ἡδέα τοῖς εἰθισμένοις καὶ (8) δυναμένοις.

. . . . .

And similarly with the serious sports; some of these become pleasant when one is accustomed to them; while others are pleasant from the first, like hunting with hounds, or indeed any kind of hunting. For where there is competition, there is victory. That is why forensic pleading and debating contests are pleasant to those who are accustomed to them and have the capacity for them.

καὶ τιμὴ καὶ εὐδοξία τῶν ἡδίστων διὰ τὸ γί(9)γνεσθαι φαντασίαν ἑκάστῳ ὅτι τοιοῦτος οἷος ὁ σπουδαῖος, (10) καὶ μᾶλλον ὅταν φῶσιν οὓς οἴεται ἀληθεύειν. τοιοῦτοι δ’ (11) οἱ ἐγγὺς μᾶλλον τῶν πόρρω, καὶ οἱ συνήθεις καὶ οἱ πολῖ(12)ται τῶν ἄπωθεν, καὶ οἱ ὄντες τῶν μελλόντων, καὶ οἱ φρό(13)νιμοι ἀφρόνων, καὶ πολλοὶ ὀλίγων· μᾶλλον γὰρ εἰκὸς (14) ἀληθεύειν τοὺς εἰρημένους τῶν ἐναντίων· ἐπεὶ ὧν τις πολὺ (15) καταφρονεῖ, ὥσπερ παιδίων ἢ θηρίων, οὐδὲν μέλει τῆς τού(16)των τιμῆς ἢ τῆς δόξης αὐτῆς γε τῆς δόξης χάριν, ἀλλ’ (17) εἴπερ, δι’ ἄλλο τι.

. . . . . . . . .

Honour and good repute are among the most pleasant things of all; they make a man see himself in the character of a fine fellow, especially when he is credited with it by people whom he thinks good judges. His neighbours are better judges than people at a distance; his associates and fellow—countrymen better than strangers; his contemporaries better than posterity; sensible persons better than foolish ones; a large number of people better than a small number: those of the former class, in each case, are the more likely to be good judges of him. Honour and credit bestowed by those whom you think much inferior to yourself — e.g. children or animals — you do not value: not for its own sake, anyhow: if you do value it, it is for some other reason.

καὶ ὁ φίλος τῶν ἡδέων· τό τε γὰρ (18) φιλεῖν ἡδύ (οὐδεὶς γὰρ φίλοινος μὴ χαίρων οἴνῳ) καὶ τὸ (19) φιλεῖσθαι ἡδύ· φαντασία γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοῦ ὑπάρχειν (20) αὐτῷ τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, οὗ πάντες ἐπιθυμοῦσιν οἱ αἰσθανόμενοι· (21) τὸ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι ἀγαπᾶσθαί ἐστιν αὐτὸν δι’ αὑτόν.

. . . . .

Friends belong to the class of pleasant things; it is pleasant to love — if you love wine, you certainly find it delightful: and it is pleasant to be loved, for this too makes a man see himself as the possessor of goodness, a thing that every being that has a feeling for it desires to possess: to be loved means to be valued for one’s own personal qualities.

καὶ τὸ (22) θαυμάζεσθαι ἡδὺ διὰ <τὸ> αὐτὸ τῷ τιμᾶσθαι.

.

To be admired is also pleasant, simply because of the honour implied.

καὶ τὸ κολακεύε(23)σθαι καὶ ὁ κόλαξ ἡδέα· φαινόμενος γὰρ θαυμαστὴς καὶ (24) φαινόμενος φίλος ὁ κόλαξ ἐστίν. καὶ τὸ ταὐτὰ πράττειν (25) πολλάκις ἡδύ· τὸ γὰρ σύνηθες ἡδὺ ἦν.

. . . .

Flattery and flatterers are pleasant: the flatterer is a man who, you believe, admires and likes so do the same thing often is pleasant, since, as we saw, anything habitual is pleasant.

καὶ τὸ μετα(26)βάλλειν ἡδύ· εἰς φύσιν γὰρ γίγνεται <τὸ> μεταβάλλειν· τὸ γὰρ (27) αὐτὸ ἀεὶ ὑπερβολὴν ποιεῖ τῆς καθεστώσης ἕξεως, ὅθεν εἴρηται
μεταβολὴ πάντων γλυκύ.

. . . .

And to change is also pleasant: change means an approach to nature, whereas invariable repetition of anything causes the excessive prolongation of a settled condition: therefore, says the poet,Change is in all things sweet.

(28) διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ τὰ διὰ χρόνου ἡδέα ἐστίν, καὶ ἄνθρωποι καὶ (29) πράγματα· (30) μεταβολὴ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ παρόντος ἐστίν, ἅμα δὲ καὶ (31) σπάνιον τὸ διὰ χρόνου.

. . .

That is why what comes to us only at long intervals is pleasant, whether it be a person or a thing; for it is a change from what we had before, and, besides, what comes only at long intervals has the value of rarity.

καὶ τὸ μανθάνειν καὶ τὸ θαυμάζειν ἡδὺ (32) ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ· ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ θαυμάζειν τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν μα(33)θεῖν ἐστιν, ὥστε τὸ θαυμαστὸν ἐπιθυμητόν, ἐν δὲ τῷ μανθάνειν (34) <τὸ> εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καθίστασθαι.

. . . .

Learning things and wondering at things are also pleasant as a rule; wondering implies the desire of learning, so that the object of wonder is an object of desire; while in learning one is brought into one’s natural condition.

καὶ τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ (35) εὖ πάσχειν τῶν ἡδέων· τὸ μὲν γὰρ εὖ πάσχειν τυγχά (1371b1) νειν ὧν ἐπιθυμοῦσι, τὸ δὲ εὖ ποιεῖν ἔχειν καὶ ὑπερ(2)έχειν, ὧν ἀμφοτέρων ἐφίενται.

. . .

Conferring and receiving benefits belong to the class of pleasant things; to receive a benefit is to get what one desires; to confer a benefit implies both possession and superiority, both of which are things we try to attain.

διὰ δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ εἶναι τὸ (3) εὐποιητικόν, καὶ τὸ ἐπανορθοῦν ἡδὺ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶν τοὺς (4) πλησίον, καὶ τὸ τὰ ἐλλιπῆ ἐπιτελεῖν.

.

It is because beneficent acts are pleasant that people find it pleasant to put their neighbours straight again and to supply what they lack.

ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ μανθά(5)νειν τε ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ θαυμάζειν, καὶ τὰ τοιάδε ἀνάγκη (6) ἡδέα εἶναι, οἷον τό τε μιμούμενον, ὥσπερ γραφικὴ καὶ (7) ἀνδριαντοποιία καὶ ποιητική, καὶ πᾶν ὃ ἂν εὖ μεμιμημέ(8)νον ᾖ, κἂν ᾖ μὴ ἡδὺ αὐτὸ τὸ μεμιμημένον· οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ (9) τούτῳ χαίρει, ἀλλὰ συλλογισμὸς ἔστιν ὅτι τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο, ὥστε (10) μανθάνειν τι συμβαίνει.

. . .

Again, since learning and wondering are pleasant, it follows that such things as acts of imitation must be pleasant — for instance, painting, sculpture, poetry and every product of skilful imitation; this latter, even if the object imitated is not itself pleasant; for it is not the object itself which here gives delight; the spectator draws inferences (‘That is a so—and—so’) and thus learns something fresh.

καὶ αἱ περιπέτειαι καὶ τὸ παρὰ (11) μικρὸν σώζεσθαι ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων· πάντα γὰρ θαυμαστὰ (12) ταῦτα.

.

Dramatic turns of fortune and hairbreadth escapes from perils are pleasant, because we feel all such things are wonderful.

καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἡδύ, τὰ συγγενῆ δὲ κατὰ (13) φύσιν ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, πάντα τὰ συγγενῆ καὶ ὅμοια ἡδέα (14) ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἵππος ἵππῳ (15) καὶ νέος νέῳ, ὅθεν καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι εἴρηνται, [ὡς] “ἧλιξ ἥλικα (16) τέρπει”, καὶ “ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον”, καὶ “ἔγνω δὲ θὴρ θῆρα”, (17) “καὶ γὰρ κολοιὸς παρὰ κολοιόν”, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα.

. . .

And since what is natural is pleasant, and things akin to each other seem natural to each other, therefore all kindred and similar things are usually pleasant to each other; for instance, one man, horse, or young person is pleasant to another man, horse, or young person. Hence the proverbs ‘mate delights mate’, ‘like to like’, ‘beast knows beast’, ‘jackdaw to jackdaw’, and the rest of them.

(18) ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ τὸ συγγενὲς ἑαυτῷ ἡδὺ ἅπαν, μά(19)λιστα δὲ αὐτὸς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἕκαστος τοῦτο πέπονθεν, ἀνάγκη (20) πάντας φιλαύτους εἶναι ἢ μᾶλλον ἢ ἧττον· πάντα γὰρ (21) τὰ τοιαῦτα ὑπάρχει πρὸς αὑτὸν μάλιστα.

. .

But since everything like and akin to oneself is pleasant, and since every man is himself more like and akin to himself than any one else is, it follows that all of us must be more or less fond of ourselves. For all this resemblance and kinship is present particularly in the relation of an individual to himself.

ἐπεὶ δὲ φίλ(22)αυτοι πάντες, καὶ τὰ αὑτῶν ἀνάγκη ἡδέα εἶναι πᾶσιν, οἷον (23) ἔργα καὶ λόγους· διὸ καὶ φιλοκόλακες ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ (24) καὶ φιλερασταὶ καὶ φιλόμαιμοι καὶ φιλότεκνοι· αὐτῶν γὰρ (25) ἔργον τὰ τέκνα. καὶ τὸ τὰ ἐλλιπῆ ἐπιτελεῖν ἡδύ· αὐτῶν γὰρ (26) ἔργον ἤδη γίγνεται. καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ ἄρχειν ἥδιστον, καὶ τὸ (27) σοφὸν δοκεῖν εἶναι ἡδύ· ἀρχικὸν γὰρ τὸ φρονεῖν, ἔστιν δ’ (28) ἡ σοφία πολλῶν καὶ θαυμαστῶν ἐπιστήμη. ἔτι ἐπεὶ φιλό(29)τιμοι ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ἐπιτιμᾶν τοῖς πέ(30)λας ἡδὺ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἄρχειν, καὶ τὸ ἐν ᾧ δοκεῖ βέλτιστος (31) αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ εἶναι, ἐνταῦθα διατρίβειν, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ ποιη(32)τής φησι κἀπὶ τοῦτ’ ἐπείγει,
νέμων ἑκάστης ἡμέρας πλεῖστον μέρος,
(33) ἵν’ αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ τυγχάνει βέλτιστος ὤν.

. . . . . . . .

And because we are all fond of ourselves, it follows that what is our own is pleasant to all of us, as for instance our own deeds and words. That is why we are usually fond of our flatterers, [our lovers,] and honour; also of our children, for our children are our own work. It is also pleasant to complete what is defective, for the whole thing thereupon becomes our own work. And since power over others is very pleasant, it is pleasant to be thought wise, for practical wisdom secures us power over others. (Scientific wisdom is also pleasant, because it is the knowledge of many wonderful things.) Again, since most of us are ambitious, it must be pleasant to disparage our neighbours as well as to have power over them. It is pleasant for a man to spend his time over what he feels he can do best; just as the poet says, To that he bends himself, To that each day allots most time, whereinHe is indeed the best part of himself.

(34) ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπεὶ ἡ παιδιὰ τῶν ἡδέων καὶ πᾶσα ἄνεσις, καὶ (35) ὁ γέλως τῶν ἡδέων, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ γελοῖα ἡδέα εἶναι, καὶ (1372a1) ἀνθρώπους καὶ λόγους καὶ ἔργα· διώρισται δὲ περὶ γελοίων (2) χωρὶς ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.

. . .

Similarly, since amusement and every kind of relaxation and laughter too belong to the class of pleasant things, it follows that ludicrous things are pleasant, whether men, words, or deeds. We have discussed the ludicrous separately in the treatise on the Art of Poetry.

περὶ μὲν οὖν ἡδέων εἰρήσθω (3) ταῦτα, τὰ δὲ λυπηρὰ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις φανερά.

.

So much for the subject of pleasant things: by considering their opposites we can easily see what things are unpleasant.

12. (4) Ὧν μὲν οὖν ἕνεκα ἀδικοῦσιν, ταῦτ’ ἐστίν· πῶς δὲ ἔχον(5)τες καὶ τίνας, λέγωμεν νῦν.

. .

Part 12. The above are the motives that make men do wrong to others; we are next to consider the states of mind in which they do it, and the persons to whom they do it.

αὐτοὶ μὲν οὖν ὅταν οἴωνται (6) δυνατὸν εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα πραχθῆναι καὶ αὑτοῖς δυνατόν, (7) εἶτ’ ἂν λαθεῖν πράξαντες, ἢ μὴ λαθόντες μὴ δοῦναι δίκην, (8) ἢ δοῦναι μὲν ἀλλ’ ἐλάττω τὴν ζημίαν εἶναι τοῦ κέρδους (9) αὑτοῖς ἢ ὧν κήδονται.

. . . .

They must themselves suppose that the thing can be done, and done by them: either that they can do it without being found out, or that if they are found out they can escape being punished, or that if they are punished the disadvantage will be less than the gain for themselves or those they care for.

ποῖα μὲν οὖν δυνατὰ φαίνεται καὶ ποῖα (10) ἀδύνατα, ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον ῥηθήσεται (κοινὰ γὰρ ταῦτα (11) πάντων τῶν λόγων)· αὐτοὶ δ’ οἴονται δυνατοὶ εἶναι μάλιστα (12) ἀζήμιοι ἀδικεῖν οἱ εἰπεῖν δυνάμενοι καὶ οἱ πρακτικοὶ καὶ (13) οἱ ἔμπειροι πολλῶν ἀγώνων, κἂν πολύφιλοι ὦσιν, κἂν (14) πλούσιοι.

. . .

The general subject of apparent possibility and impossibility will be handled later on, since it is relevant not only to forensic but to all kinds of speaking. But it may here be said that people think that they can themselves most easily do wrong to others without being punished for it if they possess eloquence, or practical ability, or much legal experience, or a large body of friends, or a great deal of money.

καὶ μάλιστα μὲν ἂν αὐτοὶ ὦσιν ἐν τοῖς εἰρημένοις (15) οἴονται δύνασθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, κἂν ὑπάρχωσιν αὐτοῖς τοιοῦτοι (16) φίλοι ἢ ὑπηρέται ἢ κοινωνοί· διὰ γὰρ ταῦτα δύνανται καὶ (17) πράττειν καὶ λανθάνειν καὶ μὴ δοῦναι δίκην.

. . .

Their confidence is greatest if they personally possess the advantages mentioned: but even without them they are satisfied if they have friends or supporters or partners who do possess them: they can thus both commit their crimes and escape being found out and punished for committing them.

καὶ ἐὰν φί(18)λοι ὦσιν τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις ἢ τοῖς κριταῖς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ φίλοι (19) ἀφύλακτοί τε πρὸς τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ προσκαταλλάττονται (20) πρὶν ἐπεξελθεῖν, οἱ δὲ κριταὶ χαρίζονται οἷς ἂν φίλοι ὦσι, (21) καὶ ἢ ὅλως ἀφιᾶσιν ἢ μικροῖς ζημιοῦσιν.

. . . .

They are also safe, they think, if they are on good terms with their victims or with the judges who try them. Their victims will in that case not be on their guard against being wronged, and will make some arrangement with them instead of prosecuting; while their judges will favour them because they like them, either letting them off altogether or imposing light sentences.

λαθητικὰ δ’ εἰσὶν (22) οἵ τ’ ἐναντίοι τοῖς ἐγκλήμασιν, οἷον ἀσθενεῖς περὶ αἰκίας [καὶ] (23) ὁ πένης καὶ ὁ αἰσχρὸς περὶ μοιχείας, καὶ τὰ λίαν ἐν φανερῷ (24) καὶ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς· ἀφύλακτα γὰρ διὰ τὸ ὅλως μηδένα ἂν (25) οἴεσθαι.

. . . .

They are not likely to be found out if their appearance contradicts the charges that might be brought against them: for instance, a weakling is unlikely to be charged with violent assault, or a poor and ugly man with adultery. Public and open injuries are the easiest to do, because nobody could at all suppose them possible, and therefore no precautions are taken.

καὶ τὰ τηλικαῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα οἷα μηδ’ ἂν (26) εἷς· ἀφύλακτα γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα· πάντες γὰρ τὰ εἰωθότα, (27) ὥσπερ ἀρρωστήματα, φυλάττονται καὶ τἀδικήματα, ὃ δὲ (28) μηδείς πω ἠρρώστηκεν, οὐδεὶς εὐλαβεῖται.

. . . .

The same is true of crimes so great and terrible that no man living could be suspected of them: here too no precautions are taken. For all men guard against ordinary offences, just as they guard against ordinary diseases; but no one takes precautions against a disease that nobody has ever had.

καὶ οἷς μηδεὶς (29) ἐχθρὸς ἢ πολλοί· οἱ μὲν γὰρ οἴονται λήσειν διὰ τὸ μὴ φυ(30)λάττεσθαι, οἱ δὲ λανθάνουσι διὰ τὸ μὴ δοκεῖν ἂν ἐπιχειρῆ(31)σαι φυλαττομένοις, καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀπολογίαν ἔχειν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν (32) ἐνεχείρησαν.

. . . .

You feel safe, too, if you have either no enemies or a great many; if you have none, you expect not to be watched and therefore not to be detected; if you have a great many, you will be watched, and therefore people will think you can never risk an attempt on them, and you can defend your innocence by pointing out that you could never have taken such a risk.

καὶ οἷς ὑπάρχει κρύψις ἢ τρόποις ἢ τόποις, ἢ (33) διαθέσεις εὔποροι. καὶ ὅσοις μὴ λανθάνουσιν ἔστιν δίωσις δίκης (34) ἢ ἀναβολὴ χρόνου ἢ διαφθοραὶ κριτῶν. καὶ οἷς, ἐὰν γένηται (35) ζημία, ἔστιν δίωσις τῆς ἐκτίσεως ἢ ἀναβολὴ χρόνιος. ἢ <εἰ> (36) δι’ ἀπορίαν μηδὲν ἔχει ὅ τι ἀπολέσει.

. . . .

You may also trust to hide your crime by the way you do it or the place you do it in, or by some convenient means of disposal. You may feel that even if you are found out you can stave off a trial, or have it postponed, or corrupt your judges: or that even if you are sentenced you can avoid paying damages, or can at least postpone doing so for a long time: or that you are so badly off that you will have nothing to lose.

καὶ οἷς τὰ μὲν κέρδη (37) φανερὰ ἢ μεγάλα ἢ ἐγγύς, αἱ δὲ ζημίαι μικραὶ ἢ ἀφα (1372b1) νεῖς ἢ πόρρω. καὶ ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν τιμωρία ἴση τῇ ὠφελείᾳ, οἷον (2) δοκεῖ ἡ τυρρανίς. καὶ ὅσοις τὰ μὲν ἀδικήματα λήμματα, (3) αἱ δὲ ζημίαι ὀνείδη μόνον. καὶ οἷς τοὐναντίον τὰ μὲν ἀδική(4)ματα εἰς ἔπαινόν τινα, οἷον εἰ συνέβη ἅμα τιμωρήσασθαι (5) ὑπὲρ πατρὸς ἢ μητρός, ὥσπερ Ζήνωνι, αἱ δὲ ζημίαι εἰς (6) χρήματα ἢ φυγὴν ἢ τοιοῦτόν τι· δι’ ἀμφότερα γὰρ ἀδι(7)κοῦσι καὶ ἀμφοτέρως ἔχοντες, πλὴν οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ ἀλλ’ οἱ (8) ἐναντίοι τοῖς ἤθεσιν.

. . . . . . .

You may feel that the gain to be got by wrong—doing is great or certain or immediate, and that the penalty is small or uncertain or distant. It may be that the advantage to be gained is greater than any possible retribution: as in the case of despotic power, according to the popular view. You may consider your crimes as bringing you solid profit, while their punishment is nothing more than being called bad names. Or the opposite argument may appeal to you: your crimes may bring you some credit thus you may, incidentally, be avenging your father or mother, like Zeno, whereas the punishment may amount to a fine, or banishment, or something of that sort. People may be led on to wrong others by either of these motives or feelings; but no man by both — they will affect people of quite opposite characters.

καὶ οἱ πολλάκις ἢ λεληθότες ἢ μὴ ἐζη(9)μιωμένοι, καὶ οἱ πολλάκις ἀποτετυχηκότες (εἰσὶ γάρ τινες (10) καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, οἷοι ἀνα(11)μάχεσθαι). καὶ οἷς ἂν παραχρῆμα ᾖ τὸ ἡδύ, τὸ δὲ λυπηρὸν (12) ὕστερον, ἢ τὸ κέρδος, ἡ δὲ ζημία ὕστερον· οἱ γὰρ ἀκρατεῖς (13) τοιοῦτοι, ἔστιν δὲ ἀκρασία περὶ πάντα ὅσων ὀρέγονται. καὶ οἷς (14) ἂν τοὐναντίον τὸ μὲν λυπηρὸν ἤδη ᾖ ἢ ἡ ζημία, τὸ δὲ ἡδὺ (15) καὶ <τὸ> ὠφέλιμον ὕστερα καὶ χρονιώτερα· οἱ γὰρ ἐγκρατεῖς καὶ (16) φρονιμώτεροι τὰ τοιαῦτα διώκουσιν. καὶ οἷς ἂν ἐνδέχηται διὰ (17) τύχην δόξαι πρᾶξαι ἢ δι’ ἀνάγκην ἢ διὰ φύσιν ἢ δι’ ἔθος, (18) καὶ ὅλως ἁμαρτεῖν ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀδικεῖν. καὶ οἷς ἂν ᾖ τοῦ ἐπι(19)εικοῦς τυχεῖν. καὶ ὅσοι ἂν ἐνδεεῖς ὦσιν· διχῶς δέ εἰσιν ἐνδεεῖς· ἢ (20) γὰρ ὡς ἀναγκαίου, ὥσπερ οἱ πένητες, ἢ ὡς ὑπερβολῆς, ὥσπερ οἱ (21) πλούσιοι. καὶ οἱ σφόδρα εὐδοκιμοῦντες καὶ οἱ σφόδρα ἀδοξοῦν(22)τες, οἱ μὲν ὡς οὐ δόξοντες, οἱ δ’ ὡς οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἀδοξοῦντες.

. . . . . . . . .

You may be encouraged by having often escaped detection or punishment already; or by having often tried and failed; for in crime, as in war, there are men who will always refuse to give up the struggle. You may get your pleasure on the spot and the pain later, or the gain on the spot and the loss later. That is what appeals to weak—willed persons — and weakness of will may be shown with regard to all the objects of desire. It may on the contrary appeal to you as it does appeal to self—controlled and sensible people — that the pain and loss are immediate, while the pleasure and profit come later and last longer. You may feel able to make it appear that your crime was due to chance, or to necessity, or to natural causes, or to habit: in fact, to put it generally, as if you had failed to do right rather than actually done wrong. You may be able to trust other people to judge you equitably. You may be stimulated by being in want: which may mean that you want necessaries, as poor people do, or that you want luxuries, as rich people do. You may be encouraged by having a particularly good reputation, because that will save you from being suspected: or by having a particularly bad one, because nothing you are likely to do will make it worse.

(23) αὐτοὶ μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἔχοντες ἐπιχειροῦσιν <ἀδικεῖν>, ἀδι(24)κοῦσι δὲ τοὺς τοιούτους καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τοὺς ἔχοντας ὧν (25) αὐτοὶ ἐνδεεῖς ἢ εἰς τἀναγκαῖα ἢ εἰς ὑπεροχὴν ἢ εἰς ἀπό(26)λαυσιν, καὶ τοὺς πόρρω καὶ τοὺς ἐγγύς· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἡ (27) λῆψις ταχεῖα, τῶν δ’ ἡ τιμωρία βραδεῖα, οἷον οἱ συλῶντες (28) τοὺς Καρχηδονίους. καὶ τοὺς μὴ εὐλαβεῖς μηδὲ φυλακτικοὺς (29) ἀλλὰ πιστευτικούς· ῥᾴδιον γὰρ πάντας λαθεῖν.

. . . . . .

The above, then, are the various states of mind in which a man sets about doing wrong to others. The kind of people to whom he does wrong, and the ways in which he does it, must be considered next. The people to whom he does it are those who have what he wants himself, whether this means necessities or luxuries and materials for enjoyment. His victims may be far off or near at hand. If they are near, he gets his profit quickly; if they are far off, vengeance is slow, as those think who plunder the Carthaginians. They may be those who are trustful instead of being cautious and watchful, since all such people are easy to elude.

καὶ τοὺς ῥα(30)θύμους· ἐπιμελοῦς γὰρ τὸ ἐπεξελθεῖν. καὶ τοὺς αἰσχυντηλούς· (31) οὐ γὰρ μαχητικοὶ περὶ κέρδους. καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἀδικη(32)θέντας καὶ μὴ ἐπεξελθόντας, ὡς ὄντας κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν (33) τούτους Μυσῶν λείαν. καὶ τοὺς μηδεπώποτε καὶ τοὺς πολλάκις· (34) ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἀφύλακτοι, οἱ μὲν ὡς οὐδέποτε, οἱ δ’ ὡς οὐκ ἂν (35) ἔτι. καὶ τοὺς διαβεβλημένους ἢ εὐδιαβόλους· οἱ τοιοῦτοι γὰρ (36) οὔτε προαιροῦνται, φοβούμενοι τοὺς κριτάς, οὔτε δύνανται (37) πείθειν, ὡς μισούμενοι καὶ φθονούμενοι.

. . . . . . . . .

Or those who are too easy—going to have enough energy to prosecute an offender. Or sensitive people, who are not apt to show fight over questions of money. Or those who have been wronged already by many people, and yet have not prosecuted; such men must surely be the proverbial ‘Mysian prey’. Or those who have either never or often been wronged before; in neither case will they take precautions; if they have never been wronged they think they never will, and if they have often been wronged they feel that surely it cannot happen again. Or those whose character has been attacked in the past, or is exposed to attack in the future: they will be too much frightened of the judges to make up their minds to prosecute, nor can they win their case if they do: this is true of those who are hated or unpopular.

καὶ πρὸς οὓς (1373a1) ἔχουσι πρόφασιν ἢ προγόνων ἢ αὐτῶν ἢ φίλων ἢ ποιη(2)σάντων κακῶς ἢ μελλησάντων, ἢ αὐτοὺς ἢ προγόνους ἢ ὧν κή(3)δονται· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ παροιμία, προφάσεως δεῖται μόνον ἡ (4) πονηρία.

. .

Another likely class of victim is those who their injurer can pretend have, themselves or through their ancestors or friends, treated badly, or intended to treat badly, the man himself, or his ancestors, or those he cares for; as the proverb says, ‘wickedness needs but a pretext’.

καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ τοὺς φίλους· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ῥᾴ(5)διον, τοὺς δὲ ἡδύ. καὶ τοὺς ἀφίλους, καὶ τοὺς μὴ δεινοὺς εἰ(6)πεῖν ἢ πρᾶξαι· ἢ γὰρ οὐκ ἐγχειροῦσιν ἐπεξιέναι, ἢ καταλλάττον(7)ται, ἢ οὐδὲν περαίνουσιν.

. . .

A man may wrong his enemies, because that is pleasant: he may equally wrong his friends, because that is easy. Then there are those who have no friends, and those who lack eloquence and practical capacity; these will either not attempt to prosecute, or they will come to terms, or failing that they will lose their case.

καὶ οἷς μὴ λυσιτελεῖ διατρί(8)βειν ἐπιτηροῦσιν ἢ δίκην ἢ ἔκτισιν, οἷον οἱ ξένοι καὶ αὐτουργοί· (9) ἐπὶ μικρῷ τε γὰρ διαλύονται καὶ ῥᾳδίως καταπαύονται.

. . .

There are those whom it does not pay to waste time in waiting for trial or damages, such as foreigners and small farmers; they will settle for a trifle, and always be ready to leave off.

(10) καὶ τοὺς πολλὰ ἠδικηκότας, ἢ τοιαῦτα οἷα ἀδικοῦνται· ἐγ(11)γὺς γάρ τι δοκεῖ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν εἶναι ὅταν τι τοιοῦτον (12) ἀδικηθῇ τις οἷον εἰώθει καὶ αὐτὸς ἀδικεῖν· λέγω δ’ οἷον εἴ (13) τις τὸν εἰωθότα ὑβρίζειν αἰκίσαιτο.

. . .

Also those who have themselves wronged others, either often, or in the same way as they are now being wronged themselves — for it is felt that next to no wrong is done to people when it is the same wrong as they have often themselves done to others: if, for instance, you assault a man who has been accustomed to behave with violence to others.

καὶ τοὺς ἢ πεποιηκότας (14) κακῶς ἢ βουληθέντας ἢ βουλομένους ἢ ποιήσοντας· ἔχει γὰρ (15) καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ καλόν, καὶ ἐγγὺς τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν φαί(16)νεται.

. .

So too with those who have done wrong to others, or have meant to, or mean to, or are likely to do so; there is something fine and pleasant in wronging such persons, it seems as though almost no wrong were done.

καὶ οἷς χαριοῦνται ἢ φίλοις ἢ θαυμαζομένοις ἢ (17) ἐρωμένοις ἢ κυρίοις ἢ ὅλως πρὸς οὓς ζῶσιν αὐτοί. καὶ πρὸς (18) οὓς ἔστιν ἐπιεικείας τυχεῖν. καὶ οἷς ἂν ἐγκεκληκότες ὦσιν (19) καὶ προδιακεχωρηκότες, οἷον Κάλλιππος ἐποίησεν τὰ περὶ (20) Δίωνα· καὶ γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐγγὺς τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν φαίνε(21)ται. καὶ τοὺς ὑπ’ ἄλλων μέλλοντας, ἂν μὴ αὐτοί, ὡς οὐκέτι (22) ἐνδεχόμενον βουλεύσασθαι, ὥσπερ λέγεται Αἰνεσίδημος Γέ(23)λωνι πέμψαι κοττάβια ἀνδραποδισαμένῳ < >, ὅτι ἔφθασεν, (24) ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς μέλλων. καὶ οὓς ἀδικήσαντες δυνήσονται (25) πολλὰ δίκαια πράττειν, ὡς ῥᾳδίως ἰασόμενοι, ὥσπερ ἔφη (26) Ἰάσων ὁ Θετταλὸς δεῖν ἀδικεῖν ἔνια, ὅπως δύνηται καὶ (27) δίκαια πολλὰ ποιεῖν.

. . . . . . . . .

Also those by doing wrong to whom we shall be gratifying our friends, or those we admire or love, or our masters, or in general the people by reference to whom we mould our lives. Also those whom we may wrong and yet be sure of equitable treatment. Also those against whom we have had any grievance, or any previous differences with them, as Callippus had when he behaved as he did to Dion: here too it seems as if almost no wrong were being done. Also those who are on the point of being wronged by others if we fail to wrong them ourselves, since here we feel we have no time left for thinking the matter over. So Aenesidemus is said to have sent the ‘cottabus’ prize to Gelon, who had just reduced a town to slavery, because Gelon had got there first and forestalled his own attempt. Also those by wronging whom we shall be able to do many righteous acts; for we feel that we can then easily cure the harm done. Thus Jason the Thessalian said that it is a duty to do some unjust acts in order to be able to do many just ones.

καὶ ἃ πάντες ἢ πολλοὶ ἀδικεῖν (28) εἰώθασιν· συγγνώμης γὰρ οἴονται τεύξεσθαι.

. .

Among the kinds of wrong done to others are those that are done universally, or at least commonly: one expects to be forgiven for doing these.

καὶ τὰ ῥᾴ(29)δια κρύψαι· τοιαῦτα δὲ ὅσα ταχὺ ἀναλίσκεται, οἷον τὰ (30) ἐδώδιμα, ἢ τὰ εὐμετάβλητα σχήμασιν ἢ χρώμασιν ἢ (31) κράσεσιν, ἢ ἃ πολλαχοῦ ἀφανίσαι εὔπορον· τοιαῦτα δὲ (32) τὰ εὐβάστακτα καὶ ἐν μικροῖς τόποις ἀφανιζόμενα. καὶ (33) οἷς ἀδιάφορα καὶ ὅμοια πολλὰ προϋπῆρχεν τῷ ἀδικοῦντι. (34) καὶ ὅσα αἰσχύνονται οἱ ἀδικηθέντες λέγειν, οἷον γυναικῶν (35) οἰκείων ὕβρεις ἢ εἰς αὑτοὺς ἢ εἰς υἱεῖς. καὶ ὅσα φιλοδικεῖν (36) δόξειεν ἂν ὁ ἐπεξιών· τοιαῦτα δὲ τὰ μικρὰ καὶ ἐφ’ (37) οἷς συγγνώμη.

. . . . . . . . . .

Also those that can easily be kept dark, as where things that can rapidly be consumed like eatables are concerned, or things that can easily be changed in shape, colour, or combination, or things that can easily be stowed away almost anywhere — portable objects that you can stow away in small corners, or things so like others of which you have plenty already that nobody can tell the difference. There are also wrongs of a kind that shame prevents the victim speaking about, such as outrages done to the women in his household or to himself or to his sons. Also those for which you would be thought very litigious to prosecute any one — trifling wrongs, or wrongs for which people are usually excused.

ὡς μὲν οὖν ἔχοντες ἀδικοῦσι, καὶ ποῖα καὶ (38) ποίους καὶ διὰ τί, σχεδὸν ταῦτ’ ἐστίν.

.

The above is a fairly complete account of the circumstances under which men do wrong to others, of the sort of wrongs they do, of the sort of persons to whom they do them, and of their reasons for doing them.

13. (1373b1) Τὰ δ’ ἀδικήματα πάντα καὶ τὰ δικαιώματα διέλωμεν (2) ἀρξάμενοι πρῶτον ἐντεῦθεν.

.

Part 13. It will now be well to make a complete classification of just and unjust actions.

ὥρισται δὴ τὰ δίκαια καὶ (3) τὰ ἄδικα πρός τε νόμους δύο καὶ πρὸς οὕς ἐστι διχῶς.

.

We may begin by observing that they have been defined relatively to two kinds of law, and also relatively to two classes of persons.

(4) λέγω δὲ νόμον τὸν μὲν ἴδιον, τὸν δὲ κοινόν, ἴδιον μὲν τὸν (5) ἑκάστοις ὡρισμένον πρὸς αὑτούς, καὶ τοῦτον τὸν μὲν ἄγρα(6)φον, τὸν δὲ γεγραμμένον, κοινὸν δὲ τὸν κατὰ φύσιν. ἔστι (7) γάρ τι ὃ μαντεύονται πάντες, φύσει κοινὸν δίκαιον καὶ (8) ἄδικον, κἂν μηδεμία κοινωνία πρὸς ἀλλήλους ᾖ μηδὲ συν(9)θήκη, οἷον καὶ ἡ Σοφοκλέους Ἀντιγόνη φαίνεται λέγουσα, (10) ὅτι δίκαιον ἀπειρημένου θάψαι τὸν Πολυνείκη, ὡς φύσει (11) ὂν τοῦτο δίκαιον· (12) οὐ γάρ τι νῦν γε κἀχθές, ἀλλ’ ἀεί ποτε
(13) ζῇ τοῦτο, κοὐδεὶς οἶδεν ἐξ ὅτου φάνη· (14) καὶ ὡς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει περὶ τοῦ μὴ κτείνειν τὸ ἔμ(15)ψυχον· τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ τισὶ μὲν δίκαιον τισὶ δ’ οὐ δίκαιον, (16) ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πάντων νόμιμον διά τ’ εὐρυμέδοντος
(17) αἰθέρος ἠνεκέως τέταται διά τ’ ἀπλέτου αὐγῆς· (18) καὶ ὡς ἐν τῷ Μεσσηνιακῷ λέγει Ἀλκιδάμας, “ἐλευθέρους ἀφῆκε (19) πάντας θεός, οὐδένα δοῦλον ἡ φύσις πεποίηκεν”.

. . . . . . . . . . .

By the two kinds of law I mean particular law and universal law. Particular law is that which each community lays down and applies to its own members: this is partly written and partly unwritten. Universal law is the law of Nature. For there really is, as every one to some extent divines, a natural justice and injustice that is binding on all men, even on those who have no association or covenant with each other. It is this that Sophocles’ Antigone clearly means when she says that the burial of Polyneices was a just act in spite of the prohibition: she means that it was just by nature. Not of to—day or yesterday it is, But lives eternal: none can date its birth. And so Empedocles, when he bids us kill no living creature, says that doing this is not just for some people while unjust for others, Nay, but, an all—embracing law, through the realms of the sky Unbroken it stretcheth, and over the earth’s immensity. And as Alcidamas says in his Messeniac Oration ... ()

πρὸς οὓς (18a) [(20) δέ, διώρισται δίχα· ὥρισται γὰρ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἢ πρὸς (21) ἕνα τῶν κοινωνούντων ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πράττειν· διὸ (22) καὶ τἀδικήματα καὶ τὰ δικαιώματα διχῶς ἔστιν ἀδικεῖν (23) καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖν· ἢ γὰρ πρὸς ἕνα καὶ ὡρισμένον ἢ πρὸς (24) τὸ κοινόν· ὁ γὰρ μοιχεύων καὶ τύπτων ἀδικεῖ τινα τῶν ὡρι(25)σμένων, ὁ δὲ μὴ στρατευόμενος τὸ κοινόν.

. . . . . .

The actions that we ought to do or not to do have also been divided into two classes as affecting either the whole community or some one of its members. From this point of view we can perform just or unjust acts in either of two ways — towards one definite person, or towards the community. The man who is guilty of adultery or assault is doing wrong to some definite person; the man who avoids service in the army is doing wrong to the community.

(26) ἁπάντων δὴ τῶν ἀδικημάτων διῃρημένων, καὶ τῶν μὲν (27) ὄντων πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τῶν δὲ πρὸς ἄλλον ἢ πρὸς ἄλλους, (28) ἀναλαβόντες τί ἐστιν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι λέγωμεν. ἔστι δὴ τὸ (29) ἀδικεῖσθαι τὸ ὑπὸ ἑκόντος τὰ ἄδικα πάσχειν· τὸ γὰρ ἀδι(30)κεῖν ὥρισται πρότερον ἑκούσιον εἶναι.

. . . .

Thus the whole class of unjust actions may be divided into two classes, those affecting the community, and those affecting one or more other persons. We will next, before going further, remind ourselves of what ‘being wronged’ means. Since it has already been settled that ‘doing a wrong’ must be intentional, ‘being wronged’ must consist in having an injury done to you by some one who intends to do it.

ἐπεὶ δ’ ἀνάγκη τὸν (31) ἀδικούμενον βλάπτεσθαι καὶ ἑκουσίως βλάπτεσθαι, αἱ μὲν (32) βλάβαι ἐκ τῶν πρότερον φανεραί εἰσιν· τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ καὶ (33) τὰ κακὰ εἴρηται καθ’ αὑτὰ πρότερον καὶ τὰ ἑκούσια, ὅτι (34) ἔστιν ὅσα εἰδότες, ὥστ’ ἀνάγκη πάντα τὰ ἐγκλήματα (35) ἢ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἢ πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον εἶναι, καὶ ἢ ἀγνοοῦντος (36) καὶ ἄκοντος ἢ ἑκόντος καὶ εἰδότος, καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν (37) προελομένου τὰ δὲ διὰ πάθος.

. . . . . .

In order to be wronged, a man must (1) suffer actual harm, (2) suffer it against his will. The various possible forms of harm are clearly explained by our previous, separate discussion of goods and evils. We have also seen that a voluntary action is one where the doer knows what he is doing. We now see that every accusation must be of an action affecting either the community or some individual. The doer of the action must either understand and intend the action, or not understand and intend it. In the former case, he must be acting either from deliberate choice or from passion.

περὶ μὲν οὖν θυμοῦ ῥηθήσεται (38) ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη, ποῖα δὲ προαιροῦνται καὶ πῶς (39) ἔχοντες εἴρηται πρότερον.

.

(Anger will be discussed when we speak of the passions the motives for crime and the state of mind of the criminal have already been discussed.)

ἐπεὶ δ’ ὁμολογοῦντες πολ (1374a1) λάκις πεπραχέναι ἢ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσιν ἢ (2) περὶ ὃ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα, οἷον λαβεῖν μὲν ἀλλ’ οὐ κλέψαι, καὶ (3) πατάξαι πρότερον ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὑβρίσαι, καὶ συγγενέσθαι ἀλλ’ οὐ (4) μοιχεῦσαι, ἢ κλέψαι μὲν ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἱεροσυλῆσαι (οὐ γὰρ θεοῦ (5) τι), ἢ ἐπεργάσασθαι μὲν ἀλλ’ οὐ δημοσίαν, ἢ διειλέχθαι (6) μὲν τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀλλ’ οὐ προδοῦναι, διὰ ταῦτα δέοι ἂν (7) καὶ περὶ τούτων διωρίσθαι, τί κλοπή, τί ὕβρις, τί μοιχεία, (8) ὅπως ἐάν τε ὑπάρχειν ἐάν τε μὴ ὑπάρχειν βουλώμεθα (9) δεικνύναι ἔχωμεν ἐμφανίζειν τὸ δίκαιον.

. . . . . . . . .

Now it often happens that a man will admit an act, but will not admit the prosecutor’s label for the act nor the facts which that label implies. He will admit that he took a thing but not that he ‘stole’ it; that he struck some one first, but not that he committed ‘outrage’; that he had intercourse with a woman, but not that he committed ‘adultery’; that he is guilty of theft, but not that he is guilty of ‘sacrilege’, the object stolen not being consecrated; that he has encroached, but not that he has ‘encroached on State lands’; that he has been in communication with the enemy, but not that he has been guilty of ‘treason’. Here therefore we must be able to distinguish what is theft, outrage, or adultery, from what is not, if we are to be able to make the justice of our case clear, no matter whether our aim is to establish a man’s guilt or to establish his innocence.

ἔστι δὲ πάντα (10) τὰ τοιαῦτα περὶ τοῦ ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ φαῦλον ἢ μὴ ἄδικον (11) [ἡ] ἀμφισβήτησις· ἐν γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει ἡ μοχθηρία καὶ τὸ (12) ἀδικεῖν, τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὀνομάτων προσσημαίνει τὴν (13) προαίρεσιν, οἷον ὕβρις καὶ κλοπή· οὐ γὰρ εἰ ἐπάταξεν πάν(14)τως ὕβρισεν, ἀλλ’ εἰ ἕνεκά του, οἷον τοῦ ἀτιμάσαι ἐκεῖνον ἢ (15) αὐτὸς ἡσθῆναι.

. . . . .

Wherever such charges are brought against a man, the question is whether he is or is not guilty of a criminal offence. It is deliberate purpose that constitutes wickedness and criminal guilt, and such names as ‘outrage’ or ‘theft’ imply deliberate purpose as well as the mere action. A blow does not always amount to ‘outrage’, but only if it is struck with some such purpose as to insult the man struck or gratify the striker himself.

οὐδὲ πάντως, εἰ λάθρᾳ ἔλαβεν, ἔκλεψεν, ἀλλ’ (16) εἰ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ <τούτου ἀφ’ οὗ ἔλαβε> καὶ σφετερισμῷ ἑαυτοῦ.

. .

Nor does taking a thing without the owner’s knowledge always amount to ‘theft’, but only if it is taken with the intention of keeping it and injuring the owner.

(17) ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔχει ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τούτων.

.

And as with these charges, so with all the others.

(18) ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἦν δύο εἴδη (19) (τὰ μὲν γὰρ γεγραμμένα τὰ δ’ ἄγραφα), περὶ ὧν μὲν οἱ (20) νόμοι ἀγορεύουσιν εἴρηται, τῶν δ’ ἀγράφων δύο ἔστιν εἴδη· (21) ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶν τὰ μὲν καθ’ ὑπερβολὴν ἀρετῆς καὶ κα(22)κίας, ἐφ’ οἷς ὀνείδη καὶ ἔπαινοι καὶ ἀτιμίαι, καὶ τιμαὶ (23) καὶ δωρεαί (οἷον τὸ χάριν ἔχειν τῷ ποιήσαντι εὖ καὶ (24) ἀντευποιεῖν τὸν εὖ ποιήσαντα, καὶ βοηθητικὸν εἶναι τοῖς (25) φίλοις, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα), τὰ δὲ τοῦ ἰδίου νόμου καὶ (26) γεγραμμένου ἔλλειμμα.

. . . . . .

We saw that there are two kinds of right and wrong conduct towards others, one provided for by written ordinances, the other by unwritten. We have now discussed the kind about which the laws have something to say. The other kind has itself two varieties. First, there is the conduct that springs from exceptional goodness or badness, and is visited accordingly with censure and loss of honour, or with praise and increase of honour and decorations: for instance, gratitude to, or requital of, our benefactors, readiness to help our friends, and the like. The second kind makes up for the defects of a community’s written code of law.

τὸ γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς δοκεῖ δίκαιον (27) εἶναι, ἔστιν δὲ ἐπιεικὲς τὸ παρὰ τὸν γεγραμμένον νόμον δί(28)καιον.

.

This is what we call equity; people regard it as just; it is, in fact, the sort of justice which goes beyond the written law.

συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο τὰ μὲν ἑκόντων τὰ δὲ ἀκόν(29)των τῶν νομοθετῶν, ἀκόντων μὲν ὅταν λάθῃ, ἑκόντων δ’ (30) ὅταν μὴ δύνωνται διορίσαι, ἀλλ’ ἀναγκαῖον μὲν ᾖ καθ(31)όλου εἰπεῖν, μὴ ᾖ δέ, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, καὶ ὅσα μὴ (32) ῥᾴδιον διορίσαι δι’ ἀπειρίαν, οἷον τὸ τρῶσαι σιδήρῳ πηλίκῳ (33) καὶ ποίῳ τινί· ὑπολείποι γὰρ ἂν ὁ αἰὼν διαριθμοῦντα.

. . . . . . .

Its existence partly is and partly is not intended by legislators; not intended, where they have noticed no defect in the law; intended, where find themselves unable to define things exactly, and are obliged to legislate as if that held good always which in fact only holds good usually; or where it is not easy to be complete owing to the endless possible cases presented, such as the kinds and sizes of weapons that may be used to inflict wounds — a lifetime would be too short to make out a complete list of these.

ἂν (34) οὖν ᾖ ἀόριστον, δέῃ δὲ νομοθετῆσαι, ἀνάγκη ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, (35) ὥστε κἂν δακτύλιον ἔχων ἐπάρηται τὴν χεῖρα ἢ πατάξῃ, (36) κατὰ μὲν τὸν γεγραμμένον νόμον ἔνοχός ἐστι καὶ ἀδικεῖ, (1374b1) κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς οὐκ ἀδικεῖ, καὶ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς τοῦτό ἐστιν.

. . . .

If, then, a precise statement is impossible and yet legislation is necessary, the law must be expressed in wide terms; and so, if a man has no more than a finger—ring on his hand when he lifts it to strike or actually strikes another man, he is guilty of a criminal act according to the unwritten words of the law; but he is innocent really, and it is equity that declares him to be so.

(2) εἰ δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ εἰρημένον τὸ ἐπιεικές, φανερὸν ποῖά ἐστι τὰ (3) ἐπιεικῆ καὶ οὐκ ἐπιεικῆ, καὶ ποῖοι οὐκ ἐπιεικεῖς ἄνθρωποι· (4) ἐφ’ οἷς τε γὰρ δεῖ συγγνώμην ἔχειν, ἐπιεικῆ ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ τὰ (5) ἁμαρτήματα καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα μὴ τοῦ ἴσου ἀξιοῦν, μηδὲ τὰ (6) ἁμαρτήματα καὶ τὰ ἀτυχήματα· [ἔστιν] ἀτυχήματα μὲν <γὰρ> (7) ὅσα παράλογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ μοχθηρίας, ἁμαρτήματα δὲ ὅσα (8) μὴ παράλογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ πονηρίας, ἀδικήματα δὲ (9) ὅσα μήτε παράλογα ἀπὸ πονηρίας τέ ἐστιν· τὰ γὰρ δι’ (10) ἐπιθυμίαν ἀπὸ πονηρίας.

. . . . . . .

From this definition of equity it is plain what sort of actions, and what sort of persons, are equitable or the reverse. Equity must be applied to forgivable actions; and it must make us distinguish between criminal acts on the one hand, and errors of judgement, or misfortunes, on the other. A ‘misfortune’ is an act, not due to moral badness, that has unexpected results: an ‘error of judgement’ is an act, also not due to moral badness, that has results that might have been expected: a ‘criminal act’ has results that might have been expected, but is due to moral badness, for that is the source of all actions inspired by our appetites.

καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις (11) συγγινώσκειν ἐπιεικές. καὶ τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὸν νόμον (12) ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν νομοθέτην, καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸν λόγον (13) ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ νομοθέτου σκοπεῖν, καὶ μὴ (14) πρὸς τὴν πρᾶξιν ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν, καὶ μὴ πρὸς (15) τὸ μέρος ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, μηδὲ ποῖός τις νῦν, ἀλλὰ (16) ποῖός τις ἦν ἀεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ.

. . . . . .

Equity bids us be merciful to the weakness of human nature; to think less about the laws than about the man who framed them, and less about what he said than about what he meant; not to consider the actions of the accused so much as his intentions, nor this or that detail so much as the whole story; to ask not what a man is now but what he has always or usually been.

καὶ τὸ μνημονεύειν (17) μᾶλλον ὧν ἔπαθεν ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν, καὶ ἀγαθῶν ὧν (18) ἔπαθε μᾶλλον ἢ <ὧν> ἐποίησεν. καὶ τὸ ἀνέχεσθαι ἀδικούμενον. (19) καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον λόγῳ ἐθέλειν κρίνεσθαι ἢ ἔργῳ. καὶ τὸ εἰς (20) δίαιταν μᾶλλον ἢ εἰς δίκην βούλεσθαι ἰέναι· ὁ γὰρ (21) διαιτητὴς τὸ ἐπιεικὲς ὁρᾷ, ὁ δὲ δικαστὴς τὸν νόμον· καὶ (22) τούτου ἕνεκα διαιτητὴς εὑρέθη, ὅπως τὸ ἐπιεικὲς ἰσχύῃ.

. . . . . .

It bids us remember benefits rather than injuries, and benefits received rather than benefits conferred; to be patient when we are wronged; to settle a dispute by negotiation and not by force; to prefer arbitration to motion — for an arbitrator goes by the equity of a case, a judge by the strict law, and arbitration was invented with the express purpose of securing full power for equity.

(23) περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

.

The above may be taken as a sufficient account of the nature of equity.

14. (24) Ἀδίκημα δὲ μεῖζον, ὅσῳ ἂν ἀπὸ μείζονος ᾖ ἀδι(25)κίας· διὸ τὰ ἐλάχιστα μέγιστα, οἷον ὃ Μελανώπου (26) Καλλίστρατος κατηγόρει, ὅτι παρελογίσατο τρία ἡμιωβέλια (27) ἱερὰ τοὺς ναοποιούς· ἐπὶ δικαιοσύνης δὲ τοὐναντίον.

. . . .

Part 14. The worse of two acts of wrong done to others is that which is prompted by the worse disposition. Hence the most trifling acts may be the worst ones; as when Callistratus charged Melanopus with having cheated the temple—builders of three consecrated half—obols. The converse is true of just acts.

ἔστιν (28) δὲ ταῦτα ἐκ τοῦ ἐνυπάρχειν τῇ δυνάμει· ὁ γὰρ τρία ἡμιω(29)βέλια ἱερὰ κλέψας κἂν ὁτιοῦν ἀδικήσειεν.

. .

This is because the greater is here potentially contained in the less: there is no crime that a man who has stolen three consecrated half—obols would shrink from committing.

ὁτὲ μὲν δὴ οὕτω (30) τὸ μεῖζον, ὁτὲ δ’ ἐκ τοῦ βλάβους κρίνεται. καὶ οὗ μὴ ἔστιν (31) ἴση τιμωρία, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα ἐλάττων. καὶ οὗ μὴ ἔστιν ἴασις· (32) χαλεπὸν γὰρ †καὶ ἀδύνατον†. καὶ οὗ μὴ ἔστιν δίκην λαβεῖν (33) τὸν παθόντα· ἀνίατον γάρ· ἡ γὰρ δίκη καὶ κόλασις καὶ ἴασις.

. . . . .

Sometimes, however, the worse act is reckoned not in this way but by the greater harm that it does. Or it may be because no punishment for it is severe enough to be adequate; or the harm done may be incurable—a difficult and even hopeless crime to defend; or the sufferer may not be able to get his injurer legally punished, a fact that makes the harm incurable, since legal punishment and chastisement are the proper cure.

(34) καὶ εἰ ὁ παθὼν καὶ ἀδικηθεὶς αὐτὸς αὑτὸν μεγάλως ἐκό(35)λασεν· ἔτι γὰρ μείζονι ὁ ποιήσας δίκαιος κολασθῆναι, (36) οἷον Σοφοκλῆς ὑπὲρ Εὐκτήμονος συνηγορῶν, ἐπεὶ ἀπέσφα (1375a1) ξεν ἑαυτὸν ὑβρισθείς, οὐ τιμήσειν ἔφη ἐλάττονος ἢ ὁ πα(2)θὼν ἑαυτῷ ἐτίμησεν.

. . .

Or again, the man who has suffered wrong may have inflicted some fearful punishment on himself; then the doer of the wrong ought in justice to receive a still more fearful punishment. Thus Sophocles, when pleading for retribution to Euctemon, who had cut his own throat because of the outrage done to him, said he would not fix a penalty less than the victim had fixed for himself.

καὶ ὃ μόνος ἢ πρῶτος ἢ μετ’ ὀλίγων (3) πεποίηκεν. καὶ τὸ πολλάκις τὸ αὐτὸ ἁμαρτάνειν [μέγα]. (4) καὶ δι’ ὃ ἂν ζητηθῇ καὶ εὑρεθῇ τὰ κωλύοντα καὶ ζημιοῦντα, (5) οἷον ἐν Ἄργει ζημιοῦται δι’ ὃν ἂν νόμος τεθῇ καὶ δι’ οὓς τὸ (6) δεσμωτήριον ᾠκοδομήθη. καὶ τὸ θηριωδέστερον ἀδίκημα (7) μεῖζον. καὶ ὃ ἐκ προνοίας μᾶλλον. καὶ ὃ οἱ ἀκούοντες (8) φοβοῦνται μᾶλλον ἢ ἐλεοῦσιν.

. . . . . . .

Again, a man’s crime is worse if he has been the first man, or the only man, or almost the only man, to commit it: or if it is by no means the first time he has gone seriously wrong in the same way: or if his crime has led to the thinking—out and invention of measures to prevent and punish similar crimes — thus in Argos a penalty is inflicted on a man on whose account a law is passed, and also on those on whose account the prison was built: or if a crime is specially brutal, or specially deliberate: or if the report of it awakes more terror than pity.

καὶ τὰ μὲν ῥητορικά ἐστι (9) τοιαῦτα, ὅτι πολλὰ ἀνῄρηκεν ἢ ὑπερβέβηκεν, οἷον (10) ὅρκους, δεξιάς, πίστεις, ἐπιγαμίας· πολλῶν γὰρ ἀδικημάτων (11) ὑπεροχή. καὶ τὸ ἐνταῦθα οὗ κολάζονται οἱ ἀδικοῦντες, ὅπερ (12) ποιοῦσιν οἱ ψευδομαρτυροῦντες· ποῦ γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἀδικήσαιεν, (13) εἴ γε καὶ ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ;

. . . .

There are also such rhetorically effective ways of putting it as the following: That the accused has disregarded and broken not one but many solemn obligations like oaths, promises, pledges, or rights of intermarriage between states — here the crime is worse because it consists of many crimes; and that the crime was committed in the very place where criminals are punished, as for example perjurers do — it is argued that a man who will commit a crime in a law—court would commit it anywhere.

καὶ ἐφ’ οἷς αἰσχύνη μάλιστα. (14) καὶ εἰ τοῦτον ὑφ’ οὗ εὖ πέπονθεν· πλείω γὰρ ἀδικεῖ, ὅτι τε (15) κακῶς ποιεῖ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ εὖ. καὶ ὃ παρὰ τὰ ἄγραφα δί(16)καια· ἀμείνονος γὰρ μὴ δι’ ἀνάγκην δίκαιον εἶναι· τὰ μὲν (17) οὖν γεγραμμένα ἐξ ἀνάγκης, τὰ δ’ ἄγραφα οὔ. ἄλλον (18) δὲ τρόπον, εἰ παρὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα· ὁ γὰρ τὰ φο(19)βερὰ ἀδικῶν καὶ τὰ ἐπιζήμια καὶ τὰ ἀζήμια ἀδι(20)κήσειεν ἄν.

. . . . . . . .

Further, the worse deed is that which involves the doer in special shame; that whereby a man wrongs his benefactors — for he does more than one wrong, by not merely doing them harm but failing to do them good; that which breaks the unwritten laws of justice — the better sort of man will be just without being forced to be so, and the written laws depend on force while the unwritten ones do not. It may however be argued otherwise, that the crime is worse which breaks the written laws: for the man who commits crimes for which terrible penalties are provided will not hesitate over crimes for which no penalty is provided at all.

περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀδικήματος μείζονος καὶ ἐλάτ(21)τονος εἴρηται.

.

— So much, then, for the comparative badness of criminal actions.

15. (22) Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀτέχνων καλουμένων πίστεων ἐχόμενόν (23) ἐστι τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπιδραμεῖν· ἴδιαι γὰρ αὗται τῶν δικα(24)νικῶν. εἰσὶν δὲ πέντε τὸν ἀριθμόν, νόμοι, μάρτυρες, συνθῆκαι, (25) βάσανοι, ὅρκοι.

. . .

Part 15. There are also the so—called ‘non—technical’ means of persuasion; and we must now take a cursory view of these, since they are specially characteristic of forensic oratory. They are five in number: laws, witnesses, contracts, tortures, oaths.

πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ νόμων εἴπωμεν, πῶς (26) χρηστέον καὶ προτρέποντα καὶ ἀποτρέποντα καὶ κατηγο(27)ροῦντα καὶ ἀπολογούμενον. φανερὸν γὰρ ὅτι, ἐὰν μὲν ἐναν(28)τίος ᾖ ὁ γεγραμμένος τῷ πράγματι, τῷ κοινῷ χρηστέον (29) καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικεστέροις καὶ δικαιοτέροις. καὶ ὅτι τὸ “γνώμῃ (30) τῇ ἀρίστῃ” τοῦτ’ ἐστίν, τὸ μὴ παντελῶς χρῆσθαι τοῖς γεγραμ(31)μένοις. καὶ ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἐπιεικὲς ἀεὶ μένει καὶ οὐδέποτε (32) μεταβάλλει, οὐδ’ ὁ κοινός (κατὰ φύσιν γάρ ἐστιν), οἱ δὲ (33) γεγραμμένοι πολλάκις, ὅθεν εἴρηται τὰ ἐν τῇ Σοφοκλέους (34) Ἀντιγόνῃ· ἀπολογεῖται γὰρ ὅτι ἔθαψε παρὰ τὸν τοῦ Κρέοντος (35) νόμον, ἀλλ’ οὐ παρὰ τὸν ἄγραφον,
(1375b1) οὐ γάρ τι νῦν γε κἀχθές, ἀλλ’ ἀεί ποτε ...
ταῦτ’ οὖν ἐγὼ οὐκ ἔμελλον ἀνδρὸς οὐδενός .... (2) καὶ ὅτι τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἀληθές τε καὶ συμφέρον, ἀλλ’ οὐ (3) τὸ δοκοῦν, ὥστ’ οὐ νόμος ὁ γεγραμμένος· οὐ γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸ (4) ἔργον τὸ τοῦ νόμου. καὶ ὅτι ὥσπερ ἀργυρογνώμων ὁ κριτής (5) ἐστιν, ὅπως διακρίνῃ τὸ κίβδηλον δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἀληθές. (6) καὶ ὅτι βελτίονος ἀνδρὸς τὸ τοῖς ἀγράφοις ἢ τοῖς γεγραμ(7)μένοις χρῆσθαι καὶ ἐμμένειν. καὶ εἴ που ἐναντίος νόμῳ (8) εὐδοκιμοῦντι ἢ καὶ αὐτὸς αὑτῷ, οἷον ἐνίοτε ὁ μὲν κελεύει (9) κύρια εἶναι ἅττ’ ἂν συνθῶνται, ὁ δ’ ἀπαγορεύει μὴ συν(10)τίθεσθαι παρὰ τὸν νόμον. καὶ εἰ ἀμφίβολος, ὥστε στρέφειν (11) καὶ ὁρᾶν ἐπὶ ποτέραν [τὴν] ἀγωγὴν ἢ τὸ δίκαιον ἐφαρμό(12)σει ἢ τὸ συμφέρον, εἶτα τούτῳ χρῆσθαι. καὶ εἰ τὰ μὲν (13) πράγματα ἐφ’ οἷς ἐτέθη ὁ νόμος μηκέτι μένει, ὁ δὲ νόμος, (14) πειρατέον τοῦτο δηλοῦν καὶ μάχεσθαι ταύτῃ πρὸς τὸν νόμον. (15) ἐὰν δὲ ὁ γεγραμμένος ᾖ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα, τό τε “γνώμῃ (16) τῇ ἀρίστῃ” λεκτέον ὅτι οὐ τοῦ παρὰ τὸν νόμον ἕνεκα δικάζειν (17) ἐστίν, ἀλλ’ ἵνα, ἐὰν ἀγνοήσῃ τί λέγει ὁ νόμος, μὴ ἐπιορκῇ. (18) καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν αἱρεῖται οὐδείς, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὑτῷ. (19) καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν διαφέρει ἢ μὴ κεῖσθαι ἢ μὴ χρῆσθαι. καὶ (20) ὅτι ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις οὐ λυσιτελεῖ παρασοφίζεσθαι τὸν (21) ἰατρόν· οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτο βλάπτει ἡ ἁμαρτία τοῦ ἰατροῦ ὅσον (22) τὸ ἐθίζεσθαι ἀπειθεῖν τῷ ἄρχοντι. καὶ ὅτι τὸ τῶν νόμων (23) σοφώτερον ζητεῖν εἶναι, τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν ὃ ἐν τοῖς ἐπαινουμένοις νό(24)μοις ἀπαγορεύεται. καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν νόμων οὕτως διωρίσθω·

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

First, then, let us take laws and see how they are to be used in persuasion and dissuasion, in accusation and defence. If the written law tells against our case, clearly we must appeal to the universal law, and insist on its greater equity and justice. We must argue that the juror’s oath ‘I will give my verdict according to honest opinion’ means that one will not simply follow the letter of the written law. We must urge that the principles of equity are permanent and changeless, and that the universal law does not change either, for it is the law of nature, whereas written laws often do change. This is the bearing the lines in Sophocles’ Antigone, where Antigone pleads that in burying her brother she had broken Creon’s law, but not the unwritten law: Not of to—day or yesterday they are,But live eternal: (none can date their birth.)Not I would fear the wrath of any man(And brave God’s vengeance) for defying these. We shall argue that justice indeed is true and profitable, but that sham justice is not, and that consequently the written law is not, because it does not fulfil the true purpose of law. Or that justice is like silver, and must be assayed by the judges, if the genuine is to be distinguished from the counterfeit. Or that the better a man is, the more he will follow and abide by the unwritten law in preference to the written. Or perhaps that the law in question contradicts some other highly—esteemed law, or even contradicts itself. Thus it may be that one law will enact that all contracts must be held binding, while another forbids us ever to make illegal contracts. Or if a law is ambiguous, we shall turn it about and consider which construction best fits the interests of justice or utility, and then follow that way of looking at it. Or if, though the law still exists, the situation to meet which it was passed exists no longer, we must do our best to prove this and to combat the law thereby. If however the written law supports our case, we must urge that the oath ‘to give my verdict according to my honest opinion’ not meant to make the judges give a verdict that is contrary to the law, but to save them from the guilt of perjury if they misunderstand what the law really means. Or that no one chooses what is absolutely good, but every one what is good for himself. Or that not to use the laws is as ahas to have no laws at all. Or that, as in the other arts, it does not pay to try to be cleverer than the doctor: for less harm comes from the doctor’s mistakes than from the growing habit of disobeying authority. Or that trying to be cleverer than the laws is just what is forbidden by those codes of law that are accounted best. — So far as the laws are concerned, the above discussion is probably sufficient.

(25) περὶ δὲ μαρτύρων, μάρτυρές εἰσιν διττοί, οἱ μὲν παλαιοὶ (26) οἱ δὲ πρόσφατοι, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν μετέχοντες τοῦ κινδύνου (27) οἱ δ’ ἐκτός. λέγω δὲ παλαιοὺς μὲν τούς τε ποιητὰς καὶ (28) ὅσων ἄλλων γνωρίμων εἰσὶν κρίσεις φανεραί, οἷον Ἀθηναῖοι (29) Ὁμήρῳ μάρτυρι ἐχρήσαντο περὶ Σαλαμῖνος, καὶ Τενέδιοι (30) ἔναγχος Περιάνδρῳ τῷ Κορινθίῳ πρὸς Σιγειεῖς, καὶ Κλεοφῶν (31) κατὰ Κριτίου τοῖς Σόλωνος ἐλεγείοις ἐχρήσατο, λέγων ὅτι (32) πάλαι ἀσελγὴς ἡ οἰκία· οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε ἐποίησε Σόλων
(33) εἰπεῖν μοι Κριτίᾳ πυρρότριχι πατρὸς ἀκούειν.

. . . . . . .

As to witnesses, they are of two kinds, the ancient and the recent; and these latter, again, either do or do not share in the risks of the trial. By ‘ancient’ witnesses I mean the poets and all other notable persons whose judgements are known to all. Thus the Athenians appealed to Homer as a witness about Salamis; and the men of Tenedos not long ago appealed to Periander of Corinth in their dispute with the people of Sigeum; and Cleophon supported his accusation of Critias by quoting the elegiac verse of Solon, maintaining that discipline had long been slack in the family of Critias, or Solon would never have written, Pray thee, bid the red—haired Critias do what his father commands him.

(34) περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν γενομένων οἱ τοιοῦτοι μάρτυρες, περὶ δὲ (1376a1) τῶν ἐσομένων καὶ οἱ χρησμολόγοι, οἷον Θεμιστοκλῆς ὅτι (2) ναυμαχητέον, τὸ ξύλινον τεῖχος λέγων. ἔτι καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι, (3) ὥσπερ εἴρηται, μαρτύριά εἰσιν, οἷον εἴ τις συμβουλεύει μὴ (4) ποιεῖσθαι φίλον γέροντα, τούτῳ μαρτυρεῖ ἡ παροιμία,
μήποτ’ εὖ ἔρδειν γέροντα, (5) καὶ τὸ τοὺς υἱοὺς ἀναιρεῖν ὧν καὶ τοὺς πατέρας,
(6) νήπιος ὃς πατέρα κτείνας υἱοὺς καταλείπει. (7) πρόσφατοι δὲ ὅσοι γνώριμοί τι κεκρίκασιν· χρήσιμοι γὰρ αἱ τού(8)των κρίσεις τοῖς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, οἷον Εὔβου(9)λος ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἐχρήσατο κατὰ Χάρητος ὃ Πλάτων (10) εἶπε πρὸς Ἀρχίβιον, ὅτι ἐπιδέδωκεν ἐν τῇ πόλει τὸ ὁμολογεῖν (11) πονηροὺς εἶναι. καὶ οἱ μετέχοντες τοῦ κινδύνου, ἂν δόξωσι (12) ψεύδεσθαι. οἱ μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτοι τούτων μόνον μάρτυρές εἰσιν, (13) εἰ γέγονεν ἢ μή, εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μή, περὶ δὲ τοῦ ποῖον οὐ μάρ(14)τυρες, οἷον εἰ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, εἰ συμφέρον ἢ ἀσύμφορον· (15) οἱ δ’ ἄπωθεν περὶ τούτων πιστότεροι, πιστότατοι δ’ οἱ (16) παλαιοί· ἀδιάφθοροι γάρ.

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

These witnesses are concerned with past events. As to future events we shall also appeal to soothsayers: thus Themistocles quoted the oracle about ‘the wooden wall’ as a reason for engaging the enemy’s fleet. Further, proverbs are, as has been said, one form of evidence. Thus if you are urging somebody not to make a friend of an old man, you will appeal to the proverb,Never show an old man kindness. Or if you are urging that he who has made away with fathers should also make away with their sons, quote,Fool, who slayeth the father and leaveth his sons to avenge him. ‘Recent’ witnesses are well—known people who have expressed their opinions about some disputed matter: such opinions will be useful support for subsequent disputants on the same points: thus Eubulus used in the law—courts against the reply Plato had made to Archibius, ‘It has become the regular custom in this country to admit that one is a scoundrel’. There are also those witnesses who share the risk of punishment if their evidence is pronounced false. These are valid witnesses to the fact that an action was or was not done, that something is or is not the case; they are not valid witnesses to the quality of an action, to its being just or unjust, useful or harmful. On such questions of quality the opinion of detached persons is highly trustworthy. Most trustworthy of all are the ‘ancient’ witnesses, since they cannot be corrupted.

πιστώματα δὲ περὶ μαρτυριῶν (17) μάρτυρας μὲν μὴ ἔχοντι, ὅτι ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων δεῖ κρίνειν (18) καὶ τοῦτ’ ἐστὶ τὸ “γνώμῃ τῇ ἀρίστῃ”, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐξαπ(19)ατῆσαι τὰ εἰκότα ἐπὶ ἀργυρίῳ, καὶ ὅτι οὐχ ἁλίσκεται τὰ (20) εἰκότα ψευδομαρτυριῶν· ἔχοντι δὲ πρὸς μὴ ἔχοντα, ὅτι (21) οὐχ ὑπόδικα τὰ εἰκότα, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει μαρτυριῶν, (22) εἰ ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἱκανὸν ἦν θεωρῆσαι.

. . . .

In dealing with the evidence of witnesses, the following are useful arguments. If you have no witnesses on your side, you will argue that the judges must decide from what is probable; that this is meant by ‘giving a verdict in accordance with one’s honest opinion’; that probabilities cannot be bribed to mislead the court; and that probabilities are never convicted of perjury. If you have witnesses, and the other man has not, you will argue that probabilities cannot be put on their trial, and that we could do without the evidence of witnesses altogether if we need do no more than balance the pleas advanced on either side.

εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ μαρτυρίαι (23) αἱ μὲν περὶ αὑτοῦ αἱ δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος, καὶ αἱ (24) μὲν περὶ τοῦ πράγματος αἱ δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἤθους, ὥστε φανερὸν (25) ὅτι οὐδέποτ’ ἔστιν ἀπορῆσαι μαρτυρίας χρησίμης· εἰ μὴ γὰρ (26) κατὰ τοῦ πράγματος ἢ αὑτῷ ὁμολογουμένης ἢ τῷ ἀμφισ(27)βητοῦντι ἐναντίας, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἤθους ἢ αὑτοῦ εἰς ἐπιεί(28)κειαν ἢ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος εἰς φαυλότητα.

. . . .

The evidence of witnesses may refer either to ourselves or to our opponent; and either to questions of fact or to questions of personal character: so, clearly, we need never be at a loss for useful evidence. For if we have no evidence of fact supporting our own case or telling against that of our opponent, at least we can always find evidence to prove our own worth or our opponent’s worthlessness.

τὰ δ’ ἄλλα περὶ (29) μάρτυρος, ἢ φίλου ἢ ἐχθροῦ ἢ μεταξύ, ἢ εὐδοκιμοῦντος ἢ ἀδο(30)ξοῦντος ἢ μεταξύ, καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι τοιαῦται διαφοραί, ἐκ τῶν (31) αὐτῶν τόπων λεκτέον ἐξ οἵων περ καὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα λέγομεν.

.

Other arguments about a witness — that he is a friend or an enemy or neutral, or has a good, bad, or indifferent reputation, and any other such distinctions — we must construct upon the same general lines as we use for the regular rhetorical proofs.

(32) περὶ δὲ τῶν συνθηκῶν τοσαύτη τῶν λόγων χρῆσίς ἐστιν (33) ὅσον αὔξειν ἢ καθαιρεῖν, ἢ πιστὰς ποιεῖν ἢ ἀπίστους —ἐὰν (1376b1) μὲν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχωσι, πιστὰς καὶ κυρίας, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀμφισ(2)βητοῦντος τοὐναντίον. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πιστὰς ἢ ἀπί(3)στους κατασκευάζειν οὐδὲν διαφέρει τῆς περὶ τοὺς μάρ(4)τυρας πραγματείας· ὁποῖοι γὰρ ἄν τινες ὦσιν οἱ ἐπι(5)γεγραμμένοι ἢ φυλάττοντες, τοιούτως αἱ συνθῆκαι πισταί εἰσιν. (6) ὁμολογουμένης δ’ εἶναι τῆς συνθήκης, οἰκείας μὲν οὔσης (7) αὐξητέον· ἡ γὰρ συνθήκη νόμος ἐστὶν ἴδιος καὶ κατὰ μέ(8)ρος, καὶ αἱ μὲν συνθῆκαι οὐ ποιοῦσι τὸν νόμον κύριον, οἱ δὲ (9) νόμοι τὰς κατὰ νόμους συνθήκας, καὶ ὅλως αὐτὸς ὁ (10) νόμος συνθήκη τίς ἐστιν, ὥστε ὅστις ἀπιστεῖ ἢ ἀναιρεῖ συν(11)θήκην τοὺς νόμους ἀναιρεῖ.

. . . . . . . . .

Concerning contracts argument can be so far employed as to increase or diminish their importance and their credibility; we shall try to increase both if they tell in our favour, and to diminish both if they tell in favour of our opponent. Now for confirming or upsetting the credibility of contracts the procedure is just the same as for dealing with witnesses, for the credit to be attached to contracts depends upon the character of those who have signed them or have the custody of them. The contract being once admitted genuine, we must insist on its importance, if it supports our case. We may argue that a contract is a law, though of a special and limited kind; and that, while contracts do not of course make the law binding, the law does make any lawful contract binding, and that the law itself as a whole is a of contract, so that any one who disregards or repudiates any contract is repudiating the law itself.

ἔτι δὲ πράττεται τὰ πολλὰ τῶν (12) συναλλαγμάτων καὶ τὰ ἑκούσια κατὰ συνθήκας, ὥστε ἀκύ(13)ρων γιγνομένων ἀναιρεῖται ἡ πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρεία τῶν ἀν(14)θρώπων. καὶ τἆλλα δὲ ὅσα ἁρμόττει ἐπιπολῆς ἰδεῖν ἔστιν. (15) ἂν δ’ ἐναντία ᾖ, καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων, πρῶτον (16) μέν, ἅπερ ἄν τις πρὸς νόμον ἐναντίον μαχέσαιτο, ταῦτα (17) ἁρμόττει· ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ τοῖς μὲν νόμοις, ἂν μὴ ὀρθῶς (18) κείμενοι ὦσιν ἀλλ’ ἐξαμάρτωσιν οἱ τιθέμενοι, οὐκ οἰόμεθα (19) δεῖν πείθεσθαι, ταῖς δὲ συνθήκαις ἀναγκαῖον. εἶτα ὅτι τοῦ (20) δικαίου ἐστὶ βραβευτὴς ὁ δικαστής· οὔκουν τοῦτο σκεπτέον, (21) ἀλλ’ ὡς δικαιότερον· καὶ τὸ μὲν δίκαιον οὐκ ἔστιν μετα(22)στρέψαι οὔτ’ ἀπάτῃ οὔτ’ ἀνάγκῃ (πεφυκὸς γάρ ἐστιν), συν(23)θῆκαι δὲ γίγνονται καὶ ἐξαπατηθέντων καὶ ἀναγκασθέντων.

. . . . . . . . .

Further, most business relations — those, namely, that are voluntary — are regulated by contracts, and if these lose their binding force, human intercourse ceases to exist. We need not go very deep to discover the other appropriate arguments of this kind. If, however, the contract tells against us and for our opponents, in the first place those arguments are suitable which we can use to fight a law that tells against us. We do not regard ourselves as bound to observe a bad law which it was a mistake ever to pass: and it is ridiculous to suppose that we are bound to observe a bad and mistaken contract. Again, we may argue that the duty of the judge as umpire is to decide what is just, and therefore he must ask where justice lies, and not what this or that document means. And that it is impossible to pervert justice by fraud or by force, since it is founded on nature, but a party to a contract may be the victim of either fraud or force.

(24) πρὸς δὲ τούτοις σκοπεῖν εἰ ἐναντία ἐστί τινι τῶν γεγραμ(25)μένων νόμων ἢ τῶν κοινῶν, καὶ τῶν γεγραμμένων ἢ τοῖς (26) οἰκείοις ἢ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις, ἔπειτα εἰ ἢ ἄλλαις συνθήκαις ὑστέ(27)ραις ἢ προτέραις· ἢ γὰρ αἱ ὕστεραι κύριαι, ἄκυροι δ’ αἱ πρότεραι, (28) ἢ αἱ πρότεραι ὀρθαί, αἱ δ’ ὕστεραι ἠπατήκασιν, ὁποτέρως ἂν ᾖ (29) χρήσιμον.

. . .

Moreover, we must see if the contract contravenes either universal law or any written law of our own or another country; and also if it contradicts any other previous or subsequent contract; arguing that the subsequent is the binding contract, or else that the previous one was right and the subsequent one fraudulent — whichever way suits us.

ἔτι δὲ τὸ συμφέρον ὁρᾶν, εἴ που ἐναντιοῦται τοῖς (30) κριταῖς, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα εὐθεώρητα ὁμοίως.

. .

Further, we must consider the question of utility, noting whether the contract is against the interest of the judges or not; and so on — these arguments are as obvious as the others.

(31) αἱ δὲ βάσανοι μαρτυρίαι τινές εἰσιν, ἔχειν δὲ δοκοῦσι (32) τὸ πιστόν, ὅτι ἀνάγκη τις πρόσεστιν. οὔκουν χαλεπὸν οὐδὲ (33) περὶ τούτων εἰπεῖν τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα, ἐξ ὧν ἐάν τε ὑπάρχωσιν (34) οἰκεῖαι αὔξειν ἔστιν, ὅτι ἀληθεῖς μόναι τῶν μαρτυριῶν εἰσιν (1377a1) αὗται, ἐάν τε ὑπεναντίαι ὦσι καὶ μετὰ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦν(2)τος, διαλύοι ἄν τις τἀληθῆ λέγων καθ’ ὅλου τοῦ γένους τῶν (3) βασάνων· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἧττον ἀναγκαζόμενοι τὰ ψευδῆ λέγουσιν (4) ἢ τἀληθῆ, καὶ διακαρτεροῦντες μὴ λέγειν τἀληθῆ, καὶ ῥᾳδίως κατα(5)ψευδόμενοι ὡς παυσόμενοι θᾶττον.

. . . . .

Examination by torture is one form of evidence, to which great weight is often attached because it is in a sense compulsory. Here again it is not hard to point out the available grounds for magnifying its value, if it happens to tell in our favour, and arguing that it is the only form of evidence that is infallible; or, on the other hand, for refuting it if it tells against us and for our opponent, when we may say what is true of torture of every kind alike, that people under its compulsion tell lies quite as often as they tell the truth, sometimes persistently refusing to tell the truth, sometimes recklessly making a false charge in order to be let off sooner.

δεῖ δὲ ἔχειν ἐπαναφέρειν (6) ἐπὶ τοιαῦτα γεγενημένα παραδείγματα ἃ ἴσασιν οἱ κρίνοντες. δεῖ (7) δὲ λέγειν ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀληθεῖς αἱ βάσανοι· πολλοὶ μὲν γὰρ παχύ(8)φρονες [οἱ] καὶ λιθόδερμοι καὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὄντες δυνατοὶ γενναίως (7a) [(9) ἐγκαρτεροῦσι ταῖς ἀνάγκαις, οἱ δὲ δειλοὶ καὶ εὐλαβεῖς πρὸ τοῦ τὰς (7b) (10) ἀνάγκας ἰδεῖν αὐτῶν καταθαρροῦσιν, ὥστε οὐδὲν ἔστι πιστὸν ἐν (7c) [(11) βασάνοις.

. . . . .

We ought to be able to quote cases, familiar to the judges, in which this sort of thing has actually happened. [We must say that evidence under torture is not trustworthy, the fact being that many men whether thick—witted, tough—skinned, or stout of heart endure their ordeal nobly, while cowards and timid men are full of boldness till they see the ordeal of these others: so that no trust can be placed in evidence under torture.]

(7d) [(12) περὶ δ’ ὅρκων τετραχῶς ἔστι διελεῖν· ἢ γὰρ δίδωσι καὶ λαμ(13)βάνει, ἢ οὐδέτερον, ἢ τὸ μὲν τὸ δ’ οὔ, καὶ τούτων ἢ δίδωσιν (14) μὲν οὐ λαμβάνει δέ, ἢ λαμβάνει μὲν δίδωσιν δὲ οὔ.

. .

In regard to oaths, a fourfold division can be made. A man may either both offer and accept an oath, or neither, or one without the other — that is, he may offer an oath but not accept one, or accept an oath but not offer one.

ἔτι ἄλλως (15) παρὰ ταῦτα, εἰ ὀμώμοσται οὗτος ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ἢ ὑπ’ ἐκείνου.

.

There is also the situation that arises when an oath has already been sworn either by himself or by his opponent.

οὐ (16) δίδωσιν μὲν οὖν, ὅτι ῥᾳδίως ἐπιορκοῦσιν, καὶ ὅτι ὁ μὲν ὀμόσας (17) οὐκ ἀποδίδωσιν, τοὺς δὲ μὴ ὀμόσαντος οἴεται καταδικάσειν, (18) καὶ [ὡς] οὗτος ὁ κίνδυνος κρείττων, ὁ ἐν τοῖς δικασταῖς· τοῖς (19) μὲν γὰρ πιστεύει τῷ δ’ οὔ.

. . .

If you refuse to offer an oath, you may argue that men do not hesitate to perjure themselves; and that if your opponent does swear, you lose your money, whereas, if he does not, you think the judges will decide against him; and that the risk of an unfavourable verdict is prefer, able, since you trust the judges and do not trust him.

(15) οὐ λαμβάνει δ’, ὅτι ἀντὶ χρημά(20)των ὅρκος, καὶ ὅτι εἰ ἦν φαῦλος, κατωμόσατο ἄν· κρεῖττον γὰρ (21) ἂν <ἦν> ἕνεκά του φαῦλον εἶναι ἢ μηδενός· ὀμόσας μὲν οὖν ἕξει, (22) μὴ ὀμόσας δ’ οὔ· οὕτως δὲ δι’ ἀρετὴν ἂν εἴη, ἀλλ’ οὐ δι’ ἐπι(23)ορκίαν, τὸ μή. καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ξενοφάνους ἁρμόττει, ὅτι “οὐκ (24) ἴση πρόκλησις αὕτη τἀσεβεῖ πρὸς εὐσεβῆ”, ἀλλ’ ὁμοία καὶ (25) εἰ ἰσχυρὸς ἀσθενῆ πατάξαι ἢ πληγῆναι προκαλέσαιτο.

. . . . . . .

If you refuse to accept an oath, you may argue that an oath is always paid for; that you would of course have taken it if you had been a rascal, since if you are a rascal you had better make something by it, and you would in that case have to swear in order to succeed. Thus your refusal, you argue, must be due to high principle, not to fear of perjury: and you may aptly quote the saying of Xenophanes, ’Tis not fair that he who fears not God should challenge him who doth. It is as if a strong man were to challenge a weakling to strike, or be struck by, him.

εἰ (26) δὲ λαμβάνει, ὅτι πιστεύει αὑτῷ, ἐκείνῳ δ’ οὔ. καὶ τὸ τοῦ (27) Ξενοφάνους μεταστρέψαντα φατέον οὕτως ἴσον εἶναι ἂν ὁ μὲν (28) ἀσεβὴς διδῷ, ὁ δ’ εὐσεβὴς ὀμνύῃ· δεινόν τε τὸ μὴ θέλειν (29) αὐτόν, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐκείνους ἀξιοῖ ὀμόσαντας δικάζειν.

. . .

If you agree to accept an oath, you may argue that you trust yourself but not your opponent; and that (to invert the remark of Xenophanes) the fair thing is for the impious man to offer the oath and for the pious man to accept it; and that it would be monstrous if you yourself were unwilling to accept an oath in a case where you demand that the judges should do so before giving their verdict.

(25) εἰ δὲ (30) δίδωσιν, ὅτι εὐσεβὲς τὸ θέλειν τοῖς θεοῖς ἐπιτρέπειν, καὶ (31) ὅτι οὐδὲν δεῖ αὐτὸν ἄλλων δικαστῶν δεῖσθαι (αὐτοῖς γὰρ (32) δίδωσι κρίσιν), καὶ ὅτι ἄτοπον τὸ μὴ θέλειν ὀμνύναι περὶ (33) ὧν ἄλλους ἀξιοῦσιν ὀμνύναι.

. . .

If you wish to offer an oath, you may argue that piety disposes you to commit the issue to the gods; and that your opponent ought not to want other judges than himself, since you leave the decision with him; and that it is outrageous for your opponents to refuse to swear about this question, when they insist that others should do so.

ἐπεὶ δὲ καθ’ ἕκαστον δῆλον ὅπως (34) λεκτέον, καὶ συνδυαζομένων πῶς λεκτέον δῆλον, οἷον εἰ (35) αὐτὸς μὲν θέλει λαμβάνειν διδόναι δὲ μή, καὶ εἰ δίδωσι (36) μὲν λαμβάνειν δὲ μὴ θέλει, καὶ εἰ λαμβάνειν καὶ διδό (1377b1) ναι θέλει εἴτε μηδέτερον· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀνάγκη (2) συγκεῖσθαι, ὥστε καὶ τοὺς λόγους συγκεῖσθαι ἐκ τῶν (3) εἰρημένων.

. . .

Now that we see how we are to argue in each case separately, we see also how we are to argue when they occur in pairs, namely, when you are willing to accept the oath but not to offer it; to offer it but not to accept it; both to accept and to offer it; or to do neither. These are of course combinations of the cases already mentioned, and so your arguments also must be combinations of the arguments already mentioned.

ἐὰν δὲ ᾖ γεγενημένος ὑφ’ αὑτοῦ καὶ ἐναντίος, (4) ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιορκία· ἑκούσιον γὰρ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὸ δ’ ἐπιορκεῖν (5) ἀδικεῖν ἐστι, τὰ δὲ βίᾳ καὶ ἀπάτῃ ἀκούσια.

. .

If you have already sworn an oath that contradicts your present one, you must argue that it is not perjury, since perjury is a crime, and a crime must be a voluntary action, whereas actions due to the force or fraud of others are involuntary.

ἐνταῦθα οὖν (6) συνακτέον καὶ τὸ ἐπιορκεῖν, ὅτι ἔστι τὸ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἀλλ’ οὐ (7) τῷ στόματι. ἐὰν δὲ τῷ ἀντιδίκῳ ᾖ ὑπεναντίος καὶ ὀμωμοσμένος, (8) ὅτι πάντα ἀναιρεῖ μὴ ἐμμένων οἷς ὤμοσεν· διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο (9) καὶ τοῖς νόμοις χρῶνται ὀμόσαντες. καὶ “ὑμᾶς μὲν ἀξιοῦσιν (10) ἐμμένειν οἷς ὀμόσαντες δικάζετε, αὐτοὶ δὲ οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν”.

. . . .

You must further reason from this that perjury depends on the intention and not on the spoken words. But if it is your opponent who has already sworn an oath that contradicts his present one, you must say that if he does not abide by his oaths he is the enemy of society, and that this is the reason why men take an oath before administering the laws. ’My opponents insist that you, the judges, must abide by the oath you have sworn, and yet they are not abiding by their own oaths.’

(11) καὶ ὅσα ἂν ἄλλα αὔξων τις εἴπειεν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀτέχνων (12) πίστεων εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα.

. .

And there are other arguments which may be used to magnify the importance of the oath. [So much, then, for the ‘non—technical’ modes of persuasion.]

Permanent link

http://www2.hf.uio.no/common/apps/permlink/permlink.php?app=polyglotta&context=ctext&uid=cc2455f7-1d51-11e7-ba66-0050569f23b2

Choose languages

Choose images, etc.

Choose languages

Choose display