Bibliotheca Polyglotta

ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗ

المقالة الأولى من كتاب ارسطوطالس المسمى ريطوريقا أي الخطابة

Aristotelis Rhetorica

RETHORICE ARISTOTELIS PERIPATHETICI

RETHORICORUM ARISTOTELIS

Rhetoric By Aristotle
Translated by W. Rhys Roberts

ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗ Α

المقالة الأولى من كتاب أرسطوطالس المسمى ريطوريقا أي الخطابة

LIBER PRIMUS INCIPIT

BOOK I

(1354a1)1. Ἡ ῥητορική ἐστιν ἀντίστροφος τῇ διαλεκτικῇ· ἀμφότεραι (2) γὰρ περὶ τοιούτων τινῶν εἰσιν ἃ κοινὰ τρόπον τινὰ ἁπάντων (3) ἐστὶ γνωρίζειν καὶ οὐδεμιᾶς ἐπιστήμης ἀφωρισμένης· διὸ καὶ (4) πάντες τρόπον τινὰ μετέχουσιν ἀμφοῖν· πάντες γὰρ μέχρι (5) τινὸς καὶ ἐξετάζειν καὶ ὑπέχειν λόγον καὶ ἀπολογεῖσθαι (6) καὶ κατηγορεῖν ἐγχειροῦσιν.

إن الريطورية ترجع على الديالقطيقية وكلتاهما توجدان من أجل شيء واحد وتشتركان في نحو من الأنحاء وقد توجد معرفتهما لكل إذ ليست واحدة منها علما من العلوم منفردا ولذلك ما توجد جميع العلوم مشاركة لهما في نحو فكل الناس في نحو وحتى الشيء فقط يستعملون الفحص وتقليد الكلام والاعتذار والشكاية فيصدقون

Rethorica quidem conuertitur arti topice et utreque sunt unius rei gratia et communicant in aliquo modorum et inuenitur utrarumque noticia omnibus cum neutra ipsarum sit aliqua scientiarum separatim siue singulariter. Et hinc est quod omnes scientie inueniuntur communicare eis in modo. Averrosd. Ambe enim intendunt unum finem, et est sermo ad alterum. Non enim utitur eis homo ad se ipsum, ut est in demonstratiuis, sed tantum ad alterum, et conueniunt quodam modo in subiecto¹ uno. Ambiunt enim omnia et omnes homines intromittunt se naturaliter de sermonibus topicis et² rhetoricis : neutra ergo harum est separatim et singulariter scientia. Quelibet enim scientia certum et proprium habet subiectum et proprium artificem, et (66ra) quilibet hominum modo aliquo et usquequo utitur rethoricalibus, accusatione uidelicet et defensione, et ceteris que circa particularia existunt. Aristoteles. In sermone deliberatione et commendatione. Omnes igitur homines modo aliquo et usquequo utuntur et accusatione et recusatione³ et aliqualiter attingunt quod intendunt.

1. subiecto PF : facto T. 2. et PF : in T. 3. fort. debemus legere in Hermanni translatione omnes igitur homines modo aliquo et usquequo utuntur in sermone deliberatione et commendatione et accusatione et recusatione

Rethorica est convertibilis dialetice; utreque enim de quibusdam huiusmodi sunt que communia quodam modo omnium est cognoscere et nullius scientie determinate; ideoque et omnes secundum aliquem modum participant utramque; omnes enim usque ad aliquid et perscrutari et percipere sermonem et respondere et accusare argumentantur.

Rethorica assecutiva dialetice est; ambe enim de talibus quibusdam sunt que communiter quodammodo omnium est cognoscere et nullius scientie determinate; propter quod et ornnes modo quodam participant ambabus; omnes enim usque ad aliquid et exquirere et sustinere sermonem et defendere et accusare conantur.

Part 1. Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic. Both alike are concerned with such things as come, more or less, within the general ken of all men and belong to no definite science. Accordingly all men make use, more or less, of both; for to a certain extent all men attempt to discuss statements and to maintain them, to defend themselves and to attack others.

τῶν μὲν οὖν πολλῶν οἱ μὲν εἰκῇ (7) ταῦτα δρῶσιν, οἱ δὲ διὰ συνήθειαν ἀπὸ ἕξεως· ἐπεὶ δ’ ἀμ(8)φοτέρως ἐνδέχεται, δῆλον ὅτι εἴη ἂν αὐτὰ καὶ ὁδῷ ποιεῖν· (9) δι’ ὃ γὰρ ἐπιτυγχάνουσιν οἵ τε διὰ συνήθειαν καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ (10) τοῦ αὐτομάτου τὴν αἰτίαν θεωρεῖν ἐνδέχεται, τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον (11) ἤδη πάντες ἂν ὁμολογήσαιεν τέχνης ἔργον εἶναι.

فمن العامة من يفعل ذلك هملا ومنهم من يفعل ذلك بالاعتياد عن قنية راسخة وإذ كان هذا ممكنا أن يكون من هاتين الجهتين فهو معلوم أن هذا النحو أرشد وأصوب ولذلك قد ينجح الذين يفعلون هذا بالاعتياد والذين يستطيعون أن يبصروا العلة فيه من تلقاء أنفسهم والعلماء مقرّون بأن هذا فعل الصناعة والحذق بها

Quidam ergo uulgarium faciunt hec imperfecte; alii uero ex assuetudine et⁴ habitu stabilito. Cumque sit possibile fieri hec utroque istorum modorum, scitum est quoniam modus hic scilicet sedulus(?) melior est et rectior. Ideo perficiunt qui faciunt hec ex assuetudine ⁵ et qui potentes perspicere causam in hoc per seipsos et communiter conceditur istud esse ex opere artis et peritia ipsius.

4. fort. in Hermanni translatione ab 5. Add. P in margine magis proficiunt

Horum quidem igitur plurium hii quidem vane agunt, hii vero per consuetudinem ab habitu; quoniam autem utrimque contingens sit, palam quod erit utique eadem et declarare; ex eo quod adipiscuntur hii quidem per consuetudinem hii uera subito huius causam conuenit scire, hoc autem omnes utique confitebuntur opus artis esse.

Multorum quidem igitur hii quidem fortuito hec agunt, hii autem propter consuetudinem ab habitu; quoniam autem utroque modo contingit, palam quia erit utique ipsa et dirigere; propter quod enim adipiscuntur et hii propter consuetudinem et hii a casu huius causam considerare contingit, talc autem omnes utique iam confitebuntur artis opus esse.

Ordinary people do this either at random or through practice and from acquired habit. Both ways being possible, the subject can plainly be handled systematically, for it is possible to inquire the reason why some speakers succeed through practice and others spontaneously; and every one will at once agree that such an inquiry is the function of an art.

νῦν μὲν (12) οὖν οἱ τὰς τέχνας τῶν λόγων συντιθέντες οὐδὲν ὡς εἰπεῖν πεπο(13)ρίκασιν αὐτῆς μόριον (οἱ γὰρ πίστεις ἔντεχνόν εἰσι μόνον, τὰ δ’ (14) ἄλλα προσθῆκαι), οἱ δὲ περὶ μὲν ἐνθυμημάτων οὐδὲν λέγου(15)σιν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ σῶμα τῆς πίστεως, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἔξω τοῦ πρά(16)γματος τὰ πλεῖστα πραγματεύονται· διαβολὴ γὰρ καὶ (17) ἔλεος καὶ ὀργὴ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ περὶ τοῦ (18) πράγματός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν δικαστήν· ὥστ’ εἰ περὶ πά(19)σας ἦν τὰς κρίσεις καθάπερ ἐν ἐνίαις γε νῦν ἐστι τῶν πό(20)λεων καὶ μάλιστα ταῖς εὐνομουμέναις, οὐδὲν ἂν εἶχον ὅ τι (21) λέγωσιν· ἅπαντες γὰρ οἱ μὲν οἴονται δεῖν οὕτω τοὺς νόμους (22) ἀγορεύειν, οἱ δὲ καὶ χρῶνται καὶ κωλύουσιν ἔξω τοῦ πρά(23)γματος λέγειν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ, ὀρθῶς τοῦτο (24) νομίζοντες· οὐ γὰρ δεῖ τὸν δικαστὴν διαστρέφειν εἰς ὀργὴν (25) προάγοντας ἢ φθόνον ἢ ἔλεον· ὅμοιον γὰρ κἂν εἴ τις ᾧ (26) μέλλει χρῆσθαι κανόνι, τοῦτον ποιήσειε στρεβλόν.

فأما هؤلاء الذين يؤلفون صناعة الكلام الآن فلم يتخلصوا إلى أن يضعوا لها جزءا أو قسما من الأقسام لأن التصديقات إنما هي أمر صناعي فقط وأما تلك الأخرى فزيادات ولن يقولوا في التفكيرات التي هي عمود التصديق لكنهم قالوا وأكثروا في هذه التي هي خارجة عن الأمر نفسه فإن الخوف والرحمة والغضب وما أشبه ذلك من الآلام المعترية للنفس ليست في الأمر نفسه لكنها نحو الفاحص فلو كانت الريطورية توجد عند جميع الحكام على مثل ما هي عليه الآن في خواص من المدائن وإن قد كن تدبرن تدبيرا حسنا لم يكن لهؤلاء مقال فإن أهل المواضع كلها في ذلك فريقان فمنهم من يرى أنه ينبغي أن يلخص على السنن هذا التلخيص ومنهم من يمتنع ويمنع من ذكر شيء خارج عن الأمر نفسه كما يصنع أهل اريوس فاغوس وذلك صواب من رأي أولئك فلعمري ما ينبغي للفاحص أن يرد على المتكلمين إذا تقدموا فصاروا إلى الغضب أو إلى الخوف أو الرحمة فإن هذا القانون مشبه وإن امرؤ صار إلى استعماله صيّره ذلك لبيبا اريبا

Illi uero qui nunc artem loquendi complectuntur non attingunt⁶ ad hoc partem ei ponerent ante ⁷ aliquam suarum partitionum.⁸ Solum enim fidem facientia⁹ res sunt artificialis, illa autem alia additamenta¹⁰ sunt. Neque ad hec ut loquerentur ¹¹ in enthimematibus que columpna sunt credulitatis, sed ipsi locuti sunt multiplicantes sermonem in his que extranea sunt ad rem ipsam. Nam timor ¹² et modestia et ira et consimiles his anime accidentia passi(66rb)ones non sunt in re ipsa, sed modus ordinantis locutionum ¹³ scrutatoris ¹⁴ uel inquisitoris uel oboratoris. Si ergo inueniatur rethorica apud uniuersos iudices secundum hoc quod nunc est in quibusdam ciuitatum et ille regantur ut qui reguntur regimine decenti, non habebunt illi quid dicant.¹⁵ Omnium autem istorum locorum habitatores in hec bipertiti sunt. Quidam nempe eorum uident quoniam determinandum sit hac determinatione in iudiciis. Alii uero abstinent et prohibent ne fiat mentio cuiuspiam extranei a re ipsa quemadmodum procedunt illi de arbos et agros¹⁶ , et hoc rectum est ex illorum opinione. Per vitam autem xx non oportet scrutatorem redarguere allegantes quoniam antecedunt et inducunt ad iram aut timorem aut modestiam. Canon est enim iste fortassis si quis incedat ad utendum eo reddet elegantis peritie et leporis.

6. attingunt T : contingunt P 7. fortas. in Hermanni uersione : aut (Ar. aw). 8. artificialiter in margine P 9. id est argumenta inter lineas P 10. id est adminicula inter lineas P 11. scilicet attingunt inter lin. P 12. id est pictura sermonis et habitudine proponentis vel respondentis et inclinatione auditorum in marg. P 13. modus ordinantis locutionum P : apud scrutatorem modus T 14. id est ordinationis locutionum in marg. P 15. P add. id est non est aliqua necessitas dicenti illorum 16. arbos et agros P : arbor et agor T

Nunc quidem igitur artes sermonum componentes nullam, ut dicam, attribuerunt eiusdem partem; fides namque artificiale solum, alia vero additiones. hii vero de entimematibus nichil dicunt, quod est corpus fidei, de hiis vero que sunt extra causam maxime negotiantur; impetus enim, misericordia et ira et huiusmodi passiones anime non sunt de causa, sed penes iudicem; quare si circa omnia iudicia essent quemadmodum in quibusdam nunc sunt civitatibus et maxime in bene ordinatis legibus, nichil utique possent quod dicant; omnes enim hii quidem extimant oportere sic leges dicere, alii autem et utuntur et prohibent extra causam dicere, quemadmodum et in Ariopago, recte hoc considerantes; non enim oportet iudicem perverti ad iram tendentem aut timorem aut odium; simile enim si quis canonem quo debet uti, hunc faciat obliquum.

Nunc quidem igitur qui artes sermonum componunt modicam adepti sunt ipsius partem; persuasiones enim sunt solum artificiale, alia autem adiectiones, hii autem de enthymematibus quidem nichil dicunt, quod quidem est corpus persuasionis, de extrinsecis autem rei plurima negotiantur; commotio enim et misericordia et ira et tales passiones anime non sunt de re, sed ad iudicem; quare si circa omnia essent iudicia sicut in quibusdam civitatum nunc est et maxime in bene ordinatis legibus, nichil utique haberent quod dicerent; omnes enim hii quidem putant oportere sic leges promulgare, hii autem et utuntur et prohibent extra rem dicere, sicut et in Ariopago recte hoc putantes; non enim oportet iudicem pervertere ad iram provocantes aut timorem aut inimicitiam; simile enim et si quis qua debet uti regula, hanc faciat distortam.

Now, the framers of the current treatises on rhetoric have constructed but a small portion of that art. The modes of persuasion are the only true constituents of the art: everything else is merely accessory. These writers, however, say nothing about enthymemes, which are the substance of rhetorical persuasion, but deal mainly with non—essentials. The arousing of prejudice, pity, anger, and similar emotions has nothing to do with the essential facts, but is merely a personal appeal to the man who is judging the case. Consequently if the rules for trials which are now laid down in some states — especially in well—governed states — were applied everywhere, such people would have nothing to say. All men, no doubt, think that the laws should prescribe such rules, but some, as in the court of Areopagus, give practical effect to their thoughts and forbid talk about non—essentials. This is sound law and custom. It is not right to pervert the judge by moving him to anger or envy or pity — one might as well warp a carpenter’s rule before using it.

ἔτι δὲ (27) φανερὸν ὅτι τοῦ μὲν ἀμφισβητοῦντος οὐδέν ἐστιν ἔξω τοῦ δεῖξαι (28) τὸ πρᾶγμα ὅτι ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἢ γέγονεν ἢ οὐ γέγονεν· εἰ δὲ (29) μέγα ἢ μικρόν, ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, ὅσα μὴ ὁ νομοθέτης (30) διώρικεν, αὐτὸν δή που τὸν δικαστὴν δεῖ γιγνώσκειν καὶ οὐ (31) μανθάνειν παρὰ τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων.

ثم هو معلوم أن الذي يُري أو يُثبت ¹ ليس له أكثر من أن يثبت أن الأمر موجود أو غير موجود وأنه كان أو لم يكن فأما أن يكون عظيما أو يسيرا أو عدلا أو جورا فإنه ما لم يكن واضع السنة حد وفصل فقد ينبغي للفاحص ألا يقصر في استعلامه واستفهامه من الذي يُري

1. يُرى B and MS read. AB : pace L (?) and GlossGA (yarā). The Greek ἀμφισβητέω – here used about opposing parties in a lawsuit – means both to ”argue against“ and ”argue that“ (LSJ), the Arabic is a hendiadys translation of the latter: ”the one which shows or demonstrates“.

Deinde scitum est quoniam ei qui monstrat aut affirmat non pertinet amplius quam ut rem esse aut fuisse aut non fuisse confirmet. Esse autem eam grandem aut exiguam aut iustam aut iniustam cum non diffiniuit aut distinxit legislator oportet ne sit contentus scrutator¹⁷ quin exigat probatorem ad sciendum hec et (66va) intelligendum ab eo qui monstrat.

17. P in margine : uel inquisitor uel obuiator

Adhuc autem manifestum quoniam quidem questionantis non est extra demonstrare causa quod est aut non est, aut facta aut non facta; si vero parva aut magna, aut iusta aut iniusta, et quecumque legislator non determinavit, oportet utique ipsum quidem iudicem cognoscere et non doceri a questionantibus.

Adhuc autem manifestum quod litigantis quidem nichil est nisi ostendere rem quia est aut non est, aut facta est aut facta non est; si autem magna aut parva, aut iusta aut iniusta, quecumque legislator non determinavit, ipsum utique iudicem oportet cognoscere et non addiscere a litigantibus.

Again, a litigant has clearly nothing to do but to show that the alleged fact is so or is not so, that it has or has not happened. As to whether a thing is important or unimportant, just or unjust, the judge must surely refuse to take his instructions from the litigants: he must decide for himself all such points as the law—giver has not already defined for him.

μάλιστα μὲν οὖν (32) προσήκει τοὺς ὀρθῶς κειμένους νόμους, ὅσα ἐνδέχεται, πάντα (33) διορίζειν αὐτούς, καὶ ὅτι ἐλάχιστα καταλείπειν ἐπὶ τοῖς κρί(34)νουσι, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἕνα λαβεῖν καὶ ὀλίγους ῥᾷον ἢ πολλοὺς (1354b1) εὖ φρονοῦντας καὶ δυναμένους νομοθετεῖν καὶ δικάζειν· ἔπειθ’ (2) αἱ μὲν νομοθεσίαι ἐκ πολλοῦ χρόνου σκεψαμένων γίνονται, (3) αἱ δὲ κρίσεις ἐξ ὑπογυίου, ὥστε χαλεπὸν ἀποδιδόναι τὸ δί(4)καιον καὶ τὸ συμφέρον καλῶς τοὺς κρίνοντας.

وقد ينبغي بزيادة أن تحد السنن المستقيم وضعها وتفوض الأمور اليسيرة إلى الذي يحكم واّول ذلك لاّن وجدان واحد او قليل ايسر من وجدان كثير ذوی صحّة رای وقدرة علی وضع السنن والحكومة وذلك اّن وضع السنن اّنما يكون فی طول الزمان عن رؤية وتثبّت. فاّما الاحكام فتحدث من زمان الی زمان وقد يصعب لذلك ان يفوّض الی الحكّام النظر فی معنى العدل او المنفعة اى هل هو عدل وهل هو نافع

Oportet autem ut affirmant uel determinent hec quarum recta est positio. Res uero faciles et exigue relinquantur industrie iudicis. Primo quidem quoniam inuentio unius aut paucorum facilior est inuentione plurium sane opinionis et potentie in positione legum et sententiarum. Legum namque constitutio exigit longitudinem temporis et firmitudinem consilii et profundationem inuestigationis. Iudicia uero contingunt de tempore in tempus, ideoque graue est ut iudicum commitatur industrie consideratio in re iuris aut [36rc] potioris aut utilitatis.

Maxime quidem igitur decens est ipsas recte statutas leges, quecumque conveniunt, omnia determinare, et quia minima dimittantur indicantibus, primum quidem quod unum aut paucos accipere facilius est qumn multos bene sapientes et patentes legem ferre et iudicare; quoniam autem positiones legum a providentibus multo tempore fiunt, iudicia vera ex recenti, quare difficile est bene iudicantes assignare iustum et conferens.

Maxime quidem igitur convenit recte positas leges, quecu1nquc contingit, omnia determinare ipsas, et quam paucissima committere iudicantibus, primum quidem quia unum habere et paucos facilius qumn multos bene sapientes et patentes leges ferre et iudicare; deinde legislationes quidem ex multo tempore consideratis fiunt, iudicia autem ex suborto; quare difficile assignare iustum et expediens bene iudicantes.

Now, it is of great moment that well—drawn laws should themselves define all the points they possibly can and leave as few as may be to the decision of the judges; and this for several reasons. First, to find one man, or a few men, who are sensible persons and capable of legislating and administering justice is easier than to find a large number. Next, laws are made after long consideration, whereas decisions in the courts are given at short notice, which makes it hard for those who try the case to satisfy the claims of justice and expediency.

τὸ δὲ πάντων (5) μέγιστον, ὅτι ἡ μὲν τοῦ νομοθέτου κρίσις οὐ κατὰ μέ(6)ρος, ἀλλὰ περὶ μελλόντων τε καὶ καθόλου ἐστίν, ὁ δ’ (7) ἐκκλησιαστὴς καὶ δικαστὴς ἤδη περὶ παρόντων καὶ (8) ἀφωρισμένων κρίνουσιν· πρὸς οὓς καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν ἤδη καὶ (9) τὸ μισεῖν καὶ τὸ ἴδιον συμφέρον συνήρτηται πολλάκις, (10) ὥστε μηκέτι δύνασθαι θεωρεῖν ἱκανῶς τὸ ἀληθές, ἀλλ’ (11) ἐπισκοτεῖν τῇ κρίσει τὸ ἴδιον ἡδὺ ἢ λυπηρόν.

واعظم من ذلك كلّه انّ حكم واضع السنّة ليس يجرى فى الأفراد الجزئيّة لكنّه فى الكلّ وفيما هو آت. فامّا رئيس الجمع والحاكم فانّما يحكم فى الأمور الحاضرة المفردة ولهذا تعرض المحبّة والبغضة والسرور والحزن

Et maius hoc toto est quoniam sententia legislatoris non uersatur contra singularia presentia hoc contra uniuersale, et id quod futurum est. Princeps autem collegii alicuius uel unius uersitatis et iudex non iudicat quidem nisi in rebus presentibus singularibus. Et propter has siquidem res accidit amor et odium et gaudium et tristitia.

Et omnium maximum, quia legislatoris iudicium non est particulare, sed de futuris quidem et universali, orator vera et iudex utique de presentibus et determinatis iudicant; apud quos et amare utique et odire et proprium conferens multociens commiscentur propter id quod non possunt inspicere sufficienter verum, sed conturbare iudicio et proprium delectabile aut tristabile.

Omnium autem maximum, quia iudicium quidem legislatoris non secundum partem, sed de futuris et universalibus est, prefectus autem et iudex iam de presentibus et detenninatis iudicant; ad quos et amare iam et odire et proprium commodum adnexa sunt sepe, ut non adhuc possint videre sufficienter verum, sed attendere in iudicio proprium delectabile aut triste.

The weightiest reason of all is that the decision of the lawgiver is not particular but prospective and general, whereas members of the assembly and the jury find it their duty to decide on definite cases brought before them. They will often have allowed themselves to be so much influenced by feelings of friendship or hatred or self—interest that they lose any clear vision of the truth and have their judgement obscured by considerations of personal pleasure or pain.

περὶ μὲν οὖν (12) τῶν ἄλλων, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, δεῖ ὡς ἐλαχίστων ποιεῖν κύ(13)ριον τὸν κριτήν, περὶ δὲ τοῦ γεγονέναι ἢ μὴ γεγονέναι, (14) ἢ ἔσεσθαι ἢ μὴ ἔσεσθαι, ἢ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι, ἀνάγκη ἐπὶ (15) τοῖς κριταῖς καταλείπειν· οὐ γὰρ δυνατὸν ταῦτα τὸν νο(16)μοθέτην προϊδεῖν.

فتلك الأخرى كما ذكرنا ، لانّها يسيرة قد ينبغى ان تجعل فى ملك الحكّام ، اعنى النظر فى الأمر هل هو البتّة ام لا وهل كان ام لم يكن وهل هو كائن ام لا يكون ممّا ينبغى ان يفوّض الى الحكّام لا محالة لاّن واضع السنّة لا يقدر على ان يتقدّم فيعرف هذا ٠

Illa ergo alia que sunt leuia ut diximus oportet ut ponantur in potestate iudicis, scilicet consideratio in re an est aut non est penitus, et an fuit aut non fuit, et an est fiens (66vb) aut non est, de his que oportet commiti industrie iudicis procul dubio, eo quod legislator non potest antecedere et cognoscere istud.

De aliis quidem igitur, sicut diximus, oportet tamquam de minimis facere iudicem principalem, de eo autem quod factum est aut non factum, aut erit aut non erit, aut esse aut non esse, econverso a iudicibus relinquendum est; non enim possibile est legislatorem hec providere.

De aliis quidem igitur, ut diximus, oportet quam paucissimis facere dominum iudicem, de eo autem quod est factum esse aut non factum esse, aut fore aut non fore, aut esse aut non esse, necesse iudicibus committere; non enim possibile hec legislatorem previdere.

In general, then, the judge should, we say, be allowed to decide as few things as possible. But questions as to whether something has happened or has not happened, will be or will not be, is or is not, must of necessity be left to the judge, since the lawgiver cannot foresee them.

εἰ δὲ ταῦθ’ οὕτως ἔχει, φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ (17) ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος τεχνολογοῦσιν ὅσοι τἆλλα διορίζου(18)σιν, οἷον τί δεῖ τὸ προοίμιον ἢ τὴν διήγησιν ἔχειν, καὶ τῶν (19) ἄλλων ἕκαστον μορίων· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἄλλο πρα(20)γματεύονται πλὴν ὅπως τὸν κριτὴν ποιόν τινα ποιήσωσιν, (21) περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐντέχνων πίστεων οὐδὲν δεικνύουσιν, τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν (22) ὅθεν ἄν τις γένοιτο ἐνθυμηματικός.

وإذا كان هذا هكذا فهو معلوم أن الذين يحدون تلك الأخر إنما يخبرون فى صفاتهم عن صفحة الأمر وظاهره كقولهم فيما ينبغى أن يستعد به فى مقدمات الكلام او فى الاقتصاص وسائر الأجزاء الأخر فاّنهم ليس يفيدون بذلك شيئا اكثر من ان يضعوا كيف يصيّرون الحاكم بحال ما. فاّما التصديقات التى تكون بالصناعة فلا يخبرون عنها بشىء وهذه انّما تكون من قبل التفكير.

Cumque hec ita sit notum est quod illi qui diffiniunt partes illas assignant in suis notionibus hoc quod est in superficie et apparentia rei, ut est dictio eorum in eo quod oportet preparari in prohemio orationis aut narratione et ceteris eius partibus. Ipsi enim per hoc nichil amplius acquirere faciunt quam quod notificant qualiter conuertatur iudex ad dispositionem aliquam de credulitatibus uero que fiunt per artem et qualiter fiant non enuntiant quippiam et hoc quidem fit quidem ex parte enthimematum.

Si vero hoc sic se habet, manifestum est quoniam extra causam artificialiter sermocinantur quicumque alia determinant, ut quid oportet prohemium aut narrationem habere, et de aliis quibuslibet partibus (nichil enim aliud in hiis negotiantur nisi ut iudicem qualem quendam faciant), de fide vero artificiali nichil demonstrant, hoc autem est unde utique aliquis fiet entimematicus.

Si itaque hec ita se habent, manifestum quod que extra negotium tegnologizant quicumque alia determinant, puta quid oportet prohemium aut narrationcm habere et aliarum unamquamque partium (nichil enim aliud in ipsis negotiantur nisi quomodo iudicem qualem quendam faciant), de artificialibus autem persuasionibus nichil determinant, hoc autem est, unde utique aliquis fiet enthymematicus.

If this is so, it is evident that any one who lays down rules about other matters, such as what must be the contents of the ‘introduction’ or the ‘narration’ or any of the other divisions of a speech, is theorizing about non—essentials as if they belonged to the art. The only question with which these writers here deal is how to put the judge into a given frame of mind. About the orator’s proper modes of persuasion they have nothing to tell us; nothing, that is, about how to gain skill in enthymemes.

διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς αὐτῆς (23) οὔσης μεθόδου περὶ τὰ δημηγορικὰ καὶ δικανικά, καὶ καλ(24)λίονος καὶ πολιτικωτέρας τῆς δημηγορικῆς πραγματείας (25) οὔσης ἢ τῆς περὶ τὰ συναλλάγματα, περὶ μὲν ἐκείνης οὐδὲν (26) λέγουσι, περὶ δὲ τοῦ δικάζεσθαι πάντες πειρῶνται τεχνολο(27)γεῖν, ὅτι ἧττόν ἐστι πρὸ ἔργου τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος λέγειν (28) ἐν τοῖς δημηγορικοῖς καὶ ἧττόν ἐστι κακοῦργον ἡ δημηγορία (29) δικολογίας, ὅτι κοινότερον. ἐνταῦθα μὲν γὰρ ὁ κριτὴς (30) περὶ οἰκείων κρίνει, ὥστ’ οὐδὲν ἄλλο δεῖ πλὴν ἀποδεῖξαι ὅτι (31) οὕτως ἔχει ὥς φησιν ὁ συμβουλεύων· ἐν δὲ τοῖς δικανικοῖς (32) οὐχ ἱκανὸν τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ πρὸ ἔργου ἐστὶν ἀναλαβεῖν τὸν ἀκροα(33)τήν· περὶ ἀλλοτρίων γὰρ ἡ κρίσις, ὥστε πρὸς τὸ αὑτῶν σκο(34)πούμενοι καὶ πρὸς χάριν ἀκροώμενοι διδόασι τοῖς ἀμφισβη(1355a1)τοῦσιν, ἀλλ’ οὐ κρίνουσιν.

ومن اجل هذا ما يقول على انّ الحيلة او الصناعة فى التفسير و التشاجر واحدة وانّه اذا كان التشاجر فوليطيّا اى مدينيّا فهو خير واشرف مذهبا من التفسير الذى يجرى في الاخذ والاعطاء . فامّا هؤلاء فلم يقولوا فى التفسير شيئا لكنّهم يتكلّفون بتزويق الكلام ان يضعوا الحكم فى كلّ شىء من الأشياء واقتصاص الخارجة من الأمر فى التفسير قبل العمل امر خسيس ٠ ثم التفسير على ذوى الجنايات أخس من كلام العدل فى الحكومة وهو أكثر وأعم فالحاكم هاهنا انّما يحكم فى الأمور الأهليّة فليس يحتاج المثبت الى شىء الكثر من ان يثبت انّ الامر هكذا اى على ما وصفه المشير فامّا فى التشاجر فليس يكتفى بهذا لكن من بوادى العمل فى ذلك ان يتحفّظ الذى ينصت فانّ الحكم هاهنا فى الغريبة ويتأمّل ما يكون منهما فانّهم اذا سمعوا من المتكلّمين قد يسلمون الذى يثبت تبرّعا ولا يستعملون الحكم

Auerroes. Et quoniam nos uidemus enthimemata columnam huius artis esse¹⁸ , credimus orationem rhetoricam que est in contentionibus et litigiis¹⁹ ante iudices et eam que est in deliberationibus uni et eidem arti pertinere, et est ars ista. Illos autem consequemur²⁰ necessario ut²¹ non sit hec ars²² nisi de iudiciali genere cause tantum, nec de hoc toto, sed de uiliore parte ipsius, scilicet de hoc quod forensi strepitu ante tribunal iudicum²³ litigatorie tractatur. De condendis autem legibus et iuribus statuendis²⁴ in nullo profecerunt per ea que conscripserunt²⁵ de hac arte. (67ra) Habere autem usum rerum que quasi extrinsecus aminiculantur ad artem et non earum que intrinsece sunt²⁶ et essentiales arti, illaudabile est. Et propter hoc est quod nos dicimus quoniam ars in deliberatione et in contentione una est. Cum sit contentio legalis id est ciuilis melioris et honoratioris uie quam ars rethoricalis que uersatur contra acceptionem et dationem. Illi itaque non dixerunt in enthimemate quicquam sed conati sunt picturam sermonis ut notificent iudicium in omni rerum et narratio extranei a re in deliberatione ante opus res est uilis. Deinde deliberatio de flagitiosis ²⁷ vilior est sermone juris in judiciis. Et est plus et communior judex quia hic judicat quidem in rebus familiaribus. Et non eget ille qui affirmat aliquo amplius quam ut probet quoniam res sic est prout dixit deliberator. In contentione autem non sufficit istud sed ex principiis operationis in hoc est ut observet [interligne P : vel caveat] is qui animadvertit. Est etenim judicium hoc in rebus extraneis. Et diligenter consideret que sit ab eis. Ipsi enim quando audiunt allegantes interdum favent ²⁸ ei probat vitio/ultimo et non utuntur judicio.

18. huius artis esse P : esse huius artis TF 19. litigiis FP : litigiis cum T 20. consequemur PT : consequimur F 21. ut PT : ubi F 22. hec ars PT : ars F 23. iudicum PT : iudicis F 24. autem legibus et iuribus statuendis om. T 25. conscripserunt PT : scripserunt F 26. que quasi extrinsecus aminiculantur ad artem et non earum que intrinsece sunt P : que quasi extrinsecus aminiculantur ad artem et non earum que intrinsece sunt T : que intrinsece sunt F 27. interligne P : vel sceleratis 28. inter lineas P : vel concedunt

Propter hoc enim eadem disciplina existente circa perorabilia et iudicialia, et existente meliore et civiliore causa perorabili eo quod est circa permutabilia, de illo quidem nichil dicunt, de iudicare autem omnia temptant artificialiter sermocinari, quoniam minus est pre opere ea que sunt extra causam dicere in perorabilibus et minus malum opus est peroratio quam disceptatio, sed communius. Hic quidem iudex de propriis iudicat, quare nichil aliud oportet nisi demonstrare quod ita se habet sicut dixit deliberans; in iudicialibus autem non sufficit hoc, sed pre opere est assumere auditorem; de alienis enim iudicium; quare id quod eorum est intendentes et per gratiam audientes exhibent disceptantibus, sed non iudicant.

Propter hoc enim eadem existente methodo circa contionalia et iudicialia, et pulcriori et magis civili contionali negotio quam id quod circa commutationes, de illo quidem nichil dicunt, de disceptare autem omnia temptant artificialiter disserere, quia minus est pre opere que extra rem dicere in contionalibus et minus est fraudulentum contionatio disceptatione, quia communius. Hie quidem enim iudex de convenientibus iudicat, quare nichil aliud oportet nisi ostendere quod sic habet ut ait consilians; in iudicialibus autem non sufficiens hoc, sed pre opere est per singula captare auditorem; de alienis enim iudicium; quare ad id quod ipsorum intendentes et ad gratiam audientes donant litigantibus, sed non iudicant.

Hence it comes that, although the same systematic principles apply to political as to forensic oratory, and although the former is a nobler business, and fitter for a citizen, than that which concerns the relations of private individuals, these authors say nothing about political oratory, but try, one and all, to write treatises on the way to plead in court. The reason for this is that in political oratory there is less inducement to talk about nonessentials. Political oratory is less given to unscrupulous practices than forensic, because it treats of wider issues. In a political debate the man who is forming a judgement is making a decision about his own vital interests. There is no need, therefore, to prove anything except that the facts are what the supporter of a measure maintains they are. In forensic oratory this is not enough; to conciliate the listener is what pays here. It is other people’s affairs that are to be decided, so that the judges, intent on their own satisfaction and listening with partiality, surrender themselves to the disputants instead of judging between them.

διὸ καὶ πολλαχοῦ, ὥσπερ πρό(2)τερον εἶπον, ὁ νόμος κωλύει λέγειν ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος· ἐκεῖ (3) δ’ αὐτοὶ οἱ κριταὶ τοῦτο τηροῦσιν ἱκανῶς.

ولذلك ما تمنع السنّة في مواضع كثيرة ان يتكلّم بشىء سوى ما فى الكتاب فامّا هناك فانّ الحكّام يبالغون فى التحفّظ

Et ideo prohibet lex in locis pluribus ne allegetur aliquid preter id quod fuerit in [67rb] scripto. Illic autem usque ad ultimum quidem proveniunt in cautela.

Ideo multociens, quemadmodum prius diximus, lex prohibet non dicere extra causam; illic autem ipsi iudices hoc observant sufficienter.

Propter quod in multis locis, sicut et prius diximus, lex prohibet quidem dicere extra rem; ibi autem ipsi iudices hoc servant sufficienter.

Hence in many places, as we have said already, irrelevant speaking is forbidden in the law—courts: in the public assembly those who have to form a judgement are themselves well able to guard against that.

ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερόν (4) ἐστιν ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἔντεχνος μέθοδος περὶ τὰς πίστεις ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ (5) πίστις ἀπόδειξίς τις τότε γὰρ πιστεύομεν μάλιστα ὅταν (6) ἀποδεδεῖχθαι ὑπολάβωμεν), ἔστι δ’ ἀπόδειξις ῥητορικὴ ἐν(7)θύμημα, καὶ ἔστι τοῦτο ὡς εἰπεῖν ἁπλῶς κυριώτατον τῶν πί(8)στεων, τὸ δ’ ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμός τις, περὶ δὲ συλλογισμοῦ (9) ὁμοίως ἅπαντος τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἐστιν ἰδεῖν, ἢ αὐτῆς ὅλης ἢ (10) μέρους τινός, δῆλον ὅτι ὁ μάλιστα τοῦτο δυνάμενος θεω(11)ρεῖν, ἐκ τίνων καὶ πῶς γίνεται συλλογισμός, οὗτος καὶ ἐν(12)θυμηματικὸς ἂν εἴη μάλιστα, προσλαβὼν περὶ ποῖά τέ ἐστι (13) τὸ ἐνθύμημα καὶ τίνας ἔχει διαφορὰς πρὸς τοὺς λογικοὺς (14) συλλογισμούς.

ومن اجل انّه معلوم انّ هذه الحيلة الصناعيّة انّما توجّه نحو التصديقات والتصديق انّما يكون بالتثبت فانّا انّما نقرّ بالشىء اذا ظننا انّه قد يثبت عندنا والتثبيت الريطورىّ هو التفكير لانّ هذا في الجملة هو الأصل المتقدّم للتصديقات. والتفكير شىء من السلجسة والسلجسة قد ترى انّها من الديالقطيقيّة امّا فى الكلّ من هذه الحيلة وامّا فى الجزء فهو واضح بيّن انّ الذي هو بنفسه اقدر على ان ينظر ممّا ومن كم يكون السلوجسموس هو التفكيرىّ بزيادة القادر على التفكير ثمّ الذى يزيد فينظر نحو ماذا يكون التفكير وما الفصول بينه وبين السلوجسمات المنطقيّة

Quoniam autem scitum est quod istud ingenium artificiale rendit quidem ad inducendum credulitates et credulitas quidem fit per probationem. Nos etenim tunc certe assentimus in rem quando putaverimus quod jam probata sit nobis, et probatio rethorica est enthimema, eo quod istud omnino est radix preexistens ad credulitates et enthimema pars est sillogismi. Et sillogismus videtur esse pars dialectice aut in toto hujus ingenii aut in parte : est manifestum et clarum quoniam ille qui per semetipsum potentior est considerare ex quibus et ex quot fit sillogismus. Est plus enthimematicus. Potens inquam enthimematis. Deinde ille qui addit et considerat ad quid sit enthimema et que sit differentia inter ipsum et inter sillogismos logicos, scilicet est pars enthimematicus.

Quoniam autem manifestum est quoniam quidem artificialis methodus circa fidem est, fides autem demonstratio (tunc enim credimus maxime cum demonstratum esse arbitramur), est autem demonstratio rethortica entimerna, et est hoc ut dicam simpliciter magis proprium fidei, entimema vera sillogismus quidam, de sillogismo autern similiter omne dialetice est scire, aut eiusdem omnis aut cuiusdam partis, manifestum quoniam qui maxime hoc potest scire, ex quibus et qualiter fit sillogismus, hie et entimematicus utique erit maxime, opinans circa qualia quedam est entimema et quales habet differentias ad sermocinales sillogismos.

Quoniam autem manifestum est quod artificialis quidem methodus circa persuasiones est, persuasio autem demonstratio (tunc enim credimus maxime quando ostensum esse existimamus), est autem ostensio rethorica enthymema, et est hoc ut est dicere simpliciter principalissimum persuasionum, enthymema autem sillogismus quidam, de sillogismo autem similiter omnis dialetice est videre, aut ipsius totius aut partis alicuius, palam quia qui maxime hoc potest considerare, ex qui bus et quomodo fit sillogismus, iste et enthymematicus utique erit maxime, coassumens circa qualia quedam est enthymema et quas habet differentias ad logicos sillogismos.

It is clear, then, that rhetorical study, in its strict sense, is concerned with the modes of persuasion. Persuasion is clearly a sort of demonstration, since we are most fully persuaded when we consider a thing to have been demonstrated. The orator’s demonstration is an enthymeme, and this is, in general, the most effective of the modes of persuasion. The enthymeme is a sort of syllogism, and the consideration of syllogisms of all kinds, without distinction, is the business of dialectic, either of dialectic as a whole or of one of its branches. It follows plainly, therefore, that he who is best able to see how and from what elements a syllogism is produced, will also be best skilled in the enthymeme, when he has further learnt what its subject—matter is and in what respects it differs from the syllogism of strict logic.

τό τε γὰρ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ἀληθεῖ (15) τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστι δυνάμεως ἰδεῖν, ἅμα δὲ καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι (16) πρὸς τὸ ἀληθὲς πεφύκασιν ἱκανῶς καὶ τὰ πλείω τυγχά(17)νουσι τῆς ἀληθείας· διὸ πρὸς τὰ ἔνδοξα στοχαστικῶς ἔχειν (18) τοῦ ὁμοίως ἔχοντος καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειάν ἐστιν.

فانّ للقوّة الواحدة بعينها ان ترى الحقّ نفسه وما هو شبيه بالحقّ ثمّ الناس مع هذا مهيّئون كلّ التهيئة نحو الحقّ وهم اكثر ذلك يأمّونه ويقصدون قصده والمحمودات قد تدخل فى علم الحقّ من قبل انّها شبيهة به

Etenim potentie unius ejusdem est videre ipsummet verum et quod est simile vero. Deinde homines toto apparatu parati sunt ad verum et sunt plus hoc conantes hec ad ipsum et intendentes eius intentioni. Probabilia autem ingrediuntur [36va] scientiam veri ex hoc quod assimilatur ei.

Verum namque et verisimile eiusdern potentie est scire, simul autem et homines ad verum innati sunt sufficienter et plurimum veritatis adipiscuntur; unde ad opinabilia coniecturaliter se habere similiter habentis se et ad veritatem est.

Verum enim et quod simile vero eiusdem est potentie videre, simul autem et homines ad veritatem apti nati sunt sufficientcr et in pluribus adipiscuntur veritatem; propter quod ad probabilia coniecturahiliter se habere est et ad veritatem similiter se habentis.

The true and the approximately true are apprehended by the same faculty; it may also be noted that men have a sufficient natural instinct for what is true, and usually do arrive at the truth. Hence the man who makes a good guess at truth is likely to make a good guess at probabilities.

(19) ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος οἱ ἄλλοι τεχνολογοῦσι, (20) καὶ διότι μᾶλλον ἀπονενεύκασι πρὸς τὸ δικολογεῖν, φανερόν· (21) χρήσιμος δέ ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορικὴ διά τε τὸ φύσει εἶναι κρείττω (22) τἀληθῆ καὶ τὰ δίκαια τῶν ἐναντίων, ὥστε ἐὰν μὴ κατὰ τὸ (23) προσῆκον αἱ κρίσεις γίγνωνται, ἀνάγκη δι’ αὑτῶν ἡττᾶσθαι, (24) τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν ἄξιον ἐπιτιμήσεως, ἔτι δὲ πρὸς ἐνίους οὐδ’ εἰ τὴν (25) ἀκριβεστάτην ἔχοιμεν ἐπιστήμην, ῥᾴδιον ἀπ’ ἐκείνης πεῖσαι (26) λέγοντας· διδασκαλίας γάρ ἐστιν ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην λόγος, (27) τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, ἀλλ’ ἀνάγκη διὰ τῶν κοινῶν ποιεῖσθαι τὰς (28) πίστεις καὶ τοὺς λόγους, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς ἐλέ(29)γομεν περὶ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐντεύξεως.

فقد استبان اذاً انّ هؤلاء انّما يزخرفون القول فى صفحة الأمر وظاهره وانّهم مالوا بزيادة الى ان ينطقوا بالعدل فقط والريطوريّة ذات غناء ومنفعة لانّ الصادقات العادلات المنفعة افضل فى الطبيعة من اضدادها. ثمّ انّه اذا لم تضبط الأحكام على ما ينبغى فالمرء فيها مغلوب مقهور لا محالة. وهذا امر يستحقّ التأنيب والتوبيخ ثمّ انّ من الناس صنفا ليس ينبغى ان نستعمل فيما بيننا وبينهم العلم الصحيح المستقصى لانّه يسهل علينا ان نقنع المتكلّم من مذهبه وطريقه وذلك انّ الكلام الذى يحمل على العلم المستقصى انّما هو للتعليم وهذا ممّا لا يمكن تكلفه في تلك الحال لكنّه قد نضطرّ الى ان نجعل التصديق والكلام <بـ>ـالمشتركات بيننا وبين المخاطب كالذى وصفنا فى كتاب طوبيقا عند قولنا فيما تلفى به وجوه شتّى

Patet igitur quoniam illi picturant orationem in superficie rei et ejus apparentia. Averroes. Et non [67va] attingunt quod est tamquam constitutivum et essentiale rei, et si putentur per hoc incessisse via recta et justa, et quoniam ipsi declinant amplius ad hoc ut ratiocinentur justum tantum. Rethorica autem utilis est et proficiens eo quod veracia secundum justum meliora sunt suis contrariis. Quando etenim non fiunt judicia contenta secundum quod oportet vincuntur ab hujus rebus necessario, et istud est res que meretur redargutionem et increpationem. Averroes. Rhetorica duas habet utilitates, quarum una est quod instigat cives ad operationes nobiles. Homines enim naturaliter proni sunt ad contrarium operationum justitie . Quando igitur non retinentur per sermones rhetoricos, vincunt eos illicita desideria et operantur contraria operibus justitie. Inquit interpres idem : veritates rerum operandarum pertinentium justitie sequende sunt et respuende falsitates desideriorum illicitorum, et ad has veritates conatur rhetorica et ad redargutiones et increpationes propter opposita. Deinde eo quod aliquis modus hominum contra quos in eo quod est inter nos et ipsos non oportet ut utamur scientia certa exquisita, cum sit facile nobis per[67vb]suadere colloquenti ex sua via et incessa. Sermo enim qui inducitur in scientia exquisita pertinet quidem doctrine et hujus non est possibilis conatus in hac dispositione. Immo constringimur ad hoc ut ponamus persuasiva et sermonem per ea que communia sunt nobis et ei ad quem sermocinamur prout diximus in topicis ubi locuti fuimus de diversis modis obviandi.

Quoniam quidem igitur ea que sunt extra negotium alii artificialiter sermocinantur et propter quid magis diverterunt ad litigandum manifestum; utilis autem est rethorica propter id quod meliora sunt natura vera et iusta contrariis, quare si utique non ad conveniens indicia fiant, necesse per se ipsa diminui, hoc autem dignum est increpatione. Amplius autem apud quosdam non oportet certissimam habere scientiam, facile ab ea persuaderi dicentes; doctrina enim est sermo qui est secundum scientiam, hoc autem impossibile, sed necessarium per communia fieri fidem et sermones, quemadmodum et in Topicis diximus de obviatione ad multos.

Quod quidem igitur que extra rem alii negotiantur, et quia magis diverterunt ad litigare, manifestum; utilis autem est rethorica propterea quod vera et iusta sunt natura meliora contrariis, quare si non secundum conveniens iudicia fiant, necesse per ipsa vinci, hoc autem est dignum increpatione. Adhuc autem ad quosdam neque si certissimam habeamus scientiam, facile ab illa persuadere loquentes; doctrine enim est qui secundum scientiam sermo, hoc autem impossibile, sed necesse per communia fieri persuasiones et orationes, sicut et in Topicis dicebamus de ea que ad multos obviatione.

It has now been shown that the ordinary writers on rhetoric treat of non—essentials; it has also been shown why they have inclined more towards the forensic branch of oratory. Rhetoric is useful (1) because things that are true and things that are just have a natural tendency to prevail over their opposites, so that if the decisions of judges are not what they ought to be, the defeat must be due to the speakers themselves, and they must be blamed accordingly. Moreover, (2) before some audiences not even the possession of the exactest knowledge will make it easy for what we say to produce conviction. For argument based on knowledge implies instruction, and there are people whom one cannot instruct. Here, then, we must use, as our modes of persuasion and argument, notions possessed by everybody, as we observed in the Topics when dealing with the way to handle a popular audience.

ἔτι δὲ τἀναντία (30) δεῖ δύνασθαι πείθειν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς, οὐχ (31) ὅπως ἀμφότερα πράττωμεν (οὐ γὰρ δεῖ τὰ φαῦλα πείθειν), ἀλλ’ (32) ἵνα μὴ λανθάνῃ πῶς ἔχει, καὶ ὅπως ἄλλου χρωμένου τοῖς λόγοις (33) μὴ δικαίως αὐτοὶ λύειν ἔχωμεν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ἄλλων (34) τεχνῶν οὐδεμία τἀναντία συλλογίζεται, ἡ δὲ διαλεκτικὴ (35) καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ μόναι τοῦτο ποιοῦσιν· ὁμοίως γάρ εἰσιν ἀμ(36)φότεραι τῶν ἐναντίων. τὰ μέντοι ὑποκείμενα πράγματα (37) οὐχ ὁμοίως ἔχει, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ τἀληθῆ καὶ τὰ βελτίω τῇ φύσει (38) εὐσυλλογιστότερα καὶ πιθανώτερα ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν.

وقد يمكن الإقناع فى المتضادّين كما يمكن السلجسة فانا قد نقنع على ذى الجناية ليس لنعقد الأمرين جميعا بل لكيلا يخفا علينا المذهب فى ذلك وكيف نستطيع اذا المتكلّم تكلّم بغير العدل ان ننقض عليه فاما سائر الصناعات فليس شىء منها يسلجس فى المتضادين انّما يفعل ذلك الديالقطيقية والريطورية فقط فانهما جميعا متهيئان للمتضادين كليهما بحال واحدة ٠ فاما الأشياء الموضوعة لهما اى الأمور التى فيها يعملان فليست شبيهة بعضها ببعض لكنّها اذا كانت من اللاتى هى اصدق وافضل فى الطبيعة كانت السلجسة والإقناع افضل واشفا.

Et est possibilis persuasio in duobus contrariis sicut possibilis est sillogizatio. Averroes. Pecasse ipsum et non peccasse, sed non hec duo simul, sed modo hoc modo illud. Aristoteles. Nos enim interdum persuademus de flagitioso non ut connectamus utrasque res simul, sed ut non lateat nos via in hac et qualiter possimus quando quis locutus fuerit id quod preter justum est et contradicere ei. At vero nichil reliquarum artium sillogizat duo contraria, sed faciunt hoc quidem ars topica et rethorica tantum. Vtraque enim istarum apta est ad utrumque contrariorum secundum dispositionem unam. Ea vero que subjecta sunt eis, id est res in quas operantur, non sunt consimiles ad se invicem, sed quando fuerint ex eis que veraciora sint et nobiliora in natura erit sillogizatio et persuasio nobilior et sufficientior.

Amplius autem contraria oportet posse persuaderi, quemadmodum et in sillogismis, non quod utraque operamur (non enim oportet mala persuadere), sed quod non lateat nos quomodo se habeant, et qualiter alius utentis non iuste sermones nos ipsi dissolvere possimus. Nulla igitur aliarum artium contraria sillogizat, dialetica vero et rethorica sole hoc faciunt; pariter enim est utraque de contrariis. Subiective autem cause non similiter se habent, sed semper vera et optima natura sillogizabilia et probabilia ut vere dicam.

Adhuc contraria oportet posse persuadere, sicut et in sillogismis, non ut ambo agamus (non enim oportet prava agere), sed ut non lateat qualiter habet, et ut alia utente non iuste orationibus ipsi solvere habeamus. Aliarum quidem igitur artium nulla contraria sillogizat, dialetica autem et rethorica sole hoc faciunt; similiter enim sunt am be contrariorum. Res tamen subiecte non similiter habent, sed semper vera et meliora natura sillogizabiliora et persuasibiliora sunt ut vere est dicere.

Further, (3) we must be able to employ persuasion, just as strict reasoning can be employed, on opposite sides of a question, not in order that we may in practice employ it in both ways (for we must not make people believe what is wrong), but in order that we may see clearly what the facts are, and that, if another man argues unfairly, we on our part may be able to confute him. No other of the arts draws opposite conclusions: dialectic and rhetoric alone do this. Both these arts draw opposite conclusions impartially. Nevertheless, the underlying facts do not lend themselves equally well to the contrary views. No; things that are true and things that are better are, by their nature, practically always easier to prove and easier to believe in.

πρὸς (39) δὲ τούτοις ἄτοπον εἰ τῷ σώματι μὲν αἰσχρὸν μὴ δύνασθαι (1355b1) βοηθεῖν ἑαυτῷ, λόγῳ δ’ οὐκ αἰσχρόν· ὃ μᾶλλον ἴδιόν ἐστιν (2) ἀνθρώπου τῆς τοῦ σώματος χρείας. εἰ δ’ ὅτι μεγάλα βλά(3)ψειεν ἂν ὁ χρώμενος ἀδίκως τῇ τοιαύτῃ δυνάμει τῶν λό(4)γων, τοῦτό γε κοινόν ἐστι κατὰ πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν πλὴν (5) ἀρετῆς, καὶ μάλιστα κατὰ τῶν χρησιμωτάτων, οἷον ἰσχύος (6) ὑγιείας πλούτου στρατηγίας· τούτοις γὰρ ἄν τις ὠφελήσειεν τὰ (7) μέγιστα χρώμενος δικαίως καὶ βλάψειεν ἀδίκως.

ومع هذا فليس جميلا ان يكون قد يقبح بالبدن ان يعجز عن نصرة نفسه ولا يقبح ذلك بالكلام الذى هو اخص بالإنسان من جميع ذوات البدن اعنى ان يعجز ان يضر الضرر العظيم مستعملا بالجور لهذه القوة فى الكلام وهذا شىء يوجد عاما فى جميع الخيرات سوى الفضيلة ولا سيما فى الامور النافعة النفيسة مثل الجلد والصحة واليسار والسلطان فكل هذا ونحوه مما قد ينتفع به المرء المنفعة العظيمة اذا استعمل العدل وكذلك يضر اذا جار.

Et preterea non decet tempore repu[68ra]tari ex parte corporis pigritari a tuitione sui ipsius, et non reputari hoc tempore ex parte sermonis qui est magis proprius homini omnibus instrumentis corporalibus, videlicet pigritari ab illatione dampnii eximii usitando circa injuriam hac potentia in sermone, et istud est res que invenitur communiter in omnibus bonis preter quam in virtute, et precipue in rebus utilibus pretiosis ut robore et sanitate et opibus et potestate. Omnia ergo hec et hujusmodi magnam conferunt viro utilitatem in utendo justitia et similiter nocet per hoc in injuriando.

Adhuc autem inconveniens si quidem malum est non posse iuvare ipso corpore, sermone vero non malum, quod magis proprium est hominis iuvamento corporis. Si vero quoniam maxime leserit utique utens iniuste eadem potentia sermonum, hoc autem commune est secundum omnia bona preter virtutem, et maxime optima, ut fortitudinem sanitatem divitias militiam; hiis enim si quis iuverit maxime utens iuste et leserit iniuste.

Ad hec autem inconveniens si corpore quidem non posse adiuvare se ipsum sit turpe, oratione autem non turpe, quod magis proprium est hominis corporis oportunitate. Si antem quam magna nocebit utique qui utitur iniuste tali potentia orationum, hoc et commune est de omnibus bonis exceptis virtutibus, et maxime de oportunissimis, puta robore, sanitate, divitiis, militia; talibus enim utique quis proderit rnaxime utens iuste et nocebit iniuste.

Again, (4) it is absurd to hold that a man ought to be ashamed of being unable to defend himself with his limbs, but not of being unable to defend himself with speech and reason, when the use of rational speech is more distinctive of a human being than the use of his limbs. And if it be objected that one who uses such power of speech unjustly might do great harm, that is a charge which may be made in common against all good things except virtue, and above all against the things that are most useful, as strength, health, wealth, generalship. A man can confer the greatest of benefits by a right use of these, and inflict the greatest of injuries by using them wrongly.

(8) ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν οὐθενός τινος γένους ἀφωρισμένου (9) ἡ ῥητορική, ἀλλὰ καθάπερ ἡ διαλεκτική, καὶ ὅτι χρήσιμος, φα(10)νερόν, καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ πεῖσαι ἔργον αὐτῆς, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἰδεῖν τὰ ὑπάρ(11)χοντα πιθανὰ περὶ ἕκαστον, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις (12) τέχναις πάσαις (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἰατρικῆς τὸ ὑγιᾶ ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ (13) μέχρι οὗ ἐνδέχεται, μέχρι τούτου προαγαγεῖν· ἔστιν γὰρ καὶ (14) τοὺς ἀδυνάτους μεταλαβεῖν ὑγιείας ὅμως θεραπεῦσαι καλῶς)· (15) πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὅτι τῆς αὐτῆς τό τε πιθανὸν καὶ τὸ φαινό(16)μενον ἰδεῖν πιθανόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς συλλο(17)γισμόν τε καὶ φαινόμενον συλλογισμόν· ἡ γὰρ σοφιστικὴ (18) οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει ἀλλ’ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει· πλὴν ἐνταῦθα μὲν (19) ἔσται ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ὁ δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν (20) ῥήτωρ, ἐκεῖ δὲ σοφιστὴς μὲν κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν, διαλεκτι(21)κὸς δὲ οὐ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν.

فقد استبان اذا ان الريطورية ليست جنسا لشيء واحد مفرد لكنها بمنزلة الديالقطيقية وانها جد نافعة وانه ليس عملها ان تقنع لكن ان تعرف المقنعات في كل امر من الامور كما يوجد في صناعات اخر فان الطب ايضا ليس عمله ان يؤتى الشفاء لكن ان يبلغ من ذلك حيث يستطاع ان يبلغ وقد يشترك الضعفاء ايضا في الشفاء ولكن الشفاء بالصواب الصناعة ثم في الريطورية ايضا مقنع وما يرى مقنعا كمثل ما الديالقطيقية مسلجس وما يُرى مسلجسا فاما السوفسطي فليس بالقوة يكون سوفسطيا لكن بالمشيئة. فليكن الريطوريون هاهنا اما بعض فمن جهة العلم واما بعض فمن جهة المشيئة. فأما هناك فالسوفسطي من جهة المشيئة وأما الديالقطيقي فليس من جهة المشيئة لكن من جهة القوة

Iam ergo patuit quoniam rethorica non est alicujus unius generis singularis sed quoniam est ad modum dialectice, et quoniam ipsa est utilis valde, et quoniam opus ejus non est ut persuadeat sed ut doceat persuasione in qualibet rerum, quemadmodum invenitur in aliis artibus. Neque enim opus est medicine ut compleat medicationem, sed ut pertingat in hoc usque potest perveniri. Et jam quoque participant medicationem etiam imperfecti vel debiles, verumptamen medicatio secundum rectitudinem artis est. Deinde in rethorica quidem etiam est persuasivum et quod videtur persuasivum, prout est in disputativa quod est sillo[68rb]gizans et quod videtur sillogizans. Sophistica vero non est secundum facilitatem soph[36vb]istica sed secundum voluntatem. Sit igitur quidem hic rethorice quiddam ex parte scientie et quiddam ex parte voluntatis. Illic autem sophicus quidem ex parte voluntatis disputativa vero non ex parte voluntatis at ex parte facultatis.

Quoniam quidem igitur rethorica non sit alicuius generis determinati, sed quemadmodum dialetica, et quoniam utilis, manifestum est, et quod non est opus ipsius probare, sed scire que sunt probabilia circa unumquodque, sicut et in aliis artibus (non enim est medicine sanitatem facere, sed quousque contingit, usque ad hoc ducere; est enim et impossibiles assumere sanitatem tamen curare bene), adhuc autem quod eiusdem est scire probabile et apparens probabile scire, quemadmodum et in dialetica sillogismum quidem et apparentem sillogismum; sophistica enim non in potentia, sed in voluntate est; verum hic est hic quidem secundum scientiam, hic vero secundum voluntatem rethor, illic vero sophista quidem secundum voluntatem, dialeticus autem non secundum voluntatem, sed secundum potentiam.

Quod quidem igitur non est neque unius alicuius generis determinati rethorica, sed quemadmodum dialetica, et quia utilis, manifestum, et quod non est opus ipsius persuadere, sed videre existentia persuasibilia circa unumquodque, sicut et in aliis artibus (non enim est rnedicinalis sanitates efficere, sed usque quo contingit usque ad hoc perducere; est enim et eos qui non possunt recipere sanitatem tamen medicari bene), ad hec autem quod eiusdem persuasibile videre et apparens persuasibile, sicut et in dialetica sillogismum et apparentem sillogismum; sophistica enim non in potentia, sed in electione est; verumptamen hic erit iste quidem secundum scientiam, ille autem secundum electionem rethor, ibi autem sophysta quidem secundum electionem, dialeticus autem non secundum electionem, sed secundum potentiam.

It is clear, then, that rhetoric is not bound up with a single definite class of subjects, but is as universal as dialectic; it is clear, also, that it is useful. It is clear, further, that its function is not simply to succeed in persuading, but rather to discover the means of coming as near such success as the circumstances of each particular case allow. In this it resembles all other arts. For example, it is not the function of medicine simply to make a man quite healthy, but to put him as far as may be on the road to health; it is possible to give excellent treatment even to those who can never enjoy sound health. Furthermore, it is plain that it is the function of one and the same art to discern the real and the apparent means of persuasion, just as it is the function of dialectic to discern the real and the apparent syllogism. What makes a man a ‘sophist’ is not his faculty, but his moral purpose. In rhetoric, however, the term ‘rhetorician’ may describe either the speaker’s knowledge of the art, or his moral purpose. In dialectic it is different: a man is a ‘sophist’ because he has a certain kind of moral purpose, a ‘dialectician’ in respect, not of his moral purpose, but of his faculty.

(22) περὶ δὲ αὐτῆς ἤδη τῆς μεθόδου πειρώμεθα λέγειν, πῶς τε καὶ (23) ἐκ τίνων δυνησόμεθα τυγχάνειν τῶν προκειμένων. πάλιν οὖν (24) οἷον ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς ὁρισάμενοι αὐτὴν τίς ἐστι, λέγωμεν τὰ λοιπά.

فللقول في هذه الحيلة ² قصدنا من أول هذا الكلام وأن نخبر أى وكيف نستطيع أن نصيب بها الأمور المطلوبة غير انا حين نعود فنستانف القول كالابتدا نبدا فنحد هذه الحيلة ³ ونخبر ما هى ونحو ماذا ثُم نخبر عن سائر تلك الاخر

2. الحيلة em. L : الجمله MS 3. الحيلة em. L : الجمله MS

Dicere ergo de hoc ingenio intendimus a principio hujus sermonis et determinare quomodo aut qualiter possimus invenire per ipsum res quesitas. Revertamur igitur quasi resumentes a principio et diffinimus istud ingenium dicentes quid est et ad quid est, deinde pronuntiabimus de illis residuis.

De ipsa autem scientia temptemus dicere, quomodo et ex quibus possimus invenire subiecta. Rursus igitur sicut a principio determinantes ipsam quid est, dicimus autem reliqua.

De ipsa autem iam methodo temptemus dicere, qualiterque et ex quibus poterimus adipisci proposita. Rursum igitur velut a principio diffinientes ipsam que est, dicamus reliqua.

Let us now try to give some account of the systematic principles of Rhetoric itself — of the right method and means of succeeding in the object we set before us. We must make as it were a fresh start, and before going further define what rhetoric is.

2. (25) Ἔστω δὴ ἡ ῥητορικὴ δύναμις περὶ ἕκαστον τοῦ θεωρῆσαι (26) τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν.

فالريطورية قوة تتكلف الإقناع الممكن في كل واحد من الأمور المفردة

.

Est autem rethorica potentia circa unumquodque ad sciendum conveniens probabile.

Est itaque rethorica potentia circa unumquodque considerandi contingens persuasibile.

Part 2. Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion.

τοῦτο γὰρ οὐδεμιᾶς ἑτέρας ἐστὶ (27) τέχνης ἔργον· τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων ἑκάστη περὶ τὸ αὑτῇ ὑπο(28)κείμενόν ἐστιν διδασκαλικὴ καὶ πειστική, οἷον ἰατρικὴ περὶ (29) ὑγιεινῶν καὶ νοσερῶν, καὶ γεωμετρία περὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα (30) πάθη τοῖς μεγέθεσι, καὶ ἀριθμητικὴ περὶ ἀριθμῶν, ὁμοίως δὲ (31) καὶ αἱ λοιπαὶ τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν· ἡ δὲ ῥητορικὴ (32) περὶ τοῦ δοθέντος ὡς εἰπεῖν δοκεῖ δύνασθαι θεωρεῖν τὸ πιθα(33)νόν, διὸ καί φαμεν αὐτὴν οὐ περί τι γένος ἴδιον ἀφωρισμέ(34)νον ἔχειν τὸ τεχνικόν.

وهذا ليس عمل شى من الصناعات الأخرى لان تلك الاخر انما تكون كل واحد منها معلمة ومقنعة فى الامور تحتها فالطب يعلم ويقنع فى انواع الصحة والمرض والهندسة فى الاشكال التى تحدث فى الاجسام و الحساب في ضروب الاعداد وكذلك سائر الصناعات والعلوم الاخر فأما الريطورية فقد يظن أنها هي التي تتكلف الإقناع في الأمر يعرض كائنا ما كان ولذلك ما لا ننتسبها ⁴ إلى جنس أصلي منفرد حتى تكون لها تلك الصناعة خاصة

4. ننتَسبها MS read. AB : ننسبها MS read. B : ينسب بها em. L.

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Hoc enim nullius alterius artis est opus; unaqueque enim aliarum artium de proprio subiecto est docibilis et credibilis ut medicina circa sana et egra, et geometria circa passiones accidentes magnitudinibus, arismetica circa numeros, similiter autem et relique artium et scientiarum; rethorica vero circa traditum ut dicam videtur posse videre probabile; ideoque diximus ipsam non circa genus proprium determinatum habere artificiale.

Hoc enim nullius alterius artis opus est; aliarum enim unaqueque circa suum subiectum est doctrinativa et fidemfactiva, puta medicinalis de sanis et egris, et geometria circa passiones accidentes magnitudinibus, et arithmetica circa numerum, similiter autem et relique artium et scientiarum; rethorica autem de data ut est dicere videtur posse considerare persuasibile, propter quod et dicimus ipsam non circa aliquod genus proprium determinatum habere artificialitatem.

This is not a function of any other art. Every other art can instruct or persuade about its own particular subject—matter; for instance, medicine about what is healthy and unhealthy, geometry about the properties of magnitudes, arithmetic about numbers, and the same is true of the other arts and sciences. But rhetoric we look upon as the power of observing the means of persuasion on almost any subject presented to us; and that is why we say that, in its technical character, it is not concerned with any special or definite class of subjects.

(35) τῶν δὲ πίστεων αἱ μὲν ἄτεχνοί εἰσιν αἱ δ’ ἔντεχνοι. ἄτεχνα (36) δὲ λέγω ὅσα μὴ δι’ ἡμῶν πεπόρισται ἀλλὰ προϋπῆρχεν, οἷον (37) μάρτυρες βάσανοι συγγραφαὶ καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἔντεχνα δὲ (38) ὅσα διὰ τῆς μεθόδου καὶ δι’ ἡμῶν κατασκευασθῆναι δυνατόν, (39) ὥστε δεῖ τούτων τοῖς μὲν χρήσασθαι, τὰ δὲ εὑρεῖν.

فأما التصديقات فمنها بصناعة ومنها بغير صناعة وقد أعني باللاتي ⁵ بغير صناعة تلك اللاتي ⁶ ليست تكون بحيلة منا لكن بأمور متقدمة كمثل الشهود والعذاب والكتب والصكاك وما أشبه ذلك وأما اللاتي بالصناعة فما أمكن إعداده وتثبيته على ما ينبغي بالحيلة وبأنفسنا فمن هذه الآن ما ينبغي أن يستعمل استعمالا ومنها ما ينبغي أن يستخرج استخراجا

5. بالاتى MS 6. الاتى MS

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Fidei vero hec quidem est inartificialis, hec vero artificialis. Inartificialia dico quecumque non per nos inveniuntur, sed ante fuerunt, ut testes tormenta conscripture et quot huiusmodi, artificiales vero quecumque per scientiam et per nos construi possibile, quare oportet horum hiis quidem uti, hcc autem invenire.

Persuasionum autem hee quidem inartificiales sunt, hee autem artificiales. Inartificialia autem dico quecumque non per nos acquisita sunt, sed preextiterunt, ut puta testes extorta conscriptiones et quecumque talia, artificialia autem quecumque per methodum et per nos effici possibile est; quare oportet horum hiis quidem uti, hec autem invenire.

Of the modes of persuasion some belong strictly to the art of rhetoric and some do not. By the latter I mean such things as are not supplied by the speaker but are there at the outset—witnesses, evidence given under torture, written contracts, and so on. By the former I mean such as we can ourselves construct by means of the principles of rhetoric. The one kind has merely to be used, the other has to be invented.

(1356a1) τῶν δὲ διὰ τοῦ λόγου ποριζομένων πίστεων τρία εἴδη (2) ἔστιν· αἱ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἐν τῷ ἤθει τοῦ λέγοντος, αἱ δὲ (3) ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατὴν διαθεῖναί πως, αἱ δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ (4) λόγῳ διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι ἢ φαίνεσθαι δεικνύναι. διὰ μὲν (5) οὖν τοῦ ἤθους, ὅταν οὕτω λεχθῇ ὁ λόγος ὥστε ἀξιό(6)πιστον ποιῆσαι τὸν λέγοντα· τοῖς γὰρ ἐπιεικέσι πιστεύομεν (7) μᾶλλον καὶ θᾶττον, περὶ πάντων μὲν ἁπλῶς, ἐν οἷς δὲ τὸ (8) ἀκριβὲς μὴ ἔστιν ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀμφιδοξεῖν, καὶ παντελῶς.

فأما التصديقات التي يحتال لها بالكلام فإنها أنواع ثلاثة فمنها ما يكون بكيفية المتكلم وسمته ⁷ ومنها ما يكون بتهيئة للسامع واستدراجه نحو الأمر ومنها ما يكون بالكلام نفسه قبل التثبيت فأما بالكيفية والسمت فأن يكون الكلام بنحو يجعل المتكلم أهلا أن يصدق ويقبل قوله والصالحون هم المصدقون سريعا بالأكثر في جميع الأمور الظاهرة فأما التي ليس فيها أمر قاطع ولكن وقوف بين ظنين

7. المتكلم وسمته MS read. AB pace B and L

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Fidei autem per sermones procedentis tres species sunt; hec quidem sunt in consuetudine sermonis, hec vero in disponendo auditorem qualiter, hec vero in ipso sermone propter demonstrare aut apparere demonstrare. Per consuetudinem quidem, quando utique sic dicitur sermo quod dicentem faciat fide dignum; modestis namque credimus magis et minus, de omnibus quidem manifeste, in quibus vero certum non est sed utrumlibet opinari, et omnino.

Earum autem que per orationem acquiruntur fidierum tres species sunt; hec quidem enim sunt in more loquentis, hec autem in eo quod est auditorem disponi aliqualiter, hee vera in ipsa oratione per hoc quod ostendit aut videtur ostendere. Per morem quidem, cum sic dicatur oratio ut faciat dicentem dignum fide; modestis enim credimus magis et celerius, de omnibus quidem simpliciter, in quibus autem certitudo non est, sed utrimque opinari, et penitus.

Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word there are three kinds. The first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker; the second on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind; the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself. Persuasion is achieved by the speaker’s personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible. We believe good men more fully and more readily than others: this is true generally whatever the question is, and absolutely true where exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided.

δεῖ (9) δὲ καὶ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν διὰ τοῦ λόγου, ἀλλὰ μὴ διὰ τοῦ (10) προδεδοξάσθαι ποιόν τινα εἶναι τὸν λέγοντα· οὐ γάρ, ὥσπερ (11) ἔνιοι τῶν τεχνολογούντων τιθέασιν ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ καὶ τὴν ἐπι(12)είκειαν τοῦ λέγοντος, ὡς οὐδὲν συμβαλλομένην πρὸς τὸ πιθα(13)νόν, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν κυριωτάτην ἔχει πίστιν τὸ ἦθος.

فإن هذا النحو أيضا مما ينبغي أن يكون تثبيته بالكلام لا بما ذكرنا آنفا من كيفية المتكلم وسمته غير أنه ليس كما ظن أناس من الحذاق بالكلام حين أضافوا الأناة إلى باب التشجع كأنه لا غناء فيها عند الإقناع بل الكيفية والسمت قريب من أن يكون له التصديق بالحقيقة

. . .

Oportet autem et hoc contingere per sermonem, sed propter hoc quod non existimamus prius qualem esse quendam dicentem; non enim, quemadmodum quidam sermocinantium artificialiter apposuerunt in arte modestiam dicentis, sicut non proficientem ad probabile, sed fere ut dicam magis propriam habet fidem consuetudo.

Oportet autem et hoc accidere non per orationem, sed propter preopinari qualem quendam esse dicentem; non enim sicut quidam orationum artem tradentium apponunt in arte modestiam dicentis, tamquam nichil conferentem ad persuasibilitatem, sed fere ut est dicere principalissimam habet fidem mos.

This kind of persuasion, like the others, should be achieved by what the speaker says, not by what people think of his character before he begins to speak. It is not true, as some writers assume in their treatises on rhetoric, that the personal goodness revealed by the speaker contributes nothing to his power of persuasion; on the contrary, his character may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion he possesses.

(14) διὰ δὲ τῶν ἀκροατῶν, ὅταν εἰς πάθος ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου προ(15)αχθῶσιν· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀποδίδομεν τὰς κρίσεις λυπούμενοι (16) καὶ χαίροντες, ἢ φιλοῦντες καὶ μισοῦντες· πρὸς ὃ καὶ μόνον (17) πειρᾶσθαί φαμεν πραγματεύεσθαι τοὺς νῦν τεχνολογοῦντας. (18) περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων δηλωθήσεται καθ’ ἕκαστον, ὅταν περὶ τῶν (19) παθῶν λέγωμεν,

وأما بتهيئة السامع فحين يستميله الكلام إلى شيء من الآلام المعترية فإنه ليس إعطاؤنا الأحكام في حال الفرح والحزن ومع المحبة والبغضة سواء ذلك هو الذى نزعم أن هؤلاء الحذاق بالكلام قصدوا له فقط بالمشيئة والحيلة ونحن مبينون عن هذه المعاني شيئا شيئا عند قولنا في الآلام المعترية

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Per auditores autem, cum utique ad passionem a sermone deferuntur; non enim similiter tradimus indicia tristabiles et gaudentes, aut amantes et odientes; ad quod et solum, [et] dicimus, nituntur negotiari artificialiter sermocinantes. De hiis igitur explanabitur unumquodque, cum de passionibus dicemus;

Per auditores autem, cum in passionem per orationem perducti fuerint; non enim similiter reddimus iudicia tristes et gaudentes, vel amantes et odientes; ad quod et solum dicimus eos qui orationum artem tradiderunt temptasse negotiari. De hiis quidem igitur declarabitur secundum unumquodque, quando de passionibus dicemus;

Secondly, persuasion may come through the hearers, when the speech stirs their emotions. Our judgements when we are pleased and friendly are not the same as when we are pained and hostile. It is towards producing these effects, as we maintain, that present—day writers on rhetoric direct the whole of their efforts. This subject shall be treated in detail when we come to speak of the emotions.

διὰ δὲ τοῦ λόγου πιστεύουσιν, ὅταν ἀληθὲς (20) ἢ φαινόμενον δείξωμεν ἐκ τῶν περὶ ἕκαστα πιθανῶν. (20) ἐπεὶ (21) δ’ αἱ πίστεις διὰ τούτων εἰσί, φανερὸν ὅτι ταύτας ἐστὶ λαβεῖν (22) τοῦ συλλογίσασθαι δυναμένου καὶ τοῦ θεωρῆσαι περὶ τὰ (23) ἤθη καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τρίτον [τοῦ] περὶ τὰ πάθη, τί τε (24) ἕκαστόν ἐστιν τῶν παθῶν καὶ ποῖόν τι, καὶ ἐκ τίνων ἐγγίνεται (25) καὶ πῶς, ὥστε συμβαίνει τὴν ῥητορικὴν οἷον παραφυές τι (26) τῆς διαλεκτικῆς εἶναι καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἤθη πραγματείας, ἣν (27) δίκαιόν ἐστι προσαγορεύειν πολιτικήν. διὸ καὶ ὑποδύεται (28) ὑπὸ τὸ σχῆμα τὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς ἡ ῥητορικὴ καὶ οἱ ἀντι(29)ποιούμενοι ταύτης τὰ μὲν δι’ ἀπαιδευσίαν, τὰ δὲ δι’ ἀλαζο(30)νείαν, τὰ δὲ καὶ δι’ ἄλλας αἰτίας ἀνθρωπικάς· ἔστι γὰρ μόριόν (31) τι τῆς διαλεκτικῆς καὶ ὁμοίωμα, καθάπερ καὶ ἀρχόμενοι εἴπομεν· (32) περὶ οὐδενὸς γὰρ ὡρισμένου οὐδετέρα αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη (33) πῶς ἔχει, ἀλλὰ δυνάμεις τινὲς τοῦ πορίσαι λόγους.

وأما ما يكون من التصديق من قبل الكلام نفسه فحين نثبت حقا أو ما يرى حقا من الإقناعات فى الأمور المفردة وإذ كانت التصديقات تكون بهذه الوجوه فهو معلوم أنه إنما يقدر على تناول هذه الذى يستطيع ان يفعل السلجسة والذى يبصر مذاهب الأخلاق والفضائل والثالثة معرفة الآلام وذلك أن يعرف كل واحد من الآلام ما هو وأى شيء وممَ يكون وكيف يكون فقد يعرض للريطورية أن تكون بمنزلة التركيب من الديالقطيقية والصناعة الخليقية التى قد تستحق أن تسمى الفوليطية فإن الريطورية قد تدخل فى شكل الفوليطية وقد يعلقها الذين علقوها أما بعض فمن عدم الأدب وأما بعض فمن الخيلاء والأبهة مع علل أخرى إنسية فهي كما وصفنا فى مبتدأ قولنا جزء من الديالقطيقية وشبيهة بها من قبل أنها فى الكل فأما فى شيء واحد محدود كالعلم المحيط بكمية ما هو عليه فليست واحدة منهما كذلك لكن قوة تتلطف للكلام

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per sermones quidem credunt, quando utique verum aut apparens demonstrabimus [et] ex probabilibus circa unumquodque. Cum autem fides per hec sint, palam quoniam hec tria est accipere habendi potentiam sillogizandi et sciendi que sunt circa consuetudines et virtutes et tertium que circa passiones, quid autem sit quelibet passionum et quale quid, et ex quibus fiunt et quomodo, sicut contingit rethoricam tamquam innatam partem quandam dialetice esse et negotii quod est circa consuetudinem, quam iustum est appellare civilem. Ideoque induitur rethorica habitum eius que est civilis et qui contradicunt hanc hec quidem per ignorantiam, hec quidem per superbiam, hec autem et per alias causas humanas; est enim pars quedam dialetice et similis, quemadmodum et incipientes diximus; nullius enim determinati neutra istarum scientia quomodo se habet, sed paten tie quedam habundandi sermonibus.

per orationes autem credimus, quando verum aut apparens ostenderimus ex probabilibus circa singula. Quoniam autem persuasiones per hec sunt, manifestum quod hec tria est accipere eius qui sillogizare potest et considerare que circa mores et virtutes et tertio que circa passiones, quid sit unaqueque passionum et quale quid, et ex quibus fiat et quomodo; quare accidit rethoricam velut adnatam partem quandam dialetice esse et negotii quod circa mores, quod iustum est appellare politicum. Propter quod et induit figuram politice rethorica et contrafacti huius quantum ad hec quidem propter ineruditionem, et quantum ad alia propter iactantiam, quantum ad alia vero et propter alias causas humanas; est enim pars quedam dialetice et similis, sicut et incipientes diximus; de nullo enim determinato neutra harum est scientia qualiter habet, sed quedam potentie optinendi orationes.

Thirdly, persuasion is effected through the speech itself when we have proved a truth or an apparent truth by means of the persuasive arguments suitable to the case in question. There are, then, these three means of effecting persuasion. The man who is to be in command of them must, it is clear, be able (1) to reason logically, (2) to understand human character and goodness in their various forms, and (3) to understand the emotions — that is, to name them and describe them, to know their causes and the way in which they are excited. It thus appears that rhetoric is an offshoot of dialectic and also of ethical studies. Ethical studies may fairly be called political; and for this reason rhetoric masquerades as political science, and the professors of it as political experts — sometimes from want of education, sometimes from ostentation, sometimes owing to other human failings. As a matter of fact, it is a branch of dialectic and similar to it, as we said at the outset. Neither rhetoric nor dialectic is the scientific study of any one separate subject: both are faculties for providing arguments.

(34) περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτῶν, καὶ πῶς ἔχουσι (35) πρὸς ἀλλήλας, εἴρηται σχεδὸν ἱκανῶς· τῶν δὲ διὰ τοῦ δει(36)κνύναι ἢ φαίνεσθαι δεικνύναι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς δια(1356b1)λεκτικοῖς τὸ μὲν ἐπαγωγή ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ συλλογισμός, τὸ δὲ (2) φαινόμενος συλλογισμός, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ὁμοίως· ἔστιν γὰρ τὸ μὲν (3) παράδειγμα ἐπαγωγή, τὸ δ’ ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμός, τὸ δὲ φαι(4)νόμενον ἐνθύμημα φαινόμενος συλλογισμός.

أما فى قوتهن ومنزلة إحداهن من الأخرى فقد قلنا بالقرب قولا كافيا ونحن قائلون الآن في التثبيت وما يرى تثبيتا فالتثبيت كما هو في الديالقطيقية منه الايفاغوغي وهو الاعتبار ومنه ما يرى اعتبارا ومنه السلجسة ومنه ما يرى سلجسة وبهذه الحال يوجد هاهنا أيضا فان البرهان شيء من الاعتبار والتفكير شيء من السلجسة والتفكير الذي يرى سلجسة ترى

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De potentia quidem igitur ipsarum, et qualiter se habeant ad invicem, dictum est fere sufficienter; eorum vero que sunt per demonstrare aut apparere demonstrate, sicut et in dialeticis hoc quidem inductio est, hoc vera sillogismus, aliud autem apparens sillogismus, et hie similiter;

De potentia quidem igitur ipsarum, et quomodo habent ad invicem, dictum est fere sufficienter. Earum autem que per ostendere aut apparere ostendere, sicut et in dialeticis hoc quidem inductio est, hoc autem sillogismus, est enim exemplum quidem inductio, enthymema autem sillogismus.

This is perhaps a sufficient account of their scope and of how they are related to each other. With regard to the persuasion achieved by proof or apparent proof: just as in dialectic there is induction on the one hand and syllogism or apparent syllogism on the other, so it is in rhetoric. The example is an induction, the enthymeme is a syllogism, and the apparent enthymeme is an apparent syllogism.

καλῶ δ’ ἐνθύ(5)μημα μὲν ῥητορικὸν συλλογισμόν, παράδειγμα δὲ ἐπαγωγὴν (6) ῥητορικήν.

و قد أعني بالتفكير السلوجسموس الريطوري و البرهان الاعتبار الريطوري

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Voco enim entimema quidem rethoricum sillogismum, exemplum vero inductionem rethoricam.

Voco autem enthymema quidem rethoricum sillogismum, exemplum autem rethoricam inductionem.

I call the enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, and the example a rhetorical induction.

πάντες δὲ τὰς πίστεις ποιοῦνται διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι (7) ἢ παραδείγματα λέγοντες ἢ ἐνθυμήματα, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα (8) οὐδέν· ὥστ’ εἴπερ καὶ ὅλως ἀνάγκη ἢ συλλογιζόμενον ἢ (9) ἐπάγοντα δεικνύναι ὁτιοῦν [ἢ ὁντινοῦν] (δῆλον δ’ ἡμῖν τοῦτο (10) ἐκ τῶν Ἀναλυτικῶν), ἀναγκαῖον ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν ἑκατέρῳ (11) τούτων τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι.

فقد يفعلون التصديقات كلها بالتثبيت و ذلك إما بإحضار البرهان و إما بالتفكير لا في شيء آخر سوى في هذين كي يكونوا في الجملة سلجسة فعلوا أو اعتبارا إما أن يثبتوا شيئا وإما أن يكون الشيء موجودا فيثبتوه وهذا بين واضح في كتاب أنولوطيقى فلا بد اضطرار أن يكون كل واحدة من هاتين تحكي كل واحدة من هاتين بل هي فهي ⁸

8. L em. : MS وهى

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Omnes autem fidem faciunt propter demonstrare aut exempla dicentes aut entimemata, et extra hec nichil; quare et si universaliter necesse est sillogizantem aut inducentem demonstrate quia igitur aut aliquem igitur (manifestum autem nobis hoc ab Analeticis), necessarium utrumque horum utrique horum idem esse.

Omnes autem persuasiones faciunt per ostendere aut exempla dicentes aut enthymemata, et preter hec nichil; quare si quidem et totaliter necesse sillogizantem aut inducentem ostendere quodcumque aut quemcumque (palam autem nobis hoc ex Analeticis), necessarium utrumque ipsorum utrique horum idem esse.

Every one who effects persuasion through proof does in fact use either enthymemes or examples: there is no other way. And since every one who proves anything at all is bound to use either syllogisms or inductions (and this is clear to us from the Analytics), it must follow that enthymemes are syllogisms and examples are inductions.

(12) τίς δ’ ἐστὶν διαφορὰ παραδείγματος καὶ ἐνθυμήματος, φανε(13)ρὸν ἐκ τῶν Τοπικῶν (ἐκεῖ γὰρ περὶ συλλογισμοῦ καὶ ἐπαγωγῆς (14) εἴρηται πρότερον), ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ πολλῶν καὶ ὁμοίων δείκνυ(15)σθαι ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει ἐκεῖ μὲν ἐπαγωγή ἐστιν ἐνταῦθα δὲ παρά(16)δειγμα, τὸ δὲ τινῶν ὄντων ἕτερόν τι διὰ ταῦτα συμβαίνειν (17) παρὰ ταῦτα τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι ἢ καθόλου ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ (18) ἐκεῖ μὲν συλλογισμὸς ἐνταῦθα δὲ ἐνθύμημα καλεῖται.

فأما معنى السلوجسموس ما هو وما الفصل بينه وبين البرهان فمعلوم من كتاب طوبيقا فإنا قد أنبأنا هناك عن السلوجيسموس وعن الاعتبار فالنحو الذي يكون بإثبات أن هذا هكذا في شيئين متشابهين هو هناك اعتبارا وهو هاهنا برهان والنحو الذى يكون بأن يكون شيء موضوع يحدث من أجله شيء آخر سوى ذلك الموضوع بذلك الموضوع نفسه إما بالكلية وإما بالأكثر فهو هناك سلوجسموس وهو هاهنا يسمى تفكيرا

. . .

Quod autem est differentia exempli et entimematis, manifestum ex Topicis (illic enim de sillogismo et induetione dictum est prius), quoniam quidem in demonstrando in pluribus et paucis quod sic se habet ibi enim inductio est, hie autem exemplum, hoc autem quibusdam entibus alterum aliquid preter hec accidere propter ista eo quod hec sint universaliter aut ut in pluribus ibi quidem sillogismus, hie autem enthymema vacatur.

Que autem est difierentia exempli et enthymematis, manifestum ex Topicis (ibi enim de sillogismo et inductione dictum est prius), quia hoc quidem in multis et similibus ostendere quod sic habet ibi quidem inductio est, hic autem exemplum, quibusdam autem existentibus aliud aliquid per hec aeeidere et propter hec esse hee universalia aut ut in pluribus illic quidem sillogismus hic autem entimema vacatur.

The difference between example and enthymeme is made plain by the passages in the Topics where induction and syllogism have already been discussed. When we base the proof of a proposition on a number of similar cases, this is induction in dialectic, example in rhetoric; when it is shown that, certain propositions being true, a further and quite distinct proposition must also be true in consequence, whether invariably or usually, this is called syllogism in dialectic, enthymeme in rhetoric.

φα(19)νερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἑκάτερον ἔχει ἀγαθὸν τὸ εἶδος τῆς (20) ῥητορείας· καθάπερ γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς μεθοδικοῖς εἴρηται, καὶ ἐν (21) τούτοις ὁμοίως ἔχει· εἰσὶν γὰρ αἱ μὲν παραδειγματώδεις ῥη(22)τορεῖαι αἱ δὲ ἐνθυμηματικαί, καὶ ῥήτορες ὁμοίως οἱ μὲν (23) παραδειγματώδεις οἱ δὲ ἐνθυμηματικοί.

فهو معلوم أن فيهما جميعا نوعا ريطوريا وكما يوجد هذان الأمران في هذه الحيل التي ذكرنا كذلك يوجد في هذه الحيلة أيضا فإن الريطوريات منهن برهانيات ومنهن تفكيرات وكذلك توجد البرهانيات فإن هذه أيضا منها برهانية ومنها تفكيرية

. . .

Manifestum autem quoniam utrum que habet bonum species rethorice; sicut in disciplinalibus dictum est, et in hiis similiter se habet; sunt enim hec quidem exemplares rethorice, hec vero entimematice, et rethores similiter hii quidem exemplares, hii vero entimematici.

Manifestum autem et quod utrumque habet species rethoric; sicut autem et in methodicis dictum est, et in hiis similiter habet; sunt enim hec quidem exemplares rethorie, hec autem enthymematice, et rethores similiter hii quidem exemplares, hii autem enthymematici.

It is plain also that each of these types of oratory has its advantages. Types of oratory, I say: for what has been said in the Methodics applies equally well here; in some oratorical styles examples prevail, in others enthymemes; and in like manner, some orators are better at the former and some at the latter.

πιθανοὶ μὲν οὖν οὐχ (24) ἧττον οἱ λόγοι οἱ διὰ τῶν παραδειγμάτων, θορυβοῦνται δὲ (25) μᾶλλον οἱ ἐνθυμηματικοί· τὴν δ’ αἰτίαν [αὐτῶν], καὶ πῶς (26) ἑκατέρῳ χρηστέον, ἐροῦμεν ὕστερον· νῦν δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων (27) μᾶλλον διορίσωμεν καθαρῶς.

وأما الإقناع خاصة فقد يكون فيه من الكلام على جهة البرهان غير قليل وإنما يكون الشغب الأكثر في تلك التفكيرات فأما البيان عن علتها وكيف ينبغي أن يستعملا جميعا فنحن صائرون إليه بآخرة فأما الآن فإنا بالحري أن نجرد القول في تحديدهما

. . .

Probabiles autem nichilominus sermones qui sunt per exempla, perturbantur vero magis et qui entimematici; causam autem ipsorum, et qualiter utroque utendum, dicemus posterius; nunc autem de hiis huiusmodi magis determinemus sincere.

Persuasibiles quidem igitur non minus orationes que per exempla, turbantur autem magis enthymematice; causam autem ipsorum, et quomodo utroque utendum, dicemus posterius; nunc autem de ipsis hiis magis determinemus liquido.

Speeches that rely on examples are as persuasive as the other kind, but those which rely on enthymemes excite the louder applause. The sources of examples and enthymemes, and their proper uses, we will discuss later. Our next step is to define the processes themselves more clearly.

(28) ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ πιθανὸν τινὶ πιθανόν ἐστι, καὶ τὸ μὲν εὐθὺς (29) ὑπάρχει δι’ αὑτὸ πιθανὸν καὶ πιστὸν τὸ δὲ τῷ δείκνυσθαι δοκεῖν (30) διὰ τοιούτων, οὐδεμία δὲ τέχνη σκοπεῖ τὸ καθ’ ἕκαστον, οἷον ἡ (31) ἰατρικὴ τί Σωκράτει τὸ ὑγιεινόν ἐστιν ἢ Καλλίᾳ, ἀλλὰ τί τῷ (32) τοιῷδε ἢ τοῖς τοιοῖσδε (τοῦτο γὰρ ἔντεχνον, τὸ δὲ καθ’ ἕκαστον (33) ἄπειρον καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστητόν), οὐδὲ ἡ ῥητορικὴ τὸ καθ’ ἕκαστον (34) ἔνδοξον θεωρήσει, οἷον Σωκράτει ἢ Ἱππίᾳ, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοισδί, (35) καθάπερ καὶ ἡ διαλεκτική.

فإن المقنع يكون مقنعا لمرئ من الناس فمنه ما يكون من ساعته التصديق للسامع ومنه ما يكون بالتثبيت فانه هكذى وليس هكذى ومنه ما يكون من قبل أن المخاطب يرى هذه المفردات والجزئيات من الصناعة كقول القائل إن علاج كذى شفى لسوقراطيس أو لقيلياس غير أنا إذا قلنا لكذى ومثل كذى فتلك حينئذ صناعة فأما التي لكل واحد فإنها غير متناهية ولا معلومة وليست أيضا صفة الريطورية أنها التي تبصر المحمودات عند كل واحد من الناس مثل سقراطيس أو إيفياس لكن المحمود على ما هو للديالقطيقية

. . . . .

Quoniam enim probabile cuidam probabile est, et rectum quidem per se ipsum probabile et credibile, hoc autem quod videtur demonstrari per huiusmodi; nulla vero ars scrutatur singulare ut medicina quid Socrati sanum est aut Callie, sed quid huic [quidem hiis] aut quid hiis (hoe enim artificiale, singulare vera infinitum nec scibile) nec rethorica singulare opinabile inquirit, ut Socrati aut Yppie, sed quid hiis autem, sicut dialetica.

Quoniam enim persuasibile alicui persuasibile est, et hoc quidem confestim existit propter se persuasibile et credibile, hoc autem eo quod videatur ostendi per talia, nulla autem ars considerat particulare, puta medicinalis quid Socrati sanum est aut Callie, sed quid tali aut talibus (hoc enim artificiale, quod autem secundum unumquodque infinitum et non scibile), neque rethorica quod secundum unumquemque probabile considerabit, ut Socrati vel Ippie, sed quod talibus, sicut dialetica.

A statement is persuasive and credible either because it is directly self—evident or because it appears to be proved from other statements that are so. In either case it is persuasive because there is somebody whom it persuades. But none of the arts theorize about individual cases. Medicine, for instance, does not theorize about what will help to cure Socrates or Callias, but only about what will help to cure any or all of a given class of patients: this alone is business: individual cases are so infinitely various that no systematic knowledge of them is possible. In the same way the theory of rhetoric is concerned not with what seems probable to a given individual like Socrates or Hippias, but with what seems probable to men of a given type; and this is true of dialectic also.

καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνη συλλογίζεται οὐκ (36) ἐξ ὧν ἔτυχεν (φαίνεται γὰρ ἄττα καὶ τοῖς παραληροῦσιν), (37) ἀλλ’ ἐκείνη μὲν ἐκ τῶν λόγου δεομένων, ἡ δὲ ῥητορικὴ ἐκ (1357a1) τῶν ἤδη βουλεύεσθαι εἰωθότων.

فإنها هي أيضا تفعل السلجسة ليس من أي شيء كان فإن هذا النحو مما قد نراه وقد ننطق بما شئنا وهوينا لكل تلك يحتاج فيها إلى ذوات المنطق فأما الريطورية فيحتاج فيها إلى الاتي قد اعتيد قبولها والتصديق بها من قبل

. .

Et enim ipsa sillogizat non ex quibus contingit (videntur autem quedam et fatuis), sed illa quidern ex convenientibus sermoni, rethorica vero ex consuetis utique deliberare.

Et enim ilia sillogizat non ex quibuscumque (videntur enim quedam et deliris), sed ilia quidem ex rationi oportunis, rethorica autem ex iam consuetis consiliari.

Dialectic does not construct its syllogisms out of any haphazard materials, such as the fancies of crazy people, but out of materials that call for discussion; and rhetoric, too, draws upon the regular subjects of debate.

[I.2.12] ἔστιν δὲ τὸ ἔργον αὐτῆς περί (2) τε τοιούτων περὶ ὧν βουλευόμεθα καὶ τέχνας μὴ ἔχομεν, (3) καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀκροαταῖς οἳ οὐ δύνανται διὰ πολλῶν (4) συνορᾶν οὐδὲ λογίζεσθαι πόρρωθεν. βουλευόμεθα δὲ περὶ τῶν (5) φαινομένων ἐνδέχεσθαι ἀμφοτέρως ἔχειν· περὶ γὰρ τῶν (6) ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἢ γενέσθαι ἢ ἔσεσθαι ἢ ἔχειν οὐδεὶς βου(7)λεύεται οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνων· οὐδὲν γὰρ πλέον.

فإن عملها ⁹ فيما كان هكذا من الكلام أي فيما قد نتعمد ولا ¹⁰ تكون لنا فيه صناعة وفي هذا النحو من السامعين أى الذين لا يستطيعون أن يبصروا الأمور عن مراتب كثيرة ولا يفعلوا السلجسة من بُعد وأما المشورة فإنها تكون فيما يمكن أن يرى على جهتين فأما المشاور فيما لا يمكن أن يكون بحال أخرى فلا فضل فيه فيما أحسب

9. عملها em. L : علمها MS 10. ولا em. L : الا MS.

. . .

Est autem opus ipsius de hiis de quibus deliberamus et artes non habemus, et in hiis auditores qui non possunt per multa conspicere neque delonge sillogizare. Deliberamus autern de apparentibus contingenter utrimque se habere, de impossibilibus enim aliter aut fieri aut esse aut se habere nullus deliberat sic existimans. Non enim plura.

Est autem opus ipsius et de talibus de quibus consiliamur et artes non habemus, et inter tales auditores qui non possunt per multa conspicere neque ratiocinari a longe. Consiliamur autem de hiis que videntur contingere utroque modo se habere; de impossibilibus enim aliter aut facta esse aut fore aut habere nullus consiliatur ita existirnans; nichil enim plus;

The duty of rhetoric is to deal with such matters as we deliberate upon without arts or systems to guide us, in the hearing of persons who cannot take in at a glance a complicated argument, or follow a long chain of reasoning. The subjects of our deliberation are such as seem to present us with alternative possibilities: about things that could not have been, and cannot now or in the future be, other than they are, nobody who takes them to be of this nature wastes his time in deliberation.

[I.2.13] ἐνδέχεται (8) δὲ συλλογίζεσθαι καὶ συνάγειν τὰ μὲν ἐκ συλλελογισμέ(9)νων πρότερον, τὰ δ’ ἐξ ἀσυλλογίστων μέν, δεομένων δὲ συλ(10)λογισμοῦ διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἔνδοξα, ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτων τὸ μὲν (11) μὴ εἶναι εὐεπακολούθητον διὰ τὸ μῆκος (ὁ γὰρ κριτὴς ὑπό(12)κειται εἶναι ἁπλοῦς), τὰ δὲ μὴ πιθανὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐξ ὁμο(13)λογουμένων εἶναι μηδ’ ἐνδόξων, ὥστ’ ἀναγκαῖον τό τε ἐνθύ(14)μημα εἶναι καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα περί τε τῶν ἐνδεχομένων (15) ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ἔχειν ἄλλως, τὸ μὲν παράδειγμα ἐπαγω(16)γὴν τὸ δ’ ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμόν, καὶ ἐξ ὀλίγων τε καὶ (17) πολλάκις ἐλαττόνων ἢ ἐξ ὧν ὁ πρῶτος συλλογισμός· ἐὰν γὰρ (18) ᾖ τι τούτων γνώριμον, οὐδὲ δεῖ λέγειν· αὐτὸς γὰρ τοῦτο προσ(19)τίθησιν ὁ ἀκροατής, οἷον ὅτι Δωριεὺς στεφανίτην ἀγῶνα νενίκη(20)κεν· ἱκανὸν γὰρ εἰπεῖν ὅτι Ὀλύμπια νενίκηκεν, τὸ δ’ ὅτι στεφανί(21)της τὰ Ὀλύμπια οὐδὲ δεῖ προσθεῖναι· γιγνώσκουσι γὰρ πάντες.

وقد يمكن أن يكون فعل السلجسة والجمع حسنا مجازا أما في بعض فمن اللاتي قد كانت سلوجسمية أولا وأما في بعض فمن اللاتي لم تكن سلوجسمية وهى محتاجة إلى السلوجسموس بما أنها لم تكن محمودة ولا بد اضطرارا أن يكون فى هذه ما لا يسهل تأليفه وتوصيله من أجل الطول والكثرة فإن الحاكم يشكر على أن يكون الكلام بسيطا مرسلا وأما لا مقنع فالذى لا يقر به ¹¹ أنه كائن أو محمود فلا محالة إذا إن التفكير والبرهان معا يكونان فى الأمور التى إذ هي بحال ما قد يمكن أن تكون أخرى مثلهما بغير تلك الحال فأما البرهان فالاعتبار وأما التفكير فالسلوجسموس ثم من القلائل والوجوه أكثر ذلك أو من اللاتي منها السلوجسموس أو الشكل الأول فإن كان شيء مما يستدل عليه بالمعنى المقول فليس ينبغي أن يذكر البتة كأن ¹² السامع يفطن بذلك فيضيفه إلى المعنى وذلك كما قيل إن داريوس كان يظفر ظفرا مكللا فقد كان يكتفي بأن يقال ظفرا فأما المكلل فلم يكن ينبغى أن يزاد إليه لأنهم جميعا يعرفون ذلك

11. يقر به : H's exemplar or H's reading has نعرفه (nescimus). 12. كأن MS : فإن em L.

. . . . . . . . . .

Contingit autem sillogizare et congregare hec quidem ex sillogizatis prius, hec vero ex non sillogizatis, indigentibus autem sillogismo ex eo quod non sunt opinabilia, necesse autem horum hec quidem non esse bene consequentia propter longitudinem (iudex enim supponitur esse universaliter), hec vera non probabilia ex eo quod non ex confessis sunt neque opinabilibus, quare necessarium est entimema esse et exemplum de contingentibus autem sicut in plnribus se habere, sed exemplum quidem tamquam inductionem, entimema quidem sicut sillogismum, et ex paucis autem et multociens minimis aut ex quibus primus sillogismus; si enim fuerit aliquid horum cognitum, non oportet dicere; ipse enim auditor hoc proponit, ut, quod Dorieus coronatur in agone vicit; sufficiens est dicere quoniam Olimpia vicit, quod coronatur in Olimpiadibus non oportet proponi; cognoscunt enim omnes.

aut sic: contingit consiliari et concludere hec quidem ex sillogizatis prius, hec autem ex non sillogizatis, oportunis autem sillogismo propterea quod non sunt opinata, necesse autem horum hec quidem non esse bene assequibilia propter longitudinem (iudex enim supponitur esse simplex), hec autem non persuasibilia propterea quod neque ex confessis sint neque ex opinabilibus, quare necessarium enthymema esse et exemplum de contingentibus aliter se habere ut multa, exemplum quidem inductionem, enthymema autem sillogismum, et ex paucis et sepe paucioribus quam ex quibus primus sillogismus; si enim sit aliquid horum notum, nichil oportet dicere; ipse enim auditor hoc apponit, puta quod Dorieus coronalem agonem devicit; cognoscunt enim omnes. sufficiens dicere quod Olympia enim devicit, hoc autem quod coronalis Olympia nichil oportet apponere; cognoscunt enim omnes.

It is possible to form syllogisms and draw conclusions from the results of previous syllogisms; or, on the other hand, from premisses which have not been thus proved, and at the same time are so little accepted that they call for proof. Reasonings of the former kind will necessarily be hard to follow owing to their length, for we assume an audience of untrained thinkers; those of the latter kind will fail to win assent, because they are based on premisses that are not generally admitted or believed. The enthymeme and the example must, then, deal with what is in the main contingent, the example being an induction, and the enthymeme a syllogism, about such matters. The enthymeme must consist of few propositions, fewer often than those which make up the normal syllogism. For if any of these propositions is a familiar fact, there is no need even to mention it; the hearer adds it himself. Thus, to show that Dorieus has been victor in a contest for which the prize is a crown, a fact which everybody knows. it is enough to say ‘For he has been victor in the Olympic games’, without adding ‘And in the Olympic games the prize is a crown’, for everybody knows it.

[I.2.14] (22) ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστὶν ὀλίγα μὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐξ ὧν οἱ ῥητορικοὶ (23) συλλογισμοί εἰσι (τὰ γὰρ πολλὰ περὶ ὧν αἱ κρίσεις καὶ αἱ (24) σκέψεις ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν· περὶ ὧν μὲν γὰρ πράτ(25)τουσι βουλεύονται καὶ σκοποῦσι, τὰ δὲ πραττόμενα πάντα (26) τοιούτου γένους ἐστί, καὶ οὐδὲν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἐξ ἀνάγκης (27) τούτων), τὰ δ’ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ συμβαίνοντα καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα (28) ἐκ τοιούτων ἀνάγκη ἑτέρων συλλογίζεσθαι, τὰ δ’ ἀναγκαῖα (29) ἐξ ἀναγκαίων· δῆλον δ’ ἡμῖν καὶ τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν Ἀναλυτι(30)κῶν, φανερὸν ὅτι ἐξ ὧν τὰ ἐνθυμήματα λέγεται, τὰ μὲν (31) ἀναγκαῖα ἔσται, τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, τὰ δ’ (32) ἐνθυμήματα ἐξ εἰκότων καὶ ἐκ σημείων, ὥστε ἀνάγκη τούτων (33) ἑκάτερον ἑκατέρῳ ταὐτὸ εἶναι.

ومن أجل أنه قل ما تكون السلوجسمات الريطورية من الاضطراريات فإن أكثر ما تجري فيه الأحكام والفحص مما قد يمكن أن يكون بحال أخرى وذلك أنه إنما يتشاور المتشاورون فيما يفعلون والمفعولات كلها من هذا الجنس وليس يمكن فى القول ¹³ أن يكون شيء مما يعطي هؤلاء يعرض اضطرارا فلا ¹⁴ بد حينئذ أن يسلجس ¹⁵ من هذه الأخرى فأما الاضطرارية فمن الاضطراريات وهذا بين واضح فى كتاب انولوطيقى فهو معلوم الآن أن من هذه التي تسمى تفكيرات ما هو اضطراري فإن كثيرا منها مما يوجد بالأكثر وقد يؤتى بالتفكيرات من الصادقات ومن الدلائل كي تكون لا محالة كل واحدة من هاتين هي واحدة من تينك

13. after وليس ... القول dittogr. (cancelled, single line). 14. τὰ ... ἐνδεχόμενα not translated. 15. أن يسلجس em AB : من سلجس MS.

. . . . . .

Quoniam autem pauca quidem sunt necessaria ex quibus rethorici sillogismi sunt (plura enim de quibus iudicia et inspectiones contingit et aliter se habere; de quibus autem agunt volunt et provident, quecumque autem aguntur huius generis sunt, et non ut dicam ex necessitate horum), bee vera ut in pluribus accidentia et contingentia ex talibus necesse est aliis sillogizari, necessaria vera ex necessariis (manifestum autem est nobis et hoc ex Analeticis), palam quoniam ex qui bus entimemata dicuntur, entimemata vera ex ycotibus et signis, quare necesse est harum utrumque utrique idem esse.

Quoniam autem sunt pauca quidem necessaria ex quibus rethorici sillogismi sunt (multa enim de quibus iudicia et considerationes contingit et aliter habere; de hiis enim que agunt consiliantur et tractant, que autem aguntur omnia talis generis sunt, et nichil horum ut consequens est dicere ex necessitate), ut in pluribus autem accidentia et contingentia ex talibus alteris necesse sillogizari, necessaria autem ex necessariis (palam aut em nobis et hoc ex Analeticis), manifestum quia ex quibus enthymemata dicuntur, hec quidem necessaria erunt, plurima autem ut in pluribus dicuntur, enthymemata autem ex ykotibus et signis, quare necesse horum utrumque utrique idem esse.

There are few facts of the ‘necessary’ type that can form the basis of rhetorical syllogisms. Most of the things about which we make decisions, and into which therefore we inquire, present us with alternative possibilities. For it is about our actions that we deliberate and inquire, and all our actions have a contingent character; hardly any of them are determined by necessity. Again, conclusions that state what is merely usual or possible must be drawn from premisses that do the same, just as ‘necessary’ conclusions must be drawn from ‘necessary’ premisses; this too is clear to us from the Analytics. It is evident, therefore, that the propositions forming the basis of enthymemes, though some of them may be ‘necessary’, will most of them be only usually true. Now the materials of enthymemes are Probabilities and Signs, which we can see must correspond respectively with the propositions that are generally and those that are necessarily true.

[I.2.15] (34) τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἰκός ἐστι τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γινόμενον, οὐχ (35) ἁπλῶς δὲ καθάπερ ὁρίζονταί τινες, ἀλλὰ τὸ περὶ τὰ ἐν(36)δεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὕτως ἔχον πρὸς ἐκεῖνο πρὸς ὃ εἰκὸς (1357b1) ὡς τὸ καθόλου πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος·

فأما تلك فصادقة وأما هذه فتكون بالأكثر وليس ذلك مرسلا كما حد أناس لكن التي توجد بغير حال الممكنة فتكون منزلتها من تلك كمنزلة الصادقة منها أي كمنزلة الكلية من الجزئية

. .

Ycos enim est sicut in pluribus fiendum, non universaliter quemadmodum determinant, sed circa contingentia aliter se habere sic se habens ad illud ad quod ycos sicut universale ad particulare;

Ykos quidem enim est quod ut in pluribus fit, non simpliciter autem sicut diffiniunt quidam, sed quod circa contingentia aliter habere sic se habet ad illud ad quod ykos ut universale ad particulare;

A Probability is a thing that usually happens; not, however, as some definitions would suggest, anything whatever that usually happens, but only if it belongs to the class of the ‘contingent’ or ‘variable’. It bears the same relation to that in respect of which it is probable as the universal bears to the particular.

[I.2.16] τῶν δὲ σημείων τὸ (2) μὲν οὕτως ἔχει ὡς τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστόν τι πρὸς τὸ καθόλου, (3) τὸ δὲ ὡς τῶν καθόλου τι πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος. τούτων δὲ (4) τὸ μὲν ἀναγκαῖον τεκμήριον, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον ἀνώνυ(5)μόν ἐστι κατὰ τὴν διαφοράν.

فالدلائل منها ما هو بمنزلة الجزء من الكل ¹⁶ وما كان من هذا النحو اضطراريا فهو دلالة وما كان منه غير اضطراري فليس يسمى كالفصل من الفصول

16. τὸ ... μέρος not translated.

. .

signorum autem hoc quidem sic se habet sicut quiddam particularium ad universale, hoc sicut aliquid universalium ad particulare. Horum autem quod necessarium est tecmirium, quod vero non necessarium innominatum est secundum differentiam.

signorum autem hoc quidem sic habet ut aliquod singularium ad universale, hoc autem ut aliquod universalium ad particulare. Horum autem quod quidem necessarium tecmerium, quod autem non necessarium innominatum est secundum differentiam.

Of Signs, one kind bears the same relation to the statement it supports as the particular bears to the universal, the other the same as the universal bears to the particular. The infallible kind is a ‘complete proof’; the fallible kind has no specific name.

[I.2.17] ἀναγκαῖα μὲν οὖν λέγω ἐξ (6) ὧν γίνεται συλλογισμός· διὸ καὶ τεκμήριον τὸ τοιοῦτον τῶν (7) σημείων ἐστίν· ὅταν γὰρ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι οἴωνται λῦσαι τὸ (8) λεχθέν, τότε φέρειν οἴονται τεκμήριον ὡς δεδειγμένον καὶ (9) πεπερασμένον· τὸ γὰρ τέκμαρ καὶ πέρας ταὐτόν ἐστι κατὰ (10) τὴν ἀρχαίαν γλῶτταν.

وقد أعني بالاضطرارية تلك التي تكون منها السلوجسمات وما كان من الدلائل هكذا فهو دلالة فإنهم إذا ظنوا أنهم لا يستطيعون نقض القول المقول رأوا أنه ينبغي أن يأتوا بدلالة هي له مبيّنة محصورة فيه ...¹⁷

17. τὸ ... γλῶτταν not translated.

. . . .

Necessaria quidem igitur dico ex quibus fit sillogismus; ideoque tecmirion huiusmodi signorum est, cum enim non contingere opinantur dissolvere predictum, tunc ferre arbitrantur tecmirium sicut demonstratum et perconclusum. Tecmar quidem et terminus idem sunt secundum antiquam linguam.

Necessaria quidem igitur dico ex quibus fit sillogismus; propter quod et tecmerium est quod tale signarum; quando enim putant non contingere solvere quod dictum est, tunc ferre putant tecmerium tamquam ostensum et terminatum; tecmar enim et terminus idem est secundum antiquam linguam.

By infallible signs I mean those on which syllogisms proper may be based: and this shows us why this kind of Sign is called ‘complete proof’: when people think that what they have said cannot be refuted, they then think that they are bringing forward a ‘complete proof’, meaning that the matter has now been demonstrated and completed; for the word ‘peras’ has the same meaning (of ‘end’ or ‘boundary’) as the word ‘tekmar’ in the ancient tongue.

[I.2.18] ἔστιν δὲ τῶν σημείων τὸ μὲν ὡς (11) τὸ καθ’ ἕκαστον πρὸς τὸ καθόλου ὧδε, οἷον εἴ τις εἴπειεν (12) σημεῖον εἶναι ὅτι οἱ σοφοὶ δίκαιοι, Σωκράτης γὰρ σοφὸς (13) ἦν καὶ δίκαιος. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν σημεῖον, λυτὸν δέ, κἂν (14) ἀληθὲς ᾖ τὸ εἰρημένον (ἀσυλλόγιστον γὰρ), τὸ δέ, οἷον εἴ (15) τις εἴπειεν σημεῖον ὅτι νοσεῖ, πυρέττει γάρ, ἢ τέτοκεν, ὅτι (16) γάλα ἔχει, ἀναγκαῖον.

ومن الرواسم كالجزئي ومنها كالكلي فلتكن للرواسم هاهنا كما لو قال قائل إن الحكماء عدول لأن سقراطس كان حكيما وعدلا فهذا الآن رسم وهو له إن كان هذا القول حقا وليس باضطراري لأنه ليس سلوجسميا وأما ذاك الآخر فكقول القائل في الكد والحمى وقوله ولدت لأن لها لبنا

. . . .

Sunt autem signorum hoc quidem sicut particulare ad universale, ut si quis dicat signum esse quod sapientes iusti, Socrates quidem sapiens igitur iustus. Hoc quidem igitur signum, solubile enim, et verum erit dictum (non sillogizabile enim), hoc vera, ut si quis dicat signum quoniam egrotat, febricitat enim, aut peperit, quoniam lac habet, necessarium est.

Adhuc autem signorum hoc quidem ut singulare ad universale sic, ut si quis dicat signum esse quod sapientes sint iusti, Socrates enim et sapiens erat et iustus. Hoc quidem igitur signum, solvendum autem quod dictum est, et si verum sit (insillogizabile enim), hoc autem, ut si quis dicat signum quod egrotat, febricitat enim, vel peperit, quia lac habet, necessarium.

Now the one kind of Sign (that which bears to the proposition it supports the relation of particular to universal) may be illustrated thus. Suppose it were said, ‘The fact that Socrates was wise and just is a sign that the wise are just’. Here we certainly have a Sign; but even though the proposition be true, the argument is refutable, since it does not form a syllogism. Suppose, on the other hand, it were said, ‘The fact that he has a fever is a sign that he is ill’, or, ‘The fact that she is giving milk is a sign that she has lately borne a child’.

ὅπερ τῶν σημείων τεκμήριον μόνον (17) ἐστίν· μόνον γάρ, ἂν ἀληθὲς ᾖ, ἄλυτόν ἐστιν. τὸ δὲ ὡς τὸ (18) καθόλου πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἔχον, οἷον εἴ τις εἴπειεν ὅτι (19) πυρέττει σημεῖον εἶναι, πυκνὸν γὰρ ἀναπνεῖ. λυτὸν δὲ καὶ (20) τοῦτο, κἂν ἀληθὲς ᾖ· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ καὶ μὴ πυρέττοντα (21) πνευστιᾶν.

فهذا أشد اضطرارا من الرسوم لأنه دلالة للرواسم وهو وحده الصحيح غير المنتقض فأما التي ليست له المفردات المفندات البتة فكما لو قال قائل توسم الحميات أو الرواسم في الولاد أنه يتنفس نفسا متتابعا فهذا أيضا له وإن كان صادقا فقد يمكن أن يكون الإنسان يتنفس نفسا متتابعا وإن لم تكن به حمى وإن المرأة تتنفس نفسا متتابعا وإن لم تكن ولدت

. . . .

Quod signorum tecmirium solum est ; solum enim utique verum erit, et insolubile est. Hoc vero sicut universale ad particulare se habet, ut puta si quis dicat quoniam febricitat signum esse, dense respirat. Solubile enim et hoc, quamquam verum sit; contingit autem et non febricitanti pneustian.

Quod quidem signorum solum tecmerium est; solum enim, cum verum sit, insolubile est. Hoc autem ut universale ad particulare se habet, ut si quis dicat quod febricitat signum esse, spissim enim respirat. Solubile enim et hoc, et si verum sit; contingit enim et non febricitantem spissim respirare.

Here we have the infallible kind of Sign, the only kind that constitutes a complete proof, since it is the only kind that, if the particular statement is true, is irrefutable. The other kind of Sign, that which bears to the proposition it supports the relation of universal to particular, might be illustrated by saying, ‘The fact that he breathes fast is a sign that he has a fever’. This argument also is refutable, even if the statement about the fast breathing be true, since a man may breathe hard without having a fever.

τί μὲν οὖν εἰκός ἐστι καὶ τί σημεῖον καὶ (22) τεκμήριον, καὶ τί διαφέρουσιν, εἴρηται μὲν καὶ νῦν, μᾶλ(23)λον δὲ φανερῶς καὶ περὶ τούτων, καὶ διὰ τίν’ αἰτίαν τὰ (24) μὲν ἀσυλλόγιστά ἐστι τὰ δὲ συλλελογισμένα, ἐν τοῖς Ἀνα(25)λυτικοῖς διώρισται περὶ αὐτῶν.

أما ما الصادق وما الرواسم وما الدلالة وما الفرق بينهن فقد بينا عنه هاهنا أيضا وأما كنه البيان وحقيقته ففي أنولوطيقى وأخبرنا أن من هذه أيضا ما هو لعلة من العلل غير ذي سلوجسموس ومنها ما هو مسلجس وحددنا ذلك وبيناه

. .

Quid igitur ycos est et quid signum et quid tecmirium, et quid differant, dictum est quidem nunc, et magis autem manifestum et de hiis, et propter quam causam hec quidem sillogizabilia sunt, hec quidem sillogizata, in Analeticis determinatum est de ipsis.

Quid igitur est ykos et quid signum et quid tecmerium, et quid differunt, dictum est quidem et nunc, magis autem manifeste et de hiis, et propter quam causam hec quidem insillogizabilia sunt, hec autem sillogizata, in Analeticis determinatum est de ipsis.

It has, then, been stated above what is the nature of a Probability, of a Sign, and of a complete proof, and what are the differences between them. In the Analytics a more explicit description has been given of these points; it is there shown why some of these reasonings can be put into syllogisms and some cannot.

(26) παράδειγμα δὲ ὅτι μέν ἐστιν ἐπαγωγὴ καὶ περὶ ποῖα ἐπαγωγή, (27) εἴρηται· ἔστι δὲ οὔτε ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον οὔθ’ ὡς ὅλον πρὸς (28) μέρος οὔθ’ ὡς ὅλον πρὸς ὅλον, ἀλλ’ ὡς μέρος πρὸς μέρος, ὅμοιον (29) πρὸς ὅμοιον —ὅταν ἄμφω μὲν ᾖ ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος, γνωριμώτε(30)ρον δὲ θάτερον ᾖ θατέρου, παράδειγμά ἐστιν· οἷον ὅτι ἐπ(31)εβούλευε τυραννίδι Διονύσιος αἰτῶν τὴν φυλακήν· καὶ γὰρ Πεισί(32)στρατος πρότερον ἐπιβουλεύων ᾔτει φυλακὴν καὶ λαβὼν ἐτυράν(33)νησε, καὶ Θεαγένης ἐν Μεγάροις· καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσους ἴσασι, (34) παράδειγμα πάντες γίγνονται τοῦ Διονυσίου, ὃν οὐκ ἴσασίν (35) πω εἰ διὰ τοῦτο αἰτεῖ. πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ καθόλου, (36) ὅτι ὁ ἐπιβουλεύων τυραννίδι φυλακὴν αἰτεῖ.

وأما البرهان فقد بينا أنه اعتبار وأي نحو هو من الاعتبار فإنه ليس كالجزء إلى الكل ولا كالكل إلى الجزء لكن كالجزء إلى الجزء والشبيه إلى الشبيه إذا كانا جميعا يكونان ¹⁸ تحت ذلك الجنس بعينه ولم يكن واحد منهما يدل على أنه برهان للآخر وذلك كما قالوا أن ديانوسيس حين يسئل الحرس والحفظة إنما يمكر ليفتك لأن فسستراطس من قبل قد مكر بأن سأل الحرس فلما أعطى فتك وتمرد وثاغانيس أيضا بماغارا وآخرون يعرفونهم يتخذونهم برهانا في ديانسوس الذي لم يعرفوه بعد أن كانوا داخلين في هذا الكل أعني أن الذي يمكر ليفتك يسئل الحرس

18. MS يمكنان

. . . . . . .

Exemplum autem quoniam est inductio, dictum est; est autem neque sicut pars ad totum neque sicut totum ad partem neque sicut totum ad totum, sed sicut pars ad partem, simile enim ad simile, cum utique utraque quidem erunt in eadem genere, notius autem utrumque utriusque, exemplum erit; ut quoniam insidiatur tyrannidi Dyonisius petens custodiam; et enim Pesistratus prius insidians petebat custodiam et accipiens tyrannizavit, et Theagenes in Megaris; et alii, quoscumque possunt, exemplum omnes fiunt Dyonisii, quem non produxerunt per hoc petere. Omnia autem hec sub eodem universali, quoniam qui insidiatur tyrannidi custodiam petit.

Exemplum autem quod quidem sit inductio et qualis inductio, dictum est; est autem neque ut pars ad totum neque ut totum ad partem neque ut totum ad totum, sed ut pars ad partem, simile ad simile, cum ambo quidem sint sub eadem genere, notius autem altero sit alterum, exemplum est; puta quod insidiatur tyrannidi Dionisius expetens munitionem; et enim Peisistratus prius insidians expetebat munltlonem et accipiens tyrannizavit, et Theagenes in Megaris; et alii quoscumque sciunt, exemplum omnes fiunt Dionisii, quem nondum sciunt si propter hoc expetit. Omnia autem hec sub eodem universali, quia insidians tyrannidi munitionem expetit.

The ‘example’ has already been described as one kind of induction; and the special nature of the subject—matter that distinguishes it from the other kinds has also been stated above. Its relation to the proposition it supports is not that of part to whole, nor whole to part, nor whole to whole, but of part to part, or like to like. When two statements are of the same order, but one is more familiar than the other, the former is an ‘example’. The argument may, for instance, be that Dionysius, in asking as he does for a bodyguard, is scheming to make himself a despot. For in the past Peisistratus kept asking for a bodyguard in order to carry out such a scheme, and did make himself a despot as soon as he got it; and so did Theagenes at Megara; and in the same way all other instances known to the speaker are made into examples, in order to show what is not yet known, that Dionysius has the same purpose in making the same request: all these being instances of the one general principle, that a man who asks for a bodyguard is scheming to make himself a despot.

(1358a1) ἐξ ὧν μὲν οὖν λέγονται αἱ δοκοῦσαι εἶναι πίστεις ἀποδεικτι(2)καί, εἴρηται.

وأما ما كان من هذه التي تقال لها التصديقات يظن أفودقطيقيا فقد قيل عنه

.

Ex quibus quidem igitur dicitur apparens fides esse demonstrativa, dictum est.

Ex quibus quidem igitur dicuntur que putantur persuasiones esse demonstrative, dictum est.

We have now described the sources of those means of persuasion which are popularly supposed to be demonstrative.

[1.2.20] τῶν δὲ ἐνθυμημάτων μεγίστη διαφορὰ καὶ (3) μάλιστα λεληθυῖα σχεδὸν παρὰ πᾶσίν ἐστιν ἥπερ καὶ περὶ τὴν (4) διαλεκτικὴν μέθοδον τῶν συλλογισμῶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν (5) ἐστι κατὰ τὴν ῥητορικὴν ὥσπερ καὶ κατὰ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν (6) μέθοδον τῶν συλλογισμῶν, τὰ δὲ κατ’ ἄλλας τέχνας καὶ (7) δυνάμεις, τὰς μὲν οὔσας τὰς δ’ οὔπω κατειλημμένας· διὸ (8) καὶ λανθάνουσίν τε τοὺς ἀκροατὰς καὶ [μᾶλλον] ἁπτόμενοι (9) κατὰ τρόπον μεταβαίνουσιν ἐξ αὐτῶν.

وأما التفكيرات فإن الفصل فيها عظيم وهو أخفى وأغمض من غيره لأنها تكون من كل كمثل السلوجسمات في الحيلة الديالقطيقية لكن منها ما هو على حذو الريطورية كما يوجد في الديالقطيقية ومنها ما هو على حذو صناعات وقوات أخرى منها موجودة ومنها غير موجودة لأنها لم تدرك بعد ولذلك ما قد يخفى إذا أوردنا على السامعين تلك التي تخالف نحوهم أو حذوهم

. . .

Entimematum maxima differentia et maxime solubilia fere circa omnes est que et circa dialeticam disciplinam sillogismorum; hec quidem ipsorum sunt secundum rethoricam sicut et secundum dialeticam, bee vero secundum alias artes et potentias, has quidem entes, has vero non iam sumptas; ideoque latent et auditores et magis tangentes secundum modum transgrediuntur ex ipsis.

Enthymematum autem maxima differentia et que maxime latuit omnes fere est que quidem et circa dialeticam methodum sillogismorum; hec quidem enim ipsorum sunt secundum rethoricam sicut et secundum dialeticam methodum sillogismorum, hec autem secundum alias artes et potentias, has quidem existentes, has autem nondum comprehensas; propter quod et latent auditores et magis tangentes secundum modum transeunt ex ipsis.

There is an important distinction between two sorts of enthymemes that has been wholly overlooked by almost everybody — one that also subsists between the syllogisms treated of in dialectic. One sort of enthymeme really belongs to rhetoric, as one sort of syllogism really belongs to dialectic; but the other sort really belongs to other arts and faculties, whether to those we already exercise or to those we have not yet acquired. Missing this distinction, people fail to notice that the more correctly they handle their particular subject the further they are getting away from pure rhetoric or dialectic.

μᾶλλον δὲ σαφὲς (10) ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον διὰ πλειόνων ῥηθέν.

وقد يكون القول المقول بزيادة بائنا مؤكدا إذا كان مقولا في أشياء كثيرة

.

Magis autem manifesturn erit quod dicitur per plura dictum.

Magis autem planum erit quod dicitur per plura dictum.

This statement will be clearer if expressed more fully.

[I.2.21] λέγω γὰρ δια(11)λεκτικούς τε καὶ ῥητορικοὺς συλλογισμοὺς εἶναι περὶ ὧν τοὺς (12) τόπους λέγομεν· οὗτοι δ’ εἰσὶν οἱ κοινοὶ περὶ δικαίων καὶ (13) φυσικῶν καὶ περὶ πολιτικῶν καὶ περὶ πολλῶν διαφερόν(14)των εἴδει, οἷον ὁ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον τόπος· οὐδὲν γὰρ (15) μᾶλλον ἔσται ἐκ τούτου συλλογίσασθαι ἢ ἐνθύμημα εἰπεῖν (16) περὶ δικαίων ἢ περὶ φυσικῶν ἢ περὶ ὁτουοῦν· καίτοι ταῦτα εἴδει (17) διαφέρει.

فقد أزعم أن المواضع أكثر من السلجسموس الريطوري والديالقطيقي لأن هذه توجد عامة في العادلات وفي الطبيعيات وفي الفوليطيات وأشياء كثيرة مختلفة كمثل المواضع في الأقل والأكثر فإنه ليس شيء من هذا يفعل فيه السلجسة والتفكير في العادلات فقط أو في الطبيعيات أو في أي شيء كائنا ما كان من اللاتي هن منفصلات بأنفسهن

. . . . .

Dico enim dialeticos et rethoricos sillogismos esse de quibus locos dicimus; hii autem sunt quat communes de iustis et de naturalibus et de civilibus et de multis differentibus specie, ut qui est a maiori et minori locus; non enim magis erit ex hoc sillogizari aut entimema dicere de iustis [autem] aut naturalibus aut de quolibet, et quid huiusmodi species differunt.

Dico enim dialeticos et rethoricos sillogismos esse de quibus locos dicimus; hii autem sunt qui communes de iustis et de naturalibus et politicis et de multis differentibus specie, ut puta locus a maiori et minori; nichil enim magis erit ex hoc sillogizare aut enthymema dicere de iustis vel de naturalibus vel de quocumque, quamvis hec specie differant.

I mean that the proper subjects of dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms are the things with which we say the regular or universal Lines of Argument are concerned, that is to say those lines of argument that apply equally to questions of right conduct, natural science, politics, and many other things that have nothing to do with one another. Take, for instance, the line of argument concerned with ‘the more or less’. On this line of argument it is equally easy to base a syllogism or enthymeme about any of what nevertheless are essentially disconnected subjects — right conduct, natural science, or anything else whatever. .

ἴδια δὲ ὅσα ἐκ τῶν περὶ ἕκαστον εἶδος καὶ γέ(18)νος προτάσεών ἐστιν, οἷον περὶ φυσικῶν εἰσι προτάσεις ἐξ (19) ὧν οὔτε ἐνθύμημα οὔτε συλλογισμὸς ἔστι περὶ τῶν ἠθικῶν, (20) καὶ περὶ τούτων ἄλλαι ἐξ ὧν οὐκ ἔσται περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν· (21) ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτ’ ἔχει ἐπὶ πάντων.

بل كل ما يقال فيها من نوع وجنس إنما هو من القضايا التي هي المفردات كمثل ما يوجد في القضايا في الطبيعيات التي لا يكون بها سلوجسموس ولا تفكير في الأخلاق وكذلك تلك الأخر لا يكون فيها هذا في الطبيعيات فإذا كان هذا هكذا فكذلك هو في الجميع

. .

Propria autem quecumque ex propositionibus circa unamquamque speciem aut genus sunt, ut de naturalibus sunt propositiones ex quibus neque entimema neque sillogismus est de ethicis, et de hiis alia ex qui bus non est de na turalibus ; similiter autem hec sic se habent in omnibus.

Propria autem quecumque ex propositionibus que circa unamquamque speciem aut genus sunt, ut puta de naturalibus sunt propositiones ex quibus neque enthymema neque sillogismus est de moralibus, et de hiis alie ex quibus non erit de naturalibus; similiter aute1n hoc se habet in omnibus.

But there are also those special Lines of Argument which are based on such propositions as apply only to particular groups or classes of things. Thus there are propositions about natural science on which it is impossible to base any enthymeme or syllogism about ethics, and other propositions about ethics on which nothing can be based about natural science. The same principle applies throughout.

κἀκεῖνα μὲν οὐ ποιήσει (22) περὶ οὐδὲν γένος ἔμφρονα· περὶ οὐδὲν γὰρ ὑποκείμενόν ἐστιν· (23) ταῦτα δὲ ὅσῳ τις ἂν βέλτιον ἐκλέγηται [τὰς προτάσεις], (24) λήσει ποιήσας ἄλλην ἐπιστήμην τῆς διαλεκτικῆς καὶ ῥητο(25)ρικῆς· ἂν γὰρ ἐντύχῃ ἀρχαῖς, οὐκέτι διαλεκτικὴ οὐδὲ ῥη(26)τορικὴ ἀλλ’ ἐκείνη ἔσται ἧς ἔχει τὰς ἀρχάς.

فأما تلك فإنها لا تجمع شيئا ولا إلى جنس واحد وذلك أن الذي يتصور في الوهم هنالك ليس يتناهى إلى شيء محدود وأما هذه فإنه إن قال قائل إنها قضايا محققة فاضلة كان ذلك ضلالة لأنه يفعل حينئذ علما آخر سوى الديالقطيقية والريطورية وذلك أنها إن كانت تلفي البوادئ فليست ريطورية ولا ديالقطيقية بل هي تلك التي لها تلك المبادئ

. . .

Illa autem non faciunt circa nullum genus bene scibilia; circa nullum enim subiectum sunt; hec autem in quantum quis utique melius eliget propositiones, faciens aliam scientiam dialetice et rethorice; si enim attingat principia, non adhuc dialetica neque rethorica sed illa erit cuius habebit principia.

Et illa quidem non facient circa nullum genus sapientem; circa nullum enim subiectum sunt; hec a utero quanto quis utique melius elegerit propositiones, latebit faciens aliam scientiam dialetica et rethorica; si enim inciderit principiis, non adhuc dialetica neque rethorica, sed illa erit cuius habet principia.

The general Lines of Argument have no special subject—matter, and therefore will not increase our understanding of any particular class of things. On the other hand, the better the selection one makes of propositions suitable for special Lines of Argument, the nearer one comes, unconsciously, to setting up a science that is distinct from dialectic and rhetoric. One may succeed in stating the required principles, but one’s science will be no longer dialectic or rhetoric, but the science to which the principles thus discovered belong.

[1.2.22] ἔστι δὲ τὰ (27) πλεῖστα τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων ἐκ τούτων τῶν εἰδῶν λεγόμενα, (28) τῶν κατὰ μέρος καὶ ἰδίων, ἐκ δὲ τῶν κοινῶν ἐλάττω. (29) καθάπερ οὖν καὶ ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς, καὶ ἐνταῦθα διαιρετέον (30) τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων τά τε εἴδη καὶ τοὺς τόπους ἐξ ὧν ληπτέον. (31) λέγω δ’ εἴδη μὲν τὰς καθ’ ἕκαστον γένος ἰδίας προτάσεις, (32) τόπους δὲ τοὺς κοινοὺς ὁμοίως πάντων.

فقد يوجد أكثر التفكيرات مقولا من هذه الأنواع التي هي للجزئيات الخواص والعوام ومن العوام التي تكون بحال واحدة فكما قسمنا في طوبيقا كذلك ينبغي أن نقسم هاهنا الأنواع والمواضع في التفكيرات التي منها نأخذ التصديقات وقد أعني بالأنواع تلك التي تكون عن الأجناس المفردة في القضايا الخواص وبالمواضع تلك العوام للكل بحال واحدة

. . .

Sunt autem plura entimematum ex hiis speciebus dicta, de particulari et propriis, ex communibus autem minora. Quemadmodum igitur et in Topicis, et hie dividendum entimematum species et locos ex quibus sumendum. Dico autem species quidem propositiones proprias que sunt circa unumquodque genus, locos autem communes pariter omnium.

Sunt autem plurima enthymematum que dicuntur ex hiis speciebus, scilicet particularibus et propriis, ex comrnunibus autem pauciora. Quemadmodum igitur et in Topicis, et hic dividendum en thymematum species et locos ex quibus surnendum. Dico autem species quidem eas que secundum unumquodque genus proprias propositiones, locos autem communes similiter omnium.

Most enthymemes are in fact based upon these particular or special Lines of Argument; comparatively few on the common or general kind. As in the Topologies therefore, so in this work, we must distinguish, in dealing with enthymemes, the special and the general Lines of Argument on which they are to be founded. By special Lines of Argument I mean the propositions peculiar to each several class of things, by general those common to all classes alike.

πρότερον οὖν εἴπωμεν (33) περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν· πρῶτον δὲ λάβωμεν τὰ γένη τῆς ῥητορι(34)κῆς, ὅπως διελόμενοι πόσα ἐστίν, περὶ τούτων χωρὶς λαμ(35)βάνωμεν τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ τὰς προτάσεις.

فلنقل أولا في الأنواع ونبدأ فنتخذ أجناس الريطورية فإذا بينا كم هي أخذنا الحروف أي الأسطقسات والقضايا على حدة

. .

Primo quidem igitur dicamus de speciebus; prima quidem assumamus genera rethorice, quomodo dividentes quot sunt, de hiis divisim assumimus elementa et propositiones.

Prius quidern igitur dicamus de speciebus; primo autem accipiamus genera rethorice, quatinus dividentes quat sunt de hiis sigillatim accipiamus elementa et propositiones.

We may begin with the special Lines of Argument. But, first of all, let us classify rhetoric into its varieties. Having distinguished these we may deal with them one by one, and try to discover the elements of which each is composed, and the propositions each must employ.

[1.3.1] (36) Ἔστιν δὲ τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἴδη τρία τὸν ἀριθμόν· τοσοῦτοι (37) γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἀκροαταὶ τῶν λόγων ὑπάρχουσιν ὄντες.

قد توجد أنواع الريطورية ثلاثة عددا وكذلك يوجد السامعون للكلام

.

Sunt autem rethorice species tres numero; tot enim et auditores sermonum sunt.

Sunt itaque rethorice species tres numero; tot enim et auditores orationum existunt entes.

Part 3. Rhetoric falls into three divisions, determined by the three classes of listeners to speeches.

σύγ(38)κειται μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τριῶν ὁ λόγος, ἔκ τε τοῦ λέγοντος καὶ (1358b1) περὶ οὗ λέγει καὶ πρὸς ὅν, καὶ τὸ τέλος πρὸς τοῦτόν ἐστιν, (2) λέγω δὲ τὸν ἀκροατήν.

والكلام نفسه مركب من ثلاثة من القائل ومن المقول فيه ومن الذي إليه القول والغاية إنما هي نحو هذا أعني السامع

.

Constat enim ex tribus sermo, ex dicente quidem et de quo dicit et ad quem, et finis apud hunc, dico autem auditorem.

Componitur quidem enim ex tribus oratio, ex dicente et de quo dicit et ad quem, et finis ad hunc est, dico autem auditorem.

For of the three elements in speech-making – speaker, subject, and person addressed –it is the last one, the hearer, that determines the speech’s end and object.

[1.3.2] ἀνάγκη δὲ τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἢ θεωρὸν (3) εἶναι ἢ κριτήν, κριτὴν δὲ ἢ τῶν γεγενημένων ἢ τῶν μελ(4)λόντων.

فالسامع لا محالة إما نظار وإما حاكم والحاكم إما في المستقبلات وإما في اللاتي قد كن

.

Necesse autem auditorem aut scientem esse aut iudicem, iudicem autem aut factorum aut futurorum.

Necesse autem auditorem aut speculatorem esse aut iudicem, iudicem autem aut factorum aut futurorum.

The hearer must be either a judge, with a decision to make about things past or future, or an observer.

ἔστιν δ’ ὁ μὲν περὶ τῶν μελλόντων κρίνων ὁ ἐκ(5)κλησιαστής, ὁ δὲ περὶ τῶν γεγενημένων [οἷον] ὁ δικαστής, ὁ (6) δὲ περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως ὁ θεωρός, ὥστ’ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἂν εἴη (7) τρία γένη τῶν λόγων τῶν ῥητορικῶν, συμβουλευτικόν, δικα(8)νικόν, ἐπιδεικτικόν.

فالذي يحكم في المستقبلات كرئيس الجمع والذي يحكم في اللاتي قد كنّ كالفاحص وأمّا الناظر فللقوّة فمن الاضطرار إذا يكون الكلام الريطوري ثلاثة أجناس مشوريّ ومشاجريّ وتثبيتيّ

. .

Est autem qui de futuris iudicat ut orator, de factis vero iudex, qui vero circa potentiam sciens, quare ex necessitate utique erunt tria genera sermonum rethoricorum, deliberativum, iudiciale, demonstrativum.

Est autem qui quidem de futuris discernit velut capitaneus, qui autem de factis velut iudicator, qui vero de potentia vel ut speculator; quare ex necessitate tria utique erunt genera orationum rethoricarum, deliberativum, disceptativum, exclamativum.

A member of the assembly decides about future events, a juryman about past events: while those who merely decide on the orator’s skill are observers. From this it follows that there are three divisions of oratory — (1) political, (2) forensic, and (3) the ceremonial oratory of display.

συμβουλῆς δὲ τὸ μὲν προτροπή, τὸ (9) δὲ ἀποτροπή· ἀεὶ γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἰδίᾳ συμβουλεύοντες καὶ οἱ (10) κοινῇ δημηγοροῦντες τούτων θάτερον ποιοῦσιν. δίκης δὲ τὸ μὲν (11) κατηγορία, τὸ δ’ ἀπολογία· τούτων γὰρ ὁποτερονοῦν ποιεῖν (12) ἀνάγκη τοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντας. ἐπιδεικτικοῦ δὲ τὸ μὲν ἔπ(13)αινος τὸ δὲ ψόγος.

فأمّا المشير فمنه إذن ومنه منع فإنّ الذين يشيرون في الخواص والذين يشيرون العوام معا إنّما يفعلون أبدا واحدة من هاتين وأمّا التشاجر فمنه شكاية ومنه اعتذار فإنّ الذين يتشاجرون لا محالة إنّما يفعلون أبدا واحدة من هاتين وأمّا المُرى أو المُثبت فمنه مدح ومنه ذم

. . . . .

Deliberationis quidem hoc dissuasum, aliud vero persuasum; semper enim deliberantes propria et communia perorantes horum alterum faciunt. Iudicialis quidem hoc quidem accusatio, alterum vero responsio; horum enim utrum igitur facere necesse questionantes. Demonstrativi quidem hoc quidem laus, hoc vero vituperium.

Deliberationis autem hoc quidem exhortatio, hoc autem dehortatio; semper enim qui singulariter consulunt et qui communiter contionantur horum alterum faciunt. Disceptationis autem hoc quidem accusatio, hoc autem defensio; horum enim alterutrum facere necesse litigantes. Exclamativi autem hoc quidem laus, hoc autem vituperium.

Political speaking urges us either to do or not to do something: one of these two courses is always taken by private counsellors, as well as by men who address public assemblies. Forensic speaking either attacks or defends somebody: one or other of these two things must always be done by the parties in a case. The ceremonial oratory of display either praises or censures somebody.

χρόνοι δὲ ἑκάστου τούτων εἰσὶ τῷ μὲν (14) συμβουλεύοντι ὁ μέλλων (περὶ γὰρ τῶν ἐσομένων συμβου(15)λεύει ἢ προτρέπων ἢ ἀποτρέπων), τῷ δὲ δικαζομένῳ ὁ γε(16)νόμενος (περὶ γὰρ τῶν πεπραγμένων ἀεὶ ὁ μὲν κατηγορεῖ, (17) ὁ δὲ ἀπολογεῖται), τῷ δ’ ἐπιδεικτικῷ κυριώτατος μὲν ὁ (18) παρών (κατὰ γὰρ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἐπαινοῦσιν ἢ ψέγουσιν (19) πάντες), προσχρῶνται δὲ πολλάκις καὶ τὰ γενόμενα ἀνα (20)μιμνήσκοντες καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα προεικάζοντες.

والوقت أو الزمان لكلّ واحد من هذه أمّا الذي يشير فالمستقبل لأنه إنّما يشير المشير فيما هو مستقبل فيأذن أو يمنع فأمّا الذي ينازع فالذي قد كان فأمّا الآن فإنّما يذكر ليفصل النافع وكذلك تلك الأخرى وإنّما يكون أبدا واحد يشكو وواحد يعتذر في اللاتي قد فعلن وأمّا المرى أو المثبت فإنّ الذي هو أولى الزمان به ذلك القريب الحاضر فإنّ الناس جميعا إنما يمدحون ويذمّون على حسب ما هو موجود قائم وقد يستعملون الأرب أحيانا فإذا ذكروا النافعات تقدّموا فأشاروا في المستقبلات

. . . .

Tempora autem uniuscuiusque istorum sunt deliberanti quidem futurum (de futuris enim deliberat qui persuadet aut dissuadet), iudiciali vero factum (de factis enim semper hic quidem accusat, alter vero respondet), demonstrativo valde proprium est presens (secundum enim existentia laudant aut vituperant omnes), utuntur autem multociens et preterita commemorantes et futura preponentes.

Tempora autem uniuscuiusque horum sunt deliberauti quidem futurum (de futuris enim deliberat qui exhortatur aut dehortatur), disceptanti autem preteritum (de actis enim semper hic quidem accusat, hic autem defendit), exclamativo autem principalissimum quidem presens (secundum existentia enim laudant aut vituperant omnes), coutuntur autem sepe et facta rememorantes et futura preconicientes.

These three kinds of rhetoric refer to three different kinds of time. The political orator is concerned with the future: it is about things to be done hereafter that he advises, for or against. The party in a case at law is concerned with the past; one man accuses the other, and the other defends himself, with reference to things already done. The ceremonial orator is, properly speaking, concerned with the present, since all men praise or blame in view of the state of things existing at the time, though they often find it useful also to recall the past and to make guesses at the future.

(20) τέλος δὲ (21) ἑκάστοις τούτων ἕτερόν ἐστι, καὶ τρισὶν οὖσι τρία, τῷ μὲν (22) συμβουλεύοντι τὸ συμφέρον καὶ βλαβερόν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ (23) προτρέπων ὡς βέλτιον συμβουλεύει, ὁ δὲ ἀποτρέπων ὡς (24) χείρονος ἀποτρέπει, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα πρὸς τοῦτο συμπαραλαμ(25)βάνει, ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, ἢ καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν· τοῖς δὲ (26) δικαζομένοις τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα καὶ οὗτοι (27) συμπαραλαμβάνουσι πρὸς ταῦτα· τοῖς δ’ ἐπαινοῦσιν καὶ (28) ψέγουσιν τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσχρόν, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα καὶ οὗτοι (29) πρὸς ταῦτα ἐπαναφέρουσιν.

وأما الغاية من كل واحد من هذه فمختلفة وهي ثلاث لثلاثة أما للمشير فالنافع والضارّ فإنّ الذي يشير يأذن في التي هي أفضل ويمنع من تلك الأخسّ وقد تستعمل تلك الأخر أيضا في هذا المعنى أعني العادلة والجائرة أو الصالحة أو السعيدة وأما المشاجري فالعادلة أو الجائرة

. . . . . .

Horum autem unicuique finis alius est, et cum sint tria tres, deliberanti quidem utile et inutile; qui enim persuadet sicut melius consulit, qui vero dissuadet sicut deterius dissuadet, alia vero cum hoc assumit, aut iustum aut iniustum, aut bonum aut malum; iudicantibus vero iustum et iniustum, et alia et hii assumunt ad hec; laudantibus et vituperantibus bonum et malum, alia vero ad hec et hii referunt.

Singulis autem horum finis alius est, et tribus existentibus tres, deliberanti quidem conferens et nocivum; qui enim exhortatur tamquam melius consulit, qui autem dehortatur tamquam deterius dissuadet, alia autem ad hoc coassumit, aut iustum vel iniustum aut pulcrum vel turpe; disceptantibus autem iustum et iniustum, alia autem et hii coassumunt ad hec; laudantibus vera et vituperantibus pulcrum et turpe, alia autem ad hec et hii referunt.

Rhetoric has three distinct ends in view, one for each of its three kinds. The political orator aims at establishing the expediency or the harmfulness of a proposed course of action; if he urges its acceptance, he does so on the ground that it will do good; if he urges its rejection, he does so on the ground that it will do harm; and all other points, such as whether the proposal is just or unjust, honourable or dishonourable, he brings in as subsidiary and relative to this main consideration. Parties in a law—case aim at establishing the justice or injustice of some action, and they too bring in all other points as subsidiary and relative to this one. Those who praise or attack a man aim at proving him worthy of honour or the reverse, and they too treat all other considerations with reference to this one.

σημεῖον δ’ ὅτι τὸ εἰρημένον (30) ἑκάστοις τέλος· περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνίοτε οὐκ ἂν (31) ἀμφισβητήσαιεν, οἷον ὁ δικαζόμενος ὡς οὐ γέγονεν ἢ (32) οὐκ ἔβλαψεν· ὅτι δ’ ἀδικεῖ οὐδέποτ’ ἂν ὁμολογήσειεν· (33) οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἔδει δίκης.

والرسم لكل واحد منهما هو الغاية التي ذكرت وأما تلك الأخرى فربما لم يكن فيها مكاس ومعاسرة /و/كما ينازع المنازع في أنه قد كان أو أنه لم يكن فاما أنه ظلم فلا يقرّ بذلك البتّة فربما لم تكن به حاجة إلى المشاجرة

. . . .

Signum quidem quoniam dictum unicuique finis est; de aliis enim aliquotiens non dubitabunt, ut iudex quomodo non factum est aut quomodo non lesit; quoniam autem iniustificat non utique confitebitur; non enim verebatur iustitiam.

Signum autem quod id quod dictum est singulis sit finis; de aliis quidem enim numquam utique litigabunt, puta qui diiudicatur quomodo non fuerit factum aut quomodo non nocuerit; quod autem iniuriam fecerit non utique confitebitur; nichil enim utique opus esset disceptatione.

That the three kinds of rhetoric do aim respectively at the three ends we have mentioned is shown by the fact that speakers will sometimes not try to establish anything else. Thus, the litigant will sometimes not deny that a thing has happened or that he has done harm. But that he is guilty of injustice he will never admit; otherwise there would be no need of a trial.

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ συμβουλεύοντες (34) τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πολλάκις προΐενται, ὡς δὲ ἀσύμφορα συμ(35)βουλεύουσιν ἢ ἀπ’ ὠφελίμων ἀποτρέπουσιν οὐκ ἂν ὁμολογή(36)σαιεν· ὡς δ’ [οὐκ] ἄδικον τοὺς ἀστυγείτονας καταδουλοῦσθαι (37) καὶ τοὺς μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντας, πολλάκις οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν.

وكذلك الذين يشيرون قد يقدّمون هذه الأخر كثيرا ويشيرون بما لا ينفع ويمنعون من النافعات غير أنهم لا يقرّون بذلك كمثل ما قالوا إنه ليس جور منهم أن يقهروا مدينة في جوارهم وما لم يجوروا عليه وليس ينبغي أن يعنيهم شيء من أمره

. .

Similiter autem et deliberantes alia quidem multociens pretermittunt, sicut inhonesta deliberant aut ab utilibus dissuadent non utique confitebuntur; sicut non iniustum cives vicinos servos facere et nichil iniustificantes, multociens non curant.

Similiter autem et deliberantes alia quidem sepe fatentur, quod autem inutilia consuluerint aut a proficuis dissuaserint non utique confitebuntur; quasi autem non iniustum vicinos in servitutem redigere et eos qui nichil iniuriabantur, sepe nichil curant.

So too, political orators often make any concession short of admitting that they are recommending their hearers to take an inexpedient course or not to take an expedient one. The question whether it is not unjust for a city to enslave its innocent neighbours often does not trouble them at all.

(38) ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ οἱ ψέγοντες οὐ σκοποῦσιν (1359a1) εἰ συμφέροντα ἔπραξεν ἢ βλαβερά, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἐπαίνῳ (2) πολλάκις τιθέασιν ὅτι ὀλιγωρήσας τοῦ αὑτῷ λυσιτελοῦντος (3) ἔπραξεν ὅ τι καλόν, οἷον Ἀχιλλέα ἐπαινοῦσιν ὅτι ἐβοήθησε (4) τῷ ἑταίρῳ Πατρόκλῳ εἰδὼς ὅτι δεῖ αὐτὸν ἀποθανεῖν ἐξὸν ζῆν.

وكذلك الذين يمدحون ويذمون لا ينـظرون كثيرا في أنه فعل فيما ينفع أو يضرّ لكنهم يضعون الاتي يكون بها المدح أكثر ذلك فإن المرء قد يتهاون بالذي ينفعه ويفعل مع ذلك كل حسن كما يمدح أخيلوس حين نصر فطروقلوس صاحبه وهو يعلم أنه يموت بسببه ولا يحيا

. .

Similiter autem et laudantes et vituperantes non considerant aut honesta egerint aut inhonesta, sed in laude posuerunt quoniam despicientes quod proficit eis multociens operati sunt bonum aliquod, ut Achillem laudant quoniam auxiliatus est alteri Patroclo sciens quoniam oportet ipsum mori quam vivere.

Similiter autem et laudantes et vituperantes nichil considerant si conferentia egerunt aut nociva, sed et in laude sepe ponunt quod parvi pendens quod ipsi erat pretiosum egit quod pulcrum, Achillem laudant quod adiuvit amicum Patroclum sciens quod oportebat ipsum mori cum posset vivcre.

In like manner those who praise or censure a man do not consider whether his acts have been expedient or not, but often make it a ground of actual praise that he has neglected his own interest to do what was honourable. Thus, they praise Achilles because he championed his fallen friend Patroclus, though he knew that this meant death, and that otherwise he need not die:

(5) τούτῳ δὲ ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος θάνατος κάλλιον, τὸ δὲ ζῆν συμφέρον.

فالموت لهذا هاهنا أحسن والحياة هي النافعة له

.

Huic autem huiusmodi mors melior est, vivere vero honestum.

Huic autem talis mors pulcrior erat, vivere autem conferens.

yet while to die thus was the nobler thing for him to do, the expedient thing was to live on.

(6) φανερὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι ἀνάγκη περὶ τού(7)των ἔχειν πρῶτον τὰς προτάσεις· τὰ γὰρ τεκμήρια καὶ (8) τὰ εἰκότα καὶ τὰ σημεῖα προτάσεις εἰσὶν ῥητορικαί· ὅλως (9) μὲν γὰρ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ προτάσεών ἐστιν, τὸ δ’ ἐνθύμημα (10) συλλογισμός ἐστι συνεστηκὼς ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων προτάσεων. (11) ἐπεὶ δὲ οὔτε πραχθῆναι οἷόν τε οὔτε πεπρᾶχθαι τὰ ἀδύ(12)νατα ἀλλὰ τὰ δυνατά, οὐδὲ τὰ μὴ γενόμενα ἢ μὴ ἐσό(13)μενα [οὐχ] οἷόν τε τὰ μὲν πεπρᾶχθαι, τὰ δὲ πραχθήσεσθαι, (14) ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τῷ συμβουλεύοντι καὶ τῷ δικαζομένῳ καὶ (15) τῷ ἐπιδεικτικῷ ἔχειν προτάσεις περὶ δυνατοῦ καὶ ἀδυνάτου, (16) καὶ εἰ γέγονεν ἢ μή, καὶ εἰ ἔσται ἢ μή.

فهو معلوم من قبل ما قد قيل أنه من الاضطرار أن يكون في هذا النحو من الكلام قضية مقدّمة فالدلائل والصدق والرواسم هن مقدمات الريطورية لأن السلوجسموس بأسره من المقدمات فأما التفكير فسلوجسموس يكون من هذه المقدمات التي ذُكرت ومن أجل أن الاتي هن لا ممكنات لا يستطاع أن يفعلن في الحاضر ولا في المستقبل فانه لا الاتي لم يكنّ ولا الاتي لا يكنّ فيما يستقبل يستطاع أن يكنّ مفعولات أو يكنّ سيفعلن فلا بد للذي يشير والذي ينازع والذي يرى أو يثبت من أن تكون له قضايا في الأمر يمكن ولا يمكن وهل كان أو لم يكن ويكون أو لا يكون

. . . .

Manifestum autem ex dictis quod necesse est de hiis habere prius propositiones; tecmiria enim et ycota et signa propositiones sunt rethorice; universaliter quidem enim sillogismus ex propositionibus est, entimema quidem sillogismus quidam sensibilis ex predictis. Quoniam autem neque fieri arbitrantur neque facta sunt impossibilia sed possibilia, neque non fienda aut futura non arbitrantur hec quidem facta sunt, hec vero fient, necessarium est et deliberanti et iudicanti et demonstranti habere propositiones de possibili et impossibili, et si factum est aut non, aut erit aut non.

Manifestum autem ex dictis quod necesse de hiis habere primum propositiones; tecmeria enim et ykota et signa propositiones sunt rethorice; totaliter quidem enim sillogismus ex propositionibus est, enthymema autem sillogismus est constans ex dictis propositionibus. Quoniam autem neque acta esse neque agenda possibile est impossibilia, sed possibilia, neque que non fiebant aut futura erant non possibile est hcc quidem acta esse in preterito, hec autem agi in futuro, necessarium et deliberanti et clisceptanti et exclamativo habere propositiones de possibili et impossibili, et si factum fuit aut non, et si erit aut non.

It is evident from what has been said that it is these three subjects, more than any others, about which the orator must be able to have propositions at his command. Now the propositions of Rhetoric are Complete Proofs, Probabilities, and Signs. Every kind of syllogism is composed of propositions, and the enthymeme is a particular kind of syllogism composed of the aforesaid propositions. Since only possible actions, and not impossible ones, can ever have been done in the past or the present, and since things which have not occurred, or will not occur, also cannot have been done or be going to be done, it is necessary for the political, the forensic, and the ceremonial speaker alike to be able to have at their command propositions about the possible and the impossible, and about whether a thing has or has not occurred, will or will not occur.

ἔτι δὲ ἐπεὶ ἅπαν(17)τες, καὶ ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ ψέγοντες, καὶ προτρέποντες καὶ (18) ἀποτρέποντες, καὶ κατηγοροῦντες καὶ ἀπολογούμενοι, οὐ μόνον (19) τὰ εἰρημένα δεικνύναι πειρῶνται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι μέγα ἢ (20) μικρὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ κακόν, ἢ τὸ καλὸν ἢ τὸ αἰσχρόν, (21) ἢ τὸ δίκαιον ἢ τὸ ἄδικον, ἢ καθ’ αὑτὰ λέγοντες ἢ πρὸς (22) ἄλληλα ἀντιπαραβάλλοντες, δῆλον ὅτι δέοι ἂν καὶ περὶ (23) μεγέθους καὶ μικρότητος καὶ τοῦ μείζονος καὶ τοῦ ἐλάττονος (24) προτάσεις ἔχειν, καὶ καθόλου καὶ περὶ ἑκάστου, οἷον τί μεῖ(25)ζον ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἔλαττον ἢ ἀδίκημα ἢ δικαίωμα· ὁμοίως δὲ (26) καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων. περὶ ὧν μὲν οὖν ἐξ ἀνάγκης δεῖ (27) λαβεῖν τὰς προτάσεις, εἴρηται·

ثم أن جميع المتكلمين يمدحون ويذمّون ويأذنون ويمنعون ويشكون ويعتذرون وليس هذا فقط يتكلفون بل ان الأمر حسن أو قبيح أو عدل أو جور اما حين يضعون الأمور مفردة بأنفسها واما حين يقيسون بعضها ببعض فهو معلوم أنه ينبغي أن تكون عندهم قضايا في أن الأمر عظيم أو يسير وفي الأفضل والأخسّ وفي الكليات والمفردات كما يقال في شيء من الخير إنه فاضل أو خسيس وإنه جور أو واجب وكذلك تلك الأخرى أما الاتي ينبغي اضطرارا أن تستعمل في القضايا فقد وصفناها

. .

Amplius autem quoniam omnes, et laudantes et vituperantes, et persuadentes et dissuadentes, et accusantes et respondentes, non solum predicta demonstrare temptant, sed et quoniam magnum aut parvum bonum aut malum, aut iustum aut iniustum, ad invicem aut secundum se aut ad alia intromittuntur, palam quoniam oportebit et de magnitudine et de parvitate et maiori et minori propositiones habere, et de universali et particulari, ut puta quid maius bonum aut quid minus aut iustificatio aut iniustificatio; similiter autem et de aliis. De quibus quidem igitur ex necessitate oportet dicere propositiones, dictum est;

Adhuc autem quoniam omnes, et laudantes et vituperantes, et exhortantes et dehortantes, et accusantes et defendentes, non solum ea que dicta sunt ostendere temptant, sed et quod magnum aut parvum bonum aut malum, vel pulcrum aut turpe, vel iustum aut iniustum, vel secundum se dicentes aut ad invicem comparantes, palam quia oportebit utique et de magnitudine et parvitatc et de maiori et minori propositiones habere, et universaliter et de unoquoque, puta quid maius bonum aut quid minus vel iniustitia aut iustitia; similiter autem et de aliis. De quibus quidem igitur ex necessitate oportet dicere propositiones, dictum est.

Further, all men, in giving praise or blame, in urging us to accept or reject proposals for action, in accusing others or defending themselves, attempt not only to prove the points mentioned but also to show that the good or the harm, the honour or disgrace, the justice or injustice, is great or small, either absolutely or relatively; and therefore it is plain that we must also have at our command propositions about greatness or smallness and the greater or the lesser—propositions both universal and particular. Thus, we must be able to say which is the greater or lesser good, the greater or lesser act of justice or injustice; and so on. Such, then, are the subjects regarding which we are inevitably bound to master the propositions relevant to them.

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα διαιρετέον (28) ἰδίᾳ περὶ ἑκάστου τούτων, οἷον περὶ ὧν συμβουλὴ καὶ περὶ (29) ὧν οἱ ἐπιδεικτικοὶ λόγοι, τρίτον δὲ περὶ ὧν αἱ δίκαι.

وأما بعد هذا فإنه ينبغي أن نقسم على حدة كل واحدة من هذه الاتي فيها تكون المشورة والكلام /و/المثبت والثالثة الاتي فيها يكون التشاجر

.

post hec autem dividendum est propria de unoquoque istorum, ut puta de quibus deliberatio et de quibus demonstrativi sermones, tertio autem et de quibus iudicia.

Post hec autem dividendum singulariter de unoquoque horum, puta de quibus deliberatio et de quibus exclamative orationes, tertio autem de qui bus disceptationes.

We must now discuss each particular class of these subjects in turn, namely those dealt with in political, in ceremonial, and lastly in legal, oratory.

4. (30) Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ληπτέον περὶ ποῖα ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ (31) ὁ συμβουλεύων συμβουλεύει, ἐπειδὴ οὐ περὶ ἅπαντα ἀλλ’ (32) ὅσα ἐνδέχεται καὶ γενέσθαι καὶ μή, ὅσα δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ (33) ἔστιν ἢ ἔσται, ἢ ἀδύνατον ἢ εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι, περὶ δὲ τούτων (34) οὐκ ἔστι συμβουλή.

فأما أول ذلك فإنه ينبغي أن ننظر من أجل أي الخير يشير المشير ومن أجل أنه ليس في كل شيء تكون المشورة لكن في الذي يسطاع أن يكون وأن لا يكون فأما الاتي من الاضطرار أن تكون أو لا يستطاع أن تكون فليست فيهم مشورة

. . .

Primum quidem igitur sumendum est circa que bona aut mala consultans deliberat, quoniam utique non circa omnia, sed quecumque contingit fieri et non; quecumque vero ex necessitate aut sunt aut erunt, aut impossibile est esse aut fieri, de hiis autem non est consultatio.

Prima quidem igitur accipiendum circa qualia bona aut mala deliberans consulit, quoniam non circa omnia, sed quecumque contingit et fieri et non, quecumque autem ex necessitate aut sunt aut erunt, vel impossibile esse aut fieri, de biis non est consilium.

Part 4. First, then, we must ascertain what are the kinds of things, good or bad, about which the political orator offers counsel. For he does not deal with all things, but only with such as may or may not take place. Concerning things which exist or will exist inevitably, or which cannot possibly exist or take place, no counsel can be given.

οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ἁπάντων· (35) ἔστιν γὰρ καὶ φύσει ἔνια καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης γινόμενα ἀγαθὰ (36) τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ γίγνεσθαι καὶ μή, περὶ ὧν οὐδὲν πρὸ (37) ἔργου τὸ συμβουλεύειν· ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ὅσων ἐστὶν τὸ (38) βουλεύεσθαι.

ولا في كل الممكنات أيضا فان من الخيرات خيرات هن في الطبيعة وقد تكون بالعرض مما يمكن أن يكون وأن لا يكون فليست المشورة فيهم من مقدمات العمل فقد استبان ووضح في مقدار كم تكون المشورة

. . .

Neque utique de contingentibus omnibus; sunt enim et natura quedam et a fortuna fienda bona contingentium et fieri et non, de qui bus non est pre opere deliberare; sed manifestum quod de quibuscumque consultare.

Neque etiam de contingentibus omnibus; sunt enim et a natura quedam et a fortuna fiunt bona contingentium et fieri et non, de quibus nichil pre opere consiliari; sed palam quia de quibuscumque est consiliari,

Nor, again, can counsel be given about the whole class of things which may or may not take place; for this class includes some good things that occur naturally, and some that occur by accident; and about these it is useless to offer counsel. Clearly counsel can only be given on matters about which people deliberate;

τοιαῦτα δ’ ἐστὶν ὅσα πέφυκεν ἀνάγεσθαι εἰς (39) ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἐστιν· μέχρι γὰρ τού (1359b1) του σκοποῦμεν, ἕως ἂν εὕρωμεν εἰ ἡμῖν δυνατὰ ἢ ἀδύνατα πρᾶξαι.

وذلك في جميع الاتي يمكن أن تفعل بنا والاتي بدو كونها من قبلنا فانا قد ننظر في الأشياء حتى يتبين لنا أنها مما لا يمكن أن تفعل إن كانت كذلك

. .

Hec autem sunt quecumque possunt reduci ad nos, et quorum principium generationis in nobis est; usque ad hoc consideramus, quousque inveniamus si a nobis possunt agi.

talia sunt quecumque nata sunt reduci in nos, et quorum principium generationis in nobis est; usque ad hoc enim aspicimus, donec inveniamus si nobis possibilia agere.

matters, namely, that ultimately depend on ourselves, and which we have it in our power to set going. For we turn a thing over in our mind until we have reached the point of seeing whether we can do it or not.

(2) καθ’ ἕκαστον μὲν οὖν ἀκριβῶς διαριθμήσασθαι καὶ (3) διαλαβεῖν εἰς εἴδη περὶ ὧν εἰώθασι χρηματίζειν, ἔτι (4) δ’ ὅσον ἐνδέχεται περὶ αὐτῶν διορίσαι κατὰ τὴν ἀλή(5)θειαν, οὐ δεῖ κατὰ τὸν παρόντα καιρὸν ζητεῖν διὰ τὸ (6) μήτε τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἶναι τέχνης, ἀλλ’ ἐμφρονεστέρας καὶ (7) μᾶλλον ἀληθινῆς, πολλῷ τε πλείω δεδόσθαι καὶ νῦν αὐτῇ (8) τῶν οἰκείων θεωρημάτων· ὅπερ γὰρ καὶ πρότερον εἰρηκότες (9) τυγχάνομεν ἀληθές ἐστιν, ὅτι ἡ ῥητορικὴ σύγκειται μὲν (10) ἔκ τε τῆς ἀναλυτικῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἤθη πο(11)λιτικῆς, ὁμοία δ’ ἐστὶν τὰ μὲν τῇ διαλεκτικῇ τὰ δὲ τοῖς (12) σοφιστικοῖς λόγοις. ὅσῳ δ’ ἄν τις ἢ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ἢ (13) ταύτην μὴ καθάπερ ἂν δυνάμεις ἀλλ’ ἐπιστήμας πειρᾶται (14) κατασκευάζειν, λήσεται τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν ἀφανίσας τῷ μετα(15)βαίνειν ἐπισκευάζων εἰς ἐπιστήμας ὑποκειμένων τινῶν πρα(16)γμάτων, ἀλλὰ μὴ μόνον λόγων. ὅμως δὲ ὅσα πρὸ ἔργου μέν (17) ἐστι διελεῖν, ἔτι δ’ ὑπολείπει σκέψιν τῇ πολιτικῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, (18) εἴπωμεν καὶ νῦν.

فأما إحصاء كل واحدة منها والإحاطة بها من قبل الأنواع التي اعتيد أن يوقّع عليها والتحديد لها والبيان عنها بمبلغ الطاقة فليس ينبغي تكلفه بالحقيقة والاستقصاء في هذا الوقت الحاضر لأنّ هذا ليس من شأن الصناعة الريطورية ولكن من شأن تلك التي لها الفضل في الفهم وهي بالحوى أن تكون أصحّ وأصدق والقول فيها أكثر ولا الذى يتكلف هاهنا أيضا أبواب وقوانين أهلية فالذي ذكرنا آنفا قد وجد حقّا أعني قولنا أن الريطورية مركبة من الأنالوطيقي ومن الفوليطية التي في الأخلاق وقد تشبه في شيء الديالقطيقية وفي أشياء أخر الكلام السوفسطي وذلك بأن يتكلف متكلف تهيئة هذه الديالقطيقية فيوصل طبيعتهن ويلغي ما فيهن من الاختلاف ويهيئون نحو العلم إذ يجعل الموضوع لها ليس أمورا ما لكن الكلام فقط وذلك في قدرها من بدو العمل ان تفصل وتميز ثم على أنها قد تدع للعلم الفوليطي موضع نظر وتدبر في مثل هذا الذي نحن ذاكرون

. . . .

Unumquodque igitur diligenter dinumerare et assumere in species de quibus consueverunt vivere, amplius autem quantum contingit de ipsis determinare secundum veritatem, non oportet secundum presens tempus inquirere pro eo quod non est rethorice artis, sed manifestioris et verioris, multo magis attribuitur et nunc eidem a propriis speculationibus; quod et prima dicentes adipiscimur, verum est, quoniam rethorica componitur ex dialetica scientia et ex civili que est circa consuetudines, similia autem sunt hec quidem dialetice, hec autem sophisticis sermonibus. Quantum autem si quis aut dialeticam aut hanc non tamquam potentias, sed scientias temptat construere, solvet naturam ipsorum destruens pertranseundo construens ad scientias aliquarurn subiectarum quidem rerum, sed non solum sermonum. Tamen quecumque pre opere est quidem dividere, adhuc autem relinquit inquisitionem civili scientie, dicamus et nunc.

Per singula quidem igitur diligenter dinumerare et distinguere in species de quibus consueverunt negotiari, adhuc autem quantum contingit de ipsis determinare secundum veritatem, non oportet secundum presens tempus inquirere propterea quod non est artis rethorice, sed illustrioris et magis vere, et quia multo plura attributa sunt et nunc ipsi quam sint propria theoremata. Quod enim et prius dicentes extitimus verum est, quod rethorica componitur quidem ex dialetica scientia et ex ea que circa mores politica, similis antem est quantum ad hec quidem dialetice, quantum ad alia autem sophisticis sennonibus. Quanto autem utique quis vel dialeticam vel hanc non' quemadmodum uti que potentias, sed ut scientias temptaverit constituere, latebit naturam ipsarum exterminans eo quod transgrediatur insuper instituendo ad scientias quarundam rerum subiectarum et non solum orationum. Attamen quecumque pre opere quidem est dividere, relinquunt autem considerationem adhuc politice scientie, dicamus et nunc.

Now to enumerate and classify accurately the usual subjects of public business, and further to frame, as far as possible, true definitions of them is a task which we must not attempt on the present occasion. For it does not belong to the art of rhetoric, but to a more instructive art and a more real branch of knowledge; and as it is, rhetoric has been given a far wider subject—matter than strictly belongs to it. The truth is, as indeed we have said already, that rhetoric is a combination of the science of logic and of the ethical branch of politics; and it is partly like dialectic, partly like sophistical reasoning. But the more we try to make either dialectic rhetoric not, what they really are, practical faculties, but sciences, the more we shall inadvertently be destroying their true nature; for we shall be re—fashioning them and shall be passing into the region of sciences dealing with definite subjects rather than simply with words and forms of reasoning. Even here, however, we will mention those points which it is of practical importance to distinguish, their fuller treatment falling naturally to political science.

(19) σχεδὸν γάρ, περὶ ὧν βουλεύονται πάντες καὶ περὶ ὧν ἀγο(20)ρεύουσιν οἱ συμβουλεύοντες, τὰ μέγιστα τυγχάνει πέντε τὸν (21) ἀριθμὸν ὄντα· ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶν περί τε πόρων, καὶ πολέμου καὶ (22) εἰρήνης, ἔτι δὲ περὶ φυλακῆς τῆς χώρας, καὶ τῶν εἰσαγομένων (23) καὶ ἐξαγομένων, καὶ νομοθεσίας· ὥστε περὶ μὲν πόρων τὸν (24) μέλλοντα συμβουλεύειν δέοι ἂν τὰς προσόδους τῆς πόλεως εἰδέναι (25) τίνες καὶ πόσαι, ὅπως εἴτε τις παραλείπεται προστεθῇ καὶ (26) εἴ τις ἐλάττων αὐξηθῇ, ἔτι δὲ τὰς δαπάνας τῆς πόλεως (27) ἁπάσας, ὅπως εἴ τις περίεργος ἀφαιρεθῇ καὶ εἴ τις μείζων (28) ἐλάττων γένηται· οὐ γὰρ μόνον πρὸς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα προσ(29)τιθέντες πλουσιώτεροι γίγνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀφαιροῦντες τῶν (30) δαπανημάτων.

فقد يوجد قريبا من أن تكون جميع الأمور الجسيمة التي يتشاور فيها المتشاورون ويتكلم فيها ويثبتها المشيرون خمسة عددا فقر تكون المشورة في العدة وفي الحرب وفي السلم وفي حفظ البلد وفيما يدخل ويخرج فقي وضع السنن فالذي يشير في العدة حقيق أن يعرف غلات المدينة ما هي وأي وكم كيما إن قصر شيء زيد فيه وإن نقص مد وكثر وعرف مع ذلك نفقات المدينة كلها وإن كان فيها إنسان بطال أو متعطل نحى وإن كان عظيم المروءة حط عن تلك المرتبة فإنهم ليس في الزيادة في المال فقط يزدادون لكن بالنقصان من النفقة أيضا

. . . . .

Fere enim, de quibus consultant omnes et circa que agunt consultantes, maxime autem inveniunt quinque numero entia; hec autem sunt de expensis, et de bello et pace, amplius autem et de custodia loci, et inducendis et extrahendis, et legum positione; quare de expensis quidem debentem deliberare oportet utique introitus civitatis considerare et quot et quales, quomodo si aliqua deficit restauretur et si quis minor augeatur, amplius autem consumptiones civitatis omnes, quomodo si qua superflua auferatur et si qua maior minor fiat; non enim apponentes super existentibus ditiores fiunt, sed auferentes a consumptionibus.

Fere enim de quibus consiliantur omnes et circa que pronuntiant deliberantes, maxime quinque numero existunt entia; hec autem sunt de proventibus, et de bello et pace, adhuc autem et de custodia regionis, et de hiis que inferuntur et educuntur, et de legislatione; quare de proventibus quidem debentem consiliari oportebit utique introitus civitatis scire et qui et quanti, quatinus si quis deficit apponatur et si quis minor augeatur, adhuc autem expensas civitatis omnes, quatinus si que superflue auferantur et si que maiores minores fiant; non enim solum apponentes ad existentia ditiores fiunt, sed et auferentes ab expensis.

The main matters on which all men deliberate and on which political speakers make speeches are some five in number: ways and means, war and peace, national defence, imports and exports, and legislation. As to Ways and Means, then, the intending speaker will need to know the number and extent of the country’s sources of revenue, so that, if any is being overlooked, it may be added, and, if any is defective, it may be increased. Further, he should know all the expenditure of the country, in order that, if any part of it is superfluous, it may be abolished, or, if any is too large, it may be reduced. For men become richer not only by increasing their existing wealth but also by reducing their expenditure.

ταῦτα δ’ οὐ μόνον ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἴδια ἐμ(31)πειρίας ἐνδέχεται συνορᾶν, ἀλλ’ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ἄλ(32)λοις εὑρημένων ἱστορικὸν εἶναι πρὸς τὴν περὶ τούτων συμβουλήν. (33) περὶ δὲ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης τὴν δύναμιν εἰδέναι (34) τῆς πόλεως, ὁπόση τε ὑπάρχει ἤδη καὶ πόσην ἐνδέχε(35)ται ὑπάρξαι, καὶ ποία τις ἥ τε ὑπάρχουσά ἐστιν καὶ (36) ἥτις ἐνδέχεται προσγενέσθαι, ἔτι δὲ πολέμους πῶς καὶ τίνας (37) πεπολέμηκεν. οὐ μόνον δὲ τῆς οἰκείας πόλεως ἀλλὰ (38) καὶ τῶν ὁμόρων ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖον εἰδέναι, καὶ πρὸς οὓς (39) ἐπίδοξον πολεμεῖν, ὅπως πρὸς μὲν τοὺς κρείττους εἰρηνεύηται, (1360a1) πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἥττους ἐφ’ αὑτοῖς ᾖ τὸ πολεμεῖν, καὶ τὰς δυ(2)νάμεις, πότερον ὅμοιαι ἢ ἀνόμοιαι· ἔστιν γὰρ καὶ ταύτῃ πλεον(3)εκτεῖν ἢ ἐλαττοῦσθαι.

وهذا مما قد يقدر على معرفته ليس من التجارب في الأمور الخواص فقط ولكن من قبل الاضطرار أيضا وينبغي أن يكون عالما بالأخبار التي يتحدث بها عن آخرين فأما في الحرب والسلم فأن يعرف قوة الأمور وقدره وحال المدينة وكم هي في تلك الحال وكم تستطيع أن يكون وبأي نحو هي تستطيع أن تقبل زيادة شيء وأن يعرف مع ذلك شيئا من الحروب وكيف حارب من حارب وقد يحتاج إلى أن يعرف ليس حال أهل مدينته فقط ولكن حال من في تخومه وما يليه أيضا وان لم يعلم إلى أي المحمودات تؤدي المحاربة no Arabic وأن يعرف حال الاجناد أيضا متشابهون هم أم غير متشابهين فإنهم ربما تناسلوا وأكثروا

. . . . . .

. sed necessarium est et ab inventis ab aliis ystoriatum esse ad consultationern circa hoc. De bello vero et pace potentiam videre civitatis, quanta fuit iam et quantam contingit esse, et qualis quedam est que presens est et si qua contingit ante fieri, amplius autem bella quedam et quomodo pugnaverunt. Non solum proprie civitatis sed et aliorum hec necesse scire, aut apud quos arbitrandum bellare, quomodo ad meliores quidem pacificant, apud minores quidem in ipsis erit bellare, et potentias quidem utrum equales aut inequales; est autem et in hac excellere et deficere (superhabundam et minorificari).

Hec autem non solum ex ea que circa propria experientia contingit conspicere, sed necessarium et inventorum aput alios scientem esse ad eam que de hoc deliberationem. De bello autem et pace scire potentiam civitatis, quanta est iam et quantam contingit fore, et qualis quedam et que existit et que potest ad venire, adhuc autem bella que et qualiter preliati sunt. Non solum autem proprie civitatis sed et conterminalium hec necessarium scire, aut et ad quos dubii eventus sit pugnare, quatinus ad meliores quidem pacem habeant, ad deteriores autem in ipsis sit pugnare, et potentie utrum similes aut dissimiles; est enim et hiis excedere et minorari.

A comprehensive view of these questions cannot be gained solely from experience in home affairs; in order to advise on such matters a man must be keenly interested in the methods worked out in other lands. As to Peace and War, he must know the extent of the military strength of his country, both actual and potential, and also the mature of that actual and potential strength; and further, what wars his country has waged, and how it has waged them. He must know these facts not only about his own country, but also about neighbouring countries; and also about countries with which war is likely, in order that peace may be maintained with those stronger than his own, and that his own may have power to make war or not against those that are weaker. He should know, too, whether the military power of another country is like or unlike that of his own; for this is a matter that may affect their relative strength.

ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα μὴ μόνον τοὺς (4) οἰκείους πολέμους τεθεωρηκέναι ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς τῶν ἄλλων, πῶς (5) ἀποβαίνουσιν· ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν ὁμοίων τὰ ὅμοια γίγνεσθαι πέφυκεν.

وقد ينبغي له مع ذلك ألا يكون ينظر في حروبه فقط ولكن في حروب غيره إلى ما آلت لأن الشبيهات ممكنة أن تكون من الشبيهات

. .

Necesse vero et ad hec non solum propria bella providere, sed et ea que sunt aliorurn, quomodo contingunt; a similibus enim similia fieri apta nata sunt.

Necessarium autem et ad hec non sol urn tua prelia considerasse sed et ea que aliorum, qualiter eveniunt; a similibus enim similia fieri nata sunt.

With the same end in view he must, besides, have studied the wars of other countries as well as those of his own, and the way they ended; similar causes are likely to have similar results.

(6) ἔτι δὲ περὶ φυλακῆς τῆς χώρας μὴ λανθάνειν πῶς (7) φυλάττεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἰδέναι τῆς φυλακῆς καὶ (8) τὸ εἶδος καὶ τοὺς τόπους τῶν φυλακτηρίων (τοῦτο δ’ ἀδύ(9)νατον μὴ ἔμπειρον ὄντα τῆς χώρας), ἵν’ εἴ τ’ ἐλάττων ἡ φυ(10)λακὴ προστεθῇ καὶ εἴ τις περίεργος ἀφαιρεθῇ καὶ τοὺς ἐπι(11)τηδείους τόπους τηρῶσι μᾶλλον.

ثم في حفظ البالد أيضا فإنه ينبغي أن لا يذهب عليه حفظ البلاد وكيف ينبغي أن تحفظ وأن يعرف مبلغ الحفظ ونوعه ومواضع المسالح وهذا يمكنه وإن لم يكن بالبلاد خبر فإن كان في الحفظة قليلا زاد فيهم وإن كان فيهم ذو إرب ومكر نحّاه ونبغي له أن يحفظ بزيادة المواضع التي ينتفع بحفظها

. . .

Amplius autem de custodia loci, quod non la teat nos quomodo custoditur, sed necesse multitudinem videre custodie et speciem et loca custodiarum (hoc autem impossibile, si non est expertus loci), ut si minor fuerit custodia addatur et si superflua auferatur et apta loca custodiunt magis.

Adhuc autem de munitione regionis non latere qualiter custoditur, sed multitudinem scire custodie et speciem et loca munitionum (hoc autem impossibile non expertum existentem regionis), ut si minor sit custodia apponatur et si qua superflua auferatur et loca ydonea observent magis.

With regard to National Defence: he ought to know all about the methods of defence in actual use, such as the strength and character of the defensive force and the positions of the forts — this last means that he must be well acquainted with the lie of the country — in order that a garrison may be increased if it is too small or removed if it is not wanted, and that the strategic points may be guarded with special care.

(12) ἔτι δὲ περὶ τροφῆς, πόση [δαπάνη] ἱκανὴ τῇ πόλει καὶ ποία, (13) ἡ αὐτοῦ τε γιγνομένη καὶ <ἡ> εἰσαγώγιμος, καὶ τίνων τ’ ἐξ(14)αγωγῆς δέονται καὶ τίνων <καὶ παρὰ τίνων> εἰσαγωγῆς, ἵνα (15) πρὸς τούτους καὶ συνθῆκαι καὶ συμβολαὶ γίγνωνται· πρὸς δύο (16) γὰρ διαφυλάττειν ἀναγκαῖον ἀνεγκλήτους τοὺς πολίτας, πρός (17) τε τοὺς κρείττους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς εἰς ταῦτα χρησίμους.

وأن يعرف أيضا مبلغ القوت وبكم من النزل تكتفي المدينة وكم الحاضر الموجود فيها من ذلك وهل أدخل ذلك وأحرز وما الأشياء التي ينبغي أن تدحل لتكون مشورته وما يعهد به على حسب ذلك فإنه قد يحتاج المرء إلى أن يحفظ أهل مدينته لأمرين للأفاضل ولذوي الغنى منهم

. . .

Amplius autem de nutrimento, quanta consumptio sufficiens est civitati et quantum ibidem factum et quantum introducendum, et quorum extraductione indigent et quorum inductione, quod ad hos consultationes et compositiones fiant; penes duo enim necessarium custodire cives non querulos, penes rnaiores et penes ad hec utiles.

Adhuc antem de alimento, quantus sumptus sufficiens civitati et quantum ibidem factum et quantum adducibile, et quorum eductione incligent et quorum adductione, ut ad hec et consilia et statuta fiant; ad duo enim necessarium cives conservare sine querela, ad potentiores et ad eos qui ad ista sunt utiles.

With regard to the Food Supply: he must know what outlay will meet the needs of his country; what kinds of food are produced at home and what imported; and what articles must be exported or imported. This last he must know in order that agreements and commercial treaties may be made with the countries concerned. There are, indeed, two sorts of state to which he must see that his countrymen give no cause for offence, states stronger than his own, and states with which it is advantageous to trade.

(18) εἰς δ’ ἀσφάλειαν ἅπαντα μὲν ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖον δύνασθαι θε(19)ωρεῖν, οὐκ ἐλάχιστον δὲ περὶ νομοθεσίας ἐπαΐειν· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς νό(20)μοις ἐστὶν ἡ σωτηρία τῆς πόλεως, ὥστ’ ἀναγκαῖον εἰδέναι πόσα (21) τέ ἐστι πολιτειῶν εἴδη, καὶ ποῖα συμφέρει ἑκάστῃ, καὶ ὑπὸ (22) τίνων φθείρεσθαι πέφυκεν καὶ οἰκείων τῆς πολιτείας καὶ (23) ἐναντίων.

وقد يحتاج في الحفظ إلى أن يكون مشرفا بعلمه على هذا كله ثم ليس النظر في وضع السنن بيسير فإن أمر المدينة إنما يخلص ويقوم بالسن فقد ينبغى إذًا أن يعلم واضع السنة كم أنواع المدينيات و *اي* ينتفع بكل واحدة منها وممن يخاف عليها الفساد وقد يخاف ذلك من أهل تلك المدينة ومن الأضداد معا

. . .

Ad roborationem autem omnia hec necesse est posse inspicere, nichilominus autem de legum positione dicere; in legibus enim est salus civitatis, quare necessarium est scire quat sunt civilitatum species, et que expediunt unicuique, et ex quibus corrumpi contingit et de propriis civilitatis et contrariis.

Ad securitatem autem omnia quidem hec necessarium posse considerare, non minimum autem de legislatione audire; in legibus enim est salus civitatis; quare necessarium scire quat sunt civilitatum species, et quales conferunt unicuique, et a quibus corrumpi nate sunt et propriis civilitatis et contrariis.

But while he must, for security’s sake, be able to take all this into account, he must before all things understand the subject of legislation; for it is on a country’s laws that its whole welfare depends. He must, therefore, know how many different forms of constitution there are; under what conditions each of these will prosper and by what internal developments or external attacks each of them tends to be destroyed.

λέγω δὲ τὸ ὑπὸ οἰκείων φθείρεσθαι, ὅτι ἔξω τῆς (24) βελτίστης πολιτείας αἱ ἄλλαι πᾶσαι καὶ ἀνιέμεναι καὶ (25) ἐπιτεινόμεναι φθείρονται, οἷον δημοκρατία οὐ μόνον ἀνιεμένη (26) ἀσθενεστέρα γίγνεται ὥστε τέλος ἥξει εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν, ἀλλὰ (27) καὶ ἐπιτεινομένη σφόδρα· ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ γρυπότης καὶ ἡ σιμό(28)της οὐ μόνον ἀνιέμενα ἔρχεται εἰς τὸ μέσον, ἀλλὰ καὶ (29) σφόδρα γρυπὰ γινόμενα ἢ σιμὰ οὕτως διατίθεται ὥστε μηδὲ (30) μυκτῆρα δοκεῖν εἶναι.

وقد أعني بالفساد من أهلها أن مراتب التدبير كلها المدينية المحكمة قد تفسد اذا قصرت فاسترخت واذا أفرطت فاشتدت كما أن التدبير الذي يسمى الديمقراطية وهو تدبير المدينة قد يضعف ويؤول إلى النحو الذي يسمى خساسة الرياسة ليس اذا استرخى قط وضعف لكن اذا اشتد أيضا وعنف جدا وذلك بمنزلة الفطس فان الفطس ليس اذا قل وضعف قط يقرب من الاعتدال ولكن اذا أفرط وتفاقم أيضا فإنه يصير إلى أن يظن أنه لا أنف هناك

. . .

Dico autem a propriis corrumpi, quoniam extra optimam civilitatem alie omnes remisse et intense corrumpuntur, ut puta regimen populi non solum remissum infirmius fit et finiet ad parvum dominium, sed tensum vehementer, quemadmodum et curvitas et simitas non solum remisse ad medium veniunt, sed vehementer curva facta sic disponunt quare non nares habere videantur.

Dico autem a propriis corrumrpi quia excepta optima civilitate alie omnes et remisse et intense corrumpuntur, puta dermocratia non solum rernissa debilior fit et terminabitur in oligarchiam, sed et intensa valde; sicut et aquilinitas et simitas non solum remisse in medium veniunt, sed et valde aquila facta aut sirna ita disponunt nasum, ut neque nasus videatur esse.

When I speak of destruction through internal developments I refer to the fact that all constitutions, except the best one of all, are destroyed both by not being pushed far enough and by being pushed too far. Thus, democracy loses its vigour, and finally passes into oligarchy, not only when it is not pushed far enough, but also when it is pushed a great deal too far; just as the aquiline and the snub nose not only turn into normal noses by not being aquiline or snub enough, but also by being too violently aquiline or snub arrive at a condition in which they no longer look like noses at all.

χρήσιμον δὲ πρὸς τὰς νομοθεσίας (31) τὸ μὴ μόνον ἐπαΐειν τίς πολιτεία συμφέρει, ἐκ τῶν παρ(32)εληλυθότων θεωροῦντα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις (33) εἰδέναι, αἱ ποῖαι τοῖς ποίοις ἁρμόττουσιν· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι (34) πρὸς μὲν τὴν νομοθεσίαν αἱ τῆς γῆς περίοδοι χρήσιμοι (ἐν(35)τεῦθεν γὰρ λαβεῖν ἔστιν τοὺς τῶν ἐθνῶν νόμους), πρὸς δὲ τὰς (36) πολιτικὰς συμβουλὰς αἱ τῶν περὶ τὰς πράξεις γραφόντων ἱστο(37)ρίαι· ἅπαντα δὲ ταῦτα πολιτικῆς ἀλλ’ οὐ ῥητορικῆς ἔργον ἐστίν.

وقد ينتفع في وضع السنن ليس بأن يتخلص الواضع إلى وضع النافعات للمدينية فقط إذ يعتبر ذلك على ما يرى ولكن بأن يعرف النافعات عند آخرين فيعلم أيها يشاكل أيها وقد استبان اذًا معرفة حالات البلاد مما ينتفع به عند وضع السنن فإنه من هاهنا يمكن أن تنتزع سنن الأمم وأما أصناف المشورة في الأعداء فإن القصص المكتوبة في الأمور تخبر عن ذلك فكل هذا من عمل الفوليطية وليس من عمل الريطورية

. . . . .

Utile autem in legum positionibus non solum considerare que conveniunt civilitati a preteritis, sed eas que sunt ab aliis scire, que quibus conveniunt; quare manifestum, quoniam ad legum positionem terre periodi sunt utiles (exinde enim est accipere gentium leges), ad civiles autem consultationes circa operationes scribentium hystorias; hec autem omnia civilis et non rethorice opus est.

Utile autem ad legislationes non solum attendere que civilitati expediunt, ex preteritis consideranti, sed et eas que apnt alios scire, quales quibus congruant; quare palam quod ad legislationem quidem terre descriptiones sunt utiles (hinc enim est accipere gentium leges), ad civilia autem consilia ystorie scribentiurn gesta; omnia autem hec politice, sed non rethorice opus sunt.

It is useful, in framing laws, not only to study the past history of one’s own country, in order to understand which constitution is desirable for it now, but also to have a knowledge of the constitutions of other nations, and so to learn for what kinds of nation the various kinds of constitution are suited. From this we can see that books of travel are useful aids to legislation, since from these we may learn the laws and customs of different races. The political speaker will also find the researches of historians useful. But all this is the business of political science and not of rhetoric.

(38) περὶ ὧν μὲν οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ <τὰς προτάσεις> τὸν μέλλον (1360b1) τα συμβουλεύειν, τὰ μέγιστα τοσαῦτά ἐστιν· ἐξ ὧν δὲ δεῖ καὶ (2) περὶ τούτων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων προτρέπειν ἢ ἀποτρέπειν (3) λέγωμεν πάλιν.

وهذه هي الأمور العظمى التي فيها يشير المشير وفيما أنبأنا به عن هذه دلالة على تلك الأخر

. .

De quibus quidem oportet habere debentem consultare, maxima tot sunt; ex quibus autem oportet et de hiis et aliis persuadere aut dissuadere rursum dicamus.

De quibus quidem igitur oportet habere debentem consiliari, que maxima tot sunt. Ex quibus autem oportet et de hiis et de aliis exhortari et dehortari dicamus iterum.

These, then, are the most important kinds of information which the political speaker must possess. Let us now go back and state the premisses from which he will have to argue in favour of adopting or rejecting measures regarding these and other matters.

5. (4) Σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστῳ καὶ κοινῇ πᾶσι σκοπός (5) τις ἔστιν οὗ στοχαζόμενοι καὶ αἱροῦνται καὶ φεύγουσιν· καὶ (6) τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν ἥ τ’ εὐδαιμονία καὶ τὰ μόρια (7) αὐτῆς· ὥστε παραδείγματος χάριν λάβωμεν τί ἐστιν ὡς (8) ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ ἐκ τίνων τὰ μόρια ταύ(9)της· περὶ γὰρ ταύτης καὶ τῶν εἰς ταύτην συντεινόντων (10) καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων ταύτῃ αἵ τε προτροπαὶ καὶ αἱ ἀποτροπαὶ (11) πᾶσαί εἰσιν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ παρασκευάζοντα ταύτην ἢ τῶν μορίων (12) τι, ἢ μεῖζον ἀντ’ ἐλάττονος ποιοῦντα, δεῖ πράττειν, τὰ δὲ (13) φθείροντα ἢ ἐμποδίζοντα ἢ τὰ ἐναντία ποιοῦντα μὴ πράττειν.

ثم نحن قائلون أيضا في الإذن والمنع فإن ذلك قريب أو شبيه أن يكون لكل واحد من الناس خاصا وللكل عاما اربا مغتزيا ليس على أنهم يعرفون الحق فيختارونه ويجتنبون بمعرفته ذلك في الجملة صلاح الحال واجزاؤه فقد ينبغي إذا في تعت التثبيت أو الوصف أن ننظـر ما صلاح الحال عاما وممَّ يكون ونخبر عن هذه الجملة وما يغنى عنها ونخبر عن أضدادها وعن الإذن والمنع في كم نحو يكون فإن الذين يضعون إلى ذلك شيئا من الأجزاء يرون أنه ينبغي أن يكون المتكلم يجعل الشيء إما مكان الكبير صغيرا وإما مكان الصغير كبيرا فأما الاتي يفسدن أو يعقن يجاوزن فلا ينبغي أن يفعلهن

. . . . . .

Fere utique et propria unicuique et communis omnibus intentio quedam est quam inspicientes et appetunt et fugiunt; . . . . .

Fere itaque et singulariter unicuique et communiter omnibus finis quida1n est quem coniectantes et eligunt et fugiunt; . . . . .

Part 5. It may be said that every individual man and all men in common aim at a certain end which determines what they choose and what they avoid. This end, to sum it up briefly, is happiness and its constituents. Let us, then, by way of illustration only, ascertain what is in general the nature of happiness, and what are the elements of its constituent parts. For all advice to do things or not to do them is concerned with happiness and with the things that make for or against it; whatever creates or increases happiness or some part of happiness, we ought to do; whatever destroys or hampers happiness, or gives rise to its opposite, we ought not to do.

(14) ἔστω δὴ εὐδαιμονία εὐπραξία μετ’ ἀρετῆς, ἢ αὐτάρκεια (15) ζωῆς, ἢ ὁ βίος ὁ μετὰ ἀσφαλείας ἥδιστος, ἢ εὐθενία κτημάτων (16) καὶ σωμάτων μετὰ δυνάμεως φυλακτικῆς τε καὶ πρακτικῆς (17) τούτων· σχεδὸν γὰρ τούτων ἓν ἢ πλείω τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν (18) ὁμολογοῦσιν εἶναι ἅπαντες. [I.5.4] (19) εἰ δή ἐστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τοιοῦτον, ἀνάγκη αὐτῆς εἶναι μέρη (20) εὐγένειαν, πολυφιλίαν, χρηστοφιλίαν, πλοῦτον, εὐτεκνίαν, πολυ(21)τεκνίαν, εὐγηρίαν· ἔτι τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἀρετάς (οἷον ὑγίειαν, (22) κάλλος, ἰσχύν, μέγεθος, δύναμιν ἀγωνιστικήν), δόξαν, τιμήν, (23) εὐτυχίαν, ἀρετήν [ἢ καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῆς φρόνησιν, ἀνδρείαν, (24) δικαιοσύνην, σωφροσύνην]· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν αὐταρκέστατός <τις> (25) εἴη, εἰ ὑπάρχοι αὐτῷ τά τ’ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά· (26) οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄλλα παρὰ ταῦτα.

فليكن صلاح الحال حسن الفعال مع الفضيلة أو منتهى العمر أو محيا الذيذ مع التوقي أو السعة في المال والعقد مع القوة الحافظة والفاعلة لهذه فإن العامة مقرون بأن صلاح الحال شيء قريب من هذا وإن كان صلاح الحال هكذا فإنّ أجزاءه لا محالة كرم الحسب وكثرة الإخوان واليسار وحسن الفعال الشيخوخة الصالحة ثم فضائل الجسد أيضا مثل الصحة والجمال والجلد والجزالة والبطش والمجد والجلالة والسعادة والفضيلة وأجزاءها من العقل الشجاعة والعفاف والبر فإنه هكذا أحرى أن يكون الإنسان موفورا مكتفيا أعني إذا كانت له حال الخير التي يكون فيه مع التي من خارج وليس يكون شيء آخر سوى هذه

. . . . . .

We may define happiness as prosperity combined with virtue; or as independence of life; or as the secure enjoyment of the maximum of pleasure; or as a good condition of property and body, together with the power of guarding one’s property and body and making use of them. That happiness is one or more of these things, pretty well everybody agrees. From this definition of happiness it follows that its constituent parts are: — good birth, plenty of friends, good friends, wealth, good children, plenty of children, a happy old age, also such bodily excellences as health, beauty, strength, large stature, athletic powers, together with fame, honour, good luck, and virtue. A man cannot fail to be completely independent if he possesses these internal and these external goods; for besides these there are no others to have.

ἔστι δ’ ἐν αὐτῷ μὲν τὰ (27) περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ τὰ ἐν σώματι, ἔξω δὲ εὐγένεια καὶ φίλοι (28) καὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμή, ἔτι δὲ προσήκειν οἰόμεθα δυνάμεις (29) ὑπάρχειν καὶ τύχην· οὕτω γὰρ ἀσφαλέστατος ὁ βίος.

فأما التي تكون فيه فهي التي للنفس والتي للجسد وأما التي من خارج فالحسب الكريم والإخوان والمال والكرامة ثم قد يظن أنه يلزم مع ذلك القوة والسعادة فقد يكون محيا المرء ومنقلبه في خاصة نفسه مسلما مهذبا بهذه التي ذكرنا

. .

Goods of the soul and of the body are internal. Good birth, friends, money, and honour are external. Further, we think that he should possess resources and luck, in order to make his life really secure.

λάβωμεν (30) τοίνυν ὁμοίως καὶ τούτων ἕκαστον τί ἐστιν. (31) εὐγένεια μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἔθνει μὲν καὶ πόλει τὸ αὐτό(32)χθονας ἢ ἀρχαίους εἶναι, καὶ ἡγεμόνας τοὺς πρώτους ἐπι(33)φανεῖς, καὶ πολλοὺς ἐπιφανεῖς γεγονέναι ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐπὶ (34) τοῖς ζηλουμένοις· ἰδίᾳ δὲ εὐγένεια ἢ ἀπ’ ἀνδρῶν ἢ ἀπὸ (35) γυναικῶν, καὶ γνησιότης ἀπ’ ἀμφοῖν, καί, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ πόλεως, (36) <τὸ> τούς τε πρώτους γνωρίμους ἢ ἐπ’ ἀρετῇ ἢ πλούτῳ ἢ (37) ἄλλῳ τῳ τῶν τιμωμένων εἶναι, καὶ πολλοὺς ἐπιφανεῖς ἐκ τοῦ (38) γένους καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ νέους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους. (39) εὐτεκνία δὲ καὶ πολυτεκνία οὐκ ἄδηλα.

ولننظر الآن بهذا النحو من النظر في كل واحدة من هذه ما هي أمّا الحسب فانّه في القوم او في المدينة ان يكونوا بكناء او قدماء او حكماء او رؤساء او مذكورين وذوى كثرة واحرارا ، ويكون فيهم من قد نال الأمور الجميلة المغبوطة. فامّا التبيين عن الحسب ، من قبل الرجال هو ام من قبل النساء، فانّه يتفّرع منهما جميعا ، كما انّه يكون الرؤساء والأحرار معروفين في المدينة اذا اشتهروا بالفضيلة او اليسار او غير ذلك من الأمور المكرمّة ، ويكون اَخرون معروفين من ذلك الجنس بعينه ثم من ذلك الجنس بعينه غلمان واشياخ. (٥) فامّا كثرة الأولاد وحسن الأولاد فليس ممّا به من خفاء ،

. . . . . .

As we have already ascertained what happiness in general is, so now let us try to ascertain what of these parts of it is. Now good birth in a race or a state means that its members are indigenous or ancient: that its earliest leaders were distinguished men, and that from them have sprung many who were distinguished for qualities that we admire. The good birth of an individual, which may come either from the male or the female side, implies that both parents are free citizens, and that, as in the case of the state, the founders of the line have been notable for virtue or wealth or something else which is highly prized, and that many distinguished persons belong to the family, men and women, young and old. The phrases ‘possession of good children’ and ‘of many children’ bear a quite clear meaning.

ἔστιν δὲ τῷ κοινῷ (1361a1) μὲν [εὐτεκνία], νεότης ἂν ᾖ πολλὴ καὶ ἀγαθή, ἀγαθὴ δὲ (2) κατ’ ἀρετὴν σώματος, οἷον μέγεθος, κάλλος, ἰσχύν, δύνα(3)μιν ἀγωνιστικήν· ψυχῆς δὲ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία νέου (4) ἀρεταί· ἰδίᾳ δὲ εὐτεκνία καὶ πολυτεκνία τὸ τὰ ἴδια τέκνα (5) πολλὰ καὶ τοιαῦτα εἶναι, καὶ θήλεα καὶ ἄρρενα· θηλειῶν (6) δὲ ἀρετὴ σώματος μὲν κάλλος καὶ μέγεθος, ψυχῆς δὲ (7) σωφροσύνη καὶ φιλεργία ἄνευ ἀνελευθερίας.

وحسن الولد امّا من للعامّة فكثرة الفتيان وصلاحهم في فضائل الجسد كالجزالة والجمال والشدّة والبطش وامّا في ذوات النفس فانّ فضائل الغلام العفاف والشجاعة . وامّا للخاصّة فحسن الولد وكثرة الأولاد . من الذكور والإناث . وفضيلة الإناث امّا في الجسد فالجمال والعبالة وامّا في النفس فالعفاف و حبّ الألفة وحبّ الكدّ ،

. . . .

Applied to a community, they mean that its young men are numerous and of good a quality: good in regard to bodily excellences, such as stature, beauty, strength, athletic powers; and also in regard to the excellences of the soul, which in a young man are temperance and courage. Applied to an individual, they mean that his own children are numerous and have the good qualities we have described. Both male and female are here included; the excellences of the latter are, in body, beauty and stature; in soul, self—command and an industry that is not sordid.

ὁμοίως δὲ (8) καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ κοινῇ, καὶ κατ’ ἄνδρας καὶ κατὰ γυναῖκας, δεῖ (9) ζητεῖν ἕκαστον ὑπάρχειν τῶν τοιούτων· ὅσοις γὰρ τὰ κατὰ (10) γυναῖκας φαῦλα ὥσπερ Λακεδαιμονίοις, σχεδὸν κατὰ τὸ (11) ἥμισυ οὐκ εὐδαιμονοῦσιν.

وذلك وجد عامّا وخاصّا في الرجال وفي النسا ء بحال واحدة . وقد ينبغي ان ننظر في كلّ واحد منهم هل هو هكذا ، علىّ انّ الذين يزنّون بالريبة في النساء ، كمثل اللقدمنين ، ليس لهم كالنصف من صلاح الحال .

. .

Communities as well as individuals should lack none of these perfections, in their women as well as in their men. Where, as among the Lacedaemonians, the state of women is bad, almost half of human life is spoilt.

(12) πλούτου δὲ μέρη νομίσματος πλῆθος <καὶ> γῆς, χωρίων (13) κτῆσις πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει καὶ κάλλει διαφερόντων, ἔτι δὲ (14) ἐπίπλων κτῆσις καὶ ἀνδραπόδων καὶ βοσκημάτων πλήθει καὶ (15) κάλλει διαφερόντων, ταῦτα δὲ πάντα <οἰκεῖα> καὶ ἀσφαλῆ (16) καὶ ἐλευθέρια καὶ χρήσιμα. ἔστιν δὲ χρήσιμα μὲν μᾶλλον τὰ (17) κάρπιμα, ἐλευθέρια δὲ τὰ πρὸς ἀπόλαυσιν (κάρπιμα δὲ (18) λέγω ἀφ’ ὧν αἱ πρόσοδοι, ἀπολαυστικὰ δὲ ἀφ’ ὧν μηδὲν (19) παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν γίγνεται ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον). ὅρος δὲ ἀσφα(20)λείας μὲν τὸ ἐνταῦθα καὶ οὕτω κεκτῆσθαι ὥστ’ ἐφ’ αὑτῷ (21) εἶναι τὴν χρῆσιν αὐτῶν, τοῦ δὲ οἰκεῖα εἶναι ἢ μὴ ὅταν ἐφ’ αὑτῷ (22) ᾖ ἀπαλλοτριῶσαι· λέγω δὲ ἀπαλλοτρίωσιν δόσιν καὶ πρᾶσιν. λέγω δὲ ἀπαλλοτρίωσιν δόσιν καὶ πρᾶσιν. (23) ὅλως δὲ τὸ πλουτεῖν ἐστιν ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ κεκτῆ(24)σθαι· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐνέργειά ἐστι τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἡ χρῆσις πλοῦτος.

فامّا اجزاء اليسار فكثرة الدنانير والأرضين والمال والعقد وجميع الأشياء المختلفة في النفاسة والحسن ، ثم اقتناء اثاث البيت واللقط والأمتعة والمواشى الكثيرة المختلفة في الحسن والكثر، وكلّ ذلك في توقٍّ وحرّيّة ونحو التنعّم . ثم من النافعة ايضا ملك الثماريّات ومنها الغلّات ، فقد استلذّ من الغلاّت ما يجتنيه قانيه بلا نصب ، وحدّ التحرّز او التحفّظ هو ان يكون اقتناؤه في الموضع على النحو الذي تكون منفعته قنية له . فامّا ان تكون اهليّة ، له او لا ، فإذا كان الإغراب اليه ، وقد اعنى بلإغراب الإعطاء والبيع . والجمّلة انّ الغناء في الاستعمال احرى ان يكون منه في الاقتناء ، فانّ هذا ونحوه من الفعل ، فامّا الاستعمال فهو الغنى . .

. . . . . .

The constituents of wealth are: plenty of coined money and territory; the ownership of numerous, large, and beautiful estates; also the ownership of numerous and beautiful implements, live stock, and slaves. All these kinds of property are our own, are secure, gentlemanly, and useful. The useful kinds are those that are productive, the gentlemanly kinds are those that provide enjoyment. By 'productive' I mean those from which we get our income; by 'enjoyable', those from which we get nothing worth mentioning except the use of them. The criterion of 'security' is the ownership of property in such places and under such Conditions that the use of it is in our power; and it is 'our own' if it is in our own power to dispose of it or keep it. By 'disposing of it' I mean giving it away or selling it. By ‘disposing of it’ I mean giving it away or selling it. Wealth as a whole consists in using things rather than in owning them; it is really the activity — that is, the use — of property that constitutes wealth.

(25) εὐδοξία δ’ ἐστὶν τὸ ὑπὸ πάντων σπουδαῖον ὑπολαμβάνε(26)σθαι ἢ τοιοῦτόν τι ἔχειν οὗ πάντες ἐφίενται ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ ἢ (27) οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἢ οἱ φρόνιμοι. (28) τιμὴ δ’ ἐστὶν μὲν σημεῖον εὐεργετικῆς εὐδοξίας, τιμῶνται δὲ (29) δικαίως μὲν καὶ μάλιστα οἱ εὐεργετηκότες, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τιμᾶται (30) καὶ ὁ δυνάμενος εὐεργετεῖν· εὐεργεσία δὲ ἢ εἰς σωτηρίαν καὶ ὅσα (31) αἴτια τοῦ εἶναι, ἢ εἰς πλοῦτον, ἢ εἴς τι τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν, (32) ὧν μὴ ῥᾳδία ἡ κτῆσις ἢ ὅλως ἢ ἐνταῦθα ἢ τότε· πολλοὶ (33) γὰρ διὰ μικρὰ δοκοῦντα τιμῆς τυγχάνουσιν, ἀλλ’ οἱ τόποι (34) καὶ οἱ καιροὶ αἴτιοι. μέρη δὲ τιμῆς θυσίαι, μνῆμαι ἐν (35) μέτροις καὶ ἄνευ μέτρων, γέρα, τεμένη, προεδρίαι, τάφοι, (36) εἰκόνες, τροφαὶ δημόσιαι, τὰ βαρβαρικά, οἷον προσκυνήσεις (37) καὶ ἐκστάσεις, δῶρα τὰ παρ’ ἑκάστοις τίμια. καὶ γὰρ τὸ (38) δῶρόν ἐστι κτήματος δόσις καὶ τιμῆς σημεῖον, διὸ καὶ οἱ (39) φιλοχρήματοι καὶ οἱ φιλότιμοι ἐφίενται αὐτῶν· ἀμφ(1361b1)οτέροις γὰρ ἔχει ὧν δέονται· καὶ γὰρ κτῆμά ἐστιν οὗ ἐφίεν(2)ται οἱ φιλοχρήματοι, καὶ τιμὴν ἔχει οὗ οἱ φιλότιμοι.

. . . . . . . . .

Fame means being respected by everybody, or having some quality that is desired by all men, or by most, or by the good, or by the wise. Honour is the token of a man’s being famous for doing good. it is chiefly and most properly paid to those who have already done good; but also to the man who can do good in future. Doing good refers either to the preservation of life and the means of life, or to wealth, or to some other of the good things which it is hard to get either always or at that particular place or time — for many gain honour for things which seem small, but the place and the occasion account for it. The constituents of honour are: sacrifices; commemoration, in verse or prose; privileges; grants of land; front seats at civic celebrations; state burial; statues; public maintenance; among foreigners, obeisances and giving place; and such presents as are among various bodies of men regarded as marks of honour. For a present is not only the bestowal of a piece of property, but also a token of honour; which explains why honour—loving as well as money—loving persons desire it. The present brings to both what they want; it is a piece of property, which is what the lovers of money desire; and it brings honour, which is what the lovers of honour desire.

(3) σώματος δὲ ἀρετὴ ὑγίεια, αὕτη δὲ οὕτως ὥστε ἀνόσους (4) εἶναι χρωμένους τοῖς σώμασιν· πολλοὶ γὰρ ὑγιαίνουσιν, ὥσπερ (5) Ἡρόδικος λέγεται, οὓς οὐδεὶς ἂν εὐδαιμονίσειε τῆς ὑγιείας (6) διὰ τὸ πάντων ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἢ τῶν πλείστων. (7) κάλλος δὲ ἕτερον καθ’ ἑκάστην ἡλικίαν ἐστίν. νέου μὲν οὖν (8) κάλλος τὸ πρὸς τοὺς πόνους χρήσιμον ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα τούς (9) τε πρὸς δρόμον καὶ πρὸς βίαν, ἡδὺν ὄντα ἰδεῖν πρὸς ἀπό(10)λαυσιν· διὸ οἱ πένταθλοι κάλλιστοι, ὅτι πρὸς βίαν καὶ (11) πρὸς τάχος ἅμα πεφύκασιν· ἀκμάζοντος δὲ πρὸς μὲν (12) πόνους τοὺς πολεμικούς, ἡδὺν δ’ εἶναι δοκεῖν μετὰ φοβερό(13)τητος· γέροντος δὲ πρὸς μὲν πόνους τοὺς ἀναγκαίους ἱκανόν, (14) ἄλυπον δὲ διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν ὧν τὸ γῆρας λωβᾶται. (15) ἰσχὺς δ’ ἐστὶ μὲν δύναμις τοῦ κινεῖν ἕτερον ὡς βούλεται, (16) ἀνάγκη δὲ κινεῖν ἕτερον ἢ ἕλκοντα ἢ ὠθοῦντα ἢ αἴροντα (17) ἢ πιέζοντα ἢ συνθλίβοντα, ὥστε ὁ ἰσχυρὸς ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τού(18)των τισίν ἐστιν ἰσχυρός. μεγέθους δὲ ἀρετὴ τὸ ὑπάρχειν (19) κατὰ μῆκος καὶ βάθος καὶ πλάτος τῶν πολλῶν τοσούτῳ (20) μείζον’ ὥστε μὴ βραδυτέρας ποιεῖν τὰς κινήσεις διὰ τὴν (21) ὑπερβολήν. ἀγωνιστικὴ δὲ σώματος ἀρετὴ σύγκειται ἐκ (22) μεγέθους καὶ ἰσχύος καὶ τάχους (καὶ γὰρ ὁ ταχὺς ἰσχυρός (23) ἐστιν)· ὁ γὰρ δυνάμενος τὰ σκέλη ῥιπτεῖν πως καὶ κινεῖν (24) ταχὺ καὶ πόρρω δρομικός, ὁ δὲ θλίβειν καὶ κατέχειν πα(25)λαιστικός, ὁ δὲ ὦσαι τῇ πληγῇ πυκτικός, ὁ δ’ ἀμφοτέροις (26) τούτοις παγκρατιαστικός, ὁ δὲ πᾶσι πένταθλος.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The excellence of the body is health; that is, a condition which allows us, while keeping free from disease, to have the use of our bodies; for many people are ‘healthy’ as we are told Herodicus was; and these no one can congratulate on their ‘health’, for they have to abstain from everything or nearly everything that men do. Beauty varies with the time of life. In a young man beauty is the possession of a body fit to endure the exertion of running and of contests of strength; which means that he is pleasant to look at; and therefore all-round athletes are the most beautiful, being naturally adapted both for contests of strength and for speed also. For a man in his prime, beauty is fitness for the exertion of warfare, together with a pleasant but at the same time formidable appearance. For an old man, it is to be strong enough for such exertion as is necessary, and to be free from all those deformities of old age which cause pain to others. Strength is the power of moving some one else at will; to do this, you must either pull, push, lift, pin, or grip him; thus you must be strong in all of those ways or at least in some. Excellence in size is to surpass ordinary people in height, thickness, and breadth by just as much as will not make one’s movements slower in consequence. Athletic excellence of the body consists in size, strength, and swiftness; swiftness implying strength. He who can fling forward his legs in a certain way, and move them fast and far, is good at running; he who can grip and hold down is good at wrestling; he who can drive an adversary from his ground with the right blow is a good boxer: he who can do both the last is a good pancratiast, while he who can do all is an ‘all-round’ athlete.

(27) εὐγηρία δ’ ἐστὶ βραδυτὴς γήρως μετ’ ἀλυπίας· οὔτε γὰρ (28) εἰ ταχὺ γηράσκει, εὔγηρως, οὔτ’ εἰ μόγις μὲν λυπηρῶς δέ. ἔστιν (29) δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἀρετῶν καὶ <ἐκ> τύχης· μὴ ἄνοσος (30) γὰρ ὢν μηδὲ ἰσχυρὸς οὐκ ἔσται ἀπαθὴς οὐδ’ ἄλυπος, καὶ πολυ(31)χρόνιος οὐκ ἄνευ τύχης διαμείνειεν ἄν. ἔστιν δέ τις καὶ (32) χωρὶς ἰσχύος καὶ ὑγιείας ἄλλη δύναμις μακροβιότητος· (33) πολλοὶ γὰρ ἄνευ τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἀρετῶν μακρόβιοί εἰσιν· (34) ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν ἡ ἀκριβολογία χρήσιμος ἡ περὶ τούτων εἰς τὰ νῦν.

. . . . . . .

Happiness in old age is the coming of old age slowly and painlessly; for a man has not this happiness if he grows old either quickly, or tardily but painfully. It arises both from the excellences of the body and from good luck. If a man is not free from disease, or if he is strong, he will not be free from suffering; nor can he continue to live a long and painless life unless he has good luck. There is, indeed, a capacity for long life that is quite independent of health or strength; for many people live long who lack the excellences of the body; but for our present purpose there is no use in going into the details of this.

(35) πολυφιλία δὲ καὶ χρηστοφιλία οὐκ ἄδηλα, τοῦ φίλου (36) ὡρισμένου, ὅτι ἔστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος φίλος ὅστις ἃ οἴεται ἀγαθὰ (37) εἶναι ἐκείνῳ, πρακτικός ἐστιν αὐτῶν δι’ ἐκεῖνον. ᾧ δὴ πολ(38)λοὶ τοιοῦτοι, πολύφιλος, ᾧ δὲ καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς ἄνδρες, χρηστόφιλος.

. . .

The terms ‘possession of many friends’ and ‘possession of good friends’ need no explanation; for we define a ‘friend’ as one who will always try, for your sake, to do what he takes to be good for you. The man towards whom many feel thus has many friends; if these are worthy men, he has good friends.

(39) εὐτυχία δέ ἐστιν, ὧν ἡ τύχη ἀγαθῶν αἰτία, ταῦτα (1362a1) γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὑπάρχειν ἢ πάντα ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα ἢ τὰ (2) μέγιστα. αἰτία δ’ ἐστὶν ἡ τύχη ἐνίων μὲν καὶ ὧν αἱ τέχναι, (3) πολλῶν δὲ καὶ ἀτέχνων, οἷον ὅσων ἡ φύσις (ἐνδέχεται δὲ (4) καὶ παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι)· ὑγιείας μὲν γὰρ τέχνη αἰτία, κάλ(5)λους δὲ καὶ μεγέθους φύσις. ὅλως δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀγα(6)θῶν ἐστιν ἀπὸ τύχης ἐφ’ οἷς ἐστιν ὁ φθόνος. ἔστιν δὲ καὶ (7) τῶν παρὰ λόγον ἀγαθῶν αἰτία τύχη, οἷον εἰ οἱ ἄλλοι (8) ἀδελφοὶ αἰσχροί, ὁ δὲ καλός, ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι μὴ εἶδον τὸν (9) θησαυρόν, ὁ δ’ εὗρεν, ἢ εἰ τοῦ πλησίον ἔτυχεν τὸ βέλος, (10) τούτου δὲ μή, ἢ εἰ μὴ ἦλθε μόνος, ἀεὶ φοιτῶν, οἱ δὲ ἅπαξ (11) ἐλθόντες διεφθάρησαν· πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα εὐτυχήματα (12) δοκεῖ εἶναι.

. . . . . . . . . .

’Good luck’ means the acquisition or possession of all or most, or the most important, of those good things which are due to luck. Some of the things that are due to luck may also be due to artificial contrivance; but many are independent of art, as for example those which are due to nature — though, to be sure, things due to luck may actually be contrary to nature. Thus health may be due to artificial contrivance, but beauty and stature are due to nature. All such good things as excite envy are, as a class, the outcome of good luck. Luck is also the cause of good things that happen contrary to reasonable expectation: as when, for instance, all your brothers are ugly, but you are handsome yourself; or when you find a treasure that everybody else has overlooked; or when a missile hits the next man and misses you; or when you are the only man not to go to a place you have gone to regularly, while the others go there for the first time and are killed. All such things are reckoned pieces of good luck.

(13) περὶ δὲ ἀρετῆς ἐπείπερ οἰκειότατος ὁ περὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους τό(14)πος, ὅταν περὶ ἐπαίνου ποιώμεθα τὸν λόγον, τότε διοριστέον.

.

As to virtue, it is most closely connected with the subject of Eulogy, and therefore we will wait to define it until we come to discuss that subject.

6.(15) Ὧν μὲν οὖν δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι προτρέποντα ὡς ἐσομέ(16)νων ἢ ὑπαρχόντων, καὶ ὧν ἀποτρέποντα, φανερόν· τὰ γὰρ (17) ἐναντία τούτων ἐστίν.

.

Part 6. It is now plain what our aims, future or actual, should be in urging, and what in depreciating, a proposal; the latter being the opposite of the former.

ἐπεὶ δὲ πρόκειται τῷ συμβουλεύοντι (18) σκοπὸς τὸ συμφέρον (βουλεύονται γὰρ οὐ περὶ τοῦ τέλους, ἀλλὰ (19) περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶ τὰ συμφέροντα κατὰ (20) τὰς πράξεις, τὸ δὲ συμφέρον ἀγαθόν), ληπτέον ἂν εἴη τὰ στοι(21)χεῖα περὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ συμφέροντος ἁπλῶς.

. . .

Now the political or deliberative orator’s aim is utility: deliberation seeks to determine not ends but the means to ends, i.e. what it is most useful to do. Further, utility is a good thing. We ought therefore to assure ourselves of the main facts about Goodness and Utility in general.

ἔστω δὴ ἀγα(22)θὸν ὃ ἂν αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα ᾖ αἱρετόν, καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα ἄλλο (23) αἱρούμεθα, καὶ οὗ ἐφίεται πάντα, ἢ πάντα τὰ αἴσθησιν (24) ἔχοντα ἢ νοῦν ἢ εἰ λάβοι νοῦν, καὶ ὅσα ὁ νοῦς ἂν ἑκάστῳ (25) ἀποδοίη, καὶ ὅσα ὁ περὶ ἕκαστον νοῦς ἀποδίδωσιν ἑκάστῳ· (26) τοῦτό <γάρ> ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ ἀγαθόν, καὶ οὗ παρόντος εὖ διάκει(27)ται καὶ αὐτάρκως ἔχει, καὶ τὸ αὔταρκες, καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν ἢ (28) φυλακτικὸν τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ᾧ ἀκολουθεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ (29) τὰ κωλυτικὰ τῶν ἐναντίων καὶ τὰ φθαρτικά.

. . . . . .

We may define a good thing as that which ought to be chosen for its own sake; or as that for the sake of which we choose something else; or as that which is sought after by all things, or by all things that have sensation or reason, or which will be sought after by any things that acquire reason; or as that which must be prescribed for a given individual by reason generally, or is prescribed for him by his individual reason, this being his individual good; or as that whose presence brings anything into a satisfactory and self—sufficing condition; or as self—sufficiency; or as what produces, maintains, or entails characteristics of this kind, while preventing and destroying their opposites.

ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ (30) διχῶς (ἢ γὰρ ἅμα ἢ ὕστερον, οἷον τῷ μὲν μανθάνειν τὸ (31) ἐπίστασθαι ὕστερον, τῷ δὲ ὑγιαίνειν τὸ ζῆν ἅμα), καὶ τὰ (32) ποιητικὰ τριχῶς, τὰ μὲν ὡς τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ὑγιείας, τὰ δὲ (33) ὡς σιτία ὑγιείας, τὰ δὲ ὡς τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι, ὅτι ὡς ἐπὶ (34) τὸ πολὺ ποιεῖ ὑγίειαν.

. . .

One thing may entail another in either of two ways — (1) simultaneously, (2) subsequently. Thus learning entails knowledge subsequently, health entails life simultaneously. Things are productive of other things in three senses: first as being healthy produces health; secondly, as food produces health; and thirdly, as exercise does — i.e. it does so usually.

τούτων δὲ κειμένων ἀνάγκη τάς τε (35) λήψεις τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθὰς εἶναι καὶ τὰς τῶν κακῶν (36) ἀποβολάς· ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ τῷ μὲν τὸ μὴ ἔχειν τὸ κακὸν (37) ἅμα, τῷ δὲ τὸ ἔχειν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὕστερον.

. .

All this being settled, we now see that both the acquisition of good things and the removal of bad things must be good; the latter entails freedom from the evil things simultaneously, while the former entails possession of the good things subsequently.

καὶ ἡ ἀντ’ ἐλάτ(38)τονος ἀγαθοῦ μείζονος λῆψις καὶ ἀντὶ μείζονος κακοῦ ἐλάτ (1362b1) τονος· ᾧ γὰρ ὑπερέχει τὸ μεῖζον τοῦ ἐλάττονος, τούτῳ γίνε(2)ται τοῦ μὲν λῆψις τοῦ δ’ ἀποβολή.

. .

The acquisition of a greater in place of a lesser good, or of a lesser in place of a greater evil, is also good, for in proportion as the greater exceeds the lesser there is acquisition of good or removal of evil.

καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς δὲ (3) ἀνάγκη ἀγαθὸν εἶναι (κατὰ γὰρ ταύτας εὖ τε διάκεινται (4) οἱ ἔχοντες, καὶ ποιητικαὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν εἰσι καὶ πρακτικαί· (5) περὶ ἑκάστης δὲ καὶ τίς καὶ ποία χωρὶς ῥητέον), καὶ τὴν (6) ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· πάντα γὰρ ἐφίεται τὰ ζῷα αὐτῆς τῇ (7) φύσει· ὥστε καὶ τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλὰ ἀνάγκη ἀγαθὰ (8) εἶναι· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡδονῆς ποιητικά, τῶν δὲ καλῶν τὰ μὲν (9) ἡδέα τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ καθ’ ἑαυτὰ αἱρετά ἐστιν.

. . . . . . . . .

The virtues, too, must be something good; for it is by possessing these that we are in a good condition, and they tend to produce good works and good actions. They must be severally named and described elsewhere. Pleasure, again, must be a good thing, since it is the nature of all animals to aim at it. Consequently both pleasant and beautiful things must be good things, since the former are productive of pleasure, while of the beautiful things some are pleasant and some desirable in and for themselves.

(10) ὡς δὲ καθ’ ἓν εἰπεῖν, ἀνάγκη ἀγαθὰ εἶναι τάδε. εὐδαιμονία· (11) καὶ γὰρ καθ’ αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν καὶ αὔταρκες, καὶ ἕνεκα αὐτῆς (12) τἆλλα αἱρούμεθα. δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη, μεγαλο(13)ψυχία, μεγαλοπρέπεια, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι αἱ τοιαῦται ἕξεις· ἀρεταὶ (14) γὰρ ψυχῆς.

. . .

The following is a more detailed list of things that must be good. Happiness, as being desirable in itself and sufficient by itself, and as being that for whose sake we choose many other things. Also justice, courage, temperance, magnanimity, magnificence, and all such qualities, as being excellences of the soul.

καὶ ὑγίεια καὶ κάλλος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· (15) ἀρεταὶ γὰρ σώματος καὶ ποιητικὰ πολλῶν, οἷον ὑγίεια (16) καὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ τοῦ ζῆν, διὸ καὶ ἄριστον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὅτι (17) δύο τῶν τοῖς πολλοῖς τιμιωτάτων αἴτιόν ἐστιν, ἡδονῆς καὶ (18) τοῦ ζῆν.

. . .

Further, health, beauty, and the like, as being bodily excellences and productive of many other good things: for instance, health is productive both of pleasure and of life, and therefore is thought the greatest of goods, since these two things which it causes, pleasure and life, are two of the things most highly prized by ordinary people.

πλοῦτος· ἀρετὴ γὰρ κτήσεως καὶ ποιητικὸν πολ(19)λῶν.

.

Wealth, again: for it is the excellence of possession, and also productive of many other good things.

φίλος καὶ φιλία· καὶ γὰρ καθ’ αὑτὸν αἱρετὸς ὁ (20) φίλος καὶ ποιητικὸς πολλῶν.

.

Friends and friendship: for a friend is desirable in himself and also productive of many other good things.

τιμή, δόξα· καὶ γὰρ ἡδέα (21) καὶ ποιητικὰ πολλῶν, καὶ ἀκολουθεῖ αὐταῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ (22) πολὺ τὸ ὑπάρχειν ἐφ’ οἷς τιμῶνται.

.

So, too, honour and reputation, as being pleasant, and productive of many other good things, and usually accompanied by the presence of the good things that cause them to be bestowed.

δύναμις τοῦ λέγειν, (23) τοῦ πράττειν· ποιητικὰ γὰρ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγαθῶν.

.

The faculty of speech and action; since all such qualities are productive of what is good.

ἔτι (24) εὐφυΐα, μνήμη, εὐμάθεια, ἀγχίνοια, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα· (25) ποιητικαὶ γὰρ αὗται ἀγαθῶν αἱ δυνάμεις εἰσίν.

.

Further — good parts, strong memory, receptiveness, quickness of intuition, and the like, for all such faculties are productive of what is good.

ὁμοίως δὲ (26) καὶ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι πᾶσαι καὶ αἱ τέχναι.

.

Similarly, all the sciences and arts.

καὶ τὸ ζῆν· εἰ γὰρ (27) μηδὲν ἄλλο ἕποιτο ἀγαθόν, καθ’ αὑτὸ αἱρετόν ἐστιν.

.

And life: since, even if no other good were the result of life, it is desirable in itself.

καὶ (28) τὸ δίκαιον· συμφέρον γάρ τι κοινῇ ἐστιν.

.

And justice, as the cause of good to the community.

(29) ταῦτα μὲν οὖν σχεδὸν τὰ ὁμολογούμενα ἀγαθά ἐστιν· ἐν δὲ (30) τοῖς ἀμφισβητησίμοις ἐκ τῶνδε οἱ συλλογισμοί.

. .

The above are pretty well all the things admittedly good. In dealing with things whose goodness is disputed, we may argue in the following ways:

ᾧ τὸ ἐναντίον (31) κακόν, τοῦτ’ ἀγαθόν.

.

— That is good of which the contrary is bad.

καὶ οὗ τὸ ἐναντίον τοῖς ἐχθροῖς συμ(32)φέρει· οἷον εἰ τὸ δειλοὺς εἶναι μάλιστα συμφέρει τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, (33) δῆλον ὅτι ἀνδρεία μάλιστα ὠφέλιμον τοῖς πολίταις.

. .

That is good the contrary of which is to the advantage of our enemies; for example, if it is to the particular advantage of our enemies that we should be cowards, clearly courage is of particular value to our countrymen.

καὶ (34) ὅλως ὃ οἱ ἐχθροὶ βούλονται ἢ ἐφ’ ᾧ χαίρουσι, τοὐναντίον (35) τούτου ὠφέλιμον φαίνεται· διὸ εἴρηται (35)
ἦ κεν γηθήσαι Πρίαμος.

. .

And generally, the contrary of that which our enemies desire, or of that at which they rejoice, is evidently valuable. Hence the passage beginning: Surely would Priam exult.

(36) ἔστι δ’ οὐκ ἀεὶ τοῦτο, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει (37) ἐνίοτε ταὐτὸ συμφέρειν τοῖς ἐναντίοις· ὅθεν λέγεται ὡς τὰ (1363a1) κακὰ συνάγει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ὅταν ᾖ ταὐτὸ βλαβερὸν ἀμφοῖν.

. . .

This principle usually holds good, but not always, since it may well be that our interest is sometimes the same as that of our enemies. Hence it is said that ‘evils draw men together’; that is, when the same thing is hurtful to them both.

(2) καὶ οὗ μὴ ἔστιν ὑπερβολή, τοῦτο ἀγαθόν, ὃ δ’ ἂν ᾖ μεῖζον ἢ (3) δεῖ, κακόν. καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα πολλὰ πεπόνηται ἢ δεδαπάνηται· (4) φαινόμενον γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἤδη, καὶ ὡς τέλος τὸ τοιοῦτον ὑπολαμ(5)βάνεται, καὶ τέλος πολλῶν, τὸ δὲ τέλος ἀγαθόν.

. . .

Further: that which is not in excess is good, and that which is greater than it should be is bad. That also is good on which much labour or money has been spent; the mere fact of this makes it seem good, and such a good is assumed to be an end — an end reached through a long chain of means; and any end is a good.

ὅθεν ταῦτ’ εἴρηται (6) “κὰδ δέ κεν εὐχωλὴν Πριάμῳ” καὶ “αἰσχρόν τοι δηρόν τε (7) μένειν”. καὶ ἡ παροιμία δὲ τὸ ἐπὶ θύραις τὴν ὑδρίαν.

. .

Hence the lines beginning: And for Priam (and Troy—town’s folk) should they leave behind them a boast; and Oh, it were shame to have tarried so long and return empty—handed as erst we came; and there is also the proverb about ‘breaking the pitcher at the door’.

καὶ οὗ <οἱ> (8) πολλοὶ ἐφίενται, καὶ τὸ περιμάχητον φαινόμενον· οὗ γὰρ πάντες (9) ἐφίενται, τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν ἦν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ὥσπερ πάντες φαίνον(10)ται. καὶ τὸ ἐπαινετόν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἀγαθὸν ἐπαινεῖ.

. . .

That which most people seek after, and which is obviously an object of contention, is also a good; for, as has been shown, that is good which is sought after by everybody, and ‘most people’ is taken to be equivalent to ‘everybody’. That which is praised is good, since no one praises what is not good.

(11) καὶ ὃ οἱ ἐχθροὶ καὶ οἱ φαῦλοι ἐπαινοῦσιν· ὥσπερ γὰρ (12) πάντες ἤδη ὁμολογοῦσιν, εἰ καὶ οἱ κακῶς πεπονθότες· διὰ γὰρ (13) τὸ φανερὸν ὁμολογοῖεν ἄν, ὥσπερ καὶ φαῦλοι οὓς οἱ φί(14)λοι ψέγουσι καὶ [ἀγαθοὶ] οὓς οἱ ἐχθροὶ μὴ ψέγουσιν (διὸ λελοι(15)δορῆσθαι ὑπέλαβον Κορίνθιοι ὑπὸ Σιμωνίδου ποιήσαντος
(16) Κορινθίοις δ’ οὐ μέμφεται τὸ Ἴλιον).

. . . .

So, again, that which is praised by our enemies, or by the worthless, for when even those who have a grievance think a thing good, it is at once felt that every one must agree with them; our enemies can admit the fact only because it is evident, just as those must be worthless whom their friends censure and their enemies do not. For this reason the Corinthians conceived themselves to be insulted by Simonides when he wrote: Against the Corinthians hath Ilium no complaint.

(17) καὶ ὃ τῶν φρονίμων τις ἢ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἢ γυναι(18)κῶν προέκρινεν, οἷον Ὀδυσσέα Ἀθηνᾶ καὶ Ἑλένην Θησεὺς καὶ (19) Ἀλέξανδρον αἱ θεαὶ καὶ Ἀχιλλέα Ὅμηρος.

.

Again, that is good which has been distinguished by the favour of a discerning or virtuous man or woman, as Odysseus was distinguished by Athena, Helen by Theseus, Paris by the goddesses, and Achilles by Homer.

καὶ ὅλως τὰ προ(20)αιρετά· προαιροῦνται δὲ πράττειν τά τε εἰρημένα καὶ τὰ τοῖς (21) ἐχθροῖς κακὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς φίλοις ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ δυνατά· ταῦτα (22) δὲ διχῶς ἐστιν, τά τε γενόμενα ἂν καὶ τὰ ῥᾳδίως γιγνό(23)μενα· ῥᾴδια δὲ ὅσα ἢ ἄνευ λύπης ἢ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ· τὸ (24) γὰρ χαλεπὸν ὁρίζεται ἢ λύπῃ ἢ πλήθει χρόνου.

. . . .

And, generally speaking, all things are good which men deliberately choose to do; this will include the things already mentioned, and also whatever may be bad for their enemies or good for their friends, and at the same time practicable. Things are ‘practicable’ in two senses: (1) it is possible to do them, (2) it is easy to do them. Things are done ‘easily’ when they are done either without pain or quickly: the ‘difficulty’ of an act lies either in its painfulness or in the long time it takes.

καὶ (25) ἐὰν ὡς βούλονται· βούλονται δὲ ἢ μηδὲν κακὸν ἢ ἔλαττον (26) τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ (τοῦτο δὲ ἔσται, ἐὰν ἢ λανθάνῃ ἢ ἡ τιμωρία μι(27)κρὰ ᾖ).

. .

Again, a thing is good if it is as men wish; and they wish to have either no evil at it or at least a balance of good over evil. This last will happen where the penalty is either imperceptible or slight.

καὶ τὰ ἴδια, καὶ ἃ μηδείς, καὶ τὰ περιττά· τιμὴ (28) γὰρ οὕτω μᾶλλον.

. .

Good, too, are things that are a man’s very own, possessed by no one else, exceptional; for this increases the credit of having them.

καὶ τὰ ἁρμόττοντα αὐτοῖς· τοιαῦτα δὲ (29) τά τε προσήκοντα κατὰ γένος καὶ δύναμιν, καὶ ὧν ἐλλείπειν (30) οἴονται καὶ ἂν μικρὰ ᾖ· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἧττον προαιροῦνται ταῦτα (31) πράττειν. καὶ τὰ εὐκατέργαστα. δυνατὰ γὰρ καὶ ῥᾴδια· (32) εὐκατέργαστα δὲ ἃ πάντες ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ ἢ οἱ ὅμοιοι ἢ οἱ (33) ἥττους κατώρθωσαν.

. . . . . .

So are things which befit the possessors, such as whatever is appropriate to their birth or capacity, and whatever they feel they ought to have but lack — such things may indeed be trifling, but none the less men deliberately make them the goal of their action. And things easily effected; for these are practicable (in the sense of being easy); such things are those in which every one, or most people, or one’s equals, or one’s inferiors have succeeded.

καὶ ἃ χαριοῦνται τοῖς φίλοις, ἢ (34) ἃ ἀπεχθήσονται τοῖς ἐχθροῖς. καὶ ὅσα οὓς θαυμάζουσι (35) προαιροῦνται πράττειν. καὶ πρὸς ἃ εὐφυεῖς εἰσιν καὶ ἔμπει(36)ροι· ῥᾷον γὰρ κατορθώσειν οἴονται. καὶ ἃ μηδεὶς φαῦλος· (37) ἐπαινετὰ γὰρ μᾶλλον. καὶ ὧν ἐπιθυμοῦντες τυγχάνουσιν, (38) οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἡδὺ ἀλλὰ καὶ βέλτιον φαίνεται.

. . . . . . . .

Good also are the things by which we shall gratify our friends or annoy our enemies; and the things chosen by those whom we admire: and the things for which we are fitted by nature or experience since we think we shall succeed more easily in these: and those in which no worthless man can succeed, for such things bring greater praise: and those which we do in fact desire, for what we desire is taken to be not only pleasant but also better.

καὶ μάλιστα (1363b1) ἕκαστοι πρὸς ἃ φιλοτοίουτοι, οἷον οἱ φιλόνικοι εἰ νίκη (2) ἔσται, οἱ φιλότιμοι εἰ τιμή, οἱ φιλοχρήματοι εἰ χρήματα, καὶ (3) οἱ ἄλλοι ὡσαύτως.

. .

Further, a man of a given disposition makes chiefly for the corresponding things: lovers of victory make for victory, lovers of honour for honour, money—loving men for money, and so with the rest.

περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ συμφέρον(4)τος ἐκ τούτων ληπτέον τὰς πίστεις.

.

These, then, are the sources from which we must derive our means of persuasion about Good and Utility.

7. (5) Ἐπεὶ δὲ πολλάκις ὁμολογοῦντες ἄμφω συμφέρειν (6) περὶ τοῦ μᾶλλον ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ἐφεξῆς ἂν εἴη λεκτέον (7) περὶ τοῦ μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ μᾶλλον συμφέροντος.

.

Part 7. Since, however, it often happens that people agree that two things are both useful but do not agree about which is the more so, the next step will be to treat of relative goodness and relative utility.

ἔστω (8) δὴ ὑπερέχον μὲν τὸ τοσοῦτον καὶ ἔτι, ὑπερεχόμενον δὲ τὸ (9) ἐνυπάρχον, καὶ μεῖζον μὲν ἀεὶ καὶ πλεῖον πρὸς ἔλαττον, (10) μέγα δὲ καὶ μικρὸν καὶ πολὺ καὶ ὀλίγον πρὸς τὸ τῶν (11) πολλῶν μέγεθος, καὶ ὑπερέχον μὲν τὸ μέγα, τὸ δὲ μι(12)κρὸν ἐλλεῖπον, καὶ πολὺ καὶ ὀλίγον ὡσαύτως.

. . .

A thing which surpasses another may be regarded as being that other thing plus something more, and that other thing which is surpassed as being what is contained in the first thing. Now to call a thing ‘greater’ or ‘more’ always implies a comparison of it with one that is ‘smaller’ or ‘less’, while ‘great’ and ‘small’, ‘much’ and ‘little’, are terms used in comparison with normal magnitude. The ‘great’ is that which surpasses the normal, the ‘small’ is that which is surpassed by the normal; and so with ‘many’ and ‘few’.

ἐπεὶ οὖν (13) ἀγαθὸν λέγομεν τό τε αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου (14) αἱρετόν, καὶ οὗ πάντ’ ἐφίεται, καὶ ὃ νοῦν ἂν καὶ φρόνησιν (15) λαβόντα ἕλοιτο, καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν καὶ τὸ φυλακτικόν, ἢ (16) ᾧ ἕπεται τὰ τοιαῦτα, [τὸ δ’ οὗ ἕνεκα τὸ τέλος ἐστίν,] τέλος (17) δέ ἐστιν οὗ ἕνεκα τὰ ἄλλα, αὐτῷ δὲ ἀγαθὸν τὸ πρὸς αὐτὸν (18) ταῦτα πεπονθός, ἀνάγκη τά γε πλείω τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ τῶν (19) ἐλαττόνων, συναριθμουμένου τοῦ ἑνὸς ἢ τῶν ἐλαττόνων, μεῖ(20)ζον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· ὑπερέχει γάρ, τὸ δὲ ἐνυπάρχον ὑπερ(21)έχεται.

. . . . . .

Now we are applying the term ‘good’ to what is desirable for its own sake and not for the sake of something else; to that at which all things aim; to what they would choose if they could acquire understanding and practical wisdom; and to that which tends to produce or preserve such goods, or is always accompanied by them. Moreover, that for the sake of which things are done is the end (an end being that for the sake of which all else is done), and for each individual that thing is a good which fulfils these conditions in regard to himself. It follows, then, that a greater number of goods is a greater good than one or than a smaller number, if that one or that smaller number is included in the count; for then the larger number surpasses the smaller, and the smaller quantity is surpassed as being contained in the larger.

καὶ ἐὰν τὸ μέγιστον τοῦ μεγίστου ὑπερέχῃ, καὶ αὐτὰ (22) αὐτῶν· καὶ ὅσα αὐτὰ αὐτῶν, καὶ τὸ μέγιστον τοῦ μεγίστου· (23) οἷον εἰ ὁ μέγιστος ἀνὴρ γυναικὸς τῆς μεγίστης μείζων, καὶ (24) ὅλως οἱ ἄνδρες τῶν γυναικῶν μείζους, καὶ εἰ οἱ ἄνδρες (25) ὅλως τῶν γυναικῶν μείζους, καὶ ἀνὴρ ὁ μέγιστος τῆς με(26)γίστης γυναικὸς μείζων· ἀνάλογον γὰρ ἔχουσιν αἱ ὑπερ(27)οχαὶ τῶν γενῶν καὶ τῶν μεγίστων ἐν αὐτοῖς.

. . . . .

Again, if the largest member of one class surpasses the largest member of another, then the one class surpasses the other; and if one class surpasses another, then the largest member of the one surpasses the largest member of the other. Thus, if the tallest man is taller than the tallest woman, then men in general are taller than women. Conversely, if men in general are taller than women, then the tallest man is taller than the tallest woman. For the superiority of class over class is proportionate to the superiority possessed by their largest specimens.

καὶ ὅταν τόδε (28) μὲν τῷδε ἕπηται, ἐκεῖνο δὲ τούτῳ μή, ἕπηται δὲ ἢ τῷ (29) ἅμα ἢ τῷ ἐφεξῆς ἢ τῇ δυνάμει· ἐνυπάρχει γὰρ ἡ χρῆ(30)σις ἡ τοῦ ἑπομένου ἐν τῇ θατέρου.

. .

Again, where one good is always accompanied by another, but does not always accompany it, it is greater than the other, for the use of the second thing is implied in the use of the first. A thing may be accompanied by another in three ways, either simultaneously, subsequently, or potentially.

ἕπεται δὲ ἅμα μὲν τῷ (31) ὑγιαίνειν τὸ ζῆν, τούτῳ δὲ ἐκεῖνο οὔ, ὕστερον δὲ τῷ μανθά(32)νειν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι, δυνάμει δὲ τῷ ἱεροσυλεῖν τὸ ἀποστερεῖν· (33) ὁ γὰρ ἱεροσυλήσας κἂν ἀποστερήσειεν.

. . . .

Life accompanies health simultaneously (but not health life), knowledge accompanies the act of learning subsequently, cheating accompanies sacrilege potentially, since a man who has committed sacrilege is always capable of cheating.

καὶ τὰ ὑπερέχοντα (34) τοῦ αὐτοῦ μείζονι μείζω· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ὑπερέχειν καὶ τοῦ (35) μείονι. καὶ τὰ μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ ποιητικὰ μείζω· τοῦτο (36) γὰρ ἦν τὸ μείζονος ποιητικῷ εἶναι. καὶ οὗ τὸ ποιητικὸν (37) μεῖζον, ὡσαύτως· εἰ γὰρ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν αἱρετώτερον τοῦ ἡδέος (38) καὶ μεῖζον ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια τῆς ἡδονῆς μείζων. καὶ (1364a1) αἱρετώτερον τὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ τοῦ μὴ καθ’ αὑτό, οἷον ἰσχὺς ὑγιει(2)νοῦ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ οὐχ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα, τὸ δὲ αὑτοῦ, ὅπερ ἦν (3) τὸ ἀγαθόν. κἂν ᾖ τὸ μὲν τέλος, τὸ δὲ μὴ τέλος· τὸ μὲν (4) γὰρ ἄλλου ἕνεκα, τὸ δὲ αὑτοῦ, οἷον τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι τοῦ εὖ (5) ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα. καὶ τὸ ἧττον προσδεόμενον θατέρου [ἢ] ἑ(6)τέρων· αὐταρκέστερον γάρ· ἧττον δὲ προσδεῖται τὸ ἐλαττόνων (7) ἢ ῥᾳόνων προσδεόμενον. καὶ ὅταν τόδε μὲν ἄνευ τοῦδε μὴ (8) ᾖ, ἢ μὴ δυνατὸν ᾖ γενέσθαι, θάτερον δὲ ἄνευ τούτου, αὐταρ(9)κέστερον [δὲ] τὸ μὴ δεόμενον, ὥστε φαίνεται μεῖζον ἀγαθόν. (10) κἂν ᾖ ἀρχή, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀρχή, κἂν ᾖ αἴτιον, τὸ δ’ οὐκ (11) αἴτιον, διὰ τὸ αὐτό· ἄνευ γὰρ αἰτίου καὶ ἀρχῆς ἀδύνατον (12) εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι. καὶ δυοῖν ἀρχαῖν τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς μείζονος ἀρχῆς (13) μεῖζον, καὶ δυοῖν αἰτίοιν τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ μείζονος αἰτίου μεῖ(14)ζον. καὶ ἀνάπαλιν δὲ δυοῖν ἀρχαῖν ἡ τοῦ μείζονος ἀρχὴ (15) μείζων, καὶ δυοῖν αἰτίοιν τὸ τοῦ μείζονος αἴτιον μεῖζον.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Again, when two things each surpass a third, that which does so by the greater amount is the greater of the two; for it must surpass the greater as well as the less of the other two. A thing productive of a greater good than another is productive of is itself a greater good than that other. For this conception of ‘productive of a greater’ has been implied in our argument. Likewise, that which is produced by a greater good is itself a greater good; thus, if what is wholesome is more desirable and a greater good than what gives pleasure, health too must be a greater good than pleasure. Again, a thing which is desirable in itself is a greater good than a thing which is not desirable in itself, as for example bodily strength than what is wholesome, since the latter is not pursued for its own sake, whereas the former is; and this was our definition of the good. Again, if one of two things is an end, and the other is not, the former is the greater good, as being chosen for its own sake and not for the sake of something else; as, for example, exercise is chosen for the sake of physical well—being. And of two things that which stands less in need of the other, or of other things, is the greater good, since it is more self—sufficing. (That which stands ‘less’ in need of others is that which needs either fewer or easier things.) So when one thing does not exist or cannot come into existence without a second, while the second can exist without the first, the second is the better. That which does not need something else is more self—sufficing than that which does, and presents itself as a greater good for that reason. Again, that which is a beginning of other things is a greater good than that which is not, and that which is a cause is a greater good than that which is not; the reason being the same in each case, namely that without a cause and a beginning nothing can exist or come into existence. Again, where there are two sets of consequences arising from two different beginnings or causes, the consequences of the more important beginning or cause are themselves the more important; and conversely, that beginning or cause is itself the more important which has the more important consequences.

δῆ(16)λον οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι ἀμφοτέρως μεῖζον ἔστιν φαίνεσθαι· (17) καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἀρχή, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀρχή, δόξει μεῖζον εἶναι, καὶ εἰ (18) μὴ ἀρχή, τὸ δὲ ἀρχή· τὸ γὰρ τέλος μεῖζον καὶ οὐχ <ἡ> ἀρχή, (19) ὥσπερ ὁ Λεωδάμας κατηγορῶν ἔφη Καλλιστράτου τὸν βου(20)λεύσαντα τοῦ πράξαντος μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν πρα(21)χθῆναι μὴ βουλεύσαντος· πάλιν δὲ καὶ Χαβρίου, τὸν πρά(22)ξαντα τοῦ βουλεύσαντος· οὐ γὰρ ἂν γενέσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἦν ὁ (23) πράξων· τούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα ἐπιβουλεύειν, ὅπως πράξωσιν.

. . . . . . . .

Now it is plain, from all that has been said, that one thing may be shown to be more important than another from two opposite points of view: it may appear the more important (1) because it is a beginning and the other thing is not, and also (2) because it is not a beginning and the other thing is — on the ground that the end is more important and is not a beginning. So Leodamas, when accusing Callistratus, said that the man who prompted the deed was more guilty than the doer, since it would not have been done if he had not planned it. On the other hand, when accusing Chabrias he said that the doer was worse than the prompter, since there would have been no deed without some one to do it; men, said he, plot a thing only in order to carry it out.

καὶ (24) τὸ σπανιώτερον τοῦ ἀφθόνου, οἷον χρυσὸς σιδήρου, ἀχρη(25)στότερος ὤν· μεῖζον γὰρ ἡ κτῆσις διὰ τὸ χαλεπωτέρα (26) εἶναι.

. . .

Further, what is rare is a greater good than what is plentiful. Thus, gold is a better thing than iron, though less useful: it is harder to get, and therefore better worth getting.

(ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον τὸ ἄφθονον τοῦ σπανίου, ὅτι ἡ χρῆσις (27) ὑπερέχει· τὸ γὰρ πολλάκις τοῦ ὀλιγάκις ὑπερέχει, ὅθεν λέγεται ἄριστον μὲν ὕδωρ.) (28) καὶ ὅλως τὸ χαλεπώτερον τοῦ ῥᾴονος· σπανιώτερον γάρ. ἄλλον (29) δὲ τρόπον τὸ ῥᾷον τοῦ χαλεπωτέρου· ἔχει γὰρ ὡς βουλόμεθα. (30) καὶ ᾧ τὸ ἐναντίον μεῖζον, καὶ οὗ ἡ στέρησις μείζων. καὶ (31) ἀρετὴ μὴ κακίας καὶ κακία μὴ ἀρετῆς μείζων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ (32) τέλη, τὰ δ’ οὐ τέλη.

. . . . . . .

Reversely, it may be argued that the plentiful is a better thing than the rare, because we can make more use of it. For what is often useful surpasses what is seldom useful, whence the saying:The best of things is water. More generally: the hard thing is better than the easy, because it is rarer: and reversely, the easy thing is better than the hard, for it is as we wish it to be. That is the greater good whose contrary is the greater evil, and whose loss affects us more. Positive goodness and badness are more important than the mere absence of goodness and badness: for positive goodness and badness are ends, which the mere absence of them cannot be.

καὶ ὧν τὰ ἔργα καλλίω ἢ αἰσχίω, μείζω (33) αὐτά, καὶ ὧν αἱ κακίαι καὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ μείζους, καὶ τὰ ἔργα (34) μείζω, ἐπείπερ ὡς τὰ αἴτια καὶ αἱ ἀρχαί, καὶ τὰ ἀπο(35)βαίνοντα, καὶ ὡς τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα, καὶ τὰ αἴτια καὶ αἱ (36) ἀρχαί.

. . . .

Further, in proportion as the functions of things are noble or base, the things themselves are good or bad: conversely, in proportion as the things themselves are good or bad, their functions also are good or bad; for the nature of results corresponds with that of their causes and beginnings, and conversely the nature of causes and beginnings corresponds with that of their results.

καὶ ὧν ἡ ὑπεροχὴ αἱρετωτέρα ἢ καλλίων, οἷον τὸ (37) ἀκριβῶς ὁρᾶν αἱρετώτερον τοῦ ὀσφραίνεσθαι (καὶ γὰρ ὄψις (1364b1) ὀσφρήσεως), καὶ τὸ φιλεταιρώτερον εἶναι τοῦ φιλοχρηματώ(2)τερον [μᾶλλον] κάλλιον, ὥστε καὶ φιλεταιρία φιλοχρηματίας.

. . .

Moreover, those things are greater goods, superiority in which is more desirable or more honourable. Thus, keenness of sight is more desirable than keenness of smell, sight generally being more desirable than smell generally; and similarly, unusually great love of friends being more honourable than unusually great love of money, ordinary love of friends is more honourable than ordinary love of money.

(3) καὶ ἀντικειμένως δὲ τῶν βελτιόνων αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ βελτίους (4) καὶ <αἱ> καλλιόνων καλλίους. καὶ ὧν αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι καλλίους ἢ (5) βελτίους· αἱ γὰρ μείζους ὀρέξεις μειζόνων εἰσίν. καὶ τῶν (6) καλλιόνων δὲ ἢ βελτιόνων αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι βελτίους καὶ (7) καλλίους διὰ τὸ αὐτό. καὶ ὧν αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι καλλίους ἢ (8) σπουδαιότεραι, καὶ τὰ πράγματα καλλίω καὶ σπουδαιότερα· (9) ὡς γὰρ ἔχει ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τὸ ἀληθές· κελεύει δὲ τὸ (10) αὑτῆς ἑκάστη. καὶ τῶν σπουδαιοτέρων δὲ καὶ καλλιόνων αἱ (11) ἐπιστῆμαι ἀνάλογον διὰ τὸ αὐτό. καὶ ὃ κρίνειαν ἂν ἢ κε(12)κρίκασιν οἱ φρόνιμοι ἢ πάντες ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ ἢ οἱ πλείους ἢ (13) οἱ κράτιστοι ἀγαθὸν μεῖζον, ἀνάγκη οὕτως ἔχειν, ἢ ἁπλῶς (14) ἢ ᾗ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν ἔκριναν.

. . . . . . . . . .

Conversely, if one of two normal things is better or nobler than the other, an unusual degree of that thing is better or nobler than an unusual degree of the other. Again, one thing is more honourable or better than another if it is more honourable or better to desire it; the importance of the object of a given instinct corresponds to the importance of the instinct itself; and for the same reason, if one thing is more honourable or better than another, it is more honourable and better to desire it. Again, if one science is more honourable and valuable than another, the activity with which it deals is also more honourable and valuable; as is the science, so is the reality that is its object, each science being authoritative in its own sphere. So, also, the more valuable and honourable the object of a science, the more valuable and honourable the science itself is — in consequence. Again, that which would be judged, or which has been judged, a good thing, or a better thing than something else, by all or most people of understanding, or by the majority of men, or by the ablest, must be so; either without qualification, or in so far as they use their understanding to form their judgement.

ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο κοινὸν καὶ (15) κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων· καὶ γὰρ τὶ καὶ ποσὸν καὶ ποιὸν οὕτως (16) ἔχει ὡς ἂν ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ φρόνησις εἴποι. ἀλλ’ ἐπ’ (17) ἀγαθῶν εἰρήκαμεν· ὥρισται γὰρ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ὃ λαβὸν (18) [τὰ πράγματα] φρόνησιν ἕλοιτ’ ἂν ἕκαστον· δῆλον οὖν ὅτι (19) καὶ μεῖζον ὃ μᾶλλον ἡ φρόνησις λέγει.

. . . .

This is indeed a general principle, applicable to all other judgements also; not only the goodness of things, but their essence, magnitude, and general nature are in fact just what knowledge and understanding will declare them to be. Here the principle is applied to judgements of goodness, since one definition of ‘good’ was ‘what beings that acquire understanding will choose in any given case’: from which it clearly follows that that thing is better which understanding declares to be so.

καὶ τὸ τοῖς βελ(20)τίοσιν ὑπάρχον, ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ ᾗ βελτίους, οἷον ἡ ἀνδρεία ἰσχύος. (21) καὶ ὃ ἕλοιτ’ ἂν ὁ βελτίων, ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ ᾗ βελτίων, οἷον τὸ (22) ἀδικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀδικεῖν· τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ δικαιότερος ἂν (23) ἕλοιτο. καὶ τὸ ἥδιον τοῦ ἧττον ἡδέος· τὴν γὰρ ἡδονὴν (24) πάντα διώκει, καὶ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα τοῦ ἥδεσθαι ὀρέγονται, ὥρι(25)σται δὲ τούτοις τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ τέλος· ἥδιον δὲ τό τε (26) ἀλυπότερον καὶ τὸ πολυχρονιώτερον ἡδύ. καὶ τὸ κάλλιον (27) τοῦ ἧττον καλοῦ· τὸ γὰρ καλόν ἐστιν ἤτοι τὸ ἡδὺ ἢ τὸ (28) καθ’ αὑτὸ αἱρετόν. καὶ ὅσων αὐτοὶ αὑτοῖς ἢ φίλοις βού(29)λονται αἴτιοι εἶναι μᾶλλον, ταῦτα μείζω ἀγαθά, ὅσων (30) δὲ ἧττον, μείζω κακά. (30) καὶ τὰ πολυχρονιώτερα τῶν ὀλιγο(31)χρονιωτέρων καὶ τὰ βεβαιότερα τῶν ἀβεβαιοτέρων· (32) ὑπερέχει γὰρ ἡ χρῆσις τῶν μὲν τῷ χρόνῳ τῶν δὲ τῇ (33) βουλήσει· ὅταν γὰρ βούλωνται, ὑπάρχει μᾶλλον ἡ τοῦ βε(34)βαίου.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

That, again, is a better thing which attaches to better men, either absolutely, or in virtue of their being better; as courage is better than strength. And that is a greater good which would be chosen by a better man, either absolutely, or in virtue of his being better: for instance, to suffer wrong rather than to do wrong, for that would be the choice of the juster man. Again, the pleasanter of two things is the better, since all things pursue pleasure, and things instinctively desire pleasurable sensation for its own sake; and these are two of the characteristics by which the ‘good’ and the ‘end’ have been defined. One pleasure is greater than another if it is more unmixed with pain, or more lasting. Again, the nobler thing is better than the less noble, since the noble is either what is pleasant or what is desirable in itself. And those things also are greater goods which men desire more earnestly to bring about for themselves or for their friends, whereas those things which they least desire to bring about are greater evils. And those things which are more lasting are better than those which are more fleeting, and the more secure than the less; the enjoyment of the lasting has the advantage of being longer, and that of the secure has the advantage of suiting our wishes, being there for us whenever we like.

καὶ ὡς ἂν ἓν τῶν συστοίχων καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων πτώ(35)σεων, καὶ τἆλλ’ ἀκολουθεῖ, οἷον εἰ τὸ ἀνδρείως κάλλιον καὶ (36) αἱρετώτερον τοῦ σωφρόνως, καὶ ἀνδρεία σωφροσύνης αἱρετω(37)τέρα καὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι τοῦ σωφρονεῖν. καὶ ὃ πάντες (38) αἱροῦνται τοῦ μὴ ὃ πάντες. καὶ ὃ οἱ πλείους ἢ ὃ οἱ ἐλάττους· (1365a1) ἀγαθὸν γὰρ ἦν οὗ πάντες ἐφίενται, ὥστε καὶ μεῖζον οὗ (2) μᾶλλον.

. . . . . .

Further, in accordance with the rule of co—ordinate terms and inflexions of the same stem, what is true of one such related word is true of all. Thus if the action qualified by the term ‘brave’ is more noble and desirable than the action qualified by the term ‘temperate’, then ‘bravery’ is more desirable than ‘temperance’ and ‘being brave’ than ‘being temperate’. That, again, which is chosen by all is a greater good than that which is not, and that chosen by the majority than that chosen by the minority. For that which all desire is good, as we have said; and so, the more a thing is desired, the better it is.

καὶ ὃ οἱ ἀμφισβητοῦντες ἢ οἱ ἐχθροί, ἢ οἱ κρίνον(3)τες ἢ οὓς οὗτοι κρίνουσιν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἂν εἰ πάντες φαῖέν (4) ἐστι, τὸ δὲ οἱ κύριοι καὶ οἱ εἰδότες. καὶ ὁτὲ μὲν οὗ πάντες (5) μετέχουσι μεῖζον· ἀτιμία γὰρ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν· ὁτὲ δὲ οὗ (6) μηδεὶς ἢ οὗ ὀλίγοι· σπανιώτερον γάρ.

. . . .

Further, that is the better thing which is considered so by competitors or enemies, or, again, by authorized judges or those whom they select to represent them. In the first two cases the decision is virtually that of every one, in the last two that of authorities and experts. And sometimes it may be argued that what all share is the better thing, since it is a dishonour not to share in it; at other times, that what none or few share is better, since it is rarer.

καὶ τὰ ἐπαινετώτερα· (7) καλλίω γάρ. καὶ ὧν αἱ τιμαὶ μείζους, ὡσαύτως· ἡ γὰρ (8) τιμὴ ὥσπερ ἀξία τίς ἐστιν. καὶ ὧν αἱ ζημίαι μείζους. καὶ (9) τὰ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων ἢ φαινομένων μεγάλων μείζω.

. . . . .

The more praiseworthy things are, the nobler and therefore the better they are. So with the things that earn greater honours than others — honour is, as it were, a measure of value; and the things whose absence involves comparatively heavy penalties; and the things that are better than others admitted or believed to be good.

(10) καὶ διαιρούμενα δὲ εἰς τὰ μέρη τὰ αὐτὰ μείζω φαίνεται. (11) πλεῖον γὰρ ὑπερέχειν φαίνεται, ὅθεν καὶ ὁ ποιητής φησι (12) πεῖσαι τὸν Μελέαγρον ἀναστῆναι (13)
ὅσσα κάκ’ ἀνθρώποισι πέλει τῶν ἄστυ ἁλώῃ·
(14) λαοὶ μὲν φθινύθουσι, πόλιν δέ τε πῦρ ἀμαθύνει,
(15) τέκνα δέ τ’ ἄλλοι ἄγουσιν.

. . .

Moreover, things look better merely by being divided into their parts, since they then seem to surpass a greater number of things than before. Hence Homer says that Meleager was roused to battle by the thought of All horrors that light on a folk whose city is ta’en of their foes, When they slaughter the men, when the burg is wasted with ravening flame, When strangers are haling young children to thraldom, (fair women to shame.)

(16) καὶ τὸ συντιθέναι δὲ καὶ ἐποικοδομεῖν, ὥσπερ Ἐπίχαρμος, (17) διά τε τὸ αὐτὸ τῇ διαιρέσει (ἡ γὰρ σύνθεσις ὑπεροχὴν (18) δείκνυσι πολλήν) καὶ ὅτι ἀρχὴ φαίνεται μεγάλων καὶ αἴ(19)τιον.

. . . .

The same effect is produced by piling up facts in a climax after the manner of Epicharmus. The reason is partly the same as in the case of division (for combination too makes the impression of great superiority), and partly that the original thing appears to be the cause and origin of important results.

ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον καὶ σπανιώτερον μεῖζον, (20) καὶ οἱ καιροὶ καὶ αἱ ἡλικίαι καὶ οἱ τόποι καὶ οἱ χρόνοι καὶ (21) αἱ δυνάμεις ποιοῦσι μεγάλα· εἰ γὰρ παρὰ δύναμιν καὶ (22) παρὰ ἡλικίαν καὶ παρὰ τοὺς ὁμοίους, καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἢ (23) ἐνταῦθα ἢ τότε, ἕξει μέγεθος καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ (24) δικαίων καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων, ὅθεν καὶ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα τῷ (25) ὀλυμπιονίκῃ·
(26) πρόσθε μὲν ἀμφ’ ὤμοισιν ἔχων τραχεῖαν ἄσιλλαν
(27) ἰχθῦς ἐξ Ἄργους εἰς Τεγέαν ἔφερον,
(28) καὶ ὁ Ἰφικράτης αὑτὸν ἐνεκωμίαζε λέγων ἐξ ὧν ὑπῆρξεν (29) ταῦτα. καὶ τὸ αὐτοφυὲς τοῦ ἐπικτήτου· χαλεπώτερον γάρ. (30) ὅθεν καὶ ὁ ποιητής φησιν
“αὐτοδίδακτος δ’ εἰμί.” καὶ τὸ (31) μεγάλου μέγιστον μέρος, οἷον Περικλῆς τὸν ἐπιτάφιον (32) λέγων, τὴν νεότητα ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀνῃρῆσθαι ὥσπερ τὸ ἔαρ (33) ἐκ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ εἰ ἐξαιρεθείη.

. . . . . . .

And since a thing is better when it is harder or rarer than other things, its superiority may be due to seasons, ages, places, times, or one’s natural powers. When a man accomplishes something beyond his natural power, or beyond his years, or beyond the measure of people like him, or in a special way, or at a special place or time, his deed will have a high degree of nobleness, goodness, and justice, or of their opposites. Hence the epigram on the victor at the Olympic games: In time past, hearing a Yoke on my shoulders, of wood unshaven, I carried my loads of fish from, Argos to Tegea town. So Iphicrates used to extol himself by describing the low estate from which he had risen. Again, what is natural is better than what is acquired, since it is harder to come by. Hence the words of Homer: I have learnt from none but myself. And the best part of a good thing is particularly good; as when Pericles in his funeral oration said that the country’s loss of its young men in battle was ‘as if the spring were taken out of the year’.

καὶ τὰ ἐν χρείᾳ μείζονι (34) χρήσιμα, οἷον τὰ ἐν γήρᾳ καὶ νόσοις. καὶ δυοῖν τὸ ἐγγύ(35)τερον τοῦ τέλους. καὶ τὸ αὐτῷ τοῦ ἁπλῶς. καὶ τὸ δυνα(36)τὸν τοῦ ἀδυνάτου· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ, τὸ δ’ οὔ. καὶ τὰ ἐν (37) τέλει τοῦ βίου· τέλη γὰρ μᾶλλον τὰ πρὸς τῷ τέλει.

. . . . . .

So with those things which are of service when the need is pressing; for example, in old age and times of sickness. And of two things that which leads more directly to the end in view is the better. So too is that which is better for people generally as well as for a particular individual. Again, what can be got is better than what cannot, for it is good in a given case and the other thing is not. And what is at the end of life is better than what is not, since those things are ends in a greater degree which are nearer the end.

καὶ (1365b1) τὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν τῶν πρὸς δόξαν· ὅρος δὲ τοῦ πρὸς δόξαν, (2) ὃ λανθάνειν μέλλων οὐκ ἂν ἕλοιτο· διὸ καὶ τὸ εὖ πάσχειν (3) τοῦ εὖ ποιεῖν δόξειεν ἂν αἱρετώτερον εἶναι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ κἂν (4) λανθάνῃ αἱρήσεται, ποιεῖν δ’ εὖ λανθάνων οὐ δοκεῖ ἂν ἑλέ(5)σθαι. καὶ ὅσα εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ δοκεῖν βούλονται· πρὸς (6) ἀλήθειαν γὰρ μᾶλλον· διὸ καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην φασὶ μι(7)κρὸν εἶναι, ὅτι δοκεῖν ἢ εἶναι αἱρετώτερον· τὸ δὲ ὑγιαίνειν (8) οὔ. καὶ τὸ πρὸς πολλὰ χρησιμώτερον, οἷον τὸ πρὸς τὸ (9) ζῆν καὶ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὸ πράττειν τὰ καλά· (10) διὸ ὁ πλοῦτος καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια μέγιστα δοκεῖ εἶναι· (11) ἅπαντα γὰρ ἔχει ταῦτα. καὶ τὸ ἀλυπότερον καὶ μεθ’ (12) ἡδονῆς· πλείω γὰρ ἑνός, ὅτι ὑπάρχει καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ [ἀγα(13)θὸν] καὶ ἡ ἀλυπία. καὶ δυοῖν ὃ τῷ αὐτῷ προστιθέμενον (14) μεῖζον τὸ ὅλον ποιεῖ. καὶ ἃ μὴ λανθάνει παρόντα ἢ ἃ λαν(15)θάνει· πρὸς ἀλήθειαν γὰρ τείνει ταῦτα· διὸ τὸ πλουτεῖν (16) φανείη ἂν μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν τοῦ δοκεῖν.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

What aims at reality is better than what aims at appearance. We may define what aims at appearance as what a man will not choose if nobody is to know of his having it. This would seem to show that to receive benefits is more desirable than to confer them, since a man will choose the former even if nobody is to know of it, but it is not the general view that he will choose the latter if nobody knows of it. What a man wants to be is better than what a man wants to seem, for in aiming at that he is aiming more at reality. Hence men say that justice is of small value, since it is more desirable to seem just than to be just, whereas with health it is not so. That is better than other things which is more useful than they are for a number of different purposes; for example, that which promotes life, good life, pleasure, and noble conduct. For this reason wealth and health are commonly thought to be of the highest value, as possessing all these advantages. Again, that is better than other things which is accompanied both with less pain and with actual pleasure; for here there is more than one advantage; and so here we have the good of feeling pleasure and also the good of not feeling pain. And of two good things that is the better whose addition to a third thing makes a better whole than the addition of the other to the same thing will make. Again, those things which we are seen to possess are better than those which we are not seen to possess, since the former have the air of reality. Hence wealth may be regarded as a greater good if its existence is known to others.

καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητόν, (17) καὶ τοῖς μὲν μόνον <ὂν> τοῖς δὲ μετ’ ἄλλων· διὸ καὶ οὐκ ἴση (18) ζημία, ἄν τις τὸν ἑτερόφθαλμον τυφλώσῃ καὶ τὸν δύ’ ἔχον(19)τα· ἀγαπητὸν γὰρ ἀφῄρηται.

. . .

That which is dearly prized is better than what is not — the sort of thing that some people have only one of, though others have more like it. Accordingly, blinding a one—eyed man inflicts worse injury than half—blinding a man with two eyes; for the one—eyed man has been robbed of what he dearly prized.

ἐκ τίνων μὲν οὖν δεῖ τὰς πίστεις (20) φέρειν ἐν τῷ προτρέπειν καὶ ἀποτρέπειν, σχεδὸν εἴρηται.

.

The grounds on which we must base our arguments, when we are speaking for or against a proposal, have now been set forth more or less completely.

8. (21) Μέγιστον δὲ καὶ κυριώτατον ἁπάντων πρὸς τὸ δύνα(22)σθαι πείθειν καὶ καλῶς συμβουλεύειν <τὸ> τὰς πολιτείας ἁ(23)πάσας λαβεῖν καὶ τὰ ἑκάστης ἤθη καὶ νόμιμα καὶ συμ(24)φέροντα διελεῖν.

.

Part 8. The most important and effective qualification for success in persuading audiences and speaking well on public affairs is to understand all the forms of government and to discriminate their respective customs, institutions, and interests.

πείθονται γὰρ ἅπαντες τῷ συμφέροντι, (25) συμφέρει δὲ τὸ σῶζον τὴν πολιτείαν.

.

For all men are persuaded by considerations of their interest, and their interest lies in the maintenance of the established order.

ἔτι δὲ κυρία μέν (26) ἐστιν ἡ τοῦ κυρίου ἀπόφανσις, τὰ δὲ κύρια διῄρηται κατὰ (27) τὰς πολιτείας· ὅσαι γὰρ αἱ πολιτεῖαι, τοσαῦτα καὶ τὰ (28) κύριά ἐστιν. εἰσὶν δὲ πολιτεῖαι τέτταρες, δημοκρατία, ὀλι(29)γαρχία, ἀριστοκρατία, μοναρχία, ὥστε τὸ μὲν κύριον καὶ τὸ (30) κρῖνον τούτων τι ἂν εἴη μόριον ἢ ὅλον τούτων. (30) ἔστιν δὲ δημο(31)κρατία μὲν πολιτεία ἐν ᾗ κλήρῳ διανέμονται τὰς ἀρχάς, (32) ὀλιγαρχία δὲ ἐν ᾗ οἱ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, ἀριστοκρατία δὲ ἐν (33) ᾗ κατὰ τὴν παιδείαν· παιδείαν δὲ λέγω τὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου (34) κειμένην. οἱ γὰρ ἐμμεμενηκότες ἐν τοῖς νομίμοις ἐν τῇ (35) ἀριστοκρατίᾳ ἄρχουσιν. ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτους φαίνεσθαι ἀρίστους, (36) ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα εἴληφεν τοῦτο. μοναρχία δ’ ἐστὶν κατὰ (1366a1) τοὔνομα ἐν ᾗ εἷς ἁπάντων κύριός ἐστιν· τούτων δὲ ἡ μὲν (2) κατὰ τάξιν τινὰ βασιλεία, ἡ δ’ ἀόριστος τυραννίς.

. . . . . . . . . .

Further, it rests with the supreme authority to give authoritative decisions, and this varies with each form of government; there are as many different supreme authorities as there are different forms of government. The forms of government are four — democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy. The supreme right to judge and decide always rests, therefore, with either a part or the whole of one or other of these governing powers. A Democracy is a form of government under which the citizens distribute the offices of state among themselves by lot, whereas under oligarchy there is a property qualification, under aristocracy one of education. By education I mean that education which is laid down by the law; for it is those who have been loyal to the national institutions that hold office under an aristocracy. These are bound to be looked upon as ‘the best men’, and it is from this fact that this form of government has derived its name (’the rule of the best’). Monarchy, as the word implies, is the constitution a in which one man has authority over all. There are two forms of monarchy: kingship, which is limited by prescribed conditions, and ‘tyranny’, which is not limited by anything.

τὸ δὴ (3) τέλος ἑκάστης πολιτείας οὐ δεῖ λανθάνειν· αἱροῦνται γὰρ τὰ (4) πρὸς τὸ τέλος. ἔστι δὲ δημοκρατίας μὲν τέλος ἐλευθερία, (5) ὀλιγαρχίας δὲ πλοῦτος, ἀριστοκρατίας δὲ τὰ περὶ παιδείαν (6) καὶ τὰ νόμιμα, τυραννίδος δὲ φυλακή. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τὰ (7) πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἑκάστης ἤθη καὶ νόμιμα καὶ συμφέροντα (8) διαιρετέον, εἴπερ αἱροῦνται πρὸς τοῦτο ἐπαναφέροντες. ἐπεὶ (9) δὲ οὐ μόνον αἱ πίστεις γίνονται δι’ ἀποδεικτικοῦ λόγου, ἀλλὰ (10) καὶ δι’ ἠθικοῦ (τῷ γὰρ ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα (11) πιστεύομεν, τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν ἂν ἀγαθὸς φαίνηται ἢ εὔνους ἢ (12) ἄμφω), δέοι ἂν τὰ ἤθη τῶν πολιτειῶν ἑκάστης ἔχειν ἡμᾶς· (13) τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἑκάστης ἦθος πιθανώτατον ἀνάγκη πρὸς ἑκάστην (14) εἶναι.

. . . . . . .

We must also notice the ends which the various forms of government pursue, since people choose in practice such actions as will lead to the realization of their ends. The end of democracy is freedom; of oligarchy, wealth; of aristocracy, the maintenance of education and national institutions; of tyranny, the protection of the tyrant. It is clear, then, that we must distinguish those particular customs, institutions, and interests which tend to realize the ideal of each constitution, since men choose their means with reference to their ends. But rhetorical persuasion is effected not only by demonstrative but by ethical argument; it helps a speaker to convince us, if we believe that he has certain qualities himself, namely, goodness, or goodwill towards us, or both together. Similarly, we should know the moral qualities characteristic of each form of government, for the special moral character of each is bound to provide us with our most effective means of persuasion in dealing with it.

ταῦτα δὲ ληφθήσεται διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ (15) ἤθη φανερὰ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ἀνα(16)φέρεται πρὸς τὸ τέλος. (17) ὧν μὲν οὖν δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι προτρέποντας ὡς ἐσομένων (18) ἢ ὄντων, καὶ ἐκ τίνων δεῖ τὰς περὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος πίστεις (19) λαμβάνειν, ἔτι δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἠθῶν καὶ νομίμων (20) διὰ τίνων τε καὶ πῶς εὐπορήσομεν, ἐφ’ ὅσον ἦν τῷ παρόντι (21) καιρῷ σύμμετρον, εἴρηται· διηκρίβωται γὰρ ἐν τοῖς Πολιτι(22)κοῖς περὶ τούτων.

. . . .

We shall learn the qualities of governments in the same way as we learn the qualities of individuals, since they are revealed in their deliberate acts of choice; and these are determined by the end that inspires them. We have now considered the objects, immediate or distant, at which we are to aim when urging any proposal, and the grounds on which we are to base our arguments in favour of its utility. We have also briefly considered the means and methods by which we shall gain a good knowledge of the moral qualities and institutions peculiar to the various forms of government — only, however, to the extent demanded by the present occasion; a detailed account of the subject has been given in the Politics.

9. (23) μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα λέγωμεν περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας καὶ (24) καλοῦ καὶ αἰσχροῦ· οὗτοι γὰρ σκοποὶ τῷ ἐπαινοῦντι καὶ ψέ(25)γοντι· συμβήσεται γὰρ ἅμα περὶ τούτων λέγοντας κἀκεῖνα (26) δηλοῦν ἐξ ὧν ποιοί τινες ὑποληφθησόμεθα κατὰ τὸ ἦθος, (27) ἥπερ ἦν δευτέρα πίστις· ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ ἡμᾶς τε καὶ ἄλλον (28) ἀξιόπιστον δυνησόμεθα ποιεῖν πρὸς ἀρετήν.

. . . .

Part 9. We have now to consider Virtue and Vice, the Noble and the Base, since these are the objects of praise and blame. In doing so, we shall at the same time be finding out how to make our hearers take the required view of our own characters — our second method of persuasion. The ways in which to make them trust the goodness of other people are also the ways in which to make them trust our own.

ἐπεὶ δὲ συμβαίνει (29) καὶ χωρὶς σπουδῆς καὶ μετὰ σπουδῆς ἐπαινεῖν πολλάκις οὐ μόνον (30) ἄνθρωπον ἢ θεὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄψυχα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων τὸ τυχόν, (31) τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ περὶ τούτων ληπτέον τὰς προτάσεις, (32) ὥστε ὅσον παραδείγματος χάριν εἴπωμεν καὶ περὶ τούτων.

. .

Praise, again, may be serious or frivolous; nor is it always of a human or divine being but often of inanimate things, or of the humblest of the lower animals. Here too we must know on what grounds to argue, and must, therefore, now discuss the subject, though by way of illustration only.

(33) καλὸν μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ὃ ἂν δι’ αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν ὂν ἐπ(34)αινετὸν ᾖ, ἢ ὃ ἂν ἀγαθὸν ὂν ἡδὺ ᾖ, ὅτι ἀγαθόν· εἰ δὲ (35) τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ καλόν, ἀνάγκη τὴν ἀρετὴν καλὸν εἶναι· (36) ἀγαθὸν γὰρ ὂν ἐπαινετόν ἐστιν.

. . .

The Noble is that which is both desirable for its own sake and also worthy of praise; or that which is both good and also pleasant because good. If this is a true definition of the Noble, it follows that virtue must be noble, since it is both a good thing and also praiseworthy.

ἀρετὴ δ’ ἐστὶ μὲν δύ(37)ναμις ὡς δοκεῖ ποριστικὴ ἀγαθῶν καὶ φυλακτική, καὶ (38) δύναμις εὐεργετικὴ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων, καὶ πάντων (1366b1) περὶ πάντα· μέρη δὲ ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρεία, σωφρο(2)σύνη, μεγαλοπρέπεια, μεγαλοψυχία, ἐλευθεριότης, φρόνησις, (3) σοφία.

. . .

Virtue is, according to the usual view, a faculty of providing and preserving good things; or a faculty of conferring many great benefits, and benefits of all kinds on all occasions. The forms of Virtue are justice, courage, temperance, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, gentleness, prudence, wisdom.

ἀνάγκη δὲ μεγίστας εἶναι ἀρετὰς τὰς τοῖς ἄλλοις (4) χρησιμωτάτας, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ δύναμις εὐεργετική, (5) <καὶ> διὰ τοῦτο τοὺς δικαίους καὶ ἀνδρείους μάλιστα τιμῶ(6)σιν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐν πολέμῳ, ἡ δὲ καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν εἰ(7)ρήνῃ χρήσιμος ἄλλοις.

. . .

If virtue is a faculty of beneficence, the highest kinds of it must be those which are most useful to others, and for this reason men honour most the just and the courageous, since courage is useful to others in war, justice both in war and in peace.

εἶτα ἐλευθεριότης· προΐενται γὰρ (8) καὶ οὐκ ἀνταγωνίζονται περὶ τῶν χρημάτων, ὧν μάλιστα (9) ἐφίενται ἄλλοι.

. .

Next comes liberality; liberal people let their money go instead of fighting for it, whereas other people care more for money than for anything else.

ἔστι δὲ δικαιοσύνη μὲν ἀρετὴ δι’ ἣν τὰ αὑτῶν (10) ἕκαστοι ἔχουσι, καὶ ὡς ὁ νόμος· ἀδικία δὲ δι’ ἣν τὰ ἀλλό(11)τρια, οὐχ ὡς ὁ νόμος.

. .

Justice is the virtue through which everybody enjoys his own possessions in accordance with the law; its opposite is injustice, through which men enjoy the possessions of others in defiance of the law.

ἀνδρεία δὲ δι’ ἣν πρακτικοί εἰσι τῶν (12) καλῶν ἔργων ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις, καὶ ὡς ὁ νόμος κελεύει, καὶ (13) ὑπηρετικοὶ τῷ νόμῳ· δειλία δὲ τοὐναντίον.

. .

Courage is the virtue that disposes men to do noble deeds in situations of danger, in accordance with the law and in obedience to its commands; cowardice is the opposite.

σωφροσύνη δὲ (14) ἀρετὴ δι’ ἣν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς τὰς τοῦ σώματος οὕτως ἔχουσιν (15) ὡς ὁ νόμος κελεύει· ἀκολασία δὲ τοὐναντίον.

.

Temperance is the virtue that disposes us to obey the law where physical pleasures are concerned; incontinence is the opposite.

ἐλευθεριότης (16) δὲ περὶ χρήματα εὐποιητική, ἀνελευθερία δὲ τοὐναντίον.

.

Liberality disposes us to spend money for others’ good; illiberality is the opposite.

(17) μεγαλοψυχία δὲ ἀρετὴ μεγάλων ποιητικὴ εὐεργετημάτων (18) [μικροψυχία δὲ τοὐναντίον], μεγαλοπρέπεια δὲ ἀρετὴ ἐν δαπα(19)νήμασι μεγέθους ποιητική, μικροψυχία δὲ καὶ μικρο(20)πρέπεια τἀναντία.

. . .

Magnanimity is the virtue that disposes us to do good to others on a large scale; [its opposite is meanness of spirit]. Magnificence is a virtue productive of greatness in matters involving the spending of money. The opposites of these two are smallness of spirit and meanness respectively.

φρόνησις δ’ ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ διανοίας καθ’ (21) ἣν εὖ βουλεύεσθαι δύνανται περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν τῶν (22) εἰρημένων εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν.

.

Prudence is that virtue of the understanding which enables men to come to wise decisions about the relation to happiness of the goods and evils that have been previously mentioned.

(23) περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας καθόλου καὶ περὶ τῶν μο(24)ρίων εἴρηται κατὰ τὸν ἐνεστῶτα καιρὸν ἱκανῶς, περὶ δὲ τῶν (25) ἄλλων οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν· φανερὸν γὰρ ὅτι ἀνάγκη τά τε ποιη (26)τικὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς εἶναι καλά (πρὸς ἀρετὴν γάρ) καὶ τὰ ἀπ’ ἀρε(27)τῆς γινόμενα, τοιαῦτα δὲ τά τε σημεῖα τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τὰ (28) ἔργα· ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ σημεῖα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἅ ἐστιν ἀγαθοῦ ἔργα (29) ἢ πάθη καλά, ἀνάγκη ὅσα τε ἀνδρείας ἔργα ἢ σημεῖα ἀν(30)δρείας ἢ ἀνδρείως πέπρακται καλὰ εἶναι, καὶ τὰ δίκαια (31) καὶ τὰ δικαίως ἔργα (πάθη δὲ οὔ· ἐν μόνῃ γὰρ ταύτῃ τῶν (32) ἀρετῶν οὐκ ἀεὶ τὸ δικαίως καλόν, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τοῦ ζημιοῦ(33)σθαι αἰσχρὸν τὸ δικαίως μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀδίκως), καὶ κατὰ (34) τὰς ἄλλας δὲ ἀρετὰς ὡσαύτως.

. . . . . .

The above is a sufficient account, for our present purpose, of virtue and vice in general, and of their various forms. As to further aspects of the subject, it is not difficult to discern the facts; it is evident that things productive of virtue are noble, as tending towards virtue; and also the effects of virtue, that is, the signs of its presence and the acts to which it leads. And since the signs of virtue, and such acts as it is the mark of a virtuous man to do or have done to him, are noble, it follows that all deeds or signs of courage, and everything done courageously, must be noble things; and so with what is just and actions done justly. (Not, however, actions justly done to us; here justice is unlike the other virtues; ‘justly’ does not always mean ‘nobly’; when a man is punished, it is more shameful that this should be justly than unjustly done to him). The same is true of the other virtues.

καὶ ἐφ’ ὅσοις τὰ ἆθλα (35) τιμή, καλά. καὶ ἐφ’ ὅσοις τιμὴ μᾶλλον ἢ χρήματα. (36) καὶ ὅσα μὴ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα πράττει τις τῶν αἱρετῶν, καὶ τὰ (37) ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά, ὅσα τε ὑπὲρ πατρίδος τις ἐποίησεν παρ(38)ιδὼν τὸ αὑτοῦ, καὶ τὰ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθά, καὶ ἃ μὴ αὐτῷ (1367a1) ἀγαθά· αὑτοῦ γὰρ ἕνεκα τὰ τοιαῦτα.

. .

Again, those actions are noble for which the reward is simply honour, or honour more than money. So are those in which a man aims at something desirable for some one else’s sake; actions good absolutely, such as those a man does for his country without thinking of himself; actions good in their own nature; actions that are not good simply for the individual, since individual interests are selfish.

καὶ ὅσα τεθνεῶτι (2) ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν μᾶλλον ἢ ζῶντι· τὸ γὰρ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα (3) μᾶλλον ἔχει τὰ ζῶντι.

.

Noble also are those actions whose advantage may be enjoyed after death, as opposed to those whose advantage is enjoyed during one’s lifetime: for the latter are more likely to be for one’s own sake only.

καὶ ὅσα ἔργα τῶν ἄλλων ἕνεκα· (4) ἧττον γὰρ αὑτοῦ. καὶ ὅσαι εὐπραγίαι περὶ ἄλλους ἀλλὰ (5) μὴ περὶ αὑτόν, καὶ <αἱ> περὶ τοὺς εὖ ποιήσαντας· δίκαιον γάρ. (6) καὶ τὰ εὐεργετήματα· οὐ γὰρ εἰς αὑτόν.

. . .

Also, all actions done for the sake of others, since less than other actions are done for one’s own sake; and all successes which benefit others and not oneself; and services done to one’s benefactors, for this is just; and good deeds generally, since they are not directed to one’s own profit.

καὶ τὰ ἐναντία (7) ἢ ἐφ’ οἷς αἰσχύνονται· τὰ γὰρ αἰσχρὰ αἰσχύνονται καὶ (8) λέγοντες καὶ ποιοῦντες καὶ μέλλοντες, ὥσπερ καὶ Σαπφὼ (9) πεποίηκεν, εἰπόντος τοῦ Ἀλκαίου (10) θέλω τι εἰπῆν, ἀλλά με κωλύει
(11) αἰδώς,
(12) αἱ δ’ ἦχες ἐσθλῶν ἵμερον ἢ καλῶν
(13) καὶ μή τι εἰπῆν γλῶσσ’ ἐκύκα κακόν
(14) αἰδώς κέν σε οὐκ εἶχεν ὄμματ’,
(15) ἀλλ’ ἔλεγες περὶ τῶ δικαίω.

. . .

And the opposites of those things of which men feel ashamed, for men are ashamed of saying, doing, or intending to do shameful things. Sappho wrote, when Alcaius said: Something I fain would say to thee,Only shame restraineth me,If for things good and noble thou wert yearning,If to speak baseness were thy tongue not burning,No load of shame would on thine eyelids weigh;What thou with honour wishest thou wouldst say.

(16) καὶ περὶ ὧν ἀγωνιῶσι μὴ φοβούμενοι· περὶ γὰρ τῶν πρὸς (17) δόξαν φερόντων ἀγαθῶν τοῦτο πάσχουσιν. καὶ αἱ τῶν φύσει (18) σπουδαιοτέρων ἀρεταὶ καλλίους καὶ τὰ ἔργα, οἷον ἀνδρὸς ἢ (19) γυναικός.

. .

Those things, also, are noble for which men strive anxiously, without feeling fear; for they feel thus about the good things which lead to fair fame. Again, one quality or action is nobler than another if it is that of a naturally finer being: thus a man’s will be nobler than a woman’s.

καὶ αἱ ἀπολαυστικαὶ ἄλλοις μᾶλλον ἢ αὐτοῖς· (20) διὸ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καλόν.

.

And those qualities are noble which give more pleasure to other people than to their possessors; hence the nobleness of justice and just actions.

καὶ τὸ τοὺς (21) ἐχθροὺς τιμωρεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ καταλλάττεσθαι· τό τε γὰρ (22) ἀνταποδιδόναι δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον καλόν, καὶ ἀνδρείου τὸ μὴ (23) ἡττᾶσθαι.

. .

It is noble to avenge oneself on one’s enemies and not to come to terms with them; for requital is just, and the just is noble; and not to surrender is a sign of courage.

καὶ νίκη καὶ τιμὴ τῶν καλῶν· αἱρετά (24) τε γὰρ ἄκαρπα ὄντα, καὶ ὑπεροχὴν ἀρετῆς δηλοῖ. καὶ τὰ (25) μνημονευτά, καὶ τὰ μᾶλλον μᾶλλον.

. . .

Victory, too, and honour belong to the class of noble things, since they are desirable even when they yield no fruits, and they prove our superiority in good qualities. Things that deserve to be remembered are noble, and the more they deserve this, the nobler they are.

καὶ ἃ μὴ ζῶντι (26) ἕπεται, καὶ οἷς τιμὴ ἀκολουθεῖ, καὶ τὰ περιττά, καὶ τὰ (27) μόνῳ ὑπάρχοντα, καλλίω· εὐμνημονευτότερα γάρ. καὶ (28) κτήματα ἄκαρπα· ἐλευθεριώτερα γάρ. καὶ τὰ παρ’ ἑκά(29)στοις δὲ ἴδια καλά, καὶ ὅσα σημεῖά ἐστιν τῶν παρ’ ἑκάστοις (30) ἐπαινουμένων, οἷον ἐν Λακεδαίμονι κομᾶν καλόν· ἐλευθέρου (31) γὰρ σημεῖον· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν κομῶντα ῥᾴδιον οὐδὲν ποιεῖν ἔργον (32) θητικόν.

. . . .

So are the things that continue even after death; those which are always attended by honour; those which are exceptional; and those which are possessed by one person alone—these last are more readily remembered than others. So again are possessions that bring no profit, since they are more fitting than others for a gentleman. So are the distinctive qualities of a particular people, and the symbols of what it specially admires, like long hair in Sparta, where this is a mark of a free man, as it is not easy to perform any menial task when one’s hair is long.

καὶ τὸ μηδεμίαν ἐργάζεσθαι βάναυσον τέχνην· (33) ἐλευθέρου γὰρ τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἄλλον ζῆν.

.

Again, it is noble not to practise any sordid craft, since it is the mark of a free man not to live at another’s beck and call.

ληπτέον δὲ καὶ τὰ (34) σύνεγγυς τοῖς ὑπάρχουσιν ὡς ταὐτὰ ὄντα καὶ πρὸς ἔπ(35)αινον καὶ πρὸς ψόγον, οἷον τὸν εὐλαβῆ ψυχρὸν καὶ ἐπίβου(36)λον καὶ τὸν ἠλίθιον χρηστὸν ἢ τὸν ἀνάλγητον πρᾶον, καὶ (37) ἕκαστον δ’ ἐκ τῶν παρακολουθούντων ἀεὶ κατὰ τὸ βέλτιστον, (38) οἷον τὸν ὀργίλον καὶ τὸν μανικὸν ἁπλοῦν καὶ τὸν αὐθάδη (1367b1) μεγαλοπρεπῆ καὶ σεμνόν, καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς ὡς (2) ἐν ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ὄντας, οἷον τὸν θρασὺν ἀνδρεῖον καὶ τὸν (3) ἄσωτον ἐλευθέριον· δόξει τε γὰρ τοῖς πολλοῖς, καὶ ἅμα (4) παραλογιστικὸν [ἐκ] τῆς αἰτίας. εἰ γὰρ οὗ μὴ ἀνάγκη κιν(5)δυνευτικός, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἂν δόξειεν ὅπου καλόν, καὶ εἰ (6) προετικὸς τοῖς τυχοῦσι, καὶ τοῖς φίλοις· ὑπερβολὴ γὰρ (7) ἀρετῆς τὸ πάντας εὖ ποιεῖν.

. . . . . . . . . .

We are also to assume when we wish either to praise a man or blame him that qualities closely allied to those which he actually has are identical with them; for instance, that the cautious man is cold—blooded and treacherous, and that the stupid man is an honest fellow or the thick—skinned man a good—tempered one. We can always idealize any given man by drawing on the virtues akin to his actual qualities; thus we may say that the passionate and excitable man is ‘outspoken’; or that the arrogant man is ‘superb’ or ‘impressive’. Those who run to extremes will be said to possess the corresponding good qualities; rashness will be called courage, and extravagance generosity. That will be what most people think; and at the same time this method enables an advocate to draw a misleading inference from the motive, arguing that if a man runs into danger needlessly, much more will he do so in a noble cause; and if a man is open—handed to any one and every one, he will be so to his friends also, since it is the extreme form of goodness to be good to everybody.

σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ παρ’ οἷς ὁ (8) ἔπαινος· ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔλεγεν, οὐ χαλεπὸν Ἀθη(9)ναίους ἐν Ἀθηναίοις ἐπαινεῖν. δεῖ δὲ τὸ παρ’ ἑκάστοις τίμιον (10) ὂν λέγειν ὡς ὑπάρχει, οἷον ἐν Σκύθαις ἢ Λάκωσιν ἢ φιλοσό(11)φοις.

. . .

We must also take into account the nature of our particular audience when making a speech of praise; for, as Socrates used to say, ‘it is not difficult to praise the Athenians to an Athenian audience.’ If the audience esteems a given quality, we must say that our hero has that quality, no matter whether we are addressing Scythians or Spartans or philosophers.

καὶ ὅλως δὲ τὸ τίμιον ἄγειν εἰς τὸ καλόν, ἐπείπερ (12) γε δοκεῖ γειτνιᾶν. καὶ ὅσα κατὰ τὸ προσῆκον, οἷον εἰ ἄξια (13) τῶν προγόνων καὶ τῶν προϋπηργμένων· εὐδαιμονικὸν γὰρ (14) καὶ καλὸν καὶ τὸ προσεπικτᾶσθαι τιμήν.

. . .

Everything, in fact, that is esteemed we are to represent as noble. After all, people regard the two things as much the same. All actions are noble that are appropriate to the man who does them: if, for instance, they are worthy of his ancestors or of his own past career. For it makes for happiness, and is a noble thing, that he should add to the honour he already has.

καὶ εἰ παρὰ τὸ προσ(15)ῆκον ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ κάλλιον, οἷον εἰ εὐτυχῶν (16) μὲν μέτριος, ἀτυχῶν δὲ μεγαλόψυχος, ἢ μείζων γιγνό(17)μενος βελτίων καὶ καταλλακτικώτερος.

. . .

Even inappropriate actions are noble if they are better and nobler than the appropriate ones would be; for instance, if one who was just an average person when all went well becomes a hero in adversity, or if he becomes better and easier to get on with the higher he rises.

τοιοῦτον δὲ τὸ τοῦ (18) Ἰφικράτους, “ἐξ οἵων εἰς οἷα”, καὶ τὸ τοῦ ὀλυμπιονίκου
(19) πρόσθε μὲν ἀμφ’ ὤμοισιν ἔχων τραχεῖαν, (20) καὶ τὸ τοῦ Σιμωνίδου
(21) ἣ πατρός τε καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀδελφῶν τ’ οὖσα τυράννων.

. . .

Compare the saying of Iphicrates, ‘Think what I was and what I am’; and the epigram on the victor at the Olympic games, In time past, bearing a yoke on my shoulders, of wood unshaven, and the encomium of Simonides, A woman whose father, whose husband, whose brethren were princes all.

(22) ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐκ τῶν πράξεων ὁ ἔπαινος, ἴδιον δὲ τοῦ σπουδαίου (23) τὸ κατὰ προαίρεσιν, πειρατέον δεικνύναι πράττοντα κατὰ (24) προαίρεσιν, χρήσιμον δὲ τὸ πολλάκις φαίνεσθαι πεπρα(25)χότα· διὸ καὶ τὰ συμπτώματα καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης ὡς (26) ἐν προαιρέσει ληπτέον· ἂν γὰρ πολλὰ καὶ ὅμοια προ(27)φέρηται, σημεῖον ἀρετῆς εἶναι δόξει καὶ προαιρέσεως.

. . .

Since we praise a man for what he has actually done, and fine actions are distinguished from others by being intentionally good, we must try to prove that our hero’s noble acts are intentional. This is all the easier if we can make out that he has often acted so before, and therefore we must assert coincidences and accidents to have been intended. Produce a number of good actions, all of the same kind, and people will think that they must have been intended, and that they prove the good qualities of the man who did them.

(28) ἔστιν δ’ ἔπαινος λόγος ἐμφανίζων μέγεθος ἀρετῆς. δεῖ οὖν (29) τὰς πράξεις ἐπιδεικνύναι ὡς τοιαῦται.

. .

Praise is the expression in words of the eminence of a man’s good qualities, and therefore we must display his actions as the product of such qualities.

τὸ δ’ ἐγκώμιον τῶν ἔρ(30)γων ἐστίν (τὰ δὲ κύκλῳ εἰς πίστιν, οἷον εὐγένεια καὶ παι(31)δεία· εἰκὸς γὰρ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ τὸν οὕτω τραφέντα (32) τοιοῦτον εἶναι), διὸ καὶ ἐγκωμιάζομεν πράξαντας.

. . . .

Encomium refers to what he has actually done; the mention of accessories, such as good birth and education, merely helps to make our story credible — good fathers are likely to have good sons, and good training is likely to produce good character. Hence it is only when a man has already done something that we bestow encomiums upon him.

τὰ δ’ (33) ἔργα σημεῖα τῆς ἕξεώς ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ ἐπαινοῖμεν ἂν καὶ μὴ πε(34)πραγότα, εἰ πιστεύοιμεν εἶναι τοιοῦτον. μακαρισμὸς δὲ καὶ (35) εὐδαιμονισμὸς αὑτοῖς μὲν ταὐτά, τούτοις δ’ οὐ ταὐτά, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ (36) ἡ εὐδαιμονία τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ ὁ εὐδαιμονισμὸς περιέχει ταῦτα. (37) ἔχει δὲ κοινὸν εἶδος ὁ ἔπαινος καὶ αἱ συμβουλαί. (38) ἃ γὰρ ἐν τῷ συμβουλεύειν ὑπόθοιο ἄν, ταῦτα μετατεθέντα (1368a1) τῇ λέξει ἐγκώμια γίγνεται.

. . . . . .

Yet the actual deeds are evidence of the doer’s character: even if a man has not actually done a given good thing, we shall bestow praise on him, if we are sure that he is the sort of man who would do it. To call any one blest is, it may be added, the same thing as to call him happy; but these are not the same thing as to bestow praise and encomium upon him; the two latter are a part of ‘calling happy’, just as goodness is a part of happiness. To praise a man is in one respect akin to urging a course of action. The suggestions which would be made in the latter case become encomiums when differently expressed.

ἐπεὶ οὖν ἔχομεν ἃ δεῖ πράτ(2)τειν καὶ ποῖόν τινα εἶναι δεῖ, ταῦτα ὡς ὑποθήκας λέγοντας (3) τῇ λέξει μετατιθέναι δεῖ καὶ στρέφειν, οἷον ὅτι οὐ δεῖ (4) μέγα φρονεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς διὰ τύχην ἀλλὰ τοῖς δι’ αὑτόν. (5) οὕτω μὲν οὖν λεχθὲν ὑποθήκην δύναται, ὡδὶ δ’ ἔπαινον “μέγα (6) φρονῶν οὐκ <ἐπὶ> τοῖς διὰ τύχην ὑπάρχουσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς δι’ (7) αὑτόν”. ὥστε ὅταν ἐπαινεῖν βούλῃ, ὅρα τί ἂν ὑπόθοιο· καὶ ὅταν (8) ὑποθέσθαι, ὅρα τί ἂν ἐπαινέσειας. ἡ δὲ λέξις ἔσται ἀντικειμένη (9) ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὅταν τὸ μὲν κωλῦον τὸ δὲ μὴ κωλῦον μετατεθῇ.

. . . . . . .

When we know what action or character is required, then, in order to express these facts as suggestions for action, we have to change and reverse our form of words. Thus the statement ‘A man should be proud not of what he owes to fortune but of what he owes to himself’, if put like this, amounts to a suggestion; to make it into praise we must put it thus, ‘Since he is proud not of what he owes to fortune but of what he owes to himself.’ Consequently, whenever you want to praise any one, think what you would urge people to do; and when you want to urge the doing of anything, think what you would praise a man for having done. Since suggestion may or may not forbid an action, the praise into which we convert it must have one or other of two opposite forms of expression accordingly.

(10) χρηστέον δὲ καὶ τῶν αὐξητικῶν πολλοῖς, οἷον εἰ μό(11)νος ἢ πρῶτος ἢ μετ’ ὀλίγων ἢ καὶ [ὃ] μάλιστα πεποίηκεν· (12) ἅπαντα γὰρ ταῦτα καλά.

. .

There are, also, many useful ways of heightening the effect of praise. We must, for instance, point out that a man is the only one, or the first, or almost the only one who has done something, or that he has done it better than any one else; all these distinctions are honourable.

καὶ τῷ ἐκ τῶν χρόνων καὶ (13) τῶν καιρῶν· τούτῳ δ’ εἰ παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον. καὶ εἰ πολ(14)λάκις τὸ αὐτὸ κατώρθωκεν· μέγα γὰρ καὶ οὐκ ἀπὸ (15) τύχης ἀλλὰ δι’ αὑτοῦ ἂν δόξειεν. καὶ εἰ τὰ προτρέποντα (16) καὶ τιμῶντα διὰ τοῦτον εὕρηται καὶ κατεσκευάσθη, καὶ εἰς (17) τοῦτον πρῶτον ἐγκώμιον ἐποιήθη, οἷον εἰς Ἱππόλοχον, καὶ <εἰς> (18) Ἁρμόδιον καὶ Ἀριστογείτονα τὸ ἐν ἀγορᾷ σταθῆναι· ὁμοίως δὲ (19) καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐναντίων. κἂν μὴ καθ’ αὑτὸν εὐπορῇς, πρὸς (20) ἄλλους ἀντιπαραβάλλειν, ὅπερ Ἰσοκράτης ἐποίει διὰ τὴν (21) ἀσυνήθειαν τοῦ δικολογεῖν. δεῖ δὲ πρὸς ἐνδόξους συγκρίνειν· (22) αὐξητικὸν γὰρ καὶ καλόν, εἰ σπουδαίων βελτίων. πίπτει δ’ (23) εὐλόγως ἡ αὔξησις εἰς τοὺς ἐπαίνους· ἐν ὑπεροχῇ γάρ ἐστιν, (24) ἡ δ’ ὑπεροχὴ τῶν καλῶν· διὸ κἂν μὴ πρὸς τοὺς ἐνδόξους, (25) ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους δεῖ παραβάλλειν, ἐπείπερ ἡ ὑπεροχὴ (26) δοκεῖ μηνύειν ἀρετήν.

. . . . . . . . . . . .

And we must, further, make much of the particular season and occasion of an action, arguing that we could hardly have looked for it just then. If a man has often achieved the same success, we must mention this; that is a strong point; he himself, and not luck, will then be given the credit. So, too, if it is on his account that observances have been devised and instituted to encourage or honour such achievements as his own: thus we may praise Hippolochus because the first encomium ever made was for him, or Harmodius and Aristogeiton because their statues were the first to be put up in the market—place. And we may censure bad men for the opposite reason. Again, if you cannot find enough to say of a man himself, you may pit him against others, which is what Isocrates used to do owing to his want of familiarity with forensic pleading. The comparison should be with famous men; that will strengthen your case; it is a noble thing to surpass men who are themselves great. It is only natural that methods of ‘heightening the effect’ should be attached particularly to speeches of praise; they aim at proving superiority over others, and any such superiority is a form of nobleness. Hence if you cannot compare your hero with famous men, you should at least compare him with other people generally, since any superiority is held to reveal excellence.

ὅλως δὲ τῶν κοινῶν εἰδῶν ἅπασι τοῖς (27) λόγοις ἡ μὲν αὔξησις ἐπιτηδειοτάτη τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς (τὰς (28) γὰρ πράξεις ὁμολογουμένας λαμβάνουσιν, ὥστε λοιπὸν μέ(29)γεθος περιθεῖναι καὶ κάλλος)· τὰ δὲ παραδείγματα τοῖς (30) συμβουλευτικοῖς (ἐκ γὰρ τῶν προγεγονότων τὰ μέλλοντα (31) καταμαντευόμενοι κρίνομεν)· τὰ δ’ ἐνθυμήματα τοῖς δικα(32)νικοῖς (αἰτίαν γὰρ καὶ ἀπόδειξιν μάλιστα δέχεται τὸ γε(33)γονὸς διὰ τὸ ἀσαφές).

. . . .

And, in general, of the lines of argument which are common to all speeches, this ‘heightening of effect’ is most suitable for declamations, where we take our hero’s actions as admitted facts, and our business is simply to invest these with dignity and nobility. ‘Examples’ are most suitable to deliberative speeches; for we judge of future events by divination from past events. Enthymemes are most suitable to forensic speeches; it is our doubts about past events that most admit of arguments showing why a thing must have happened or proving that it did happen.

ἐκ τίνων μὲν οὖν οἱ ἔπαινοι καὶ οἱ (34) ψόγοι λέγονται σχεδὸν πάντες, καὶ πρὸς ποῖα δεῖ βλέ(35)ποντας ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ψέγειν, καὶ ἐκ τίνων τὰ ἐγκώμια γί(36)γνεται καὶ τὰ ὀνείδη, ταῦτ’ ἐστίν· ἐχομένων γὰρ τούτων τὰ (37) ἐναντία τούτοις φανερά· ὁ γὰρ ψόγος ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστίν.

. . . .

The above are the general lines on which all, or nearly all, speeches of praise or blame are constructed. We have seen the sort of thing we must bear in mind in making such speeches, and the materials out of which encomiums and censures are made. No special treatment of censure and vituperation is needed. Knowing the above facts, we know their contraries; and it is out of these that speeches of censure are made.

10. (1368b1) Περὶ δὲ κατηγορίας καὶ ἀπολογίας, ἐκ πόσων καὶ (2) ποίων ποιεῖσθαι δεῖ τοὺς συλλογισμούς, ἐχόμενον ἂν εἴη λέ(3)γειν.

.

Part 10. We have next to treat of Accusation and Defence, and to enumerate and describe the ingredients of the syllogisms used therein.

δεῖ δὴ λαβεῖν τρία, ἓν μὲν τίνων καὶ πόσων ἕνεκα ἀδι(4)κοῦσι, δεύτερον δὲ πῶς αὐτοὶ διακείμενοι, τρίτον δὲ τοὺς ποίους (5) καὶ πῶς ἔχοντας.

. . . .

There are three things we must ascertain first, the nature and number of the incentives to wrong—doing; second, the state of mind of wrongdoers; third, the kind of persons who are wronged, and their condition.

διορισάμενοι οὖν τὸ ἀδικεῖν λέγωμεν ἑξῆς. (6) ἔστω δὴ τὸ ἀδικεῖν τὸ βλάπτειν ἑκόντα παρὰ τὸν (7) νόμον. νόμος δ’ ἐστὶν ὁ μὲν ἴδιος ὁ δὲ κοινός· λέγω (8) δὲ ἴδιον μὲν καθ’ ὃν γεγραμμένον πολιτεύονται, κοινὸν δὲ (9) ὅσα ἄγραφα παρὰ πᾶσιν ὁμολογεῖσθαι δοκεῖ. ἑκόντες δὲ (10) ποιοῦσιν ὅσα εἰδότες καὶ μὴ ἀναγκαζόμενοι. ὅσα μὲν οὖν (11) εἰδότες, οὐ πάντα προαιρούμενοι, ὅσα δὲ προαιρούμενοι, εἰδό(12)τες ἅπαντα· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὃ προαιρεῖται ἀγνοεῖ.

. . . . . . . .

We will deal with these questions in order. But before that let us define the act of ‘wrong—doing’. We may describe ‘wrong—doing’ as injury voluntarily inflicted contrary to law. ‘Law’ is either special or general. By special law I mean that written law which regulates the life of a particular community; by general law, all those unwritten principles which are supposed to be acknowledged everywhere. We do things ‘voluntarily’ when we do them consciously and without constraint. Not all voluntary acts are deliberate, but all deliberate acts are conscious — no one is ignorant of what he deliberately intends.

δι’ ἃ δὲ (13) προαιροῦνται βλάπτειν καὶ φαῦλα ποιεῖν παρὰ τὸν νόμον (14) κακία ἐστὶν καὶ ἀκρασία· ἐὰν γάρ τινες ἔχωσιν μοχθηρίαν (15) ἢ μίαν ἢ πλείους, περὶ τοῦτο ὃ μοχθηροὶ τυγχάνουσιν (16) ὄντες καὶ ἄδικοί εἰσιν· οἷον ὁ μὲν ἀνελεύθερος περὶ χρή(17)ματα, ὁ δ’ ἀκόλαστος περὶ τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἡδονάς, ὁ δὲ (18) μαλακὸς περὶ τὰ ῥάθυμα, ὁ δὲ δειλὸς περὶ τοὺς κινδύνους (19) (τοὺς γὰρ συγκινδυνεύοντας ἐγκαταλιμπάνουσι διὰ τὸν φό(20)βον), ὁ δὲ φιλότιμος διὰ τιμήν, ὁ δ’ ὀξύθυμος δι’ ὀργήν, (21) ὁ δὲ φιλόνικος διὰ νίκην, ὁ δὲ πικρὸς διὰ τιμωρίαν, ὁ δ’ (22) ἄφρων διὰ τὸ ἀπατᾶσθαι περὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἄδικον, ὁ (23) δ’ ἀναίσχυντος δι’ ὀλιγωρίαν δόξης· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων (24) ἕκαστος περὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὑποκειμένων.

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

The causes of our deliberately intending harmful and wicked acts contrary to law are (1) vice, (2) lack of self—control. For the wrongs a man does to others will correspond to the bad quality or qualities that he himself possesses. Thus it is the mean man who will wrong others about money, the profligate in matters of physical pleasure, the effeminate in matters of comfort, and the coward where danger is concerned — his terror makes him abandon those who are involved in the same danger. The ambitious man does wrong for sake of honour, the quick—tempered from anger, the lover of victory for the sake of victory, the embittered man for the sake of revenge, the stupid man because he has misguided notions of right and wrong, the shameless man because he does not mind what people think of him; and so with the rest — any wrong that any one does to others corresponds to his particular faults of character.

(25) ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων δῆλον, τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς (26) εἰρημένων, τὰ δ’ ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰ πάθη ῥηθησομένων· λοιπὸν (27) δ’ εἰπεῖν τίνος ἕνεκα καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες ἀδικοῦσι καὶ τίνας. (28) πρῶτον μὲν οὖν διελώμεθα τίνων ὀρεγόμενοι καὶ ποῖα φεύ(29)γοντες ἐγχειροῦσιν ἀδικεῖν· δῆλον γὰρ ὡς τῷ μὲν κατηγο(30)ροῦντι πόσα καὶ ποῖα τούτων ὑπάρχει τῷ ἀντιδίκῳ σκεπτέον, (31) ὧν ἐφιέμενοι πάντες τοὺς πλησίον ἀδικοῦσι, τῷ δὲ ἀπο(32)λογουμένῳ ποῖα καὶ πόσα τούτων οὐχ ὑπάρχει.

. . . .

However, this subject has already been cleared up in part in our discussion of the virtues and will be further explained later when we treat of the emotions. We have now to consider the motives and states of mind of wrongdoers, and to whom they do wrong. Let us first decide what sort of things people are trying to get or avoid when they set about doing wrong to others. For it is plain that the prosecutor must consider, out of all the aims that can ever induce us to do wrong to our neighbours, how many, and which, affect his adversary; while the defendant must consider how many, and which, do not affect him.

πάντες δὴ (33) πάντα πράττουσι τὰ μὲν οὐ δι’ αὑτοὺς τὰ δὲ δι’ αὑτούς. τῶν (34) μὲν οὖν μὴ δι’ αὑτοὺς τὰ μὲν διὰ τύχην πράττουσι τὰ δ’ (35) ἐξ ἀνάγκης, τῶν δ’ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ μὲν βίᾳ τὰ δὲ φύ(36)σει, ὥστε πάντα ὅσα μὴ δι’ αὑτοὺς πράττουσι, τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ (37) τύχης τὰ δὲ φύσει τὰ δὲ βίᾳ. ὅσα δὲ δι’ αὑτούς, καὶ ὧν (1369a1) αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι, τὰ μὲν δι’ ἔθος τὰ δὲ δι’ ὄρεξιν, τὰ μὲν (2) διὰ λογιστικὴν ὄρεξιν τὰ δὲ δι’ ἄλογον· ἔστιν δ’ ἡ μὲν (3) βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ ὄρεξις (οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται ἀλλ’ ἢ ὅταν (4) οἰηθῇ εἶναι ἀγαθόν), ἄλογοι δ’ ὀρέξεις ὀργὴ καὶ ἐπιθυμία· (5) ὥστε πάντα ὅσα πράττουσιν ἀνάγκη πράττειν δι’ αἰτίας (6) ἑπτά, διὰ τύχην, διὰ φύσιν, διὰ βίαν, δι’ ἔθος, διὰ λο(7)γισμόν, διὰ θυμόν, δι’ ἐπιθυμίαν. τὸ δὲ προσδιαιρεῖσθαι (8) καθ’ ἡλικίαν ἢ ἕξεις ἢ ἀλλ’ ἄττα τὰ πραττόμενα περί(9)εργον· εἰ γὰρ συμβέβηκεν τοῖς νέοις ὀργίλοις εἶναι ἢ ἐπι(10)θυμητικοῖς, οὐ διὰ τὴν νεότητα πράττουσι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀλλὰ δι’ (11) ὀργὴν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν. οὐδὲ διὰ πλοῦτον καὶ πενίαν, ἀλλὰ (12) συμβέβηκε τοῖς μὲν πένησι διὰ τὴν ἔνδειαν ἐπιθυμεῖν χρη(13)μάτων, τοῖς δὲ πλουσίοις διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἐπιθυμεῖν τῶν (14) μὴ ἀναγκαίων ἡδονῶν· ἀλλὰ πράξουσι καὶ οὗτοι οὐ διὰ (15) πλοῦτον καὶ πενίαν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν.

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

Now every action of every person either is or is not due to that person himself. Of those not due to himself some are due to chance, the others to necessity; of these latter, again, some are due to compulsion, the others to nature. Consequently all actions that are not due to a man himself are due either to chance or to nature or to compulsion. All actions that are due to a man himself and caused by himself are due either to habit or to rational or irrational craving. Rational craving is a craving for good, i.e. a wish — nobody wishes for anything unless he thinks it good. Irrational craving is twofold, viz. anger and appetite. Thus every action must be due to one or other of seven causes: chance, nature, compulsion, habit, reasoning, anger, or appetite. It is superfluous further to distinguish actions according to the doers’ ages, moral states, or the like; it is of course true that, for instance, young men do have hot tempers and strong appetites; still, it is not through youth that they act accordingly, but through anger or appetite. Nor, again, is action due to wealth or poverty; it is of course true that poor men, being short of money, do have an appetite for it, and that rich men, being able to command needless pleasures, do have an appetite for such pleasures: but here, again, their actions will be due not to wealth or poverty but to appetite.

ὁμοίως δὲ (16) καὶ οἱ δίκαιοι καὶ οἱ ἄδικοι, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἱ λεγόμενοι κατὰ (17) τὰς ἕξεις πράττειν, διὰ ταῦτα πράξουσιν· ἢ γὰρ διὰ (18) λογισμὸν ἢ διὰ πάθος· ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν διὰ ἤθη καὶ πάθη (19) χρηστά, οἱ δὲ διὰ τἀναντία. συμβαίνει μέντοι ταῖς μὲν (20) τοιαύταις ἕξεσι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκολουθεῖν, ταῖς δὲ τοιαῖσδε (21) τὰ τοιάδε· εὐθὺς γὰρ ἴσως τῷ μὲν σώφρονι διὰ τὸ σώ(22)φρονα εἶναι δόξαι τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι χρησταὶ ἐπακολουθοῦσι (23) περὶ τῶν ἡδέων, τῷ δ’ ἀκολάστῳ αἱ ἐναντίαι περὶ τῶν (24) αὐτῶν τούτων· διὸ τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας διαιρέσεις ἐατέον, σκε(25)πτέον δὲ ποῖα ποίοις εἴωθεν ἕπεσθαι· εἰ μὲν γὰρ λευκὸς (26) ἢ μέλας, ἢ μέγας ἢ μικρός, οὐδὲν τέτακται τῶν τοιούτων (27) ἀκολουθεῖν, εἰ δὲ νέος ἢ πρεσβύτης, ἢ δίκαιος ἢ ἄδικος, ἤδη (28) διαφέρει· καὶ ὅλως ὅσα τῶν συμβαινόντων ποιεῖ διαφέρειν (29) τὰ ἤθη τῶν ἀνθρώπων, οἷον πλουτεῖν δοκῶν ἑαυτῷ ἢ πένεσθαι (30) διοίσει τι, καὶ εὐτυχεῖν ἢ ἀτυχεῖν.

. . . . . . . .

Similarly, with just men, and unjust men, and all others who are said to act in accordance with their moral qualities, their actions will really be due to one of the causes mentioned — either reasoning or emotion: due, indeed, sometimes to good dispositions and good emotions, and sometimes to bad; but that good qualities should be followed by good emotions, and bad by bad, is merely an accessory fact — it is no doubt true that the temperate man, for instance, because he is temperate, is always and at once attended by healthy opinions and appetites in regard to pleasant things, and the intemperate man by unhealthy ones. So we must ignore such distinctions. Still we must consider what kinds of actions and of people usually go together; for while there are no definite kinds of action associated with the fact that a man is fair or dark, tall or short, it does make a difference if he is young or old, just or unjust. And, generally speaking, all those accessory qualities that cause distinctions of human character are important: e.g. the sense of wealth or poverty, of being lucky or unlucky.

ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὕστερον (31) ἐροῦμεν, νῦν δὲ περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν εἴπωμεν πρῶτον.

.

This shall be dealt with later — let us now deal first with the rest of the subject before us.

(32) ἔστι δ’ ἀπὸ τύχης μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα γιγνόμενα, ὅσων ἥ τε (33) αἰτία ἀόριστος καὶ μὴ ἕνεκά του γίγνεται καὶ μήτε ἀεὶ (34) μήτε ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ μήτε τεταγμένως (δῆλον δ’ ἐκ τοῦ (35) ὁρισμοῦ τῆς τύχης περὶ τούτων), φύσει δὲ ὅσων ἥ τ’ αἰτία (1369b1) ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ τεταγμένη· ἢ γὰρ ἀεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ (2) ὡσαύτως ἀποβαίνει. τὰ γὰρ παρὰ φύσιν οὐδὲν δεῖ ἀκριβο(3)λογεῖσθαι πότερα κατὰ φύσιν ἤ τινα ἄλλην αἰτίαν (4) γίγνεται· δόξειε δ’ ἂν καὶ ἡ τύχη αἰτία εἶναι τῶν τοιού(5)των.

. . . . . .

The things that happen by chance are all those whose cause cannot be determined, that have no purpose, and that happen neither always nor usually nor in any fixed way. The definition of chance shows just what they are. Those things happen by nature which have a fixed and internal cause; they take place uniformly, either always or usually. There is no need to discuss in exact detail the things that happen contrary to nature, nor to ask whether they happen in some sense naturally or from some other cause; it would seem that chance is at least partly the cause of such events.

βίᾳ δὲ ὅσα παρ’ ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ τοὺς λογισμοὺς γίγνε(6)ται [δι’] αὐτῶν τῶν πραττόντων. ἔθει δὲ ὅσα διὰ τὸ πολ(7)λάκις πεποιηκέναι ποιοῦσιν. διὰ λογισμὸν δὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα (8) συμφέρειν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀγαθῶν ἢ ὡς τέλος ἢ ὡς (9) πρὸς τὸ τέλος, ὅταν διὰ τὸ συμφέρειν πράττηται· ἔνια (10) γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἀκόλαστοι συμφέροντα πράττουσιν, ἀλλ’ οὐ διὰ (11) τὸ συμφέρειν ἀλλὰ δι’ ἡδονήν. διὰ θυμὸν δὲ καὶ ὀργὴν (12) τὰ τιμωρητικά.

. . . . . .

Those things happen through compulsion which take place contrary to the desire or reason of the doer, yet through his own agency. Acts are done from habit which men do because they have often done them before. Actions are due to reasoning when, in view of any of the goods already mentioned, they appear useful either as ends or as means to an end, and are performed for that reason: ‘for that reason,’ since even licentious persons perform a certain number of useful actions, but because they are pleasant and not because they are useful. To passion and anger are due all acts of revenge.

διαφέρει δὲ τιμωρία καὶ κόλασις· ἡ μὲν γὰρ (13) κόλασις τοῦ πάσχοντος ἕνεκά ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ τιμωρία τοῦ ποιοῦν(14)τος, ἵνα πληρωθῇ. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ὀργή, δῆλον ἔσται (15) ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῶν παθῶν. δι’ ἐπιθυμίαν δὲ πράττεται (16) ὅσα φαίνεται ἡδέα. ἔστιν δὲ καὶ τὸ σύνηθες καὶ τὸ ἐθιστὸν (17) ἐν τοῖς ἡδέσιν· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν φύσει μὴ ἡδέων, ὅταν (18) συνεθισθῶσιν, ἡδέως ποιοῦσιν· ὥστε συλλαβόντι εἰπεῖν, ὅσα δι’ (19) αὑτοὺς πράττουσιν ἅπαντ’ ἐστὶν ἢ ἀγαθὰ ἢ φαινόμενα (20) ἀγαθά, ἢ ἡδέα ἢ φαινόμενα ἡδέα.

. . . . . . .

Revenge and punishment are different things. Punishment is inflicted for the sake of the person punished; revenge for that of the punisher, to satisfy his feelings. (What anger is will be made clear when we come to discuss the emotions.) Appetite is the cause of all actions that appear pleasant. Habit, whether acquired by mere familiarity or by effort, belongs to the class of pleasant things, for there are many actions not naturally pleasant which men perform with pleasure, once they have become used to them. To sum up then, all actions due to ourselves either are or seem to be either good or pleasant.

ἐπεὶ δ’ ὅσα δι’ αὑτοὺς (21) ἑκόντες πράττουσιν, οὐχ ἑκόντες δὲ ὅσα μὴ δι’ αὑτούς, πάντ’ (22) ἂν εἴη ὅσα ἑκόντες πράττουσιν ἢ ἀγαθὰ ἢ φαινόμενα (23) ἀγαθά, ἢ ἡδέα ἢ φαινόμενα ἡδέα· τίθημι γὰρ καὶ τὴν (24) τῶν κακῶν ἢ φαινομένων κακῶν ἢ ἀπαλλαγὴν ἢ ἀντὶ (25) μείζονος ἐλάττονος μετάληψιν ἐν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς (αἱρετὰ γάρ (26) πως), καὶ τὴν τῶν λυπηρῶν ἢ φαινομένων <λυπηρῶν> ἢ ἀπαλ(27)λαγὴν ἢ μετάληψιν ἀντὶ μειζόνων ἐλαττόνων ἐν τοῖς ἡδέ(28)σιν ὡσαύτως. ληπτέον ἄρα τὰ συμφέροντα καὶ τὰ ἡδέα, (29) πόσα καὶ ποῖα. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐν τοῖς (30) συμβουλευτικοῖς εἴρηται πρότερον, περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἡδέος (31) εἴπωμεν νῦν.

. . . . .

Moreover, as all actions due to ourselves are done voluntarily and actions not due to ourselves are done involuntarily, it follows that all voluntary actions must either be or seem to be either good or pleasant; for I reckon among goods escape from evils or apparent evils and the exchange of a greater evil for a less (since these things are in a sense positively desirable), and likewise I count among pleasures escape from painful or apparently painful things and the exchange of a greater pain for a less. We must ascertain, then, the number and nature of the things that are useful and pleasant. The useful has been previously examined in connexion with political oratory; let us now proceed to examine the pleasant.

δεῖ δὲ νομίζειν ἱκανοὺς εἶναι τοὺς ὅρους ἐὰν (32) ὦσι περὶ ἑκάστου μήτε ἀσαφεῖς μήτε ἀκριβεῖς.

.

Our various definitions must be regarded as adequate, even if they are not exact, provided they are clear.

11. (33) Ὑποκείσθω δὴ ἡμῖν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησίν τινα τῆς (34) ψυχῆς καὶ κατάστασιν ἀθρόαν καὶ αἰσθητὴν εἰς τὴν ὑπάρ(35)χουσαν φύσιν, λύπην δὲ τοὐναντίον.

.

Part 11. We may lay it down that Pleasure is a movement, a movement by which the soul as a whole is consciously brought into its normal state of being; and that Pain is the opposite.

εἰ δ’ ἐστὶν ἡδονὴ τὸ (1370a1) τοιοῦτον, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡδύ ἐστι τὸ ποιητικὸν τῆς εἰρημένης (2) διαθέσεως, τὸ δὲ φθαρτικὸν ἢ τῆς ἐναντίας καταστάσεως (3) ποιητικὸν λυπηρόν.

. .

If this is what pleasure is, it is clear that the pleasant is what tends to produce this condition, while that which tends to destroy it, or to cause the soul to be brought into the opposite state, is painful.

ἀνάγκη οὖν ἡδὺ εἶναι τό τε εἰς τὸ κατὰ (4) φύσιν ἰέναι ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν ἀπειλη(5)φότα ᾖ τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν τὰ κατ’ αὐτὴν γιγνόμενα, καὶ τὰ (6) ἔθη (καὶ γὰρ τὸ εἰθισμένον ὥσπερ πεφυκὸς ἤδη γίγνεται· (7) ὅμοιον γάρ τι τὸ ἔθος τῇ φύσει· ἐγγὺς γὰρ καὶ τὸ πολλάκις (8) τῷ ἀεί, ἔστιν δ’ ἡ μὲν φύσις τοῦ ἀεί, τὸ δὲ ἔθος τοῦ πολ(9)λάκις), καὶ τὸ μὴ βίαιον (παρὰ φύσιν γὰρ ἡ βία, διὸ τὸ (10) ἀναγκαῖον λυπηρόν, καὶ ὀρθῶς εἴρηται
(10) πᾶν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον πρᾶγμ’ ἀνιαρὸν ἔφυ), (11) τὰς δ’ ἐπιμελείας καὶ τὰς σπουδὰς καὶ τὰς συντονίας λυπηράς· (12) ἀναγκαῖα γὰρ καὶ βίαια ταῦτα, ἐὰν μὴ ἐθισθῶσιν· οὕτω δὲ τὸ (13) ἔθος ποιεῖ ἡδύ.

. . . . . . . . . . .

It must therefore be pleasant as a rule to move towards a natural state of being, particularly when a natural process has achieved the complete recovery of that natural state. Habits also are pleasant; for as soon as a thing has become habitual, it is virtually natural; habit is a thing not unlike nature; what happens often is akin to what happens always, natural events happening always, habitual events often. Again, that is pleasant which is not forced on us; for force is unnatural, and that is why what is compulsory, painful, and it has been rightly said: All that is done on compulsion is bitterness unto the soul. So all acts of concentration, strong effort, and strain are necessarily painful; they all involve compulsion and force, unless we are accustomed to them, in which case it is custom that makes them pleasant.

τὰ δ’ ἐναντία ἡδέα· διὸ αἱ ῥαθυμίαι καὶ αἱ (14) ἀπονίαι καὶ αἱ ἀμέλειαι καὶ αἱ παιδιαὶ καὶ αἱ ἀναπαύσεις καὶ (15) ὁ ὕπνος τῶν ἡδέων· οὐδὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἀνάγκην τούτων.

. . .

The opposites to these are pleasant; and hence ease, freedom from toil, relaxation, amusement, rest, and sleep belong to the class of pleasant things; for these are all free from any element of compulsion.

καὶ οὗ (16) ἂν ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἐνῇ, ἅπαν ἡδύ· ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος (17) ἐστὶν ὄρεξις. τῶν δὲ ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν ἄλογοί εἰσιν αἱ δὲ (18) μετὰ λόγου.

. . .

Everything, too, is pleasant for which we have the desire within us, since desire is the craving for pleasure. Of the desires some are irrational, some associated with reason.

λέγω δὲ ἀλόγους ὅσας μὴ ἐκ τοῦ ὑπο(19)λαμβάνειν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν (εἰσὶν δὲ τοιαῦται ὅσαι εἶναι λέ(20)γονται φύσει, ὥσπερ αἱ διὰ τοῦ σώματος ὑπάρχουσαι, οἷον (21) ἡ τροφῆς δίψα καὶ πεῖνα, καὶ καθ’ ἕκαστον εἶδος τροφῆς (22) εἶδος ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ αἱ περὶ τὰ γευστὰ καὶ ἀφροδίσια καὶ (23) ὅλως τὰ ἁπτά, καὶ περὶ ὀσμὴν [εὐωδίας] καὶ ἀκοὴν καὶ (24) ὄψιν), μετὰ λόγου δὲ ὅσας ἐκ τοῦ πεισθῆναι ἐπιθυμοῦσιν· (25) πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ θεάσασθαι καὶ κτήσασθαι ἐπιθυμοῦσιν (26) ἀκούσαντες καὶ πεισθέντες.

. . . . . .

By irrational I mean those which do not arise from any opinion held by the mind. Of this kind are those known as ‘natural’; for instance, those originating in the body, such as the desire for nourishment, namely hunger and thirst, and a separate kind of desire answering to each kind of nourishment; and the desires connected with taste and sex and sensations of touch in general; and those of smell, hearing, and vision. Rational desires are those which we are induced to have; there are many things we desire to see or get because we have been told of them and induced to believe them good.

ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστὶν τὸ ἥδεσθαι ἐν τῷ (27) αἰσθάνεσθαί τινος πάθους, ἡ δὲ φαντασία ἐστὶν αἴσθησίς τις (28) ἀσθενής, ἀεὶ ἐν τῷ μεμνημένῳ καὶ τῷ ἐλπίζοντι ἀκολουθοῖ (29) ἂν φαντασία τις οὗ μέμνηται ἢ ἐλπίζει· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, δῆλον (30) ὅτι καὶ ἡδοναὶ ἅμα μεμνημένοις καὶ ἐλπίζουσιν, ἐπείπερ (31) καὶ αἴσθησις· ὥστ’ ἀνάγκη πάντα τὰ ἡδέα ἢ ἐν τῷ αἰσθά(32)νεσθαι εἶναι παρόντα ἢ ἐν τῷ μεμνῆσθαι γεγενημένα ἢ ἐν (33) τῷ ἐλπίζειν μέλλοντα· αἰσθάνονται μὲν γὰρ τὰ παρόντα, (34) μέμνηνται δὲ τὰ γεγενημένα, ἐλπίζουσι δὲ τὰ μέλλοντα.

. . . . . .

Further, pleasure is the consciousness through the senses of a certain kind of emotion; but imagination is a feeble sort of sensation, and there will always be in the mind of a man who remembers or expects something an image or picture of what he remembers or expects. If this is so, it is clear that memory and expectation also, being accompanied by sensation, may be accompanied by pleasure. It follows that anything pleasant is either present and perceived, past and remembered, or future and expected, since we perceive present pleasures, remember past ones, and expect future ones.

τὰ (1370b1) μὲν οὖν μνημονευτὰ ἡδέα ἐστὶν οὐ μόνον ὅσα ἐν τῷ παρ(2)όντι, ὅτε παρῆν, ἡδέα ἦν, ἀλλ’ ἔνια καὶ οὐχ ἡδέα, ἂν ᾖ (3) ὕστερον καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο· ὅθεν καὶ τοῦτ’ εἴρηται,
ἀλλ’ ἡδύ τοι σωθέντα μεμνῆσθαι πόνων,
(4) καὶ
(5) μετὰ γάρ τε καὶ ἄλγεσι τέρπεται ἀνὴρ
(6) μνημένος ὅστις πολλὰ πάθῃ καὶ πολλὰ ἐόργῃ· (7) τούτου δ’ αἴτιον ὅτι ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν κακόν· τὰ δ’ ἐν (8) ἐλπίδι ὅσα παρόντα ἢ εὐφραίνειν ἢ ὠφελεῖν φαίνεται μεγάλα, (9) καὶ ἄνευ λύπης ὠφελεῖν.

. . . .

Now the things that are pleasant to remember are not only those that, when actually perceived as present, were pleasant, but also some things that were not, provided that their results have subsequently proved noble and good. Hence the words Sweet ‘tis when rescued to remember pain, and Even his griefs are a joy long after to one that remembers All that he wrought and endured. The reason of this is that it is pleasant even to be merely free from evil. The things it is pleasant to expect are those that when present are felt to afford us either great delight or great but not painful benefit.

ὅλως δὲ ὅσα παρόντα εὐφραίνει, καὶ (10) ἐλπίζοντας καὶ μεμνημένους ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ· διὸ καὶ τὸ ὀργί(11)ζεσθαι ἡδύ, ὥσπερ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐποίησε περὶ τοῦ θυμοῦ
(12) ὅς τε πολὺ γλυκίων μέλιτος καταλειβομένοιο (13) (οὐθεὶς γὰρ ὀργίζεται τῷ ἀδυνάτῳ φαινομένῳ τιμωρίας τυχεῖν, (14) τοῖς δὲ πολὺ ὑπὲρ αὑτοὺς τῇ δυνάμει ἢ οὐκ ὀργίζονται ἢ (15) ἧττον)· καὶ ἐν ταῖς πλείσταις ἐπιθυμίαις ἀκολουθεῖ τις (16) ἡδονή· ἢ γὰρ μεμνημένοι ὡς ἔτυχον ἢ ἐλπίζοντες ὡς τεύξονται (17) χαίρουσίν τινα ἡδονήν, οἷον οἵ τ’ ἐν τοῖς πυρετοῖς ἐχόμενοι (18) ταῖς δίψαις καὶ μεμνημένοι ὡς ἔπιον καὶ ἐλπίζοντες πιεῖσθαι (19) χαίρουσιν, καὶ οἱ ἐρῶντες καὶ διαλεγόμενοι καὶ γράφοντες (20) καὶ ποιοῦντές τι ἀεὶ περὶ τοῦ ἐρωμένου χαίρουσιν· ἐν ἅπασι (21) γὰρ τοῖς τοιούτοις μεμνημένοι οἷον αἰσθάνεσθαι οἴονται τοῦ (22) ἐρωμένου.

. . . . . . . . . .

And in general, all the things that delight us when they are present also do so, as a rule, when we merely remember or expect them. Hence even being angry is pleasant — Homer said of wrath that Sweeter it is by far than the honeycomb dripping with sweetness — for no one grows angry with a person on whom there is no prospect of taking vengeance, and we feel comparatively little anger, or none at all, with those who are much our superiors in power. Some pleasant feeling is associated with most of our appetites we are enjoying either the memory of a past pleasure or the expectation of a future one, just as persons down with fever, during their attacks of thirst, enjoy remembering the drinks they have had and looking forward to having more. So also a lover enjoys talking or writing about his loved one, or doing any little thing connected with him; all these things recall him to memory and make him actually present to the eye of imagination.

καὶ ἀρχὴ δὲ τοῦ ἔρωτος αὕτη γίγνεται πᾶσιν, (23) ὅταν μὴ μόνον παρόντος χαίρωσιν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπόντος (24) μεμνημένοις [ἐρῶσιν] λύπη προσγένηται τῷ μὴ παρ(25)εῖναι, καὶ ἐν πένθεσι καὶ θρήνοις ὡσαύτως ἐπιγίγνεταί τις (26) ἡδονή· ἡ μὲν γὰρ λύπη ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, ἡδονὴ δ’ ἐν (27) τῷ μεμνῆσθαι καὶ ὁρᾶν πως ἐκεῖνον καὶ ἃ ἔπραττεν καὶ (28) οἷος ἦν· διὸ καὶ τοῦτ’ εἰκότως εἴρηται
(29) ὧς φάτο, τοῖσι δὲ πᾶσιν ὑφ’ ἵμερον ὦρσε γόοιο.

. . . .

Indeed, it is always the first sign of love, that besides enjoying some one’s presence, we remember him when he is gone, and feel pain as well as pleasure, because he is there no longer. Similarly there is an element of pleasure even in mourning and lamentation for the departed. There is grief, indeed, at his loss, but pleasure in remembering him and as it were seeing him before us in his deeds and in his life. We can well believe the poet when he says He spake, and in each man’s heart he awakened the love of lament.

(30) καὶ τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι ἡδύ. οὗ γὰρ τὸ μὴ τυγχάνειν λυπηρόν, τὸ (31) τυγχάνειν ἡδύ· οἱ δ’ ὀργιζόμενοι λυποῦνται ἀνυπερβλήτως μὴ (32) τιμωρούμενοι, ἐλπίζοντες δὲ χαίρουσιν.

. . .

Revenge, too, is pleasant; it is pleasant to get anything that it is painful to fail to get, and angry people suffer extreme pain when they fail to get their revenge; but they enjoy the prospect of getting it.

καὶ τὸ νικᾶν ἡδύ, οὐ (33) μόνον τοῖς φιλονίκοις ἀλλὰ πᾶσιν· φαντασία γὰρ ὑπεροχῆς (34) γίγνεται, οὗ πάντες ἔχουσιν ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ ἠρέμα ἢ μάλα. ἐπεὶ (35) δὲ τὸ νικᾶν ἡδύ, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰς παιδιὰς ἡδείας εἶναι τὰς (1371a1) μαχητικὰς καὶ τὰς ἐριστικάς (πολλάκις γὰρ ἐν ταύταις (2) γίγνεται τὸ νικᾶν), καὶ ἀστραγαλίσεις καὶ σφαιρίσεις καὶ (3) κυβείας καὶ πεττείας.

. . . . .

Victory also is pleasant, and not merely to ‘bad losers’, but to every one; the winner sees himself in the light of a champion, and everybody has a more or less keen appetite for being that. The pleasantness of victory implies of course that combative sports and intellectual contests are pleasant since in these it often happens that some one wins and also games like knuckle—bones, ball, dice, and draughts.

καὶ περὶ τὰς ἐσπουδασμένας δὲ (4) παιδιὰς ὁμοίως· αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἡδεῖαι γίγνονται ἄν τις ᾖ (5) συνήθης, αἱ δ’ εὐθὺς ἡδεῖαι, οἷον κυνηγία καὶ πᾶσα θηρευ(6)τική· ὅπου γὰρ ἅμιλλα, ἐνταῦθα καὶ νίκη ἔστιν· διὸ (7) καὶ ἡ δικανικὴ καὶ ἡ ἐριστικὴ ἡδέα τοῖς εἰθισμένοις καὶ (8) δυναμένοις.

. . . . .

And similarly with the serious sports; some of these become pleasant when one is accustomed to them; while others are pleasant from the first, like hunting with hounds, or indeed any kind of hunting. For where there is competition, there is victory. That is why forensic pleading and debating contests are pleasant to those who are accustomed to them and have the capacity for them.

καὶ τιμὴ καὶ εὐδοξία τῶν ἡδίστων διὰ τὸ γί(9)γνεσθαι φαντασίαν ἑκάστῳ ὅτι τοιοῦτος οἷος ὁ σπουδαῖος, (10) καὶ μᾶλλον ὅταν φῶσιν οὓς οἴεται ἀληθεύειν. τοιοῦτοι δ’ (11) οἱ ἐγγὺς μᾶλλον τῶν πόρρω, καὶ οἱ συνήθεις καὶ οἱ πολῖ(12)ται τῶν ἄπωθεν, καὶ οἱ ὄντες τῶν μελλόντων, καὶ οἱ φρό(13)νιμοι ἀφρόνων, καὶ πολλοὶ ὀλίγων· μᾶλλον γὰρ εἰκὸς (14) ἀληθεύειν τοὺς εἰρημένους τῶν ἐναντίων· ἐπεὶ ὧν τις πολὺ (15) καταφρονεῖ, ὥσπερ παιδίων ἢ θηρίων, οὐδὲν μέλει τῆς τού(16)των τιμῆς ἢ τῆς δόξης αὐτῆς γε τῆς δόξης χάριν, ἀλλ’ (17) εἴπερ, δι’ ἄλλο τι.

. . . . . . . . .

Honour and good repute are among the most pleasant things of all; they make a man see himself in the character of a fine fellow, especially when he is credited with it by people whom he thinks good judges. His neighbours are better judges than people at a distance; his associates and fellow—countrymen better than strangers; his contemporaries better than posterity; sensible persons better than foolish ones; a large number of people better than a small number: those of the former class, in each case, are the more likely to be good judges of him. Honour and credit bestowed by those whom you think much inferior to yourself — e.g. children or animals — you do not value: not for its own sake, anyhow: if you do value it, it is for some other reason.

καὶ ὁ φίλος τῶν ἡδέων· τό τε γὰρ (18) φιλεῖν ἡδύ (οὐδεὶς γὰρ φίλοινος μὴ χαίρων οἴνῳ) καὶ τὸ (19) φιλεῖσθαι ἡδύ· φαντασία γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοῦ ὑπάρχειν (20) αὐτῷ τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, οὗ πάντες ἐπιθυμοῦσιν οἱ αἰσθανόμενοι· (21) τὸ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι ἀγαπᾶσθαί ἐστιν αὐτὸν δι’ αὑτόν.

. . . . .

Friends belong to the class of pleasant things; it is pleasant to love — if you love wine, you certainly find it delightful: and it is pleasant to be loved, for this too makes a man see himself as the possessor of goodness, a thing that every being that has a feeling for it desires to possess: to be loved means to be valued for one’s own personal qualities.

καὶ τὸ (22) θαυμάζεσθαι ἡδὺ διὰ <τὸ> αὐτὸ τῷ τιμᾶσθαι.

.

To be admired is also pleasant, simply because of the honour implied.

καὶ τὸ κολακεύε(23)σθαι καὶ ὁ κόλαξ ἡδέα· φαινόμενος γὰρ θαυμαστὴς καὶ (24) φαινόμενος φίλος ὁ κόλαξ ἐστίν. καὶ τὸ ταὐτὰ πράττειν (25) πολλάκις ἡδύ· τὸ γὰρ σύνηθες ἡδὺ ἦν.

. . . .

Flattery and flatterers are pleasant: the flatterer is a man who, you believe, admires and likes so do the same thing often is pleasant, since, as we saw, anything habitual is pleasant.

καὶ τὸ μετα(26)βάλλειν ἡδύ· εἰς φύσιν γὰρ γίγνεται <τὸ> μεταβάλλειν· τὸ γὰρ (27) αὐτὸ ἀεὶ ὑπερβολὴν ποιεῖ τῆς καθεστώσης ἕξεως, ὅθεν εἴρηται
μεταβολὴ πάντων γλυκύ.

. . . .

And to change is also pleasant: change means an approach to nature, whereas invariable repetition of anything causes the excessive prolongation of a settled condition: therefore, says the poet,Change is in all things sweet.

(28) διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ τὰ διὰ χρόνου ἡδέα ἐστίν, καὶ ἄνθρωποι καὶ (29) πράγματα· (30) μεταβολὴ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ παρόντος ἐστίν, ἅμα δὲ καὶ (31) σπάνιον τὸ διὰ χρόνου.

. . .

That is why what comes to us only at long intervals is pleasant, whether it be a person or a thing; for it is a change from what we had before, and, besides, what comes only at long intervals has the value of rarity.

καὶ τὸ μανθάνειν καὶ τὸ θαυμάζειν ἡδὺ (32) ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ· ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ θαυμάζειν τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν μα(33)θεῖν ἐστιν, ὥστε τὸ θαυμαστὸν ἐπιθυμητόν, ἐν δὲ τῷ μανθάνειν (34) <τὸ> εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καθίστασθαι.

. . . .

Learning things and wondering at things are also pleasant as a rule; wondering implies the desire of learning, so that the object of wonder is an object of desire; while in learning one is brought into one’s natural condition.

καὶ τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ (35) εὖ πάσχειν τῶν ἡδέων· τὸ μὲν γὰρ εὖ πάσχειν τυγχά (1371b1) νειν ὧν ἐπιθυμοῦσι, τὸ δὲ εὖ ποιεῖν ἔχειν καὶ ὑπερ(2)έχειν, ὧν ἀμφοτέρων ἐφίενται.

. . .

Conferring and receiving benefits belong to the class of pleasant things; to receive a benefit is to get what one desires; to confer a benefit implies both possession and superiority, both of which are things we try to attain.

διὰ δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ εἶναι τὸ (3) εὐποιητικόν, καὶ τὸ ἐπανορθοῦν ἡδὺ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶν τοὺς (4) πλησίον, καὶ τὸ τὰ ἐλλιπῆ ἐπιτελεῖν.

.

It is because beneficent acts are pleasant that people find it pleasant to put their neighbours straight again and to supply what they lack.

ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ μανθά(5)νειν τε ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ θαυμάζειν, καὶ τὰ τοιάδε ἀνάγκη (6) ἡδέα εἶναι, οἷον τό τε μιμούμενον, ὥσπερ γραφικὴ καὶ (7) ἀνδριαντοποιία καὶ ποιητική, καὶ πᾶν ὃ ἂν εὖ μεμιμημέ(8)νον ᾖ, κἂν ᾖ μὴ ἡδὺ αὐτὸ τὸ μεμιμημένον· οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ (9) τούτῳ χαίρει, ἀλλὰ συλλογισμὸς ἔστιν ὅτι τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο, ὥστε (10) μανθάνειν τι συμβαίνει.

. . .

Again, since learning and wondering are pleasant, it follows that such things as acts of imitation must be pleasant — for instance, painting, sculpture, poetry and every product of skilful imitation; this latter, even if the object imitated is not itself pleasant; for it is not the object itself which here gives delight; the spectator draws inferences (‘That is a so—and—so’) and thus learns something fresh.

καὶ αἱ περιπέτειαι καὶ τὸ παρὰ (11) μικρὸν σώζεσθαι ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων· πάντα γὰρ θαυμαστὰ (12) ταῦτα.

.

Dramatic turns of fortune and hairbreadth escapes from perils are pleasant, because we feel all such things are wonderful.

καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἡδύ, τὰ συγγενῆ δὲ κατὰ (13) φύσιν ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, πάντα τὰ συγγενῆ καὶ ὅμοια ἡδέα (14) ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἵππος ἵππῳ (15) καὶ νέος νέῳ, ὅθεν καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι εἴρηνται, [ὡς] “ἧλιξ ἥλικα (16) τέρπει”, καὶ “ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον”, καὶ “ἔγνω δὲ θὴρ θῆρα”, (17) “καὶ γὰρ κολοιὸς παρὰ κολοιόν”, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα.

. . .

And since what is natural is pleasant, and things akin to each other seem natural to each other, therefore all kindred and similar things are usually pleasant to each other; for instance, one man, horse, or young person is pleasant to another man, horse, or young person. Hence the proverbs ‘mate delights mate’, ‘like to like’, ‘beast knows beast’, ‘jackdaw to jackdaw’, and the rest of them.

(18) ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ τὸ συγγενὲς ἑαυτῷ ἡδὺ ἅπαν, μά(19)λιστα δὲ αὐτὸς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἕκαστος τοῦτο πέπονθεν, ἀνάγκη (20) πάντας φιλαύτους εἶναι ἢ μᾶλλον ἢ ἧττον· πάντα γὰρ (21) τὰ τοιαῦτα ὑπάρχει πρὸς αὑτὸν μάλιστα.

. .

But since everything like and akin to oneself is pleasant, and since every man is himself more like and akin to himself than any one else is, it follows that all of us must be more or less fond of ourselves. For all this resemblance and kinship is present particularly in the relation of an individual to himself.

ἐπεὶ δὲ φίλ(22)αυτοι πάντες, καὶ τὰ αὑτῶν ἀνάγκη ἡδέα εἶναι πᾶσιν, οἷον (23) ἔργα καὶ λόγους· διὸ καὶ φιλοκόλακες ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ (24) καὶ φιλερασταὶ καὶ φιλόμαιμοι καὶ φιλότεκνοι· αὐτῶν γὰρ (25) ἔργον τὰ τέκνα. καὶ τὸ τὰ ἐλλιπῆ ἐπιτελεῖν ἡδύ· αὐτῶν γὰρ (26) ἔργον ἤδη γίγνεται. καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ ἄρχειν ἥδιστον, καὶ τὸ (27) σοφὸν δοκεῖν εἶναι ἡδύ· ἀρχικὸν γὰρ τὸ φρονεῖν, ἔστιν δ’ (28) ἡ σοφία πολλῶν καὶ θαυμαστῶν ἐπιστήμη. ἔτι ἐπεὶ φιλό(29)τιμοι ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ἐπιτιμᾶν τοῖς πέ(30)λας ἡδὺ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἄρχειν, καὶ τὸ ἐν ᾧ δοκεῖ βέλτιστος (31) αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ εἶναι, ἐνταῦθα διατρίβειν, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ ποιη(32)τής φησι κἀπὶ τοῦτ’ ἐπείγει,
νέμων ἑκάστης ἡμέρας πλεῖστον μέρος,
(33) ἵν’ αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ τυγχάνει βέλτιστος ὤν.

. . . . . . . .

And because we are all fond of ourselves, it follows that what is our own is pleasant to all of us, as for instance our own deeds and words. That is why we are usually fond of our flatterers, [our lovers,] and honour; also of our children, for our children are our own work. It is also pleasant to complete what is defective, for the whole thing thereupon becomes our own work. And since power over others is very pleasant, it is pleasant to be thought wise, for practical wisdom secures us power over others. (Scientific wisdom is also pleasant, because it is the knowledge of many wonderful things.) Again, since most of us are ambitious, it must be pleasant to disparage our neighbours as well as to have power over them. It is pleasant for a man to spend his time over what he feels he can do best; just as the poet says, To that he bends himself, To that each day allots most time, whereinHe is indeed the best part of himself.

(34) ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπεὶ ἡ παιδιὰ τῶν ἡδέων καὶ πᾶσα ἄνεσις, καὶ (35) ὁ γέλως τῶν ἡδέων, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ γελοῖα ἡδέα εἶναι, καὶ (1372a1) ἀνθρώπους καὶ λόγους καὶ ἔργα· διώρισται δὲ περὶ γελοίων (2) χωρὶς ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.

. . .

Similarly, since amusement and every kind of relaxation and laughter too belong to the class of pleasant things, it follows that ludicrous things are pleasant, whether men, words, or deeds. We have discussed the ludicrous separately in the treatise on the Art of Poetry.

περὶ μὲν οὖν ἡδέων εἰρήσθω (3) ταῦτα, τὰ δὲ λυπηρὰ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις φανερά.

.

So much for the subject of pleasant things: by considering their opposites we can easily see what things are unpleasant.

12. (4) Ὧν μὲν οὖν ἕνεκα ἀδικοῦσιν, ταῦτ’ ἐστίν· πῶς δὲ ἔχον(5)τες καὶ τίνας, λέγωμεν νῦν.

. .

Part 12. The above are the motives that make men do wrong to others; we are next to consider the states of mind in which they do it, and the persons to whom they do it.

αὐτοὶ μὲν οὖν ὅταν οἴωνται (6) δυνατὸν εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα πραχθῆναι καὶ αὑτοῖς δυνατόν, (7) εἶτ’ ἂν λαθεῖν πράξαντες, ἢ μὴ λαθόντες μὴ δοῦναι δίκην, (8) ἢ δοῦναι μὲν ἀλλ’ ἐλάττω τὴν ζημίαν εἶναι τοῦ κέρδους (9) αὑτοῖς ἢ ὧν κήδονται.

. . . .

They must themselves suppose that the thing can be done, and done by them: either that they can do it without being found out, or that if they are found out they can escape being punished, or that if they are punished the disadvantage will be less than the gain for themselves or those they care for.

ποῖα μὲν οὖν δυνατὰ φαίνεται καὶ ποῖα (10) ἀδύνατα, ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον ῥηθήσεται (κοινὰ γὰρ ταῦτα (11) πάντων τῶν λόγων)· αὐτοὶ δ’ οἴονται δυνατοὶ εἶναι μάλιστα (12) ἀζήμιοι ἀδικεῖν οἱ εἰπεῖν δυνάμενοι καὶ οἱ πρακτικοὶ καὶ (13) οἱ ἔμπειροι πολλῶν ἀγώνων, κἂν πολύφιλοι ὦσιν, κἂν (14) πλούσιοι.

. . .

The general subject of apparent possibility and impossibility will be handled later on, since it is relevant not only to forensic but to all kinds of speaking. But it may here be said that people think that they can themselves most easily do wrong to others without being punished for it if they possess eloquence, or practical ability, or much legal experience, or a large body of friends, or a great deal of money.

καὶ μάλιστα μὲν ἂν αὐτοὶ ὦσιν ἐν τοῖς εἰρημένοις (15) οἴονται δύνασθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, κἂν ὑπάρχωσιν αὐτοῖς τοιοῦτοι (16) φίλοι ἢ ὑπηρέται ἢ κοινωνοί· διὰ γὰρ ταῦτα δύνανται καὶ (17) πράττειν καὶ λανθάνειν καὶ μὴ δοῦναι δίκην.

. . .

Their confidence is greatest if they personally possess the advantages mentioned: but even without them they are satisfied if they have friends or supporters or partners who do possess them: they can thus both commit their crimes and escape being found out and punished for committing them.

καὶ ἐὰν φί(18)λοι ὦσιν τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις ἢ τοῖς κριταῖς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ φίλοι (19) ἀφύλακτοί τε πρὸς τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ προσκαταλλάττονται (20) πρὶν ἐπεξελθεῖν, οἱ δὲ κριταὶ χαρίζονται οἷς ἂν φίλοι ὦσι, (21) καὶ ἢ ὅλως ἀφιᾶσιν ἢ μικροῖς ζημιοῦσιν.

. . . .

They are also safe, they think, if they are on good terms with their victims or with the judges who try them. Their victims will in that case not be on their guard against being wronged, and will make some arrangement with them instead of prosecuting; while their judges will favour them because they like them, either letting them off altogether or imposing light sentences.

λαθητικὰ δ’ εἰσὶν (22) οἵ τ’ ἐναντίοι τοῖς ἐγκλήμασιν, οἷον ἀσθενεῖς περὶ αἰκίας [καὶ] (23) ὁ πένης καὶ ὁ αἰσχρὸς περὶ μοιχείας, καὶ τὰ λίαν ἐν φανερῷ (24) καὶ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς· ἀφύλακτα γὰρ διὰ τὸ ὅλως μηδένα ἂν (25) οἴεσθαι.

. . . .

They are not likely to be found out if their appearance contradicts the charges that might be brought against them: for instance, a weakling is unlikely to be charged with violent assault, or a poor and ugly man with adultery. Public and open injuries are the easiest to do, because nobody could at all suppose them possible, and therefore no precautions are taken.

καὶ τὰ τηλικαῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα οἷα μηδ’ ἂν (26) εἷς· ἀφύλακτα γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα· πάντες γὰρ τὰ εἰωθότα, (27) ὥσπερ ἀρρωστήματα, φυλάττονται καὶ τἀδικήματα, ὃ δὲ (28) μηδείς πω ἠρρώστηκεν, οὐδεὶς εὐλαβεῖται.

. . . .

The same is true of crimes so great and terrible that no man living could be suspected of them: here too no precautions are taken. For all men guard against ordinary offences, just as they guard against ordinary diseases; but no one takes precautions against a disease that nobody has ever had.

καὶ οἷς μηδεὶς (29) ἐχθρὸς ἢ πολλοί· οἱ μὲν γὰρ οἴονται λήσειν διὰ τὸ μὴ φυ(30)λάττεσθαι, οἱ δὲ λανθάνουσι διὰ τὸ μὴ δοκεῖν ἂν ἐπιχειρῆ(31)σαι φυλαττομένοις, καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀπολογίαν ἔχειν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν (32) ἐνεχείρησαν.

. . . .

You feel safe, too, if you have either no enemies or a great many; if you have none, you expect not to be watched and therefore not to be detected; if you have a great many, you will be watched, and therefore people will think you can never risk an attempt on them, and you can defend your innocence by pointing out that you could never have taken such a risk.

καὶ οἷς ὑπάρχει κρύψις ἢ τρόποις ἢ τόποις, ἢ (33) διαθέσεις εὔποροι. καὶ ὅσοις μὴ λανθάνουσιν ἔστιν δίωσις δίκης (34) ἢ ἀναβολὴ χρόνου ἢ διαφθοραὶ κριτῶν. καὶ οἷς, ἐὰν γένηται (35) ζημία, ἔστιν δίωσις τῆς ἐκτίσεως ἢ ἀναβολὴ χρόνιος. ἢ <εἰ> (36) δι’ ἀπορίαν μηδὲν ἔχει ὅ τι ἀπολέσει.

. . . .

You may also trust to hide your crime by the way you do it or the place you do it in, or by some convenient means of disposal. You may feel that even if you are found out you can stave off a trial, or have it postponed, or corrupt your judges: or that even if you are sentenced you can avoid paying damages, or can at least postpone doing so for a long time: or that you are so badly off that you will have nothing to lose.

καὶ οἷς τὰ μὲν κέρδη (37) φανερὰ ἢ μεγάλα ἢ ἐγγύς, αἱ δὲ ζημίαι μικραὶ ἢ ἀφα (1372b1) νεῖς ἢ πόρρω. καὶ ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν τιμωρία ἴση τῇ ὠφελείᾳ, οἷον (2) δοκεῖ ἡ τυρρανίς. καὶ ὅσοις τὰ μὲν ἀδικήματα λήμματα, (3) αἱ δὲ ζημίαι ὀνείδη μόνον. καὶ οἷς τοὐναντίον τὰ μὲν ἀδική(4)ματα εἰς ἔπαινόν τινα, οἷον εἰ συνέβη ἅμα τιμωρήσασθαι (5) ὑπὲρ πατρὸς ἢ μητρός, ὥσπερ Ζήνωνι, αἱ δὲ ζημίαι εἰς (6) χρήματα ἢ φυγὴν ἢ τοιοῦτόν τι· δι’ ἀμφότερα γὰρ ἀδι(7)κοῦσι καὶ ἀμφοτέρως ἔχοντες, πλὴν οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ ἀλλ’ οἱ (8) ἐναντίοι τοῖς ἤθεσιν.

. . . . . . .

You may feel that the gain to be got by wrong—doing is great or certain or immediate, and that the penalty is small or uncertain or distant. It may be that the advantage to be gained is greater than any possible retribution: as in the case of despotic power, according to the popular view. You may consider your crimes as bringing you solid profit, while their punishment is nothing more than being called bad names. Or the opposite argument may appeal to you: your crimes may bring you some credit thus you may, incidentally, be avenging your father or mother, like Zeno, whereas the punishment may amount to a fine, or banishment, or something of that sort. People may be led on to wrong others by either of these motives or feelings; but no man by both — they will affect people of quite opposite characters.

καὶ οἱ πολλάκις ἢ λεληθότες ἢ μὴ ἐζη(9)μιωμένοι, καὶ οἱ πολλάκις ἀποτετυχηκότες (εἰσὶ γάρ τινες (10) καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, οἷοι ἀνα(11)μάχεσθαι). καὶ οἷς ἂν παραχρῆμα ᾖ τὸ ἡδύ, τὸ δὲ λυπηρὸν (12) ὕστερον, ἢ τὸ κέρδος, ἡ δὲ ζημία ὕστερον· οἱ γὰρ ἀκρατεῖς (13) τοιοῦτοι, ἔστιν δὲ ἀκρασία περὶ πάντα ὅσων ὀρέγονται. καὶ οἷς (14) ἂν τοὐναντίον τὸ μὲν λυπηρὸν ἤδη ᾖ ἢ ἡ ζημία, τὸ δὲ ἡδὺ (15) καὶ <τὸ> ὠφέλιμον ὕστερα καὶ χρονιώτερα· οἱ γὰρ ἐγκρατεῖς καὶ (16) φρονιμώτεροι τὰ τοιαῦτα διώκουσιν. καὶ οἷς ἂν ἐνδέχηται διὰ (17) τύχην δόξαι πρᾶξαι ἢ δι’ ἀνάγκην ἢ διὰ φύσιν ἢ δι’ ἔθος, (18) καὶ ὅλως ἁμαρτεῖν ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀδικεῖν. καὶ οἷς ἂν ᾖ τοῦ ἐπι(19)εικοῦς τυχεῖν. καὶ ὅσοι ἂν ἐνδεεῖς ὦσιν· διχῶς δέ εἰσιν ἐνδεεῖς· ἢ (20) γὰρ ὡς ἀναγκαίου, ὥσπερ οἱ πένητες, ἢ ὡς ὑπερβολῆς, ὥσπερ οἱ (21) πλούσιοι. καὶ οἱ σφόδρα εὐδοκιμοῦντες καὶ οἱ σφόδρα ἀδοξοῦν(22)τες, οἱ μὲν ὡς οὐ δόξοντες, οἱ δ’ ὡς οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἀδοξοῦντες.

. . . . . . . . .

You may be encouraged by having often escaped detection or punishment already; or by having often tried and failed; for in crime, as in war, there are men who will always refuse to give up the struggle. You may get your pleasure on the spot and the pain later, or the gain on the spot and the loss later. That is what appeals to weak—willed persons — and weakness of will may be shown with regard to all the objects of desire. It may on the contrary appeal to you as it does appeal to self—controlled and sensible people — that the pain and loss are immediate, while the pleasure and profit come later and last longer. You may feel able to make it appear that your crime was due to chance, or to necessity, or to natural causes, or to habit: in fact, to put it generally, as if you had failed to do right rather than actually done wrong. You may be able to trust other people to judge you equitably. You may be stimulated by being in want: which may mean that you want necessaries, as poor people do, or that you want luxuries, as rich people do. You may be encouraged by having a particularly good reputation, because that will save you from being suspected: or by having a particularly bad one, because nothing you are likely to do will make it worse.

(23) αὐτοὶ μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἔχοντες ἐπιχειροῦσιν <ἀδικεῖν>, ἀδι(24)κοῦσι δὲ τοὺς τοιούτους καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τοὺς ἔχοντας ὧν (25) αὐτοὶ ἐνδεεῖς ἢ εἰς τἀναγκαῖα ἢ εἰς ὑπεροχὴν ἢ εἰς ἀπό(26)λαυσιν, καὶ τοὺς πόρρω καὶ τοὺς ἐγγύς· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἡ (27) λῆψις ταχεῖα, τῶν δ’ ἡ τιμωρία βραδεῖα, οἷον οἱ συλῶντες (28) τοὺς Καρχηδονίους. καὶ τοὺς μὴ εὐλαβεῖς μηδὲ φυλακτικοὺς (29) ἀλλὰ πιστευτικούς· ῥᾴδιον γὰρ πάντας λαθεῖν.

. . . . . .

The above, then, are the various states of mind in which a man sets about doing wrong to others. The kind of people to whom he does wrong, and the ways in which he does it, must be considered next. The people to whom he does it are those who have what he wants himself, whether this means necessities or luxuries and materials for enjoyment. His victims may be far off or near at hand. If they are near, he gets his profit quickly; if they are far off, vengeance is slow, as those think who plunder the Carthaginians. They may be those who are trustful instead of being cautious and watchful, since all such people are easy to elude.

καὶ τοὺς ῥα(30)θύμους· ἐπιμελοῦς γὰρ τὸ ἐπεξελθεῖν. καὶ τοὺς αἰσχυντηλούς· (31) οὐ γὰρ μαχητικοὶ περὶ κέρδους. καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἀδικη(32)θέντας καὶ μὴ ἐπεξελθόντας, ὡς ὄντας κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν (33) τούτους Μυσῶν λείαν. καὶ τοὺς μηδεπώποτε καὶ τοὺς πολλάκις· (34) ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἀφύλακτοι, οἱ μὲν ὡς οὐδέποτε, οἱ δ’ ὡς οὐκ ἂν (35) ἔτι. καὶ τοὺς διαβεβλημένους ἢ εὐδιαβόλους· οἱ τοιοῦτοι γὰρ (36) οὔτε προαιροῦνται, φοβούμενοι τοὺς κριτάς, οὔτε δύνανται (37) πείθειν, ὡς μισούμενοι καὶ φθονούμενοι.

. . . . . . . . .

Or those who are too easy—going to have enough energy to prosecute an offender. Or sensitive people, who are not apt to show fight over questions of money. Or those who have been wronged already by many people, and yet have not prosecuted; such men must surely be the proverbial ‘Mysian prey’. Or those who have either never or often been wronged before; in neither case will they take precautions; if they have never been wronged they think they never will, and if they have often been wronged they feel that surely it cannot happen again. Or those whose character has been attacked in the past, or is exposed to attack in the future: they will be too much frightened of the judges to make up their minds to prosecute, nor can they win their case if they do: this is true of those who are hated or unpopular.

καὶ πρὸς οὓς (1373a1) ἔχουσι πρόφασιν ἢ προγόνων ἢ αὐτῶν ἢ φίλων ἢ ποιη(2)σάντων κακῶς ἢ μελλησάντων, ἢ αὐτοὺς ἢ προγόνους ἢ ὧν κή(3)δονται· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ παροιμία, προφάσεως δεῖται μόνον ἡ (4) πονηρία.

. .

Another likely class of victim is those who their injurer can pretend have, themselves or through their ancestors or friends, treated badly, or intended to treat badly, the man himself, or his ancestors, or those he cares for; as the proverb says, ‘wickedness needs but a pretext’.

καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ τοὺς φίλους· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ῥᾴ(5)διον, τοὺς δὲ ἡδύ. καὶ τοὺς ἀφίλους, καὶ τοὺς μὴ δεινοὺς εἰ(6)πεῖν ἢ πρᾶξαι· ἢ γὰρ οὐκ ἐγχειροῦσιν ἐπεξιέναι, ἢ καταλλάττον(7)ται, ἢ οὐδὲν περαίνουσιν.

. . .

A man may wrong his enemies, because that is pleasant: he may equally wrong his friends, because that is easy. Then there are those who have no friends, and those who lack eloquence and practical capacity; these will either not attempt to prosecute, or they will come to terms, or failing that they will lose their case.

καὶ οἷς μὴ λυσιτελεῖ διατρί(8)βειν ἐπιτηροῦσιν ἢ δίκην ἢ ἔκτισιν, οἷον οἱ ξένοι καὶ αὐτουργοί· (9) ἐπὶ μικρῷ τε γὰρ διαλύονται καὶ ῥᾳδίως καταπαύονται.

. . .

There are those whom it does not pay to waste time in waiting for trial or damages, such as foreigners and small farmers; they will settle for a trifle, and always be ready to leave off.

(10) καὶ τοὺς πολλὰ ἠδικηκότας, ἢ τοιαῦτα οἷα ἀδικοῦνται· ἐγ(11)γὺς γάρ τι δοκεῖ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν εἶναι ὅταν τι τοιοῦτον (12) ἀδικηθῇ τις οἷον εἰώθει καὶ αὐτὸς ἀδικεῖν· λέγω δ’ οἷον εἴ (13) τις τὸν εἰωθότα ὑβρίζειν αἰκίσαιτο.

. . .

Also those who have themselves wronged others, either often, or in the same way as they are now being wronged themselves — for it is felt that next to no wrong is done to people when it is the same wrong as they have often themselves done to others: if, for instance, you assault a man who has been accustomed to behave with violence to others.

καὶ τοὺς ἢ πεποιηκότας (14) κακῶς ἢ βουληθέντας ἢ βουλομένους ἢ ποιήσοντας· ἔχει γὰρ (15) καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ καλόν, καὶ ἐγγὺς τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν φαί(16)νεται.

. .

So too with those who have done wrong to others, or have meant to, or mean to, or are likely to do so; there is something fine and pleasant in wronging such persons, it seems as though almost no wrong were done.

καὶ οἷς χαριοῦνται ἢ φίλοις ἢ θαυμαζομένοις ἢ (17) ἐρωμένοις ἢ κυρίοις ἢ ὅλως πρὸς οὓς ζῶσιν αὐτοί. καὶ πρὸς (18) οὓς ἔστιν ἐπιεικείας τυχεῖν. καὶ οἷς ἂν ἐγκεκληκότες ὦσιν (19) καὶ προδιακεχωρηκότες, οἷον Κάλλιππος ἐποίησεν τὰ περὶ (20) Δίωνα· καὶ γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐγγὺς τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν φαίνε(21)ται. καὶ τοὺς ὑπ’ ἄλλων μέλλοντας, ἂν μὴ αὐτοί, ὡς οὐκέτι (22) ἐνδεχόμενον βουλεύσασθαι, ὥσπερ λέγεται Αἰνεσίδημος Γέ(23)λωνι πέμψαι κοττάβια ἀνδραποδισαμένῳ < >, ὅτι ἔφθασεν, (24) ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς μέλλων. καὶ οὓς ἀδικήσαντες δυνήσονται (25) πολλὰ δίκαια πράττειν, ὡς ῥᾳδίως ἰασόμενοι, ὥσπερ ἔφη (26) Ἰάσων ὁ Θετταλὸς δεῖν ἀδικεῖν ἔνια, ὅπως δύνηται καὶ (27) δίκαια πολλὰ ποιεῖν.

. . . . . . . . .

Also those by doing wrong to whom we shall be gratifying our friends, or those we admire or love, or our masters, or in general the people by reference to whom we mould our lives. Also those whom we may wrong and yet be sure of equitable treatment. Also those against whom we have had any grievance, or any previous differences with them, as Callippus had when he behaved as he did to Dion: here too it seems as if almost no wrong were being done. Also those who are on the point of being wronged by others if we fail to wrong them ourselves, since here we feel we have no time left for thinking the matter over. So Aenesidemus is said to have sent the ‘cottabus’ prize to Gelon, who had just reduced a town to slavery, because Gelon had got there first and forestalled his own attempt. Also those by wronging whom we shall be able to do many righteous acts; for we feel that we can then easily cure the harm done. Thus Jason the Thessalian said that it is a duty to do some unjust acts in order to be able to do many just ones.

καὶ ἃ πάντες ἢ πολλοὶ ἀδικεῖν (28) εἰώθασιν· συγγνώμης γὰρ οἴονται τεύξεσθαι.

. .

Among the kinds of wrong done to others are those that are done universally, or at least commonly: one expects to be forgiven for doing these.

καὶ τὰ ῥᾴ(29)δια κρύψαι· τοιαῦτα δὲ ὅσα ταχὺ ἀναλίσκεται, οἷον τὰ (30) ἐδώδιμα, ἢ τὰ εὐμετάβλητα σχήμασιν ἢ χρώμασιν ἢ (31) κράσεσιν, ἢ ἃ πολλαχοῦ ἀφανίσαι εὔπορον· τοιαῦτα δὲ (32) τὰ εὐβάστακτα καὶ ἐν μικροῖς τόποις ἀφανιζόμενα. καὶ (33) οἷς ἀδιάφορα καὶ ὅμοια πολλὰ προϋπῆρχεν τῷ ἀδικοῦντι. (34) καὶ ὅσα αἰσχύνονται οἱ ἀδικηθέντες λέγειν, οἷον γυναικῶν (35) οἰκείων ὕβρεις ἢ εἰς αὑτοὺς ἢ εἰς υἱεῖς. καὶ ὅσα φιλοδικεῖν (36) δόξειεν ἂν ὁ ἐπεξιών· τοιαῦτα δὲ τὰ μικρὰ καὶ ἐφ’ (37) οἷς συγγνώμη.

. . . . . . . . . .

Also those that can easily be kept dark, as where things that can rapidly be consumed like eatables are concerned, or things that can easily be changed in shape, colour, or combination, or things that can easily be stowed away almost anywhere — portable objects that you can stow away in small corners, or things so like others of which you have plenty already that nobody can tell the difference. There are also wrongs of a kind that shame prevents the victim speaking about, such as outrages done to the women in his household or to himself or to his sons. Also those for which you would be thought very litigious to prosecute any one — trifling wrongs, or wrongs for which people are usually excused.

ὡς μὲν οὖν ἔχοντες ἀδικοῦσι, καὶ ποῖα καὶ (38) ποίους καὶ διὰ τί, σχεδὸν ταῦτ’ ἐστίν.

.

The above is a fairly complete account of the circumstances under which men do wrong to others, of the sort of wrongs they do, of the sort of persons to whom they do them, and of their reasons for doing them.

13. (1373b1) Τὰ δ’ ἀδικήματα πάντα καὶ τὰ δικαιώματα διέλωμεν (2) ἀρξάμενοι πρῶτον ἐντεῦθεν.

.

Part 13. It will now be well to make a complete classification of just and unjust actions.

ὥρισται δὴ τὰ δίκαια καὶ (3) τὰ ἄδικα πρός τε νόμους δύο καὶ πρὸς οὕς ἐστι διχῶς.

.

We may begin by observing that they have been defined relatively to two kinds of law, and also relatively to two classes of persons.

(4) λέγω δὲ νόμον τὸν μὲν ἴδιον, τὸν δὲ κοινόν, ἴδιον μὲν τὸν (5) ἑκάστοις ὡρισμένον πρὸς αὑτούς, καὶ τοῦτον τὸν μὲν ἄγρα(6)φον, τὸν δὲ γεγραμμένον, κοινὸν δὲ τὸν κατὰ φύσιν. ἔστι (7) γάρ τι ὃ μαντεύονται πάντες, φύσει κοινὸν δίκαιον καὶ (8) ἄδικον, κἂν μηδεμία κοινωνία πρὸς ἀλλήλους ᾖ μηδὲ συν(9)θήκη, οἷον καὶ ἡ Σοφοκλέους Ἀντιγόνη φαίνεται λέγουσα, (10) ὅτι δίκαιον ἀπειρημένου θάψαι τὸν Πολυνείκη, ὡς φύσει (11) ὂν τοῦτο δίκαιον· (12) οὐ γάρ τι νῦν γε κἀχθές, ἀλλ’ ἀεί ποτε
(13) ζῇ τοῦτο, κοὐδεὶς οἶδεν ἐξ ὅτου φάνη· (14) καὶ ὡς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει περὶ τοῦ μὴ κτείνειν τὸ ἔμ(15)ψυχον· τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ τισὶ μὲν δίκαιον τισὶ δ’ οὐ δίκαιον, (16) ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πάντων νόμιμον διά τ’ εὐρυμέδοντος
(17) αἰθέρος ἠνεκέως τέταται διά τ’ ἀπλέτου αὐγῆς· (18) καὶ ὡς ἐν τῷ Μεσσηνιακῷ λέγει Ἀλκιδάμας, “ἐλευθέρους ἀφῆκε (19) πάντας θεός, οὐδένα δοῦλον ἡ φύσις πεποίηκεν”.

. . . . . . . . . . .

By the two kinds of law I mean particular law and universal law. Particular law is that which each community lays down and applies to its own members: this is partly written and partly unwritten. Universal law is the law of Nature. For there really is, as every one to some extent divines, a natural justice and injustice that is binding on all men, even on those who have no association or covenant with each other. It is this that Sophocles’ Antigone clearly means when she says that the burial of Polyneices was a just act in spite of the prohibition: she means that it was just by nature. Not of to—day or yesterday it is, But lives eternal: none can date its birth. And so Empedocles, when he bids us kill no living creature, says that doing this is not just for some people while unjust for others, Nay, but, an all—embracing law, through the realms of the sky Unbroken it stretcheth, and over the earth’s immensity. And as Alcidamas says in his Messeniac Oration ... ()

πρὸς οὓς (18a) [(20) δέ, διώρισται δίχα· ὥρισται γὰρ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἢ πρὸς (21) ἕνα τῶν κοινωνούντων ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πράττειν· διὸ (22) καὶ τἀδικήματα καὶ τὰ δικαιώματα διχῶς ἔστιν ἀδικεῖν (23) καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖν· ἢ γὰρ πρὸς ἕνα καὶ ὡρισμένον ἢ πρὸς (24) τὸ κοινόν· ὁ γὰρ μοιχεύων καὶ τύπτων ἀδικεῖ τινα τῶν ὡρι(25)σμένων, ὁ δὲ μὴ στρατευόμενος τὸ κοινόν.

. . . . . .

The actions that we ought to do or not to do have also been divided into two classes as affecting either the whole community or some one of its members. From this point of view we can perform just or unjust acts in either of two ways — towards one definite person, or towards the community. The man who is guilty of adultery or assault is doing wrong to some definite person; the man who avoids service in the army is doing wrong to the community.

(26) ἁπάντων δὴ τῶν ἀδικημάτων διῃρημένων, καὶ τῶν μὲν (27) ὄντων πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τῶν δὲ πρὸς ἄλλον ἢ πρὸς ἄλλους, (28) ἀναλαβόντες τί ἐστιν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι λέγωμεν. ἔστι δὴ τὸ (29) ἀδικεῖσθαι τὸ ὑπὸ ἑκόντος τὰ ἄδικα πάσχειν· τὸ γὰρ ἀδι(30)κεῖν ὥρισται πρότερον ἑκούσιον εἶναι.

. . . .

Thus the whole class of unjust actions may be divided into two classes, those affecting the community, and those affecting one or more other persons. We will next, before going further, remind ourselves of what ‘being wronged’ means. Since it has already been settled that ‘doing a wrong’ must be intentional, ‘being wronged’ must consist in having an injury done to you by some one who intends to do it.

ἐπεὶ δ’ ἀνάγκη τὸν (31) ἀδικούμενον βλάπτεσθαι καὶ ἑκουσίως βλάπτεσθαι, αἱ μὲν (32) βλάβαι ἐκ τῶν πρότερον φανεραί εἰσιν· τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ καὶ (33) τὰ κακὰ εἴρηται καθ’ αὑτὰ πρότερον καὶ τὰ ἑκούσια, ὅτι (34) ἔστιν ὅσα εἰδότες, ὥστ’ ἀνάγκη πάντα τὰ ἐγκλήματα (35) ἢ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἢ πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον εἶναι, καὶ ἢ ἀγνοοῦντος (36) καὶ ἄκοντος ἢ ἑκόντος καὶ εἰδότος, καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν (37) προελομένου τὰ δὲ διὰ πάθος.

. . . . . .

In order to be wronged, a man must (1) suffer actual harm, (2) suffer it against his will. The various possible forms of harm are clearly explained by our previous, separate discussion of goods and evils. We have also seen that a voluntary action is one where the doer knows what he is doing. We now see that every accusation must be of an action affecting either the community or some individual. The doer of the action must either understand and intend the action, or not understand and intend it. In the former case, he must be acting either from deliberate choice or from passion.

περὶ μὲν οὖν θυμοῦ ῥηθήσεται (38) ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη, ποῖα δὲ προαιροῦνται καὶ πῶς (39) ἔχοντες εἴρηται πρότερον.

.

(Anger will be discussed when we speak of the passions the motives for crime and the state of mind of the criminal have already been discussed.)

ἐπεὶ δ’ ὁμολογοῦντες πολ (1374a1) λάκις πεπραχέναι ἢ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσιν ἢ (2) περὶ ὃ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα, οἷον λαβεῖν μὲν ἀλλ’ οὐ κλέψαι, καὶ (3) πατάξαι πρότερον ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὑβρίσαι, καὶ συγγενέσθαι ἀλλ’ οὐ (4) μοιχεῦσαι, ἢ κλέψαι μὲν ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἱεροσυλῆσαι (οὐ γὰρ θεοῦ (5) τι), ἢ ἐπεργάσασθαι μὲν ἀλλ’ οὐ δημοσίαν, ἢ διειλέχθαι (6) μὲν τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀλλ’ οὐ προδοῦναι, διὰ ταῦτα δέοι ἂν (7) καὶ περὶ τούτων διωρίσθαι, τί κλοπή, τί ὕβρις, τί μοιχεία, (8) ὅπως ἐάν τε ὑπάρχειν ἐάν τε μὴ ὑπάρχειν βουλώμεθα (9) δεικνύναι ἔχωμεν ἐμφανίζειν τὸ δίκαιον.

. . . . . . . . .

Now it often happens that a man will admit an act, but will not admit the prosecutor’s label for the act nor the facts which that label implies. He will admit that he took a thing but not that he ‘stole’ it; that he struck some one first, but not that he committed ‘outrage’; that he had intercourse with a woman, but not that he committed ‘adultery’; that he is guilty of theft, but not that he is guilty of ‘sacrilege’, the object stolen not being consecrated; that he has encroached, but not that he has ‘encroached on State lands’; that he has been in communication with the enemy, but not that he has been guilty of ‘treason’. Here therefore we must be able to distinguish what is theft, outrage, or adultery, from what is not, if we are to be able to make the justice of our case clear, no matter whether our aim is to establish a man’s guilt or to establish his innocence.

ἔστι δὲ πάντα (10) τὰ τοιαῦτα περὶ τοῦ ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ φαῦλον ἢ μὴ ἄδικον (11) [ἡ] ἀμφισβήτησις· ἐν γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει ἡ μοχθηρία καὶ τὸ (12) ἀδικεῖν, τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὀνομάτων προσσημαίνει τὴν (13) προαίρεσιν, οἷον ὕβρις καὶ κλοπή· οὐ γὰρ εἰ ἐπάταξεν πάν(14)τως ὕβρισεν, ἀλλ’ εἰ ἕνεκά του, οἷον τοῦ ἀτιμάσαι ἐκεῖνον ἢ (15) αὐτὸς ἡσθῆναι.

. . . . .

Wherever such charges are brought against a man, the question is whether he is or is not guilty of a criminal offence. It is deliberate purpose that constitutes wickedness and criminal guilt, and such names as ‘outrage’ or ‘theft’ imply deliberate purpose as well as the mere action. A blow does not always amount to ‘outrage’, but only if it is struck with some such purpose as to insult the man struck or gratify the striker himself.

οὐδὲ πάντως, εἰ λάθρᾳ ἔλαβεν, ἔκλεψεν, ἀλλ’ (16) εἰ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ <τούτου ἀφ’ οὗ ἔλαβε> καὶ σφετερισμῷ ἑαυτοῦ.

. .

Nor does taking a thing without the owner’s knowledge always amount to ‘theft’, but only if it is taken with the intention of keeping it and injuring the owner.

(17) ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔχει ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τούτων.

.

And as with these charges, so with all the others.

(18) ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἦν δύο εἴδη (19) (τὰ μὲν γὰρ γεγραμμένα τὰ δ’ ἄγραφα), περὶ ὧν μὲν οἱ (20) νόμοι ἀγορεύουσιν εἴρηται, τῶν δ’ ἀγράφων δύο ἔστιν εἴδη· (21) ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶν τὰ μὲν καθ’ ὑπερβολὴν ἀρετῆς καὶ κα(22)κίας, ἐφ’ οἷς ὀνείδη καὶ ἔπαινοι καὶ ἀτιμίαι, καὶ τιμαὶ (23) καὶ δωρεαί (οἷον τὸ χάριν ἔχειν τῷ ποιήσαντι εὖ καὶ (24) ἀντευποιεῖν τὸν εὖ ποιήσαντα, καὶ βοηθητικὸν εἶναι τοῖς (25) φίλοις, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα), τὰ δὲ τοῦ ἰδίου νόμου καὶ (26) γεγραμμένου ἔλλειμμα.

. . . . . .

We saw that there are two kinds of right and wrong conduct towards others, one provided for by written ordinances, the other by unwritten. We have now discussed the kind about which the laws have something to say. The other kind has itself two varieties. First, there is the conduct that springs from exceptional goodness or badness, and is visited accordingly with censure and loss of honour, or with praise and increase of honour and decorations: for instance, gratitude to, or requital of, our benefactors, readiness to help our friends, and the like. The second kind makes up for the defects of a community’s written code of law.

τὸ γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς δοκεῖ δίκαιον (27) εἶναι, ἔστιν δὲ ἐπιεικὲς τὸ παρὰ τὸν γεγραμμένον νόμον δί(28)καιον.

.

This is what we call equity; people regard it as just; it is, in fact, the sort of justice which goes beyond the written law.

συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο τὰ μὲν ἑκόντων τὰ δὲ ἀκόν(29)των τῶν νομοθετῶν, ἀκόντων μὲν ὅταν λάθῃ, ἑκόντων δ’ (30) ὅταν μὴ δύνωνται διορίσαι, ἀλλ’ ἀναγκαῖον μὲν ᾖ καθ(31)όλου εἰπεῖν, μὴ ᾖ δέ, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, καὶ ὅσα μὴ (32) ῥᾴδιον διορίσαι δι’ ἀπειρίαν, οἷον τὸ τρῶσαι σιδήρῳ πηλίκῳ (33) καὶ ποίῳ τινί· ὑπολείποι γὰρ ἂν ὁ αἰὼν διαριθμοῦντα.

. . . . . . .

Its existence partly is and partly is not intended by legislators; not intended, where they have noticed no defect in the law; intended, where find themselves unable to define things exactly, and are obliged to legislate as if that held good always which in fact only holds good usually; or where it is not easy to be complete owing to the endless possible cases presented, such as the kinds and sizes of weapons that may be used to inflict wounds — a lifetime would be too short to make out a complete list of these.

ἂν (34) οὖν ᾖ ἀόριστον, δέῃ δὲ νομοθετῆσαι, ἀνάγκη ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, (35) ὥστε κἂν δακτύλιον ἔχων ἐπάρηται τὴν χεῖρα ἢ πατάξῃ, (36) κατὰ μὲν τὸν γεγραμμένον νόμον ἔνοχός ἐστι καὶ ἀδικεῖ, (1374b1) κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς οὐκ ἀδικεῖ, καὶ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς τοῦτό ἐστιν.

. . . .

If, then, a precise statement is impossible and yet legislation is necessary, the law must be expressed in wide terms; and so, if a man has no more than a finger—ring on his hand when he lifts it to strike or actually strikes another man, he is guilty of a criminal act according to the unwritten words of the law; but he is innocent really, and it is equity that declares him to be so.

(2) εἰ δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ εἰρημένον τὸ ἐπιεικές, φανερὸν ποῖά ἐστι τὰ (3) ἐπιεικῆ καὶ οὐκ ἐπιεικῆ, καὶ ποῖοι οὐκ ἐπιεικεῖς ἄνθρωποι· (4) ἐφ’ οἷς τε γὰρ δεῖ συγγνώμην ἔχειν, ἐπιεικῆ ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ τὰ (5) ἁμαρτήματα καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα μὴ τοῦ ἴσου ἀξιοῦν, μηδὲ τὰ (6) ἁμαρτήματα καὶ τὰ ἀτυχήματα· [ἔστιν] ἀτυχήματα μὲν <γὰρ> (7) ὅσα παράλογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ μοχθηρίας, ἁμαρτήματα δὲ ὅσα (8) μὴ παράλογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ πονηρίας, ἀδικήματα δὲ (9) ὅσα μήτε παράλογα ἀπὸ πονηρίας τέ ἐστιν· τὰ γὰρ δι’ (10) ἐπιθυμίαν ἀπὸ πονηρίας.

. . . . . . .

From this definition of equity it is plain what sort of actions, and what sort of persons, are equitable or the reverse. Equity must be applied to forgivable actions; and it must make us distinguish between criminal acts on the one hand, and errors of judgement, or misfortunes, on the other. A ‘misfortune’ is an act, not due to moral badness, that has unexpected results: an ‘error of judgement’ is an act, also not due to moral badness, that has results that might have been expected: a ‘criminal act’ has results that might have been expected, but is due to moral badness, for that is the source of all actions inspired by our appetites.

καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις (11) συγγινώσκειν ἐπιεικές. καὶ τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὸν νόμον (12) ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν νομοθέτην, καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸν λόγον (13) ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ νομοθέτου σκοπεῖν, καὶ μὴ (14) πρὸς τὴν πρᾶξιν ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν, καὶ μὴ πρὸς (15) τὸ μέρος ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, μηδὲ ποῖός τις νῦν, ἀλλὰ (16) ποῖός τις ἦν ἀεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ.

. . . . . .

Equity bids us be merciful to the weakness of human nature; to think less about the laws than about the man who framed them, and less about what he said than about what he meant; not to consider the actions of the accused so much as his intentions, nor this or that detail so much as the whole story; to ask not what a man is now but what he has always or usually been.

καὶ τὸ μνημονεύειν (17) μᾶλλον ὧν ἔπαθεν ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν, καὶ ἀγαθῶν ὧν (18) ἔπαθε μᾶλλον ἢ <ὧν> ἐποίησεν. καὶ τὸ ἀνέχεσθαι ἀδικούμενον. (19) καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον λόγῳ ἐθέλειν κρίνεσθαι ἢ ἔργῳ. καὶ τὸ εἰς (20) δίαιταν μᾶλλον ἢ εἰς δίκην βούλεσθαι ἰέναι· ὁ γὰρ (21) διαιτητὴς τὸ ἐπιεικὲς ὁρᾷ, ὁ δὲ δικαστὴς τὸν νόμον· καὶ (22) τούτου ἕνεκα διαιτητὴς εὑρέθη, ὅπως τὸ ἐπιεικὲς ἰσχύῃ.

. . . . . .

It bids us remember benefits rather than injuries, and benefits received rather than benefits conferred; to be patient when we are wronged; to settle a dispute by negotiation and not by force; to prefer arbitration to motion — for an arbitrator goes by the equity of a case, a judge by the strict law, and arbitration was invented with the express purpose of securing full power for equity.

(23) περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

.

The above may be taken as a sufficient account of the nature of equity.

14. (24) Ἀδίκημα δὲ μεῖζον, ὅσῳ ἂν ἀπὸ μείζονος ᾖ ἀδι(25)κίας· διὸ τὰ ἐλάχιστα μέγιστα, οἷον ὃ Μελανώπου (26) Καλλίστρατος κατηγόρει, ὅτι παρελογίσατο τρία ἡμιωβέλια (27) ἱερὰ τοὺς ναοποιούς· ἐπὶ δικαιοσύνης δὲ τοὐναντίον.

. . . .

Part 14. The worse of two acts of wrong done to others is that which is prompted by the worse disposition. Hence the most trifling acts may be the worst ones; as when Callistratus charged Melanopus with having cheated the temple—builders of three consecrated half—obols. The converse is true of just acts.

ἔστιν (28) δὲ ταῦτα ἐκ τοῦ ἐνυπάρχειν τῇ δυνάμει· ὁ γὰρ τρία ἡμιω(29)βέλια ἱερὰ κλέψας κἂν ὁτιοῦν ἀδικήσειεν.

. .

This is because the greater is here potentially contained in the less: there is no crime that a man who has stolen three consecrated half—obols would shrink from committing.

ὁτὲ μὲν δὴ οὕτω (30) τὸ μεῖζον, ὁτὲ δ’ ἐκ τοῦ βλάβους κρίνεται. καὶ οὗ μὴ ἔστιν (31) ἴση τιμωρία, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα ἐλάττων. καὶ οὗ μὴ ἔστιν ἴασις· (32) χαλεπὸν γὰρ †καὶ ἀδύνατον†. καὶ οὗ μὴ ἔστιν δίκην λαβεῖν (33) τὸν παθόντα· ἀνίατον γάρ· ἡ γὰρ δίκη καὶ κόλασις καὶ ἴασις.

. . . . .

Sometimes, however, the worse act is reckoned not in this way but by the greater harm that it does. Or it may be because no punishment for it is severe enough to be adequate; or the harm done may be incurable—a difficult and even hopeless crime to defend; or the sufferer may not be able to get his injurer legally punished, a fact that makes the harm incurable, since legal punishment and chastisement are the proper cure.

(34) καὶ εἰ ὁ παθὼν καὶ ἀδικηθεὶς αὐτὸς αὑτὸν μεγάλως ἐκό(35)λασεν· ἔτι γὰρ μείζονι ὁ ποιήσας δίκαιος κολασθῆναι, (36) οἷον Σοφοκλῆς ὑπὲρ Εὐκτήμονος συνηγορῶν, ἐπεὶ ἀπέσφα (1375a1) ξεν ἑαυτὸν ὑβρισθείς, οὐ τιμήσειν ἔφη ἐλάττονος ἢ ὁ πα(2)θὼν ἑαυτῷ ἐτίμησεν.

. . .

Or again, the man who has suffered wrong may have inflicted some fearful punishment on himself; then the doer of the wrong ought in justice to receive a still more fearful punishment. Thus Sophocles, when pleading for retribution to Euctemon, who had cut his own throat because of the outrage done to him, said he would not fix a penalty less than the victim had fixed for himself.

καὶ ὃ μόνος ἢ πρῶτος ἢ μετ’ ὀλίγων (3) πεποίηκεν. καὶ τὸ πολλάκις τὸ αὐτὸ ἁμαρτάνειν [μέγα]. (4) καὶ δι’ ὃ ἂν ζητηθῇ καὶ εὑρεθῇ τὰ κωλύοντα καὶ ζημιοῦντα, (5) οἷον ἐν Ἄργει ζημιοῦται δι’ ὃν ἂν νόμος τεθῇ καὶ δι’ οὓς τὸ (6) δεσμωτήριον ᾠκοδομήθη. καὶ τὸ θηριωδέστερον ἀδίκημα (7) μεῖζον. καὶ ὃ ἐκ προνοίας μᾶλλον. καὶ ὃ οἱ ἀκούοντες (8) φοβοῦνται μᾶλλον ἢ ἐλεοῦσιν.

. . . . . . .

Again, a man’s crime is worse if he has been the first man, or the only man, or almost the only man, to commit it: or if it is by no means the first time he has gone seriously wrong in the same way: or if his crime has led to the thinking—out and invention of measures to prevent and punish similar crimes — thus in Argos a penalty is inflicted on a man on whose account a law is passed, and also on those on whose account the prison was built: or if a crime is specially brutal, or specially deliberate: or if the report of it awakes more terror than pity.

καὶ τὰ μὲν ῥητορικά ἐστι (9) τοιαῦτα, ὅτι πολλὰ ἀνῄρηκεν ἢ ὑπερβέβηκεν, οἷον (10) ὅρκους, δεξιάς, πίστεις, ἐπιγαμίας· πολλῶν γὰρ ἀδικημάτων (11) ὑπεροχή. καὶ τὸ ἐνταῦθα οὗ κολάζονται οἱ ἀδικοῦντες, ὅπερ (12) ποιοῦσιν οἱ ψευδομαρτυροῦντες· ποῦ γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἀδικήσαιεν, (13) εἴ γε καὶ ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ;

. . . .

There are also such rhetorically effective ways of putting it as the following: That the accused has disregarded and broken not one but many solemn obligations like oaths, promises, pledges, or rights of intermarriage between states — here the crime is worse because it consists of many crimes; and that the crime was committed in the very place where criminals are punished, as for example perjurers do — it is argued that a man who will commit a crime in a law—court would commit it anywhere.

καὶ ἐφ’ οἷς αἰσχύνη μάλιστα. (14) καὶ εἰ τοῦτον ὑφ’ οὗ εὖ πέπονθεν· πλείω γὰρ ἀδικεῖ, ὅτι τε (15) κακῶς ποιεῖ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ εὖ. καὶ ὃ παρὰ τὰ ἄγραφα δί(16)καια· ἀμείνονος γὰρ μὴ δι’ ἀνάγκην δίκαιον εἶναι· τὰ μὲν (17) οὖν γεγραμμένα ἐξ ἀνάγκης, τὰ δ’ ἄγραφα οὔ. ἄλλον (18) δὲ τρόπον, εἰ παρὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα· ὁ γὰρ τὰ φο(19)βερὰ ἀδικῶν καὶ τὰ ἐπιζήμια καὶ τὰ ἀζήμια ἀδι(20)κήσειεν ἄν.

. . . . . . . .

Further, the worse deed is that which involves the doer in special shame; that whereby a man wrongs his benefactors — for he does more than one wrong, by not merely doing them harm but failing to do them good; that which breaks the unwritten laws of justice — the better sort of man will be just without being forced to be so, and the written laws depend on force while the unwritten ones do not. It may however be argued otherwise, that the crime is worse which breaks the written laws: for the man who commits crimes for which terrible penalties are provided will not hesitate over crimes for which no penalty is provided at all.

περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀδικήματος μείζονος καὶ ἐλάτ(21)τονος εἴρηται.

.

— So much, then, for the comparative badness of criminal actions.

15. (22) Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀτέχνων καλουμένων πίστεων ἐχόμενόν (23) ἐστι τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπιδραμεῖν· ἴδιαι γὰρ αὗται τῶν δικα(24)νικῶν. εἰσὶν δὲ πέντε τὸν ἀριθμόν, νόμοι, μάρτυρες, συνθῆκαι, (25) βάσανοι, ὅρκοι.

. . .

Part 15. There are also the so—called ‘non—technical’ means of persuasion; and we must now take a cursory view of these, since they are specially characteristic of forensic oratory. They are five in number: laws, witnesses, contracts, tortures, oaths.

πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ νόμων εἴπωμεν, πῶς (26) χρηστέον καὶ προτρέποντα καὶ ἀποτρέποντα καὶ κατηγο(27)ροῦντα καὶ ἀπολογούμενον. φανερὸν γὰρ ὅτι, ἐὰν μὲν ἐναν(28)τίος ᾖ ὁ γεγραμμένος τῷ πράγματι, τῷ κοινῷ χρηστέον (29) καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικεστέροις καὶ δικαιοτέροις. καὶ ὅτι τὸ “γνώμῃ (30) τῇ ἀρίστῃ” τοῦτ’ ἐστίν, τὸ μὴ παντελῶς χρῆσθαι τοῖς γεγραμ(31)μένοις. καὶ ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἐπιεικὲς ἀεὶ μένει καὶ οὐδέποτε (32) μεταβάλλει, οὐδ’ ὁ κοινός (κατὰ φύσιν γάρ ἐστιν), οἱ δὲ (33) γεγραμμένοι πολλάκις, ὅθεν εἴρηται τὰ ἐν τῇ Σοφοκλέους (34) Ἀντιγόνῃ· ἀπολογεῖται γὰρ ὅτι ἔθαψε παρὰ τὸν τοῦ Κρέοντος (35) νόμον, ἀλλ’ οὐ παρὰ τὸν ἄγραφον,
(1375b1) οὐ γάρ τι νῦν γε κἀχθές, ἀλλ’ ἀεί ποτε ...
ταῦτ’ οὖν ἐγὼ οὐκ ἔμελλον ἀνδρὸς οὐδενός .... (2) καὶ ὅτι τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἀληθές τε καὶ συμφέρον, ἀλλ’ οὐ (3) τὸ δοκοῦν, ὥστ’ οὐ νόμος ὁ γεγραμμένος· οὐ γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸ (4) ἔργον τὸ τοῦ νόμου. καὶ ὅτι ὥσπερ ἀργυρογνώμων ὁ κριτής (5) ἐστιν, ὅπως διακρίνῃ τὸ κίβδηλον δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἀληθές. (6) καὶ ὅτι βελτίονος ἀνδρὸς τὸ τοῖς ἀγράφοις ἢ τοῖς γεγραμ(7)μένοις χρῆσθαι καὶ ἐμμένειν. καὶ εἴ που ἐναντίος νόμῳ (8) εὐδοκιμοῦντι ἢ καὶ αὐτὸς αὑτῷ, οἷον ἐνίοτε ὁ μὲν κελεύει (9) κύρια εἶναι ἅττ’ ἂν συνθῶνται, ὁ δ’ ἀπαγορεύει μὴ συν(10)τίθεσθαι παρὰ τὸν νόμον. καὶ εἰ ἀμφίβολος, ὥστε στρέφειν (11) καὶ ὁρᾶν ἐπὶ ποτέραν [τὴν] ἀγωγὴν ἢ τὸ δίκαιον ἐφαρμό(12)σει ἢ τὸ συμφέρον, εἶτα τούτῳ χρῆσθαι. καὶ εἰ τὰ μὲν (13) πράγματα ἐφ’ οἷς ἐτέθη ὁ νόμος μηκέτι μένει, ὁ δὲ νόμος, (14) πειρατέον τοῦτο δηλοῦν καὶ μάχεσθαι ταύτῃ πρὸς τὸν νόμον. (15) ἐὰν δὲ ὁ γεγραμμένος ᾖ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα, τό τε “γνώμῃ (16) τῇ ἀρίστῃ” λεκτέον ὅτι οὐ τοῦ παρὰ τὸν νόμον ἕνεκα δικάζειν (17) ἐστίν, ἀλλ’ ἵνα, ἐὰν ἀγνοήσῃ τί λέγει ὁ νόμος, μὴ ἐπιορκῇ. (18) καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν αἱρεῖται οὐδείς, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὑτῷ. (19) καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν διαφέρει ἢ μὴ κεῖσθαι ἢ μὴ χρῆσθαι. καὶ (20) ὅτι ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις οὐ λυσιτελεῖ παρασοφίζεσθαι τὸν (21) ἰατρόν· οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτο βλάπτει ἡ ἁμαρτία τοῦ ἰατροῦ ὅσον (22) τὸ ἐθίζεσθαι ἀπειθεῖν τῷ ἄρχοντι. καὶ ὅτι τὸ τῶν νόμων (23) σοφώτερον ζητεῖν εἶναι, τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν ὃ ἐν τοῖς ἐπαινουμένοις νό(24)μοις ἀπαγορεύεται. καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν νόμων οὕτως διωρίσθω·

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

First, then, let us take laws and see how they are to be used in persuasion and dissuasion, in accusation and defence. If the written law tells against our case, clearly we must appeal to the universal law, and insist on its greater equity and justice. We must argue that the juror’s oath ‘I will give my verdict according to honest opinion’ means that one will not simply follow the letter of the written law. We must urge that the principles of equity are permanent and changeless, and that the universal law does not change either, for it is the law of nature, whereas written laws often do change. This is the bearing the lines in Sophocles’ Antigone, where Antigone pleads that in burying her brother she had broken Creon’s law, but not the unwritten law: Not of to—day or yesterday they are,But live eternal: (none can date their birth.)Not I would fear the wrath of any man(And brave God’s vengeance) for defying these. We shall argue that justice indeed is true and profitable, but that sham justice is not, and that consequently the written law is not, because it does not fulfil the true purpose of law. Or that justice is like silver, and must be assayed by the judges, if the genuine is to be distinguished from the counterfeit. Or that the better a man is, the more he will follow and abide by the unwritten law in preference to the written. Or perhaps that the law in question contradicts some other highly—esteemed law, or even contradicts itself. Thus it may be that one law will enact that all contracts must be held binding, while another forbids us ever to make illegal contracts. Or if a law is ambiguous, we shall turn it about and consider which construction best fits the interests of justice or utility, and then follow that way of looking at it. Or if, though the law still exists, the situation to meet which it was passed exists no longer, we must do our best to prove this and to combat the law thereby. If however the written law supports our case, we must urge that the oath ‘to give my verdict according to my honest opinion’ not meant to make the judges give a verdict that is contrary to the law, but to save them from the guilt of perjury if they misunderstand what the law really means. Or that no one chooses what is absolutely good, but every one what is good for himself. Or that not to use the laws is as ahas to have no laws at all. Or that, as in the other arts, it does not pay to try to be cleverer than the doctor: for less harm comes from the doctor’s mistakes than from the growing habit of disobeying authority. Or that trying to be cleverer than the laws is just what is forbidden by those codes of law that are accounted best. — So far as the laws are concerned, the above discussion is probably sufficient.

(25) περὶ δὲ μαρτύρων, μάρτυρές εἰσιν διττοί, οἱ μὲν παλαιοὶ (26) οἱ δὲ πρόσφατοι, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν μετέχοντες τοῦ κινδύνου (27) οἱ δ’ ἐκτός. λέγω δὲ παλαιοὺς μὲν τούς τε ποιητὰς καὶ (28) ὅσων ἄλλων γνωρίμων εἰσὶν κρίσεις φανεραί, οἷον Ἀθηναῖοι (29) Ὁμήρῳ μάρτυρι ἐχρήσαντο περὶ Σαλαμῖνος, καὶ Τενέδιοι (30) ἔναγχος Περιάνδρῳ τῷ Κορινθίῳ πρὸς Σιγειεῖς, καὶ Κλεοφῶν (31) κατὰ Κριτίου τοῖς Σόλωνος ἐλεγείοις ἐχρήσατο, λέγων ὅτι (32) πάλαι ἀσελγὴς ἡ οἰκία· οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε ἐποίησε Σόλων
(33) εἰπεῖν μοι Κριτίᾳ πυρρότριχι πατρὸς ἀκούειν.

. . . . . . .

As to witnesses, they are of two kinds, the ancient and the recent; and these latter, again, either do or do not share in the risks of the trial. By ‘ancient’ witnesses I mean the poets and all other notable persons whose judgements are known to all. Thus the Athenians appealed to Homer as a witness about Salamis; and the men of Tenedos not long ago appealed to Periander of Corinth in their dispute with the people of Sigeum; and Cleophon supported his accusation of Critias by quoting the elegiac verse of Solon, maintaining that discipline had long been slack in the family of Critias, or Solon would never have written, Pray thee, bid the red—haired Critias do what his father commands him.

(34) περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν γενομένων οἱ τοιοῦτοι μάρτυρες, περὶ δὲ (1376a1) τῶν ἐσομένων καὶ οἱ χρησμολόγοι, οἷον Θεμιστοκλῆς ὅτι (2) ναυμαχητέον, τὸ ξύλινον τεῖχος λέγων. ἔτι καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι, (3) ὥσπερ εἴρηται, μαρτύριά εἰσιν, οἷον εἴ τις συμβουλεύει μὴ (4) ποιεῖσθαι φίλον γέροντα, τούτῳ μαρτυρεῖ ἡ παροιμία,
μήποτ’ εὖ ἔρδειν γέροντα, (5) καὶ τὸ τοὺς υἱοὺς ἀναιρεῖν ὧν καὶ τοὺς πατέρας,
(6) νήπιος ὃς πατέρα κτείνας υἱοὺς καταλείπει. (7) πρόσφατοι δὲ ὅσοι γνώριμοί τι κεκρίκασιν· χρήσιμοι γὰρ αἱ τού(8)των κρίσεις τοῖς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, οἷον Εὔβου(9)λος ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἐχρήσατο κατὰ Χάρητος ὃ Πλάτων (10) εἶπε πρὸς Ἀρχίβιον, ὅτι ἐπιδέδωκεν ἐν τῇ πόλει τὸ ὁμολογεῖν (11) πονηροὺς εἶναι. καὶ οἱ μετέχοντες τοῦ κινδύνου, ἂν δόξωσι (12) ψεύδεσθαι. οἱ μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτοι τούτων μόνον μάρτυρές εἰσιν, (13) εἰ γέγονεν ἢ μή, εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μή, περὶ δὲ τοῦ ποῖον οὐ μάρ(14)τυρες, οἷον εἰ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, εἰ συμφέρον ἢ ἀσύμφορον· (15) οἱ δ’ ἄπωθεν περὶ τούτων πιστότεροι, πιστότατοι δ’ οἱ (16) παλαιοί· ἀδιάφθοροι γάρ.

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

These witnesses are concerned with past events. As to future events we shall also appeal to soothsayers: thus Themistocles quoted the oracle about ‘the wooden wall’ as a reason for engaging the enemy’s fleet. Further, proverbs are, as has been said, one form of evidence. Thus if you are urging somebody not to make a friend of an old man, you will appeal to the proverb,Never show an old man kindness. Or if you are urging that he who has made away with fathers should also make away with their sons, quote,Fool, who slayeth the father and leaveth his sons to avenge him. ‘Recent’ witnesses are well—known people who have expressed their opinions about some disputed matter: such opinions will be useful support for subsequent disputants on the same points: thus Eubulus used in the law—courts against the reply Plato had made to Archibius, ‘It has become the regular custom in this country to admit that one is a scoundrel’. There are also those witnesses who share the risk of punishment if their evidence is pronounced false. These are valid witnesses to the fact that an action was or was not done, that something is or is not the case; they are not valid witnesses to the quality of an action, to its being just or unjust, useful or harmful. On such questions of quality the opinion of detached persons is highly trustworthy. Most trustworthy of all are the ‘ancient’ witnesses, since they cannot be corrupted.

πιστώματα δὲ περὶ μαρτυριῶν (17) μάρτυρας μὲν μὴ ἔχοντι, ὅτι ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων δεῖ κρίνειν (18) καὶ τοῦτ’ ἐστὶ τὸ “γνώμῃ τῇ ἀρίστῃ”, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐξαπ(19)ατῆσαι τὰ εἰκότα ἐπὶ ἀργυρίῳ, καὶ ὅτι οὐχ ἁλίσκεται τὰ (20) εἰκότα ψευδομαρτυριῶν· ἔχοντι δὲ πρὸς μὴ ἔχοντα, ὅτι (21) οὐχ ὑπόδικα τὰ εἰκότα, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει μαρτυριῶν, (22) εἰ ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἱκανὸν ἦν θεωρῆσαι.

. . . .

In dealing with the evidence of witnesses, the following are useful arguments. If you have no witnesses on your side, you will argue that the judges must decide from what is probable; that this is meant by ‘giving a verdict in accordance with one’s honest opinion’; that probabilities cannot be bribed to mislead the court; and that probabilities are never convicted of perjury. If you have witnesses, and the other man has not, you will argue that probabilities cannot be put on their trial, and that we could do without the evidence of witnesses altogether if we need do no more than balance the pleas advanced on either side.

εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ μαρτυρίαι (23) αἱ μὲν περὶ αὑτοῦ αἱ δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος, καὶ αἱ (24) μὲν περὶ τοῦ πράγματος αἱ δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἤθους, ὥστε φανερὸν (25) ὅτι οὐδέποτ’ ἔστιν ἀπορῆσαι μαρτυρίας χρησίμης· εἰ μὴ γὰρ (26) κατὰ τοῦ πράγματος ἢ αὑτῷ ὁμολογουμένης ἢ τῷ ἀμφισ(27)βητοῦντι ἐναντίας, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἤθους ἢ αὑτοῦ εἰς ἐπιεί(28)κειαν ἢ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος εἰς φαυλότητα.

. . . .

The evidence of witnesses may refer either to ourselves or to our opponent; and either to questions of fact or to questions of personal character: so, clearly, we need never be at a loss for useful evidence. For if we have no evidence of fact supporting our own case or telling against that of our opponent, at least we can always find evidence to prove our own worth or our opponent’s worthlessness.

τὰ δ’ ἄλλα περὶ (29) μάρτυρος, ἢ φίλου ἢ ἐχθροῦ ἢ μεταξύ, ἢ εὐδοκιμοῦντος ἢ ἀδο(30)ξοῦντος ἢ μεταξύ, καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι τοιαῦται διαφοραί, ἐκ τῶν (31) αὐτῶν τόπων λεκτέον ἐξ οἵων περ καὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα λέγομεν.

.

Other arguments about a witness — that he is a friend or an enemy or neutral, or has a good, bad, or indifferent reputation, and any other such distinctions — we must construct upon the same general lines as we use for the regular rhetorical proofs.

(32) περὶ δὲ τῶν συνθηκῶν τοσαύτη τῶν λόγων χρῆσίς ἐστιν (33) ὅσον αὔξειν ἢ καθαιρεῖν, ἢ πιστὰς ποιεῖν ἢ ἀπίστους —ἐὰν (1376b1) μὲν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχωσι, πιστὰς καὶ κυρίας, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀμφισ(2)βητοῦντος τοὐναντίον. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πιστὰς ἢ ἀπί(3)στους κατασκευάζειν οὐδὲν διαφέρει τῆς περὶ τοὺς μάρ(4)τυρας πραγματείας· ὁποῖοι γὰρ ἄν τινες ὦσιν οἱ ἐπι(5)γεγραμμένοι ἢ φυλάττοντες, τοιούτως αἱ συνθῆκαι πισταί εἰσιν. (6) ὁμολογουμένης δ’ εἶναι τῆς συνθήκης, οἰκείας μὲν οὔσης (7) αὐξητέον· ἡ γὰρ συνθήκη νόμος ἐστὶν ἴδιος καὶ κατὰ μέ(8)ρος, καὶ αἱ μὲν συνθῆκαι οὐ ποιοῦσι τὸν νόμον κύριον, οἱ δὲ (9) νόμοι τὰς κατὰ νόμους συνθήκας, καὶ ὅλως αὐτὸς ὁ (10) νόμος συνθήκη τίς ἐστιν, ὥστε ὅστις ἀπιστεῖ ἢ ἀναιρεῖ συν(11)θήκην τοὺς νόμους ἀναιρεῖ.

. . . . . . . . .

Concerning contracts argument can be so far employed as to increase or diminish their importance and their credibility; we shall try to increase both if they tell in our favour, and to diminish both if they tell in favour of our opponent. Now for confirming or upsetting the credibility of contracts the procedure is just the same as for dealing with witnesses, for the credit to be attached to contracts depends upon the character of those who have signed them or have the custody of them. The contract being once admitted genuine, we must insist on its importance, if it supports our case. We may argue that a contract is a law, though of a special and limited kind; and that, while contracts do not of course make the law binding, the law does make any lawful contract binding, and that the law itself as a whole is a of contract, so that any one who disregards or repudiates any contract is repudiating the law itself.

ἔτι δὲ πράττεται τὰ πολλὰ τῶν (12) συναλλαγμάτων καὶ τὰ ἑκούσια κατὰ συνθήκας, ὥστε ἀκύ(13)ρων γιγνομένων ἀναιρεῖται ἡ πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρεία τῶν ἀν(14)θρώπων. καὶ τἆλλα δὲ ὅσα ἁρμόττει ἐπιπολῆς ἰδεῖν ἔστιν. (15) ἂν δ’ ἐναντία ᾖ, καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων, πρῶτον (16) μέν, ἅπερ ἄν τις πρὸς νόμον ἐναντίον μαχέσαιτο, ταῦτα (17) ἁρμόττει· ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ τοῖς μὲν νόμοις, ἂν μὴ ὀρθῶς (18) κείμενοι ὦσιν ἀλλ’ ἐξαμάρτωσιν οἱ τιθέμενοι, οὐκ οἰόμεθα (19) δεῖν πείθεσθαι, ταῖς δὲ συνθήκαις ἀναγκαῖον. εἶτα ὅτι τοῦ (20) δικαίου ἐστὶ βραβευτὴς ὁ δικαστής· οὔκουν τοῦτο σκεπτέον, (21) ἀλλ’ ὡς δικαιότερον· καὶ τὸ μὲν δίκαιον οὐκ ἔστιν μετα(22)στρέψαι οὔτ’ ἀπάτῃ οὔτ’ ἀνάγκῃ (πεφυκὸς γάρ ἐστιν), συν(23)θῆκαι δὲ γίγνονται καὶ ἐξαπατηθέντων καὶ ἀναγκασθέντων.

. . . . . . . . .

Further, most business relations — those, namely, that are voluntary — are regulated by contracts, and if these lose their binding force, human intercourse ceases to exist. We need not go very deep to discover the other appropriate arguments of this kind. If, however, the contract tells against us and for our opponents, in the first place those arguments are suitable which we can use to fight a law that tells against us. We do not regard ourselves as bound to observe a bad law which it was a mistake ever to pass: and it is ridiculous to suppose that we are bound to observe a bad and mistaken contract. Again, we may argue that the duty of the judge as umpire is to decide what is just, and therefore he must ask where justice lies, and not what this or that document means. And that it is impossible to pervert justice by fraud or by force, since it is founded on nature, but a party to a contract may be the victim of either fraud or force.

(24) πρὸς δὲ τούτοις σκοπεῖν εἰ ἐναντία ἐστί τινι τῶν γεγραμ(25)μένων νόμων ἢ τῶν κοινῶν, καὶ τῶν γεγραμμένων ἢ τοῖς (26) οἰκείοις ἢ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις, ἔπειτα εἰ ἢ ἄλλαις συνθήκαις ὑστέ(27)ραις ἢ προτέραις· ἢ γὰρ αἱ ὕστεραι κύριαι, ἄκυροι δ’ αἱ πρότεραι, (28) ἢ αἱ πρότεραι ὀρθαί, αἱ δ’ ὕστεραι ἠπατήκασιν, ὁποτέρως ἂν ᾖ (29) χρήσιμον.

. . .

Moreover, we must see if the contract contravenes either universal law or any written law of our own or another country; and also if it contradicts any other previous or subsequent contract; arguing that the subsequent is the binding contract, or else that the previous one was right and the subsequent one fraudulent — whichever way suits us.

ἔτι δὲ τὸ συμφέρον ὁρᾶν, εἴ που ἐναντιοῦται τοῖς (30) κριταῖς, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα εὐθεώρητα ὁμοίως.

. .

Further, we must consider the question of utility, noting whether the contract is against the interest of the judges or not; and so on — these arguments are as obvious as the others.

(31) αἱ δὲ βάσανοι μαρτυρίαι τινές εἰσιν, ἔχειν δὲ δοκοῦσι (32) τὸ πιστόν, ὅτι ἀνάγκη τις πρόσεστιν. οὔκουν χαλεπὸν οὐδὲ (33) περὶ τούτων εἰπεῖν τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα, ἐξ ὧν ἐάν τε ὑπάρχωσιν (34) οἰκεῖαι αὔξειν ἔστιν, ὅτι ἀληθεῖς μόναι τῶν μαρτυριῶν εἰσιν (1377a1) αὗται, ἐάν τε ὑπεναντίαι ὦσι καὶ μετὰ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦν(2)τος, διαλύοι ἄν τις τἀληθῆ λέγων καθ’ ὅλου τοῦ γένους τῶν (3) βασάνων· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἧττον ἀναγκαζόμενοι τὰ ψευδῆ λέγουσιν (4) ἢ τἀληθῆ, καὶ διακαρτεροῦντες μὴ λέγειν τἀληθῆ, καὶ ῥᾳδίως κατα(5)ψευδόμενοι ὡς παυσόμενοι θᾶττον.

. . . . .

Examination by torture is one form of evidence, to which great weight is often attached because it is in a sense compulsory. Here again it is not hard to point out the available grounds for magnifying its value, if it happens to tell in our favour, and arguing that it is the only form of evidence that is infallible; or, on the other hand, for refuting it if it tells against us and for our opponent, when we may say what is true of torture of every kind alike, that people under its compulsion tell lies quite as often as they tell the truth, sometimes persistently refusing to tell the truth, sometimes recklessly making a false charge in order to be let off sooner.

δεῖ δὲ ἔχειν ἐπαναφέρειν (6) ἐπὶ τοιαῦτα γεγενημένα παραδείγματα ἃ ἴσασιν οἱ κρίνοντες. δεῖ (7) δὲ λέγειν ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀληθεῖς αἱ βάσανοι· πολλοὶ μὲν γὰρ παχύ(8)φρονες [οἱ] καὶ λιθόδερμοι καὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὄντες δυνατοὶ γενναίως (7a) [(9) ἐγκαρτεροῦσι ταῖς ἀνάγκαις, οἱ δὲ δειλοὶ καὶ εὐλαβεῖς πρὸ τοῦ τὰς (7b) (10) ἀνάγκας ἰδεῖν αὐτῶν καταθαρροῦσιν, ὥστε οὐδὲν ἔστι πιστὸν ἐν (7c) [(11) βασάνοις.

. . . . .

We ought to be able to quote cases, familiar to the judges, in which this sort of thing has actually happened. [We must say that evidence under torture is not trustworthy, the fact being that many men whether thick—witted, tough—skinned, or stout of heart endure their ordeal nobly, while cowards and timid men are full of boldness till they see the ordeal of these others: so that no trust can be placed in evidence under torture.]

(7d) [(12) περὶ δ’ ὅρκων τετραχῶς ἔστι διελεῖν· ἢ γὰρ δίδωσι καὶ λαμ(13)βάνει, ἢ οὐδέτερον, ἢ τὸ μὲν τὸ δ’ οὔ, καὶ τούτων ἢ δίδωσιν (14) μὲν οὐ λαμβάνει δέ, ἢ λαμβάνει μὲν δίδωσιν δὲ οὔ.

. .

In regard to oaths, a fourfold division can be made. A man may either both offer and accept an oath, or neither, or one without the other — that is, he may offer an oath but not accept one, or accept an oath but not offer one.

ἔτι ἄλλως (15) παρὰ ταῦτα, εἰ ὀμώμοσται οὗτος ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ἢ ὑπ’ ἐκείνου.

.

There is also the situation that arises when an oath has already been sworn either by himself or by his opponent.

οὐ (16) δίδωσιν μὲν οὖν, ὅτι ῥᾳδίως ἐπιορκοῦσιν, καὶ ὅτι ὁ μὲν ὀμόσας (17) οὐκ ἀποδίδωσιν, τοὺς δὲ μὴ ὀμόσαντος οἴεται καταδικάσειν, (18) καὶ [ὡς] οὗτος ὁ κίνδυνος κρείττων, ὁ ἐν τοῖς δικασταῖς· τοῖς (19) μὲν γὰρ πιστεύει τῷ δ’ οὔ.

. . .

If you refuse to offer an oath, you may argue that men do not hesitate to perjure themselves; and that if your opponent does swear, you lose your money, whereas, if he does not, you think the judges will decide against him; and that the risk of an unfavourable verdict is prefer, able, since you trust the judges and do not trust him.

(15) οὐ λαμβάνει δ’, ὅτι ἀντὶ χρημά(20)των ὅρκος, καὶ ὅτι εἰ ἦν φαῦλος, κατωμόσατο ἄν· κρεῖττον γὰρ (21) ἂν <ἦν> ἕνεκά του φαῦλον εἶναι ἢ μηδενός· ὀμόσας μὲν οὖν ἕξει, (22) μὴ ὀμόσας δ’ οὔ· οὕτως δὲ δι’ ἀρετὴν ἂν εἴη, ἀλλ’ οὐ δι’ ἐπι(23)ορκίαν, τὸ μή. καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ξενοφάνους ἁρμόττει, ὅτι “οὐκ (24) ἴση πρόκλησις αὕτη τἀσεβεῖ πρὸς εὐσεβῆ”, ἀλλ’ ὁμοία καὶ (25) εἰ ἰσχυρὸς ἀσθενῆ πατάξαι ἢ πληγῆναι προκαλέσαιτο.

. . . . . . .

If you refuse to accept an oath, you may argue that an oath is always paid for; that you would of course have taken it if you had been a rascal, since if you are a rascal you had better make something by it, and you would in that case have to swear in order to succeed. Thus your refusal, you argue, must be due to high principle, not to fear of perjury: and you may aptly quote the saying of Xenophanes, ’Tis not fair that he who fears not God should challenge him who doth. It is as if a strong man were to challenge a weakling to strike, or be struck by, him.

εἰ (26) δὲ λαμβάνει, ὅτι πιστεύει αὑτῷ, ἐκείνῳ δ’ οὔ. καὶ τὸ τοῦ (27) Ξενοφάνους μεταστρέψαντα φατέον οὕτως ἴσον εἶναι ἂν ὁ μὲν (28) ἀσεβὴς διδῷ, ὁ δ’ εὐσεβὴς ὀμνύῃ· δεινόν τε τὸ μὴ θέλειν (29) αὐτόν, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐκείνους ἀξιοῖ ὀμόσαντας δικάζειν.

. . .

If you agree to accept an oath, you may argue that you trust yourself but not your opponent; and that (to invert the remark of Xenophanes) the fair thing is for the impious man to offer the oath and for the pious man to accept it; and that it would be monstrous if you yourself were unwilling to accept an oath in a case where you demand that the judges should do so before giving their verdict.

(25) εἰ δὲ (30) δίδωσιν, ὅτι εὐσεβὲς τὸ θέλειν τοῖς θεοῖς ἐπιτρέπειν, καὶ (31) ὅτι οὐδὲν δεῖ αὐτὸν ἄλλων δικαστῶν δεῖσθαι (αὐτοῖς γὰρ (32) δίδωσι κρίσιν), καὶ ὅτι ἄτοπον τὸ μὴ θέλειν ὀμνύναι περὶ (33) ὧν ἄλλους ἀξιοῦσιν ὀμνύναι.

. . .

If you wish to offer an oath, you may argue that piety disposes you to commit the issue to the gods; and that your opponent ought not to want other judges than himself, since you leave the decision with him; and that it is outrageous for your opponents to refuse to swear about this question, when they insist that others should do so.

ἐπεὶ δὲ καθ’ ἕκαστον δῆλον ὅπως (34) λεκτέον, καὶ συνδυαζομένων πῶς λεκτέον δῆλον, οἷον εἰ (35) αὐτὸς μὲν θέλει λαμβάνειν διδόναι δὲ μή, καὶ εἰ δίδωσι (36) μὲν λαμβάνειν δὲ μὴ θέλει, καὶ εἰ λαμβάνειν καὶ διδό (1377b1) ναι θέλει εἴτε μηδέτερον· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀνάγκη (2) συγκεῖσθαι, ὥστε καὶ τοὺς λόγους συγκεῖσθαι ἐκ τῶν (3) εἰρημένων.

. . .

Now that we see how we are to argue in each case separately, we see also how we are to argue when they occur in pairs, namely, when you are willing to accept the oath but not to offer it; to offer it but not to accept it; both to accept and to offer it; or to do neither. These are of course combinations of the cases already mentioned, and so your arguments also must be combinations of the arguments already mentioned.

ἐὰν δὲ ᾖ γεγενημένος ὑφ’ αὑτοῦ καὶ ἐναντίος, (4) ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιορκία· ἑκούσιον γὰρ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὸ δ’ ἐπιορκεῖν (5) ἀδικεῖν ἐστι, τὰ δὲ βίᾳ καὶ ἀπάτῃ ἀκούσια.

. .

If you have already sworn an oath that contradicts your present one, you must argue that it is not perjury, since perjury is a crime, and a crime must be a voluntary action, whereas actions due to the force or fraud of others are involuntary.

ἐνταῦθα οὖν (6) συνακτέον καὶ τὸ ἐπιορκεῖν, ὅτι ἔστι τὸ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἀλλ’ οὐ (7) τῷ στόματι. ἐὰν δὲ τῷ ἀντιδίκῳ ᾖ ὑπεναντίος καὶ ὀμωμοσμένος, (8) ὅτι πάντα ἀναιρεῖ μὴ ἐμμένων οἷς ὤμοσεν· διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο (9) καὶ τοῖς νόμοις χρῶνται ὀμόσαντες. καὶ “ὑμᾶς μὲν ἀξιοῦσιν (10) ἐμμένειν οἷς ὀμόσαντες δικάζετε, αὐτοὶ δὲ οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν”.

. . . .

You must further reason from this that perjury depends on the intention and not on the spoken words. But if it is your opponent who has already sworn an oath that contradicts his present one, you must say that if he does not abide by his oaths he is the enemy of society, and that this is the reason why men take an oath before administering the laws. ’My opponents insist that you, the judges, must abide by the oath you have sworn, and yet they are not abiding by their own oaths.’

(11) καὶ ὅσα ἂν ἄλλα αὔξων τις εἴπειεν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀτέχνων (12) πίστεων εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα.

. .

And there are other arguments which may be used to magnify the importance of the oath. [So much, then, for the ‘non—technical’ modes of persuasion.]

(13) ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗ Β

المقالة الثانية من كتاب ريطوريقا
قال أرسطوطاليس

.

RETHORICE ARISTOTELIS PERIPATHETICI
LIBER SECUNDUS INCIPIT

RETHORICORUM ARISTOTELIS
LIBER SECUNDUS

BOOK II

[2.1.1] (14) Ἐκ τίνων μὲν οὖν δεῖ καὶ προτρέπειν καὶ ἀποτρέπειν, καὶ (15) ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ψέγειν, καὶ κατηγορεῖν καὶ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, καὶ (16) ποῖαι δόξαι καὶ προτάσεις χρήσιμοι πρὸς τὰς τούτων πίστεις, (17) ταῦτ’ ἐστίν· περὶ γὰρ τούτων καὶ ἐκ τούτων τὰ ἐνθυμήματα, (18) ὡς περὶ ἕκαστον εἰπεῖν ἰδίᾳ τὸ γένος τῶν λόγων.

أما من أي الأشياء يكون الحث والنهي والمدح والذم والشكاية والاحتجاج وأي الظنون وأي القضايا تصلح للتصديقات المستعملة في هذه الوجوه فالقول فيها على ما قد قدمنا فبيّنّا فإنه من أجل تلك ومن هذه تقال التفكيرات وهذا الجنس من الكلام خاص بالأمور الوحدانية أي الجزئية

. . .

[1] Ex quibus quidem igitur oportet et persuadere et dissuadere, et vituperare et laudare, et accusare et respondere, et que opiniones et propositiones utiles ad fidem horum hec sunt · de hiis enim et ex hiis entimemata dicuntur, sicut circa unumquodque dicere propria ad genus sermonum.

[1] Ex quibus quidem igitur oportet et exhortari et dehortari, et vituperare et laudare, et accusare et defendere, et quales sententie et propositiones utiles ad horum persuasiones, hec sunt; de hiis enim et ex hiis enthymemata dicuntur, ut circa unumquodque est dicere propter genus sermonum.

Part 1. We have now considered the materials to be used in supporting or opposing a political measure, in pronouncing eulogies or censures, and for prosecution and defence in the law courts. We have considered the received opinions on which we may best base our arguments so as to convince our hearers — those opinions with which our enthymemes deal, and out of which they are built, in each of the three kinds of oratory, according to what may be called the special needs of each.

[2.1.2] (20) ἐπεὶ δὲ ἕνεκα (19) κρίσεώς ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορική (καὶ γὰρ τὰς συμβουλὰς κρίνουσι (20) καὶ ἡ δίκη κρίσις ἐστίν), ἀνάγκη μὴ μόνον πρὸς τὸν λόγον (21) ὁρᾶν, ὅπως ἀποδεικτικὸς ἔσται καὶ πιστός, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὑτὸν (22) ποιόν τινα καὶ τὸν κριτὴν κατασκευάζειν· [2.1.3] πολὺ γὰρ διαφέρει (23) πρὸς πίστιν, μάλιστα μὲν ἐν ταῖς συμβουλαῖς, εἶτα καὶ ἐν (24) ταῖς δίκαις, τό τε ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα καὶ τὸ (25) πρὸς αὑτοὺς ὑπολαμβάνειν πως διακεῖσθαι αὐτόν, πρὸς δὲ (26) τούτοις ἐὰν καὶ αὐτοὶ διακείμενοί πως τυγχάνωσιν.

ومن أجل أن الريطورية إنما تكون في أمور الحكومة لأنهم قد يحكمون في المَشورات ثم الأحكام أيضا من الحكومة فقد يجب اضطرارا أن ينظر ليس في المثبت المصدق من الكلام فقط وأن كيف يكون بل الذي يصير الحاكم إلى الضعف والميل أيضا فإنه قد يختلف التصديق جدا ولا سيما في المَشورات ثم في الحكومات من بعد بأن يعرف الحاكم أي امرئ هو وأن يكون مظنونا عندهم بالاستيجاب ثم من هذا أيضا أن يعرفوا هم أنفسهم كيف هم وبأية حال هم

. . . . . . .

Quoniam autem causa iudicii est rethorica (et enim consultationes indicant et iustitia iudicium est), necesse non solum adro sermonem intendere, qualiter dernonstrativus sit et credibilis, sed et ipsum qualem quendam et iudicem construere; multum enim dlffert ad fidem, maxime quidem in consultationibus, si que et in iudiciis, tunc qualem quendam videri dicentem et arbitrari ad ipsos habere qualiter ipsum, adhuc autem si et ipsi adiacentes qualiter adipiscuntur

Quoniam autem gratia iudicii est rethorica (et enim consilia iudicant et dika iudicium est), necesse non sol urn ad orationem videre, qualiter demonstrativa erit et credibilis, sed et ipsum qualem quendam et iudicem facere; multum enim differt ad fidem, maxime quidem in consiliis, deinde autem et in litigiis, qualem quendam apparere dicentem et [existimare] ad ipsos estimare habere qualiter ipsum, ad hec autem si et ipsi dispositi aliqualiter existant

But since rhetoric exists to affect the giving of decisions — the hearers decide between one political speaker and another, and a legal verdict is a decision — the orator must not only try to make the argument of his speech demonstrative and worthy of belief; he must also make his own character look right and put his hearers, who are to decide, into the right frame of mind. Particularly in political oratory, but also in lawsuits, it adds much to an orator’s influence that his own character should look right and that he should be thought to entertain the right feelings towards his hearers; and also that his hearers themselves should be in just the right frame of mind.

[2.1.4] τὸ μὲν (27) οὖν ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα χρησιμώτερον εἰς τὰς (28) συμβουλάς ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ διακεῖσθαί πως τὸν ἀκροατὴν εἰς τὰς (29) δίκας· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ φαίνεται φιλοῦσι καὶ μισοῦσιν, οὐδ’ (30) ὀργιζομένοις καὶ πράως ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ’ ἢ τὸ παράπαν ἕτερα ἢ (1378a1) κατὰ μέγεθος ἕτερα· τῷ μὲν γὰρ φιλοῦντι περὶ οὗ ποιεῖται (2) τὴν κρίσιν ἢ οὐκ ἀδικεῖν ἢ μικρὰ δοκεῖ ἀδικεῖν, τῷ δὲ μισοῦντι (3) τοὐναντίον· καὶ τῷ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦντι καὶ εὐέλπιδι ὄντι, ἐὰν ᾖ (4) τὸ ἐσόμενον ἡδύ, καὶ ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἔσεσθαι φαίνεται, τῷ (5) δ’ ἀπαθεῖ <ἢ> καὶ δυσχεραίνοντι τοὐναντίον.

وأما المعرفة بالمتكلم أي امرئ هو فإنها تُعيَّن بزيادة عند التشاور وأما المعرفة بالسامع بأية حال هو ففي الحكومات لأنه ليست أحكامهم فيمن أحبوه ومن قلوه شيئا واحدا ولا فيمن كانوا غضابا عليه أو كافّين عنه بل هي مختلفة البتة أو مختلفة في القدر والمبلغ فإن الحاكم قد يتلون في الحكم على من يحكم عليه فأما الذي يحبه فيعتمد ألا يخسّره أو يخسّره اليسير وأما الذي يبغضه فخلاف ذلك وكذلك أما الذي يُرى منشرحا حسن الظن فإنه يصير إلى خير إن كان الأمر المتوقع لذيذا وأما الذي لا يكترث ويتعسر فخلاف ذلك

. . . . . .

(videri quidem igitur qualem quendam dicentem utilius in consultationibus est, assentire vero qualiter auditorern in iustitiis); non enim eadem videntur amantibus et odientibus, neque irascentibus et humiliter se habentibus, sed aut extra omne alia aut secundum magnitudinem alia; diligenti enim de quo facit iudicium aut non iniustificare aut parva existimare iniustificare, odienti vero contrarium; et desideranti quidem et bene speranti, si fuerit futurum delectabile, et erit et bonum [et erit] esse videtur, dissuaso vero et difficili contrarium.

(apparere quidem igitur qualem quendam dicentem utili us ad consilia est, disponi autem aliqualiter auditorem ad litigia); non enim eadem videntur amantibus et odientibus, neque iratis et mansuete se habentibus, sed aut omnino altcra aut secundum magnitudinem altera; a1nanti quidem cnim eurn de quo facit iudicium aut non iniustum fecisse aut secundum parva videtur iniustum fecisse, odienti autem contrarium; et concupiscenti quidem et confidenti, si sit quod futurum delectabile, et fore et bonum fore videtur, desperato autem et aspernanti contrarium.

That the orator’s own character should look right is particularly important in political speaking: that the audience should be in the right frame of mind, in lawsuits. When people are feeling friendly and placable, they think one sort of thing; when they are feeling angry or hostile, they think either something totally different or the same thing with a different intensity: when they feel friendly to the man who comes before them for judgement, they regard him as having done little wrong, if any; when they feel hostile, they take the opposite view. Again, if they are eager for, and have good hopes of, a thing that will be pleasant if it happens, they think that it certainly will happen and be good for them: whereas if they are indifferent or annoyed, they do not think so.

[2.1.5] (6) τοῦ μὲν οὖν αὐτοὺς εἶναι πιστοὺς τοὺς λέγοντας τρία ἐστὶ (7) τὰ αἴτια· τοσαῦτα γάρ ἐστι δι’ ἃ πιστεύομεν ἔξω τῶν ἀπο(8)δείξεων. ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα φρόνησις καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ εὔνοια· (9) διαψεύδονται γὰρ περὶ ὧν λέγουσιν ἢ συμβουλεύουσιν ἢ δι’ (10) ἅπαντα ταῦτα ἢ διὰ τούτων τι· [2.1.6] ἢ γὰρ δι’ ἀφροσύνην οὐκ ὀρθῶς (11) δοξάζουσιν, ἢ δοξάζοντες ὀρθῶς διὰ μοχθηρίαν οὐ τὰ δοκοῦντα (12) λέγουσιν, ἢ φρόνιμοι μὲν καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς εἰσιν ἀλλ’ οὐκ εὖνοι, (13) διόπερ ἐνδέχεται μὴ τὰ βέλτιστα συμβουλεύειν γιγνώσκοντας, (14) καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδέν.

وقد يكون المتكلمون مصدقين لعلل ثلاث إنا قد نصدق من قبل هذه الثلاثة الأوجه كلها دون التثبت وهي اللب والفضيلة والألفة فقد يكذب جميع الواصفين أو المشيرين إما من أجل عدم هذه العلل أجمع وإما من أجل عدم شيء منها لأنهم إما أن يكونوا للجهل والخطل لا يصيبون الرأي وإما أن يكونوا وهم على صواب في الرأي للخبث والشرارة لا ينطقون بما عليه ظنهم ورأيهم وإما أن يكون ذوي لب فاضل لكنهم ليسوا بذوي إلف وأنس وقد يمكن حينئذ أن يكونوا وهم يعرفون التي هي أفضل لا يشيرون بها وليس سوى هذه الخلال خلة

. . . . . . . .

Et ut sint fide digni dicentes tres sunt cause; tot enim sunt per que credimus extra demonstrationes. Sunt autem hec sapientia et virtus et dilectio; mentiuntur enim de quibus dicunt et consiliantur aut per hec omnia aut horum aliquid; aut enim per insipientiam non recte hoc opinantur, aut opinantes recte per malitiam non que vident dicunt, sapientes quidem et modesti [quidem] sunt, sed non eunoi, ideoque contingit non optima consultare cognoscentes, et extra hec nichil.

Eius quidem igitur quod est esse ipsos dicentes credibiles tres sunt cause; tot enim sunt propter que credimus exceptis ostensionibus. Sunt autem hec prudentia et virtus et benivolentia; mentiuntur enim de hiis que dicunt et consulunt aut propter onmia hec aut propter horum aliquid; aut enim propter imprudentiam non recte hoc sentiunt, aut sentientes recte propter nequitiam non que sentinnt dicunt, ant prudentes quidem et epieikei sunt sed non benivoli, propter quod contingit non optima consulere hec cognoscentes, et preter hec nichil.

There are three things which inspire confidence in the orator’s own character — the three, namely, that induce us to believe a thing apart from any proof of it: good sense, good moral character, and goodwill. False statements and bad advice are due to one or more of the following three causes. Men either form a false opinion through want of good sense; or they form a true opinion, but because of their moral badness do not say what they really think; or finally, they are both sensible and upright, but not well disposed to their hearers, and may fail in consequence to recommend what they know to be the best course. These are the only possible cases.

ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸν ἅπαντα δοκοῦντα (15) ταῦτ’ ἔχειν εἶναι τοῖς ἀκροωμένοις πιστόν.

إذا وجدت للمرء يضطر أن يظن مصدقا عند السامعين

.

Necesse est ergo omnia videntem hec habere esse auditoribus fidum.

Necesse ergo cum qui existimatur omnia hec habere esse audientibus credibilem.

It follows that any one who is thought to have all three of these good qualities will inspire trust in his audience.

[2.1.7] ὅθεν μὲν οὖν (16) φρόνιμοι καὶ σπουδαῖοι φανεῖεν ἄν, ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς (17) διῃρημένων ληπτέον· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν κἂν ἕτερόν τις κἂν (18) ἑαυτὸν κατασκευάσειε τοιοῦτον· περὶ δ’ εὐνοίας καὶ φιλίας ἐν (19) τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη λεκτέον.

فأما ذوو اللب والأفاضل فقد يعرفون أو يمتحنون بأن يعتبروا على الصفات التي قدمنا في ذكر الفضائل لأنه ليس لإنسان آخر أن يثبت هذا المعنى أيضا من تلك الصفات بأعيانها وأما الإلف أو الأنس والصداقة فإنا قائلون فيها عند قولنا في الآلام

. . .

Unde quidem sapientes et studiosi utique videantur, ex predictis circa virtutem surmendum; ex eisdem enim quamvis aliud quis quam vis se ipsum construct talem; de eunia vero et amicitia in hiis que sunt de passionibus dicendum est.

Unde quidem igitur prudentes et studiosi apparebunt utique, ex hiis que circa virtutes divisa sunt sumendum; ex eisdem enim aliquis et alterum utique et se ipsum astruet talem; de benivolentia autem et amicitia in hiis que circa passiones nunc dicendum.

The way to make ourselves thought to be sensible and morally good must be gathered from the analysis of goodness already given: the way to establish your own goodness is the same as the way to establish that of others. Good will and friendliness of disposition will form part of our discussion of the emotions, to which we must now turn.

[2.1.8] ἔστι δὲ τὰ πάθη δι’ ὅσα μεταβάλ(20)λοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις οἷς ἕπεται λύπη καὶ (21) ἡδονή, οἷον ὀργὴ ἔλεος φόβος καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, καὶ τὰ (22) τούτοις ἐναντία.

فالآلام هي التي حين يتغير الحاكم بسببها تختلف أحكامه وقد تلزمها اللذة والأذى وهي الغضب والرحمة والخوف وما كان نحو هذه ثم أضداد هذه أيضا

. .

Sunt autem passiones quecumque permutantes differunt ad iudicia, quibus consequitur tristitia et voluptas, ut ira, misericordia, timor, et quecumque alia huiusmodi, et hiis contraria.

Sunt autem passiones propter quascumque commoti differunt ad indicia ad quas sequitur tristitia et delectatio, puta ira misericordia timor et quecumque alia talia, et hiis contraria.

The Emotions are all those feelings that so change men as to affect their judgements, and that are also attended by pain or pleasure. Such are anger, pity, fear and the like, with their opposites.

[2.1.9] δεῖ δὲ διαιρεῖν περὶ ἕκαστον εἰς τρία, λέγω (23) δ’ οἷον περὶ ὀργῆς πῶς τε διακείμενοι ὀργίλοι εἰσί, καὶ τίσιν (24) εἰώθασιν ὀργίζεσθαι, καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις· εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἓν ἢ τὰ (25) δύο ἔχοιμεν τούτων, ἅπαντα δὲ μή, ἀδύνατον ἂν εἴη τὴν (26) ὀργὴν ἐμποιεῖν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

وقد ينبغي أن نعود فنقسم كل واحد منها ثلاثة أقسام فأما كيف ذلك فإني أقول إنه على نحو ما نصنع في الغضب حين ننظر أن كيف وباية حال اذ كان المرء فهو غضوب وممَّ اعتيد أن يكون الغضب وعلى من فإنه إن وجدت واحدة من هذه الخلال أو اثنتان حتى يوجد بعضها ولا يوجد بعض فليس يكون بذلك تهييج الغضب وكذلك سائر الأخر

. . . .

Oportet dividere que sunt circa unumquodque ad tria, dico autem tamquam de ira quomodo se habentes iracundi sunt, et quibus consueverunt irasci, et in qualibus; si enim quidern unum aut duo habearnus horum, omnia vera non, impossibile utique erit iram bene facere; similiter autem et in aliis.

Oportet autem dividere que circa unumquodque in tria, dico autem puta de ira qualiter dispositi iracundi sunt, et quibus consueverunt irasci, et in qualibus rebus; si enim unum quidem aut duo habeamus horum, omnia autem non, impossibile utique erit iram efficere; similiter autem et in aliis.

We must arrange what we have to say about each of them under three heads. Take, for instance, the emotion of anger: here we must discover (1) what the state of mind of angry people is, (2) who the people are with whom they usually get angry, and (3) on what grounds they get angry with them. It is not enough to know one or even two of these points; unless we know all three, we shall be unable to arouse anger in any one. The same is true of the other emotions.

ὥσπερ οὖν (27) καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν προειρημένων διεγράψαμεν τὰς προτάσεις, οὕτω (28) καὶ περὶ τούτων ποιήσωμεν καὶ διέλωμεν τὸν εἰρημένον (29) τρόπον.

فقد ينبغي كما كتبنا وصنفنا القضايا في تلك اللاتي قيلت أولا أن تفعل مثل ذلك في هذه أيضا ونفصلها بالنحو الذي ذكرنا

.

Quemadmodum igitur et in predictis scripsimus propositiones, sic et in hiis faciemus et dividemus secundum predictum modum.

Sicut igitur et de antepositis tradidimus propositiones, ita et de hiis faciamus et dividamus predicta modo.

So just as earlier in this work we drew up a list of useful propositions for the orator, let us now proceed in the same way to analyse the subject before us.

[2.2.1] (30) Ἔστω δὴ ὀργὴ ὄρεξις μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας [φαινομένης] (31) διὰ φαινομένην ὀλιγωρίαν εἰς αὐτὸν ἤ <τι> τῶν αὐτοῦ, (32) τοῦ ὀλιγωρεῖν μὴ προσήκοντος.

فليكن الغضب حزنا أو أذى مع تشوق من المرء إلى عقوبة ترى من أجل صغر نفسه أو استهانة به أو بمن يتصل به

.

[2] Sit autem ira appetitus cum tristitia afflictione apparente propter apparentem despectum eorum que sunt ad ipsum aut ad ipsius aliquem non convenienter.

[2] Sit aut em ira appetitus cum tristitia punitionis apparentis propter apparentem parvipensionem eorum que in ipsum aut in ipsius aliqua non convenienter.

Part 2. Anger may be defined as an impulse, accompanied by pain, to a conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight directed without justification towards what concerns oneself or towards what concerns one’s friends.

[2.2.2] εἰ δὴ τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν ἡ ὀργή, (33) ἀνάγκη τὸν ὀργιζόμενον ὀργίζεσθαι ἀεὶ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστόν τινι, (34) οἷον Κλέωνι ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ὅτι αὑτὸν ἢ τῶν αὑτοῦ τί (1378b1) πεποίηκεν ἢ ἤμελλεν, καὶ πάσῃ ὀργῇ ἕπεσθαί τινα ἡδονήν, (2) τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλπίδος τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι· ἡδὺ μὲν γὰρ τὸ οἴεσθαι (3) τεύξεσθαι ὧν ἐφίεται, οὐδεὶς δὲ τῶν φαινομένων ἀδυνάτων (4) ἐφίεται αὑτῷ, ὁ δὲ ὀργιζόμενος ἐφίεται δυνατῶν αὑτῷ.

فإن كان هذا هو الغضب فلا بد أن يكون الذي يغضب أبدا يغضب على واحد من الناس فردا أي على فلان وليس على الإنسان وذلك لشيء فعله به أو أحد ممن هو منه بسبب وأن يلزم كل غضب شيء من اللذة من قبل أنه يؤمل أن ينتقم لأنه قد يلتذ إذا ظن أنه سيظفر بما قد يرى ممتنعا حتى تتوق نفسه إلى ذلك والذي يغضب أو يستشيط قد يتشوق في نفسه

. . . .

Quoniam autem hoc est ira, necesse iracundum irasci semper alicui singularium, ut Cleoni, sed non homini, et quod ipsum aut aliquid eorum que sunt in ipso fecit aut debebat, et omni ire consequi quandam voluptatem, que est a spe tormentandi; delectabile quidem enim posse invenire que desiderant, nullus autem apparentia impossibilia appetit, qui vera irascitur appetit sibi.

Quoniam autern hoc est ira, necesse eum qui irascitur irasci semper singularium alicui, puta Cleoni, sed non homini, et quia in ipsum aut in aliquid eorum que ipsius fecit aut facturus erat, et ad omnem iram sequi aliquam delectationem a spe puniendi; delectabile quidem enim existimare adipisci ea que appetuntur, nullus autem ea que apparent sibi impossibilia appetit, iratus autem appetit sibi possibilia.

If this is a proper definition of anger, it must always be felt towards some particular individual, e.g. Cleon, and not ‘man’ in general. It must be felt because the other has done or intended to do something to him or one of his friends. It must always be attended by a certain pleasure — that which arises from the expectation of revenge. For since nobody aims at what he thinks he cannot attain, the angry man is aiming at what he can attain, and the belief that you will attain your aim is pleasant.

διὸ (5) καλῶς εἴρηται περὶ θυμοῦ·
(6) ὅς τε πολὺ γλυκίων μέλιτος καταλειβομένοιο
(7) ἀνδρῶν ἐν στήθεσσιν ἀέξεται· (8) ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ καὶ ἡδονή τις διά τε τοῦτο καὶ διότι δια(9)τρίβουσιν ἐν τῷ τιμωρεῖσθαι τῇ διανοίᾳ· ἡ οὖν τότε γινομένη (10) φαντασία ἡδονὴν ἐμποιεῖ, ὥσπερ ἡ τῶν ἐνυπνίων.

فما أحسن ما قيل في الغضب إن الذي يعتلج في صدر الرجل منه أحلى من العسل والشهد وإن له مثل الدخان ¹⁹ فقد يلزمه شيء من اللذة لهذا السبب ثم لأن الأوهام تدرس وتحيل ذكر الانتقام في الفكر والمتبع الذي يكون في وهم المرء من ذلك يُحدث له لذة كالذي يحدث من الأحلام

19. The Arabic translation contains the last words of the second line in the quote from the Iliad: ἀνδρῶν ἐν στήθεσσιν ἀέξεται ἠΰτε καπνός.

. . .

Ideo bene dictum est de ira: ‘quare multo dulcius melle stillante in pectoribus hominum augetur’; consequitur enim et voluptas quedam per hoc et propter quod conteruntur in tormentando in intellectu; aut igitur huius facta fantasia voluptatem facit, quemadmodum ea que est sompniorum.

Propter quod bene dictum est de ira: ‘que multo dulcior melle distillante in pectoribus virorum crescit; ’ assequitur enim et delectatio quedam et propter hoc et propterea quia demorantur in puniendo mente; que igitur tunc infit fantasia delectationem facit sicut que sompniorum.

Hence it has been well said about wrath, Sweeter it is by far than the honeycomb, dripping with sweetness, And spreads through the hearts of men. It is also attended by a certain pleasure because the thoughts dwell upon the act of vengeance, and the images then called up cause pleasure, like the images called up in dreams.

[2.2.3] ἐπεὶ δὲ (11) ἡ ὀλιγωρία ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια δόξης περὶ τὸ μηδενὸς ἄξιον φαι(12)νόμενον (καὶ γὰρ τὰ κακὰ καὶ τἀγαθὰ ἄξια οἰόμεθα σπουδῆς (13) εἶναι, καὶ τὰ συντείνοντα πρὸς αὐτά· ὅσα δὲ μηδέν τι ἢ μικρόν, (14) οὐδενὸς ἄξια ὑπολαμβάνομεν), τρία ἐστὶν εἴδη ὀλιγωρίας, (15) καταφρόνησίς τε καὶ ἐπηρεασμὸς καὶ ὕβρις· [2.2.4] ὅ τε γὰρ κατα(16)φρονῶν ὀλιγωρεῖ (ὅσα γὰρ οἴονται μηδενὸς ἄξια, τούτων (17) καταφρονοῦσιν, τῶν δὲ μηδενὸς ἀξίων ὀλιγωροῦσιν), καὶ ὁ (18) ἐπηρεάζων φαίνεται ὀλιγωρεῖν. ἔστι γὰρ ὁ ἐπηρεασμὸς (19) ἐμποδισμὸς ταῖς βουλήσεσιν μὴ ἵνα τι αὑτῷ ἀλλ’ ἵνα μὴ (20) ἐκείνῳ· ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐχ ἵνα αὑτῷ τι, ὀλιγωρεῖ· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὔτε (21) βλάψειν ὑπολαμβάνει, ἐφοβεῖτο γὰρ ἂν καὶ οὐκ ὠλιγώρει, οὔτ’ (22) ὠφελῆσαι ἂν οὐδὲν ἄξιον λόγου, ἐφρόντιζε γὰρ ἂν ὥστε (23) φίλος εἶναι· καὶ ὁ ὑβρίζων δὲ ὀλιγωρεῖ· ἔστι γὰρ ὕβρις τὸ (24) πράττειν καὶ λέγειν ἐφ’ οἷς αἰσχύνη ἔστι τῷ πάσχοντι, μὴ (25) ἵνα τι γίγνηται αὑτῷ ἄλλο ἢ ὅ τι ἐγένετο, ἀλλ’ ὅπως ἡσθῇ· οἱ (26) γὰρ ἀντιποιοῦντες οὐχ ὑβρίζουσιν ἀλλὰ τιμωροῦνται.

وصغر النفس إنما يكون من قبل الظن بالشيء أنه لا قدر له ولا يستحق أن يعنى به فإن الشرور والخيرات قد تظن مستوجبة للعناية واللوازم لهذه أيضا وإنما نظن أنه لا يستحق شيئا بكل ما ظننا أنه ليس بشيء أو أنه يسير جدا وانواع صغر النفس ثلاثة وهي التهاون والعيث والشتيمة لان الذي يتهاون قد يصغر نفسه وانما يتهاون المرء بالذين يظنّ انّهم ليسوا بأهل لشيء والذين ليسوا اهلا لشيء قد تصغر النفس فيهم فانّ العيث عائق للارادات وقد يفعله الفاعل ليس لان يكون له شيء ولكن لكيلا يكون كذاك ومن اجل انّه ليس في نفسه يصغر نفسه فهو واضح انّه لا يظنّ في ذلك ضررا عليه ولو ظنّ ذلك لخوف فلم يكن يصغر نفسه فامّا نفعه ان انتفع به فلا يستحق ان يقال فيه هاهنا شيء لانّه حينئذ يحتال لان يستعطف كذلك الذي يشتم أيضا قد تصغر نفسه فإن الشتيمة إضرار والإضرار أذى فيما يخزى منه المشتوم وليس في شيء يكون له ولكن فيما قد كان وإنه قد أحس به كيف هو لأن الذين يفعلون خلاف ذلك لا يشتمون لكنهم يعاقبون

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Amplius autem despectio est actio opinionis circa dignum apparens nulli (et enim mala et bona digna extimamus studioso esse, et distensa ad hec; quecumque vera non aut valde parva nullo digna arbitramur), tres autem sunt species despectus, negligentia et temptatio et iniuria; qui enim negligit despicit (que enim considerant nullo digna esse, hec negligunt), et temptans videtur negligere. Est autem temptatio impedimentum consultationibus non ipsi, sed quod non illi despicit; palam enim non ledere arbitratur, timebat enim et non despiciebat, neque proderit utique nichil dignum sermone, curabat enim sicut amicus esse; et iniurians despicit; est enim iniuria ledendi et tristandi in quibus verecundia est patienti, non quod aliquid fiat alii aut quoniam factum est, sed quomodo sentiat; contrafacientes enim non iniuriantur, sed affiiguntur.

Quoniam autem parvipensio est actus opinionis circa id quod nullo dignum videtur (et enim mala et bona digna putamus studio esse, et tendentia ad hec; quecumque autem nichil aut valde modica, nullo digna existimamus), tres sunt species parvipensionis, despectus et epireasmus et contumeliatio; qui enim despicit parvi pendit (que enim putant nullo digna esse, hec despiciunt, que autem nullo digna parvi pendunt), et que epireazat videtur despicere. Est enim epireasmus impedimentum voluntatibus non ut aliquid sibi, sed ut non illi; quoniam igitur non ut aliquid sibi, parvi pendit; palam enim quod neque nociturum existimat (timeret enim et non parvi penderet) neque prodesse utique nichil dignum verbo (curaret enim utique ut amicus esset); et contumelians autem parvi pendit; est enim contumeliatio nocendi et contristandi in quibus confusio est patienti, non ut aliquid fiat sibi aliud, sed ut delectetur; qui enim contrafaciunt non contumelizant, sed puniunt.

Now slighting is the actively entertained opinion of something as obviously of no importance. We think bad things, as well as good ones, have serious importance; and we think the same of anything that tends to produce such things, while those which have little or no such tendency we consider unimportant. There are three kinds of slighting — contempt, spite, and insolence. (1) Contempt is one kind of slighting: you feel contempt for what you consider unimportant, and it is just such things that you slight. (2) Spite is another kind; it is a thwarting another man’s wishes, not to get something yourself but to prevent his getting it. The slight arises just from the fact that you do not aim at something for yourself: clearly you do not think that he can do you harm, for then you would be afraid of him instead of slighting him, nor yet that he can do you any good worth mentioning, for then you would be anxious to make friends with him. (3) Insolence is also a form of slighting, since it consists in doing and saying things that cause shame to the victim, not in order that anything may happen to yourself, or because anything has happened to yourself, but simply for the pleasure involved. (Retaliation is not ‘insolence’, but vengeance.)

αἴτιον (27) δὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς τοῖς ὑβρίζουσιν, ὅτι οἴονται κακῶς δρῶντες (28) αὐτοὶ ὑπερέχειν μᾶλλον (διὸ οἱ νέοι καὶ οἱ πλούσιοι ὑβρισταί· (29) ὑπερέχειν γὰρ οἴονται ὑβρίζοντες)· ὕβρεως δὲ ἀτιμία, ὁ δ’ (30) ἀτιμάζων ὀλιγωρεῖ· τὸ γὰρ μηδενὸς ἄξιον οὐδεμίαν ἔχει τιμήν, (31) οὔτε ἀγαθοῦ οὔτε κακοῦ· διὸ λέγει ὀργιζόμενος ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς “ἠτίμησεν· ἑλὼν γὰρ ἔχει γέρας αὐτὸς” (32) καὶ (33) “ὡς εἴ τιν’ ἀτίμητον μετανάστην,” (34) ὡς διὰ ταῦτα ὀργιζόμενος.

والعلة فيما يجد الذين يشتمون اللذة أنهم يظنون إذا فعلوا ذلك أنهم أفضل من المشتومين ولذلك ما يوجد الأحداث والأغنياء شتامين أو فحاشين فقد يظنون إذا شتموا أنهم أفضل من المشتوم والشتيمة استهانة واحتقار وإنما يحتقر من ليس بأهل لشيء وليس له شيء من الكرامة لا في خير ولا في شر ولذلك ما قال اوميروس إن اغاممنن استهان باخليوس حيث غضب وسلبه كرامته يعني سرّيته وتركه كالطارئ المحتقر فغضب لذلك اخليوس

. . . . .

Causa autem voluptatis iniuriantibus quoniam extimant male agentes ipsos superhabundare magis (ideo iuvenes et divites iniuriatores; superhabundare arbitrantur iniuriantes) ; iniurie autem dedecus, qui enim dedecorat despicit; quod nulli dignum nullum habet honorem, neque boni neque mali; ideo dicit iratus Achilles: ‘dedecoravit; auferens enim habet decus auferens’, et ‘sicut aliquem advenam dedecoratum’, sicut per hec iratus.

Causa autem delectationis contumelizantibus, quia putant quod ipsi male agentes excedant magis (propter quod et iuvenes et divites contumeliosi; excellere enim putant contumelias inferentes); contumeliationis autem dehonoratio, qui enim dehonorat parvi pendit; quod enim nullo dignum nullum habet honorem, neque mali neque boni; propter quod dicit iratus Achilles: ‘dehonoravit; accipiens enim habet venerationem ipse auferens,’ et, ‘ac si aliquem inhonoratum post exurgentem,’ tamquam propter hec iratus.

The cause of the pleasure thus enjoyed by the insolent man is that he thinks himself greatly superior to others when ill—treating them. That is why youths and rich men are insolent; they think themselves superior when they show insolence. One sort of insolence is to rob people of the honour due to them; you certainly slight them thus; for it is the unimportant, for good or evil, that has no honour paid to it. So Achilles says in anger: He hath taken my prize for himself and hath done me dishonour, and Like an alien honoured by none, meaning that this is why he is angry.

[II.2.7] προσήκειν δὲ οἴονται πολυωρεῖ(35)σθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἡττόνων κατὰ γένος, κατὰ δύναμιν, κατ’ ἀρετήν, (1379a1) καὶ ὅλως ἐν ᾧ ἂν αὐτὸς ὑπερέχῃ πολύ, οἷον ἐν χρήμασιν ὁ (2) πλούσιος πένητος καὶ ἐν τῷ λέγειν ῥητορικὸς ἀδυνάτου εἰπεῖν (3) καὶ ἄρχων ἀρχομένου καὶ ἄρχειν ἄξιος οἰόμενος τοῦ ἄρχε(4)σθαι ἀξίου· διὸ εἴρηται “θυμὸς δὲ μέγας ἐστὶ διοτρεφέων βασιλήων” (5) καὶ “ἀλλά τε καὶ μετόπισθεν ἔχει κότον·” (6) ἀγανακτοῦσι γὰρ διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν.

وقد يظن كثير من الناس أن لها حقا واجبا على الذين هم دونهم في الجنس والقوة والفضيلة وفي كل ما يوجد لهم عليهم فيه الفضل جملة كفضل الأغنياء على الفقراء بالمال وفضل البليغ على الضعيف عن المنطق بالمنطق وفضل المتسلط <على المتسلط> عليه بالسلطان والذي يظن أنه يستحق أن يتسلط على الذي يستحق أن يتسلط (86) عليه ولذلك ما قيل إن شدة الاستشاطة للملوك الذين نشئوا في الثروة وأشياء أخر تتصل بذلك فقد يمتعضون لعظم شأنهم

. . . . .

Con venire autem opinantur multipliciter diffiniri a minoribus secundum genus, secundum patentiam, secundum virtutem, et simpliciter in quo utique eadem multum superhabundat, ut in pecuniis dives a mendico et in dicendo rethoricus a potente dicere et dominus domino et dominari dignus existimans dominari digno; ideo dictum est: ‘ira autem magna est nobilium regum’, ‘sed tamen et denique portat iram ut perficiat’; vexantur (conturbantur)¹ autem propter superhabundantiam.

1. Above vexantur, above the line.

Convenire autem putant magni pendi a minoribus secundum genus, secundum potentiam, secundum virtutem, et totaliter in ipso in quo excedunt multum, ut in pecuniis dives pauperem et in loquendo rethoricus impotentem loqui et principans subiectum et arbitratus dignus ad principandum eum qui dignus subici; propter quod dictum est: ‘ira autem magna est a Iove educatorum regum,’ et, ‘alias autem et posterius habet iram; ' indignantur enim propter excellentiam.

A man expects to be specially respected by his inferiors in birth, in capacity, in goodness, and generally in anything in which he is much their superior: as where money is concerned a wealthy man looks for respect from a poor man; where speaking is concerned, the man with a turn for oratory looks for respect from one who cannot speak; the ruler demands the respect of the ruled, and the man who thinks he ought to be a ruler demands the respect of the man whom he thinks he ought to be ruling. Hence it has been said: “Great is the wrath of kings, whose father is Zeus almighty,” and “Yea, but his rancour abideth long afterward also,” their great resentment being due to their great superiority.

[II.2.8] ἔτι ὑφ’ ὧν τις οἴεται (7) εὖ πάσχειν δεῖν· οὗτοι δ’ εἰσὶν οὓς εὖ πεποίηκεν ἢ ποιεῖ, (8) αὐτὸς ἢ δι’ αὐτόν τις ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ τις, ἢ βούλεται ἢ ἐβουλήθη.

ثم الذين يتوقع منهم الإحسان وذلك فيما لم يفعل أو لا يفعل إما به نفسه وإما بأحد ممن يتصل به إن كان هوى ذلك أو يهواه

. .

Amplius ex quibus quis extimat bene pati oportere; hii autem sunt quos bene fecit aut facit, aut ipse autem eum qui sunt in ipso aliquis aut per se, aut vult aut voluit.

Adhuc a quibus aliquis putat debere bene pati; isti autem sunt quibus bene fecit aut facit, aut ipse aut aliquis suorum aut per ipsum, aut volitum est aut volitum fuit.

Then again a man looks for respect from those who he thinks owe him good treatment, and these are the people whom he has treated or is treating well, or means or has meant to treat well, either himself, or through his friends, or through others at his request.

[II.2.9] (9) φανερὸν οὖν ἐκ τούτων ἤδη πῶς τε ἔχοντες ὀργίζονται (10) αὐτοὶ καὶ τίσιν καὶ διὰ ποῖα.

فقد يستبين من هذا القول كيف وبأية \ حال إذا كان المرء فهو غضوب وعلى من يغضب ومن أجل أي شيء يغضب

.

Manifestum igitur ex hiis utique qualiter se habentes irascuntur ipsi et quibusdam et per qualia.

Manifestum igitur ex hiis iam qualiter habentes irascuntur ipsi et quibus et propter que.

It will be plain by now, from what has been said, (1) in what frame of mind, (2) with what persons, and (3) on what grounds people grow angry.

αὐτοὶ μὲν γάρ, ὅταν λυπῶνται· (11) ἐφίεται γάρ τινος ὁ λυπούμενος· ἐάν τε οὖν κατ’ εὐθυωρίαν (12) ὁτιοῦν ἀντικρούσῃ τις, οἷον τῷ διψῶντι πρὸς τὸ πιεῖν, ἐάν τε (13) μή, ὁμοίως ταὐτὸ φαίνεται ποιεῖν· καὶ ἐάν τε ἀντιπράττῃ (14) τις ἐάν τε μὴ συμπράττῃ ἐάν τε ἄλλο τι ἐνοχλῇ οὕτως (15) ἔχοντα, πᾶσιν ὀργίζεται· [II.2.10] διὸ κάμνοντες, πενόμενοι, <πολε(16)μοῦντες,> ἐρῶντες, διψῶντες, ὅλως ἐπιθυμοῦντες καὶ μὴ(17) (18) κατορθοῦντες ὀργίλοι εἰσὶ καὶ εὐπαρόρμητοι, μάλιστα μὲν πρὸς (19) τοὺς τοῦ παρόντος ὀλιγωροῦντας, οἷον κάμνων μὲν τοῖς πρὸς (20) τὴν νόσον, πενόμενος δὲ τοῖς πρὸς τὴν πενίαν, πολεμῶν δὲ (21) τοῖς πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, ἐρῶν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς τὸν ἔρωτα, ὁμοίως (22) δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ‹εἰ δὲ μή, κἂν ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο ὀλιγωρῇ τις›· (23) προοδοποιεῖται γὰρ ἕκαστος πρὸς τὴν ἑκάστου ὀργὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ (24) ὑπάρχοντος πάθους· [II.2.11] ἔτι δ’ ἐὰν τἀναντία τύχῃ προσδεχόμενος· (25) λυπεῖ γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ πολὺ παρὰ δόξαν, ὥσπερ καὶ τέρπει τὸ (26) πολὺ παρὰ δόξαν, ἐὰν γένηται ὃ βούλεται· διὸ καὶ ὧραι καὶ (27) χρόνοι καὶ διαθέσεις καὶ ἡλικίαι ἐκ τούτων φανεραί, ποῖαι (28) εὐκίνητοι πρὸς ὀργὴν καὶ ποῦ καὶ πότε, καὶ ὅτε μᾶλλον ἐν (29) τούτοις εἰσί, μᾶλλον καὶ εὐκίνητοι.

فإذا كان بهذه \ الحال أعني أن يكون مع الحزن أو الأذى يتشوق إلى شيء دخلته الموجدة من ساعته \ أو لم تدخله غير أنه يُرى فاعلا ذلك بعينه إن فعل به أحد شيئا وإن لم يفعل به وكذلك \ إن كان شيء آخر يؤذيه فإنه إذا كان كذلك فقد يغضب على كل أو في كل فالذين إذا مستهم \ فاقة أو مرض يشتهون البتة ولا يقومون شيئا فهم غضوبون وليسوا شهويين وقد يغضبون بزيادة على الذين تصغر نفوسهم أو يتهاونون بالأمر الواقع أما عند الوجع \ منهم فعلى الذين يتهاونون بالوجع وأما في حال الفاقة منهم فعلى المتهاونين بالفاقة وأما في الحرب فعلى المتهاونين بالحرب وأما في الصداقة فعلى المتهاونين بالذين هم أصدقاء وإن لم يكن شيء من هذا فغير ذلك مما يتهاون فيه المتهاون فكل امرئ فقد يخرج إلى الغضب من قبل الألم الذي هو به ثم إن صار إلى خلاف ما أمل فقد يعرض للمرء الأذى والحزن الشديد بالأكثر إذا ظن ظنا ولم يكن ما أمل وقد يستبين من هذا الذي ذكرنا في أي الأوقات والأزمنة والأسنان والأخلاق يكونون أيسر تحريكا نحو الغضب ²⁰

20. Om. (saut du même au même) πρὸς ὀργὴν (1379a28) ... πρὸς ὀργὴν (1379a30)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Ipsi quidem enim, quando tristantur; appetit enim aliquid qui tristatur; si secundum visum igitur repercutit aliquis, ut sitienti ad bibendum, si vero non, similiter idem videtur facere; et si ad invicem agit aliquis sive non simul operatur sive aliud quis impedit sic se habentem, omnibus irasci; ideo laborantes mendici desiderantes sitientes, omnino concupiscentes et non rectificantes irascibiles sunt et bene mobiles, maxime quidem despicientes presens, ut puta laborans quidem existentibus ad egritudinem, mendicans autem entibus ad mendicitatem, bellans vero eis qui sunt in bello, petens vero eis qui sunt ad petitionem, similiter autem et alii, si vero non, et quoniam utique aliud parvipendit aliquid; preparatur enim unusquisque ad uniuscuiusque iram ab existente passione; amplius autem si contraria attigerit expectans; tristatur enim magis multum transopinabile, tamquam et exultat multum inopinabile, si fiat quod vult; ideoque hore et anni et dispositiones et etates ex hiis manifeste, et que bene mobiles ad iram et quando, et quoniam quando magis in hiis sunt, magis et bene mobiles.

Ipsi quidem enim, cum tristantur; appetit enim aliquid qui tristatur; sive directe contra molestet quis, ut sitienti quantum ad bibere, sive non, idem videtur facere; et sive contra agat aliquis sive non cooperetur sive in alio quis molestet sic habens omnibus irascitur; propter quod infirmi, egentes, amantes, sitientes, totaliter concupiscentes et non assequentes iracundi sunt et facile commobiles, maxime quidem ad presentes parvi pendentes, puta laborans quidem eis qui ad egritudinem, egentes autem eis qui ad egestatem, bellans autem eis qui ad bellum, amans autem eis qui ad amorem, similiter autem et alii, si autem non et quodcumque aliud parvi pendat quis; preparatur enim unusquisque ad uniuscuiusque iram ab inexistente passione; adhuc autem si contraria extiterit suscipiens; contristat enim magis quod multum inopinatum, sicut et delectat quod multum inopinatum, si fiat quod volitum est; propter quod et tempora et hore et dispositiones et etates ex hiis manifeste, et que facile mobiles ad iram et quando et ubi, et quod quando magis in hiis sunt, magis etiam facile mobiles.

(1) The frame of mind is that of one in which any pain is being felt. In that condition, a man is always aiming at something. Whether, then, another man opposes him either directly in any way, as by preventing him from drinking when he is thirsty, or indirectly, the act appears to him just the same; whether some one works against him, or fails to work with him, or otherwise vexes him while he is in this mood, he is equally angry in all these cases. Hence people who are afflicted by sickness or poverty or love or thirst or any other unsatisfied desires are prone to anger and easily roused: especially against those who slight their present distress. Thus a sick man is angered by disregard of his illness, a poor man by disregard of his poverty, a man waging war by disregard of the war he is waging, a lover by disregard of his love, and so throughout, any other sort of slight being enough if special slights are wanting. Each man is predisposed, by the emotion now controlling him, to his own particular anger. Further, we are angered if we happen to be expecting a contrary result: for a quite unexpected evil is specially painful, just as the quite unexpected fulfilment of our wishes is specially pleasant. Hence it is plain what seasons, times, conditions, and periods of life tend to stir men easily to anger, and where and when this will happen; and it is plain that the more we are under these conditions the more easily we are stirred.

[II.2.12] (30) αὐτοὶ μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἔχοντες εὐκίνητοι πρὸς ὀργήν, ὀργί(31)ζονται δὲ τοῖς τε καταγελῶσι καὶ χλευάζουσιν καὶ σκώ(32)πτουσιν (ὑβρίζουσι γάρ), καὶ τοῖς τὰ τοιαῦτα βλάπτουσιν ὅσα (33) ὕβρεως σημεῖα· ἀνάγκη δὲ τοιαῦτα εἶναι ἃ μήτε ἀντί τινος (34) μήτ’ ὠφέλιμα τοῖς ποιοῦσιν· ἤδη γὰρ δοκεῖ δι’ ὕβριν.

وعلى من يغضبون وبمن يهزؤون يعينون وبمن يعيرون [L 87] وإنما يشتمون أو يستهينون بالذين هم بهذه الحال أعني الذين يضرون بهم فعلامات الشتم أو الاستهانة بالغة ما بلغت تعدو أن تكون من هذا النحو أعني التي لا ينتفع بها الفاعلون في شيء فقد يظن واجبا أن يكون من الشتم والاستهانة

. . . . .

Hii quidem igitur sic se habentes bene mobiles ad iram, irascuntur autem deridentibus et deliciosis; vituperant (iniuriantur enim); et ledentibus talia quecumque iniurie signa; necesse talia esse que nee contra aliquem nee auxilium facientibus; utique enim videtur per iniuriam.

Ipsi quidem igitur sic habentes facile mobiles ad iram. Irascuntur autem et deridentibus et subsannantibus et conviciantibus (contumeliam enim inferunt), et in talibus nocentibus quecumque sunt contumelie signa; necesse autem talia esse que neque pro aliquo neque proficua facientibus; iam enim videntur in contumeliam.

These, then, are the frames of mind in which men are easily stirred to anger. The persons with whom we get angry are those who laugh, mock, or jeer at us, for such conduct is insolent. Also those who inflict injuries upon us that are marks of insolence. These injuries must be such as are neither retaliatory nor profitable to the doers: for only then will they be felt to be due to insolence.

[II.2.13] καὶ (35) τοῖς κακῶς λέγουσι καὶ καταφρονοῦσι περὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ μάλιστα (36) σπουδάζουσιν, οἷον οἱ ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ φιλοτιμούμενοι ἐάν τις (37) εἰς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, οἱ δ’ ἐπὶ τῇ ἰδέᾳ ἐάν τις εἰς τὴν ἰδέαν, (38) ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων· [II.2.14] ταῦτα δὲ πολλῷ μᾶλλον, ἐὰν (39) ὑποπτεύσωσι μὴ ὑπάρχειν αὑτοῖς, ἢ ὅλως ἢ μὴ ἰσχυρῶς, ἢ (1379b1) μὴ δοκεῖν· ἐπειδὰν γὰρ σφόδρα οἴωνται ὑπερέχειν ἐν τού(2)τοις ἐν οἷς σκώπτονται, οὐ φροντίζουσιν.

فعل الذين يسيئون القول ويستخفون بالمجتهدين فضل اجتهاد في الفضيلة كالذين يشرفون بالفلسفة إن امرؤ شرف بها أو بما أشبهها إن كان شيء يشبهها وكذلك سائر الأخر فأما هؤلاء فكم بالحري يظنون أنه ليست لهم في ذلك منفعة البتة أو يظنون بلا قوة أو لا يظنون لكنهم إن ظنوا أن لهم في اللاتي يعيرون بها منفعة عظيمة ²¹

21. For "οὐ φροντίζουσιν", .

. . . . .

Et male dicentibus et spernentibus ea circa que maxime student, tamquam qui in phllosophia diliguntur honorabiles si quis ad philosophiam, hii vero in ydea si quis ad ydeam, similiter autem et in aliis; hec autem multo magis, si insidiantur non esse ipsis, aut omnino aut non fortiter aut non videri; quoniam autem si vehementer arbitrantur esse in hiis in quibus iniuriam patiantur, non curant.

Et obloquentibus et despicientibus ea circa que ipsi maxime student, puta qui in philosophia amant honorari si quis in philosophiam, qui autem in specie si quis in speciem, similiter aute1n et in aliis; hec autem multo magis, si suspicati fuerint non existere ipsis, aut totaliter aut non fortiter, aut non videri; sed cum valde putent existere in hiis in quibus subsannantur, non curant.

Also those who speak ill of us, and show contempt for us, in connexion with the things we ourselves most care about: thus those who are eager to win fame as philosophers get angry with those who show contempt for their philosophy; those who pride themselves upon their appearance get angry with those who show contempt for their appearance and so on in other cases. We feel particularly angry on this account if we suspect that we are in fact, or that people think we are, lacking completely or to any effective extent in the qualities in question. For when we are convinced that we excel in the qualities for which we are jeered at, we can ignore the jeering.

[II.2.15] καὶ τοῖς φίλοις (3) μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς μὴ φίλοις· οἴονται γὰρ προσήκειν μᾶλλον (4) πάσχειν εὖ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ἢ μή.

فهم بالأكثر يخالون للرحمة أو العطف لأنهم يظنون أنهم قريب من أن ينالون منهم فعل حسن إلا أن

. .

Et amicis magis quam non amicis; extimant convenire magis ab ipsis bene pati aut non.

Et amicis magis quam non amicis; arbitrantur enirn con venire magis ab ipsis bene pati quam non.

Again, we are angrier with our friends than with other people, since we feel that our friends ought to treat us well and not badly.

[II.2.16] καὶ τοῖς εἰθισμένοις τιμᾶν ἢ (5) φροντίζειν, ἐὰν πάλιν μὴ οὕτως ὁμιλῶσιν· καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ (6) τούτων οἴονται καταφρονεῖσθαι· ταὐτὰ γὰρ ἂν ποιεῖν.

يكونوا إنما يعيرون أو يخالون باللاتي قد اعتيدت وإن لم يعودوا فيلقوهم بمثل ذلك ثانية فإنهم قد يظنون بهؤلاء أيضا التهاون بهم

. .

Et consuetis honorare aut curare, si iterum non sic mitigentur; et enim ab hiis putant despici; hec enim utique facere.

Et hiis qui consueverunt honorare aut curare, si iterum non ita se habeant; et enim ab hiis putant despici; eadem enim utique facerent.

We are angry with those who have usually treated us with honour or regard, if a change comes and they behave to us otherwise: for we think that they feel contempt for us, or they would still be behaving as they did before.

καὶ (7) τοῖς μὴ ἀντιποιοῦσιν εὖ μηδὲ τὴν ἴσην ἀνταποδιδοῦσιν.

وكذلك يظنون بالذين لا يعودون فيحسنون والذين لا يكافئون بالاستيجاب

.

Et non contrafacientibus bene neque equalitatem retribuentes.

Et hiis qui non contra bene faciunt neque equalem retribuunt.

And with those who do not return our kindnesses or fail to return them adequately,

[II.2.17] καὶ (8) τοῖς τἀναντία ποιοῦσιν αὐτοῖς, ἐὰν ἥττους ὦσιν. καταφρονεῖν (9) γὰρ πάντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι φαίνονται, καὶ οἱ μὲν ὡς ἡττόνων οἱ (10) δ’ ὡς παρὰ ἡττόνων.

والذين يفعلون بهم المخالفات والذين هم عندهم بحال خسيسة فكل هؤلاء ونحوهم قد يظنون متهاونين أما بعضهم ففي الأمور الخسيسة وأما بعضهم ففي التي هي أخس

. . .

Et facientibus contraria ipsis, quamvis minores sint. Despicere enim omnes hii videntur, et hii quidem tamquam minora, hii vera tamquam iuxta minora.

Et hiis qui contraria faciunt ipsis, si minores fuerint. Despicere enim omnes tales videntur, et hii quidem ut minores, hii autem ut comparatione minores.

and with those who oppose us though they are our inferiors: for all such persons seem to feel contempt for us; those who oppose us seem to think us inferior to themselves, and those who do not return our kindnesses seem to think that those kindnesses were conferred by inferiors.

[II.2.18] καὶ τοῖς ἐν μηδενὶ λόγῳ οὖσιν, ἄν τι (11) ὀλιγωρῶσι, μᾶλλον· ὑπόκειται γὰρ ἡ ὀργὴ τῆς ὀλιγωρίας (12) πρὸς τοὺς μὴ προσήκοντας, προσήκει δὲ τοῖς ἥττοσι μὴ ὀλι(13)γωρεῖν· [II.2.19] τοῖς δὲ φίλοις, ἐάν τε μὴ εὖ λέγωσιν ἢ ποιῶσιν, καὶ (14) ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐὰν τἀναντία, καὶ ἐὰν μὴ αἰσθάνωνται δεομένων, (15) ὥσπερ ὁ Ἀντιφῶντος Πλήξιππος τῷ Μελεάγρῳ· ὀλιγωρίας (16) γὰρ τὸ μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι σημεῖον· ὧν γὰρ φροντίζομεν οὐ (17) λανθάνει.

والتي ليست فيها كلمة البتة وأيضا الغضب موضوع تحت صغر النفس في الواجبات فليس ينبغي أن تصغر النفس في الأمور اليسيرة فأما الأصدقاء فقد يجب الغضب عليهم إن لم يقولوا جميلا وأكثر من ذلك وإن كانوا لا يحسون أو يألمون للمتضادات المخالفات إذا أصابت أصدقاءهم وإذا مستهم حاجة كمثل [L 88] ما يقال في فيليخيفوس صاحب أنطيفون بمالاغروس ولا حس أو لا ألم دليل على صغر النفس والتهاون ثم إن هم أحزنوا أو أذوا من يعنون به ²²

22. Ar. om. (saut du même au même) "[φροντίζομεν] ... φροντίζουσιν (1379b19)". Comb. "ὧν γὰρ φροντίζομεν ... ἐὰν λυπήσωσιν (1379b19)".

. . . . . . .

Et existentibus nulli rationi, si quid despiciunt magis; subiacct enim ira despectioni ad non convenientes, con venit autem minoribus non despicere; amicis vera, sive non bene dicant aut faciant, et amplius magis si contraria, et si non tangunt indigentia, quemadmodum Antphontis Plexippus Meleagro; despectionis enim non tangere signum; que curamus non latere.

Et hiis qui in nulla proportione sunt, si quid parvi pendant, magis; supponitur enim ira parvipensionis ad non convenientes, convenit autem minoribus non parvi pendere; amicis autem, si non bene dicant vel faciant, et adhuc magis si contraria, et si non intendant indirogentibus, sicut Plexippus Antifontis Meleagro; parvipensionis enim non intendere signum; ea enim que curamus non latent.

And we feel particularly angry with men of no account at all, if they slight us. For, by our hypothesis, the anger caused by the slight is felt towards people who are not justified in slighting us, and our inferiors are not thus justified. Again, we feel angry with friends if they do not speak well of us or treat us well; and still more, if they do the contrary; or if they do not perceive our needs, which is why Plexippus is angry with Meleager in Antiphon’s play; for this want of perception shows that they are slighting us — we do not fail to perceive the needs of those for whom we care.

[II.2.20] καὶ τοῖς ἐπιχαίρουσι ταῖς ἀτυχίαις καὶ ὅλως (18) εὐθυμουμένοις ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ἀτυχίαις· ἢ γὰρ ἐχθροῦ ἢ ὀλι(19)γωροῦντος σημεῖον.

. .

Et gaudentibus infelicitatibus et universaliter bene putantibus in infelicitatibus ipsorum; aut enim inimici aut despicientis signum.

Et exultantibus in infortuniis et totaliter hiis qui boni animi in ipsorum infortuniis; aut enim inimici aut parvi pendentis signum.

Again we are angry with those who rejoice at our misfortunes or simply keep cheerful in the midst of our misfortunes, since this shows that they either hate us or are slighting us.

καὶ τοῖς μὴ φροντίζουσιν ἐὰν λυπήσωσιν· (20) διὸ καὶ τοῖς κακὰ ἀγγέλλουσιν ὀργίζονται.

فقد يغضبون على من أساءوا به الظن

. .

Et non sollicitis entibus si tristabuntur; ideo mala nuntiantibus irascuntur.

Et hiis qui non curant si contristaverint; propter quod mala annuntiantibus irascuntur.

Also with those who are indifferent to the pain they give us: this is why we get angry with bringers of bad news.

[II.2.21] καὶ τοῖς ἢ ἀκούουσι (21) περὶ αὐτῶν ἢ θεωμένοις τὰ αὐτῶν φαῦλα· ὅμοιοι γάρ εἰσιν ἢ (22) ὀλιγωροῦσιν ἢ ἐχθροῖς· οἱ γὰρ φίλοι συναλγοῦσιν, θεώμενοι δὲ (23) τὰ οἰκεῖα φαῦλα πάντες ἀλγοῦσιν.

وعلى الذين يتهاونون بما يبلغون عنهم أو يرون بهم من سوء فإنهم يشبهون عندهم الأعداء إذا صغرت أنفسهم أو تهاونوا لأن كل الذين يمضهم أمر أصدقائهم قد يألمون أو يجزعون إذا رأوا بهم سوءا

. . .

Et audientibus de ipsis aut videntibus ipsorum mala; silniles enim sunt aut despicientibus aut inimicis; amici enim condolent, inspicientes autem propria mala omnes dolent.

Et hiis qui aut audiunt de ipsis aut inspiciunt ea que ipsorum mala; silniles enim sunt aut parvi pendentibus aut inimicis; amici enirn condolcnt, inspicientes autem propria mala omnes dolent.

And with those who listen to stories about us or keep on looking at our weaknesses; this seems like either slighting us or hating us; for those who love us share in all our distresses and it must distress any one to keep on looking at his own weaknesses.

[II.2.22] ἔτι τοῖς ὀλιγωροῦσι πρὸς (24) πέντε, πρὸς οὓς φιλοτιμοῦνται, [πρὸς] οὓς θαυμάζουσιν, ὑφ’ (25) ὧν βούλονται θαυμάζεσθαι, ἢ οὓς αἰσχύνονται, ἢ ἐν τοῖς (26) αἰσχυνομένοις αὐτούς· ἄν τις ἐν τούτοις ὀλιγωρῇ, ὀργίζονται (27) μᾶλλον.

ثم قد يغضبون على الذين يتهاونون أو بصغر أنفسهم في خمسة أصناف وذلك في الذين يكرمونهم وفي الذين يتعجبون منهم وفي الذين يحبون أن يكونوا عندهم عجيبين أو متعجبا منهم وفي الذين هم يستخزون منهم وفي اللاتي يكون فيها الخزى والفضيحة إن امرء صغرت نفسه أو تهاون بذلك فقد يشتد الغضب منهم على الذين يتهاونون أو تصغر نفوسهم

. .

Amplius despicientibus ad quinque, apud quos philotimunte, ad quos mirantur, a quibus, volunt admirari, ad quos verentur, in verentibus ipsos; in hiis si quis despicit, irascuntur magis.

Adhuc parvi pendentibus ad quinque, ad quos sunt in am ore honoris, ad quos sunt in admiratione, a quibus volunt in admiratione haberi, ad quos verecundantur aut in confundentibus ipsos; in hiis si quis parvi pendat, irascuntur magis.

Further, with those who slight us before five classes of people: namely, (1) our rivals, (2) those whom we admire, (3) those whom we wish to admire us, (4) those for whom we feel reverence, (5) those who feel reverence for us: if any one slights us before such persons, we feel particularly angry.

[II.2.23] καὶ τοῖς εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀλιγωροῦσιν ὑπὲρ ὧν αὐτοῖς (28) αἰσχρὸν μὴ βοηθεῖν, οἷον γονεῖς, τέκνα, γυναῖκας, ἀρχομένους. (29) καὶ τοῖς χάριν μὴ ἀποδιδοῦσιν· παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον γὰρ ἡ (30) ὀλιγωρία.

وفي هذه الأصناف كالذين لا يؤازرونهم على الجميل وذلك كغضب الآباء على البنين والنساء على الذين يتسلطن عليهم ثم على الذين لا يكافون بالمنة فإن النقصان في الواجب من صغر النفس أو التهاون

. . .

Et despicientibus ad hec super qui bus ipsis malum non auxiliantur, ut puta parentes, filios, uxores, dominantes. Et non retribuentibus gratias; iuxta decens enim despectio.

Et hiis qui in talibus parvi pendunt in quibus turpe est ipsis non auxiliari, puta parentes, pueros, uxores, subiectos. Et gratiam non reddentibus; preter conveniens enim parvipensio.

Again, we feel angry with those who slight us in connexion with what we are as honourable men bound to champion — our parents, children, wives, or subjects. And with those who do not return a favour, since such a slight is unjustifiable.

[II.2.24] καὶ τοῖς εἰρωνευομένοις πρὸς σπουδάζοντας· (31) καταφρονητικὸν γὰρ ἡ εἰρωνεία.

وعلى الذين يهزلون عند الذين يجدون لأن الهزل تهاون

. .

Et yronizantibus ad studentes; despectibile enim yronia.

Et yronizantibus ad studentes; despectivum enim yronia.

Also with those who reply with humorous levity when we are speaking seriously, for such behaviour indicates contempt.

[II.2.25] καὶ τοῖς τῶν ἄλλων εὐποιη(32)τικοῖς, ἐὰν μὴ καὶ αὐτῶν· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο καταφρονητικόν, (33) τὸ μὴ ἀξιοῦν, ὧν πάντας, καὶ αὐτόν.

وعلى الذين يحسنون إلى آخرين إن لم يكونوا يحسنون إليهم لأن هذا أيضا من التهاون أعني الأمر لا يستوي فيه المرء بالكل

. .

Et aliis bene facientibus, si non et ipsis; et enim hoc despectibile, non dignari omnes et ipsum.

Et hiis qui sunt aliis benefactivi, si non et ipsis; et enim hoc despectivum, non dignificare ipsum, quibus omnes.

And with those who treat us less well than they treat everybody else; it is another mark of contempt that they should think we do not deserve what every one else deserves.

[II.2.26] ποιητικὸν δ’ ὀργῆς καὶ (34) ἡ λήθη, οἷον καὶ ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων, οὕτως οὖσα περὶ μικρόν· (35) ὀλιγωρίας γὰρ δοκεῖ καὶ ἡ λήθη σημεῖον εἶναι· δι’ ἀμέλειαν (36) μὲν γὰρ ἡ λήθη γίγνεται, ἡ δ’ ἀμέλεια ὀλιγωρία τίς (37) ἐστιν.

ثم مما يفعل فعل الغضب أيضا النسيان كالذي قد يعرض في الأسماء وكذلك مهما كان في الأمور اليسيرة لأن النسيان أيضا قد يظن دليلا على صغر النفس وذلك [L89] أن النسيان إنما يكون عن التواني والتواني شيء من صغر النفس

. . . .

Effectivum autem ire et oblivio, ut puta et ea que est nominum, circa parvum; despcctionis enim videtur et oblivio signum esse; ob negligentiam quidem enim oblivio fit, negligentia enim despectio est.

Factivurn autern ire et oblivio, velut et que nominum, existens circa modicum; parvipensionis enim videtur et oblivio signum esse; propter incuriam quidem enim oblivio fit, incuria autem parvipensio est.

Forgetfulness, too, causes anger, as when our own names are forgotten, trifling as this may be; since forgetfulness is felt to be another sign that we are being slighted; it is due to negligence, and to neglect us is to slight us.

[II.2.27] (1380a1) οἷς μὲν οὖν ὀργίζονται καὶ ὡς ἔχοντες καὶ διὰ ποῖα, (2) ἅμα εἴρηται· δῆλον δ’ ὅτι δέοι ἂν κατασκευάζειν τῷ λόγῳ (3) τοιούτους οἷοι ὄντες ὀργίλως ἔχουσιν, καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους (4) τούτοις ἐνόχους ὄντας ἐφ’ οἷς ὀργίζονται, καὶ τοιούτους οἵοις (5) ὀργίζονται.

أما على من يغضبون وبأية حال يكونون غضابا ومن أجل أي شيء يغضبون فقد قيل ثم هو معلوم أنه يمكن أن يثبت بهذا القول أن كيف يوجد الذين يكون لهم صغر النفس فأما أضداد هؤلاء أعني الغضاب فقد يستدل عليهم من قبل الغضاب والأشياء التي في مثلها يغضبون

. . .

Quibus quidem igitur irascuntur et quomodo se habentes et per qualia, dictum est; manifestum autem tamquam oporteat ipsum construere sermone hos putantes irascibiliter habent, et contrarios hiis reos existentes in quibus irascuntur, et tales qui quibus irascuntur.

Quibus quidem igitur irascuntur et quomodo habentes et propter que, dictum est; palam autem quomodo oportebit utique ipsum efficere oratione tales quales existentes iracunde habent, et contrarios hiis reos existentes in quibus irascuntur, et tales qualibus irascuntur.

The persons with whom we feel anger, the frame of mind in which we feel it, and the reasons why we feel it, have now all been set forth. Clearly the orator will have to speak so as to bring his hearers into a frame of mind that will dispose them to anger, and to represent his adversaries as open to such charges and possessed of such qualities as do make people angry.

[II.3.1] (6) Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι ἐναντίον τῷ πραΰνεσθαι καὶ (7) ὀργὴ πραότητι, ληπτέον πῶς ἔχοντες πρᾶοί εἰσι καὶ πρὸς (8) τίνας πράως ἔχουσι καὶ διὰ τίνων πραΰνονται.

فمن أجل أن ضد الغضب السكون وإن يسكن المرء هو ضد لأن يغضب فقد ينبغي أن ننظر كيف وبأية حال إذا كانوا فهم سكون وعند من يكونون سكونا وفي أي الأشياء يكونون كذلك

.

Quoniam autem irasci contrarium est mitem esse et ira mitigationi, sumendum qualiter se habentes mites sunt et ad quos humiliter se habent et per que mitigantur.

Quoniam autem irasci contrarium est ei quod est mitescere et ira mansuetudini, sumendum qualiter se habentes mites sunt et ad quos mansuete se habent et per que mitescunt.

Part 3. Since growing calm is the opposite of growing angry, and calmness the opposite of anger, we must ascertain in what frames of mind men are calm, towards whom they feel calm, and by what means they are made so.

[II.3.2] ἔστω δὴ (9) πράϋνσις κατάστασις καὶ ἠρέμησις ὀργῆς.

فالسكون هو وقار الغضب وفتوره

.

Est autem mitigatio cessatio et quietatio ire.

Sit itaque mansuefactio destitutio et quietatio ire.

Growing calm may be defined as a settling down or quieting of anger.

[II.3.3] εἰ οὖν ὀργίζονται (10) τοῖς ὀλιγωροῦσιν, ὀλιγωρία δ’ ἑκούσιον, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τοῖς (11) μηδὲν τούτων ποιοῦσιν ἢ ἀκουσίως ποιοῦσιν ἢ φαινομένοις (12) τοιούτοις πρᾶοί εἰσιν.

وإذا كانوا إنما يغضبون على الذين تصغر نفوسهم أو يتهاونون ثم في الذي يكون من ذلك بالمشيئة أعني من صغر النفس والتهاون فهو معلوم أن الذين لا يفعلون شيئا من هذا أو يغعلونه بلا مشيئة وعمد أو يظنون كذلك فهم عن هؤلاء سكون كافّون

.

Si igitur irascuntur despicientibus, despectus autem est voluntarium, palam quoniam et nichil horum facientibus aut involuntarie facientibus aut talibus apparentibus mites sunt.

Si igitur irascuntur parvi pendentibus, parvipensio autem est voluntarium, manifestum quod et hiis qui nichil horum faciunt aut involuntarie faciunt aut apparentibus talibus mites sunt.

Now we get angry with those who slight us; and since slighting is a voluntary act, it is plain that we feel calm towards those who do nothing of the kind, or who do or seem to do it involuntarily.

[II.3.4] καὶ τοῖς τἀναντία ὧν ἐποίησαν βουλο(13)μένοις.

وعن بعض الذين يفعلون بهم المتضادات المخالفات بمشيئة وعمد

.

Et volentibus contraria eorum que fecerunt.

Also towards those who intended to do the opposite of what they did do.

καὶ ὅσοι καὶ αὐτοὶ εἰς αὑτοὺς τοιοῦτοι· οὐδεὶς γὰρ (14) αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ δοκεῖ ὀλιγωρεῖν.

والذين يفعلون بهم كل ما كان مما قد يفعلونه هم بأنفسهم فإنه ليس يظن بأحد أنه تصغر نفسه في نفسه

. .

Et quicumque et ad se ipsos tales; nullus enim ipse se ipsum videtur despicere.

Et hiis qui et ad se ipsos tales; nullus enim ipse se ipsum videtur parvi pendere.

Also towards those who treat themselves as they have treated us: since no one can be supposed to slight himself.

[II.3.5] καὶ τοῖς ὁμολογοῦσι καὶ μετα(15)μελομένοις· ὡς γὰρ ἔχοντες δίκην τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς (16) πεποιημένοις παύονται τῆς ὀργῆς· σημεῖον δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν (17) οἰκετῶν κολάσεως· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἀντιλέγοντας καὶ ἀρνουμέ(18)νους μᾶλλον κολάζομεν, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ὁμολογοῦντας δικαίως (19) κολάζεσθαι παυόμεθα θυμούμενοι· αἴτιον δ’ ὅτι ἀναισχυντία (20) τὸ τὰ φανερὰ ἀρνεῖσθαι, ἡ δ’ ἀναισχυντία ὀλιγωρία καὶ (21) καταφρόνησις· ὧν γοῦν πολὺ καταφρονοῦμεν, οὐκ αἰσχυνόμεθα.

ثم عن الذين يقرون ويرجعون أو ينقلبون فمن أجل أن الحكم واجب لهم عليهم قد يفترون عن الاغتمام بما فعل بهم وعلامة ذلك في العقوبة التي تكون بالفعل فإنا قد نعاقب بزيادة الذين يجيبون ويجحدون فأما الذين يقرون أن العقوبة تقع بهم عدلا فقد نفتر عن (لـ ٩٠) الغضب عليهم وقد تكون علة الجحود للأمر الظاهر وقاحة الوجه والوقاحة صغر نفس واستهانة فإن الذين لا تستهين بهم جدا لا يخزى منهم

. . . . . . . .

Et despicientibus et penitentibus; sicut habentes occasionem in tristando in factis cessant ab ira; signum autem a tormento clientum; negantes enim et contradicentes magis tormentamus, apud confitentes autem iuste tormentari cessamus irascibiles; causa autem quoniam inverecundia in negando manifesta, inverecundia vera despectio et negligentia; quecumque multum negligimus, non verecundamur.

Et hiis qui confitentur et penitent; tamquam enim habentes satisfactionem id quod est tristari de factis cessant ab ira; signum autern in servorum castigatione; negantes quidem enim et contradicentes magis flagellamus, ad confitentes autem iuste flagellari quietamur ab ira; causa autem quia inreverentia est manifesta negari, inrerverentia autem parvipensio et despectus; inrerverentia autem parvipensio et despectus; quos enim multum despicimus, non reveremur.

Also towards those who admit their fault and are sorry: since we accept their grief at what they have done as satisfaction, and cease to be angry. The punishment of servants shows this: those who contradict us and deny their offence we punish all the more, but we cease to be incensed against those who agree that they deserved their punishment. The reason is that it is shameless to deny what is obvious, and those who are shameless towards us slight us and show contempt for us: anyhow, we do not feel shame before those of whom we are thoroughly contemptuous.

[II.3.6] (22) καὶ τοῖς ταπεινουμένοις πρὸς αὐτοὺς καὶ μὴ ἀντιλέγουσιν· (23) φαίνονται γὰρ ὁμολογεῖν ἥττους εἶναι, οἱ δ’ ἥττους φοβοῦνται, (24) φοβούμενος δὲ οὐδεὶς ὀλιγωρεῖ· ὅτι δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ταπεινου(25)μένους παύεται ἡ ὀργή, καὶ οἱ κύνες δηλοῦσιν οὐ δάκνοντες (26) τοὺς καθίζοντας.

ثم الذين يذلون ولا يجيبون لأنهم يرون مقرّين بالنقص فأما أولئك فهم أقل خوفا لأنه ليس أحدا يخاف فتصغر نفسه فأما أن يكون الغضب قد يفتر عن الذين يذلون ويتواضعون فقد يدل على ذلك فعل الكلاب أيضا حين تكف عن الجلوس

. . . .

Et humiliantibus penes eos et non contradicentibus; videntur enim confiteri minores esse, qui minores timent, timens autem nullus despicit; quoniam autem apud humiliantes se cessat ira, et canes manifestant non mordentes sedentes.

Et humiliatis ad ipsum et non contradicentibus; videntur enim confiteri minores esse, qui autem minores timent, timens autem nullus parvi pendit; quod autem ad humiliatos cessat ira, et canes manifestant non mordentes eos qui resident.

Also we feel calm towards those who humble themselves before us and do not gainsay us; we feel that they thus admit themselves our inferiors, and inferiors feel fear, and nobody can slight any one so long as he feels afraid of him. That our anger ceases towards those who humble themselves before us is shown even by dogs, who do not bite people when they sit down.

[II.3.7] καὶ τοῖς σπουδάζουσι πρὸς [τοὺς] σπουδάζον(27)τας· δοκεῖ γὰρ σπουδάζεσθαι ἀλλ’ οὐ καταφρονεῖσθαι.

وتنهش المستعجلين وقد يظن ذلك ذعرا وليس استهانة

. .

Et studentibus ad studentes; videtur studiosum fieri, sed non negligi.

Et studiosis ad studiosos; videtur enim haberi in pretia, sed non despici.

We also feel calm towards those who are serious when we are serious, because then we feel that we are treated seriously and not contemptuously.

[II.3.8] καὶ τοῖς (28) μείζω κεχαρισμένοις. καὶ τοῖς δεομένοις καὶ παραιτουμένοις· (29) ταπεινότεροι γάρ.

ثم عن الذين هم مفراحون جدا جدا والذين هم محتاجون والذين يستعفّون أو يحتجرون فإنهم أشد تواضعا وذلة

. . .

Et maius regratiantibus. Et indigentibus et petentibus; humiliores enim.

Et quibus maiora data fuerunt. Et deprecantibus et excusantibus; humiliores enim.

Also towards those who have done us more kindnesses than we have done them. Also towards those who pray to us and beg for mercy, since they humble themselves by doing so.

[II.3.9] καὶ τοῖς μὴ ὑβρισταῖς μηδὲ χλευασταῖς (30) μηδ’ ὀλιγώροις εἰς μηδένα ἢ μὴ εἰς χρηστοὺς μηδ’ εἰς τοιού(31)τους οἷοί περ αὐτοί·

ثم الذين لا يشتمون أو يستهينون ولا يدعبون ولا تصغر نفوسهم في أحد البتة أو في كثير من الناس

.

Et non iniuriantibus neque deliciosis neque despicientibus aut ad nullum aut non ad utiles aut non tales quales ipsi;

Et non contumeliatoribus neque subsannatoribus neque contemptoribus aut in nullum aut non in bonos aut non in tales quales ipsi;

Also towards those who do not insult or mock at or slight any one at all, or not any worthy person or any one like ourselves.

[II.3.10] ὅλως δ’ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων δεῖ σκοπεῖν (32) τὰ πραΰνοντα. καὶ οὓς φοβοῦνται ἢ αἰσχύνονται, ἕως ἂν (33) οὕτως ἔχωσιν, οὐκ ὀργίζονται· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἅμα φοβεῖσθαι (34) καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι.

والجملة أن التي فيها يكون السكون ينبغي أن ننظر فيها بزيادة من قبل الأضداد ثم عن الذين يهابونهم أو يستحيون منهم فإنهم ما داموا لهم على تلك الحال فليس يغضبون عليهم لأنه لا يمكن أن يكون المرء يخاف ويغضب معا

. . .

omnino autem ex contrariis oportet intueri mitia. Et quos timent et verentur; quousque enim sic se habent, non irascuntur; impossibile enim est simul timeri et irasci.

totaliter autem ex contrariis oportet intendere ea que mansuefaciunt. Et quos timent aut verecundantur; donec enim sic habeant, non irascuntur; impossibile enim simul timere et irasci.

In general, the things that make us calm may be inferred by seeing what the opposites are of those that make us angry. We are not angry with people we fear or respect, as long as we fear or respect them; you cannot be afraid of a person and also at the same time angry with him.

[II.3.11] καὶ τοῖς δι’ ὀργὴν ποιήσασιν ἢ οὐκ ὀργίζονται (35) ἢ ἧττον ὀργίζονται· οὐ γὰρ δι’ ὀλιγωρίαν φαίνονται πρᾶξαι· (36) οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὀργιζόμενος ὀλιγωρεῖ· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὀλιγωρία ἄλυπον, (1380b1) ἡ δ’ ὀργὴ μετὰ λύπης. καὶ τοῖς αἰσχυνομένοις αὐτούς.

ثم عن الذين فعلوا شيئا من أجل الغضب فإنهم إما ألا يغضبوا عليهم وإما أن يغضبوا غضبا يسيرا لأنه لا يظن بهم أنهم فعلوا ذلك لصغر النفس ذلك أنه ليس من أحد يغضب فتصغر نفسه لأن صغر النفس ليس فيه حزن أو أذى فأما الغضب فمع حزن أو أذى ثم عن الذين يخزون ويستحيون

. . . . .

Et facientibus per iram aut non irascuntur aut minus irascuntur; non enim per despectum videntur operari; null us enim iratus despicit; despectio quidem intristabile, ira vero cum tristitia. Et verentibus ipsos.

Et hiis qui propter iram fecerunt aut non irascuntur aut minus irascuntur; non enim propter parvipensionem videntur egisse; nullus enim qui irascitur parvi pendit; parvipensio quidem enim sine tristitia, ira autem cum tristitia. Et reverentibus ipsos.

Again, we feel no anger, or comparatively little, with those who have done what they did through anger: we do not feel that they have done it from a wish to slight us, for no one slights people when angry with them, since slighting is painless, and anger is painful. Nor do we grow angry with those who reverence us.

[II.3.12] (2) καὶ ἔχοντες δὲ ἐναντίως τῷ ὀργίζεσθαι δῆλον ὅτι πρᾶοί (3) εἰσιν, οἷον ἐν παιδιᾷ, ἐν γέλωτι, ἐν ἑορτῇ, ἐν εὐημερίᾳ, ἐν (4) κατορθώσει, ἐν πληρώσει, ὅλως ἐν ἀλυπίᾳ καὶ ἡδονῇ μὴ (5) ὑβριστικῇ καὶ ἐν ἐλπίδι ἐπιεικεῖ. ἔτι κεχρονικότες καὶ μὴ (6) ὑπόγυιοι τῇ ὀργῇ ὄντες· παύει γὰρ ὀργὴν ὁ χρόνος· [II.3.13] παύει δὲ (7) καὶ ἑτέρου ὀργὴν μείζω ἡ παρ’ ἄλλου ληφθεῖσα τιμωρία (8) πρότερον· διὸ εὖ Φιλοκράτης, εἰπόντος τινός, ὀργιζομένου τοῦ (9) δήμου, “Τί οὐκ ἀπολογεῖ;”, “Οὔπω γε”, ἔφη. “Ἀλλὰ πότε”; (10) “Ὅταν ἴδω ἄλλον διαβεβλημένον”· πρᾶοι γὰρ γίγνονται ὅταν (11) εἰς ἄλλον τὴν ὀργὴν ἀναλώσωσιν, ὃ συνέβη ἐπὶ Ἐργοφίλου· (12) μᾶλλον γὰρ χαλεπαίνοντες ἢ Καλλισθένει ἀφεῖσαν διὰ τὸ (13) Καλλισθένους τῇ προτεραίᾳ καταγνῶναι θάνατον.

ثم إذا كان الغضب في تلك الحال ضدا أو خلافا لما ينبغي فهو معلوم أنهم يكونون في تلك الحال سكونا (لـ ٩١) كاللاتي تكون في حال الأدب وفي حال المزاح وفي حال الغضب و في حال اللهو وفي التقويم وفي سد الحاجة وبالجملة كل ما كان بلا حزن وبلذة غير دنية وبحسن الأمل والرجاء ثم إذا طال بهم الزمان ولم يخامرهم الغضب فإن الزمان قد يسكّن الغضب وقد يسكّن الغضب العظيم الأخذ بالثأر من آخر أولا فما أحسن ما قال فيلوقراطيس حين قال له رجل من السوقة وهو غضبان ما لك لا ترد؟ : فقال : لم يأن لذلك بعد حتى أرى آخرًا مجدلًا مطروحًا فقد يسكنون إذا يبيدوا غضبهم في آخرين كمثل الذي حدث في أيام ارغوفيلوس ولا سيما حيث كانوا يتعسّرون في أمر قليثانيس إذ كان قليثانيس بالأمس يذمّ الموت

. . . . . . . . .

Et habentes opposite irasci palam quoniam mites sunt in ludo, derisione, in festivitate, in euimeria, in rectificatione, in complemento, universaliter in non tristitia et voluptate non iniuriosa et in spe honesta. Amplius autem et diuturni et non recentes existentes in ira; tempus enim facit iram cessare; cessare autem facit et alterius ira maior et ab alia sumptum tormentum prius; ideo et Philocrates, dicente aliquo, irato populo, ‘quid non respondet?’, ‘non autem ’, dixit, ‘sed quandoque, quando utique alium video percussum (accusatum)’; mites enim fiunt quando utique in alium iram destruent, ut puta contingit in Ergofilo; magis enim difficultantes cognoscere mortem.

Et habentes autem contrarie ei quod est irasci palam quia mites sunt, puta in ludo, in risu, in festo, in prosperitate, in directione, in consummatione, totaliter in non tristitia et delectatione non contumeliosa et in spe optima. Adhuc autem qui a longo tempore et non de novo in ira entes; quietat enim iram tempus; quietat autem et alterius ira maior et ab alia recepta punitio prius; propter quod bene Filocrates, dicente quodam, irato populo: ‘cur non respondes? ’, ‘nondum,’ ait, ‘sed tunc cum alium videro crimina tum’; mites enim fiunt, cum in alium iram expenderint, quale accidit in Ergophilo; magis enim sevientes quam Callisteni dimisissent propterea quod precedenti die Callistenis mortem sententiaverant.

As to the frame of mind that makes people calm, it is plainly the opposite to that which makes them angry, as when they are amusing themselves or laughing or feasting; when they are feeling prosperous or successful or satisfied; when, in fine, they are enjoying freedom from pain, or inoffensive pleasure, or justifiable hope. Also when time has passed and their anger is no longer fresh, for time puts an end to anger. And vengeance previously taken on one person puts an end to even greater anger felt against another person. Hence Philocrates, being asked by some one, at a time when the public was angry with him, ‘Why don’t you defend yourself?’ did right to reply, ‘The time is not yet.’ ‘Why, when is the time?’ ‘When I see someone else calumniated.’ For men become calm when they have spent their anger on somebody else. This happened in the case of Ergophilus: though the people were more irritated against him than against Callisthenes, they acquitted him because they had condemned Callisthenes to death the day before.

[II.3.14] καὶ ἐὰν (14) ἕλωσιν. καὶ ἐὰν μεῖζον κακὸν πεπονθότες ὦσιν ἢ ὃ ὀργιζό(15)μενοι ἂν ἔδρασαν· ὥσπερ εἰληφέναι γὰρ οἴονται τιμωρίαν.

ثم إن ألفى أولئك قد لقوا شرًا عظيمًا فقد يفتر غضبهم عليهم وكأنهم يظنون أنهم قد أخذوا بثأرهم

. . .

Et si accipiant. Et si maius malum patiantur aut irati operati sunt; quemadmodum enim recipere tormenta (tormentum) arbitrantur.

Et si absorbeantur. Et si maius malum passi fuerint quam irati intulissent; velut enim accepisse punitionem existimantur.

Again, men become calm if they have convicted the offender; or if he has already suffered worse things than they in their anger would have themselves inflicted upon him; for they feel as if they were already avenged.

[II.3.15] (16) καὶ ἐὰν ἀδικεῖν οἴωνται αὐτοὶ καὶ δικαίως πάσχειν, οὐ (17) γίγνεται [ἡ] ὀργὴ¹ πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι παρὰ τὸ προσ(18)ῆκον νομίζουσι πάσχειν, ἡ δ’ ὀργὴ τοῦτο ἦν· διὸ δεῖ τῷ (19) λόγῳ προκολάζειν· ἀγανακτοῦσιν γὰρ ἧττον κολαζόμενοι καὶ (20) οἱ δοῦλοι.

1. βVet (=Anonyma infra) οὐ γίγνεται γὰρ ἡ ὀργὴ

ثم إن ظنوا بأنفسهم أنهم ظالمون أو أنهم يألمون بعدل فليس يكون الغضب عند العدل لأنهم لا يظنون أنه يفعل بهم غير الواجب وفي هذا يكون الغضب ولذلك ما ينبغي أن تكون العقوبة أولًا بالكلام وقد يتذمّر أقلّ ذلك العبيد حين يعاقبون

. . . .

Et si opinantur iniustificare et iuste pati; non fit enim ira ad iustum; neque enim amplius ad decens extimant pati, ira vero hoc fuit; ideo sermoni tormentat; solliciti sunt magis tormentati et famuli.

Et si iniustum facere putaverint ipsi et iure pati; non fit enim ira ad iustum; non enirn adhuc preter conveniens putant pati, ira autem hoc erat; propter quod sermone oportet preobiurgare; indignantur enim minus et servi qui flagellantur,

Or if they feel that they themselves are in the wrong and are suffering justly (for anger is not excited by what is just), since men no longer think then that they are suffering without justification; and anger, as we have seen, means this. Hence we ought always to inflict a preliminary punishment in words: if that is done, even slaves are less aggrieved by the actual punishment.

[II.3.16] καὶ ἐὰν μὴ αἰσθήσεσθαι οἴωνται ὅτι δι’ αὑτοὺς καὶ (21) ἀνθ’ ὧν ἔπαθον· ἡ γὰρ ὀργὴ πρὸς τὸν καθ’ ἕκαστόν ἐστιν· (22) δῆλον δ’ ἐκ τοῦ ὁρισμοῦ· διὸ ὀρθῶς πεποίηται
φάσθαι Ὀδυσσῆα πτολιπόρθιον,
(23) ὡς οὐ τετιμωρημένος εἰ μὴ ᾔσθετο καὶ ὑφ’ ὅτου καὶ ἀνθ’ (24) ὅτου· ὥστε οὔτε τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅσοι μὴ αἰσθάνονται ὀργίζονται, (25) οὔτε τοῖς τεθνεῶσιν ἔτι, ὡς πεπονθόσι τε τὸ ἔσχατον καὶ (26) οὐκ ἀλγήσουσιν οὐδ’ αἰσθησομένοις, οὗ οἱ ὀργιζόμενοι ἐφίεν(27)ται· διὸ εὖ περὶ τοῦ Ἕκτορος ὁ ποιητής, παῦσαι βουλόμενος (28) τὸν Ἀχιλλέα τῆς ὀργῆς τεθνεῶτος,
(29) κωφὴν γὰρ δὴ γαῖαν ἀεικίζει μενεαίνων.

ثم إن ظنوا أنهم لا يشعرون ما الذي يجب عليهم بسبب ما لقوا منهم فأما إن الغضب إنما يكون على كل واحد فهو معلوم من قبل الحد فبحق ما قيل لأدوسوس إنك لست فتّاح المدائن ليعلموا هل يشعر بأنهم يؤذونه أم لا وكذلك كل ما كان لا يشعر فإنهم لا يغضبون عليه ولا على الهالكين أيضا [L92] من قبل أنهم قد صاروا إلى /تلك/ الآخر فليس يحيفون عليهم فما أحسن ما حكى الشاعر عن اقطور أنه قال حيث أراد أن يسكّن غضب اخليوس على ذلك الذي هلك حيث يقول للهالك إنك الآن معانق الأرض البكماء التي أنت فيها أبدًا

. . . . . . .

Et si non sentiri opinantur quoniam per ipsos et pro quibus passi sunt; ira enim singularium est; palam autem ex diffinitione; ideo recte factum est: ‘dici Ulixem predatorem urbium ’, sicut non tormentatus nisi senserit et a quo et cuius rei causa; quare neque aliis quicumque non sentiunt irascuntur, neque amplius mortuis, sicut patientibus ultimum, et non dolent, neque senticntibus, quod irascibiles appetunt; ideo bene de Hectare poeta, cessare volens Achillem ab ira mortui: ‘surdam terrain tormentat iratus ’.

si non percipi putent quod propter se et pro quibus patiebantur; ira enim singularium est; palam autem ex diffinitione; propter quod recte poesi factum est: dixisse Ulixem urbium predatorem, ‘tamquam non punitus nisi sciat et a quo et pro quo; quare neque aliis quicumque non sentiunt irascuntur, neque mortuis adhuc, velut passis extremum et non dolituris neque sentientibus, quod irati appetunt; propter quod bene de Hectare mortua poeta, quietare volens Achillem ab ira: ‘surdam utique terrarn cruciat iratus. ’

We also feel calm if we think that the offender will not see that he is punished on our account and because of the way he has treated us. For anger has to do with individuals. This is plain from the definition. Hence the poet has well written:Say that it was Odysseus, sacker of cities, implying that Odysseus would not have considered himself avenged unless the Cyclops perceived both by whom and for what he had been blinded. Consequently we do not get angry with any one who cannot be aware of our anger, and in particular we cease to be angry with people once they are dead, for we feel that the worst has been done to them, and that they will neither feel pain nor anything else that we in our anger aim at making them feel. And therefore the poet has well made Apollo say, in order to put a stop to the anger of Achilles against the dead Hector,For behold in his fury he doeth despite to the senseless clay.

[II.3.17] (30) δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τοῖς καταπραΰνειν βουλομένοις ἐκ τούτων (31) τῶν τόπων λεκτέον, αὑτοὺς μὲν παρασκευάζουσι τοιούτους, (32) οἷς δ’ ὀργίζονται ἢ φοβεροὺς ἢ αἰσχύνης ἀξίους ἢ κεχαρισμέ(33)νους ἢ ἄκοντας ἢ ὑπεραλγοῦντας τοῖς πεποιημένοις.

فهو معلوم أن الذين يريدون أن يسكّنوا أو يخفضوا الغضب قد ينبغي أن يستعملوا هذه المواضع أعني التي منها يتهيّأ مثل هذه الوجوه فأما الذين عليهم يكون الغضب فقد يفتر الغضب عنهم بأن يكونوا إما مخوّفين أو مستحيًى منهم وإما مفراحين وإما أن يكونوا فعلوا ذلك بلا مشيئة أو قد لقوا ما هو أشد وأعظم أو قد بادوا ودرجوا

. .

Palam igitur quoniam volentibus mitigari ex hiis locis sumendum, ipsos quidem enim construunt tales, quibus autem irascuntur aut terribiles aut verecundia dignos aut gratiosos aut non voluntarios aut superdolentes factis.

Palam igitur quod mansucfacere volentibus ex hiis locis dicendum, ipsos quidem enirn procurant fieri tales, quibus autem irascuntur aut terribiles aut reverentia dignos aut gratiosos aut involuntarios aut dolentes de factis.

It is now plain that when you wish to calm others you must draw upon these lines of argument; you must put your hearers into the corresponding frame of mind, and represent those with whom they are angry as formidable, or as worthy of reverence, or as benefactors, or as involuntary agents, or as much distressed at what they have done.

[2.4.1] (34) Τίνας δὲ φιλοῦσι καὶ μισοῦσι, καὶ διὰ τί, τὴν φιλίαν καὶ (35) τὸ φιλεῖν ὁρισάμενοι λέγωμεν.

فأما من ²³ يصادقون ومن أجل أىّ شيء فإنّا حين نحدّ الصداقة نقول

23. Ar. من يصادقون man (obj.) yuṣādiqūna = Gr. τίνας ... φιλοῦσι.

.

Quosdam diligunt et odiunt, et quare, amicitiam et amare determinantes dicimus.

Quos autem amant et odiunt, et propter quid, amicitiam et amare diffinientes dicamus.

Part 4. Let us now turn to Friendship and Enmity, and ask towards whom these feelings are entertained, and why. We will begin by defining and friendly feeling.

[2.4.2] ἔστω δὴ τὸ φιλεῖν τὸ βούλε(36)σθαί τινι ἃ οἴεται ἀγαθά, ἐκείνου ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ μὴ αὑτοῦ, καὶ τὸ (1381a1) κατὰ δύναμιν πρακτικὸν εἶναι τούτων.

إن الصداق هي أن يكون الإنسان يهوى الخير لذلك من أجل ذاك وليس من أجل نفسه وأن يكون من جهة القوة فعّالا لذلك

. . .

Sit autem amare in volendo cuidam ea que opinatur bona, illius causa, sed non sui, et secundum potentiam operativum esse horum.

Sit itaque amare velle alicui que putat bona, illius gratia, sed non sui, et secundum posse activum esse horum.

We may describe friendly feeling towards any one as wishing for him what you believe to be good things, not for your own sake but for his, and being inclined, so far as you can, to bring these things about.

φίλος δέ ἐστιν ὁ φιλῶν (2) καὶ ἀντιφιλούμενος· οἴονται δὲ φίλοι εἶναι οἱ οὕτως ἔχειν (3) οἰόμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

فالصديق هو الذى يحبّ ويحبّ معا وقد يُظَنّ أنّ الأصدقاء هم الـ<ـذين يكونـ>ـون بهذه الحال أعنى أن يكون كلّ واحد منهم يظنّ بصاحبه المودّة

. .

Amicus enim est qui amat et invicem amatur; arbitrantur autem amici esse sic se habere ad invicem.

Amicus autem est qui amat et e contra amatur; putantur autem amici esse qui sic habere putantur ad invicem.

A friend is one who feels thus and excites these feelings in return: those who think they feel thus towards each other think themselves friends.

[2.4.3] τούτων δὲ ὑποκειμένων ἀνάγκη φίλον (4) εἶναι τὸν συνηδόμενον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς καὶ συναλγοῦντα τοῖς (5) λυπηροῖς μὴ διά τι ἕτερον ἀλλὰ δι’ ἐκεῖνον· γιγνομένων γὰρ (6) ὧν βούλονται χαίρουσιν πάντες, τῶν ἐναντίων δὲ λυποῦνται, (7) ὥστε τῆς βουλήσεως σημεῖον αἱ λῦπαι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί.

فإذا كان هذا موضوعا فالصديق لا محالة [16] هو الذى يستلذّ الخير الذى يكون لصاحبه ويشركه في المؤذيات المحزنات ليس من أجل شيء آخر [17] ولكن من أجل ذاك فقط فإنّ هذا إذا كان هكذا فكلّ أحد يفرح به وأمّا الأضداد المعاندون [18] فيحزنون لذلك فعلامة الهوى إذًا المحزنات واللذيذات

. .

Hiis autem suppositis necesse amicum esse condelectantem bonis et condolentem tristabilibus non propter aliquid aliud, sed propter ilium; factis enim que volunt gaudent omnes, de contrariis vero tristantur, quare voluntatis signum tristitie et voluptates.

Hiis autem suppositis necesse amicum esse congaudentem bonis et condolentem tristibus, non propter aliquid alterum, sed propter ilium; factis enim hiis que volunt gaudent omnes, contrariis autem tristantur, quare voluntatis signum tristitie et delectationes.

This being assumed, it follows that your friend is the sort of man who shares your pleasure in what is good and your pain in what is unpleasant, for your sake and for no other reason. This pleasure and pain of his will be the token of his good wishes for you, since we all feel glad at getting what we wish for, and pained at getting what we do not.

[2.4.4] καὶ οἷς (8) δὴ ταὐτὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά, καὶ οἱ τοῖς αὐτοῖς φίλοι καὶ οἱ τοῖς (9) αὐτοῖς ἐχθροί· ταὐτὰ γὰρ τούτοις βούλεσθαι ἀνάγκη, ὥστε (10) ἅπερ αὑτῷ καὶ ἄλλῳ βουλόμενος τούτῳ φαίνεται φίλος εἶναι.

ثمّ الذين تكون الخيرات والشرور [19] لهم هي بأعيانها لهؤلاء ثمّ الذين يستبين أنهم أصدقاء في الاتي فيها بأعيانها يكون الأعداء [20] فإنّ هؤلاء باضطرار يهوون هذه الأمور فإذا كان يهوى مثل هذا لذاك لا من أجل شيء آخر [21] استبان عند ذلك أنّه صديق [[L93]]

. . .

Et cui aut utique eadem bona et mala, et amici eisdem et eisdem inimici; hec enim hos velle necesse, quemadmodum quod sibi ipsi et alii volens huic videtur amicus esse.

Et quibus iam eadem bona et mala, et qui eisdem amici et qui eisdem inimici; eadem enim has velle necesse, quare qui ea que sibi alii vult, huic videtur amicus esse.

Those, then, are friends to whom the same things are good and evil; and those who are, moreover, friendly or unfriendly to the same people; for in that case they must have the same wishes, and thus by wishing for each other what they wish for themselves, they show themselves each other’s friends.

[2.4.5] (11) καὶ τοὺς πεποιηκότας εὖ φιλοῦσιν, ἢ αὐτοὺς ἢ ὧν κήδονται, (12) ἢ εἰ μεγάλα, ἢ εἰ προθύμως, ἢ εἰ ἐν τοιούτοις καιροῖς, καὶ (13) αὐτῶν ἕνεκα, ἢ οὓς ἂν οἴωνται βούλεσθαι ποιεῖν εὖ. [2.4.6] καὶ τοὺς (14) τῶν φίλων φίλους καὶ φιλοῦντας οὓς αὐτοὶ φιλοῦσιν. καὶ τοὺς (15) φιλουμένους ὑπὸ τῶν φιλουμένων αὐτοῖς. [2.4.7] καὶ τοὺς τοῖς (16) αὐτοῖς ἐχθροὺς καὶ μισοῦντας οὓς αὐτοὶ μισοῦσιν, καὶ τοὺς (17) μισουμένους ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτοῖς μισουμένων· πᾶσιν γὰρ τούτοις (18) τὰ αὐτὰ ἀγαθὰ φαίνεται εἶναι καὶ αὐτοῖς, ὥστε βούλεσθαι τὰ (19) αὐτοῖς ἀγαθά, ὅπερ ἦν τοῦ φίλου. [2.4.8] ἔτι τοὺς εὐποιητικοὺς εἰς (20) χρήματα καὶ εἰς σωτηρίαν· διὸ τοὺς ἐλευθερίους καὶ ἀνδρείους (21) τιμῶσι [2.4.9] καὶ τοὺς δικαίους· τοιούτους δ’ ὑπολαμβάνουσι τοὺς (22) μὴ ἀφ’ ἑτέρων ζῶντας· τοιοῦτοι δ’ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐργάζεσθαι, καὶ (23) τούτων οἱ ἀπὸ γεωργίας, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ αὐτουργοὶ μάλιστα.

ثمّ يحبّون أيضا الذين يحسنون إمّا إليهم أنفسهم وإمّا إلى [22] من يعنون به أو الذين فعلوا به الأمور الجسيمة بهشاشة ونشاط أو في مثل هذا الوقت [23] أو لقوا بسببهم مثل ذلك والذين <يظنّون أنهم> يهمّون بالإحسان إليهم وأصدقاء أصدقائهم [24] والذين يحبّون من أحبّوه هم والذين هم محبوبون من المحبوبين عندهم والذين يعادون أو يبغضون [28v1] من يبغضونه هم والذين يبغضهم المبغضون منهم لهؤلاء جميعا يُرون أنّ الخيرات التى [2] لأولئك هي لهم أيضا فقد يهوون لذلك أن تكون الخيرات التى لهم لأصدقائهم كما هي لهم [3] أعني الذين كانوا يحسنون إليهم فى المال وأفعال الكرم ولذلك ما قد يكرمون الأسخياء [4] والشجعاء والأبرار أيضا فقد يُظنّ بهذه الصفة الذين ليس معاشهم من أصحابهم لكن [5] من الكدّ والكسب ثمّ من هؤلاء أيضا الذين معاشهم من الحرث وأشياء أخر يعملونها [6] لأنفسهم

. . . . . . . . .

Et facientes bene amant, aut ipsos aut de quibus curant, aut maxime, aut studiose, aut in hiis temporibus, et ipsorum causa, aut quos utique extimant velle facere bene. Et amicorum amicos et amantes quos ipsi amant. Et qui amantur ab hiis qui amantur ab ipsis. Et inimicos ipsis et odientes quos ipsi odiunt, et odiosos ab hiis qui odiunt ipsos; omnibus enim hiis hec bona videntur esse et ipsis, quare velle bona ipsis, quod est amici. Amplius bene effectivos ad pecunias et salutem; ideo liberales et viriles honorant et iustos; tales autem opinantur non viventes ab aliis; hii autem ab operari, et horum hii ab agricultura, et aliorum ipsimet operatores maxime.

Et eos qui fecerunt bene amant, aut ipis aut eis quos cordi habent, aut si magne aut prompte aut in talibus temporibus, et ipsorum gratia, et quoscumque putant velle bene facere. Et amicorum amicos et amantes quos ipsi diligunt. Et dilectos a dilectis sibi. Et eisdem inimicos et odientes quos ipsi odiunt, et eos qui habentur odio ab hiis qui odiuntur a se; omnibus enim hiis eadem bona videntur esse et sibi ipsis; quare velle que ipsis bona, quod quidem erat amici. Adhuc beneficos in pecunias et salutem; propter quod liberales et fortes honorant et iustos; tales autem putant non ab aliis viventes; tales autem qui ab operando, et horum qui ab agricultura, et aliorum qui ipsimet operantur maxime.

Again, we feel friendly to those who have treated us well, either ourselves or those we care for, whether on a large scale, or readily, or at some particular crisis; provided it was for our own sake. And also to those who we think wish to treat us well. And also to our friends’ friends, and to those who like, or are liked by, those whom we like ourselves. And also to those who are enemies to those whose enemies we are, and dislike, or are disliked by, those whom we dislike. For all such persons think the things good which we think good, so that they wish what is good for us; and this, as we saw, is what friends must do. And also to those who are willing to treat us well where money or our personal safety is concerned: and therefore we value those who are liberal, brave, or just. The just we consider to be those who do not live on others; which means those who work for their living, especially farmers and others who work with their own hands.

[2.4.10] (24) καὶ τοὺς σώφρονας, ὅτι οὐκ ἄδικοι. καὶ τοὺς ἀπράγμονας (25) διὰ τὸ αὐτό. [2.4.11] καὶ οἷς βουλόμεθα φίλοι εἶναι, ἂν φαίνωνται (26) βουλόμενοι· εἰσὶ δὲ τοιοῦτοι οἵ τ’ ἀγαθοὶ κατ’ ἀρετὴν καὶ οἱ (27) εὐδόκιμοι ἢ ἐν ἅπασιν ἢ ἐν τοῖς βελτίστοις ἢ ἐν τοῖς θαυ(28)μαζομένοις ὑφ’ αὑτῶν ἢ ἐν τοῖς θαυμάζουσιν αὐτούς.

فقد يُظنّ هؤلاء بزيادة أعفّاء غير ظلّامين ثمّ السليمة صدورهم من أجل هذه [7] العلّة أيضا والذين قد نهوى أن نصادقهم إن هم هووا ذلك وهؤلاء هم الخيار ذوو [8] الفضيلة ثمّ السعداء المنجحين إمّا في كل وإمّا في الفضائل أو في الّاتي قد يتعجّب منها [9] أو في الّاتي يتعجّب منهم فيها

. . . .

Et castos, quoniam non iniusti. Et inertes propter idem. Et quibus volumus amici esse, si videntur volentes; sunt autem tales boni secundum virtutem et bene experti aut in omnibus aut in optimis aut admirabilibus a se ipsis aut in admirantibus ipsos.

Et temperaios, quia non iniusti. Et eos qui sine negotiis propter idem. Et quibus volumus amici esse, si videantur volentes; sunt autem tales boni secundum virtutem et bene probati aut in omnibus aut in optimis aut in hiis que admirantur ab ipsis aut in quibus admirantur ipsos.

We also like temperate men, because they are not unjust to others; and, for the same reason, those who mind their own business. And also those whose friends we wish to be, if it is plain that they wish to be our friends: such are the morally good, and those well thought of by every one, by the best men, or by those whom we admire or who admire us.

[2.4.12] ἔτι (29) τοὺς ἡδεῖς συνδιαγαγεῖν καὶ συνδιημερεῦσαι· τοιοῦτοι δ’ (30) οἱ εὔκολοι καὶ μὴ ἐλεγκτικοὶ τῶν ἁμαρτανομένων καὶ μὴ (31) φιλόνικοι μηδὲ δυσέριδες (πάντες γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι μαχη(32)τικοί, οἱ δὲ μαχόμενοι τἀναντία φαίνονται βούλεσθαι), [2.4.13] καὶ (33) οἱ ἐπιδέξιοι καὶ τῷ τωθάσαι καὶ τῷ ὑπομεῖναι· ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ γὰρ (34) ἀμφοτέρως σπεύδουσι τῷ πλησίον, δυνάμενοί τε σκώπτεσθαι (35) καὶ ἐμμελῶς σκώπτοντες.

ثمّ جميع الطيّبين أو اللذيذة عشرتهم وملازمتهم النهار كلّه [10] فإنّ مثل هؤلاء سهلة أخلاقهم وليسوا بموبّخين على الخطأ والإساءة ولا يشغبون ولا [11] يتعسرون ولا يتحرّشون وجميع هؤلاء الذين هم بهذه الصفات صخّابون والصخّابون قد [12] يرون أضدادا وكذلك الذين يكونون متهيّئين للضرب والصبر فكلاهما [[L94]] يوجدان [13] مسارعين إلى هذا وإلى عذل القريب إذا أمكنهم أن يعذلوا وإذا كان العذل من جهة [14] الشفقة

. . . . . .

Amplius delectabiles simul ducere et dietare; huiusmodi autem bene leves et non eligibiles (reprehensores) peccantium et non seditiosi neque rixosi (omnes enim hii pugnaces, qui oppugnantur vero contraria videntur velle), et apti ad iniuriandum et patiendum (durare); ad hec enim utrique student propinquam, patentes autem iniuriari et studiose offenduntur.

Adhuc delectabiles simul conversari et per diem simul commorari; tales autem tractabiles et non arguitivi peccatorum et non litigiosi neque cervicosi (omnes enirn tales pugnaces, pugnaces autem contraria videntur velle), et ydonei deridere et sufferre; ad eadem enim student ambo e vicino, patentes irrideri et suaviter irridentes.

And also those with whom it is pleasant to live and spend our days: such are the good—tempered, and those who are not too ready to show us our mistakes, and those who are not cantankerous or quarrelsome — such people are always wanting to fight us, and those who fight us we feel wish for the opposite of what we wish for ourselves — and those who have the tact to make and take a joke; here both parties have the same object in view, when they can stand being made fun of as well as do it prettily themselves.

[2.4.14] καὶ τοὺς ἐπαινοῦντας τὰ ὑπ(36)άρχοντα ἀγαθά, καὶ τούτων μάλιστα ἃ φοβοῦνται μὴ ὑπ (1381b1) άρχειν αὐτοῖς. [2.4.15] καὶ τοὺς καθαρείους περὶ ὄψιν, περὶ ἀμπεχόνην, (2) περὶ ὅλον τὸν βίον. [2.4.16] καὶ τοὺς μὴ ὀνειδιστὰς μήτε τῶν ἁμαρ(3)τημάτων μήτε τῶν εὐεργετημάτων· ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἐλεγ(4)κτικοί. [2.4.17] καὶ τοὺς μὴ μνησικακοῦντας, μηδὲ φυλακτικοὺς τῶν (5) ἐγκλημάτων, ἀλλ’ εὐκαταλλάκτους· οἵους γὰρ ἂν ὑπολαμ(6)βάνωσιν εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ πρὸς αὑτοὺς οἴονται. [2.4.18] (7) καὶ τοὺς μὴ κακολόγους μηδὲ εἰδότας μήτε τὰ τῶν πλησίον (8) κακὰ μήτε τὰ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τἀγαθά· ὁ γὰρ ἀγαθὸς ταῦτα (9) δρᾷ. [2.4.19] καὶ τοὺς μὴ ἀντιτείνοντας τοῖς ὀργιζομένοις ἢ σπουδά(10)ζουσιν· μαχητικοὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι. καὶ τοὺς πρὸς αὐτοὺς (11) σπουδαίως πως ἔχοντας, οἷον θαυμάζοντας αὐτοὺς καὶ σπου(12)δαίους ὑπολαμβάνοντας καὶ χαίροντας αὐτοῖς, [2.4.20] καὶ ταῦτα (13) μάλιστα πεπονθότας περὶ ἃ μάλιστα βούλονται αὐτοὶ ἢ (14) θαυμάζεσθαι ἢ σπουδαῖοι δοκεῖν εἶναι ἢ ἡδεῖς. [2.4.21] καὶ τοὺς (15) ὁμοίους καὶ ταὐτὰ ἐπιτηδεύοντας, ἐὰν μὴ παρενοχλῶσι μηδ’ (16) ἀπὸ ταὐτοῦ ᾖ ὁ βίος· γίγνεται γὰρ οὕτω τὸ “κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ”. [2.4.22] (17) καὶ τοὺς τῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιθυμοῦντας, ὧν ἐνδέχεται ἅμα μετ(18)έχειν αὐτούς· εἰ δὲ μή, ταὐτὸ καὶ οὕτω συμβαίνει. [2.4.23] καὶ (19) πρὸς οὓς οὕτως ἔχουσιν ὥστε μὴ αἰσχύνεσθαι τὰ πρὸς (20) δόξαν, μὴ καταφρονοῦντες. καὶ πρὸς οὓς αἰσχύνονται τὰ (21) πρὸς ἀλήθειαν.

والذين يمدحونهم أيضا قد يرون أنّهم يشركونهم في الخيرات التي هي لهم [15] وعلى أنّهم قد يخافون في بعضها ألّا يكون لهم ثمّ الذين يرى لباسهم نظيفا طول أعمارهم [16] ثمّ الذين لا يعيّرون لا بالذنوب ولا بالعنايات فإنّ اللذين يفعلان ذلك جميعا موبّخان [17] والذين لا يصرّون علي الضغن ولا يقيمون على العذل واللحي لكنّهم يرضون سريعا فقد يظنّون [18] أنّهم كما هم لآخرين كذلك هم لهم أيضا والذين لا ينطقون بالشرّ ولا يعرفون شرور أقاربهم [19] ولا شرور أنفسهم لكنّ الخيرات لأنّهم أخيار وكذلك الذين لا يشغبون على الذين يغضبون <أو> [20] يجدّون فإنّ الذين هم على خلاف ذلك صخّابون ثم الذين هم لهم بهذه الحال ²⁴ أعني كالذين [21] يتعجّبون من أنفسهم ويظنّون بأنفسهم أنّهم أفاضل ثمّ الذين يفرحون بهم وبما هم لهم [22] ولا سيما إذا كانوا قد ألموا أو لقوا شيئا ثم الذين يهوون بزيادة أن يظنّوا عندهم [23] عجيبين أو متعجّبا منهم أو أفاضل أو لذيذين طيّبين أو الذين يبدعون الأمور التي هي بأعيانها [24] عندهم عجيبة إن لم يكونوا يتأذّون بهم أو يكون معاشهما ومكسبهما من ذلك الأمر [25] بعينه كالذي يكون بين الفاخراني والفاخراني ثم الذين يشتهون ما هم له مشتهون [29r1] أعني الأمر قد يمكن أن يشركوا فيه معا فإنّه إن لم يكن كذلك فقد يعرض حينئذ أيضا [2] [[L95]] عارض والذين هم عندهم لهذه الحال أعنى الذين لا يخزون عندهم من اللاتي هي للحمد أن تهاونوا بها والذين يخزون عندهم من الثقة الصادقة

24. بهذه الحال bi-hāḏihi ʾl-ḥāl = ὡσαύτως β Vet : σπουδαίως πως A

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Et laudantes existentia bona, et horum maxime que timent non esse ipsis. Et puros circa visum et circa vestitum et circa totam vitam. Et non iniuriosos vel improperantes neque peccata neque beneficia; utrique enim reprehensores. Et non malorum recordatores, neque conservatores delictorum, sed bene permutabiles; quales enim utique opinabuntur esse ad alios, et ad se ipsos opinantur. Et non maledicentes neque scientes neque vicinorum mala neque ipsorum, sed bona; bonus enim hoc agit. Et non contratendentibus iratis aut student; pugnaces enim tales. Et habentes ad se ipsos similiter, ut admirantes ipsos et studiosos extimantes et gaudentes ipsis, et hec maxime patientes circa que maxime volunt ipsi aut admirari aut studiosos videri esse aut delectabiles. Et similes et hec studentes, nisi impediantur neque ab ipso fuerit vita; fit autem sic ‘figulus figulo’. Et desiderantes se ipsos, que contingit simul ipsos participare; si vera non, idem et sic contingit. Et ad quos sic se habent quod non vereantur ea que sunt ad gloriam, non negligentes. Et ad quos verentur ea que sunt ad veritatem.

Et laudantes inexistentia bona, et horum maxime que timent non inesse sibi. Et mundos circa visum, circa vestitum, circa totam vitam. Et non exprobratores neque peccatorum neque beneficiorum; utrique enim arguitivi. Et non memorativos malorum, neque servativos impositionum, sed facile placabiles; quales enim utique existimaverint esse ad alios, et ad ipsos putant. Et non maliloquos neque scientes neque proximorum mala neque sua, sed bona; bonus enirn hoc agit. Et non contratendentes iratis neque studentibus; pugnaces enim qui tales. Et eos qui ad ipsos similiter habent, vel ut admirantes ipsos et studiosos existimantes et gaudentes ipsis, et hec maxirne passos circa que maxime ipsi volunt aut in admiratione esse aut studiosi videri esse aut delectabiles. Et similes et eadem exercentes, si non molestent neque ab eadem sit vita; fit enim ita ‘figulus figulo’. Et eadem desiderantes, que contingit simul participare ipsos; si autem non, idem sic accidit. Et ad quos ita se habent, ut non verecundentur ea que ad gloriam, non despicientes. Et ad quos verecundantur ea que ad veritatem.

And we also feel friendly towards those who praise such good qualities as we possess, and especially if they praise the good qualities that we are not too sure we do possess. And towards those who are cleanly in their person, their dress, and all their way of life. And towards those who do not reproach us with what we have done amiss to them or they have done to help us, for both actions show a tendency to criticize us. And towards those who do not nurse grudges or store up grievances, but are always ready to make friends again; for we take it that they will behave to us just as we find them behaving to every one else. And towards those who are not evil speakers and who are aware of neither their neighbours’ bad points nor our own, but of our good ones only, as a good man always will be. And towards those who do not try to thwart us when we are angry or in earnest, which would mean being ready to fight us. And towards those who have some serious feeling towards us, such as admiration for us, or belief in our goodness, or pleasure in our company; especially if they feel like this about qualities in us for which we especially wish to be admired, esteemed, or liked. And towards those who are like ourselves in character and occupation, provided they do not get in our way or gain their living from the same source as we do — for then it will be a case of ‘potter against potter’: Potter to potter and builder to builder begrudge their reward. And those who desire the same things as we desire, if it is possible for us both to share them together; otherwise the same trouble arises here too. And towards those with whom we are on such terms that, while we respect their opinions, we need not blush before them for doing what is conventionally wrong: as well as towards those before whom we should be ashamed to do anything really wrong.

[2.4.24] καὶ πρὸς οὓς φιλοτιμοῦνται, ἢ ὑφ’ ὧν (22) ζηλοῦσθαι βούλονται καὶ μὴ φθονεῖσθαι, τούτους ἢ φιλοῦσιν (23) ἢ βούλονται φίλοι εἶναι. [2.4.25] καὶ οἷς ἂν τἀγαθὰ συμπράττωσιν, (24) ἐὰν μὴ μέλλῃ αὐτοῖς ἔσεσθαι μείζω κακά. [2.4.26] καὶ οἳ ὁμοίως (25) καὶ τοὺς ἀπόντας καὶ τοὺς παρόντας φιλοῦσιν· διὸ καὶ τοὺς (26) περὶ τοὺς τεθνεῶτας τοιούτους πάντες φιλοῦσιν. καὶ ὅλως (27) τοὺς σφόδρα φιλοφίλους καὶ μὴ ἐγκαταλείποντας· μάλιστα (28) γὰρ φιλοῦσι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τοὺς φιλεῖν ἀγαθούς. [2.4.27] καὶ τοὺς μὴ (29) πλαττομένους πρὸς αὐτούς· τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ καὶ τὰ φαῦλα τὰ (30) ἑαυτῶν λέγοντες· εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι πρὸς τοὺς φίλους τὰ πρὸς (31) δόξαν οὐκ αἰσχυνόμεθα· εἰ οὖν ὁ αἰσχυνόμενος μὴ φιλεῖ, (32) ὁ μὴ αἰσχυνόμενος φιλοῦντι ἔοικεν.

والذين هم عندهم مكرّمون والذين يحبّون أن يحسدوهم ولا يغتالوا بهم ولا يحبّونهم أو يهوون أن يحبّونهم ويكونوا أصدقاءهم والذين يفعلون بهم الخيرات إن لم يكن يتبع ذلك شرّ هو أعظم أو أفظع والذين يحبّون الأباعد والأقارب بحال واحدة والذين توقّوا بالقرب ممّن هو بهذه الصفة فكل أحد يحبّهم والجملة الذين يودّون أصدقاءهم جدّا جدّا ولا يخذلونهم فإن الأصدقاء الخيار أحبّ إليهم من الخيار والذين ليس ودّهم بالترائي والتصنّع وكذلك الذين يُخبرونهم بمساوئهم فقد أنبأنا أنّهم عند الأصدقاء لا يخزون من اللاتي هنّ للحمد فالذي لا يخزي قد يودّ والذي يخزي لا يشبه الذي يودّ

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Et ad quos philotimi sunt, et a quibus zelari volunt et non invideri, has aut amant aut volunt amici esse. Et cum quibus bona operantur, si non debent ipsis esse maiora mala. Et similibus absentes et presentes amant; ideoque eos qui sunt circa mortuos tales omnes amant. Et universaliter valde philophilos et non derelinquentes; maxime autem diligunt bona diligere bonos. Et non perversos a bono ad se ipsos; huiusmodi autem et qui mala que sunt in eis dicentes; dictum est enim quoniam apud amicos ea que sunt ad gloriam non veremur; si igitur verecundus non amat, qui non verecundatur amanti assimulatur.

Et ad quos in amore honoris sunt, et a quibus zelari volunt et non invidiam pati, has aut amant aut volunt amici esse. Et cum quibus utique bona simul egerint, si non debeant ipsis fore mala maiora. Et hiis qui similiter et absentes et presentes diligunt; propter quod et eos qui circa mortuos sunt tales omnes diligunt. Et totaliter eos qui valde amatores amicorum et non derelinquentes; maxime enim amant bonorum amare bonos. Et non fictos ad se ipsos; tales autem et qui mala sua dicunt; dictum est enim quod ad amicos que ad gloriam non verecundamur; si igitur qui verecundatur non amat, qui non verecundatur amanti assimilatur.

Again, our rivals, and those whom we should like to envy us — though without ill—feeling — either we like these people or at least we wish them to like us. And we feel friendly towards those whom we help to secure good for themselves, provided we are not likely to suffer heavily by it ourselves. And those who feel as friendly to us when we are not with them as when we are — which is why all men feel friendly towards those who are faithful to their dead friends. And, speaking generally, towards those who are really fond of their friends and do not desert them in trouble; of all good men, we feel most friendly to those who show their goodness as friends. Also towards those who are honest with us, including those who will tell us of their own weak points: it has just been said that with our friends we are not ashamed of what is conventionally wrong, and if we do have this feeling, we do not love them; if therefore we do not have it, it looks as if we did love them.

καὶ τοὺς μὴ φοβερούς, (33) καὶ οὓς θαρροῦμεν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὃν φοβεῖται φιλεῖ. [2.4.28] (34) εἴδη δὲ φιλίας ἑταιρεία οἰκειότης συγγένεια καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα. [2.4.29] (35) ποιητικὰ δὲ φιλίας χάρις καὶ τὸ μὴ δεηθέντος ποιῆσαι καὶ (36) τὸ ποιήσαντα μὴ δηλῶσαι· αὐτοῦ γὰρ οὕτως ἕνεκα φαίνεται (37) καὶ οὐ διά τι ἕτερον.

والذين ليسوا مخوّفين والذين قد يثقون بهم أو يأمنونهم . فأمّا أنواع الصداقة فالصحبة والأنسة والوصلة ومهما كان من هذا النحو وأمّا فواعل الصداقة فالأيادي أو المنن وأن يفعل به حين لا يحتاج وإذا فعل لم يخبر وأن يستبين أنّه إنّما فعل من أجل ذاك لا من أجل شيء آخر

. لأنه ليس أحد يحبّ الذي يخافه . . .

Et non terribiles, et quibus confidimus; nullus, enim amat quem timet. Species autem amicitie clilectio et proprietas et cognatio et quot sunt talia. Effectiva autem amicitie gratia et facere non rogantis et non manifestare facientem; ipsius enim sic causa videtur et non per alium.

Et non timendos, et ad quos audemus; nullus enim quem timet amat. Species autem amici tie sodalitas et domesticitas et cognatio et quecumque talia. Factiva autem amicitie gratia et non requisitum facere et cum fecerit non rnanifestare; sic enim ipsius gratia videtur et non propter alterum.

We also like those with whom we do not feel frightened or uncomfortable — nobody can like a man of whom he feels frightened. Friendship has various forms—comradeship, intimacy, kinship, and so on. Things that cause friendship are: doing kindnesses; doing them unasked; and not proclaiming the fact when they are done, which shows that they were done for our own sake and not for some other reason.

[2.4.30] (1382a1) περὶ δ’ ἔχθρας καὶ τοῦ μισεῖν φανερὸν ὡς ἐκ τῶν ἐναν(2)τίων ἔστι θεωρεῖν. ποιητικὰ δὲ ἔχθρας ὀργή, ἐπηρεασμός, δια(3)βολή. [2.4.31] ὀργὴ μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς αὑτόν, ἔχθρα δὲ καὶ (4) ἄνευ τοῦ πρὸς αὑτόν· ἂν γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνωμεν εἶναι τοιόνδε, (5) μισοῦμεν. καὶ ἡ μὲν ὀργὴ ἀεὶ περὶ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα, οἷον Καλ(6)λίᾳ ἢ Σωκράτει, τὸ δὲ μῖσος καὶ πρὸς τὰ γένη· τὸν γὰρ κλέ(7)πτην μισεῖ καὶ τὸν συκοφάντην ἅπας. καὶ τὸ μὲν ἰατὸν (8) χρόνῳ, τὸ δ’ ἀνίατον. καὶ τὸ μὲν λύπης ἔφεσις, τὸ δὲ κακοῦ· (9) αἴσθεσθαι γὰρ βούλεται ὁ ὀργιζόμενος, τῷ δ’ οὐδὲν διαφέρει. (10) ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν λυπηρὰ αἰσθητὰ πάντα, τὰ δὲ μάλιστα κακὰ (11) ἥκιστα αἰσθητά, ἀδικία καὶ ἀφροσύνη· οὐδὲν γὰρ λυπεῖ ἡ (12) παρουσία τῆς κακίας. καὶ τὸ μὲν μετὰ λύπης, τὸ δ’ οὐ (13) μετὰ λύπης· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὀργιζόμενος λυπεῖται, ὁ δὲ μισῶν οὔ. (14) καὶ ὁ μὲν πολλῶν ἂν γενομένων ἐλεήσειεν, ὁ δ’ οὐδενός· ὁ μὲν (15) γὰρ ἀντιπαθεῖν βούλεται ᾧ ὀργίζεται, ὁ δὲ μὴ εἶναι.

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De inimicitia vera et odire palam quod ex contrariis oportet intueri. Effectiva enim inimicitie ira, temptatio, accusatio. Ira quidem igitur est ex hiis que sunt penes ipsum, inimicitia est et absque eis que sunt penes ipsum; si enim opinemur esse talem quidem, odimus. Et ira quidem semper est circa singularia, ut puta Calliam aut Socratem, odium autem et ad genera; furem enim et accusatorem odit unusquisque. Et hoc quidem curabile tempore, hoc vero incurabile. Et aut quidem tristari appetit aut ledendi potius; sentire autem vult qui irascitur, huic non differt. Sunt autem tristabilia quidem sensibilia omnia, maxime vera mala, minus vera sensitiva, iniustitia et insipientia; non enim contristatur presentia malitie. Et hoc quidem cum tristitia, hoc vera non cum tristitia; qui enim irascitur tristatur, odiens vera non. Et hic quidem utique multorum factorum miserebitur, hic vera nullius; hic quidem contrapati vult cui irascitur, hic vera non esse.

De inimicitia autem et odire manifestum qualiter ex contrariis oportet considerare. Factiva autem inimicitie ira, epireasmus, criminatio. Ira quidem igitur est ex hiis que ad se ipsum, inimicitia autem et sine hiis que ad se ipsum; si enim putemus esse talem, odimus. Et ira quidern semper circa singularia, puta Calliam aut Socratem, odium autem et ad genera; furem enim odit et calumpniatorem unusquisque. Et hoc quidem sanabile tempore, hoc autem insanabile. Et hoc quidem contristare appetit, hoc autem nocere magis; sentiri enim vult iratus, huic autem nichil differt. Sunt autem tristia quidem sensibilia omnia, que autem maxime mala minime sensibilia, iniustitia et imprudentia; nichil enim contristat presentia malitie. Et hoc quidem cum tristitia, hoc autem non cum tristitia; iratus quidetn eniin tristatur, odiens autem non. Et hic quidem multa si fiant miserebitur, hie autem pro nullo; hic quidem enim contra pati vult eum cui irascitur, hic autem non esse.

Enmity and Hatred should clearly be studied by reference to their opposites. Enmity may be produced by anger or spite or calumny. Now whereas anger arises from offences against oneself, enmity may arise even without that; we may hate people merely because of what we take to be their character. Anger is always concerned with individuals — a Callias or a Socrates — whereas hatred is directed also against classes: we all hate any thief and any informer. Moreover, anger can be cured by time; but hatred cannot. The one aims at giving pain to its object, the other at doing him harm; the angry man wants his victims to feel; the hater does not mind whether they feel or not. All painful things are felt; but the greatest evils, injustice and folly, are the least felt, since their presence causes no pain. And anger is accompanied by pain, hatred is not; the angry man feels pain, but the hater does not. Much may happen to make the angry man pity those who offend him, but the hater under no circumstances wishes to pity a man whom he has once hated: for the one would have the offenders suffer for what they have done; the other would have them cease to exist.

[2.4.32] (16) φανερὸν οὖν ἐν τούτων ὅτι ἐνδέχεται ἐχθροὺς καὶ φίλους (17) καὶ ὄντας ἀποδεικνύναι καὶ μὴ ὄντας ποιεῖν καὶ φάσκοντας (18) διαλύειν, καὶ δι’ ὀργὴν ἢ δι’ ἔχθραν ἀμφισβητοῦντας ἐφ’ ὁπο(19)τέραν ἂν προαιρῆταί τις ἄγειν.

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Manifestum enim ex hiis, quoniam contingit inimicos et amicos et existentes de1nonstrare et non existentes facere et dicentes dissolvere, et aut per odium aut iram altercantes utrum vult aliquis agere.

Manifestum igitur ex hiis quod contingit inimicos et amicos et existentes demonstrare et non existentes facere et dicentes dissolvere, aut propter iram aut propter inimicitiam vacillantes ad utrumcumque elegerit quis ducere.

It is plain from all this that we can prove people to be friends or enemies; if they are not, we can make them out to be so; if they claim to be so, we can refute their claim; and if it is disputed whether an action was due to anger or to hatred, we can attribute it to whichever of these we prefer.

5. (20) Ποῖα δὲ φοβοῦνται καὶ τίνας καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες, ὧδ’ ἔσται (21) φανερόν.

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Que autem timent et quos et qualiter se habentes, hie autem erit manifestum.

Qualia autem timent et quos et qualiter habentes, ita est manifestum.

Part 5. To turn next to Fear, what follows will show things and persons of which, and the states of mind in which, we feel afraid.

[2.5.1] ἔστω δὴ ὁ φόβος λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ ἐκ φαντασίας (22) μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ· οὐ γὰρ πάντα τὰ (23) κακὰ φοβοῦνται, οἷον εἰ ἔσται ἄδικος ἢ βραδύς, ἀλλ’ ὅσα (24) λύπας μεγάλας ἢ φθορὰς δύναται, καὶ ταῦτα ἐὰν μὴ πόρρω (25) ἀλλὰ σύνεγγυς φαίνηται ὥστε μέλλειν. τὰ γὰρ πόρρω σφόδρα (26) οὐ φοβοῦνται· ἴσασι γὰρ πάντες ὅτι ἀποθανοῦνται, ἀλλ’ ὅτι (27) οὐκ ἐγγύς, οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν.

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Sit utique timor tristitia quedam aut turbatio ex fantasia futuri mali aut corruptibilis aut tristabilis; non enim omnia mala timentur, ut puta si fuerit iniustus aut tardus, sed quecumque aut tristitias magnas aut corruptiones possunt, et hec si non fuerint longe, sed prope videntur sicut futura. . .

Sit itaque timor tristitia quedam vel turbatio ex fantasia futuri mali aut corruptivi aut contristativi; non enim omnia mala timentur, puta si erit iniustus aut tardus, sed quecumque aut tristitias magnas aut corruptiones possunt, et hec si non longe sed prope videantur ut in proximo futura. . .

Fear may be defined as a pain or disturbance due to a mental picture of some destructive or painful evil in the future. Of destructive or painful evils only; for there are some evils, e.g. wickedness or stupidity, the prospect of which does not frighten us: I mean only such as amount to great pains or losses. And even these only if they appear not remote but so near as to be imminent: we do not fear things that are a very long way off: for instance, we all know we shall die, but we are not troubled thereby, because death is not close at hand.

εἰ δὴ ὁ φόβος τοῦτ’ ἐστίν, (28) ἀνάγκη τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβερὰ εἶναι ὅσα φαίνεται δύναμιν ἔχειν (29) μεγάλην τοῦ φθείρειν ἢ βλάπτειν βλάβας εἰς λύπην μεγάλην (30) συντεινούσας· διὸ καὶ τὰ σημεῖα τῶν τοιούτων φοβερά· ἐγγὺς (31) γὰρ φαίνεται τὸ φοβερόν· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι κίνδυνος, φοβεροῦ (32) πλησιασμός.

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From this definition it will follow that fear is caused by whatever we feel has great power of destroying or of harming us in ways that tend to cause us great pain. Hence the very indications of such things are terrible, making us feel that the terrible thing itself is close at hand; the approach of what is terrible is just what we mean by ‘danger’.

(33) τοιαῦτα δὲ ἔχθρα τε καὶ ὀργὴ δυναμένων ποιεῖν (34) τι (δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι βούλονται τε καὶ δύνανται, ὥστε ἐγγύς εἰσιν (35) τοῦ ποιεῖν), καὶ ἀδικία δύναμιν ἔχουσα· τῷ προαιρεῖσθαι γὰρ ὁ (1382b1) ἄδικος ἄδικος.

. . . .

Such indications are the enmity and anger of people who have power to do something to us; for it is plain that they have the will to do it, and so they are on the point of doing it. Also injustice is in possession of power; for it is the unjust man’s will to do evil that makes him unjust.

καὶ ἀρετὴ ὑβριζομένη δύναμιν ἔχουσα (δῆλον (2) γὰρ ὅτι προαιρεῖται μὲν ὅταν ὑβρίζηται, ἀεί, δύναται δὲ νῦν), (3) καὶ φόβος τῶν δυναμένων τι ποιῆσαι· ἐν παρασκευῇ γὰρ ἀνάγκη (4) εἶναι καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον· ἐπεὶ δ’ οἱ πολλοὶ χείρους καὶ ἥττους τοῦ (5) κερδαίνειν καὶ δειλοὶ ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις, φοβερὸν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ (6) πολὺ τὸ ἐπ’ ἄλλῳ αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὥστε οἱ συνειδότες πεποιηκότι (7) τι δεινὸν φοβεροὶ ἢ κατειπεῖν ἢ ἐγκαταλιπεῖν.

. . . . . .

Also outraged virtue in possession of power; for it is plain that, when outraged, it always has the will to retaliate, and now it has the power to do so. Also fear felt by those who have the power to do something to us, since such persons are sure to be ready to do it. And since most men tend to be bad — slaves to greed, and cowards in danger — it is, as a rule, a terrible thing to be at another man’s mercy; and therefore, if we have done anything horrible, those in the secret terrify us with the thought that they may betray or desert us.

καὶ οἱ δυνάμενοι (8) ἀδικεῖν τοῖς δυναμένοις ἀδικεῖσθαι· ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ (9) ἀδικοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ὅταν δύνωνται. καὶ οἱ ἠδικημένοι ἢ (10) νομίζοντες ἀδικεῖσθαι· ἀεὶ γὰρ τηροῦσι καιρόν. καὶ οἱ ἠδικη(11)κότες, ἂν δύναμιν ἔχωσι, φοβεροί, δεδιότες τὸ ἀντιπαθεῖν· (12) ὑπέκειτο γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτο φοβερόν. καὶ οἱ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνταγω(13)νισταί, ὅσα μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἅμα ὑπάρχειν ἀμφοῖν· ἀεὶ γὰρ (14) πολεμοῦσι πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους.

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And those who can do us wrong are terrible to us when we are liable to be wronged; for as a rule men do wrong to others whenever they have the power to do it. And those who have been wronged, or believe themselves to be wronged, are terrible; for they are always looking out for their opportunity. Also those who have done people wrong, if they possess power, since they stand in fear of retaliation: we have already said that wickedness possessing power is terrible. Again, our rivals for a thing cause us fear when we cannot both have it at once; for we are always at war with such men.

καὶ οἱ τοῖς κρείττοσιν αὐτῶν (15) φοβεροί· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἂν δύναιντο βλάπτειν αὐτούς, εἰ καὶ τοὺς (16) κρείττους. καὶ οὓς φοβοῦνται οἱ κρείττους αὐτῶν, διὰ ταὐτό. (17) καὶ οἱ τοὺς κρείττους αὐτῶν ἀνῃρηκότες, καὶ οἱ τοῖς ἥττοσιν (18) αὐτῶν ἐπιτιθέμενοι· ἢ γὰρ ἤδη φοβεροὶ ἢ αὐξηθέντες. καὶ (19) τῶν ἠδικημένων καὶ ἐχθρῶν ἢ ἀντιπάλων οὐχ οἱ ὀξύθυμοι καὶ (20) παρρησιαστικοί, ἀλλὰ οἱ πρᾶοι καὶ εἴρωνες καὶ πανοῦργοι· (21) ἄδηλοι γὰρ εἰ ἐγγύς, ὥστε οὐδέποτε φανεροὶ ὅτι πόρρω. πάντα (22) δὲ τὰ φοβερὰ φοβερώτερα ὅσα ἁμαρτάνουσιν ἐπανορθώσασθαι (23) μὴ ἐνδέχεται, ἀλλ’ ἢ ὅλως ἀδύνατα, ἢ μὴ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ (24) τοῖς ἐναντίοις. καὶ ὧν βοήθειαι μή εἰσιν ἢ μὴ ῥᾴδιαι.

. . . . . . . . . . .

We also fear those who are to be feared by stronger people than ourselves: if they can hurt those stronger people, still more can they hurt us; and, for the same reason, we fear those whom those stronger people are actually afraid of. Also those who have destroyed people stronger than we are. Also those who are attacking people weaker than we are: either they are already formidable, or they will be so when they have thus grown stronger. Of those we have wronged, and of our enemies or rivals, it is not the passionate and outspoken whom we have to fear, but the quiet, dissembling, unscrupulous; since we never know when they are upon us, we can never be sure they are at a safe distance. All terrible things are more terrible if they give us no chance of retrieving a blunder, either no chance at all, or only one that depends on our enemies and not ourselves. Those things are also worse which we cannot, or cannot easily, help.

ὡς δ’ (25) ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, φοβερά ἐστιν ὅσα ἐφ’ ἑτέρων γιγνόμενα ἢ μέλ(26)λοντα ἐλεεινά ἐστιν. (27) τὰ μὲν οὖν φοβερὰ καὶ ἃ φοβοῦνται σχεδὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν τὰ (28) μέγιστα ταῦτ’ ἐστίν, ὡς δὲ διακείμενοι αὐτοὶ φοβοῦνται, νῦν (29) λέγωμεν. εἰ δή ἐστιν ὁ φόβος μετὰ προσδοκίας τινὸς τοῦ πεί(30)σεσθαί τι φθαρτικὸν πάθος, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδεὶς φοβεῖται τῶν (31) οἰομένων μηδὲν ἂν παθεῖν, οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἃ μὴ οἴονται <ἂν> παθεῖν (32) οὐδὲ τούτους ὑφ’ ὧν μὴ οἴονται, οὐδὲ τότε ὅτε μὴ οἴονται. (33) ἀνάγκη τοίνυν φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς οἰομένους τι παθεῖν ἄν, καὶ (34) τοὺς ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ ταῦτα καὶ τότε. οὐκ οἴονται δὲ παθεῖν (1383a1) ἂν οὔτε οἱ ἐν εὐτυχίαις μεγάλαις ὄντες καὶ δοκοῦντες (διὸ (2) ὑβρισταὶ καὶ ὀλίγωροι καὶ θρασεῖς, ποιεῖ δὲ τοιούτους πλοῦ(3)τος ἰσχὺς πολυφιλία δύναμις), οὔτε οἱ ἤδη πεπονθέναι πάντα (4) νομίζοντες τὰ δεινὰ καὶ ἀπεψυγμένοι πρὸς τὸ μέλλον, ὥσπερ (5) οἱ ἀποτυμπανιζόμενοι ἤδη· ἀλλὰ δεῖ τινα ἐλπίδα ὑπεῖναι (6) σωτηρίας, περὶ οὗ ἀγωνιῶσιν. σημεῖον δέ· ὁ γὰρ φόβος (7) βουλευτικοὺς ποιεῖ, καίτοι οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν ἀνελ(8)πίστων· ὥστε δεῖ τοιούτους παρασκευάζειν, ὅταν ᾖ βέλτιον (9) τὸ φοβεῖσθαι αὐτούς, ὅτι τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν οἷον παθεῖν (καὶ γὰρ (10) ἄλλοι μείζους ἔπαθον), καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους δεικνύναι πάσχον(11)τας ἢ πεπονθότας, καὶ ὑπὸ τοιούτων ὑφ’ ὧν οὐκ ᾤοντο, καὶ (12) ταῦτα <ἃ> καὶ τότε ὅτε οὐκ ᾤοντο.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Speaking generally, anything causes us to feel fear that when it happens to, or threatens, others cause us to feel pity. The above are, roughly, the chief things that are terrible and are feared. Let us now describe the conditions under which we ourselves feel fear. If fear is associated with the expectation that something destructive will happen to us, plainly nobody will be afraid who believes nothing can happen to him; we shall not fear things that we believe cannot happen to us, nor people who we believe cannot inflict them upon us; nor shall we be afraid at times when we think ourselves safe from them. It follows therefore that fear is felt by those who believe something to be likely to happen to them, at the hands of particular persons, in a particular form, and at a particular time. People do not believe this when they are, or think they a are, in the midst of great prosperity, and are in consequence insolent, contemptuous, and reckless — the kind of character produced by wealth, physical strength, abundance of friends, power: nor yet when they feel they have experienced every kind of horror already and have grown callous about the future, like men who are being flogged and are already nearly dead — if they are to feel the anguish of uncertainty, there must be some faint expectation of escape. This appears from the fact that fear sets us thinking what can be done, which of course nobody does when things are hopeless. Consequently, when it is advisable that the audience should be frightened, the orator must make them feel that they really are in danger of something, pointing out that it has happened to others who were stronger than they are, and is happening, or has happened, to people like themselves, at the hands of unexpected people, in an unexpected form, and at an unexpected time.

(13) ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ φόβου φανερὸν τί ἐστιν, καὶ τῶν φοβερῶν, (14) καὶ ὡς ἕκαστοι ἔχοντες δεδίασι, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων καὶ τὸ (15) θαρρεῖν τί ἐστι, καὶ περὶ ποῖα θαρραλέοι εἰσὶ καὶ πῶς διακεί(16)μενοι θαρραλέοι εἰσίν· τό τε γὰρ θάρσος τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ (17) <φόβῳ, καὶ τὸ θαρραλέον τῷ> φοβερῷ, ὥστε μετὰ φαντασίας ἡ (18) ἐλπὶς τῶν σωτηρίων ὡς ἐγγὺς ὄντων, τῶν δὲ φοβερῶν <ὡς> ἢ (19) μὴ ὄντων ἢ πόρρω ὄντων. ἔστι δὲ θαρραλέα τά τε δεινὰ πόρρω (20) ὄντα καὶ τὰ σωτήρια ἐγγύς, καὶ ἐπανορθώσεις ἂν ὦσι καὶ βοή(21)θειαι πολλαὶ ἢ μεγάλαι ἢ ἄμφω, καὶ μήτε ἠδικημένοι μήτε (22) ἠδικηκότες ὦσιν, ἀνταγωνισταί τε ἢ μὴ ὦσιν ὅλως, ἢ μὴ (23) ἔχωσιν δύναμιν, ἢ δύναμιν ἔχοντες ὦσι φίλοι ἢ πεποιηκότες (24) εὖ ἢ πεπονθότες, ἢ ἂν πλείους ὦσιν οἷς ταὐτὰ συμφέρει, (25) ἢ κρείττους, ἢ ἄμφω.

. . . . . . . . . . .

Having now seen the nature of fear, and of the things that cause it, and the various states of mind in which it is felt, we can also see what Confidence is, about what things we feel it, and under what conditions. It is the opposite of fear, and what causes it is the opposite of what causes fear; it is, therefore, the expectation associated with a mental picture of the nearness of what keeps us safe and the absence or remoteness of what is terrible: it may be due either to the near presence of what inspires confidence or to the absence of what causes alarm. We feel it if we can take steps — many, or important, or both — to cure or prevent trouble; if we have neither wronged others nor been wronged by them; if we have either no rivals at all or no strong ones; if our rivals who are strong are our friends or have treated us well or been treated well by us; or if those whose interest is the same as ours are the more numerous party, or the stronger, or both.

(25) αὐτοὶ δ’ οὕτως ἔχοντες θαρραλέοι (26) εἰσίν, ἂν πολλὰ κατωρθωκέναι οἴωνται καὶ μὴ πεπονθέναι, ἢ (27) ἐὰν πολλάκις ἐληλυθότες εἰς τὰ δεινὰ καὶ διαπεφευγότες (28) ὦσι· διχῶς γὰρ ἀπαθεῖς γίγνονται οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἢ τῷ μὴ (29) πεπειρᾶσθαι ἢ τῷ βοηθείας ἔχειν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ (30) θάλατταν κινδύνοις οἵ τε ἄπειροι χειμῶνος θαρροῦσι τὰ (31) μέλλοντα καὶ οἱ βοηθείας ἔχοντες διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν.

. . . . .

As for our own state of mind, we feel confidence if we believe we have often succeeded and never suffered reverses, or have often met danger and escaped it safely. For there are two reasons why human beings face danger calmly: they may have no experience of it, or they may have means to deal with it: thus when in danger at sea people may feel confident about what will happen either because they have no experience of bad weather, or because their experience gives them the means of dealing with it.

καὶ (32) ὅταν τοῖς ὁμοίοις φοβερὸν μὴ ᾖ, μηδὲ τοῖς ἥττοσι καὶ ὧν (33) κρείττους οἴονται εἶναι· οἴονται δὲ ὧν κεκρατήκασιν ἢ αὐτῶν (34) ἢ τῶν κρειττόνων ἢ τῶν ὁμοίων. καὶ ἂν ὑπάρχειν αὑτοῖς (35) οἴωνται πλείω καὶ μείζω, οἷς ὑπερέχοντες φοβεροί εἰσιν· (1383b1) ταῦτα δέ ἐστι πλῆθος χρημάτων καὶ ἰσχὺς σωμάτων καὶ (2) φίλων καὶ χώρας καὶ τῶν πρὸς πόλεμον παρασκευῶν, ἢ πασῶν (3) ἢ τῶν μεγίστων. καὶ ἐὰν μὴ ἠδικηκότες ὦσιν μηδένα ἢ μὴ (4) πολλοὺς ἢ μὴ τούτους παρ’ ὧν φοβοῦνται, καὶ ὅλως ἂν τὰ πρὸς (5) τοὺς θεοὺς αὐτοῖς καλῶς ἔχῃ, τά τε ἄλλα καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ σημείων (6) καὶ λογίων· θαρραλέον γὰρ ἡ ὀργή, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀδικεῖν ἀλλ’ ἀδι(7)κεῖσθαι ὀργῆς ποιητικόν, τὸ δὲ θεῖον ὑπολαμβάνεται βοηθεῖν (8) τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις.

. . . . . . . . . .

We also feel confident whenever there is nothing to terrify other people like ourselves, or people weaker than ourselves, or people than whom we believe ourselves to be stronger — and we believe this if we have conquered them, or conquered others who are as strong as they are, or stronger. Also if we believe ourselves superior to our rivals in the number and importance of the advantages that make men formidable — wealth, physical strength, strong bodies of supporters, extensive territory, and the possession of all, or the most important, appliances of war. Also if we have wronged no one, or not many, or not those of whom we are afraid; and generally, if our relations with the gods are satisfactory, as will be shown especially by signs and oracles. The fact is that anger makes us confident — that anger is excited by our knowledge that we are not the wrongers but the wronged, and that the divine power is always supposed to be on the side of the wronged.

καὶ ὅταν ἐπιχειροῦντες ἢ μηδὲν ἂν παθεῖν (9) [μηδὲ πείσεσθαι] ἢ κατορθώσειν οἴωνται.

.

Also when, at the outset of an enterprise, we believe that we cannot and shall not fail, or that we shall succeed completely.

καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν (10) φοβερῶν καὶ θαρραλέων εἴρηται.

.

— So much for the causes of fear and confidence.

6. (11) Ποῖα δ’ αἰσχύνονται καὶ ἀναισχυντοῦσιν, καὶ πρὸς τίνας (12) καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον.

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Part 6. We now turn to Shame and Shamelessness; what follows will explain the things that cause these feelings, and the persons before whom, and the states of mind under which, they are felt.

ἔστω δὴ αἰσχύνη λύπη (13) τις ἢ ταραχὴ περὶ τὰ εἰς ἀδοξίαν φαινόμενα φέρειν τῶν (14) κακῶν, ἢ παρόντων ἢ γεγονότων ἢ μελλόντων, ἡ δ’ ἀναισχυν(15)τία ὀλιγωρία τις καὶ ἀπάθεια περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα. εἰ δή (16) ἐστιν αἰσχύνη ἡ ὁρισθεῖσα, ἀνάγκη αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς (17) τοιούτοις τῶν κακῶν ὅσα αἰσχρὰ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ ὧν (18) φροντίζει· τοιαῦτα δ’ ἐστὶν ὅσα ἀπὸ κακίας ἔργα ἐστίν, οἷον (19) τὸ ἀποβαλεῖν ἀσπίδα ἢ φυγεῖν· ἀπὸ δειλίας γάρ.

. . . . .

Shame may be defined as pain or disturbance in regard to bad things, whether present, past, or future, which seem likely to involve us in discredit; and shamelessness as contempt or indifference in regard to these same bad things. If this definition be granted, it follows that we feel shame at such bad things as we think are disgraceful to ourselves or to those we care for. These evils are, in the first place, those due to moral badness. Such are throwing away one’s shield or taking to flight; for these bad things are due to cowardice.

καὶ τὸ (20) ἀποστερῆσαι παρακαταθήκην [ἢ ἀδικῆσαι]· ἀπὸ ἀδικίας γάρ.

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Also, withholding a deposit or otherwise wronging people about money; for these acts are due to injustice.

(21) καὶ τὸ συγγενέσθαι αἷς οὐ δεῖ ἢ οὗ οὐ δεῖ ἢ ὅτε οὐ δεῖ· ἀπὸ (22) ἀκολασίας γάρ.

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Also, having carnal intercourse with forbidden persons, at wrong times, or in wrong places; for these things are due to licentiousness.

καὶ τὸ κερδαίνειν ἀπὸ μικρῶν ἢ αἰσχρῶν ἢ (23) ἀπὸ ἀδυνάτων, οἷον πενήτων ἢ τεθνεώτων, ὅθεν καὶ ἡ (24) παροιμία τὸ ἀπὸ νεκροῦ φέρειν· ἀπὸ αἰσχροκερδείας γὰρ καὶ (25) ἀνελευθερίας.

. . .

Also, making profit in petty or disgraceful ways, or out of helpless persons, e.g. the poor, or the dead — whence the proverb ‘He would pick a corpse’s pocket’; for all this is due to low greed and meanness.

καὶ τὸ μὴ βοηθεῖν, δυνάμενον, εἰς χρήματα, ἢ (26) ἧττον βοηθεῖν. καὶ τὸ βοηθεῖσθαι παρὰ τῶν ἧττον εὐπόρων, (27) καὶ δανείζεσθαι ὅτε δόξει αἰτεῖν, καὶ αἰτεῖν ὅτε ἀπαιτεῖν, (28) καὶ ἀπαιτεῖν ὅτε αἰτεῖν, καὶ ἐπαινεῖν ἃ δόξει αἰτεῖν, καὶ τὸ (29) ἀποτετυχηκότα μηδὲν ἧττον· πάντα γὰρ ἀνελευθερίας ταῦτα (30) σημεῖα,

. . . . . . . .

Also, in money matters, giving less help than you might, or none at all, or accepting help from those worse off than yourself; so also borrowing when it will seem like begging; begging when it will seem like asking the return of a favour; asking such a return when it will seem like begging; praising a man in order that it may seem like begging; and going on begging in spite of failure: all such actions are tokens of meanness.

τὸ δ’ ἐπαινεῖν παρόντας κολακείας, καὶ τὸ τἀγαθὰ (31) μὲν ὑπερεπαινεῖν τὰ δὲ φαῦλα συναλείφειν, καὶ τὸ ὑπεραλγεῖν (32) ἀλγοῦντι παρόντα, καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ὅσα τοιαῦτα· κολακείας (33) γὰρ σημεῖα.

. . . .

Also, praising people to their face, and praising extravagantly a man’s good points and glozing over his weaknesses, and showing extravagant sympathy with his grief when you are in his presence, and all that sort of thing; all this shows the disposition of a flatterer.

καὶ τὸ μὴ ὑπομένειν πόνους οὓς οἱ πρεσβύτεροι (1384a1) ἢ τρυφῶντες ἢ ἐν ἐξουσίᾳ μᾶλλον ὄντες ἢ ὅλως οἱ ἀδυνατώ(2)τεροι· πάντα γὰρ μαλακίας σημεῖα.

. .

Also, refusing to endure hardships that are endured by people who are older, more delicately brought up, of higher rank, or generally less capable of endurance than ourselves: for all this shows effeminacy.

καὶ τὸ ὑφ’ ἑτέρου εὖ (3) πάσχειν, καὶ τὸ πολλάκις, καὶ ὃ εὖ ἐποίησεν ὀνειδίζειν· (4) μικροψυχίας γὰρ πάντα καὶ ταπεινότητος σημεῖα.

. .

Also, accepting benefits, especially accepting them often, from another man, and then abusing him for conferring them: all this shows a mean, ignoble disposition.

καὶ τὸ (5) περὶ αὑτοῦ πάντα λέγειν καὶ ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι, καὶ τὸ τἀλλότρια (6) αὑτοῦ φάσκειν· ἀλαζονείας γάρ.

. .

Also, talking incessantly about yourself, making loud professions, and appropriating the merits of others; for this is due to boastfulness.

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν (7) ἄλλων ἑκάστης τῶν τοῦ ἤθους κακιῶν τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὰ σημεῖα (8) καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· αἰσχρὰ γὰρ καὶ ἀναίσχυντα.

. .

The same is true of the actions due to any of the other forms of badness of moral character, of the tokens of such badness, &c.: they are all disgraceful and shameless.

καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸ τῶν (9) καλῶν ὧν πάντες μετέχουσιν, ἢ οἱ ὅμοιοι πάντες ἢ οἱ πλεῖστοι, (10) μὴ μετέχειν —ὁμοίους δὲ λέγω ὁμοεθνεῖς, πολίτας, ἡλικιώ(11)τας, συγγενεῖς, ὅλως τοὺς ἐξ ἴσου— αἰσχρὸν γὰρ ἤδη τὸ μὴ (12) μετέχειν οἷον παιδεύσεως ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως. (13) πάντα δὲ ταῦτα μᾶλλον, ἂν δι’ ἑαυτὸν φαίνηται· οὕτω γὰρ (14) ἤδη ἀπὸ κακίας μᾶλλον, ἂν αὐτὸς ᾖ αἴτιος τῶν ὑπαρξάντων (15) ἢ ὑπαρχόντων ἢ μελλόντων.

. . . . .

Another sort of bad thing at which we feel shame is, lacking a share in the honourable things shared by every one else, or by all or nearly all who are like ourselves. By ‘those like ourselves’ I mean those of our own race or country or age or family, and generally those who are on our own level. Once we are on a level with others, it is a disgrace to be, say, less well educated than they are; and so with other advantages: all the more so, in each case, if it is seen to be our own fault: wherever we are ourselves to blame for our present, past, or future circumstances, it follows at once that this is to a greater extent due to our moral badness.

πάσχοντες δὲ ἢ πεπονθότες (16) ἢ πεισόμενοι τὰ τοιαῦτα αἰσχύνονται ὅσα εἰς ἀτιμίαν φέρει (17) καὶ ὀνείδη· ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶ τὰ εἰς ὑπηρετήσεις ἢ σώματος ἢ (18) ἔργων αἰσχρῶν, ὧν ἐστιν τὸ ὑβρίζεσθαι.

. .

We are moreover ashamed of having done to us, having had done, or being about to have done to us acts that involve us in dishonour and reproach; as when we surrender our persons, or lend ourselves to vile deeds, e.g. when we submit to outrage.

καὶ τὰ μὲν εἰς ἀκολα(19)σίαν καὶ ἑκόντα καὶ ἄκοντα, τὰ δ’ εἰς βίαν ἄκοντα· ἀπὸ (20) ἀνανδρίας γὰρ ἢ δειλίας ἡ ὑπομονὴ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀμύνεσθαι.

. .

And acts of yielding to the lust of others are shameful whether willing or unwilling (yielding to force being an instance of unwillingness), since unresisting submission to them is due to unmanliness or cowardice.

(21) ἃ μὲν οὖν αἰσχύνονται, ταῦτ’ ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἐπεὶ (22) δὲ περὶ ἀδοξίας φαντασία ἐστὶν ἡ αἰσχύνη, καὶ ταύτης (23) αὐτῆς χάριν ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων, οὐδεὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης (24) φροντίζει ἀλλ’ ἢ διὰ τοὺς δοξάζοντας, ἀνάγκη τούτους (25) αἰσχύνεσθαι ὧν λόγον ἔχει· λόγον δὲ ἔχει τῶν θαυμαζόντων, (26) καὶ οὓς θαυμάζει, καὶ ὑφ’ ὧν βούλεται θαυμάζεσθαι, καὶ (27) πρὸς οὓς φιλοτιμεῖται, καὶ ὧν μὴ καταφρονεῖ τῆς δόξης· (28) θαυμάζεσθαι μὲν οὖν βούλονται ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ θαυμάζουσι (29) τούτους ὅσοι τι ἔχουσιν ἀγαθὸν τῶν τιμίων, ἢ παρ’ ὧν τυγχά(30)νουσιν δεόμενοι σφόδρα τινὸς ὧν ἐκεῖνοι κύριοι, οἷον οἱ (31) ἐρῶντες· φιλοτιμοῦνται δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ὁμοίους· φροντίζουσι δ’ (32) ὡς ἀληθευόντων τῶν φρονίμων, τοιοῦτοι δ’ οἵ τε πρεσβύτεροι (33) καὶ οἱ πεπαιδευμένοι.

. . . . . . .

These things, and others like them, are what cause the feeling of shame. Now since shame is a mental picture of disgrace, in which we shrink from the disgrace itself and not from its consequences, and we only care what opinion is held of us because of the people who form that opinion, it follows that the people before whom we feel shame are those whose opinion of us matters to us. Such persons are: those who admire us, those whom we admire, those by whom we wish to be admired, those with whom we are competing, and those whose opinion of us we respect. We admire those, and wish those to admire us, who possess any good thing that is highly esteemed; or from whom we are very anxious to get something that they are able to give us — as a lover feels. We compete with our equals. We respect, as true, the views of sensible people, such as our elders and those who have been well educated.

καὶ τὰ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς καὶ τὰ ἐν φανερῷ (34) μᾶλλον (ὅθεν καὶ ἡ παροιμία τὸ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶναι αἰδῶ)· διὰ (35) τοῦτο τοὺς ἀεὶ παρεσομένους μᾶλλον αἰσχύνονται καὶ τοὺς (1384b1) προσέχοντας αὐτοῖς, διὰ τὸ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς ἀμφότερα.

. . .

And we feel more shame about a thing if it is done openly, before all men’s eyes. Hence the proverb, ‘shame dwells in the eyes’. For this reason we feel most shame before those who will always be with us and those who notice what we do, since in both cases eyes are upon us.

καὶ τοὺς (2) μὴ περὶ ταὐτὰ ἐνόχους· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τἀναντία δοκεῖ τούτοις.

. .

We also feel it before those not open to the same imputation as ourselves: for it is plain that their opinions about it are the opposite of ours.

(3) καὶ τοὺς μὴ συγγνωμονικοὺς τοῖς φαινομένοις ἁμαρτάνειν· ἃ (4) γάρ τις αὐτὸς ποιεῖ, ταῦτα λέγεται τοῖς πέλας οὐ νεμεσᾶν, (5) ὥστε ἃ μὴ ποιεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι νεμεσᾷ.

. . .

Also before those who are hard on any one whose conduct they think wrong; for what a man does himself, he is said not to resent when his neighbours do it: so that of course he does resent their doing what he does not do himself.

καὶ τοὺς ἐξαγγελτικοὺς (6) πολλοῖς· οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει μὴ δοκεῖν ἢ μὴ ἐξαγγέλλειν· (7) ἐξαγγελτικοὶ δὲ οἵ τε ἠδικημένοι, διὰ τὸ παρατηρεῖν, καὶ οἱ (8) κακολόγοι· εἴπερ γὰρ καὶ τοὺς μὴ ἁμαρτάνοντας, ἔτι μᾶλλον (9) τοὺς ἁμαρτάνοντας.

. . . .

And before those who are likely to tell everybody about you; not telling others is as good as not be lieving you wrong. People are likely to tell others about you if you have wronged them, since they are on the look out to harm you; or if they speak evil of everybody, for those who attack the innocent will be still more ready to attack the guilty.

καὶ οἷς ἡ διατριβὴ ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν πέλας (10) ἁμαρτίαις, οἷον χλευασταῖς καὶ κωμῳδοποιοῖς· κακολόγοι γάρ (11) πως οὗτοι καὶ ἐξαγγελτικοί.

. . .

And before those whose main occupation is with their neighbours’ failings — people like satirists and writers of comedy; these are really a kind of evil—speakers and tell—tales.

καὶ ἐν οἷς μηδὲν ἀποτετυχή(12)κασιν· ὥσπερ γὰρ θαυμαζόμενοι διάκεινται· διὸ καὶ τοὺς (13) πρῶτον δεηθέντας τι αἰσχύνονται ὡς οὐδέν πω ἠδοξηκότες (14) ἐν αὐτοῖς· τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ ἄρτι βουλόμενοι φίλοι εἶναι (τὰ γὰρ (15) βέλτιστα τεθέανται· διὸ εὖ ἔχει ἡ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου ἀπόκρισις (16) πρὸς τοὺς Συρακοσίους), καὶ τῶν πάλαι γνωρίμων οἱ μηδὲν (17) συνειδότες.

. . . . . .

And before those who have never yet known us come to grief, since their attitude to us has amounted to admiration so far: that is why we feel ashamed to refuse those a favour who ask one for the first time — we have not as yet lost credit with them. Such are those who are just beginning to wish to be our friends; for they have seen our best side only (hence the appropriateness of Euripides’ reply to the Syracusans): and such also are those among our old acquaintances who know nothing to our discredit.

αἰσχύνονται δὲ οὐ μόνον αὐτὰ τὰ ῥηθέντα (18) αἰσχυντηλὰ ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ σημεῖα, οἷον οὐ μόνον ἀφροδισιά(19)ζοντες ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ σημεῖα αὐτοῦ, καὶ οὐ μόνον ποιοῦντες (20) τὰ αἰσχρά, ἀλλὰ καὶ λέγοντες.

. . .

And we are ashamed not merely of the actual shameful conduct mentioned, but also of the evidences of it: not merely, for example, of actual sexual intercourse, but also of its evidences; and not merely of disgraceful acts but also of disgraceful talk.

ὁμοίως δὲ οὐ τοὺς εἰρημένους (21) μόνον αἰσχύνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς δηλώσοντας αὐτοῖς, οἷον (22) θεράποντας καὶ φίλους τούτων.

.

Similarly we feel shame not merely in presence of the persons mentioned but also of those who will tell them what we have done, such as their servants or friends.

ὅλως δὲ οὐκ αἰσχύνονται (23) οὔθ’ ὧν πολὺ καταφρονοῦσι τῆς δόξης τοῦ ἀληθεύειν (οὐδεὶς (24) γὰρ παιδία καὶ θηρία αἰσχύνεται), οὔτε ταὐτὰ τοὺς γνωρίμους (25) καὶ τοὺς ἀγνῶτας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν γνωρίμους τὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν (26) δοκοῦντα τοὺς δ’ ἄπωθεν τὰ πρὸς τὸν νόμον.

. . . .

And, generally, we feel no shame before those upon whose opinions we quite look down as untrustworthy (no one feels shame before small children or animals); nor are we ashamed of the same things before intimates as before strangers, but before the former of what seem genuine faults, before the latter of what seem conventional ones.

(27) αὐτοὶ δὲ ὧδε διακείμενοι αἰσχυνθεῖεν ἄν, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ (28) ὑπάρχοιεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἔχοντες οὕτως τινὲς οἵους ἔφαμεν (29) εἶναι οὓς αἰσχύνονται.

.

The conditions under which we shall feel shame are these: first, having people related to us like those before whom, as has been said, we feel shame.

ἦσαν δ’ οὗτοι ἢ <οἱ> θαυμαζόμενοι ἢ (30) θαυμάζοντες ἢ ὑφ’ ὧν βούλονται θαυμάζεσθαι, ἢ ὧν δέονταί (31) τινα χρείαν ἧς μὴ τεύξονται ἄδοξοι ὄντες, καὶ οὗτοι ἢ (32) ὁρῶντες (ὥσπερ Κυδίας περὶ τῆς Σάμου κληρουχίας ἐδημηγό(33)ρησεν· ἠξίου γὰρ ὑπολαβεῖν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους περιεστάναι (34) κύκλῳ τοὺς Ἕλληνας, ὡς ὁρῶντας καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀκουσομένους (35) ἃ ἂν ψηφίσωνται), ἢ ἂν πλησίον ὦσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἢ μέλλωσιν (36) αἰσθήσεσθαι· διὸ καὶ ὁρᾶσθαι ἀτυχοῦντες ὑπὸ τῶν ζηλούντων (1385a1) ποτὲ οὐ βούλονται· θαυμασταὶ γὰρ οἱ ζηλωταί.

. . . . . . . . . .

These are, as was stated, persons whom we admire, or who admire us, or by whom we wish to be admired, or from whom we desire some service that we shall not obtain if we forfeit their good opinion. These persons may be actually looking on (as Cydias represented them in his speech on land assignments in Samos, when he told the Athenians to imagine the Greeks to be standing all around them, actually seeing the way they voted and not merely going to hear about it afterwards): or again they may be near at hand, or may be likely to find out about what we do. This is why in misfortune we do not wish to be seen by those who once wished themselves like us; for such a feeling implies admiration.

καὶ ὅταν (2) ἔχωσιν ἃ καταισχύνουσιν ἔργα καὶ πράγματα ἢ αὑτῶν ἢ προ(3)γόνων ἢ ἄλλων τινῶν πρὸς οὓς ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς ἀγχιστεία τις.

.

And men feel shame when they have acts or exploits to their credit on which they are bringing dishonour, whether these are their own, or those of their ancestors, or those of other persons with whom they have some close connexion.

(4) καὶ ὅλως ὑπὲρ ὧν αἰσχύνονται αὐτοί· εἰσὶ δ’ οὗτοι οἱ εἰρημέ(5)νοι καὶ οἱ εἰς αὐτοὺς ἀναφερόμενοι, ἢ ὧν διδάσκαλοι ἢ (6) σύμβουλοι γεγόνασιν, ἢ ἐὰν ὦσιν ἕτεροι ὅμοιοι πρὸς οὓς (7) φιλοτιμοῦνται· πολλὰ γὰρ αἰσχυνόμενοι διὰ τοὺς τοιούτους (8) καὶ ποιοῦσι καὶ οὐ ποιοῦσιν.

. . . . .

Generally, we feel shame before those for whose own misconduct we should also feel it — those already mentioned; those who take us as their models; those whose teachers or advisers we have been; or other people, it may be, like ourselves, whose rivals we are. For there are many things that shame before such people makes us do or leave undone.

καὶ μέλλοντες ὁρᾶσθαι καὶ (9) ἐν φανερῷ ἀναστρέφεσθαι τοῖς συνειδόσιν αἰσχυντηλοὶ (10) μᾶλλον εἰσίν· ὅθεν καὶ Ἀντιφῶν ὁ ποιητής, μέλλων ἀποτυμ(11)πανίζεσθαι ὑπὸ Διονυσίου, εἶπεν, ἰδὼν τοὺς συναποθνῄσκειν (12) μέλλοντας ἐγκαλυπτομένους ὡς ᾔεσαν διὰ τῶν πυλῶν, “τί (13) ἐγκαλύπτεσθε;” ἔφη· “ἦ μὴ αὔριόν τις ὑμᾶς ἴδῃ τούτων;” (14) περὶ μὲν οὖν αἰσχύνης ταῦτα· περὶ δὲ ἀναισχυντίας δῆλον (15) ὡς ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων εὐπορήσομεν.

. . .

And we feel more shame when we are likely to be continually seen by, and go about under the eyes of, those who know of our disgrace. Hence, when Antiphon the poet was to be cudgelled to death by order of Dionysius, and saw those who were to perish with him covering their faces as they went through the gates, he said, ‘Why do you cover your faces? Is it lest some of these spectators should see you to—morrow?’ So much for Shame; to understand Shamelessness, we need only consider the converse cases, and plainly we shall have all we need.

7. (16) Τίσιν δὲ χάριν ἔχουσι καὶ ἐπὶ τίσιν καὶ πῶς αὐτοὶ ἔχοντες, (17) ὁρισαμένοις τὴν χάριν δῆλον ἔσται.

.

Part 7. To take Kindness next: the definition of it will show us towards whom it is felt, why, and in what frames of mind.

ἔστω δὴ χάρις, καθ’ ἣν ὁ (18) ἔχων λέγεται χάριν ἔχειν, ὑπουργία τῷ δεομένῳ μὴ ἀντί τινος, (19) μηδ’ ἵνα τι αὐτῷ τῷ ὑπουργοῦντι ἀλλ’ ἵνα τι ἐκείνῳ· μεγάλη δὲ (20) ἂν ᾖ σφόδρα δεόμενος, ἢ μεγάλων καὶ χαλεπῶν, ἢ ἐν καιροῖς (21) τοιούτοις, ἢ μόνος ἢ πρῶτος ἢ μάλιστα.

. .

Kindness — under the influence of which a man is said to ‘be kind’ may be defined as helpfulness towards some one in need, not in return for anything, nor for the advantage of the helper himself, but for that of the person helped. Kindness is great if shown to one who is in great need, or who needs what is important and hard to get, or who needs it at an important and difficult crisis; or if the helper is the only, the first, or the chief person to give the help.

δεήσεις δέ εἰσιν αἱ (22) ὀρέξεις, καὶ τούτων μάλιστα αἱ μετὰ λύπης τοῦ μὴ γιγνομέ(23)νου.

.

Natural cravings constitute such needs; and in particular cravings, accompanied by pain, for what is not being attained.

τοιαῦται δὲ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι, οἷον ἔρως, καὶ αἱ ἐν ταῖς τοῦ (24) σώματος κακώσεσιν καὶ ἐν κινδύνοις· καὶ γὰρ ὁ κινδυνεύων (25) ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ ὁ λυπούμενος· διὸ οἱ ἐν πενίᾳ παριστάμενοι καὶ (26) φυγαῖς, κἂν μικρὰ ὑπηρετήσωσιν, διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς δεήσεως (27) καὶ τὸν καιρὸν κεχαρισμένοι, οἷον ὁ ἐν Λυκείῳ τὸν φορμὸν (28) δούς.

. . .

The appetites are cravings for this kind: sexual desire, for instance, and those which arise during bodily injuries and in dangers; for appetite is active both in danger and in pain. Hence those who stand by us in poverty or in banishment, even if they do not help us much, are yet really kind to us, because our need is great and the occasion pressing; for instance, the man who gave the mat in the Lyceum.

ἀνάγκη οὖν μάλιστα μὲν εἰς ταὐτὰ ἔχειν τὴν ὑπουρ(29)γίαν, εἰ δὲ μή, εἰς ἴσα ἢ μείζω· ὥστε ἐπεὶ φανερὸν καὶ οἷς (30) καὶ ἐφ’ οἷς γίγνεται χάρις καὶ πῶς ἔχουσι, δῆλον ὅτι ἐκ (31) τούτων παρασκευαστέον, τοὺς μὲν δεικνύντας ἢ ὄντας ἢ (32) γεγενημένους ἐν τοιαύτῃ λύπῃ καὶ δεήσει, τοὺς δὲ ὑπηρετη(33)κότας ἐν τοιαύτῃ χρείᾳ τοιοῦτόν τι ἢ ὑπηρετοῦντας.

. . .

The helpfulness must therefore meet, preferably, just this kind of need; and failing just this kind, some other kind as great or greater. We now see to whom, why, and under what conditions kindness is shown; and these facts must form the basis of our arguments. We must show that the persons helped are, or have been, in such pain and need as has been described, and that their helpers gave, or are giving, the kind of help described, in the kind of need described.

φανε(34)ρὸν δὲ καὶ ὅθεν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἐνδέχεται τὴν χάριν καὶ ποιεῖν (1385b1) ἀχαρίστους· ἢ γὰρ ὅτι αὑτῶν ἕνεκα ὑπηρετοῦσιν ἢ ὑπηρέτη(2)σαν (τοῦτο δ’ οὐκ ἦν χάρις), ἢ ὅτι ἀπὸ τύχης συνέπεσεν ἢ (3) συνηναγκάσθησαν, ἢ ὅτι ἀπέδωκαν ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔδωκαν, εἴτε (4) εἰδότες εἴτε μή· ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ τὸ ἀντί τινος, ὥστε οὐδ’ (5) οὕτως ἂν εἴη χάρις.

. . . . .

We can also see how to eliminate the idea of kindness and make our opponents appear unkind: we may maintain that they are being or have been helpful simply to promote their own interest—this, as has been stated, is not kindness; or that their action was accidental, or was forced upon them; or that they were not doing a favour, but merely returning one, whether they know this or not — in either case the action is a mere return, and is therefore not a kindness even if the doer does not know how the case stands.

καὶ περὶ ἁπάσας τὰς κατηγορίας σκε(6)πτέον· ἡ γὰρ χάρις ἐστὶν ἢ ὅτι τοδὶ ἢ τοσόνδε ἢ τοιόνδε ἢ (7) πότε ἢ ποῦ.

. .

In considering this subject we must look at all the categories an act may be an act of kindness because (1) it is a particular thing, (2) it has a particular magnitude or (3) quality, or (4) is done at a particular time or (5) place.

σημεῖον δὲ εἰ ἔλαττον μὴ ὑπηρέτησαν, καὶ εἰ (8) τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἢ ταὐτὰ ἢ ἴσα ἢ μείζω· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐδὲ (9) ταῦτα ἡμῶν ἕνεκα.

. .

As evidence of the want of kindness, we may point out that a smaller service had been refused to the man in need; or that the same service, or an equal or greater one, has been given to his enemies; these facts show that the service in question was not done for the sake of the person helped.

ἢ εἰ φαῦλα εἰδώς· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὁμολογεῖ (10) δεῖσθαι φαύλων.

.

Or we may point out that the thing desired was worthless and that the helper knew it: no one will admit that he is in need of what is worthless.

8. (11) Καὶ περὶ μὲν τοῦ χαρίζεσθαι καὶ ἀχαριστεῖν εἴρηται· ποῖα (12) δ’ ἐλεεινὰ καὶ τίνας ἐλεοῦσι, καὶ πῶς αὐτοὶ ἔχοντες, λέγωμεν.

. .

Part 8. So much for Kindness and Unkindness. Let us now consider Pity, asking ourselves what things excite pity, and for what persons, and in what states of our mind pity is felt.

(13) ἔστω δὴ ἔλεος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινομένῳ κακῷ φθαρτικῷ ἢ (14) λυπηρῷ τοῦ ἀναξίου τυγχάνειν, ὃ κἂν αὐτὸς προσδοκήσειεν (15) ἂν παθεῖν ἢ τῶν αὑτοῦ τινα, καὶ τοῦτο ὅταν πλησίον φαίνη(16)ται· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἀνάγκη τὸν μέλλοντα ἐλεήσειν ὑπάρχειν (17) τοιοῦτον οἷον οἴεσθαι παθεῖν ἄν τι κακὸν ἢ αὐτὸν ἢ τῶν (18) αὑτοῦ τινα, καὶ τοιοῦτο κακὸν οἷον εἴρηται ἐν τῷ ὅρῳ ἢ (19) ὅμοιον ἢ παραπλήσιον· διὸ οὔτε οἱ παντελῶς ἀπολωλότες (20) ἐλεοῦσιν (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἔτι παθεῖν οἴονται· πεπόνθασι γάρ), (21) οὔτε οἱ ὑπερευδαιμονεῖν οἰόμενοι, ἀλλ’ ὑβρίζουσιν· εἰ γὰρ (22) ἅπαντα οἴονται ὑπάρχειν τἀγαθά, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐν(23)δέχεσθαι παθεῖν μηδὲν κακόν· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τῶν ἀγαθῶν.

. . . . . .

Pity may be defined as a feeling of pain caused by the sight of some evil, destructive or painful, which befalls one who does not deserve it, and which we might expect to befall ourselves or some friend of ours, and moreover to befall us soon. In order to feel pity, we must obviously be capable of supposing that some evil may happen to us or some friend of ours, and moreover some such evil as is stated in our definition or is more or less of that kind. It is therefore not felt by those completely ruined, who suppose that no further evil can befall them, since the worst has befallen them already; nor by those who imagine themselves immensely fortunate — their feeling is rather presumptuous insolence, for when they think they possess all the good things of life, it is clear that the impossibility of evil befalling them will be included, this being one of the good things in question.

εἰ(24)σὶ δὲ τοιοῦτοι οἷοι νομίζειν παθεῖν ἄν, οἵ τε πεπονθότες ἤδη (25) καὶ διαπεφευγότες, καὶ οἱ πρεσβύτεροι καὶ διὰ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ (26) δι’ ἐμπειρίαν, καὶ οἱ ἀσθενεῖς, καὶ οἱ δειλότεροι μᾶλλον, καὶ (27) οἱ πεπαιδευμένοι· εὐλόγιστοι γάρ.

. . .

Those who think evil may befall them are such as have already had it befall them and have safely escaped from it; elderly men, owing to their good sense and their experience; weak men, especially men inclined to cowardice; and also educated people, since these can take long views.

καὶ οἷς ὑπάρχουσι γονεῖς (28) ἢ τέκνα ἢ γυναῖκες· αὐτοῦ τε γὰρ ταῦτα, καὶ οἷα παθεῖν τὰ (29) εἰρημένα.

. .

Also those who have parents living, or children, or wives; for these are our own, and the evils mentioned above may easily befall them.

καὶ οἱ μήτε ἐν ἀνδρείας πάθει ὄντες, οἷον ἐν ὀργῇ (30) ἢ θάρρει (ἀλόγιστα γὰρ τοῦ ἐσομένου ταῦτα), μήτε ἐν ὑβρι(31)στικῇ διαθέσει (καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι ἀλόγιστοι τοῦ πείσεσθαί τι), ἀλλ’ (32) οἱ μεταξὺ τούτων, μήτ’ αὖ φοβούμενοι σφόδρα· οὐ γὰρ ἐλεοῦ(33)σιν οἱ ἐκπεπληγμένοι, διὰ τὸ εἶναι πρὸς τῷ οἰκείῳ πάθει.

. . .

And those who neither moved by any courageous emotion such as anger or confidence (these emotions take no account of the future), nor by a disposition to presumptuous insolence (insolent men, too, take no account of the possibility that something evil will happen to them), nor yet by great fear (panic—stricken people do not feel pity, because they are taken up with what is happening to themselves); only those feel pity who are between these two extremes.

(34) κἂν οἴωνταί τινας εἶναι τῶν ἐπιεικῶν· ὁ γὰρ μηδένα οἰόμενος (1386a1) πάντας οἰήσεται ἀξίους εἶναι κακοῦ.

. .

In order to feel pity we must also believe in the goodness of at least some people; if you think nobody good, you will believe that everybody deserves evil fortune.

καὶ ὅλως δὴ ὅταν ἔχῃ (2) οὕτως ὥστ’ ἀναμνησθῆναι τοιαῦτα συμβεβηκότα ἢ αὑτῷ ἤ <τῳ> (3) τῶν αὑτοῦ, ἢ ἐλπίσαι γενέσθαι αὑτῷ ἤ τῳ τῶν αὑτοῦ.

.

And, generally, we feel pity whenever we are in the condition of remembering that similar misfortunes have happened to us or ours, or expecting them to happen in the future.

(4) ὡς μὲν οὖν ἔχοντες ἐλεοῦσιν εἴρηται, ἃ δ’ ἐλεοῦσιν ἐκ (5) τοῦ ὁρισμοῦ δῆλον· ὅσα τε γὰρ τῶν λυπηρῶν καὶ ὀδυνηρῶν (6) φθαρτικά, πάντα ἐλεεινά, καὶ ὅσα ἀναιρετικά, καὶ ὅσων ἡ (7) τύχη αἰτία κακῶν μέγεθος ἐχόντων.

. .

So much for the mental conditions under which we feel pity. What we pity is stated clearly in the definition. All unpleasant and painful things excite pity if they tend to destroy pain and annihilate; and all such evils as are due to chance, if they are serious.

ἔστι δὲ ὀδυνηρὰ μὲν καὶ (8) φθαρτικὰ θάνατοι καὶ αἰκίαι σωμάτων καὶ κακώσεις καὶ γῆρας (9) καὶ νόσοι καὶ τροφῆς ἔνδεια, ὧν δ’ ἡ τύχη αἰτία κακῶν (10) ἀφιλία, ὀλιγοφιλία (διὸ καὶ τὸ διασπᾶσθαι ἀπὸ φίλων καὶ (11) συνήθων ἐλεεινόν), αἶσχος, ἀσθένεια, ἀναπηρία, καὶ τὸ ὅθεν (12) προσῆκεν ἀγαθόν τι ὑπάρξαι κακόν τι συμβῆναι, καὶ τὸ (13) πολλάκις τοιοῦτον, καὶ τὸ πεπονθότος γενέσθαι τι ἀγαθόν, (14) οἷον Διοπείθει τὰ παρὰ βασιλέως τεθνεῶτι κατεπέμφθη, (15) καὶ τὸ ἢ μηδὲν γεγενῆσθαι ἀγαθὸν ἢ γενομένων μὴ εἶναι (16) ἀπόλαυσιν.

. . . . .

The painful and destructive evils are: death in its various forms, bodily injuries and afflictions, old age, diseases, lack of food. The evils due to chance are: friendlessness, scarcity of friends (it is a pitiful thing to be torn away from friends and companions), deformity, weakness, mutilation; evil coming from a source from which good ought to have come; and the frequent repetition of such misfortunes. Also the coming of good when the worst has happened: e.g. the arrival of the Great King’s gifts for Diopeithes after his death. Also that either no good should have befallen a man at all, or that he should not be able to enjoy it when it has.

(17) ἐφ’ οἷς μὲν οὖν ἐλεοῦσι, ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτά ἐστιν· (18) ἐλεοῦσι δὲ τούς τε γνωρίμους, ἂν μὴ σφόδρα ἐγγὺς ὦσιν (19) οἰκειότητι (περὶ δὲ τούτους ὥσπερ περὶ αὑτοὺς μέλλοντας (20) ἔχουσιν· διὸ καὶ ὁ Ἀμάσιος ἐπὶ μὲν τῷ υἱεῖ ἀγομένῳ ἐπὶ τὸ (21) ἀποθανεῖν οὐκ ἐδάκρυσεν, ὡς φασίν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ φίλῳ προσ(22)αιτοῦντι· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἐλεεινόν, ἐκεῖνο δὲ δεινόν· τὸ γὰρ δεινὸν (23) ἕτερον τοῦ ἐλεεινοῦ καὶ ἐκκρουστικὸν τοῦ ἐλέου καὶ πολλάκις (24) τῷ ἐναντίῳ χρήσιμον· <οὐ γὰρ> ἔτι ἐλεοῦσιν ἐγγὺς αὐτοῖς τοῦ (25) δεινοῦ ὄντος), καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους ἐλεοῦσιν κατὰ ἡλικίαν, κατὰ (26) ἤθη, κατὰ ἕξεις, κατὰ ἀξιώματα, κατὰ γένη· ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ (27) τούτοις μᾶλλον φαίνεται καὶ αὐτῷ ἂν ὑπάρξαι· ὅλως γὰρ καὶ (28) ἐνταῦθα δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι ὅσα ἐφ’ αὑτῶν φοβοῦνται, ταῦτα ἐπ’ (29) ἄλλων γιγνόμενα ἐλεοῦσιν.

. . . . . . . . .

The grounds, then, on which we feel pity are these or like these. The people we pity are: those whom we know, if only they are not very closely related to us — in that case we feel about them as if we were in danger ourselves. For this reason Amasis did not weep, they say, at the sight of his son being led to death, but did weep when he saw his friend begging: the latter sight was pitiful, the former terrible, and the terrible is different from the pitiful; it tends to cast out pity, and often helps to produce the opposite of pity. Again, we feel pity when the danger is near ourselves. Also we pity those who are like us in age, character, disposition, social standing, or birth; for in all these cases it appears more likely that the same misfortune may befall us also. Here too we have to remember the general principle that what we fear for ourselves excites our pity when it happens to others.

ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐγγὺς φαινόμενα τὰ πάθη (30) ἐλεεινά ἐστιν, τὰ δὲ μυριοστὸν ἔτος γενόμενα ἢ ἐσόμενα (31) οὔτε ἐλπίζοντες οὔτε μεμνημένοι ἢ ὅλως οὐκ ἐλεοῦσιν ἢ οὐχ (32) ὁμοίως, ἀνάγκη τοὺς συναπεργαζομένους σχήμασι καὶ φωναῖς (33) καὶ ἐσθῆσι καὶ ὅλως ὑποκρίσει ἐλεεινοτέρους εἶναι (ἐγγὺς (34) γὰρ ποιοῦσι φαίνεσθαι τὸ κακόν, πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιοῦντες ἢ (35) ὡς μέλλοντα ἢ ὡς γεγονότα· καὶ τὰ γεγονότα ἄρτι ἢ μέλλοντα (1386b1) διὰ ταχέων ἐλεεινότερα), <καὶ> διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὰ σημεῖα, οἷον (2) ἐσθῆτάς τε τῶν πεπονθότων καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, καὶ τὰς (3) πράξεις καὶ λόγους καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τῶν ἐν τῷ πάθει ὄντων, (4) οἷον ἤδη τελευτώντων.

. . . . . . .

Further, since it is when the sufferings of others are close to us that they excite our pity (we cannot remember what disasters happened a hundred centuries ago, nor look forward to what will happen a hundred centuries hereafter, and therefore feel little pity, if any, for such things): it follows that those who heighten the effect of their words with suitable gestures, tones, dress, and dramatic action generally, are especially successful in exciting pity: they thus put the disasters before our eyes, and make them seem close to us, just coming or just past. Anything that has just happened, or is going to happen soon, is particularly piteous: so too therefore are the tokens and the actions of sufferers — the garments and the like of those who have already suffered; the words and the like of those actually suffering — of those, for instance, who are on the point of death.

καὶ μάλιστα τὸ σπουδαίους εἶναι ἐν (5) τοῖς τοιούτοις καιροῖς ὄντας ἐλεεινόν· ἅπαντα γὰρ ταῦτα διὰ (6) τὸ ἐγγὺς φαίνεσθαι μᾶλλον ποιεῖ τὸν ἔλεον, καὶ ὡς ἀναξίου (7) ὄντος καὶ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς φαινομένου τοῦ πάθους.

. .

Most piteous of all is it when, in such times of trial, the victims are persons of noble character: whenever they are so, our pity is especially excited, because their innocence, as well as the setting of their misfortunes before our eyes, makes their misfortunes seem close to ourselves.

9. (8) Ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ ἐλεεῖν μάλιστα μὲν ὃ καλοῦσι νεμεσᾶν· (9) τῷ γὰρ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀναξίαις κακοπραγίαις ἀντι(10)κείμενόν ἐστι τρόπον τινὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἤθους τὸ λυπεῖ(11)σθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀναξίαις εὐπραγίαις.

. .

Part 9. Most directly opposed to pity is the feeling called Indignation. Pain at unmerited good fortune is, in one sense, opposite to pain at unmerited bad fortune, and is due to the same moral qualities.

καὶ ἄμφω τὰ πάθη ἤθους (12) χρηστοῦ· δεῖ γὰρ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἀναξίως πράττουσι κακῶς (13) συνάχθεσθαι καὶ ἐλεεῖν, τοῖς δὲ εὖ νεμεσᾶν· ἄδικον γὰρ τὸ (14) παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γιγνόμενον· διὸ καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀποδίδομεν τὸ (15) νεμεσᾶν.

. . . .

Both feelings are associated with good moral character; it is our duty both to feel sympathy and pity for unmerited distress, and to feel indignation at unmerited prosperity; for whatever is undeserved is unjust, and that is why we ascribe indignation even to the gods.

(16) δόξειε δ’ ἂν καὶ ὁ φθόνος τῷ ἐλεεῖν τὸν αὐτὸν (17) ἀντικεῖσθαι τρόπον, ὡς σύνεγγυς ὢν καὶ ταὐτὸν τῷ νεμεσᾶν, (18) ἔστι δ’ ἕτερον· λύπη μὲν γὰρ ταραχώδης καὶ ὁ φθόνος ἐστὶν (19) καὶ ἐπὶ εὐπραγίᾳ, ἀλλ’ οὐ τοῦ ἀναξίου ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἴσου καὶ (20) ὁμοίου.

. . .

It might indeed be thought that envy is similarly opposed to pity, on the ground that envy it closely akin to indignation, or even the same thing. But it is not the same. It is true that it also is a disturbing pain excited by the prosperity of others. But it is excited not by the prosperity of the undeserving but by that of people who are like us or equal with us.

τὸ δὲ μὴ ὅτι αὐτῷ τι συμβήσεται ἕτερον, ἀλλὰ δι’ (21) αὐτὸν τὸν πλησίον, ἅπασιν ὁμοίως δεῖ ὑπάρχειν· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι (22) ἔσται τὸ μὲν φθόνος, τὸ δὲ νέμεσις, ἀλλὰ φόβος, ἐὰν διὰ (23) τοῦτο ἡ λύπη ὑπάρχῃ καὶ ἡ ταραχή, ὅτι αὐτῷ τι ἔσται φαῦλον (24) ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου εὐπραξίας.

. . .

The two feelings have this in common, that they must be due not to some untoward thing being likely to befall ourselves, but only to what is happening to our neighbour. The feeling ceases to be envy in the one case and indignation in the other, and becomes fear, if the pain and disturbance are due to the prospect of something bad for ourselves as the result of the other man’s good fortune.

φανερὸν δ’ ὅτι ἀκολουθήσει καὶ (25) τὰ ἐναντία πάθη τούτοις· ὁ μὲν γὰρ λυπούμενος ἐπὶ τοῖς (26) ἀναξίως κακοπραγοῦσιν ἡσθήσεται ἢ ἄλυπος ἔσται ἐπὶ τοῖς (27) ἐναντίως κακοπραγοῦσιν, οἷον τοὺς πατραλοίας καὶ μιαι(28)φόνους, ὅταν τύχωσι τιμωρίας, οὐδεὶς ἂν λυπηθείη χρηστός· (29) δεῖ γὰρ χαίρειν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὡς δ’ αὔτως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς (30) εὖ πράττουσι κατ’ ἀξίαν· ἄμφω γὰρ δίκαια, καὶ ποιεῖ χαίρειν (31) τὸν ἐπιεικῆ· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐλπίζειν ὑπάρξαι ἂν ἅπερ τῷ ὁμοίῳ, (32) καὶ αὑτῷ.

. . . . . .

The feelings of pity and indignation will obviously be attended by the converse feelings of satisfaction. If you are pained by the unmerited distress of others, you will be pleased, or at least not pained, by their merited distress. Thus no good man can be pained by the punishment of parricides or murderers. These are things we are bound to rejoice at, as we must at the prosperity of the deserving; both these things are just, and both give pleasure to any honest man, since he cannot help expecting that what has happened to a man like him will happen to him too.

καὶ ἔστιν τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἤθους ἅπαντα ταῦτα, τὰ δ’ (33) ἐναντία τοῦ ἐναντίου· ὁ γὰρ αὐτός ἐστιν ἐπιχαιρέκακος καὶ (1387a1) φθονερός· ἐφ’ ᾧ γάρ τις λυπεῖται γιγνομένῳ καὶ ὑπάρχοντι, (2) ἀναγκαῖον τοῦτον ἐπὶ τῇ στερήσει καὶ τῇ φθορᾷ τῇ τούτου (3) χαίρειν· διὸ κωλυτικὰ μὲν ἐλέου πάντα ταῦτ’ ἐστί, διαφέρει (4) δὲ διὰ τὰς εἰρημένας αἰτίας, ὥστε πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἐλεεινὰ ποιεῖν (5) ἅπαντα ὁμοίως χρήσιμα.

. . . .

All these feelings are associated with the same type of moral character. And their contraries are associated with the contrary type; the man who is delighted by others’ misfortunes is identical with the man who envies others’ prosperity. For any one who is pained by the occurrence or existence of a given thing must be pleased by that thing’s non—existence or destruction. We can now see that all these feelings tend to prevent pity (though they differ among themselves, for the reasons given), so that all are equally useful for neutralizing an appeal to pity.

(6) πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ τοῦ νεμεσᾶν λέγωμεν, τίσιν τε νεμε(7)σῶσι καὶ ἐπὶ τίσι καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες αὐτοί, εἶτα μετὰ ταῦτα (8) περὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

.

We will first consider Indignation — reserving the other emotions for subsequent discussion — and ask with whom, on what grounds, and in what states of mind we may be indignant.

φανερὸν δ’ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων· εἰ γάρ ἐστι τὸ (9) νεμεσᾶν λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τῷ φαινομένῳ ἀναξίως εὐπραγεῖν, (10) πρῶτον μὲν δῆλον ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τ’ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς (11) νεμεσᾶν· οὐ γὰρ εἰ δίκαιος ἢ ἀνδρεῖος, ἢ εἰ ἀρετὴν λήψεται, (12) νεμεσήσει τούτῳ (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔλεοι ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις τούτων (13) εἰσίν), ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ πλούτῳ καὶ δυνάμει καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὅσων (14) ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἄξιοί εἰσιν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ τὰ φύσει ἔχοντες (15) ἀγαθά, οἷον εὐγένειαν καὶ κάλλος καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα.

. . . . .

These questions are really answered by what has been said already. Indignation is pain caused by the sight of undeserved good fortune. It is, then, plain to begin with that there are some forms of good the sight of which cannot cause it. Thus a man may be just or brave, or acquire moral goodness: but we shall not be indignant with him for that reason, any more than we shall pity him for the contrary reason. Indignation is roused by the sight of wealth, power, and the like—by all those things, roughly speaking, which are deserved by good men and by those who possess the goods of nature — noble birth, beauty, and so on.

ἐπεὶ δὲ (16) τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἐγγύς τι φαίνεται τοῦ φύσει, ἀνάγκη τοῖς ταὐτὸ (17) ἔχουσιν ἀγαθόν, ἐὰν νεωστὶ ἔχοντες τυγχάνωσι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο (18) εὐπραγῶσι, μᾶλλον νεμεσᾶν· μᾶλλον γὰρ λυποῦσιν οἱ νεωστὶ (19) πλουτοῦντες τῶν πάλαι καὶ διὰ γένος· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄρχοντες (20) καὶ δυνάμενοι καὶ πολύφιλοι καὶ εὔτεκνοι καὶ ὁτιοῦν τῶν (21) τοιούτων.

. . . .

Again, what is long established seems akin to what exists by nature; and therefore we feel more indignation at those possessing a given good if they have as a matter of fact only just got it and the prosperity it brings with it. The newly rich give more offence than those whose wealth is of long standing and inherited. The same is true of those who have office or power, plenty of friends, a fine family, &c.

καὶ ἂν διὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο τι ἀγαθὸν γίγνηται αὐτοῖς, (22) ὡσαύτως· καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα μᾶλλον λυποῦσιν οἱ νεόπλουτοι (23) ἄρχοντες διὰ τὸν πλοῦτον ἢ οἱ ἀρχαιόπλουτοι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ (24) ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

. . .

We feel the same when these advantages of theirs secure them others. For here again, the newly rich give us more offence by obtaining office through their riches than do those whose wealth is of long standing; and so in all other cases.

αἴτιον δ’ ὅτι οἱ μὲν δοκοῦσι τὰ αὑτῶν ἔχειν (25) οἱ δ’ οὔ· τὸ γὰρ ἀεὶ οὕτω φαινόμενον ἔχειν ἀληθὲς δοκεῖ, ὥστε (26) οἱ ἕτεροι οὐ τὰ αὑτῶν ἔχειν.

. .

The reason is that what the latter have is felt to be really their own, but what the others have is not; what appears to have been always what it is is regarded as real, and so the possessions of the newly rich do not seem to be really their own.

καὶ ἐπεὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὐ (27) τοῦ τυχόντος ἄξιον, ἀλλά τις ἔστιν ἀναλογία καί τι ἁρμόττον, (28) οἷον ὅπλων κάλλος οὐ τῷ δικαίῳ ἁρμόττει ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ, (29) καὶ γάμοι διαφέροντες οὐ τοῖς νεωστὶ πλουσίοις ἀλλὰ τοῖς (30) εὐγενέσιν· ἂν οὖν ἀγαθὸς ὢν μὴ τοῦ ἁρμόττοντος τυγχάνῃ, (31) νεμεσητόν.

. . . . .

Further, it is not any and every man that deserves any given kind of good; there is a certain correspondence and appropriateness in such things; thus it is appropriate for brave men, not for just men, to have fine weapons, and for men of family, not for parvenus, to make distinguished marriages. Indignation may therefore properly be felt when any one gets what is not appropriate for him, though he may be a good man enough.

καὶ <τὸ> τὸν ἥττω τῷ κρείττονι ἀμφισβητεῖν, (32) μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ὅθεν καὶ τοῦτ’ εἴρηται,
Αἴαντος δ’ ἀλέεινε μάχην Τελαμωνιάδαο·
(34) Ζεὺς γὰρ οἱ νεμέσασχ’, ὅτ’ ἀμείνονι φωτὶ μάχοιτο· (1387b1) εἰ δὲ μή, κἂν ὁπωσοῦν ὁ ἥττων τῷ κρείττονι, οἷον εἰ ὁ (2) μουσικὸς τῷ δικαίῳ· βέλτιον γὰρ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῆς μου(3)σικῆς.

. . . . .

It may also be felt when any one sets himself up against his superior, especially against his superior in some particular respect — whence the linesOnly from battle he shrank with Aias Telamon’s son;Zeus had been angered with him, had he fought with a mightier one; but also, even apart from that, when the inferior in any sense contends with his superior; a musician, for instance, with a just man, for justice is a finer thing than music.

(4) οἷς μὲν οὖν νεμεσῶσι καὶ διὰ τί, ἐκ τούτων δῆλον· ταῦτα (5) γὰρ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτά ἐστιν.

. .

Enough has been said to make clear the grounds on which, and the persons against whom, Indignation is felt—they are those mentioned, and others like him.

αὐτοὶ δὲ νεμεσητικοί εἰσιν, ἐὰν (6) ἄξιοι τυγχάνωσιν ὄντες τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν καὶ ταῦτα (7) κεκτημένοι· τὸ γὰρ τῶν ὁμοίων ἠξιῶσθαι τοὺς μὴ ὁμοίους οὐ (8) δίκαιον.

. .

As for the people who feel it; we feel it if we do ourselves deserve the greatest possible goods and moreover have them, for it is an injustice that those who are not our equals should have been held to deserve as much as we have.

δεύτερον δέ, ἂν ὄντες ἀγαθοὶ καὶ σπουδαῖοι τυγχά(9)νωσιν· κρίνουσί τε γὰρ εὖ, καὶ τὰ ἄδικα μισοῦσι. καὶ ἐὰν (10) φιλότιμοι καὶ ὀρεγόμενοί τινων πραγμάτων, καὶ μάλιστ’ <ἂν> (11) περὶ ταῦτα φιλότιμοι ὦσιν ὧν ἕτεροι ἀνάξιοι ὄντες τυγχάνουσιν. (12) καὶ ὅλως οἱ ἀξιοῦντες αὐτοὶ αὑτοὺς ὧν ἑτέρους μὴ ἀξιοῦσι, (13) νεμεσητικοὶ τούτοις καὶ τούτων· διὸ καὶ οἱ ἀνδραποδώδεις (14) καὶ φαῦλοι καὶ ἀφιλότιμοι οὐ νεμεσητικοί· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔστιν οὗ (15) ἑαυτοὺς οἴονται ἀξίους εἶναι.

. . . . . .

Or, secondly, we feel it if we are really good and honest people; our judgement is then sound, and we loathe any kind of injustice. Also if we are ambitious and eager to gain particular ends, especially if we are ambitious for what others are getting without deserving to get it. And, generally, if we think that we ourselves deserve a thing and that others do not, we are disposed to be indignant with those others so far as that thing is concerned. Hence servile, worthless, unambitious persons are not inclined to Indignation, since there is nothing they can believe themselves to deserve.

(16) φανερὸν δ’ ἐκ τούτων ἐπὶ ποίοις ἀτυχοῦσι καὶ κακο(17)πραγοῦσιν ἢ μὴ τυγχάνουσι χαίρειν ἢ ἀλύπως ἔχειν δεῖ· ἐκ γὰρ (18) τῶν εἰρημένων τὰ ἀντικείμενά ἐστι δῆλα, ὥστ’ ἐὰν τούς τε (19) κριτὰς τοιούτους παρασκευάσῃ ὁ λόγος, καὶ τοὺς ἀξιοῦντας (20) ἐλεεῖσθαι, καὶ ἐφ’ οἷς ἐλεεῖσθαι, δείξῃ ἀναξίους ὄντας τυγ(21)χάνειν ἀξίους δὲ μὴ τυγχάνειν, ἀδύνατον ἐλεεῖν.

. .

From all this it is plain what sort of men those are at whose misfortunes, distresses, or failures we ought to feel pleased, or at least not pained: by considering the facts described we see at once what their contraries are. If therefore our speech puts the judges in such a frame of mind as that indicated and shows that those who claim pity on certain definite grounds do not deserve to secure pity but do deserve not to secure it, it will be impossible for the judges to feel pity.

10. (22) Δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τίσι φθονοῦσι καὶ τίσι καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες, (23) εἴπερ ἐστὶν ὁ φθόνος λύπη τις ἐπὶ εὐπραγίᾳ φαινομένῃ τῶν (24) εἰρημένων ἀγαθῶν περὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους, μὴ ἵνα τι αὑτῷ, ἀλλὰ (25) δι’ ἐκείνους· φθονήσουσι μὲν γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι οἷς εἰσί τινες (26) ὅμοιοι ἢ φαίνονται· ὁμοίους δὲ λέγω κατὰ γένος, κατὰ συγ(27)γένειαν, καθ’ ἡλικίας, κατὰ ἕξεις, κατὰ δόξαν, κατὰ τὰ ὑπάρ(28)χοντα.

. . . .

Part 10. To take Envy next: we can see on what grounds, against what persons, and in what states of mind we feel it. Envy is pain at the sight of such good fortune as consists of the good things already mentioned; we feel it towards our equals; not with the idea of getting something for ourselves, but because the other people have it. We shall feel it if we have, or think we have, equals; and by ‘equals’ I mean equals in birth, relationship, age, disposition, distinction, or wealth.

καὶ οἷς μικρὸν ἐλλείπει τοῦ μὴ πάντα ὑπάρχειν (διὸ (29) οἱ μεγάλα πράττοντες καὶ οἱ εὐτυχοῦντες φθονεροί εἰσιν)· (30) πάντας γὰρ οἴονται τὰ αὑτῶν φέρειν. καὶ οἱ τιμώμενοι ἐπί (31) τινι διαφερόντως, καὶ μάλιστα ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ ἢ εὐδαιμονίᾳ. καὶ (32) οἱ φιλότιμοι φθονερώτεροι τῶν ἀφιλοτίμων. καὶ οἱ δοξόσοφοι· (33) φιλότιμοι γὰρ ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ. καὶ ὅλως οἱ φιλόδοξοι περί τι φθο(34)νεροὶ περὶ τοῦτο. καὶ οἱ μικρόψυχοι· πάντα γὰρ μεγάλα δοκεῖ (35) αὐτοῖς εἶναι. ἐφ’ οἷς δὲ φθονοῦσι, τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ εἴρηται· (1388a1) ἐφ’ οἷς γὰρ φιλοδοξοῦσι καὶ φιλοτιμοῦνται ἔργοις ἢ κτήμασι (2) καὶ ὀρέγονται δόξης, καὶ ὅσα εὐτυχήματά ἐστιν, σχεδὸν περὶ (3) πάντα φθόνος ἔστι, καὶ μάλιστα ὧν αὐτοὶ ἢ ὀρέγονται ἢ (4) οἴονται δεῖν αὑτοὺς ἔχειν, ἢ ὧν τῇ κτήσει μικρῷ ὑπερέχουσιν (5) ἢ μικρῷ ἐλλείπουσιν.

. . . . . . . . .

We feel envy also if we fall but a little short of having everything; which is why people in high place and prosperity feel it —they think every one else is taking what belongs to themselves. Also if we are exceptionally distinguished for some particular thing, and especially if that thing is wisdom or good fortune. Ambitious men are more envious than those who are not. So also those who profess wisdom; they are ambitious to be thought wise. Indeed, generally, those who aim at a reputation for anything are envious on this particular point. And small—minded men are envious, for everything seems great to them. The good things which excite envy have already been mentioned. The deeds or possessions which arouse the love of reputation and honour and the desire for fame, and the various gifts of fortune, are almost all subject to envy; and particularly if we desire the thing ourselves, or think we are entitled to it, or if having it puts us a little above others, or not having it a little below them.

φανερὸν δὲ καὶ οἷς φθονοῦσιν· ἅμα γὰρ (6) εἴρηται· τοῖς γὰρ ἐγγὺς καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ τόπῳ καὶ ἡλικίᾳ καὶ (7) δόξῃ φθονοῦσιν· ὅθεν εἴρηται
τὸ συγγενὲς γὰρ καὶ φθονεῖν ἐπίσταται.

. .

It is clear also what kind of people we envy; that was included in what has been said already: we envy those who are near us in time, place, age, or reputation. Hence the line: Ay, kin can even be jealous of their kin.

(8) καὶ πρὸς οὓς φιλοτιμοῦνται· φιλοτιμοῦνται γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς (9) εἰρημένους, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς μυριοστὸν ἔτος ὄντας ἢ πρὸς τοὺς (10) ἐσομένους ἢ τεθνεῶτας οὐδείς, οὐδὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἐφ’ Ἡρα(11)κλείαις στήλαις. οὐδ’ ὧν πολὺ οἴονται παρ’ αὐτοῖς ἢ παρὰ (12) τοῖς ἄλλοις λείπεσθαι, οὐδ’ ὧν πολὺ ὑπερέχειν, ὡσαύτως καὶ (13) πρὸς τούτους καὶ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. ἐπεὶ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνταγω(14)νιστὰς καὶ ἀντεραστὰς καὶ ὅλως τοὺς τῶν αὐτῶν ἐφιεμένους (15) φιλοτιμοῦνται, ἀνάγκη μάλιστα τούτοις φθονεῖν, διόπερ εἴρηται
(16) καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ.

. . . .

Also our fellow—competitors, who are indeed the people just mentioned—we do not compete with men who lived a hundred centuries ago, or those not yet born, or the dead, or those who dwell near the Pillars of Hercules, or those whom, in our opinion or that of others, we take to be far below us or far above us. So too we compete with those who follow the same ends as ourselves: we compete with our rivals in sport or in love, and generally with those who are after the same things; and it is therefore these whom we are bound to envy beyond all others. Hence the saying: Potter against potter.

(17) καὶ ὧν ἢ κεκτημένων ἢ κατορθούντων ὄνειδος αὐτοῖς (εἰσὶν (18) δὲ καὶ οὗτοι <οἱ> ἐγγὺς καὶ ὅμοιοι)· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι παρ’ αὐτοὺς (19) οὐ τυγχάνουσι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ὥστε τοῦτο λυποῦν ποιεῖ τὸν (20) φθόνον. καὶ τοῖς ἢ ἔχουσι ταῦτα ἢ κεκτημένοις ὅσα αὐτοῖς(21) (22) προσῆκεν ἢ ἐκέκτηντό ποτε· διὸ πρεσβύτεροί τε νεωτέροις καὶ (23) οἱ πολλὰ δαπανήσαντες εἰς ταὐτὸ τοῖς ὀλίγα φθονοῦσιν. καὶ (24) τοῖς ταχὺ οἱ ἢ μόλις τυχόντες ἢ μὴ τυχόντες φθονοῦσιν. δῆλον (25) δὲ καὶ ἐφ’ οἷς χαίρουσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἐπὶ τίσι καὶ πῶς (26) ἔχοντες· ὡς γὰρ ἔχοντες λυποῦνται, οὕτως ἔχοντες ἐπὶ τοῖς (27) ἐναντίοις ἡσθήσονται.

. . . . . . .

We also envy those whose possession of or success in a thing is a reproach to us: these are our neighbours and equals; for it is clear that it is our own fault we have missed the good thing in question; this annoys us, and excites envy in us. We also envy those who have what we ought to have, or have got what we did have once. Hence old men envy younger men, and those who have spent much envy those who have spent little on the same thing. And men who have not got a thing, or not got it yet, envy those who have got it quickly. We can also see what things and what persons give pleasure to envious people, and in what states of mind they feel it: the states of mind in which they feel pain are those under which they will feel pleasure in the contrary things.

ὥστε ἂν αὐτοὶ μὲν παρασκευασθῶσιν (28) οὕτως ἔχειν, οἱ δ’ ἐλεεῖσθαι ἢ τυγχάνειν τινὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἀξιοῦν(29)τες ὦσιν οἷοι οἱ εἰρημένοι, δῆλον ὡς οὐ τεύξονται ἐλέου (30) παρὰ τῶν κυρίων.

.

If therefore we ourselves with whom the decision rests are put into an envious state of mind, and those for whom our pity, or the award of something desirable, is claimed are such as have been described, it is obvious that they will win no pity from us.

11. (31) Πῶς δὲ ἔχοντες ζηλοῦσι καὶ τὰ ποῖα καὶ ἐπὶ τίσιν, ἐνθένδ’ (32) ἐστὶ δῆλον· εἰ γάρ ἐστιν ζῆλος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινομένῃ (33) παρουσίᾳ ἀγαθῶν ἐντίμων καὶ ἐνδεχομένων αὐτῷ λαβεῖν περὶ (34) τοὺς ὁμοίους τῇ φύσει, οὐχ ὅτι ἄλλῳ ἀλλ’ ὅτι οὐχὶ καὶ αὑτῷ (35) ἔστιν διὸ καὶ ἐπιεικές ἐστιν ὁ ζῆλος καὶ ἐπιεικῶν, τὸ δὲ (36) φθονεῖν φαῦλον καὶ φαύλων· ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὑτὸν παρασκευάζει (37) διὰ τὸν ζῆλον τυγχάνειν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὁ δὲ τὸν πλησίον μὴ (38) ἔχειν διὰ τὸν φθόνον), ἀνάγκη δὴ ζηλωτικοὺς μὲν εἶναι τοὺς (1388b1) ἀξιοῦντας αὑτοὺς ἀγαθῶν ὧν μὴ ἔχουσιν, <ἐνδεχομένων αὐ(2)τοῖς λαβεῖν>· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἀξιοῖ τὰ φαινόμενα ἀδύνατα διὸ οἱ (3) νέοι καὶ οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι τοιοῦτοι.

. . . . . .

Part 11. We will next consider Emulation, showing in what follows its causes and objects, and the state of mind in which it is felt. Emulation is pain caused by seeing the presence, in persons whose nature is like our own, of good things that are highly valued and are possible for ourselves to acquire; but it is felt not because others have these goods, but because we have not got them ourselves. It is therefore a good feeling felt by good persons, whereas envy is a bad feeling felt by bad persons. Emulation makes us take steps to secure the good things in question, envy makes us take steps to stop our neighbour having them. Emulation must therefore tend to be felt by persons who believe themselves to deserve certain good things that they have not got, it being understood that no one aspires to things which appear impossible. It is accordingly felt by the young and by persons of lofty disposition.

καὶ οἷς ὑπάρχει τοιαῦτα (4) ἀγαθὰ ἃ τῶν ἐντίμων ἄξιά ἐστιν ἀνδρῶν· ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα (5) πλοῦτος καὶ πολυφιλία καὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· ὡς γὰρ (6) προσῆκον αὐτοῖς ἀγαθοῖς εἶναι, οἷα προσήκει τοῖς ἀγαθῶς (7) ἔχουσι, ζηλοῦσι τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν. καὶ οὓς οἱ ἄλλοι (8) ἀξιοῦσιν. καὶ ὧν πρόγονοι ἢ συγγενεῖς ἢ οἰκεῖοι ἢ τὸ ἔθνος ἢ (9) ἡ πόλις ἔντιμοι, ζηλωτικοὶ περὶ ταῦτα· οἰκεῖα γὰρ οἴονται (10) αὑτοῖς εἶναι, καὶ ἄξιοι <εἶναι> τούτων.

. . . . . .

Also by those who possess such good things as are deserved by men held in honour —these are wealth, abundance of friends, public office, and the like; on the assumption that they ought to be good men, they are emulous to gain such goods because they ought, in their belief, to belong to men whose state of mind is good. Also by those whom all others think deserving. We also feel it about anything for which our ancestors, relatives, personal friends, race, or country are specially honoured, looking upon that thing as really our own, and therefore feeling that we deserve to have it.

εἰ δ’ ἐστὶν ζηλωτὰ τὰ (11) ἔντιμα ἀγαθά, ἀνάγκη τάς τε ἀρετὰς εἶναι τοιαύτας, καὶ ὅσα τοῖς (12) ἄλλοις ὠφέλιμα καὶ εὐεργετικά (τιμῶσι γὰρ τοὺς εὐεργετοῦν(13)τας καὶ τοὺς ἀγαθούς), καὶ ὅσων ἀγαθῶν ἀπόλαυσις τοῖς πλη(14)σίον ἔστιν, οἷον πλοῦτος καὶ κάλλος μᾶλλον ὑγιείας.

. . .

Further, since all good things that are highly honoured are objects of emulation, moral goodness in its various forms must be such an object, and also all those good things that are useful and serviceable to others: for men honour those who are morally good, and also those who do them service. So with those good things our possession of which can give enjoyment to our neighbours—wealth and beauty rather than health.

φανερὸν (15) δὲ καὶ οἱ ζηλωτοὶ τίνες· οἱ γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κεκτη(16)μένοι ζηλωτοί· ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα τὰ εἰρημένα, οἷον ἀνδρεία (17) σοφία ἀρχή (οἱ γὰρ ἄρχοντες πολλοὺς δύνανται εὖ ποιεῖν), (18) στρατηγοί, ῥήτορες, πάντες οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα δυνάμενοι. καὶ οἷς (19) πολλοὶ ὅμοιοι βούλονται εἶναι, ἢ πολλοὶ γνώριμοι, ἢ φίλοι (20) πολλοί, ἢ οὓς πολλοὶ θαυμάζουσιν, ἢ οὓς αὐτοὶ θαυμάζουσιν. (21) καὶ ὧν ἔπαινοι καὶ ἐγκώμια λέγονται ἢ ὑπὸ ποιητῶν ἢ ὑπὸ λογο(22)γράφων.

. . . . .

We can see, too, what persons are the objects of the feeling. They are those who have these and similar things—those already mentioned, as courage, wisdom, public office. Holders of public office—generals, orators, and all who possess such powers—can do many people a good turn. Also those whom many people wish to be like; those who have many acquaintances or friends; those whom admire, or whom we ourselves admire; and those who have been praised and eulogized by poets or prose—writers.

καταφρονοῦσιν δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων· ἐναντίον γὰρ ζήλῳ (23) καταφρόνησίς ἐστι, καὶ τῷ ζηλοῦν τὸ καταφρονεῖν. ἀνάγκη (24) δὲ τοὺς οὕτως ἔχοντας ὥστε ζηλῶσαί τινας ἢ ζηλοῦσθαι (25) καταφρονητικοὺς εἶναι τούτων τε καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ὅσοι τὰ (26) ἐναντία κακὰ ἔχουσι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τῶν ζηλωτῶν· διὸ πολλάκις (27) καταφρονοῦσιν τῶν εὐτυχούντων, ὅταν ἄνευ τῶν ἐντίμων ἀγα(28)θῶν ὑπάρχῃ αὐτοῖς ἡ τύχη.

. . .

Persons of the contrary sort are objects of contempt: for the feeling and notion of contempt are opposite to those of emulation. Those who are such as to emulate or be emulated by others are inevitably disposed to be contemptuous of all such persons as are subject to those bad things which are contrary to the good things that are the objects of emulation: despising them for just that reason. Hence we often despise the fortunate, when luck comes to them without their having those good things which are held in honour.

(29) δι’ ὧν μὲν οὖν τὰ πάθη ἐγγίγνεται καὶ διαλύεται, ἐξ ὧν αἱ (30) πίστεις γίγνονται περὶ αὐτῶν, εἴρηται.

.

This completes our discussion of the means by which the several emotions may be produced or dissipated, and upon which depend the persuasive arguments connected with the emotions.

12. (31) τὰ δὲ ἤθη ποῖοί τινες κατὰ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς ἕξεις καὶ τὰς (32) ἡλικίας καὶ τὰς τύχας, διέλθωμεν μετὰ ταῦτα.

.

Part 12. Let us now consider the various types of human character, in relation to the emotions and moral qualities, showing how they correspond to our various ages and fortunes.

λέγω δὲ πάθη (33) μὲν ὀργὴν ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα περὶ ὧν εἰρήκαμεν [πρό(34)τερον], ἕξεις δὲ ἀρετὰς καὶ κακίας, εἴρηται δὲ περὶ τούτων (35) πρότερον, καὶ ποῖα προαιροῦνται ἕκαστοι, καὶ ποίων πρακτι(36)κοί. ἡλικίαι δέ εἰσι νεότης καὶ ἀκμὴ καὶ γῆρας. τύχην δὲ (1389a1) λέγω εὐγένειαν καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ δυνάμεις καὶ τἀναντία τούτοις (2) καὶ ὅλως εὐτυχίαν καὶ δυστυχίαν.

. . . .

By emotions I mean anger, desire, and the like; these we have discussed already. By moral qualities I mean virtues and vices; these also have been discussed already, as well as the various things that various types of men tend to will and to do. By ages I mean youth, the prime of life, and old age. By fortune I mean birth, wealth, power, and their opposites—in fact, good fortune and ill fortune.

(3) οἱ μὲν οὖν νέοι τὰ ἤθη εἰσὶν ἐπιθυμητικοί, καὶ οἷοι ποιεῖν (4) ὧν ἂν ἐπιθυμήσωσι. καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμιῶν μάλιστα (5) ἀκολουθητικοί εἰσι τῇ περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια καὶ ἀκρατεῖς ταύ(6)της, εὐμετάβολοι δὲ καὶ ἁψίκοροι πρὸς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ (7) σφόδρα μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσι ταχέως δὲ παύονται (ὀξεῖαι γὰρ αἱ (8) βουλήσεις καὶ οὐ μεγάλαι, ὥσπερ αἱ τῶν καμνόντων δίψαι καὶ (9) πεῖναι), καὶ θυμικοὶ καὶ ὀξύθυμοι καὶ οἷοι ἀκολουθεῖν τῇ ὀργῇ. (10) καὶ ἥττους εἰσὶ τοῦ θυμοῦ· διὰ γὰρ φιλοτιμίαν οὐκ ἀνέχονται (11) ὀλιγωρούμενοι, ἀλλ’ ἀγανακτοῦσιν ἂν οἴωνται ἀδικεῖσθαι. καὶ (12) φιλότιμοι μέν εἰσιν, μᾶλλον δὲ φιλόνικοι (ὑπεροχῆς γὰρ ἐπι(13)θυμεῖ ἡ νεότης, ἡ δὲ νίκη ὑπεροχή τις), καὶ ἄμφω ταῦτα (14) μᾶλλον ἢ φιλοχρήματοι (φιλοχρήματοι δὲ ἥκιστα διὰ τὸ μήπω (15) ἐνδείας πεπειρᾶσθαι, ὥσπερ τὸ Πιττακοῦ ἔχει ἀπόφθεγμα (16) εἰς Ἀμφιάραον), καὶ οὐ κακοήθεις ἀλλ’ εὐήθεις διὰ τὸ μήπω (17) τεθεωρηκέναι πολλὰς πονηρίας, καὶ εὔπιστοι διὰ τὸ μήπω (18) πολλὰ ἐξηπατῆσθαι, καὶ εὐέλπιδες· ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ οἰνωμένοι, (19) οὕτω διάθερμοί εἰσιν οἱ νέοι ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως· ἅμα δὲ καὶ διὰ (20) τὸ μὴ πολλὰ ἀποτετυχηκέναι.

. . . . . . . . . . . .

To begin with the Youthful type of character. Young men have strong passions, and tend to gratify them indiscriminately. Of the bodily desires, it is the sexual by which they are most swayed and in which they show absence of self—control. They are changeable and fickle in their desires, which are violent while they last, but quickly over: their impulses are keen but not deep—rooted, and are like sick people’s attacks of hunger and thirst. They are hot—tempered, and quick—tempered, and apt to give way to their anger; bad temper often gets the better of them, for owing to their love of honour they cannot bear being slighted, and are indignant if they imagine themselves unfairly treated. While they love honour, they love victory still more; for youth is eager for superiority over others, and victory is one form of this. They love both more than they love money, which indeed they love very little, not having yet learnt what it means to be without it—this is the point of Pittacus’ remark about Amphiaraus. They look at the good side rather than the bad, not having yet witnessed many instances of wickedness. They trust others readily, because they have not yet often been cheated. They are sanguine; nature warms their blood as though with excess of wine; and besides that, they have as yet met with few disappointments.

καὶ ζῶσι τὰ πλεῖστα ἐλπίδι· ἡ (21) μὲν γὰρ ἐλπὶς τοῦ μέλλοντός ἐστιν ἡ δὲ μνήμη τοῦ παροιχο(22)μένου, τοῖς δὲ νέοις τὸ μὲν μέλλον πολὺ τὸ δὲ παρεληλυθὸς (23) βραχύ· τῇ γὰρ πρώτῃ ἡμέρᾳ μεμνῆσθαι μὲν οὐδὲν οἷόν τε, (24) ἐλπίζειν δὲ πάντα.

. . .

Their lives are mainly spent not in memory but in expectation; for expectation refers to the future, memory to the past, and youth has a long future before it and a short past behind it: on the first day of one’s life one has nothing at all to remember, and can only look forward.

καὶ εὐεξαπάτητοί εἰσι διὰ τὸ εἰρημένον (25) (ἐλπίζουσι γὰρ ῥᾳδίως), καὶ ἀνδρειότεροι (θυμώδεις γὰρ καὶ (26) εὐέλπιδες, ὧν τὸ μὲν μὴ φοβεῖσθαι τὸ δὲ θαρρεῖν ποιεῖ· οὔτε (27) γὰρ ὀργιζόμενος οὐδεὶς φοβεῖται, τό τε ἐλπίζειν ἀγαθόν τι (28) θαρραλέον ἐστίν), καὶ αἰσχυντηλοί (οὐ γάρ πω καλὰ ἕτερα ὑπο(29)λαμβάνουσιν, ἀλλὰ πεπαίδευνται ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου μόνον), καὶ (30) μεγαλόψυχοι (οὐ γὰρ ὑπὸ τοῦ βίου πω τεταπείνωνται, ἀλλὰ (31) τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἄπειροί εἰσιν, καὶ τὸ ἀξιοῦν αὑτὸν μεγάλων (32) μεγαλοψυχία· τοῦτο δ’ εὐέλπιδος). καὶ μᾶλλον αἱροῦνται πράτ(33)τειν τὰ καλὰ τῶν συμφερόντων· τῷ γὰρ ἤθει ζῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ (34) τῷ λογισμῷ, ἔστι δὲ ὁ μὲν λογισμὸς τοῦ συμφέροντος ἡ δὲ (35) ἀρετὴ τοῦ καλοῦ. καὶ φιλόφιλοι καὶ φιλέταιροι μᾶλλον τῶν (1389b1) ἄλλων ἡλικιῶν διὰ τὸ χαίρειν τῷ συζῆν καὶ μήπω πρὸς τὸ (2) συμφέρον κρίνειν μηδέν, ὥστε μηδὲ τοὺς φίλους. καὶ ἅπαντα (3) ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ σφοδρότερον ἁμαρτάνουσι, παρὰ τὸ Χιλώ(4)νειον (πάντα γὰρ ἄγαν πράττουσιν· φιλοῦσι γὰρ ἄγαν καὶ (5) μισοῦσιν ἄγαν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ὁμοίως), καὶ εἰδέναι ἅπαντα (6) οἴονται καὶ διισχυρίζονται (τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιόν ἐστιν καὶ τοῦ (7) πάντα ἄγαν), καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα ἀδικοῦσιν εἰς ὕβριν, οὐ (8) κακουργίαν. καὶ ἐλεητικοὶ διὰ τὸ πάντας χρηστοὺς καὶ βελ(9)τίους ὑπολαμβάνειν (τῇ γὰρ αὑτῶν ἀκακίᾳ τοὺς πέλας με(10)τροῦσιν, ὥστε ἀνάξια πάσχειν ὑπολαμβάνουσιν αὐτούς), καὶ (11) φιλογέλωτες, διὸ καὶ φιλευτράπελοι· ἡ γὰρ εὐτραπελία πεπαι(12)δευμένη ὕβρις ἐστίν.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

They are easily cheated, owing to the sanguine disposition just mentioned. Their hot tempers and hopeful dispositions make them more courageous than older men are; the hot temper prevents fear, and the hopeful disposition creates confidence; we cannot feel fear so long as we are feeling angry, and any expectation of good makes us confident. They are shy, accepting the rules of society in which they have been trained, and not yet believing in any other standard of honour. They have exalted notions, because they have not yet been humbled by life or learnt its necessary limitations; moreover, their hopeful disposition makes them think themselves equal to great things—and that means having exalted notions. They would always rather do noble deeds than useful ones: their lives are regulated more by moral feeling than by reasoning; and whereas reasoning leads us to choose what is useful, moral goodness leads us to choose what is noble. They are fonder of their friends, intimates, and companions than older men are, because they like spending their days in the company of others, and have not yet come to value either their friends or anything else by their usefulness to themselves. All their mistakes are in the direction of doing things excessively and vehemently. They disobey Chilon’s precept by overdoing everything, they love too much and hate too much, and the same thing with everything else. They think they know everything, and are always quite sure about it; this, in fact, is why they overdo everything. If they do wrong to others, it is because they mean to insult them, not to do them actual harm. They are ready to pity others, because they think every one an honest man, or anyhow better than he is: they judge their neighbour by their own harmless natures, and so cannot think he deserves to be treated in that way. They are fond of fun and therefore witty, wit being well—bred insolence.

13. (13) Τὸ μὲν οὖν τῶν νέων τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ἦθος, οἱ δὲ πρεσβύ(14)τεροι καὶ παρηκμακότες σχεδὸν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις τὰ (15) πλεῖστα ἔχουσιν ἤθη· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πολλὰ ἔτη βεβιωκέναι καὶ (16) πλείω ἐξηπατῆσθαι καὶ ἐξημαρτηκέναι, καὶ τὰ πλείω φαῦλα (17) εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, οὔτε διαβεβαιοῦνται οὐδέν, ἧττόν τε (18) ἄγανται πάντα ἢ δεῖ.

. . .

Part 13. Such, then is the character of the Young. The character of Elderly Men—men who are past their prime—may be said to be formed for the most part of elements that are the contrary of all these. They have lived many years; they have often been taken in, and often made mistakes; and life on the whole is a bad business. The result is that they are sure about nothing and under—do everything.

καὶ οἴονται, ἴσασι δ’ οὐδέν, καὶ ἀμφι(19)δοξοῦντες προστιθέασιν ἀεὶ τὸ ἴσως καὶ τάχα, καὶ πάντα (20) λέγουσιν οὕτως, παγίως δ’ οὐδέν. καὶ κακοήθεις εἰσίν· ἔστι (21) γὰρ κακοήθεια τὸ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ὑπολαμβάνειν πάντα.

. .

They ‘think’, but they never ‘know’; and because of their hesitation they always add a ‘possibly’or a ‘perhaps’, putting everything this way and nothing positively. They are cynical; that is, they tend to put the worse construction on everything.

ἔτι δὲ (22) καχύποπτοί εἰσι διὰ τὴν ἀπιστίαν, ἄπιστοι δὲ δι’ ἐμπειρίαν. (23) καὶ οὔτε φιλοῦσιν σφόδρα οὔτε μισοῦσι διὰ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ (24) τὴν Βίαντος ὑποθήκην καὶ φιλοῦσιν ὡς μισήσοντες καὶ μισοῦ(25)σιν ὡς φιλήσοντες.

. .

Further, their experience makes them distrustful and therefore suspicious of evil. Consequently they neither love warmly nor hate bitterly, but following the hint of Bias they love as though they will some day hate and hate as though they will some day love.

καὶ μικρόψυχοι διὰ τὸ τεταπεινῶσθαι (26) ὑπὸ τοῦ βίου· οὐδενὸς γὰρ μεγάλου οὐδὲ περιττοῦ ἀλλὰ τῶν (27) πρὸς τὸν βίον ἐπιθυμοῦσι.

. .

They are small—minded, because they have been humbled by life: their desires are set upon nothing more exalted or unusual than what will help them to keep alive.

καὶ ἀνελεύθεροι· ἓν γάρ τι τῶν (28) ἀναγκαίων ἡ οὐσία, ἅμα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἴσασιν ὡς (29) χαλεπὸν τὸ κτήσασθαι καὶ ῥᾴδιον τὸ ἀποβαλεῖν.

.

They are not generous, because money is one of the things they must have, and at the same time their experience has taught them how hard it is to get and how easy to lose.

καὶ δειλοὶ (30) καὶ πάντα προφοβητικοί· ἐναντίως γὰρ διάκεινται τοῖς νέοις· (31) κατεψυγμένοι γάρ εἰσιν, οἱ δὲ θερμοί, ὥστε προωδοπεποίηκε (32) τὸ γῆρας τῇ δειλίᾳ· καὶ γὰρ ὁ φόβος κατάψυξίς τίς ἐστιν.

. . .

They are cowardly, and are always anticipating danger; unlike that of the young, who are warm—blooded, their temperament is chilly; old age has paved the way for cowardice; fear is, in fact, a form of chill.

καὶ (33) φιλόζωοι, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῇ τελευταίᾳ ἡμέρᾳ διὰ τὸ τοῦ (34) ἀπόντος εἶναι τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν, καὶ οὗ ἐνδεεῖς, τούτου (35) μάλιστα ἐπιθυμεῖν. καὶ φίλαυτοι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ· μικροψυχία (36) γάρ τις καὶ αὕτη.

. .

They love life; and all the more when their last day has come, because the object of all desire is something we have not got, and also because we desire most strongly that which we need most urgently. They are too fond of themselves; this is one form that small—mindedness takes.

καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον ζῶσιν, ἀλλ’ οὐ πρὸς (37) τὸ καλόν, μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, διὰ τὸ φίλαυτοι εἶναι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ (1390a1) συμφέρον αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ καλὸν ἁπλῶς.

. .

Because of this, they guide their lives too much by considerations of what is useful and too little by what is noble —for the useful is what is good for oneself, and the noble what is good absolutely.

καὶ ἀν(2)αίσχυντοι μᾶλλον ἢ αἰσχυντηλοί· διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ φροντίζειν (3) ὁμοίως τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος ὀλιγωροῦσι τοῦ δοκεῖν. (4) καὶ δυσέλπιδες διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν (τὰ γὰρ πλείω τῶν γιγνο(5)μένων φαῦλά ἐστιν· ἀποβαίνει γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον), (6) καὶ ἔτι διὰ τὴν δειλίαν. καὶ ζῶσι τῇ μνήμῃ μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ (7) ἐλπίδι· τοῦ γὰρ βίου τὸ μὲν λοιπὸν ὀλίγον τὸ δὲ παρεληλυθὸς (8) πολύ, ἔστι δὲ ἡ μὲν ἐλπὶς τοῦ μέλλοντος ἡ δὲ μνήμη τῶν (9) παροιχομένων· ὅπερ αἴτιον καὶ τῆς ἀδολεσχίας αὐτοῖς· (10) διατελοῦσι γὰρ τὰ γενόμενα λέγοντες· ἀναμιμνησκόμενοι γὰρ (11) ἥδονται. καὶ οἱ θυμοὶ ὀξεῖς μὲν ἀσθενεῖς δέ εἰσιν, καὶ αἱ ἐπι(12)θυμίαι αἱ μὲν ἐκλελοίπασιν αἱ δὲ ἀσθενεῖς εἰσιν, ὥστε οὔτ’ (13) ἐπιθυμητικοὶ οὔτε πρακτικοὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, ἀλλὰ κατὰ (14) τὸ κέρδος·

. . . . . .

They are not shy, but shameless rather; caring less for what is noble than for what is useful, they feel contempt for what people may think of them. They lack confidence in the future; partly through experience—for most things go wrong, or anyhow turn out worse than one expects; and partly because of their cowardice. They live by memory rather than by hope; for what is left to them of life is but little as compared with the long past; and hope is of the future, memory of the past. This, again, is the cause of their loquacity; they are continually talking of the past, because they enjoy remembering it. Their fits of anger are sudden but feeble. Their sensual passions have either altogether gone or have lost their vigour: consequently they do not feel their passions much, and their actions are inspired less by what they do feel than by the love of gain.

διὸ σωφρονικοὶ φαίνονται οἱ τηλικοῦτοι· αἵ τε γὰρ (15) ἐπιθυμίαι ἀνείκασι καὶ δουλεύουσι τῷ κέρδει. καὶ μᾶλλον (16) ζῶσι κατὰ λογισμὸν ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἦθος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ λογισμὸς τοῦ (17) συμφέροντος τὸ δ’ ἦθος τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστιν. καὶ τἀδικήματα (18) ἀδικοῦσιν εἰς κακουργίαν, οὐκ εἰς ὕβριν.

. . . .

Hence men at this time of life are often supposed to have a self—controlled character; the fact is that their passions have slackened, and they are slaves to the love of gain. They guide their lives by reasoning more than by moral feeling; reasoning being directed to utility and moral feeling to moral goodness. If they wrong others, they mean to injure them, not to insult them.

ἐλεητικοὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ (19) γέροντές εἰσιν, ἀλλ’ οὐ διὰ ταὐτὰ τοῖς νέοις· οἱ μὲν γὰρ διὰ (20) φιλανθρωπίαν, οἱ δὲ δι’ ἀσθένειαν· πάντα γὰρ οἴονται ἐγγὺς (21) εἶναι αὑτοῖς παθεῖν, τοῦτο δ’ ἦν ἐλεητικόν· ὅθεν ὀδυρτικοί (22) εἰσι, καὶ οὐκ εὐτράπελοι οὐδὲ φιλογέλοιοι· ἐναντίον γὰρ τὸ (23) ὀδυρτικὸν τῷ φιλογέλωτι. (24) τῶν μὲν οὖν νέων καὶ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τὰ ἤθη τοιαῦτα, (25) ὥστ’ ἐπεὶ ἀποδέχονται πάντες τοὺς τῷ σφετέρῳ ἤθει (26) λεγομένους λόγους καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους, οὐκ ἄδηλον πῶς χρώμενοι (27) τοῖς λόγοις τοιοῦτοι φανοῦνται καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ οἱ λόγοι.

. . . . . . .

Old men may feel pity, as well as young men, but not for the same reason. Young men feel it out of kindness; old men out of weakness, imagining that anything that befalls any one else might easily happen to them, which, as we saw, is a thought that excites pity. Hence they are querulous, and not disposed to jesting or laughter—the love of laughter being the very opposite of querulousness. Such are the characters of Young Men and Elderly Men. People always think well of speeches adapted to, and reflecting, their own character: and we can now see how to compose our speeches so as to adapt both them and ourselves to our audiences.

14. (28) Οἱ δ’ ἀκμάζοντες φανερὸν ὅτι μεταξὺ τούτων τὸ ἦθος ἔσον(29)ται ἑκατέρων, ἀφαιροῦντες τὴν ὑπερβολήν, καὶ οὔτε σφόδρα (30) θαρροῦντες (θρασύτης γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον) οὔτε λίαν φοβούμενοι, (31) καλῶς δὲ πρὸς ἄμφω ἔχοντες, οὔτε πᾶσι πιστεύοντες οὔτε (32) πᾶσιν ἀπιστοῦντες, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ἀληθὲς κρίνοντες μᾶλλον, (33) καὶ οὔτε πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῶντες μόνον οὔτε πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον (1390b1) ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἄμφω, καὶ οὔτε πρὸς φειδὼ οὔτε πρὸς ἀσωτίαν (2) ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ἁρμόττον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς θυμὸν καὶ πρὸς (3) ἐπιθυμίαν, καὶ σώφρονες μετ’ ἀνδρείας καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι μετὰ (4) σωφροσύνης. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς νέοις καὶ τοῖς γέρουσι διῄρηται (5) ταῦτα· εἰσὶν γὰρ οἱ μὲν νέοι ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ ἀκόλαστοι, οἱ δὲ (6) πρεσβύτεροι σώφρονες καὶ δειλοί.

. . . . . . .

Part 14. As for Men in their Prime, clearly we shall find that they have a character between that of the young and that of the old, free from the extremes of either. They have neither that excess of confidence which amounts to rashness, nor too much timidity, but the right amount of each. They neither trust everybody nor distrust everybody, but judge people correctly. Their lives will be guided not by the sole consideration either of what is noble or of what is useful, but by both; neither by parsimony nor by prodigality, but by what is fit and proper. So, too, in regard to anger and desire; they will be brave as well as temperate, and temperate as well as brave; these virtues are divided between the young and the old; the young are brave but intemperate, the old temperate but cowardly.

ὡς δὲ καθόλου εἰπεῖν, (7) ὅσα μὲν διῄρηνται ἡ νεότης καὶ τὸ γῆρας τῶν ὠφελίμων, (8) ταῦτα ἄμφω ἔχουσιν, ὅσα δὲ ὑπερβάλλουσιν ἢ ἐλλείπουσιν, (9) τούτων τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ ἁρμόττον. ἀκμάζει δὲ τὸ μὲν σῶμα (10) ἀπὸ τῶν τριάκοντα ἐτῶν μέχρι τῶν πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα, ἡ δὲ (11) ψυχὴ περὶ τὰ ἑνὸς δεῖν πεντήκοντα.

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To put it generally, all the valuable qualities that youth and age divide between them are united in the prime of life, while all their excesses or defects are replaced by moderation and fitness. The body is in its prime from thirty to five—and—thirty; the mind about forty—nine.

(12) περὶ μὲν οὖν νεότητος καὶ γήρως καὶ ἀκμῆς, ποίων ἠθῶν (13) ἕκαστόν ἐστιν, εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα.

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Part 15. So much for the types of character that distinguish youth, old age, and the prime of life.

15. (14) Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης γιγνομένων ἀγαθῶν, δι’ ὅσα αὐτῶν (15) καὶ τὰ ἤθη ποιὰ ἄττα συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, λέγωμεν (16) ἐφεξῆς.

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We will now turn to those Gifts of Fortune by which human character is affected.

εὐγενείας μὲν οὖν ἦθός ἐστι τὸ φιλοτιμότερον εἶναι (17) τὸν κεκτημένον αὐτήν· ἅπαντες γάρ, ὅταν ὑπάρχῃ τι, πρὸς (18) τοῦτο σωρεύειν εἰώθασιν, ἡ δ’ εὐγένεια ἐντιμότης προγόνων (19) ἐστίν. καὶ καταφρονητικὸν καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐστὶν τοῖς προ(20)γόνοις αὑτῶν, διότι πόρρω ταὐτὰ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐγγὺς γιγνόμενα (21) ἐντιμότερα καὶ εὐαλαζόνευτα. ἔστι δὲ εὐγενὲς μὲν κατὰ τὴν (22) τοῦ γένους ἀρετήν, γενναῖον δὲ κατὰ τὸ μὴ ἐξίστασθαι τῆς (23) φύσεως· ὅπερ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οὐ συμβαίνει τοῖς εὐγενέσιν, (24) ἀλλ’ εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ εὐτελεῖς· φορὰ γὰρ τίς ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς (25) γένεσιν ἀνδρῶν ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὰς χώρας γιγνομένοις, (26) καὶ ἐνίοτε ἂν ᾖ ἀγαθὸν τὸ γένος, ἐγγίνονται διά τινος χρόνου (27) ἄνδρες περιττοί, κἄπειτα πάλιν ἀναδίδωσιν. ἐξίσταται δὲ (28) τὰ μὲν εὐφυᾶ γένη εἰς μανικώτερα ἤθη, οἷον οἱ ἀπ’ Ἀλκιβιά(29)δου καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ Διονυσίου τοῦ προτέρου, τὰ δὲ στάσιμα εἰς (30) ἀβελτερίαν καὶ νωθρότητα, οἷον οἱ ἀπὸ Κίμωνος καὶ Περι(31)κλέους καὶ Σωκράτους.

. . . . . . . . . .

First let us consider Good Birth. Its effect on character is to make those who have it more ambitious; it is the way of all men who have something to start with to add to the pile, and good birth implies ancestral distinction. The well—born man will look down even on those who are as good as his own ancestors, because any far—off distinction is greater than the same thing close to us, and better to boast about. Being well—born, which means coming of a fine stock, must be distinguished from nobility, which means being true to the family nature —a quality not usually found in the well—born, most of whom are poor creatures. In the generations of men as in the fruits of the earth, there is a varying yield; now and then, where the stock is good, exceptional men are produced for a while, and then decadence sets in. A clever stock will degenerate towards the insane type of character, like the descendants of Alcibiades or of the elder Dionysius; a steady stock towards the fatuous and torpid type, like the descendants of Cimon, Pericles, and Socrates.

16. (32) Τῷ δὲ πλούτῳ ἃ ἕπεται ἤθη, ἐπιπολῆς ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ἅπασιν· (33) ὑβρισταὶ γὰρ καὶ ὑπερήφανοι, πάσχοντές τι ὑπὸ τῆς κτήσεως (34) τοῦ πλούτου (ὥσπερ γὰρ ἔχοντες ἅπαντα τἀγαθὰ οὕτω διά (1391a1) κεινται· ὁ δὲ πλοῦτος οἷον τιμή τις τῆς ἀξίας τῶν ἄλλων, διὸ (2) φαίνεται ὤνια ἅπαντα εἶναι αὐτοῦ), καὶ τρυφεροὶ καὶ σαλά(3)κωνες, τρυφεροὶ μὲν διὰ τὴν τροφὴν καὶ τὴν ἔνδειξιν τῆς (4) εὐδαιμονίας, σαλάκωνες δὲ καὶ σόλοικοι διὰ τὸ πάντας εἰωθέ(5)ναι διατρίβειν περὶ τὸ ἐρώμενον καὶ θαυμαζόμενον ὑπ’ αὐτῶν. (6) καὶ τὸ οἴεσθαι ζηλοῦν τοὺς ἄλλους ἃ καὶ αὐτοί.

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Part 16. The type of character produced by Wealth lies on the surface for all to see. Wealthy men are insolent and arrogant; their possession of wealth affects their understanding; they feel as if they had every good thing that exists; wealth becomes a sort of standard of value for everything else, and therefore they imagine there is nothing it cannot buy. They are luxurious and ostentatious; luxurious, because of the luxury in which they live and the prosperity which they display; ostentatious and vulgar, because, like other people’s, their minds are regularly occupied with the object of their love and admiration, and also because they think that other people’s idea of happiness is the same as their own.

ἅμα δὲ καὶ (7) εἰκότως τοῦτο πάσχουσιν(πολλοὶ γάρ εἰσιν οἱ δεόμενοι τῶν (8) ἐχόντων· ὅθεν καὶ τὸ Σιμωνίδου εἴρηται περὶ τῶν σοφῶν καὶ (9) πλουσίων πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα τὴν Ἱέρωνος ἐρομένην πότερον (10) γενέσθαι κρεῖττον πλούσιον ἢ σοφόν· “πλούσιον” εἰπεῖν· τοὺς (11) σοφοὺς γὰρ ἔφη ὁρᾶν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν πλουσίων θύραις δια(12)τρίβοντας), καὶ τὸ οἴεσθαι ἀξίους εἶναι ἄρχειν· ἔχειν γὰρ (13) οἴονται ὧν ἕνεκεν ἄρχειν ἄξιον. καὶ ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ, ἀνοήτου (14) εὐδαίμονος ἦθος <ἦθος> πλούτου ἐστίν. διαφέρει δὲ τοῖς (15) νεωστὶ κεκτημένοις καὶ τοῖς πάλαι τὰ ἤθη τῷ ἅπαντα μᾶλλον (16) καὶ φαυλότερα τὰ κακὰ ἔχειν τοὺς νεοπλούτους (ὥσπερ γὰρ (17) ἀπαιδευσία πλούτου ἐστὶ τὸ νεόπλουτον εἶναι), καὶ ἀδικήματα (18) ἀδικοῦσιν οὐ κακουργικά, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ὑβριστικὰ τὰ δὲ ἀκρα(19)τευτικά, οἷον εἰς αἰκίαν καὶ μοιχείαν.

. . . . . . .

It is indeed quite natural that they should be affected thus; for if you have money, there are always plenty of people who come begging from you. Hence the saying of Simonides about wise men and rich men, in answer to Hiero’s wife, who asked him whether it was better to grow rich or wise. ’Why, rich,’ he said; ‘for I see the wise men spending their days at the rich men’s doors.’ Rich men also consider themselves worthy to hold public office; for they consider they already have the things that give a claim to office. In a word, the type of character produced by wealth is that of a prosperous fool. There is indeed one difference between the type of the newly—enriched and those who have long been rich: the newly—enriched have all the bad qualities mentioned in an exaggerated and worse form——to be newly—enriched means, so to speak, no education in riches. The wrongs they do others are not meant to injure their victims, but spring from insolence or self—indulgence, e.g. those that end in assault or in adultery.

17. (20) Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ δυνάμεως σχεδὸν τὰ πλεῖστα φανερά (21) ἐστιν ἤθη.

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Part 17. As to Power: here too it may fairly be said that the type of character it produces is mostly obvious enough.

τὰ μὲν γὰρ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχει δύναμις τῷ πλούτῳ (22) τὰ δὲ βελτίω· φιλοτιμότεροι γὰρ καὶ ἀνδρωδέστεροί εἰσιν τὰ (23) ἤθη οἱ δυνάμενοι τῶν πλουσίων διὰ τὸ ἐφίεσθαι ἔργων ὅσα (24) ἐξουσία αὐτοῖς πράττειν διὰ τὴν δύναμιν, καὶ σπουδαστικώ(25)τεροι διὰ τὸ ἐν ἐπιμελείᾳ εἶναι, ἀναγκαζόμενοι σκοπεῖν τὰ (26) περὶ τὴν δύναμιν, καὶ σεμνότεροι ἢ βαρύτεροι· ποιεῖ γὰρ σε(27)μνοτέρους τὸ ἀξίωμα, διὸ μετριάζουσιν, ἔστι δὲ ἡ σεμνότης (28) μαλακὴ καὶ εὐσχήμων βαρύτης· κἂν ἀδικῶσιν, οὐ μικρα(29)δικηταί εἰσιν ἀλλὰ μεγαλάδικοι.

. . . . . .

Some elements in this type it shares with the wealthy type, others are better. Those in power are more ambitious and more manly in character than the wealthy, because they aspire to do the great deeds that their power permits them to do. Responsibility makes them more serious: they have to keep paying attention to the duties their position involves. They are dignified rather than arrogant, for the respect in which they are held inspires them with dignity and therefore with moderation —dignity being a mild and becoming form of arrogance. If they wrong others, they wrong them not on a small but on a great scale.

(30) ἡ δ’ εὐτυχία κατὰ μόριά τε τῶν εἰρημένων ἔχει τὰ ἤθη (31) (εἰς γὰρ ταῦτα συντείνουσιν αἱ μέγισται δοκοῦσαι εἶναι εὐτυ(32)χίαι), καὶ ἔτι εἰς εὐτεκνίαν καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἀγαθὰ παρα(33)σκευάζει ἡ εὐτυχία πλεονεκτεῖν. ὑπερηφανώτεροι μὲν οὖν καὶ (1391b1) ἀλογιστότεροι διὰ τὴν εὐτυχίαν εἰσίν, ἓν δὲ ἀκολουθεῖ βέλτι(2)στον ἦθος τῇ εὐτυχίᾳ, ὅτι φιλόθεοί εἰσι καὶ ἔχουσιν πρὸς τὸ (3) θεῖόν πως, πιστεύοντες διὰ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἀπὸ τῆς τύχης. (4) περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν καθ’ ἡλικίαν καὶ τύχην ἠθῶν εἴρηται· τὰ (5) γὰρ ἐναντία τῶν εἰρημένων ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων φανερά ἐστιν, (6) οἷον πένητος καὶ ἀτυχοῦς ἦθος καὶ ἀδυνάτου.

. . . . . . . .

Good fortune in certain of its branches produces the types of character belonging to the conditions just described, since these conditions are in fact more or less the kinds of good fortune that are regarded as most important. It may be added that good fortune leads us to gain all we can in the way of family happiness and bodily advantages. It does indeed make men more supercilious and more reckless; but there is one excellent quality that goes with it —piety, and respect for the divine power, in which they believe because of events which are really the result of chance. This account of the types of character that correspond to differences of age or fortune may end here; for to arrive at the opposite types to those described, namely, those of the poor, the unfortunate, and the powerless, we have only to ask what the opposite qualities are.

18. (7) Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ τῶν πιθανῶν λόγων χρῆσις πρὸς κρίσιν ἐστί (περὶ (8) ὧν γὰρ ἴσμεν καὶ κεκρίκαμεν οὐδὲν ἔτι δεῖ λόγου), ἔστι δ’ ἐάν (9) τε πρὸς ἕνα τις τῷ λόγῳ χρώμενος προτρέπῃ ἢ ἀποτρέπῃ, (10) οἷον οἱ νουθετοῦντες ποιοῦσιν ἢ πείθοντες (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἧττον (11) κριτὴς ὁ εἷς· ὃν γὰρ δεῖ πεῖσαι, οὗτός ἐστιν ὡς εἰπεῖν ἁπλῶς (12) κριτής), ἐάν τε πρὸς ἀμφισβητοῦντας, ἐάν τε πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν (13) λέγῃ τις, ὁμοίως (τῷ γὰρ λόγῳ ἀνάγκη χρῆσθαι καὶ ἀναιρεῖν (14) τὰ ἐναντία, πρὸς ἃ ὥσπερ ἀμφισβητοῦντα τὸν λόγον ποιεῖται), (15) ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς (ὥσπερ γὰρ πρὸς κριτὴν (16) τὸν θεωρὸν ὁ λόγος συνέστηκεν, ὅλως δὲ μόνος ἐστὶν ἁπλῶς (17) κριτὴς ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς ἀγῶσιν ὁ τὰ ζητούμενα κρίνων· τά (18) τε γὰρ ἀμφισβητούμενα ζητεῖται πῶς ἔχει, καὶ περὶ ὧν βου(19)λεύονται), περὶ δὲ τῶν κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας ἠθῶν ἐν τοῖς συμ(20)βουλευτικοῖς εἴρηται πρότερον —ὥστε διωρισμένον ἂν εἴη πῶς (21) τε καὶ διὰ τίνων τοὺς λόγους ἠθικοὺς ποιητέον.

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Part 18. The use of persuasive speech is to lead to decisions. (When we know a thing, and have decided about it, there is no further use in speaking about it.) This is so even if one is addressing a single person and urging him to do or not to do something, as when we scold a man for his conduct or try to change his views: the single person is as much your ‘judge’ as if he were one of many; we may say, without qualification, that any one is your judge whom you have to persuade. Nor does it matter whether we are arguing against an actual opponent or against a mere proposition; in the latter case we still have to use speech and overthrow the opposing arguments, and we attack these as we should attack an actual opponent. Our principle holds good of ceremonial speeches also; the ‘onlookers’ for whom such a speech is put together are treated as the judges of it. Broadly speaking, however, the only sort of person who can strictly be called a judge is the man who decides the issue in some matter of public controversy; that is, in law suits and in political debates, in both of which there are issues to be decided. In the section on political oratory an account has already been given of the types of character that mark the different constitutions. The manner and means of investing speeches with moral character may now be regarded as fully set forth.

(22) ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ ἕκαστον μὲν γένος τῶν λόγων ἕτερον ἦν τὸ (23) τέλος, περὶ ἁπάντων δ’ αὐτῶν εἰλημμέναι δόξαι καὶ προτά(24)σεις εἰσὶν ἐξ ὧν τὰς πίστεις φέρουσιν καὶ συμβουλεύοντες καὶ (25) ἐπιδεικνύμενοι καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦντες, ἔτι δὲ ἐξ ὧν ἠθικοὺς (26) τοὺς λόγους ἐνδέχεται ποιεῖν, καὶ περὶ τούτων διώρισται, (27) λοιπὸν ἡμῖν διελθεῖν περὶ τῶν κοινῶν.

. . . .

Each of the main divisions of oratory has, we have seen, its own distinct purpose. With regard to each division, we have noted the accepted views and propositions upon which we may base our arguments—for political, for ceremonial, and for forensic speaking. We have further determined completely by what means speeches may be invested with the required moral character. We are now to proceed to discuss the arguments common to all oratory.

πᾶσι γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον (28) τῷ περὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ καὶ ἀδυνάτου προσχρῆσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, (29) καὶ τοὺς μὲν ὡς ἔσται τοὺς δὲ ὡς γέγονε πειρᾶσθαι δεικνύναι.

. .

All orators, besides their special lines of argument, are bound to use, for instance, the topic of the Possible and Impossible; and to try to show that a thing has happened, or will happen in future.

(30) ἔτι δὲ <τὸ> περὶ μεγέθους κοινὸν ἁπάντων ἐστὶ τῶν λόγων· (31) χρῶνται γὰρ πάντες τῷ μειοῦν καὶ αὔξειν καὶ συμβουλεύοντες (32) καὶ ἐπαινοῦντες ἢ ψέγοντες καὶ κατηγοροῦντες ἢ ἀπολογού (1392a1) μενοι.

. .

Again, the topic of Size is common to all oratory; all of us have to argue that things are bigger or smaller than they seem, whether we are making political speeches, speeches of eulogy or attack, or prosecuting or defending in the law—courts.

τούτων δὲ διορισθέντων περὶ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων κοινῇ (2) πειραθῶμεν εἰπεῖν, εἴ τι ἔχομεν, καὶ περὶ παραδειγμάτων, (3) ὅπως τὰ λοιπὰ προσθέντες ἀποδῶμεν τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρό(4)θεσιν.

. .

Having analysed these subjects, we will try to say what we can about the general principles of arguing by ‘enthymeme’ and ‘example’, by the addition of which we may hope to complete the project with which we set out.

ἔστιν δὲ τῶν κοινῶν τὸ μὲν αὔξειν οἰκειότατον τοῖς (5) ἐπιδεικτικοῖς, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, τὸ δὲ γεγονὸς τοῖς δικανικοῖς (6) (περὶ τούτων γὰρ ἡ κρίσις), τὸ δὲ δυνατὸν καὶ ἐσόμενον τοῖς (7) συμβουλευτικοῖς.

. . .

Of the above—mentioned general lines of argument, that concerned with Amplification is—as has been already said—most appropriate to ceremonial speeches; that concerned with the Past, to forensic speeches, where the required decision is always about the past; that concerned with Possibility and the Future, to political speeches.

19. (8) Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ δυνατοῦ καὶ ἀδυνάτου λέγωμεν.

.

Part 19. Let us first speak of the Possible and Impossible.

ἂν (9) δὴ τὸ ἐναντίον ᾖ δυνατὸν ἢ εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον (10) δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι δυνατόν, οἷον εἰ δυνατὸν ἄνθρωπον ὑγιασθῆ(11)ναι, καὶ νοσῆσαι· ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων ᾗ ἐναν(12)τία.

. . .

It may plausibly be argued: That if it is possible for one of a pair of contraries to be or happen, then it is possible for the other: e.g. if a man can be cured, he can also fall ill; for any two contraries are equally possible, in so far as they are contraries.

καὶ εἰ τὸ ὅμοιον δυνατόν, καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον· καὶ εἰ τὸ χαλε(13)πώτερον δυνατόν, καὶ τὸ ῥᾷον· καὶ εἰ τὸ σπουδαῖον καὶ καλὸν (14) γενέσθαι δυνατόν, καὶ ὅλως δυνατὸν γενέσθαι· χαλεπώτερον (15) γὰρ καλὴν οἰκίαν ἢ οἰκίαν εἶναι. καὶ οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ δύναται γενέ(16)σθαι, καὶ τὸ τέλος· οὐδὲν γὰρ γίγνεται οὐδ’ ἄρχεται γίγνεσθαι (17) τῶν ἀδυνάτων, οἷον τὸ σύμμετρον τὴν διάμετρον εἶναι οὔτ’ ἂν (18) ἄρξαιτο γίγνεσθαι οὔτε γίγνεται. καὶ οὗ τὸ τέλος, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ (19) δυνατή· ἅπαντα γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς γίγνεται.

. . . . . . . . .

That if of two similar things one is possible, so is the other. That if the harder of two things is possible, so is the easier. That if a thing can come into existence in a good and beautiful form, then it can come into existence generally; thus a house can exist more easily than a beautiful house. That if the beginning of a thing can occur, so can the end; for nothing impossible occurs or begins to occur; thus the commensurability of the diagonal of a square with its side neither occurs nor can begin to occur. That if the end is possible, so is the beginning; for all things that occur have a beginning.

καὶ εἰ τὸ ὕστερον τῇ (20) οὐσίᾳ ἢ τῇ γενέσει δυνατὸν γενέσθαι, καὶ τὸ πρότερον, οἷον (21) εἰ ἄνδρα γενέσθαι δυνατόν, καὶ παῖδα (πρότερον γὰρ ἐκεῖνο (22) γίγνεται), καὶ εἰ παῖδα, καὶ ἄνδρα (καὶ ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἐκείνη). καὶ (23) ὧν ἢ ἔρως ἢ ἐπιθυμία φύσει ἐστίν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἀδυνάτων ἐρᾷ (24) οὐδὲ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. καὶ ὧν ἐπιστῆμαί εἰσι καὶ (25) τέχναι, δυνατὸν ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι καὶ γίγνεσθαι. καὶ ὅσων ἡ (26) ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως ἐν τούτοις ἐστὶν ἃ ἡμεῖς ἀναγκάσαιμεν ἂν (27) ἢ πείσαιμεν· ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶν ὧν κρείττους ἢ κύριοι ἢ φίλοι. καὶ (28) ὧν τὰ μέρη δυνατά, καὶ τὸ ὅλον, καὶ ὧν τὸ ὅλον δυνατόν, καὶ (29) τὰ μέρη ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ· εἰ γὰρ πρόσχισμα καὶ κεφαλὶς καὶ (30) χιτὼν δύναται γενέσθαι, καὶ ὑποδήματα δυνατὸν γενέσθαι, καὶ (31) εἰ ὑποδήματα, καὶ πρόσχισμα καὶ κεφαλίς καὶ χιτών. καὶ εἰ τὸ (1392b1) γένος ὅλον τῶν δυνατῶν γενέσθαι, καὶ τὸ εἶδος, καὶ εἰ τὸ εἶδος, καὶ (2) τὸ γένος, οἷον εἰ πλοῖον γενέσθαι δυνατόν, καὶ τριήρη, καὶ (3) εἰ τριήρη, καὶ πλοῖον. καὶ εἰ θάτερον τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα πεφυ(4)κότων, καὶ θάτερον, οἷον εἰ διπλάσιον, καὶ ἥμισυ, καὶ εἰ (5) ἥμισυ, διπλάσιον. καὶ εἰ ἄνευ τέχνης καὶ παρασκευῆς δυνα(6)τὸν γίγνεσθαι, μᾶλλον διὰ τέχνης καὶ ἐπιμελείας δυνατόν,

. . . . . . . . . . . .

That if that which is posterior in essence or in order of generation can come into being, so can that which is prior: thus if a man can come into being, so can a boy, since the boy comes first in order of generation; and if a boy can, so can a man, for the man also is first. That those things are possible of which the love or desire is natural; for no one, as a rule, loves or desires impossibilities. That things which are the object of any kind of science or art are possible and exist or come into existence. That anything is possible the first step in whose production depends on men or things which we can compel or persuade to produce it, by our greater strength, our control of them, or our friendship with them. That where the parts are possible, the whole is possible; and where the whole is possible, the parts are usually possible. For if the slit in front, the toe—piece, and the upper leather can be made, then shoes can be made; and if shoes, then also the front slit and toe—piece. That if a whole genus is a thing that can occur, so can the species; and if the species can occur, so can the genus: thus, if a sailing vessel can be made, so also can a trireme; and if a trireme, then a sailing vessel also. That if one of two things whose existence depends on each other is possible, so is the other; for instance, if ‘double’, then ‘half’, and if ‘half’, then ‘double’. That if a thing can be produced without art or preparation, it can be produced still more certainly by the careful application of art to it.

ὅθεν (7) καὶ Ἀγάθωνι εἴρηται (8)
καὶ μὴν τὰ μέν γε τῆς τέχνης πράσσειν,
τὰ δὲ (9) ἡμῖν ἀνάγκῃ καὶ τύχῃ προσγίγνεται.
(10) καὶ εἰ τοῖς χείροσι καὶ ἥττοσι καὶ ἀφρονεστέροις δυνατόν, καὶ (11) τοῖς ἐναντίοις μᾶλλον, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἰσοκράτης ἔφη δεινὸν εἴναι (12) εἰ ὁ μὲν Εὔθυνος ἔμαθεν, αὐτὸς δὲ μὴ δυνήσεται εὑρεῖν. περὶ (13) δὲ ἀδυνάτου δῆλον ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τοῖς εἰρημένοις (14) ὑπάρχει. (15) εἰ δὲ γέγονεν, ἐκ τῶνδε σκεπτέον. πρῶτον μὲν γάρ, εἰ τὸ (16) ἧττον γίγνεσθαι πεφυκὸς γέγονεν, γεγονὸς ἂν εἴη καὶ τὸ μᾶλ(17)λον. καὶ εἰ τὸ ὕστερον εἰωθὸς γίγνεσθαι γέγονεν, καὶ τὸ πρό(18)τερον γέγονεν, οἷον εἰ ἐπιλέλησται, καὶ ἔμαθέ ποτε τοῦτο. (19) καὶ εἰ ἐδύνατο καὶ ἐβούλετο, πέπραχε· πάντες γάρ, ὅταν (20) δυνάμενοι βουληθῶσι, πράττουσιν· ἐμποδὼν γὰρ οὐδέν.

. . . . . . . . . .

Hence Agathon has said: To some things we by art must needs attain, Others by destiny or luck we gain. That if anything is possible to inferior, weaker, and stupider people, it is more so for their opposites; thus Isocrates said that it would be a strange thing if he could not discover a thing that Euthynus had found out. As for Impossibility, we can clearly get what we want by taking the contraries of the arguments stated above. Questions of Past Fact may be looked at in the following ways: First, that if the less likely of two things has occurred, the more likely must have occurred also. That if one thing that usually follows another has happened, then that other thing has happened; that, for instance, if a man has forgotten a thing, he has also once learnt it. That if a man had the power and the wish to do a thing, he has done it; for every one does do whatever he intends to do whenever he can do it, there being nothing to stop him.

ἔτι (21) εἰ ἐβούλετο καὶ μηδὲν τῶν ἔξω ἐκώλυεν, καὶ εἰ ἐδύνατο καὶ (22) ὠργίζετο, καὶ εἰ ἐδύνατο καὶ ἐπεθύμει· ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ (23) ὧν ὀρέγονται, ἂν δύνωνται, ποιοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν φαῦλοι δι’ ἀκρα(24)σίαν, οἱ δ’ ἐπιεικεῖς ὅτι τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. καὶ εἰ (25) ἔμελλε [γίγνεσθαι], καὶ ποιεῖν· εἰκὸς γὰρ τὸν μέλλοντα καὶ (26) ποιῆσαι. καὶ εἰ γέγονεν ὅσα ἢ πέφυκε πρὸ ἐκείνου ἢ ἕνεκα (27) ἐκείνου, οἷον εἰ ἤστραψε, καὶ ἐβρόντησεν, καὶ εἰ ἐπείρασε, (28) καὶ ἔπραξεν. καὶ εἰ ὅσα ὕστερον πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι ἢ οὗ (29) ἕνεκα γίγνεται γέγονε, καὶ τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ τούτου ἕνεκα (30) γέγονεν, οἷον εἰ ἐβρόντησε, καὶ ἤστραψεν, καὶ εἰ ἔπραξεν, (31) ἐπείρασεν. ἔστι δὲ τούτων ἁπάντων τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ (32) δ’ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οὕτως ἔχοντα. περὶ δὲ τοῦ μὴ γεγονέναι (33) φανερὸν ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τοῖς εἰρημένοις. (1393a1) καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἐσομένου ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν δῆλον· τό τε γὰρ ἐν (2) δυνάμει καὶ ἐν βουλήσει ὂν ἔσται, καὶ τὰ ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ καὶ (3) ὀργῇ καὶ λογισμῷ μετὰ δυνάμεως ὄντα, ταῦτα καὶ ἐν ὁρμῇ τοῦ (4) ποιεῖν ἢ μελλήσει ἔσται· ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γίγνεται μᾶλλον (5) τὰ μέλλοντα ἢ τὰ μὴ μέλλοντα. καὶ εἰ προγέγονε ὅσα πρό(6)τερον πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι, οἷον εἰ συννεφεῖ, εἰκὸς ὗσαι. καὶ εἰ τὸ (7) ἕνεκα τούτου γέγονε, καὶ τοῦτο εἰκὸς γενέσθαι, οἷον εἰ θεμέ(8)λιος, καὶ οἰκία. (9) περὶ δὲ μεγέθους καὶ μικρότητος τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ μεί(10)ζονός τε καὶ ἐλάττονος καὶ ὅλως μεγάλων καὶ μικρῶν ἐκ τῶν (11) προειρημένων ἡμῖν ἐστιν φανερόν. εἴρηται γὰρ ἐν τοῖς συμ(12)βουλευτικοῖς περί τε μεγέθους ἀγαθῶν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μείζονος (13) ἁπλῶς καὶ ἐλάττονος, ὥστε ἐπεὶ καθ’ ἕκαστον τῶν λόγων τὸ (14) προκείμενον τέλος ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, οἷον τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ (15) καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, φανερὸν ὅτι δι’ ἐκείνων ληπτέον τὰς (16) αὐξήσεις πᾶσιν. τὸ δὲ παρὰ ταῦτα ἔτι ζητεῖν περὶ μεγέθους (17) ἁπλῶς καὶ ὑπεροχῆς κενολογεῖν ἐστιν· κυριώτερα γάρ ἐστιν (18) πρὸς τὴν χρείαν τῶν καθόλου τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα τῶν πρα(19)γμάτων.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

That, further, he has done the thing in question either if he intended it and nothing external prevented him; or if he had the power to do it and was angry at the time; or if he had the power to do it and his heart was set upon it —for people as a rule do what they long to do, if they can; bad people through lack of self—control; good people, because their hearts are set upon good things. Again, that if a thing was ‘going to happen’, it has happened; if a man was ‘going to do something’, he has done it, for it is likely that the intention was carried out. That if one thing has happened which naturally happens before another or with a view to it, the other has happened; for instance, if it has lightened, it has also thundered; and if an action has been attempted, it has been done. That if one thing has happened which naturally happens after another, or with a view to which that other happens, then that other (that which happens first, or happens with a view to this thing) has also happened; thus, if it has thundered it has lightened, and if an action has been done it has been attempted. Of all these sequences some are inevitable and some merely usual. The arguments for the non—occurrence of anything can obviously be found by considering the opposites of those that have been mentioned. How questions of Future Fact should be argued is clear from the same considerations: That a thing will be done if there is both the power and the wish to do it; or if along with the power to do it there is a craving for the result, or anger, or calculation, prompting it. That the thing will be done, in these cases, if the man is actually setting about it, or even if he means to do it later —for usually what we mean to do happens rather than what we do not mean to do. That a thing will happen if another thing which naturally happens before it has already happened; thus, if it is clouding over, it is likely to rain. That if the means to an end have occurred, then the end is likely to occur; thus, if there is a foundation, there will be a house. For arguments about the Greatness and Smallness of things, the greater and the lesser, and generally great things and small, what we have already said will show the line to take. In discussing deliberative oratory we have spoken about the relative greatness of various goods, and about the greater and lesser in general. Since therefore in each type oratory the object under discussion is some kind of good —whether it is utility, nobleness, or justice—it is clear that every orator must obtain the materials of amplification through these channels. To go further than this, and try to establish abstract laws of greatness and superiority, is to argue without an object; in practical life, particular facts count more than generalizations.

(20) περὶ μὲν οὖν δυνατοῦ καὶ ἀδυνάτου, καὶ πότερον γέγονεν (21) ἢ οὐ γέγονεν καὶ ἔσται ἢ οὐκ ἔσται, ἔτι δὲ περὶ μεγέθους καὶ (22) μικρότητος τῶν πραγμάτων, εἰρήσθω ταῦτα.

.

Enough has now been said about these questions of possibility and the reverse, of past or future fact, and of the relative greatness or smallness of things.

20. (23) Λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν πίστεων ἅπασιν εἰπεῖν, ἐπείπερ (24) εἴρηται περὶ τῶν ἰδίων. εἰσὶ δ’ αἱ κοιναὶ πίστεις δύο τῷ γένει, (25) παράδειγμα καὶ ἐνθύμημα· ἡ γὰρ γνώμη μέρος ἐνθυμήματός (26) ἐστιν.

. . .

Part 20. The special forms of oratorical argument having now been discussed, we have next to treat of those which are common to all kinds of oratory. These are of two main kinds, ‘Example’ and ‘Enthymeme’; for the ‘Maxim’ is part of an enthymeme.

πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ παραδείγματος λέγωμεν· ὅμοιον (27) γὰρ ἐπαγωγῇ τὸ παράδειγμα, ἡ δ’ ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχή. (28) παραδειγμάτων δὲ εἴδη δύο· ἓν μὲν γάρ ἐστιν παραδείγμα(29)τος εἶδος τὸ λέγειν πράγματα προγενομένα, ἓν δὲ τὸ αὐτὸν (30) ποιεῖν. τούτου δὲ ἓν μὲν παραβολὴ ἓν δὲ λόγοι, οἷον οἱ Αἰσώ(31)πειοι καὶ Λιβυκοί.

. . . .

We will first treat of argument by Example, for it has the nature of induction, which is the foundation of reasoning. This form of argument has two varieties; one consisting in the mention of actual past facts, the other in the invention of facts by the speaker. Of the latter, again, there are two varieties, the illustrative parallel and the fable (e.g. the fables of Aesop, those from Libya).

ἔστιν δὲ τὸ μὲν πράγματα λέγειν τοιόνδε (32) τι, ὥσπερ εἴ τις λέγοι ὅτι δεῖ πρὸς βασιλέα παρασκευάζεσθαι (33) καὶ μὴ ἐᾶν Αἴγυπτον χειρώσασθαι· καὶ γὰρ πρότερον Δαρεῖος (1393b1) οὐ πρότερον διέβη πρὶν Αἴγυπτον ἔλαβεν, λαβὼν δὲ διέβη, καὶ (2) πάλιν Ξέρξης οὐ πρότερον ἐπεχείρησεν πρὶν ἔλαβεν, λαβὼν (3) δὲ διέβη, ὥστε καὶ οὗτος ἐὰν λάβῃ, διαβήσεται, διὸ οὐκ ἐπι(4)τρεπτέον.

. . . .

As an instance of the mention of actual facts, take the following. The speaker may argue thus: ‘We must prepare for war against the king of Persia and not let him subdue Egypt. For Darius of old did not cross the Aegean until he had seized Egypt; but once he had seized it, he did cross. And Xerxes, again, did not attack us until he had seized Egypt; but once he had seized it, he did cross. If therefore the present king seizes Egypt, he also will cross, and therefore we must not let him.’

παραβολὴ δὲ τὰ Σωκρατικά, οἷον εἴ τις λέγοι ὅτι οὐ (5) δεῖ κληρωτοὺς ἄρχειν· ὅμοιον γὰρ ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις τοὺς (6) ἀθλητὰς κληροίη μὴ οἳ δύνανται ἀγωνίζεσθαι ἀλλ’ οἳ ἂν (7) λάχωσιν, ἢ τῶν πλωτήρων ὅντινα δεῖ κυβερνᾶν κληρώσειεν, (8) ὡς δέον τὸν λαχόντα ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸν ἐπιστάμενον. λόγος δέ, οἷος (9) ὁ Στησιχόρου περὶ Φαλάριδος καὶ <ὁ> Αἰσώπου ὑπὲρ τοῦ δημα(10)γωγοῦ. Στησίχορος μὲν γὰρ ἑλομένων στρατηγὸν αὐτοκράτορα (11) τῶν Ἱμεραίων Φάλαριν καὶ μελλόντων φυλακὴν διδόναι τοῦ (12) σώματος, τἆλλα διαλεχθεὶς εἶπεν αὐτοῖς λόγον ὡς ἵππος (13) κατεῖχε λειμῶνα μόνος, ἐλθόντος δ’ ἐλάφου καὶ διαφθείροντος (14) τὴν νομὴν βουλόμενος τιμωρήσασθαι τὸν ἔλαφον ἠρώτα τινὰ (15) ἄνθρωπον εἰ δύναιτ’ ἂν μετ’ αὐτοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι τὸν ἔλαφον, (16) ὁ δ’ ἔφησεν, ἐὰν λάβῃ χαλινὸν καὶ αὐτὸς ἀναβῇ ἐπ’ αὐτὸν (17) ἔχων ἀκόντια· συνομολογήσας δὲ καὶ ἀναβάντος ἀντὶ τοῦ (18) τιμωρήσασθαι αὐτὸς ἐδούλευσε τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. “οὕτω δὲ καὶ (19) ὑμεῖς”, ἔφη, “ὁρᾶτε μὴ βουλόμενοι τοὺς πολεμίους τιμωρή(20)σασθαι τὸ αὐτὸ πάθητε τῷ ἵππῳ· τὸν μὲν γὰρ χαλινὸν ἔχετε (21) ἤδη, ἑλόμενοι στρατηγὸν αὐτοκράτορα· ἑὰν δὲ φυλακὴν δῶτε (22) καὶ ἀναβῆναι ἐάσητε, δουλεύσετε ἤδη Φαλάριδι”. Αἴσωπος δὲ (23) ἐν Σάμῳ δημηγορῶν κρινομένου δημαγωγοῦ περὶ θανάτου ἔφη (24) ἀλώπεκα διαβαίνουσαν ποταμὸν ἀπωσθῆναι εἰς φάραγγα, οὐ (25) δυναμένην δὲ ἐκβῆναι πολὺν χρόνον κακοπαθεῖν καὶ κυνοραι(26)στὰς πολλοὺς ἔχεσθαι αὐτῆς, ἐχῖνον δὲ πλανώμενον, ὡς εἶδεν (27) αὐτήν, κατοικτείραντα ἐρωτᾶν εἰ ἀφέλοι αὐτῆς τοὺς κυνοραι(28)στάς, τὴν δὲ οὐκ ἐᾶν· ἐρομένου δὲ διὰ τί, “ὅτι οὗτοι μὲν” φάναι (29) “ἤδη μου πλήρεις εἰσὶ καὶ ὀλίγον ἕλκουσιν αἷμα, ἐὰν δὲ τούτους (30) ἀφέλητε, ἕτεροι ἐλθόντες πεινῶντες ἐκπιοῦνταί μου τὸ λοιπὸν (31) αἷμα”. “ἀτὰρ καὶ ὑμᾶς, ἄνδρες Σάμιοι, οὗτος μὲν οὐδὲν ἔτι (32) βλάψει (πλούσιος γάρ ἐστιν), ἐὰν δὲ τοῦτον ἀποκτείνητε, ἕτεροι (1394a1) ἥξουσι πένητες, οἳ ὑμᾶς ἀναλώσουσι τὰ λοιπὰ κλέπτοντες.” (2) εἰσὶ δ’ οἱ λόγοι δημηγορικοί, καὶ ἔχουσιν ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο, (3) ὅτι πράγματα μὲν εὑρεῖν ὅμοια γεγενημένα χαλεπόν, λόγους (4) δὲ ῥᾷον· ποιῆσαι γὰρ δεῖ ὥσπερ καὶ παραβολάς, ἄν τις (5) δύνηται τὸ ὅμοιον ὁρᾶν, ὅπερ ῥᾷόν ἐστιν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The illustrative parallel is the sort of argument Socrates used: e.g. ’Public officials ought not to be selected by lot. That is like using the lot to select athletes, instead of choosing those who are fit for the contest; or using the lot to select a steersman from among a ship’s crew, as if we ought to take the man on whom the lot falls, and not the man who knows most about it.’ Instances of the fable are that of Stesichorus about Phalaris, and that of Aesop in defence of the popular leader. When the people of Himera had made Phalaris military dictator, and were going to give him a bodyguard, Stesichorus wound up a long talk by telling them the fable of the horse who had a field all to himself. Presently there came a stag and began to spoil his pasturage. The horse, wishing to revenge himself on the stag, asked a man if he could help him to do so. The man said, ‘Yes, if you will let me bridle you and get on to your back with javelins in my hand’. The horse agreed, and the man mounted; but instead of getting his revenge on the stag, the horse found himself the slave of the man. ’You too’, said Stesichorus, ‘take care lest your desire for revenge on your enemies, you meet the same fate as the horse. By making Phalaris military dictator, you have already let yourselves be bridled. If you let him get on to your backs by giving him a bodyguard, from that moment you will be his slaves.’ Aesop, defending before the assembly at Samos a poular leader who was being tried for his life, told this story: A fox, in crossing a river, was swept into a hole in the rocks; and, not being able to get out, suffered miseries for a long time through the swarms of fleas that fastened on her. A hedgehog, while roaming around, noticed the fox; and feeling sorry for her asked if he might remove the fleas. But the fox declined the offer; and when the hedgehog asked why, she replied, ‘These fleas are by this time full of me and not sucking much blood; if you take them away, others will come with fresh appetites and drink up all the blood I have left.’ ‘So, men of Samos’, said Aesop, ‘my client will do you no further harm; he is wealthy already. But if you put him to death, others will come along who are not rich, and their peculations will empty your treasury completely.’ Fables are suitable for addresses to popular assemblies; and they have one advantage—they are comparatively easy to invent, whereas it is hard to find parallels among actual past events. You will in fact frame them just as you frame illustrative parallels: all you require is the power of thinking out your analogy, a power developed by intellectual training.

ῥᾴω (6) μὲν οὖν πορίσασθαι τὰ διὰ τῶν λόγων, χρησιμώτερα δὲ πρὸς (7) τὸ βουλεύσασθαι τὰ διὰ τῶν πραγμάτων· ὅμοια γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ (8) πολὺ τὰ μέλλοντα τοῖς γεγονόσιν. (9) δεῖ δὲ χρῆσθαι τοῖς παραδείγμασι οὐκ ἔχοντα μὲν ἐν(10)θυμήματα ὡς ἀποδείξεσιν (ἡ γὰρ πίστις διὰ τούτων), ἔχοντα (11) δὲ ὡς μαρτυρίοις, ἐπιλόγῳ χρώμενον τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν· προ(12)τιθέμενα μὲν γὰρ ἔοικεν ἐπαγωγῇ, τοῖς δὲ ῥητορικοῖς οὐκ (13) οἰκεῖον ἐπαγωγὴ πλὴν ἐν ὀλίγοις, ἐπιλεγόμενα δὲ μαρτυρίοις, (14) ὁ δὲ μάρτυς πανταχοῦ πιθανός· διὸ καὶ προτιθέντι μὲν ἀνάγκη (15) πολλὰ λέγειν, ἐπιλέγοντι δὲ καὶ ἓν ἱκανόν· μάρτυς γὰρ χρηστὸς (16) καὶ εἷς χρήσιμος.

. . . . . . .

But while it is easier to supply parallels by inventing fables, it is more valuable for the political speaker to supply them by quoting what has actually happened, since in most respects the future will be like what the past has been. Where we are unable to argue by Enthymeme, we must try to demonstrate our point by this method of Example, and to convince our hearers thereby. If we can argue by Enthymeme, we should use our Examples as subsequent supplementary evidence. They should not precede the Enthymemes: that will give the argument an inductive air, which only rarely suits the conditions of speech—making. If they follow the enthymemes, they have the effect of witnesses giving evidence, and this alway tells. For the same reason, if you put your examples first you must give a large number of them; if you put them last, a single one is sufficient; even a single witness will serve if he is a good one.

(17) πόσα μὲν οὖν εἴδη παραδειγμάτων, καὶ πῶς αὐτοῖς καὶ πότε (18) χρηστέον, εἴρηται.

.

It has now been stated how many varieties of argument by Example there are, and how and when they are to be employed.

21. (19) Περὶ δὲ γνωμολογίας, ῥηθέντος τί ἐστιν γνώμη μάλιστ’ ἂν (20) γένοιτο φανερὸν περὶ ποίων τε καὶ πότε καὶ τίσιν ἁρμόττει (21) χρῆσθαι τῷ γνωμολογεῖν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις.

.

Part 21. We now turn to the use of Maxims, in order to see upon what subjects and occasions, and for what kind of speaker, they will appropriately form part of a speech. This will appear most clearly when we have defined a maxim.

ἔστι δὴ γνώμη (22) ἀπόφανσις, οὐ μέντοι οὔτε περὶ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστον, οἷον ποῖός (23) τις Ἰφικράτης, ἀλλὰ καθόλου, οὔτε περὶ πάντων, οἷον ὅτι τὸ (24) εὐθὺ τῷ καμπύλῳ ἐναντίον, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὅσων αἱ πράξεις εἰσί, (25) καὶ <ἃ> αἱρετὰ ἢ φευκτά ἐστι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν, ὥστ’ ἐπεὶ τὸ (26) ἐνθύμημα ὁ περὶ τοιούτων συλλογισμός ἐστιν, σχεδὸν τὰ (27) συμπεράσματα τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἀφαιρεθέντος (28) τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ γνῶμαί εἰσιν, οἷον (29)
χρὴ δ’ οὔ ποθ’ ὅστις ἀρτίφρων πέφυκ’ ἀνήρ (30)
παῖδας περισσῶς ἐκδιδάσκεσθαι σοφούς.
(30) τοῦτο μὲν οὖν γνώμη· προστεθείσης δὲ τῆς αἰτίας καὶ τοῦ διὰ (31) τί ἐνθύμημά ἐστιν τὸ ἅπαν, οἷον (32)
χωρὶς γὰρ ἄλλης ἧς ἔχουσιν ἀργίας,
(33)φθόνον παρ’ ἀστῶν ἀλφάνουσι δυσμενῆ,
(1394b1) καὶ τὸ
οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις πάντ’ ἀνὴρ εὐδαιμονεῖ,
(2) καὶ τὸ (3)
οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρῶν ὅστις ἔστ’ ἐλεύθερος
(4) γνώμη, πρὸς δὲ τῷ ἐχομένῳ ἐνθύμημα,
(5) ἢ χρημάτων γὰρ δοῦλός ἐστιν ἢ τύχης.
(6) εἰ δή ἐστιν γνώμη τὸ εἰρημένον, ἀνάγκη τέτταρα εἴδη εἶναι (7) γνώμης· ἢ γὰρ μετ’ ἐπιλόγου ἔσται ἢ ἄνευ ἐπιλόγου.

. . . . . . . . . . . .

It is a statement; not a particular fact, such as the character of Iphicrates, but of a general kind; nor is it about any and every subject —e.g. ’straight is the contrary of curved’ is not a maxim——but only about questions of practical conduct, courses of conduct to be chosen or avoided. Now an Enthymeme is a syllogism dealing with such practical subjects. It is therefore roughly true that the premisses or conclusions of Enthymemes, considered apart from the rest of the argument, are Maxims: e.g.
Never should any man whose wits are sound
Have his sons taught more wisdom than their fellows.
Here we have a Maxim; add the reason or explanation, and the whole thing is an Enthymeme; thus— It makes them idle; and therewith they earn
Ill—will and jealousy throughout the city. Again,
There is no man in all things prosperous,
and
There is no man among us all is free,
are maxims; but the latter, taken with what follows it, is an Enthymeme—
For all are slaves of money or of chance.
From this definition of a maxim it follows that there are four kinds of maxims. In the first Place, the maxim may or may not have a supplement.

ἀπο(8)δείξεως μὲν οὖν δεόμεναί εἰσιν ὅσαι παράδοξόν τι λέγουσιν (9) ἢ ἀμφισβητούμενον· ὅσαι δὲ μηδὲν παράδοξον, ἄνευ ἐπιλόγου. (10) τούτων δ’ ἀνάγκη τὰς μὲν διὰ τὸ προεγνῶσθαι μηδὲν δεῖσθαι (11) ἐπιλόγου, οἷον
(12) ἀνδρὶ δ’ ὑγιαίνειν ἄριστόν ἐστιν,
ὥς γ’ ἐμὶν δοκεῖ (13) (φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ τοῖς πολλοῖς οὕτω), τὰς δ’ ἅμα λεγομένας (14) δήλας εἶναι ἐπιβλέψασιν, οἷον
(15) οὐδεὶς ἐραστὴς ὅστις οὐκ ἀεὶ φιλεῖ.

. . . . . .

Proof is needed where the statement is paradoxical or disputable; no supplement is wanted where the statement contains nothing paradoxical, either because the view expressed is already a known truth, e.g. Chiefest of blessings is health for a man, as it seemeth to me,
this being the general opinion: or because, as soon as the view is stated, it is clear at a glance, e.g. No love is true save that which loves for ever.

(16) τῶν δὲ μετ’ ἐπιλόγου αἱ μὲν ἐνθυμήματος μέρος εἰσίν, (17) ὥσπερ
(18) χρὴ δ’ οὔ ποθ’ ὅστις ἀρτίφρων,
(19) αἱ δ’ ἐνθυμηματικαὶ μέν, οὐκ ἐνθυμήματος δὲ μέρος· αἵπερ (20) καὶ μάλιστ’ εὐδοκιμοῦσιν. εἰσὶν δ’ αὗται ἐν ὅσαις ἐμφαίνεται (21) τοῦ λεγομένου τὸ αἴτιον, οἷον ἐν τῷ
(22) ἀθάνατον ὀργὴν μὴ φύλασσε θνητὸς ὤν·
(23) τὸ μὲν γὰρ φάναι “μὴ δεῖν φυλάττειν” γνώμη, τὸ δὲ προσ(24)κείμενον “θνητὸν ὄντα” τὸ διὰ τί.

. . . . . .

Of the Maxims that do have a supplement attached, some are part of an Enthymeme, e.g. Never should any man whose wits are sound, &c. Others have the essential character of Enthymemes, but are not stated as parts of Enthymemes; these latter are reckoned the best; they are those in which the reason for the view expressed is simply implied, e.g. O mortal man, nurse not immortal wrath. To say ‘it is not right to nurse immortal wrath’ is a maxim; the added words ‘mortal man’ give the reason.

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ (25) θνατὰ χρὴ τὸν θνατόν, οὐκ ἀθάνατα τὸν θνατὸν φρονεῖν.

.

Similarly, with the words Mortal creatures ought to cherish mortal, not immortal thoughts.

(26) φανερὸν οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων πόσα τε εἴδη γνώμης, (27) καὶ περὶ ποῖον ἕκαστον ἁρμόττει· περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀμφισ(28)βητουμένων ἢ παραδόξων μὴ ἄνευ ἐπιλόγου, ἀλλ’ ἢ προθέντα τὸν (29) ἐπίλογον γνώμῃ χρῆσθαι τῷ συμπεράσματι (οἷον εἴ τις εἴποι
(30) “ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ἐπειδὴ οὔτε φθονεῖσθαι δεῖ οὔτ’ ἀργὸν εἶναι, (31) οὔ φημι χρῆναι παιδεύεσθαι”),
ἢ τοῦτο προειπόντα ἐπειπεῖν (32) τὰ ἔμπροσθεν· περὶ δὲ τῶν μὴ παραδόξων ἀδήλων δὲ προστι(33)θέντα τὸ διότι στρογγυλώτατα.

. . . . .

What has been said has shown us how many kinds of Maxims there are, and to what subjects the various kinds are appropriate. They must not be given without supplement if they express disputed or paradoxical views: we must, in that case, either put the supplement first and make a maxim of the conclusion, e.g. you might say, ‘For my part, since both unpopularity and idleness are undesirable, I hold that it is better not to be educated’; or you may say this first, and then add the previous clause. Where a statement, without being paradoxical, is not obviously true, the reason should be added as concisely as possible.

ἁρμόττει δ’ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις (34) καὶ τὰ Λακωνικὰ ἀποφθέγματα καὶ τὰ αἰνιγματώδη, οἷον εἴ (1395a1) τις λέγει ὅπερ Στησίχορος ἐν Λοκροῖς εἶπεν, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ὑβρι(2)στὰς εἶναι, ὅπως μὴ οἱ τέττιγες χαμόθεν ᾄδωσιν.

. .

In such cases both laconic and enigmatic sayings are suitable: thus one might say what Stesichorus said to the Locrians, ‘Insolence is better avoided, lest the cicalas chirp on the ground’.

ἁρμόττει δὲ (3) γνωμολογεῖν ἡλικίᾳ μὲν πρεσβυτέρων, περὶ δὲ τούτων ὧν (4) ἔμπειρός τίς ἐστιν, ὥστε τὸ μὲν μὴ τηλικοῦτον ὄντα γνωμο(5)λογεῖν ἀπρεπὲς ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μυθολογεῖν, περὶ δὲ ὧν ἄπειρος, (6) ἠλίθιον καὶ ἀπαίδευτον. σημεῖον δὲ ἱκανόν· οἱ γὰρ ἀγροῖκοι (7) μάλιστα γνωμοτύποι εἰσὶ καὶ ῥᾳδίως ἀποφαίνονται.

. . .

The use of Maxims is appropriate only to elderly men, and in handling subjects in which the speaker is experienced. For a young man to use them is—like telling stories—unbecoming; to use them in handling things in which one has no experience is silly and ill—bred: a fact sufficiently proved by the special fondness of country fellows for striking out maxims, and their readiness to air them.

(8) καθόλου δὲ μὴ ὄντος καθόλου εἰπεῖν μάλιστα ἁρμόττει (9) ἐν σχετλιασμῷ καὶ δεινώσει, καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἢ ἀρχόμενον ἢ (10) ἀποδείξαντα.

.

To declare a thing to be universally true when it is not is most appropriate when working up feelings of horror and indignation in our hearers; especially by way of preface, or after the facts have been proved.

χρῆσθαι δὲ δεῖ καὶ ταῖς τεθρυλημέναις καὶ (11) κοιναῖς γνώμαις, ἐὰν ὦσι χρήσιμοι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι κοιναί, ὡς (12) ὁμολογούντων πάντων, ὀρθῶς ἔχειν δοκοῦσιν, οἷον παρακαλοῦντι (13) ἐπὶ τὸ κινδυνεύειν μὴ θυσαμένους
εἷς οἰωνὸς ἄριστος ἀμύνεσθαι περὶ πάτρης, (14) καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἥττους ὄντας
(14) ξυνὸς Ἐνυάλιος, (15) καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἀναιρεῖν τῶν ἐχθρῶν τὰ τέκνα καὶ μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντα
(16) νήπιος ὃς πατέρα κτείνας παῖδας καταλείπει.

. . . . .

Even hackneyed and commonplace maxims are to be used, if they suit one’s purpose: just because they are commonplace, every one seems to agree with them, and therefore they are taken for truth. Thus, any one who is calling on his men to risk an engagement without obtaining favourable omens may quote One omen of all is hest, that we fight for our fatherland. Or, if he is calling on them to attack a stronger force—The War—God showeth no favour. Or, if he is urging people to destroy the innocent children of their enemies—Fool, who slayeth the father and leaveth his sons to avenge him.

(17) ἔτι ἔνιαι τῶν παροιμιῶν καὶ γνῶμαί εἰσιν, οἷον παροιμία (18) “Ἀττικὸς πάροικος”. δεῖ δὲ τὰς γνώμας λέγειν καὶ παρὰ τὰ (19) δεδημοσιευμένα (λέγω δὲ δεδημοσιευμένα οἷον τὸ “γνῶθι σαυ(20)τὸν” καὶ τὸ “μηδὲν ἄγαν”), ὅταν ἢ τὸ ἦθος φαίνεσθαι μέλλῃ (21) βέλτιον ἢ παθητικῶς εἰρημένη. ἔστι δὲ παθητικὴ μὲν οἷον (22) εἴ τις ὀργιζόμενος φαίη ψεῦδος εἶναι ὡς δεῖ γιγνώσκειν αὑτόν· (23) οὗτος γοῦν εἰ ἐγίγνωσκεν ἑαυτόν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε στρατηγεῖν (24) ἠξίωσε· τὸ δὲ ἦθος βέλτιον, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ, ὥσπερ φασίν, φιλεῖν (25) ὡς μισήσοντας, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον μισεῖν ὡς φιλήσοντας.

. . . . .

Some proverbs are also maxims, e.g. the proverb ‘An Attic neighbour’. You are not to avoid uttering maxims that contradict such sayings as have become public property (I mean such sayings as ‘know thyself’ and ‘nothing in excess’) if doing so will raise your hearers’ opinion of your character, or convey an effect of strong emotion —e.g. an angry speaker might well say, ‘It is not true that we ought to know ourselves: anyhow, if this man had known himself, he would never have thought himself fit for an army command.’ It will raise people’s opinion of our character to say, for instance, ‘We ought not to follow the saying that bids us treat our friends as future enemies: much better to treat our enemies as future friends.’

δεῖ δὲ τῇ (26) λέξει τὴν προαίρεσιν συνδηλοῦν, εἰ δὲ μή, τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπι(27)λέγειν, οἷον οὕτως εἰπόντα, ὅτι “δεῖ δὲ φιλεῖν οὐχ ὥσπερ φασίν, (28) ἀλλ’ ὡς ἀεὶ φιλήσοντα· ἐπιβούλου γὰρ θάτερον”, ἢ ὧδε, “οὐκ (29) ἀρέσκει δέ μοι τὸ λεγόμενον· δεῖ γὰρ τὸν ἀληθινὸν φίλον ὡς (30) φιλήσοντα ἀεὶ φιλεῖν”, καὶ “οὐδὲ τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν· δεῖ γὰρ (31) τούς γε κακοὺς ἄγαν μισεῖν”.

. . . . . .

The moral purpose should be implied partly by the very wording of our maxim. Failing this, we should add our reason: e.g. having said ‘We should treat our friends, not as the saying advises, but as if they were going to be our friends always’, we should add ‘for the other behaviour is that of a traitor’: or we might put it, I disapprove of that saying. A true friend will treat his friend as if he were going to be his friend for ever’; and again, ‘Nor do I approve of the saying nothing in excess: we are bound to hate bad men excessively.’

(1395b1) ἔχουσι δ’ εἰς τοὺς λόγους βοήθειαν μεγάλην μίαν μὲν διὰ (2) τὴν φορτικότητα τῶν ἀκροατῶν· χαίρουσι γὰρ ἐάν τις καθόλου (3) λέγων ἐπιτύχῃ τῶν δοξῶν ἃς ἐκεῖνοι κατὰ μέρος ἔχουσιν. ὃ (4) δὲ λέγω δῆλον ἔσται ὧδε, ἅμα δὲ καὶ πῶς δεῖ αὐτὰς θηρεύειν. (5) ἡ μὲν γὰρ γνώμη, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἀπόφανσις καθόλου ἐστίν, (6) χαίρουσι δὲ καθόλου λεγομένου ὃ κατὰ μέρος προϋπολαμβά(7)νοντες τυγχάνουσι· οἷον εἴ τις γείτοσι τύχοι κεχρημένος ἢ (8) τέκνοις φαύλοις, ἀποδέξαιτ’ ἂν τοῦ εἰπόντος ὅτι οὐδὲν γειτο(9)νίας χαλεπώτερον ἢ ὅτι οὐδὲν ἠλιθιώτερον τεκνοποιίας, (10) ὥστε δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι ποῖα τυγχάνουσι προϋπολαμβάνον(11)τες, εἶθ’ οὕτως περὶ τούτων καθόλου λέγειν. ταύτην τε δὴ (12) ἔχει μίαν χρῆσιν τὸ γνωμολογεῖν, καὶ ἑτέραν κρείττω· ἠθικοὺς (13) γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους. ἦθος δὲ ἔχουσιν οἱ λόγοι ἐν ὅσοις (14) δήλη ἡ προαίρεσις· αἱ δὲ γνῶμαι πᾶσαι τοῦτο ποιοῦσιν διὰ τὸ (15) ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸν τὴν γνώμην λέγοντα καθόλου περὶ τῶν προ(16)αιρέσεων, ὥστε, ἂν χρησταὶ ὦσιν αἱ γνῶμαι, καὶ χρηστοήθη (17) φαίνεσθαι ποιοῦσι τὸν λέγοντα.

. . . . . . . . .

One great advantage of Maxims to a speaker is due to the want of intelligence in his hearers, who love to hear him succeed in expressing as a universal truth the opinions which they hold themselves about particular cases. I will explain what I mean by this, indicating at the same time how we are to hunt down the maxims required. The maxim, as has been already said, a general statement and people love to hear stated in general terms what they already believe in some particular connexion: e.g. if a man happens to have bad neighbours or bad children, he will agree with any one who tells him, ‘Nothing is more annoying than having neighbours’, or, ‘Nothing is more foolish than to be the parent of children.’ The orator has therefore to guess the subjects on which his hearers really hold views already, and what those views are, and then must express, as general truths, these same views on these same subjects. This is one advantage of using maxims. There is another which is more important—it invests a speech with moral character. There is moral character in every speech in which the moral purpose is conspicuous: and maxims always produce this effect, because the utterance of them amounts to a general declaration of moral principles: so that, if the maxims are sound, they display the speaker as a man of sound moral character.

(18) περὶ μὲν οὖν γνώμης, καὶ τί ἐστι καὶ πόσα εἴδη ταύτης (19) καὶ πῶς χρηστέον αὐτῇ καὶ τίνα ὠφέλειαν ἔχει, εἰρήσθω (20) ταῦτα.

.

So much for the Maxim—its nature, varieties, proper use, and advantages.

22. (21) Περὶ δ’ ἐνθυμημάτων καθόλου τε εἴπωμεν τίνα τρόπον δεῖ (22) ζητεῖν, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τοὺς τόπους· ἄλλο γὰρ εἶδος ἑκάτερον (23) τούτων ἐστίν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὸ ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμός ἐστιν, (24) εἴρηται πρότερον, καὶ πῶς συλλογισμός, καὶ τί διαφέρει τῶν (25) διαλεκτικῶν· οὔτε γὰρ πόρρωθεν οὔτε πάντα δεῖ λαμβάνοντας (26) συνάγειν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀσαφὲς διὰ τὸ μῆκος, τὸ δὲ ἀδολεσχία (27) διὰ τὸ φανερὰ λέγειν.

. . . . . . .

Part 22. We now come to the Enthymemes, and will begin the subject with some general consideration of the proper way of looking for them, and then proceed to what is a distinct question, the lines of argument to be embodied in them. It has already been pointed out that the Enthymeme is a syllogism, and in what sense it is so. We have also noted the differences between it and the syllogism of dialectic. Thus we must not carry its reasoning too far back, or the length of our argument will cause obscurity: nor must we put in all the steps that lead to our conclusion, or we shall waste words in saying what is manifest.

τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον καὶ τοῦ πιθανωτέρους (28) εἶναι τοὺς ἀπαιδεύτους τῶν πεπαιδευμένων ἐν τοῖς ὄχλοις, (29) ὥσπερ φασὶν οἱ ποιηταὶ τοὺς ἀπαιδεύτους παρ’ ὄχλῳ μουσι(30)κωτέρως λέγειν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰ κοινὰ καὶ καθόλου λέγουσιν, οἱ (31) δ’ ἐξ ὧν ἴσασι, καὶ τὰ ἐγγύς· ὥστ’ οὐκ ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν (32) δοκούντων ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῶν ὡρισμένων λεκτέον, οἷον ἢ τοῖς κρί(1396a1)νουσιν ἢ οὓς ἀποδέχονται, καὶ τοῦτο διότι οὕτως φαίνεται (2) δῆλον εἶναι ἅπασιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις· καὶ μὴ μόνον συνάγειν (3) ἐκ τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ.

. . . . . .

It is this simplicity that makes the uneducated more effective than the educated when addressing popular audiences —makes them, as the poets tell us, ‘charm the crowd’s ears more finely’. Educated men lay down broad general principles; uneducated men argue from common knowledge and draw obvious conclusions. We must not, therefore, start from any and every accepted opinion, but only from those we have defined —those accepted by our judges or by those whose authority they recognize: and there must, moreover, be no doubt in the minds of most, if not all, of our judges that the opinions put forward really are of this sort. We should also base our arguments upon probabilities as well as upon certainties.

(4) πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι περὶ οὗ δεῖ λέγειν καὶ συλ(5)λογίζεσθαι εἴτε πολιτικῷ συλλογισμῷ εἴθ’ ὁποιῳοῦν, ἀναγκαῖον (6) κατὰ τούτου ἔχειν τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, ἢ πάντα ἢ ἔνια· μηδὲν γὰρ (7) ἔχων ἐξ οὐδενὸς ἂν ἔχοις συνάγειν. λέγω δ’ οἷον πῶς ἂν (8) δυναίμεθα συμβουλεύειν Ἀθηναίοις εἰ πολεμητέον ἢ μὴ (9) πολεμητέον, μὴ ἔχοντες τίς ἡ δύναμις αὐτῶν, πότερον ναυ(10)τικὴ ἢ πεζικὴ ἢ ἄμφω, καὶ αὕτη πόση, καὶ πρόσοδοι τίνες ἢ (11) φίλοι καὶ ἐχθροί, εἶτα τίνας πολέμους πεπολεμήκασι καὶ πῶς, (12) καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἢ ἐπαινεῖν, εἰ μὴ ἔχοιμεν τὴν ἐν Σαλα(13)μῖνι ναυμαχίαν ἢ τὴν ἐν Μαραθῶνι μάχην ἢ τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν (14) Ἡρακλειδῶν πραχθέντα ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων. ἐκ γὰρ τῶν (15) ὑπαρχόντων ἢ δοκούντων ὑπάρχειν καλῶν ἐπαινοῦσι πάντες. (16) ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ψέγουσιν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων, σκοποῦντες τί (17) ὑπάρχει τοιοῦτον αὐτοῖς ἢ δοκεῖ ὑπάρχειν, οἷον ὅτι τοὺς (18) Ἕλληνας κατεδουλώσαντο, καὶ τοὺς πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον (19) συμμαχεσαμένους καὶ ἀριστεύσαντας ἠνδραποδίσαντο, Αἰγινή(20)τας καὶ Ποτιδαιάτας, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, [καὶ] εἴ τι ἄλλο (21) τοιοῦτον ἁμάρτημα ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς. ὡς δ’ αὔτως καὶ οἱ κατ(22)ηγοροῦντες καὶ οἱ ἀπολογούμενοι ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων σκοπού(23)μενοι κατηγοροῦσι καὶ ἀπολογοῦνται. οὐδὲν δὲ διαφέρει περὶ (24) Ἀθηναίων ἢ Λακεδαιμονίων, ἢ ἀνθρώπου ἢ θεοῦ, τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο (25) δρᾶν· καὶ γὰρ συμβουλεύοντα τῷ Ἀχιλλεῖ, καὶ ἐπαινοῦντα καὶ (26) ψέγοντα, καὶ κατηγοροῦντα καὶ ἀπολογούμενον ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ, τὰ (27) ὑπάρχοντα ἢ δοκοῦντα ὑπάρχειν ληπτέον, ἵν’ ἐκ τούτων (28) λέγωμεν, ἐπαινοῦντες ἢ ψέγοντες εἴ τι καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν ὑπ(29)άρχει, κατηγοροῦντες δ’ ἢ ἀπολογούμενοι εἴ τι δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, (30) συμβουλεύοντες δ’ εἴ τι συμφέρον ἢ βλαβερόν.

. . . . . . . . . . .

The first thing we have to remember is this. Whether our argument concerns public affairs or some other subject, we must know some, if not all, of the facts about the subject on which we are to speak and argue. Otherwise we can have no materials out of which to construct arguments. I mean, for instance, how could we advise the Athenians whether they should go to war or not, if we did not know their strength, whether it was naval or military or both, and how great it is; what their revenues amount to; who their friends and enemies are; what wars, too, they have waged, and with what success; and so on? Or how could we eulogize them if we knew nothing about the sea—fight at Salamis, or the battle of Marathon, or what they did for the Heracleidae, or any other facts like that? All eulogy is based upon the noble deeds——real or imaginary——that stand to the credit of those eulogized. On the same principle, invectives are based on facts of the opposite kind: the orator looks to see what base deeds——real or imaginary——stand to the discredit of those he is attacking, such as treachery to the cause of Hellenic freedom, or the enslavement of their gallant allies against the barbarians (Aegina, Potidaea, &c.), or any other misdeeds of this kind that are recorded against them. So, too, in a court of law: whether we are prosecuting or defending, we must pay attention to the existing facts of the case. It makes no difference whether the subject is the Lacedaemonians or the Athenians, a man or a god; we must do the same thing. Suppose it to be Achilles whom we are to advise, to praise or blame, to accuse or defend; here too we must take the facts, real or imaginary; these must be our material, whether we are to praise or blame him for the noble or base deeds he has done, to accuse or defend him for his just or unjust treatment of others, or to advise him about what is or is not to his interest.

ὁμοίως δὲ (31) τούτοις καὶ περὶ πράγματος ὁτουοῦν, οἷον περὶ δικαιοσύνης, (32) εἰ ἀγαθὸν ἢ μὴ ἀγαθόν, ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ (33) καὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ· ὥστ’ ἐπειδὴ καὶ πάντες οὕτω φαίνονται ἀπο(34)δεικνύντες, ἐάν τε ἀκριβέστερον ἐάν τε μαλακώτερον συλ(1396b1)λογίζωνται (οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἁπάντων λαμβάνουσιν ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῶν περὶ (2) ἕκαστον ὑπαρχόντων), καὶ διὰ τοῦ λόγου δῆλον ὅτι ἀδύνατον (3) ἄλλως δεικνύναι, φανερὸν ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς Τοπι(4)κοῖς, πρῶτον περὶ ἕκαστον ἔχειν ἐξειλεγμένα περὶ τῶν ἐν(5)δεχομένων καὶ τῶν ἐπικαιροτάτων, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐξ ὑπογυίου (6) γιγνομένων ζητεῖν τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀποβλέποντα μὴ εἰς (7) ἀόριστα ἀλλ’ εἰς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος, καὶ περιγρά(8)φοντα ὅ τι πλεῖστα καὶ ἐγγύτατα τοῦ πράγματος· ὅσῳ μὲν γὰρ (9) ἂν πλείω ἔχῃ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, τοσούτῳ ῥᾷον δεικνύναι, ὅσῳ (10) δ’ ἐγγύτερον, τοσούτῳ οἰκειότερα καὶ ἧττον κοινά.

. . . . . . . . . . .

T he same thing applies to any subject whatever. Thus, in handling the question whether justice is or is not a good, we must start with the real facts about justice and goodness. We see, then, that this is the only way in which any one ever proves anything, whether his arguments are strictly cogent or not: not all facts can form his basis, but only those that bear on the matter in hand: nor, plainly, can proof be effected otherwise by means of the speech. Consequently, as appears in the Topics, we must first of all have by us a selection of arguments about questions that may arise and are suitable for us to handle; and then we must try to think out arguments of the same type for special needs as they emerge; not vaguely and indefinitely, but by keeping our eyes on the actual facts of the subject we have to speak on, and gathering in as many of them as we can that bear closely upon it: for the more actual facts we have at our command, the more easily we prove our case;

λέγω δὲ (11) κοινὰ μὲν τὸ ἐπαινεῖν τὸν Ἀχιλλέα ὅτι ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὅτι τῶν (12) ἡμιθέων καὶ ὅτι ἐπὶ τὸ Ἴλιον ἐστρατεύσατο· ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ (13) ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει πολλοῖς, ὥστε οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ὁ τοιοῦτος τὸν (14) Ἀχιλλέα ἐπαινεῖ ἢ Διομήδην· ἴδια δὲ ἃ μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ συμ(15)βέβηκεν ἢ τῷ Ἀχιλλεῖ, οἷον τὸ ἀποκτεῖναι τὸν Ἕκτορα τὸν (16) ἄριστον τῶν Τρώων καὶ τὸν Κύκνον, ὃς ἐκώλυσεν ἅπαντας (17) ἀποβαίνειν ἄτρωτος ὤν, καὶ ὅτι νεώτατος καὶ οὐκ ἔνορκος ὢν (18) ἐστράτευσεν, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα.

. . . .

and the more closely they bear on the subject, the more they will seem to belong to that speech only instead of being commonplaces. By ‘commonplaces’ I mean, for example, eulogy of Achilles because he is a human being or a demi—god, or because he joined the expedition against Troy: these things are true of many others, so that this kind of eulogy applies no better to Achilles than to Diomede. The special facts here needed are those that are true of Achilles alone;

(19) εἷς μὲν οὖν τρόπος τῆς ἐκλογῆς πρῶτος οὗτος ὁ τοπικός, (20) τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων λέγωμεν· στοιχεῖον δὲ λέγω (21) καὶ τόπον ἐνθυμήματος τὸ αὐτό.

. .

such facts as that he slew Hector, the bravest of the Trojans, and Cycnus the invulnerable, who prevented all the Greeks from landing, and again that he was the youngest man who joined the expedition, and was not bound by oath to join it, and so on. Here, again, we have our first principle of selection of Enthymemes—that which refers to the lines of argument selected.

πρῶτον δὲ εἴπωμεν περὶ ὧν (22) ἀναγκαῖον εἰπεῖν πρῶτον. ἔστιν γὰρ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων εἴδη (23) δύο· τὰ μὲν γὰρ δεικτικά ἐστιν ὅτι ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, τὰ δ’ (24) ἐλεγκτικά, καὶ διαφέρει ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς ἔλεγχος (25) καὶ συλλογισμός. ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν δεικτικὸν ἐνθύμημα τὸ ἐξ (26) ὁμολογουμένων συνάγειν, τὸ δὲ ἐλεγκτικὸν τὸ τὰ ἀνομολο(27)γούμενα συνάγειν. (28) σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν περὶ ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν τῶν (29) χρησίμων καὶ ἀναγκαίων ἔχονται οἱ τόποι· ἐξειλεγμέναι γὰρ (30) αἱ προτάσεις περὶ ἕκαστόν εἰσιν, ὥστε ἐξ ὧν δεῖ φέρειν τὰ (31) ἐνθυμήματα τόπων περὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ κακοῦ, ἢ καλοῦ ἢ αἰσχροῦ, (32) ἢ δικαίου ἢ ἀδίκου, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἠθῶν καὶ παθημάτων καὶ (33) ἕξεων ὡσαύτως, εἰλημμένοι ἡμῖν ὑπάρχουσι πρότερον οἱ τόποι.

. . . . . . .

We will now consider the various elementary classes of enthymemes. (By an ‘elementary class’ of enthymeme I mean the same thing as a ‘line of argument’.) We will begin, as we must begin, by observing that there are two kinds of enthymemes. One kind proves some affirmative or negative proposition; the other kind disproves one. The difference between the two kinds is the same as that between syllogistic proof and disproof in dialectic. The demonstrative enthymeme is formed by the conjunction of compatible propositions; the refutative, by the conjunction of incompatible propositions. We may now be said to have in our hands the lines of argument for the various special subjects that it is useful or necessary to handle, having selected the propositions suitable in various cases.

(1397a1) ἔτι δὲ ἄλλον τρόπον καθόλου περὶ ἁπάντων λάβωμεν, καὶ (2) λέγωμεν παρασημαινόμενοι τοὺς ἐλεγκτικοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀπο(3)δεικτικούς, καὶ τοὺς τῶν φαινομένων ἐνθυμημάτων, οὐκ ὄντων (4) δὲ ἐνθυμημάτων, ἐπεί περ οὐδὲ συλλογισμῶν.

. . .

We have, in fact, already ascertained the lines of argument applicable to enthymemes about good and evil, the noble and the base, justice and injustice, and also to those about types of character, emotions, and moral qualities. Let us now lay hold of certain facts about the whole subject, considered from a different and more general point of view. In the course of our discussion we will take note of the distinction between lines of proof and lines of disproof:

δηλωθέντων δὲ (5) τούτων περὶ τῶν λύσεων καὶ ἐνστάσεων διορίσωμεν, πόθεν δεῖ (6) πρὸς τὰ ἐνθυμήματα φέρειν.

.

and also of those lines of argument used in what seems to be enthymemes, but are not, since they do not represent valid syllogisms.

23. (7) Ἔστι δὲ εἷς μὲν τόπος τῶν δεικτικῶν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων· (8) δεῖ γὰρ σκοπεῖν εἰ τῷ ἐναντίῳ τὸ ἐναντίον ὑπάρχει, ἀν(9)αιροῦντα μὲν εἰ μὴ ὑπάρχει, κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ ὑπάρχει, (10) οἷον ὅτι τὸ σωφρονεῖν ἀγαθόν· τὸ γὰρ ἀκολασταίνειν βλαβερόν.

. . .

Having made all this clear, we will proceed to classify Objections and Refutations, showing how they can be brought to bear upon enthymemes. Part 23. 1. One line of positive proof is based upon consideration of the opposite of the thing in question. Observe whether that opposite has the opposite quality. If it has not, you refute the original proposition; if it has, you establish it.

(11) ἢ ὡς ἐν τῷ Μεσσηνιακῷ·
“εἰ γὰρ ὁ πόλεμος αἴτιος τῶν παρ(12)όντων κακῶν, μετὰ τῆς εἰρήνης δεῖ ἐπανορθώσασθαι”.
εἴ περ γὰρ οὐδὲ τοῖς κακῶς δεδρακόσιν
(13) ἀκουσίως δίκαιον εἰς ὀργὴν πεσεῖν,
(14) οὐδ’ ἂν ἀναγκασθείς τις εὖ δράσῃ τινά,
(15)προσῆκον εἶναι τῷδ’ ὀφείλεσθαι χάριν.
(16)
ἀλλ’ εἴ περ ἔστιν ἐν βροτοῖς ψευδηγορεῖν
(17) πιθανά, νομίζειν χρή σε καὶ τοὐναντίον,
(18) ἄπιστ’ ἀληθῆ πολλὰ συμβαίνειν βροτοῖς.
(19) ἄλλος ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων πτώσεων·

. . .

E.g. ‘Temperance is beneficial; for licentiousness is hurtful’. Or, as in the Messenian speech, ‘If war is the cause of our present troubles, peace is what we need to put things right again’. Or
—For if not even evil—doers should
Anger us if they meant not what they did,
Then can we owe no gratitude to such
As were constrained to do the good they did us.

ὁμοίως γὰρ δεῖ ὑπάρχειν (20) ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, οἷον ὅτι τὸ δίκαιον οὐ πᾶν ἀγαθόν· καὶ γὰρ (21) ἂν τὸ δικαίως, νῦν δ’ οὐχ αἱρετὸν τὸ δικαίως ἀποθανεῖν.

. .

Or
—Since in this world liars may win belief,
Be sure of the opposite likewise—that this world
Hears many a true word and believes it not. 2. Another line of proof is got by considering some modification of the key—word, and arguing that what can or cannot be said of the one, can or cannot be said of the other:

(22) ἄλλος ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα· εἰ γὰρ θατέρῳ ὑπάρχει τὸ (23) καλῶς ἢ δικαίως ποιῆσαι, θατέρῳ τὸ πεπονθέναι, καὶ εἰ <τὸ> (24) κελεῦσαι, καὶ τὸ πεποιηκέναι, οἷον ὡς ὁ τελώνης Διομέδων (25) περὶ τῶν τελῶν, “εἰ γὰρ μηδ’ ὑμῖν αἰσχρὸν τὸ πωλεῖν, οὐδ’ (26) ἡμῖν τὸ ὠνεῖσθαι”. καὶ εἰ τῷ πεπονθότι τὸ καλῶς ἢ δικαίως (27) ὑπάρχει, καὶ τῷ ποιήσαντι. ἔστι δ’ ἐν τούτῳ παραλογίσασθαι· (28) εἰ γὰρ δικαίως ἔπαθέν τι, [δικαίως πέπονθεν,] ἀλλ’ ἴσως οὐχ (29) ὑπὸ σοῦ· διὸ δεῖ σκοπεῖν χωρὶς εἰ ἄξιος ὁ παθὼν παθεῖν καὶ ὁ (1397b1) ποιήσας ποιῆσαι, εἶτα χρῆσθαι ὁποτέρως ἁρμόττει· ἐνίοτε γὰρ (2) διαφωνεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ οὐδὲν κωλύει, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Ἀλ(3)κμαίωνι τῷ Θεοδέκτου “μητέρα δὲ τὴν σὴν οὔ τις ἐστύγει βροτῶν;” (4) φησὶ δὲ ἀποκρινόμενος “ἀλλὰ διαλαβόντα χρὴ σκοπεῖν”· (5) ἐρομένης δὲ τῆς Ἀλφεσιβοίας πῶς, ὑπολαβών φησιν (6) “τὴν μὲν θανεῖν ἔκριναν, ἐμὲ δὲ μὴ κτανεῖν.” (7) καὶ ἡ περὶ Δημοσθένους δίκη καὶ τῶν ἀποκτεινάντων Νικά(8)νορα· ἐπεὶ γὰρ δικαίως ἐκρίθησαν ἀποκτεῖναι, δικαίως ἔδοξεν (9) ἀποθανεῖν. καὶ περὶ τοῦ Θήβησιν ἀποθανόντος, περὶ οὗ κελεύει (10) κρίνεσθαι εἰ δίκαιος ἦν ἀποθανεῖν, ὡς οὐκ ἄδικον ὂν τὸ ἀπο(11)κτεῖναι τὸν δικαίως ἀποθανόντα.

. . . . . . . . . . . .

e.g. ’just’ does not always mean ‘beneficial’, or ‘justly’ would always mean ‘beneficially’, whereas it is not desirable to be justly put to death. 3. Another line of proof is based upon correlative ideas. If it is true that one man noble or just treatment to another, you argue that the other must have received noble or just treatment; or that where it is right to command obedience, it must have been right to obey the command. Thus Diomedon, the tax—farmer, said of the taxes: ‘If it is no disgrace for you to sell them, it is no disgrace for us to buy them’. Further, if ‘well’ or ‘justly’ is true of the person to whom a thing is done, you argue that it is true of the doer. But it is possible to draw a false conclusion here. It may be just that A should be treated in a certain way, and yet not just that he should be so treated by B. Hence you must ask yourself two distinct questions: (1) Is it right that A should be thus treated? (2) Is it right that B should thus treat him? and apply your results properly, according as your answers are Yes or No. Sometimes in such a case the two answers differ: you may quite easily have a position like that in the Alcmaeon of Theodectes: And was there none to loathe thy mother’s crime? to which question Alcmaeon in reply says, Why, there are two things to examine here. And when Alphesiboea asks what he means, he rejoins: They judged her fit to die, not me to slay her. Again there is the lawsuit about Demosthenes and the men who killed Nicanor; as they were judged to have killed him justly, it was thought that he was killed justly.

(12) ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, οἷον “εἰ μηδ’ οἱ θεοὶ πάντα (13) ἴσασιν, σχολῇ οἵ γε ἄνθρωποι”· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν “εἰ ᾧ μᾶλλον (14) ἂν ὑπάρχοι μὴ ὑπάρχει, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδ’ ᾧ ἧττον”. τὸ δ’ ὅτι (15) τοὺς πλησίον τύπτει ὅς γε καὶ τὸν πατέρα ἐκ τοῦ “εἰ τὸ ἧττον (16) <ὑπάρχον> ὑπάρχει, καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει”· τοὺς γὰρ (17) πατέρας ἧττον τύπτουσιν ἢ τοὺς πλησίον· ἢ δὴ οὕτως γε ἢ (18) εἰ ᾧ μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει μὴ ὑπάρχει, ἢ εἰ ᾧ ἧττον ὑπάρχει <ὑπ(19)άρχει>, ὁπότερον δεῖ δεῖξαι, εἴθ’ ὅτι ὑπάρχει εἴθ’ ὅτι οὔ. ἔτι εἰ (20) μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἧττον, ὅθεν εἴρηται (20)
καὶ σὸς μὲν οἰκτρὸς παῖδας ἀπολέσας πατήρ· (21) Οἰνεὺς δ’ ἄρ’ οὐχὶ [τὸν Ἑλλάδος] κλεινὸν ἀπολέσας γόνον; (22) καὶ ὅτι, εἰ μηδὲ Θησεὺς ἠδίκησεν, οὐδ’ Ἀλέξανδρος, καὶ εἰ (23) μηδ’ οἱ Τυνδαρίδαι, οὐδ’ Ἀλέξανδρος, καὶ εἰ Πάτροκλον Ἕ(24)κτωρ, καὶ Ἀχιλλέα Ἀλέξανδρος. καὶ εἰ μηδ’ ἄλλοι τεχνῖται (25) φαῦλοι, οὐδ’ οἱ φιλόσοφοι. καὶ εἰ μηδ’ οἱ στρατηγοὶ φαῦλοι (26) ὅτι θανατοῦνται πολλάκις, οὐδ’ οἱ σοφισταί. καὶ ὅτι “εἰ δεῖ (27) τὸν ἰδιώτην τῆς ὑμετέρας δόξης ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ ὑμᾶς τῆς (28) τῶν Ἑλλήνων”.

. . . . . . . . . . .

And in the case of the man who was killed at Thebes, the judges were requested to decide whether it was unjust that he should be killed, since if it was not, it was argued that it could not have been unjust to kill him. 4. Another line of proof is the ‘a fortiori’. Thus it may be argued that if even the gods are not omniscient, certainly human beings are not. The principle here is that, if a quality does not in fact exist where it is more likely to exist, it clearly does not exist where it is less likely. Again, the argument that a man who strikes his father also strikes his neighbours follows from the principle that, if the less likely thing is true, the more likely thing is true also; for a man is less likely to strike his father than to strike his neighbours. The argument, then, may run thus. Or it may be urged that, if a thing is not true where it is more likely, it is not true where it is less likely; or that, if it is true where it is less likely, it is true where it is more likely: according as we have to show that a thing is or is not true. This argument might also be used in a case of parity, as in the lines: Thou hast pity for thy sire, who has lost his sons: Hast none for Oeneus, whose brave son is dead? And, again, ‘if Theseus did no wrong, neither did Paris’; or ‘the sons of Tyndareus did no wrong, neither did Paris’; or ‘if Hector did well to slay Patroclus, Paris did well to slay Achilles’. And ‘if other followers of an art are not bad men, neither are philosophers’. And ‘if generals are not bad men because it often happens that they are condemned to death, neither are sophists’.

(29) ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ τὸν χρόνον σκοπεῖν, οἷον ὡς Ἰφικράτης (30) ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἁρμόδιον, ὅτι “εἰ πρὶν ποιῆσαι ἠξίουν τῆς (31) εἰκόνος τυχεῖν ἐὰν ποιήσω, ἔδοτε ἄν· ποιήσαντι δ’ ἆρ’ οὐ (32) δώσετε; μὴ τοίνυν μέλλοντες μὲν ὑπισχνεῖσθε, παθόντες δ’ (33) ἀφαιρεῖσθε”. καὶ πάλιν πρὸς τὸ Θηβαίους διιέναι Φίλιππον εἰς (1398a1) τὴν Ἀττικήν, ὅτι εἰ πρὶν βοηθῆσαι εἰς Φωκεῖς ἠξίου, ὑπέσχοντο (2) ἄν· ἄτοπον οὖν εἰ διότι προεῖτο καὶ ἐπίστευσεν μὴ διήσουσιν.

. . . . .

And the remark that ‘if each individual among you ought to think of his own city’s reputation, you ought all to think of the reputation of Greece as a whole’. 5. Another line of argument is based on considerations of time. Thus Iphicrates, in the case against Harmodius, said, ‘if before doing the deed I had bargained that, if I did it, I should have a statue, you would have given me one. Will you not give me one now that I have done the deed? You must not make promises when you are expecting a thing to be done for you, and refuse to fulfil them when the thing has been done.’ And, again, to induce the Thebans to let Philip pass through their territory into Attica, it was argued that ‘if he had insisted on this before he helped them against the Phocians, they would have promised to do it.

(3) ἄλλος ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων καθ’ αὑτοῦ πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα, (4) οἷον ἐν τῷ Τεύκρῳ. διαφέρει δὲ ὁ τρόπος ᾧ ἐχρήσατο (5) Ἰφικράτης πρὸς Ἀριστοφῶντα, ἐπερόμενος εἰ προδοίη ἂν (6) τὰς ναῦς ἐπὶ χρήμασιν· οὐ φάσκοντος δέ, εἶτα εἶπεν “σὺ (7) μὲν ὢν Ἀριστοφῶν οὐκ ἂν προδοίης, ἐγὼ δ’ ὢν Ἰφικράτης;” (8) δεῖ δὲ ὑπάρχειν μᾶλλον ἂν δοκοῦντα ἀδικῆσαι ἐκεῖνον· εἰ δὲ μή, (9) γελοῖον ἂν φανείη, <οἷον> εἰ πρὸς Ἀριστείδην κατηγοροῦντα (10) τοῦτό τις [ἂν] εἴπειεν ἄλλος πρὸς ἀπιστίαν τοῦ κατηγόρου· (11) ὅλως γὰρ βούλεται ὁ κατηγορῶν βελτίων εἶναι τοῦ φεύγοντος· (12) τοῦτ’ οὖν ἐξελέγχειν δεῖ. καθόλου δὲ ἄτοπός ἐστιν, ὅταν τις (13) ἐπιτιμᾷ ἄλλοις ἃ αὐτὸς ποιεῖ ἢ ποιήσειεν ἂν, ἢ προτρέπῃ (14) ποιεῖν ἃ αὐτὸς μὴ ποιεῖ μηδὲ ποιήσειεν ἄν.

. . . . . . .

It is monstrous, therefore, that just because he threw away his advantage then, and trusted their honour, they should not let him pass through now’. 6. Another line is to apply to the other speaker what he has said against yourself. It is an excellent turn to give to a debate, as may be seen in the Teucer. It was employed by Iphicrates in his reply to Aristophon. ’Would you’, he asked, ‘take a bribe to betray the fleet?’ ‘No’, said Aristophon; and Iphicrates replied, ‘Very good: if you, who are Aristophon, would not betray the fleet, would I, who am Iphicrates?’ Only, it must be recognized beforehand that the other man is more likely than you are to commit the crime in question. Otherwise you will make yourself ridiculous; it is Aristeides who is prosecuting, you cannot say that sort of thing to him. The purpose is to discredit the prosecutor, who as a rule would have it appear that his character is better than that of the defendant, a pretension which it is desirable to upset.

(15) ἄλλος ἐξ ὁρισμοῦ, οἷον τί τὸ δαιμόνιόν ἐστιν· “ἆρα (16) θεὸς ἢ θεοῦ ἔργον; καίτοι ὅστις οἴεται θεοῦ ἔργον εἶναι, (17) τοῦτον ἀνάγκη οἴεσθαι καὶ θεοὺς εἶναι.” καὶ ὡς Ἰφικράτης, (18) ὅτι γενναιότατος ὁ βέλτιστος· καὶ γὰρ Ἁρμοδίῳ καὶ Ἀριστο(19)γείτονι οὐδὲν πρότερον ὑπῆρχεν γενναῖον πρὶν γενναῖόν τι (20) πρᾶξαι. καὶ ὅτι συγγενέστερος αὐτός· “τὰ γοῦν ἔργα συγ(21)γενέστερά ἐστι τὰ ἐμὰ τοῖς Ἁρμοδίου καὶ Ἀριστογείτονος ἢ (22) τὰ σά”. καὶ ὡς ἐν τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ὅτι πάντες ἂν ὁμολογή(23)σειαν τοὺς μὴ κοσμίους οὐχ ἑνὸς σώματος ἀγαπᾶν ἀπόλαυσιν. (24) καὶ δι’ ὃ Σωκράτης οὐκ ἔφη βαδίζειν ὡς Ἀρχέλαον· ὕβριν (25) γὰρ ἔφη εἶναι τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀμύνασθαι ὁμοίως καὶ εὖ παθόν(26)τας ὥσπερ καὶ κακῶς. πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι ὁρισάμενοι καὶ λαβόν(27)τες τὸ τί ἐστι συλλογίζονται περὶ ὧν λέγουσιν.

. . . . . . . . . .

But the use of such an argument is in all cases ridiculous if you are attacking others for what you do or would do yourself, or are urging others to do what you neither do nor would do yourself. 7. Another line of proof is secured by defining your terms. Thus, ‘What is the supernatural? Surely it is either a god or the work of a god. Well, any one who believes that the work of a god exists, cannot help also believing that gods exist.’ Or take the argument of Iphicrates, ‘Goodness is true nobility; neither Harmodius nor Aristogeiton had any nobility before they did a noble deed’. He also argued that he himself was more akin to Harmodius and Aristogeiton than his opponent was. ’At any rate, my deeds are more akin to those of Harmodius and Aristogeiton than yours are’. Another example may be found in the Alexander. ’Every one will agree that by incontinent people we mean those who are not satisfied with the enjoyment of one love.’ A further example is to be found in the reason given by Socrates for not going to the court of Archelaus. He said that ‘one is insulted by being unable to requite benefits, as well as by being unable to requite injuries’.

(28) ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ ποσαχῶς, οἷον ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς περὶ τοῦ (29) ὀρθῶς.

. .

All the persons mentioned define their term and get at its essential meaning, and then use the result when reasoning on the point at issue. 8. Another line of argument is founded upon the various senses of a word.

(30) ἄλλος ἐκ διαιρέσεως, οἷον εἰ πάντες τριῶν ἕνεκεν ἀδικοῦσιν (31) (ἢ τοῦδε γὰρ ἕνεκα ἢ τοῦδε ἢ τοῦδε), καὶ διὰ μὲν τὰ δύο (32) ἀδύνατον, διὰ δὲ τὸ τρίτον οὐδ’ αὐτοί φασιν.

. .

Such a word is ‘rightly’, as has been explained in the Topics. 9. Another line is based upon logical division.

(33) ἄλλος ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς, οἷον ἐκ τῆς Πεπαρηθίας, ὅτι περὶ (1398b1) τῶν τέκνων αἱ γυναῖκες πανταχοῦ διορίζουσι τἀληθές· (2) τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ Ἀθήνησι Μαντίᾳ τῷ ῥήτορι ἀμφισβητοῦντι (3) πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν ἀπέφηνεν ἡ μήτηρ, τοῦτο δὲ Θήβησιν Ἰσμηνίου (4) καὶ Στίλβωνος ἀμφισβητούντων ἡ Δωδωνὶς ἀπέδειξεν Ἰσμη(5)νίου τὸν υἱόν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο Θετταλίσκον Ἰσμηνίου ἐνόμιζον. (6) καὶ πάλιν ἐκ τοῦ Νόμου τοῦ Θεοδέκτου, “εἰ τοῖς κακῶς ἐπι(7)μεληθεῖσι τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἵππων οὐ παραδιδόασι τοὺς οἰκείους, (8) οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀνατρέψασι τὰς ἀλλοτρίας ναῦς <τὰς οἰκείας>, (9) οὐκοῦν εἰ ὁμοίως ἐφ’ ἁπάντων, καὶ τοῖς κακῶς φυλάξασι τὴν (10) ἀλλοτρίαν οὐ χρηστέον ἐστὶν εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν σωτηρίαν”. καὶ (11) ὡς Ἀλκιδάμας, ὅτι πάντες τοὺς σοφοὺς τιμῶσιν· “Πάριοι γοῦν (12) Ἀρχίλοχον καίπερ βλάσφημον ὄντα τετιμήκασι, καὶ Χῖοι (13) Ὅμηρον οὐκ ὄντα πολίτην, καὶ Μυτιληναῖοι Σαπφῶ καίπερ (14) γυναῖκα οὖσαν, καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Χίλωνα καὶ τῶν γερόντων (15) ἐποίησαν ἥκιστα φιλόλογοι ὄντες, καὶ Ἰταλιῶται Πυθαγόραν, (16) καὶ Λαμψακηνοὶ Ἀναξαγόραν ξένον ὄντα ἔθαψαν καὶ τιμῶσι (17) ἔτι καὶ νῦν, καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι τοῖς Σόλωνος νόμοις χρησάμενοι (18) εὐδαιμόνησαν καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοῖς Λυκούργου, καὶ Θήβησιν (19) ἅμα οἱ προστάται φιλόσοφοι ἐγένοντο καὶ εὐδαιμόνησεν ἡ (20) πόλις”.

. . . . . . . . . .

Thus, ‘All men do wrong from one of three motives, A, B, or C: in my case A and B are out of the question, and even the accusers do not allege C’. 10. Another line is based upon induction. Thus from the case of the woman of Peparethus it might be argued that women everywhere can settle correctly the facts about their children. Another example of this occurred at Athens in the case between the orator Mantias and his son, when the boy’s mother revealed the true facts: and yet another at Thebes, in the case between Ismenias and Stilbon, when Dodonis proved that it was Ismenias who was the father of her son Thettaliscus, and he was in consequence always regarded as being so. A further instance of induction may be taken from the Law of Theodectes: ‘If we do not hand over our horses to the care of men who have mishandled other people’s horses, nor ships to those who have wrecked other people’s ships, and if this is true of everything else alike, then men who have failed to secure other people’s safety are not to be employed to secure our own.’ Another instance is the argument of Alcidamas: ‘Every one honours the wise’. Thus the Parians have honoured Archilochus, in spite of his bitter tongue; the Chians Homer, though he was not their countryman; the Mytilenaeans Sappho, though she was a woman; the Lacedaemonians actually made Chilon a member of their senate, though they are the least literary of men; the Italian Greeks honoured Pythagoras; the inhabitants of Lampsacus gave public burial to Anaxagoras, though he was an alien, and honour him even to this day.

(21) ἄλλος ἐκ κρίσεως περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἢ ὁμοίου ἢ ἐναντίου, (22) μάλιστα μὲν εἰ πάντες καὶ ἀεί, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀλλ’ οἵ γε πλεῖστοι, (23) ἢ σοφοὶ ἢ πάντες ἢ οἱ πλεῖστοι, ἢ ἀγαθοί, ἢ εἰ αὐτοὶ οἱ (24) κρίνοντες, ἢ οὓς ἀποδέχονται οἱ κρίνοντες, ἢ οἷς μὴ οἷόν τε (25) ἐναντίον κρίνειν, οἷον τοῖς κυρίοις, ἢ οἷς μὴ καλὸν ἐναντίον (26) κρίνειν, οἷον θεοῖς ἢ πατρὶ ἢ διδασκάλοις, ὥσπερ ὃ εἰς (27) Μιξιδημίδην εἶπεν Αὐτοκλῆς, [εἰ] ταῖς μὲν σεμναῖς θεαῖς (28) καλῶς εἶχεν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ δοῦναι τὰ δίκαια, Μιξιδημίδῃ (29) δ’ οὔ. ἢ ὥσπερ Σαπφώ, ὅτι τὸ ἀποθνῄσκειν κακόν· οἱ θεοὶ (30) γὰρ οὕτω κεκρίκασιν· ἀπέθνησκον γὰρ ἄν. ἢ ὥσπερ Ἀρί(31)στιππος πρὸς Πλάτωνα ἐπαγγελτικώτερόν τι εἰπόντα, ὡς ᾤετο· (32) “ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅ γ’ ἑταῖρος ἡμῶν”, ἔφη, “οὐθὲν τοιοῦτον”, λέγων (33) τὸν Σωκράτη, καὶ Ἡγησίπολις ἐν Δελφοῖς ἠρώτα τὸν θεόν, (34) πρότερον κεχρημένος Ὀλυμπίασιν, εἰ αὐτῷ τὰ αὐτὰ δοκεῖ (1399a1) ἅπερ τῷ πατρί, ὡς αἰσχρὸν ὂν τἀναντία εἰπεῖν, καὶ περὶ τῆς (2) Ἑλένης ὡς Ἰσοκράτης ἔγραψεν ὅτι σπουδαία, εἴπερ Θησεὺς (3) ἔκρινεν, καὶ περὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου, ὅτι αἱ θεαὶ προέκριναν, καὶ (4) περὶ Εὐαγόρου, ὅτι σπουδαῖος, ὥσπερ Ἰσοκράτης φησίν· (5) “Κόνων γοῦν δυστυχήσας, πάντας τοὺς ἄλλους παραλιπών, (6) ὡς Εὐαγόραν ἦλθεν”.

. . . . . . . . .

(It may be argued that peoples for whom philosophers legislate are always prosperous) on the ground that the Athenians became prosperous under Solon’s laws and the Lacedaemonians under those of Lycurgus, while at Thebes no sooner did the leading men become philosophers than the country began to prosper. 11. Another line of argument is founded upon some decision already pronounced, whether on the same subject or on one like it or contrary to it. Such a proof is most effective if every one has always decided thus; but if not every one, then at any rate most people; or if all, or most, wise or good men have thus decided, or the actual judges of the present question, or those whose authority they accept, or any one whose decision they cannot gainsay because he has complete control over them, or those whom it is not seemly to gainsay, as the gods, or one’s father, or one’s teachers. Thus Autocles said, when attacking Mixidemides, that it was a strange thing that the Dread Goddesses could without loss of dignity submit to the judgement of the Areopagus, and yet Mixidemides could not. Or as Sappho said, ‘Death is an evil thing; the gods have so judged it, or they would die’. Or again as Aristippus said in reply to Plato when he spoke somewhat too dogmatically, as Aristippus thought: ‘Well, anyhow, our friend’, meaning Socrates, ‘never spoke like that’. And Hegesippus, having previously consulted Zeus at Olympia, asked Apollo at Delphi ‘whether his opinion was the same as his father’s’, implying that it would be shameful for him to contradict his father. Thus too Isocrates argued that Helen must have been a good woman, because Theseus decided that she was; and Paris a good man, because the goddesses chose him before all others;

(7) ἄλλος ἐκ τῶν μερῶν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς ποία κίνησις (8) ἡ ψυχή· ἥδε γὰρ ἢ ἥδε. παράδειγμα ἐκ τοῦ Σωκράτους (9) τοῦ Θεοδέκτου· “εἰς ποῖον ἱερὸν ἠσέβηκεν; τίνας θεῶν οὐ (10) τετίμηκεν ὧν ἡ πόλις νομίζει;”

. . .

and Evagoras also, says Isocrates, was good, since when Conon met with his misfortune he betook himself to Evagoras without trying any one else on the way. 12. Another line of argument consists in taking separately the parts of a subject. Such is that given in the Topics: ‘What sort of motion is the soul? for it must be this or that.’

(11) ἄλλος, ἐπειδὴ ἐπὶ τῶν πλείστων συμβαίνει ὥστε ἕπεσθαί (12) τι τῷ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν, ἐκ τοῦ ἀκολουθοῦντος (13) προτρέπειν ἢ ἀποτρέπειν, καὶ κατηγορεῖν ἢ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, (14) καὶ ἐπαινεῖν ἢ ψέγειν, οἷον “τῇ παιδεύσει τὸ φθονεῖσθαι ἀκο(15)λουθεῖ κακὸν <ὄν>, τὸ δὲ σοφὸν εἶναι ἀγαθόν· οὐ τοίνυν δεῖ (16) παιδεύεσθαι, φθονεῖσθαι γὰρ οὐ δεῖ· δεῖ μὲν οὖν παιδεύεσθαι, (17) σοφὸν γὰρ εἶναι δεῖ”.

. . . .

The Socrates of Theodectes provides an example: ‘What temple has he profaned? What gods recognized by the state has he not honoured?’ 13. Since it happens that any given thing usually has both good and bad consequences, another line of argument consists in using those consequences as a reason for urging that a thing should or should not be done, for prosecuting or defending any one, for eulogy or censure. E.g. education leads both to unpopularity, which is bad, and to wisdom, which is good. Hence you either argue, ‘It is therefore not well to be educated, since it is not well to be unpopular’:

ὁ τόπος οὗτός ἐστιν ἡ Καλλίππου τέχνη, (18) προσλαβοῦσα τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ τἆλλα ὡς εἴρηται. (19) ἄλλος, ὅταν περὶ δυοῖν καὶ ἀντικειμένοιν ἢ προτρέπειν (20) ἢ ἀποτρέπειν δέῃ, [καὶ] τῷ πρότερον εἰρημένῳ τρόπῳ ἐπ’ (21) ἀμφοῖν χρῆσθαι. διαφέρει δέ, ὅτι ἐκεῖ μὲν τὰ τυχόντα (22) ἀντιτίθεται, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τἀναντία· οἷον ἱέρεια οὐκ εἴα τὸν (23) υἱὸν δημηγορεῖν· “ἐὰν μὲν γάρ”, ἔφη, “τὰ δίκαια λέγῃς, οἱ (24) ἄνθρωποί σε μισήσουσιν, ἐὰν δὲ τὰ ἄδικα, οἱ θεοί· δεῖ μὲν (25) οὖν δημηγορεῖν· ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ τὰ δίκαια λέγῃς, οἱ θεοί σε (26) φιλήσουσιν, ἐὰν δὲ τὰ ἄδικα, οἱ ἄνθρωποι”. τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ ταὐτὸ (27) τῷ λεγομένῳ, τὸ ἕλος πρίασθαι καὶ τοὺς ἅλας· καὶ ἡ βλαίσωσις (28) τοῦτο ἐστίν, ὅταν δυοῖν ἐναντίοιν ἑκατέρῳ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν (29) ἕπηται, ἐναντία ἑκάτερα ἑκατέροις.

. . . . . . .

or you answer, ‘No, it is well to be educated, since it is well to be wise’. The Art of Rhetoric of Callippus is made up of this line of argument, with the addition of those of Possibility and the others of that kind already described. 14. Another line of argument is used when we have to urge or discourage a course of action that may be done in either of two opposite ways, and have to apply the method just mentioned to both. The difference between this one and the last is that, whereas in the last any two things are contrasted, here the things contrasted are opposites. For instance, the priestess enjoined upon her son not to take to public speaking: ‘For’, she said, ‘if you say what is right, men will hate you; if you say what is wrong, the gods will hate you.’ The reply might be, ‘On the contrary, you ought to take to public speaking: for if you say what is right the gods will love you; if you say what is wrong, men will love you.’ This amounts to the proverbial ‘buying the marsh with the salt’.

(30) ἄλλος, ἐπειδὴ οὐ ταὐτὰ φανερῶς ἐπαινοῦσι καὶ ἀφανῶς, (31) ἀλλὰ φανερῶς μὲν τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ καλὰ ἐπαινοῦσι μάλιστα, (32) ἰδίᾳ δὲ τὰ συμφέροντα μᾶλλον βούλονται, ἐκ τούτων πειρᾶσθαι (33) συνάγειν θάτερον· τῶν γὰρ παραδόξων οὗτος ὁ τόπος κυριώ(34)τατός ἐστιν.

. . .

It is just this situation, viz. when each of two opposites has both a good and a bad consequence opposite respectively to each other, that has been termed divarication. 15. Another line of argument is this: The things people approve of openly are not those which they approve of secretly: openly, their chief praise is given to justice and nobleness; but in their hearts they prefer their own advantage. Try, in face of this, to establish the point of view which your opponent has not adopted.

(35) ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάλογον ταῦτα συμβαίνειν, οἷον ὁ Ἰφικράτης, (36) τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ, νεώτερον ὄντα τῆς ἡλικίας, ὅτι μέγας ἦν (37) λειτουργεῖν ἀναγκαζόντων, εἶπεν ὅτι εἰ τοὺς μεγάλους (38) τῶν παίδων ἄνδρας νομίζουσι, τοὺς μικροὺς τῶν ἀνδρῶν (1399b1) παῖδας εἶναι ψηφιοῦνται, καὶ Θεοδέκτης ἐν τῷ Νόμῳ, ὅτι (2) “πολίτας μὲν ποιεῖσθε τοὺς μισθοφόρους, οἷον Στράβακα καὶ (3) Χαρίδημον, διὰ τὴν ἐπιείκειαν· φυγάδας δ’ οὐ ποιήσεσθε (4) τοὺς ἐν τοῖς μισθοφόροις ἀνήκεστα διαπεπραγμένους;”

. . . .

This is the most effective of the forms of argument that contradict common opinion. 16. Another line is that of rational correspondence. E.g. Iphicrates, when they were trying to compel his son, a youth under the prescribed age, to perform one of the state duties because he was tall, said ‘If you count tall boys men, you will next be voting short men boys’. And Theodectes in his Law said, ‘You make citizens of such mercenaries as Strabax and Charidemus, as a reward of their merits;

(5) ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐὰν ᾖ ταὐτόν, ὅτι καὶ ἐξ ὧν (6) συμβαίνει ταὐτά· οἷον Ξενοφάνης ἔλεγεν ὅτι ὁμοίως ἀσε(7)βοῦσιν οἱ γενέσθαι φάσκοντες τοὺς θεοὺς τοῖς ἀποθανεῖν (8) λέγουσιν· ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ συμβαίνει μὴ εἶναι τοὺς θεούς (9) ποτε. καὶ ὅλως δὲ τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐξ ἑκάστου λαμβάνειν (10) ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεί· “μέλλετε δὲ κρίνειν οὐ περὶ Ἰσοκράτους (11) ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐπιτηδεύματος, εἰ χρὴ φιλοσοφεῖν”. καὶ ὅτι τὸ (12) διδόναι γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ δουλεύειν ἐστίν, καὶ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς (13) κοινῆς εἰρήνης ποιεῖν τὸ προσταττόμενον. ληπτέον δ’ ὁπό(14)τερον ἂν ᾖ χρήσιμον.

. . . . . . .

will you not make exiles of such citizens as those who have done irreparable harm among the mercenaries?’ 17. Another line is the argument that if two results are the same their antecedents are also the same. For instance, it was a saying of Xenophanes that to assert that the gods had birth is as impious as to say that they die; the consequence of both statements is that there is a time when the gods do not exist. This line of proof assumes generally that the result of any given thing is always the same: e.g. ’you are going to decide not about Isocrates, but about the value of the whole profession of philosophy.’ Or, ‘to give earth and water’ means slavery; or, ‘to share in the Common Peace’ means obeying orders.

(15) ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ταὐτὸ ἀεὶ αἱρεῖσθαι ὕστερον καὶ πρότερον, (16) ἀλλ’ ἀνάπαλιν, οἷον τόδε τὸ ἐνθύμημα, “ἦ φεύγοντες μὲν (17) ἐμαχόμεθα ὅπως κατέλθωμεν, κατελθόντες δὲ φευξόμεθα (18) ὅπως μὴ μαχώμεθα;” ὁτὲ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μένειν ἀντὶ τοῦ μάχεσθαι (19) ᾑροῦντο, ὁτὲ δὲ τὸ μὴ μάχεσθαι ἀντὶ τοῦ μὴ μένειν.

. . .

We are to make either such assumptions or their opposite, as suits us best. 18. Another line of argument is based on the fact that men do not always make the same choice on a later as on an earlier occasion, but reverse their previous choice. E.g. the following enthymeme: ‘When we were exiles, we fought in order to return; now we have returned, it would be strange to choose exile in order not to have to fight.’

(20) ἄλλος τὸ οὗ ἕνεκ’ ἂν εἴη ἢ γένοιτο, τούτου ἕνεκα φάναι (21) εἶναι ἢ γεγενῆσθαι, οἷον εἰ δοίη [ἄν] τίς τινι ἵν’ ἀφελόμενος (22) λυπήσῃ, ὅθεν καὶ τοῦτ’ εἴρηται,
πολλοῖς ὁ δαίμων οὐ κατ’ εὔνοιαν φέρων
(23) μεγάλα δίδωσιν εὐτυχήματ’, ἀλλ’ ἵνα
(24) τὰς συμφορὰς λάβωσιν ἐπιφανεστέρας. (25) καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Μελεάγρου τοῦ Ἀντιφῶντος,
(26) οὐχ ὡς κτάνωσι θῆρ’, ὅπως δὲ μάρτυρες
(27) ἀρετῆς γένωνται Μελεάγρῳ πρὸς Ἑλλάδα. (28) καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Αἴαντος τοῦ Θεοδέκτου, ὅτι ὁ Διομήδης προ(29)είλετο Ὀδυσσέα οὐ τιμῶν, ἀλλ’ ἵνα ἥττων ᾖ ὁ ἀκολουθῶν· (30) ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τούτου ἕνεκα ποιῆσαι.

. . . . .

on occasion, that is, they chose to be true to their homes at the cost of fighting, and on the other to avoid fighting at the cost of deserting their homes. 19. Another line of argument is the assertion that some possible motive for an event or state of things is the real one: e.g. that a gift was given in order to cause pain by its withdrawal. This notion underlies the lines:
God gives to many great prosperity,
Not of good God towards them, but to make
The ruin of them more conspicuous. Or take the passage from the Meleager of Antiphon: To slay no boar, but to be witnesses
Of Meleager’s prowess unto Greece.

(31) ἄλλος, κοινὸς καὶ τοῖς ἀμφισβητοῦσιν καὶ τοῖς συμ(32)βουλεύουσι, σκοπεῖν τὰ προτρέποντα καὶ ἀποτρέποντα, (33) καὶ ὧν ἕνεκα καὶ πράττουσι καὶ φεύγουσιν· ταῦτα γάρ (34) ἐστιν ἃ ἐὰν μὲν ὑπάρχῃ δεῖ πράττειν, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχῃ, (35) μὴ πράττειν, οἷον, εἰ δυνατὸν καὶ ῥᾴδιον καὶ ὠφέλιμον ἢ αὐτῷ (36) ἢ φίλοις ἢ βλαβερὸν ἐχθροῖς, κἂν ᾖ ἐπιζήμιον, εἰ ἐλάττων ἡ (37) ζημία τοῦ πράγματος, καὶ προτρέπονται [δ’] ἐκ τούτων καὶ (1400a1) ἀποτρέπονται ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων. ἐκ δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων καὶ (2) κατηγοροῦσι καὶ ἀπολογοῦνται· ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἀποτρεπόντων (3) ἀπολογοῦνται, ἐκ δὲ τῶν προτρεπόντων κατηγοροῦσιν. ἔστι (4) δ’ ὁ τόπος οὗτος ὅλη τέχνη ἥ τε Παμφίλου καὶ ἡ Καλλίππου.

. . . . . . . .

Or the argument in the Ajax of Theodectes, that Diomede chose out Odysseus not to do him honour, but in order that his companion might be a lesser man than himself—such a motive for doing so is quite possible. 20. Another line of argument is common to forensic and deliberative oratory, namely, to consider inducements and deterrents, and the motives people have for doing or avoiding the actions in question. These are the conditions which make us bound to act if they are for us, and to refrain from action if they are against us: that is, we are bound to act if the action is possible, easy, and useful to ourselves or our friends or hurtful to our enemies; this is true even if the action entails loss, provided the loss is outweighed by the solid advantage. A speaker will urge action by pointing to such conditions, and discourage it by pointing to the opposite. These same arguments also form the materials for accusation or defence —the deterrents being pointed out by the defence, and the inducements by the prosecution.

(5) ἄλλος ἐκ τῶν δοκούντων μὲν γίγνεσθαι ἀπίστων δέ, ὅτι (6) οὐκ ἂν ἔδοξαν, εἰ μὴ ἦν ἢ ἐγγὺς ἦν. καὶ ὅτι μᾶλλον· ἢ γὰρ (7) τὰ ὄντα ἢ τὰ εἰκότα ὑπολαμβάνουσιν· εἰ οὖν ἄπιστον καὶ (8) μὴ εἰκός, ἀληθὲς ἂν εἴη· οὐ γὰρ διά γε τὸ εἰκὸς καὶ πιθανὸν (9) δοκεῖ οὕτως· οἷον Ἀνδροκλῆς ἔλεγεν ὁ Πιτθεὺς κατηγορῶν (10) τοῦ νόμου, ἐπεὶ ἐθορύβησαν αὐτῷ εἰπόντι, “δέονται οἱ (11) νόμοι νόμου τοῦ διορθώσοντος, καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἰχθύες ἁλός, (12) καίτοι οὐκ εἰκὸς οὐδὲ πιθανὸν ἐν ἅλμῃ τρεφομένους δεῖσθαι (13) ἁλός, καὶ τὰ στέμφυλα ἐλαίου, καίτοι ἄπιστον, ἐξ ὧν ἔλαιον (14) γίγνεται, ταῦτα δεῖσθαι ἐλαίου”.

. . . . . . . .

As for the defence,...This topic forms the whole Art of Rhetoric both of Pamphilus and of Callippus. 21. Another line of argument refers to things which are supposed to happen and yet seem incredible. We may argue that people could not have believed them, if they had not been true or nearly true: even that they are the more likely to be true because they are incredible. For the things which men believe are either facts or probabilities: if, therefore, a thing that is believed is improbable and even incredible, it must be true, since it is certainly not believed because it is at all probable or credible. An example is what Androcles of the deme Pitthus said in his well—known arrangement of the law. The audience tried to shout him down when he observed that the laws required a law to set them right.

(15) ἄλλος ἐλεγκτικός, τὸ τὰ ἀνομολογούμενα σκοπεῖν, εἴ τι (16) ἀνομολογούμενον ἐκ τόπων καὶ χρόνων καὶ πράξεων καὶ (17) λόγων, χωρὶς μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος, οἷον “καὶ φησὶ (18) μὲν φιλεῖν ὑμᾶς, συνώμοσεν δὲ τοῖς τριάκοντα”, χωρὶς δ’ (19) ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ, “καὶ φησὶ μὲν εἶναί με φιλόδικον, οὐκ ἔχει δὲ (20) ἀποδεῖξαι δεδικασμένον οὐδεμίαν δίκην”, χωρὶς δ’ ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ (21) καὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος, “καὶ οὗτος μὲν οὐ δεδάνεικε πώποτε (22) οὐδέν, ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ πολλοὺς λέλυμαι ὑμῶν”.

. . . .

’Why’, he went on, ‘fish need salt, improbable and incredible as this might seem for creatures reared in salt water; and olive—cakes need oil, incredible as it is that what produces oil should need it.’ 22. Another line of argument is to refute our opponent’s case by noting any contrasts or contradictions of dates, acts, or words that it anywhere displays; and this in any of the three following connexions. (1) Referring to our opponent’s conduct, e.g. ’He says he is devoted to you, yet he conspired with the Thirty.’ (2) Referring to our own conduct, e.g. ’He says I am litigious, and yet he cannot prove that I have been engaged in a single lawsuit.’

(23) ἄλλος τοῖς προδιαβεβλημένοις καὶ ἀνθρώποις καὶ πρά(24)γμασιν, ἢ δοκοῦσι, τὸ λέγειν τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ παραδόξου· (25) ἔστιν γάρ τι δι’ ὃ φαίνεται· οἷον, ὑποβεβλημένης τινὸς τὸν (26) αὑτῆς υἱόν, διὰ τὸ ἀσπάζεσθαι ἐδόκει συνεῖναι τῷ μειρακίῳ, (27) λεχθέντος δὲ τοῦ αἰτίου ἐλύθη ἡ διαβολή· καὶ οἷον ἐν τῷ Αἴαντι (28) τῷ Θεοδέκτου Ὀδυσσεὺς λέγει πρὸς τὸν Αἴαντα διότι ἀνδρει(29)ότερος ὢν τοῦ Αἴαντος οὐ δοκεῖ.

. . .

(3) Referring to both of us together, e.g. ’He has never even lent any one a penny, but I have ransomed quite a number of you.’ 23. Another line that is useful for men and causes that have been really or seemingly slandered, is to show why the facts are not as supposed; pointing out that there is a reason for the false impression given. Thus a woman, who had palmed off her son on another woman, was thought to be the lad’s mistress because she embraced him; but when her action was explained the charge was shown to be groundless.

(30) ἄλλος ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰτίου, ἄν τε ὑπάρχῃ, ὅτι ἔστι, κἂν μὴ (31) ὑπάρχῃ, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν· ἅμα γὰρ τὸ αἴτιον καὶ οὗ αἴτιον, (32) καὶ ἄνευ αἰτίου οὐθὲν ἔστιν, οἷον Λεωδάμας ἀπολογούμενος (33) ἔλεγε, κατηγορήσαντος Θρασυβούλου ὅτι ἦν στηλίτης γεγονὼς (34) ἐν τῇ ἀκροπόλει, ἀλλ’ ἐκκέκοπται ἐπὶ τῶν τριάκοντα· οὐκ (35) ἐνδέχεσθαι ἔφη· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἂν πιστεύειν αὑτῷ τοὺς τριάκοντα (36) ἐγγεγραμμένης τῆς ἔχθρας πρὸς τὸν δῆμον.

. . . .

Another example is from the Ajax of Theodectes, where Odysseus tells Ajax the reason why, though he is really braver than Ajax, he is not thought so. 24. Another line of argument is to show that if the cause is present, the effect is present, and if absent, absent. For by proving the cause you at once prove the effect, and conversely nothing can exist without its cause. Thus Thrasybulus accused Leodamas of having had his name recorded as a criminal on the slab in the Acropolis, and of erasing the record in the time of the Thirty Tyrants:

(37) ἄλλος, εἰ ἐνεδέχετο βέλτιον ἄλλως, ἢ ἐνδέχεται, ὧν ἢ (38) συμβουλεύει ἢ πράττει ἢ πέπραχε σκοπεῖν· φανερὸν γὰρ ὅτι, (1400b1) εἰ [μὴ] οὕτως ἔχει, οὐ πέπραχεν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἑκὼν τὰ φαῦλα (2) καὶ γιγνώσκων προαιρεῖται. ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο ψεῦδος· πολλάκις (3) γὰρ ὕστερον γίγνεται δῆλον πῶς ἦν πρᾶξαι βέλτιον, πρότερον (4) δὲ ἄδηλον.

. . .

to which Leodamas replied, ‘Impossible: for the Thirty would have trusted me all the more if my quarrel with the commons had been inscribed on the slab.’ 25. Another line is to consider whether the accused person can take or could have taken a better course than that which he is recommending or taking, or has taken. If he has not taken this better course, it is clear that he is not guilty, since no one deliberately and consciously chooses what is bad.

(5) ἄλλος, ὅταν τι ἐναντίον μέλλῃ πράττεσθαι τοῖς πεπραγμένοις, (6) ἅμα σκοπεῖν, οἷον Ξενοφάνης Ἐλεάταις ἐρωτῶσιν εἰ θύωσι (7) τῇ Λευκοθέᾳ καὶ θρηνῶσιν ἢ μή, συνεβούλευεν, εἰ μὲν θεὸν (8) ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, μὴ θρηνεῖν, εἰ δ’ ἄνθρωπον, μὴ θύειν.

. .

This argument is, however, fallacious, for it often becomes clear after the event how the action could have been done better, though before the event this was far from clear. 26. Another line is, when a contemplated action is inconsistent with any past action, to examine them both together.

(9) ἄλλος τόπος τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἁμαρτηθέντων κατηγορεῖν ἢ ἀπο(10)λογεῖσθαι, οἷον ἐν τῇ Καρκίνου Μηδείᾳ οἱ μὲν κατηγοροῦσιν (11) ὅτι τοὺς παῖδας ἀπέκτεινεν, οὐ φαίνεσθαι γοῦν αὐτούς (12) (ἥμαρτε γὰρ ἡ Μήδεια περὶ τὴν ἀποστολὴν τῶν παίδων), (13) ἡ δ’ ἀπολογεῖται ὅτι οὐ [ἂν] τοὺς παῖδας ἀλλὰ τὸν Ἰάσονα (14) ἂν ἀπέκτεινεν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἥμαρτεν ἂν μὴ ποιήσασα, εἴπερ (15) καὶ θάτερον ἐποίησεν. ἔστι δ’ ὁ τόπος οὗτος τοῦ ἐνθυμήματος (16) καὶ τὸ εἶδος ὅλη ἡ πρότερον Θεοδώρου τέχνη.

. . . . .

Thus, when the people of Elea asked Xenophanes if they should or should not sacrifice to Leucothea and mourn for her, he advised them not to mourn for her if they thought her a goddess, and not to sacrifice to her if they thought her a mortal woman. 27. Another line is to make previous mistakes the grounds of accusation or defence. Thus, in the Medea of Carcinus the accusers allege that Medea has slain her children; ‘at all events’, they say, ‘they are not to be seen’—Medea having made the mistake of sending her children away. In defence she argues that it is not her children, but Jason, whom she would have slain; for it would have been a mistake on her part not to do this if she had done the other.

(17) ἄλλος ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος, οἷον ὡς ὁ Σοφοκλῆς
σαφῶς σιδήρῳ καὶ φοροῦσα τοὔνομα, (18) καὶ ὡς ἐν τοῖς τῶν θεῶν ἐπαίνοις εἰώθασι λέγειν, καὶ ὡς (19) Κόνων Θρασύβουλον θρασύβουλον ἐκάλει, καὶ Ἡρόδικος Θρασύ(20)μαχον “ἀεὶ θρασύμαχος εἶ”, καὶ Πῶλον “ἀεὶ σὺ πῶλος εἶ”, (21) καὶ Δράκοντα τὸν νομοθέτην, ὅτι οὐκ [ἂν] ἀνθρώπου οἱ νόμοι (22) ἀλλὰ δράκοντος (χαλεποὶ γάρ)· καὶ ὡς ἡ Εὐριπίδου Ἑκάβη εἰς (23) τὴν Ἀφροδίτην “καὶ τοὔνομ’ ὀρθῶς ἀφροσύνης ἄρχει θεᾶς”, (24) καὶ ὡς Χαιρήμων Πενθεὺς ἐσομένης συμφορᾶς ἐπώνυμος. (25) εὐδοκιμεῖ δὲ μᾶλλον τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων τὰ ἐλεγκτικὰ τῶν (26) ἀποδεικτικῶν διὰ τὸ συναγωγὴν μὲν ἐναντίων εἶναι ἐν μικρῷ (27) τὸ ἐλεγκτικὸν ἐνθύμημα, παρ’ ἄλληλα δὲ φανερὰ εἶναι τῷ (28) ἀκροατῇ μᾶλλον. πάντων δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐλεγκτικῶν καὶ τῶν (29) δεικτικῶν συλλογισμῶν θορυβεῖται μάλιστα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὅσα (30) ἀρχόμενα προορῶσι μὴ ἐπιπολῆς εἶναι (ἅμα γὰρ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐφ’ (31) αὑτοῖς χαίρουσι προαισθανόμενοι), καὶ ὅσων τοσοῦτον ὑστε(32)ρίζουσιν ὥσθ’ ἅμα εἰρημένων γνωρίζειν.

. . . . . . . . . . .

This special line of argument for enthymeme forms the whole of the Art of Rhetoric in use before Theodorus. 28. Another line is to draw meanings from names. Sophocles, for instance, says, O steel in heart as thou art steel in name. This line of argument is common in praises of the gods. Thus, too, Conon called Thrasybulus rash in counsel. And Herodicus said of Thrasymachus, ‘You are always bold in battle’; of Polus, ‘you are always a colt’; and of the legislator Draco that his laws were those not of a human being but of a dragon, so savage were they. And, in Euripides, Hecuba says of Aphrodite, “Her name and Folly’s (aphrosuns) lightly begin alike,” and Chaeremon writes “Pentheus—a name foreshadowing grief (penthos) to come.” The Refutative Enthymeme has a greater reputation than the Demonstrative, because within a small space it works out two opposing arguments, and arguments put side by side are clearer to the audience. But of all syllogisms, whether refutative or demonstrative, those are most applauded of which we foresee the conclusions from the beginning, so long as they are not obvious at first sight —for part of the pleasure we feel is at our own intelligent anticipation;

24. (33) Ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐνδέχεται τὸν μὲν εἶναι συλλογισμόν, τὸν δὲ μὴ (34) εἶναι μὲν φαίνεσθαι δέ, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐνθύμημα τὸ μὲν εἶναι, τὸ (35) δὲ μὴ εἶναι ἐνθύμημα φαίνεσθαι δέ, ἐπείπερ τὸ ἐνθύμημα συλ(1401a1)λογισμός τις.

.

or those which we follow well enough to see the point of them as soon as the last word has been uttered.

τόποι δ’ εἰσὶ τῶν φαινομένων ἐνθυμημάτων (2) εἷς μὲν ὁ παρὰ τὴν λέξιν,

.

Part 24. Besides genuine syllogisms, there may be syllogisms that look genuine but are not; and since an enthymeme is merely a syllogism of a particular kind, it follows that, besides genuine enthymemes, there may be those that look genuine but are not.

καὶ τούτου ἓν μὲν μέρος, ὥσπερ (3) ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς, τὸ μὴ συλλογισάμενον συμπερα(4)σματικῶς τὸ τελευταῖον εἰπεῖν, “οὐκ ἄρα τὸ καὶ τό, ἀνάγκη (5) ἄρα τὸ καὶ τό”, ἐν τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασι τὸ συνεστραμμένως καὶ (6) ἀντικειμένως εἰπεῖν φαίνεται ἐνθύμημα (ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη (7) λέξις χώρα ἐστὶν ἐνθυμήματος)· καὶ ἔοικε τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶναι (8) παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως. ἔστι δὲ εἰς τὸ τῇ λέξει συλ(9)λογιστικῶς λέγειν χρήσιμον τὸ συλλογισμῶν πολλῶν κεφάλαια (10) λέγειν, ὅτι τοὺς μὲν ἔσωσε, τοῖς δ’ ἑτέροις ἐτιμώρησε, τοὺς (11) δ’ Ἕλληνας ἠλευθέρωσε· ἕκαστον μὲν γὰρ τούτων ἐξ ἄλλων (12) ἀπεδείχθη, συντεθέντων δὲ φαίνεται καὶ ἐκ τούτων τι γίγνε(13)σθαι.

. . . . .

1. Among the lines of argument that form the Spurious Enthymeme the first is that which arises from the particular words employed. (a) One variety of this is when—as in dialectic, without having gone through any reasoning process, we make a final statement as if it were the conclusion of such a process, ‘Therefore so—and—so is not true’, ‘Therefore also so—and—so must be true’ —so too in rhetoric a compact and antithetical utterance passes for an enthymeme, such language being the proper province of enthymeme, so that it is seemingly the form of wording here that causes the illusion mentioned. In order to produce the effect of genuine reasoning by our form of wording it is useful to summarize the results of a number of previous reasonings: as ‘some he saved—others he avenged—the Greeks he freed’.

(14) ἓν δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν, τὸ φάναι σπου(15)δαῖον εἶναι μῦν, ἀφ’ οὗ γ’ ἐστὶν ἡ τιμιωτάτη πασῶν τελετή· (16) τὰ γὰρ μυστήρια πασῶν τιμιωτάτη τελετή. ἢ εἴ τις κύνα (17) ἐγκωμιάζων τὸν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ συμπαραλαμβάνοι, ἢ τὸν Πᾶνα, (18) ὅτι Πίνδαρος ἔφησεν
ὦ μάκαρ, ὅν τε μεγάλας θεοῦ κύνα παντοδαπὸν
(19) καλέουσιν Ὀλύμπιοι, (20) ἢ ὅτι τὸ μηδένα εἶναι κύν’ ἀτιμότατόν ἐστιν, ὥστε τὸ κύνα (21) δῆλον ὅτι τίμιον. καὶ τὸ κοινωνικὸν φάναι τὸν Ἑρμῆν εἶναι (22) μάλιστα τῶν θεῶν· μόνος γὰρ καλεῖται κοινὸς Ἑρμῆς. καὶ τὸ (23) τὸν λόγον εἶναι σπουδαιότατον, ὅτι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες οὐ χρημά(24)των ἀλλὰ λόγου εἰσὶν ἄξιοι· τὸ γὰρ λόγου ἄξιον οὐχ ἁπλῶς (25) λέγεται.

. . . . . . .

Each of these statements has been previously proved from other facts; but the mere collocation of them gives the impression of establishing some fresh conclusion. (b) Another variety is based on the use of similar words for different things; e.g. the argument that the mouse must be a noble creature, since it gives its name to the most august of all religious rites—for such the Mysteries are. Or one may introduce, into a eulogy of the dog, the dog—star; or Pan, because Pindar said:
O thou blessed one!
Thou whom they of Olympus call
The hound of manifold shape
That follows the Mother of Heaven: or we may argue that, because there is much disgrace in there not being a dog about, there is honour in being a dog. Or that Hermes is readier than any other god to go shares, since we never say ‘shares all round’ except of him.

ἄλλος τὸ <τὸ> διῃρημένον συντιθέντα λέγειν ἢ (26) τὸ συγκείμενον διαιροῦντα· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ταὐτὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι (27) οὐκ ὂν ταὐτὸ πολλάκις, ὁπότερον χρησιμώτερον, τοῦτο δεῖ (28) ποιεῖν. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο Εὐθυδήμου λόγος, οἷον τὸ εἰδέναι (29) ὅτι τριήρης ἐμ Πειραεῖ ἐστίν· ἕκαστον γὰρ οἶδεν. καὶ τὸν τὰ (30) στοιχεῖα ἐπιστάμενον ὅτι τὸ ἔπος οἶδεν· τὸ γὰρ ἔπος τὸ αὐτό (31) ἐστιν. καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ δὶς τοσοῦτον νοσῶδες, μηδὲ τὸ ἓν φάναι (32) ὑγιεινὸν εἶναι· ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ τὰ δύο ἀγαθὰ ἓν κακόν ἐστιν. (33) οὕτω μὲν οὖν ἐλεγκτικόν, ὧδε δὲ δεικτικόν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἓν (34) ἀγαθὸν δύο κακά· ὅλος δὲ ὁ τόπος παραλογιστικός. πάλιν τὸ (35) Πολυκράτους εἰς Θρασύβουλον, ὅτι τριάκοντα τυράννους (36) κατέλυσε· συντίθησι γάρ. ἢ τὸ ἐν τῷ Ὀρέστῃ τῷ Θεοδέκτου· (37) ἐκ διαιρέσεως γάρ ἐστιν·
δίκαιόν ἐστιν, ἥτις ἂν κτείνῃ πόσιν, (38) ἀποθνῄσκειν ταύτην,
καὶ τῷ πατρί γε τιμωρεῖν τὸν υἱόν,
(1401b1) οὐκοῦν καὶ ταῦτα ἃ πέπρακται· συντεθέντα γὰρ ἴσως οὐκέτι (2) δίκαιον. εἴη δ’ ἂν καὶ παρὰ τὴν ἔλλειψιν· ἀφαιρεῖ γὰρ τὸ ὑπὸ (3) τίνος.

. . . . . . . . . . .

Or that speech is a very excellent thing, since good men are not said to be worth money but to be worthy of esteem—the phrase ‘worthy of esteem’ also having the meaning of ‘worth speech’. 2. Another line is to assert of the whole what is true of the parts, or of the parts what is true of the whole. A whole and its parts are supposed to be identical, though often they are not. You have therefore to adopt whichever of these two lines better suits your purpose. That is how Euthydemus argues: e.g. that any one knows that there is a trireme in the Peiraeus, since he knows the separate details that make up this statement. There is also the argument that one who knows the letters knows the whole word, since the word is the same thing as the letters which compose it; or that, if a double portion of a certain thing is harmful to health, then a single portion must not be called wholesome, since it is absurd that two good things should make one bad thing. Put thus, the enthymeme is refutative; put as follows; demonstrative: ‘For one good thing cannot be made up of two bad things.’ The whole line of argument is fallacious. Again, there is Polycrates’ saying that Thrasybulus put down thirty tyrants, where the speaker adds them up one by one. Or the argument in the Orestes of Theodectes, where the argument is from part to whole:
’Tis right that she who slays her lord should die.
‘It is right, too, that the son should avenge his father.
Very good: these two things are what Orestes has done.’ Still, perhaps the two things, once they are put together, do not form a right act.

ἄλλος δὲ τόπος τὸ δεινώσει κατασκευάζειν ἢ ἀνασκευά(4)ζειν· τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν ὅταν, μὴ δείξας ὅτι ἐποίησεν <μηδ’ ὅτι (5) οὐκ ἐποίησεν>, αὐξήσῃ τὸ πρᾶγμα· ποιεῖ γὰρ φαίνεσθαι ἢ ὡς οὐ (6) πεποίηκεν, ὅταν ὁ τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχων αὔξῃ, ἢ ὡς πεποίηκεν, (7) ὅταν ὁ κατηγορῶν αὐξῇ. οὔκουν ἐστὶν ἐνθύμημα· παρα(8)λογίζεται γὰρ ὁ ἀκροατὴς ὅτι ἐποίησεν ἢ οὐκ ἐποίησεν, οὐ (9) δεδειγμένου.

. . . .

The fallacy might also be said to be due to omission, since the speaker fails to say by whose hand a husband—slayer should die. 3. Another line is the use of indignant language, whether to support your own case or to overthrow your opponent’s. We do this when we paint a highly—coloured picture of the situation without having proved the facts of it: if the defendant does so, he produces an impression of his innocence; and if the prosecutor goes into a passion, he produces an impression of the defendant’s guilt.

ἄλλος τὸ ἐκ σημείου· ἀσυλλόγιστον γὰρ (10) καὶ τοῦτο· οἷον εἴ τις λέγοι “ταῖς πόλεσι συμφέρουσιν οἱ (11) ἐρῶντες· ὁ γὰρ Ἁρμοδίου καὶ Ἀριστογείτονος ἔρως κατέλυσε (12) τὸν τύραννον Ἵππαρχον”, ἢ εἴ τις λέγοι ὅτι κλέπτης Διονύ(13)σιος· πονηρὸς γάρ· ἀσυλλόγιστον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο· οὐ γὰρ πᾶς (14) πονηρὸς κλέπτης, ἀλλὰ κλέπτης πᾶς πονηρός.

. . . .

Here there is no genuine enthymeme: the hearer infers guilt or innocence, but no proof is given, and the inference is fallacious accordingly. 4. Another line is to use a ‘Sign’, or single instance, as certain evidence; which, again, yields no valid proof. Thus, it might be said that lovers are useful to their countries, since the love of Harmodius and Aristogeiton caused the downfall of the tyrant Hipparchus. Or, again, that Dionysius is a thief, since he is a vicious man

ἄλλος (15) διὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός, οἷον ὃ λέγει Πολυκράτης εἰς τοὺς μῦς, (16) ὅτι ἐβοήθησαν διατραγόντες τὰς νευράς· ἢ εἴ τις φαίη τὸ (17) ἐπὶ δεῖπνον κληθῆναι τιμιώτατον· διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ κληθῆναι (18) ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς ἐμήνισε τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἐν Τενέδῳ· ὁ δ’ ὡς ἀτι(19)μαζόμενος ἐμήνισεν, συνέβη δὲ τοῦτο διὰ τὸ μὴ κληθῆναι.

. . . . .

—there is, of course, no valid proof here; not every vicious man is a thief, though every thief is a vicious man. 5. Another line represents the accidental as essential. An instance is what Polycrates says of the mice, that they ‘came to the rescue’ because they gnawed through the bowstrings. Or it might be maintained that an invitation to dinner is a great honour, for it was because he was not invited that Achilles was ‘angered’ with the Greeks at Tenedos?

(20) ἄλλος τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἑπόμενον, οἷον ἐν τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, ὅτι (21) μεγαλόψυχος· ὑπεριδὼν γὰρ τὴν πολλῶν ὁμιλίαν ἐν τῇ Ἴδῃ (22) διέτριβεν καθ’ αὑτόν· ὅτι γὰρ οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι τοιοῦτοι, καὶ (23) οὗτος μεγαλόψυχος δόξειεν ἄν. καὶ ἐπεὶ καλλωπιστὴς καὶ (24) νύκτωρ πλανᾶται, μοιχός· τοιοῦτοι γάρ. ὅμοιον δὲ καὶ ὅτι (25) ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς οἱ πτωχοὶ καὶ ᾄδουσι καὶ ὀρχοῦνται, καὶ (26) ὅτι τοῖς φυγάσιν ἔξεστιν οἰκεῖν ὅπου ἂν θέλωσιν· ὅτι γὰρ (27) τοῖς δοκοῦσιν εὐδαιμονεῖν ὑπάρχει ταῦτα, καὶ οἷς ταῦτα (28) ὑπάρχει δόξαιεν ἂν εὐδαιμονεῖν, διαφέρει δὲ τῷ πῶς· (29) διὸ καὶ εἰς τὴν ἔλλειψιν ἐμπίπτει.

. . . . . . . .

As a fact, what angered him was the insult involved; it was a mere accident that this was the particular form that the insult took. 6. Another is the argument from consequence. In the Alexander, for instance, it is argued that Paris must have had a lofty disposition, since he despised society and lived by himself on Mount Ida: because lofty people do this kind of thing, therefore Paris too, we are to suppose, had a lofty soul. Or, if a man dresses fashionably and roams around at night, he is a rake, since that is the way rakes behave. Another similar argument points out that beggars sing and dance in temples, and that exiles can live wherever they please, and that such privileges are at the disposal of those we account happy and therefore every one might be regarded as happy if only he has those privileges. What matters, however, is the circumstances under which the privileges are enjoyed.

ἄλλος παρὰ τὸ (30) ἀναίτιον ὡς αἴτιον, οἷον τῷ ἅμα ἢ μετὰ τοῦτο γεγονέναι· (31) τὸ γὰρ μετὰ τοῦτο ὡς διὰ τοῦτο λαμβάνουσιν, καὶ μάλιστα (32) οἱ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις, οἷον ὡς ὁ Δημάδης τὴν Δημοσθένους (33) πολιτείαν πάντων τῶν κακῶν αἰτίαν· μετ’ ἐκείνην γὰρ συνέβη (34) ὁ πόλεμος.

. . . .

Hence this line too falls under the head of fallacies by omission. 7. Another line consists in representing as causes things which are not causes, on the ground that they happened along with or before the event in question. They assume that, because B happens after A, it happens because of A. Politicians are especially fond of taking this line.

ἄλλος παρὰ τὴν ἔλλειψιν τοῦ πότε καὶ πῶς, (35) οἷον ὅτι δικαίως Ἀλέξανδρος ἔλαβε τὴν Ἑλένην· αἵρεσις γὰρ (36) αὐτῇ ἐδόθη παρὰ τοῦ πατρός. οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ ἴσως, ἀλλὰ τὸ (1402a1) πρῶτον· καὶ γὰρ ὁ πατὴρ μέχρι τούτου κύριος. ἢ εἴ τις φαίη (2) τὸ τύπτειν τοὺς ἐλευθέρους ὕβριν εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ πάντως, (3) ἀλλ’ ὅταν ἄρχῃ χειρῶν ἀδίκων.

. . . . . .

Thus Demades said that the policy of Demosthenes was the cause of all the mischief, ‘for after it the war occurred’. 8. Another line consists in leaving out any mention of time and circumstances. E.g. the argument that Paris was justified in taking Helen, since her father left her free to choose: here the freedom was presumably not perpetual; it could only refer to her first choice, beyond which her father’s authority could not go. Or again, one might say that to strike a free man is an act of wanton outrage;

ἔτι ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς (4) παρὰ τὸ ἁπλῶς καὶ μὴ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τί, γίγνεται φαινόμενος (5) συλλογισμός, οἷον ἐν μὲν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς ὅτι ἔστι τὸ μὴ ὄν (6) [ὄν], ἔστι γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὂν μὴ ὄν, καὶ ὅτι ἐπιστητὸν τὸ ἄγνωστον, (7) ἔστιν γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν τὸ ἄγνωστον ὅτι ἄγνωστον, οὕτως καὶ (8) ἐν τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς ἐστιν φαινόμενον ἐνθύμημα παρὰ τὸ μὴ (9) ἁπλῶς εἰκὸς ἀλλὰ τὶ εἰκός. ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο οὐ καθόλου, ὥσπερ (10) καὶ Ἀγάθων λέγει
τάχ’ ἄν τις εἰκὸς αὐτὸ τοῦτ’ εἶναι λέγοι,
(11) βροτοῖσι πολλὰ τυγχάνειν οὐκ εἰκότα. (12) γίγνεται γὰρ τὸ παρὰ τὸ εἰκός, ὥστε εἰκὸς καὶ τὸ παρὰ τὸ (13) εἰκός, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔσται τὸ μὴ εἰκὸς εἰκός. ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἁπλῶς, (14) ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐριστικῶν τὸ κατὰ τί καὶ πρὸς τί καὶ (15) πῇ οὐ προστιθέμενα ποιεῖ τὴν συκοφαντίαν, καὶ ἐνταῦθα παρὰ (16) τὸ εἰκὸς εἶναι μὴ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ τὶ εἰκός. ἔστι δ’ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ (17) τόπου ἡ Κόρακος τέχνη συγκειμένη· “ἄν τε γὰρ μὴ ἔνοχος ᾖ τῇ (18) αἰτίᾳ, οἷον ἀσθενὴς ὢν αἰκίας φεύγει (οὐ γὰρ εἰκός), κἂν ἔνοχος (19) ᾖ, οἷον ἰσχυρὸς ὤν (οὐ γὰρ εἰκός, ὅτι εἰκὸς ἔμελλε δόξειν)”. (20) ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων· ἢ γὰρ ἔνοχον ἀνάγκη ἢ μὴ (21) ἔνοχον εἶναι τῇ αἰτίᾳ· φαίνεται μὲν οὖν ἀμφότερα εἰκότα, (22) ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν εἰκός, τὸ δὲ οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ εἴρηται· (23) καὶ τὸ τὸν ἥττω δὲ λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν τοῦτ’ ἔστιν. καὶ (24) ἐντεῦθεν δικαίως ἐδυσχέραινον οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὸ Πρωταγόρου (25) ἐπάγγελμα· ψεῦδός τε γάρ ἐστιν, καὶ οὐκ ἀληθὲς ἀλλὰ φαινό(26)μενον εἰκός, καὶ ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ τέχνῃ ἀλλ’ <ἢ> ἐν ῥητορικῇ καὶ (27) ἐριστικῇ.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

but it is not so in every case—only when it is unprovoked. 9. Again, a spurious syllogism may, as in ‘eristical’ discussions, be based on the confusion of the absolute with that which is not absolute but particular. As, in dialectic, for instance, it may be argued that what—is—not is, on the ground that what—is—not is what—is—not: or that the unknown can be known, on the ground that it can be known to he unknown: so also in rhetoric a spurious enthymeme may be based on the confusion of some particular probability with absolute probability. Now no particular probability is universally probable: as Agathon says,
One might perchance say that was probable—
That things improbable oft will hap to men. For what is improbable does happen, and therefore it is probable that improbable things will happen. Granted this, one might argue that ‘what is improbable is probable’. But this is not true absolutely. As, in eristic, the imposture comes from not adding any clause specifying relationship or reference or manner; so here it arises because the probability in question is not general but specific. It is of this line of argument that Corax’s Art of Rhetoric is composed. If the accused is not open to the charge—for instance if a weakling be tried for violent assault—the defence is that he was not likely to do such a thing. But if he is open to the charge—i.e. if he is a strong man—the defence is still that he was not likely to do such a thing, since he could be sure that people would think he was likely to do it. And so with any other charge: the accused must be either open or not open to it: there is in either case an appearance of probable innocence, but whereas in the latter case the probability is genuine, in the former it can only be asserted in the special sense mentioned. This sort of argument illustrates what is meant by making the worse argument seem the better. Hence people were right in objecting to the training Protagoras undertook to give them.

25. (28) Καὶ περὶ μὲν ἐνθυμημάτων, καὶ τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν φαινο(29)μένων, εἴρηται, περὶ δὲ λύσεως ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν τῶν εἰρημένων (30) εἰπεῖν. ἔστιν δὲ λύειν ἢ ἀντισυλλογισάμενον ἢ ἔνστασιν ἐνεγ(31)κόντα. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀντισυλλογίζεσθαι δῆλον ὅτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν (32) τόπων ἐνδέχεται ποιεῖν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐν(33)δόξων, δοκοῦντα δὲ πολλὰ ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν· αἱ δ’ ἐνστά(34)σεις φέρονται καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς, τετραχῶς· ἢ γὰρ (35) ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου ἢ ἐκ τῶν κεκρι(36)μένων.

. . . . .

It was a fraud; the probability it handled was not genuine but spurious, and has a place in no art except Rhetoric and Eristic. Part 25. Enthymemes, genuine and apparent, have now been described; the next subject is their Refutation. An argument may be refuted either by a counter—syllogism or by bringing an objection. It is clear that counter—syllogisms can be built up from the same lines of arguments as the original syllogisms: for the materials of syllogisms are the ordinary opinions of men, and such opinions often contradict each other.

(37) λέγω δὲ ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ μέν, οἷον εἰ περὶ ἔρωτος εἴη (1402b1) τὸ ἐνθύμημα ὡς σπουδαῖος, ἡ ἔνστασις διχῶς· ἢ γὰρ καθόλου (2) εἰπόντα ὅτι πᾶσα ἔνδεια πονηρόν, ἢ κατὰ μέρος ὅτι οὐκ ἂν (3) ἐλέγετο Καύνιος ἔρως, εἰ μὴ ἦσαν καὶ πονηροὶ ἔρωτες.

. .

Objections, as appears in the Topics, may be raised in four ways—either by directly attacking your opponent’s own statement, or by putting forward another statement like it, or by putting forward a statement contrary to it, or by quoting previous decisions. 1. By ‘attacking your opponent’s own statement’ I mean, for instance, this: if his enthymeme should assert that love is always good, the objection can be brought in two ways,

ἀπὸ (4) δὲ τοῦ ἐναντίου ἔνστασις φέρεται, οἷον, εἰ τὸ ἐνθύμημα ἦν (5) ὅτι ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ πάντας τοὺς φίλους εὖ ποιεῖ, <ὅτι> ἀλλ’ (6) οὐδ’ ὁ μοχθηρὸς κακῶς.

.

either by making the general statement that ‘all want is an evil’, or by making the particular one that there would be no talk of ‘Caunian love’ if there were not evil loves as well as good ones.

ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ὁμοίου, οἷον, εἰ ἦν (7) τὸ ἐνθύμημα ὅτι οἱ κακῶς πεπονθότες ἀεὶ μισοῦσιν, ὅτι (8) ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ οἱ εὖ πεπονθότες ἀεὶ φιλοῦσιν.

.

2. An objection ‘from a contrary statement’ is raised when, for instance, the opponent’s enthymeme having concluded that a good man does good to all his friends, you object, ‘That proves nothing, for a bad man does not do evil to all his friends’.

αἱ δὲ κρίσεις (9) αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων ἀνδρῶν, οἷον εἴ τις ἐνθύμημα εἶπεν (10) ὅτι τοῖς μεθύουσι δεῖ συγγνώμην ἔχειν, ἀγνοοῦντες γὰρ ἁμαρτά(11)νουσιν, ἔνστασις ὅτι οὔκουν ὁ Πιττακὸς αἰνετός· οὐ γὰρ ἂν (12) μείζους ζημίας ἐνομοθέτησεν ἐάν τις μεθύων ἁμαρτάνῃ.

. .

3. An example of an objection ‘from a like statement’ is, the enthymeme having shown that ill—used men always hate their ill—users, to reply, ‘That proves nothing, for well—used men do not always love those who used them well’. 4. The ‘decisions’ mentioned are those proceeding from well—known men; for instance, if the enthymeme employed has concluded that ‘that allowance ought to be made for drunken offenders, since they did not know what they were doing’,

(13) ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα λέγεται ἐκ τεττάρων, τὰ δὲ τέτ(14)ταρα ταῦτ’ ἐστίν, εἰκὸς παράδειγμα τεκμήριον σημεῖον, ἔστι δὲ (15) τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἢ ὄντων ἢ δοκούντων συνηγμένα (16) ἐνθυμήματα ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων, τὰ δὲ δι’ ἐπαγωγῆς ἐκ τοῦ (17) ὁμοίου, ἢ ἑνὸς ἢ πλειόνων, ὅταν λαβὼν τὸ καθόλου εἶτα συλ(18)λογίσηται τὰ κατὰ μέρος, διὰ παραδείγματος, τὰ δὲ διὰ ἀναγ(19)καίου καὶ <ἀεὶ> ὄντος διὰ τεκμηρίου, τὰ δὲ διὰ τοῦ καθόλου [ἢ] (20) τοῦ ἐν μέρει ὄντος, ἐάν τε ὂν ἐάν τε μή, διὰ σημείων,

. . . . .

the objection will be, ‘Pittacus, then, deserves no approval, or he would not have prescribed specially severe penalties for offences due to drunkenness’. Enthymemes are based upon one or other of four kinds of alleged fact: (1) Probabilities, (2) Examples, (3) Infallible Signs, (4) Ordinary Signs. (1) Enthymemes based upon Probabilities are those which argue from what is, or is supposed to be, usually true. (2) Enthymemes based upon Example are those which proceed by induction from one or more similar cases, arrive at a general proposition, and then argue deductively to a particular inference. (3) Enthymemes based upon Infallible Signs are those which argue from the inevitable and invariable.

τὸ δὲ (21) εἰκὸς οὐ τὸ ἀεὶ ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ (22) τοιαῦτα μὲν τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων ἀεὶ ἔστι λύειν φέροντα ἔνστασιν, (23) ἡ δὲ λύσις φαινομένη ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀληθὴς ἀεί· οὐ γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ (24) εἰκός λύει ὁ ἐνιστάμενος, ἀλλ’ ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον· διὸ καὶ ἀεὶ (25) ἔστι πλεονεκτεῖν ἀπολογούμενον μᾶλλον ἢ κατηγοροῦντα διὰ (26) τοῦτον τὸν παραλογισμόν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ μὲν κατηγορῶν διὰ εἰκό(27)των ἀποδείκνυσιν, ἔστι δὲ οὐ ταὐτὸ λῦσαι ἢ ὅτι οὐκ εἰκὸς (28) ἢ ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀεὶ δ’ ἔχει ἔνστασιν τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ (29) (οὐ γὰρ ἂν ᾖ ἅμ’ ἀεὶ εἰκός, ἀεὶ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον), ὁ δὲ κριτὴς (30) οἴεται, ἂν οὕτω λυθῇ, ἢ οὐκ εἰκὸς εἶναι ἢ οὐχ αὑτῷ κριτέον, (31) παραλογιζόμενος, ὥσπερ ἐλέγομεν (οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀναγ(32)καίων δεῖ αὐτὸν μόνον κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων· (33) τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ γνώμῃ τῇ ἀρίστῃ κρίνειν), οὔκουν ἱκανὸν (34) ἂν λύσῃ ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ λύειν ὅτι οὐκ εἰκός. (35) τοῦτο δὲ συμβήσεται ἐὰν ᾖ ἡ ἔνστασις μᾶλλον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ (36) πολύ. ἐνδέχεται δὲ εἶναι τοιαύτην διχῶς, ἢ τῷ χρόνῳ ἢ τοῖς (37) πράγμασιν, κυριώτατα δὲ εἰ ἀμφοῖν· εἰ γὰρ τὰ <πλείω καὶ> (1403a1) πλεονάκις οὕτως, τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν εἰκὸς μᾶλλον.

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

(4) Enthymemes based upon ordinary Signs are those which argue from some universal or particular proposition, true or false. Now (1) as a Probability is that which happens usually but not always, Enthymemes founded upon Probabilities can, it is clear, always be refuted by raising some objection. The refutation is not always genuine: it may be spurious: for it consists in showing not that your opponent’s premiss is not probable, but only in showing that it is not inevitably true. Hence it is always in defence rather than in accusation that it is possible to gain an advantage by using this fallacy. For the accuser uses probabilities to prove his case: and to refute a conclusion as improbable is not the same thing as to refute it as not inevitable. Any argument based upon what usually happens is always open to objection: otherwise it would not be a probability but an invariable and necessary truth. But the judges think, if the refutation takes this form, either that the accuser’s case is not probable or that they must not decide it; which, as we said, is a false piece of reasoning. For they ought to decide by considering not merely what must be true but also what is likely to be true: this is, indeed, the meaning of ‘giving a verdict in accordance with one’s honest opinion’. Therefore it is not enough for the defendant to refute the accusation by proving that the charge is not bound to be true: he must do so by showing that it is not likely to be true. For this purpose his objection must state what is more usually true than the statement attacked. It may do so in either of two ways: either in respect of frequency or in respect of exactness. It will be most convincing if it does so in both respects;

(2) λύεται δὲ καὶ τὰ σημεῖα καὶ τὰ διὰ σημείου ἐνθυμήματα (3) εἰρημένα, κἂν ᾖ ὑπάρχοντα, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις· (4) ὅτι γὰρ ἀσυλλόγιστόν ἐστιν πᾶν σημεῖον, δῆλον ἡμῖν ἐκ τῶν (5) Ἀναλυτικῶν.

. .

for if the thing in question both happens oftener as we represent it and happens more as we represent it, the probability is particularly great (2) Fallible Signs, and Enthymemes based upon them, can be refuted even if the facts are correct, as was said at the outset.

(6) πρὸς δὲ τὰ παραδειγματώδη ἡ αὐτὴ λύσις καὶ τὰ (7) εἰκότα· ἐάν τε γὰρ ἔχωμεν <ἕν> τι οὐχ οὕτω, λέλυται, ὅτι οὐκ (8) ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ καὶ τὰ πλείω ἢ πλεονάκις ἄλλως, ἐάν τε καὶ τὰ (9) πλείω καὶ τὰ πλεονάκις οὕτω, μαχετέον ἢ ὅτι τὸ παρὸν οὐχ (10) ὅμοιον ἢ οὐχ ὁμοίως, ἢ διαφοράν γέ τινα ἔχει.

. . .

For we have shown in the Analytics that no Fallible Sign can form part of a valid logical proof. (3) Enthymemes depending on examples may be refuted in the same way as probabilities. If we have a negative instance, the argument is refuted, in so far as it is proved not inevitable, even though the positive examples are more similar and more frequent.

(10) τὰ δὲ τεκμήρια (11) καὶ τεκμηριώδη ἐνθυμήματα κατὰ μὲν τὸ ἀσυλλόγιστον οὐκ (12) ἔσται λῦσαι (δῆλον δὲ καὶ τοῦθ’ ἡμῖν ἐκ τῶν Ἀναλυτικῶν), (13) λείπεται δ’ ὡς οὐχ ὑπάρχει τὸ λεγόμενον δεικνύναι. εἰ δὲ (14) φανερὸν καὶ ὅτι ὑπάρχει καὶ ὅτι τεκμήριον, ἄλυτον ἤδη γίγνε(15)ται τοῦτο· πάντα γὰρ γίγνεται ἀπόδειξις ἤδη φανερά.

. . . .

And if the positive examples are more numerous and more frequent, we must contend that the present case is dissimilar, or that its conditions are dissimilar, or that it is different in some way or other. (4) It will be impossible to refute Infallible Signs, and Enthymemes resting on them, by showing in any way that they do not form a valid logical proof: this, too, we see from the Analytics. All we can do is to show that the fact alleged does not exist. If there is no doubt that it does, and that it is an Infallible Sign, refutation now becomes impossible:

26. (16) Τὸ δ’ αὔξειν καὶ μειοῦν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνθυμήματος στοιχεῖον· (17) τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ λέγω στοιχεῖον καὶ τόπον· ἔστιν γὰρ στοιχεῖον (18) καὶ τόπος εἰς ὃ πολλὰ ἐνθυμήματα ἐμπίπτει. τὸ δ’ αὔξειν καὶ (19) μειοῦν ἐστὶν ἐνθυμήματα πρὸς τὸ δεῖξαι ὅτι μέγα ἢ μικρόν, (20) ὥσπερ καὶ ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, καὶ τῶν (21) ἄλλων ὁτιοῦν.

. . . .

for this is equivalent to a demonstration which is clear in every respect. Part 26. Amplification and Depreciation are not an element of enthymeme. By ‘an element of enthymeme’ I mean the same thing as a line of enthymematic argument —a general class embracing a large number of particular kinds of enthymeme.

ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶν πάντα περὶ ἃ οἱ συλλογισμοὶ καὶ (22) τὰ ἐνθυμήματα, ὥστ’ εἰ μηδὲ τούτων ἕκαστον ἐνθυμήματος (23) τόπος, οὐδὲ τὸ αὔξειν καὶ μειοῦν. (24) οὐδὲ τὰ λυτικὰ ἐνθυμή(25)ματος εἶδός τί ἐστιν [ἄλλο τῶν κατασκευαστικῶν]· δῆλον γὰρ (26) ὅτι λύει μὲν ἢ δείξας ἢ ἔνστασιν ἐνεγκών, ἀνταποδείκνυσι (27) δὲ τὸ ἀντικείμενον, οἷον εἰ ἔδειξε ὅτι γέγονεν, οὗτος ὅτι οὐ (28) γέγονεν, εἰ δὲ ὅτι οὐ γέγονεν, οὗτος ὅτι γέγονεν· ὥστε αὕτη (29) μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη [ἡ] διαφορά (τοῖς αὐτοῖς γὰρ χρῶνται ἀμφότεροι· (30) ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ ἔστιν, ἐνθυμήματα φέρουσιν)· ἡ δ’ ἔνστασις (31) οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνθύμημα, ἀλλά, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς, τὸ εἰπεῖν (32) δόξαν τινὰ ἐξ ἧς ἔσται δῆλον ὅτι οὐ συλλελόγισται ἢ ὅτι ψεῦ(33)δός τι εἴληφεν.

. . . . . . . .

Amplification and Depreciation are one kind of enthymeme, viz. the kind used to show that a thing is great or small; just as there are other kinds used to show that a thing is good or bad, just or unjust, and anything else of the sort. All these things are the subject—matter of syllogisms and enthymemes; none of these is the line of argument of an enthymeme; no more, therefore, are Amplification and Depreciation. Nor are Refutative Enthymemes a different species from Constructive. For it is clear that refutation consists either in offering positive proof or in raising an objection. In the first case we prove the opposite of our adversary’s statements. Thus, if he shows that a thing has happened, we show that it has not; if he shows that it has not happened, we show that it has. This, then, could not be the distinction if there were one, since the same means are employed by both parties, enthymemes being adduced to show that the fact is or is not so—and—so. An objection, on the other hand, is not an enthymeme at all,

(34) ἐπεὶ δὲ τρία ἔστιν ἃ δεῖ πραγματευθῆναι περὶ τὸν λόγον, (35) ὑπὲρ μὲν παραδειγμάτων καὶ γνωμῶν καὶ ἐνθυμημάτων καὶ (1403b1) ὅλως τῶν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, ὅθεν τε εὐπορήσομεν καὶ ὡς αὐτὰ (2) λύσομεν, εἰρήσθω ἡμῖν τοσαῦτα, λοιπὸν δὲ διελθεῖν περὶ λέξεως (3) καὶ τάξεως.(4) (5)

. . .

as was said in the Topics, consists in stating some accepted opinion from which it will be clear that our opponent has not reasoned correctly or has made a false assumption. Three points must be studied in making a speech; and we have now completed the account of (1) Examples, Maxims, Enthymemes, and in general the thought—element the way to invent and refute arguments.

ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗ Γ

.

We have next to discuss (2) Style, and (3) Arrangement.

1. (6) Ἐπειδὴ τρία ἐστὶν ἃ δεῖ πραγματευθῆναι περὶ τὸν λό(7)γον, ἓν μὲν ἐκ τίνων αἱ πίστεις ἔσονται, δεύτερον δὲ περὶ (8) τὴν λέξιν, τρίτον δὲ πῶς χρὴ τάξαι τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου, (9) περὶ μὲν τῶν πίστεων εἴρηται, καὶ ἐκ πόσων, ὅτι ἐκ τριῶν (10) εἰσί, καὶ ταῦτα ποῖα, καὶ διὰ τί τοσαῦτα μόνα (ἢ γὰρ τῷ (11) αὐτοί τι πεπονθέναι οἱ κρίνοντες, ἢ τῷ ποιούς τινας ὑπο(12)λαμβάνειν τοὺς λέγοντας, ἢ τῷ ἀποδεδεῖχθαι, πείθονται πάν(13)τες), εἴρηται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα, πόθεν δεῖ πορίζεσθαι (14) (ἔστι γὰρ τὰ μὲν εἴδη τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων, τὰ δὲ τόποι)· περὶ (15) δὲ τῆς λέξεως ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἀπόχρη τὸ (16) ἔχειν ἃ δεῖ λέγειν, ἀλλ’ ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα ὡς δεῖ εἰπεῖν, (17) καὶ συμβάλλεται πολλὰ πρὸς τὸ φανῆναι ποιόν τινα τὸν (18) λόγον.

. . . . . . .

BOOK III Part 1. In making a speech one must study three points: first, the means of producing persuasion; second, the style, or language, to be used; third, the proper arrangement of the various parts of the speech. We have already specified the sources of persuasion. We have shown that these are three in number; what they are; and why there are only these three: for we have shown that persuasion must in every case be effected either (1) by working on the emotions of the judges themselves, (2) by giving them the right impression of the speakers’ character, or (3) by proving the truth of the statements made. Enthymemes also have been described, and the sources from which they should be derived; there being both special and general lines of argument for enthymemes. Our next subject will be the style of expression. For it is not enough to know what we ought to say; we must also say it as we ought;

τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἐζητήθη κατὰ φύσιν ὅπερ πέ(19)φυκε πρῶτον, αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα ἐκ τίνων ἔχει τὸ πιθανόν, (20) δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ταῦτα τῇ λέξει διαθέσθαι, τρίτον δὲ τούτων (21) ὃ δύναμιν μὲν ἔχει μεγίστην, οὔπω δ’ ἐπικεχείρηται, τὰ (22) περὶ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν.

. . . .

much help is thus afforded towards producing the right impression of a speech. The first question to receive attention was naturally the one that comes first naturally —how persuasion can be produced from the facts themselves. The second is how to set these facts out in language.

καὶ γὰρ εἰς τὴν τραγικὴν καὶ ῥαψῳδίαν (23) ὀψὲ παρῆλθεν· ὑπεκρίνοντο γὰρ αὐτοὶ τὰς τραγῳδίας οἱ (24) ποιηταὶ τὸ πρῶτον. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ περὶ τὴν ῥητορικήν (25) ἐστι τὸ τοιοῦτον ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὴν ποιητικήν, ὅπερ (26) ἕτεροί <τέ> τινες ἐπραγματεύθησαν καὶ Γλαύκων ὁ Τήιος. ἔστιν (27) δὲ αὕτη μὲν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ, πῶς αὐτῇ δεῖ χρῆσθαι πρὸς (28) ἕκαστον πάθος, οἷον πότε μεγάλῃ καὶ πότε μικρᾷ καὶ μέσῃ, (29) καὶ πῶς τοῖς τόνοις, οἷον ὀξείᾳ καὶ βαρείᾳ καὶ μέσῃ, καὶ (30) ῥυθμοῖς τίσι πρὸς ἕκαστα. τρία γάρ ἐστιν περὶ ἃ σκοποῦ(31)σιν· ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶ μέγεθος ἁρμονία ῥυθμός.

. . . . . . .

A third would be the proper method of delivery; this is a thing that affects the success of a speech greatly; but hitherto the subject has been neglected. Indeed, it was long before it found a way into the arts of tragic drama and epic recitation: at first poets acted their tragedies themselves. It is plain that delivery has just as much to do with oratory as with poetry. (In connexion with poetry, it has been studied by Glaucon of Teos among others.) It is, essentially, a matter of the right management of the voice to express the various emotions —of speaking loudly, softly, or between the two; of high, low, or intermediate pitch; of the various rhythms that suit various subjects.

τὰ μὲν οὖν (32) ἆθλα σχεδὸν ἐκ τῶν ἀγώνων οὗτοι λαμβάνουσιν, καὶ καθ(33)άπερ ἐκεῖ μεῖζον δύνανται νῦν τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ὑποκριταί, (34) καὶ κατὰ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς ἀγῶνας, διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν τῶν (35) πολιτῶν. οὔπω δὲ σύγκειται τέχνη περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπεὶ καὶ (36) τὸ περὶ τὴν λέξιν ὀψὲ προῆλθεν· καὶ δοκεῖ φορτικὸν εἶναι, (1404a1) καλῶς ὑπολαμβανόμενον. ἀλλ’ ὅλης οὔσης πρὸς δόξαν τῆς (2) πραγματείας τῆς περὶ τὴν ῥητορικήν, οὐχ ὡς ὀρθῶς ἔχοντος (3) ἀλλ’ ὡς ἀναγκαίου τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιητέον, ἐπεὶ τό γε δίκαιόν (4) <ἐστι> μηδὲν πλέον ζητεῖν περὶ τὸν λόγον ἢ ὥστε μήτε (5) λυπεῖν μήτ’ εὐφραίνειν· δίκαιον γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἀγωνίζεσθαι (6) τοῖς πράγμασιν, ὥστε τἆλλα ἔξω τοῦ ἀποδεῖξαι περίεργα (7) ἐστίν· ἀλλ’ ὅμως μέγα δύναται, καθάπερ εἴρηται, διὰ τὴν (8) τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ μοχθηρίαν.

. . . . . . . .

These are the three things—volume of sound, modulation of pitch, and rhythm—that a speaker bears in mind. It is those who do bear them in mind who usually win prizes in the dramatic contests; and just as in drama the actors now count for more than the poets, so it is in the contests of public life, owing to the defects of our political institutions. No systematic treatise upon the rules of delivery has yet been composed; indeed, even the study of language made no progress till late in the day. Besides, delivery is—very properly—not regarded as an elevated subject of inquiry. Still, the whole business of rhetoric being concerned with appearances, we must pay attention to the subject of delivery, unworthy though it is, because we cannot do without it. The right thing in speaking really is that we should be satisfied not to annoy our hearers, without trying to delight them: we ought in fairness to fight our case with no help beyond the bare facts: nothing, therefore, should matter except the proof of those facts.

τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς λέξεως ὅμως ἔχει (9) τι μικρὸν ἀναγκαῖον ἐν πάσῃ διδασκαλίᾳ· διαφέρει γάρ τι (10) πρὸς τὸ δηλῶσαι ὡδὶ ἢ ὡδὶ εἰπεῖν, οὐ μέντοι τοσοῦτον, (11) ἀλλ’ ἅπαντα φαντασία ταῦτ’ ἐστί, καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατήν· (12) διὸ οὐδεὶς οὕτω γεωμετρεῖν διδάσκει.

. . . .

Still, as has been already said, other things affect the result considerably, owing to the defects of our hearers. The arts of language cannot help having a small but real importance, whatever it is we have to expound to others: the way in which a thing is said does affect its intelligibility. Not, however, so much importance as people think. All such arts are fanciful and meant to charm the hearer.

ἐκείνη μὲν οὖν ὅταν (13) ἔλθῃ ταὐτὸ ποιήσει τῇ ὑποκριτικῇ, ἐγκεχειρήκασιν δὲ ἐπ’ (14) ὀλίγον περὶ αὐτῆς εἰπεῖν τινές, οἷον Θρασύμαχος ἐν τοῖς (15) Ἐλέοις· καὶ ἔστιν φύσεως τὸ ὑποκριτικὸν εἶναι, καὶ ἀτεχνό(16)τερον, περὶ δὲ τὴν λέξιν ἔντεχνον. διὸ καὶ τοῖς τοῦτο δυνα(17)μένοις γίνεται πάλιν ἆθλα, καθάπερ καὶ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν ὑπό(18)κρισιν ῥήτορσιν· οἱ γὰρ γραφόμενοι λόγοι μεῖζον ἰσχύουσι (19) διὰ τὴν λέξιν ἢ διὰ τὴν διάνοιαν. (20) ἤρξαντο μὲν οὖν κινῆσαι τὸ πρῶτον, ὥσπερ πέφυκεν, (21) οἱ ποιηταί· τὰ γὰρ ὀνόματα μιμήματα ἐστίν, ὑπῆρξεν δὲ (22) καὶ ἡ φωνὴ πάντων μιμητικώτατον τῶν μορίων ἡμῖν· διὸ (23) καὶ αἱ τέχναι συνέστησαν ἥ τε ῥαψῳδία καὶ ἡ ὑποκριτικὴ (24) καὶ ἄλλαι γε. ἐπεὶ δ’ οἱ ποιηταί, λέγοντες εὐήθη, διὰ τὴν (25) λέξιν ἐδόκουν πορίσασθαι τὴν δόξαν, διὰ τοῦτο (26) ποιητικὴ πρώτη ἐγένετο λέξις, οἷον ἡ Γοργίου, καὶ νῦν (27) ἔτι οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀπαιδεύτων τοὺς τοιούτους οἴονται δια(28)λέγεσθαι κάλλιστα. τοῦτο δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλ’ ἑτέρα λόγου (29) καὶ ποιήσεως λέξις ἐστίν. δηλοῖ δὲ τὸ συμβαῖνον· οὐδὲ γὰρ (30) οἱ τὰς τραγῳδίας ποιοῦντες ἔτι χρῶνται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, (31) ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐκ τῶν τετραμέτρων εἰς τὸ ἰαμβεῖον μετ(32)έβησαν διὰ τὸ τῷ λόγῳ τοῦτο τῶν μέτρων ὁμοιότατον εἶναι (33) τῶν ἄλλων, οὕτω καὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀφείκασιν ὅσα παρὰ (34) τὴν διάλεκτόν ἐστιν, οἷς [δ’] οἱ πρῶτοι ἐκόσμουν, καὶ ἔτι (35) νῦν οἱ τὰ ἑξάμετρα ποιοῦντες [ἀφείκασιν]. διὸ γελοῖον μι(36)μεῖσθαι τούτους οἳ αὐτοὶ οὐκέτι χρῶνται ἐκείνῳ τῷ τρόπῳ, (37) ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι οὐχ ἅπαντα ὅσα περὶ λέξεως ἔστιν εἰπεῖν (38) ἀκριβολογητέον ἡμῖν, ἀλλ’ ὅσα περὶ τοιαύτης οἵας λέγομεν.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Nobody uses fine language when teaching geometry. When the principles of delivery have been worked out, they will produce the same effect as on the stage. But only very slight attempts to deal with them have been made and by a few people, as by Thrasymachus in his ‘Appeals to Pity’. Dramatic ability is a natural gift, and can hardly be systematically taught. The principles of good diction can be so taught, and therefore we have men of ability in this direction too, who win prizes in their turn, as well as those speakers who excel in delivery —speeches of the written or literary kind owe more of their effect to their direction than to their thought. It was naturally the poets who first set the movement going; for words represent things, and they had also the human voice at their disposal, which of all our organs can best represent other things. Thus the arts of recitation and acting were formed, and others as well. Now it was because poets seemed to win fame through their fine language when their thoughts were simple enough, that the language of oratorical prose at first took a poetical colour, e.g. that of Gorgias. Even now most uneducated people think that poetical language makes the finest discourses. That is not true: the language of prose is distinct from that of poetry. This is shown by the state of things to—day, when even the language of tragedy has altered its character. Just as iambics were adopted, instead of tetrameters, because they are the most prose—like of all metres, so tragedy has given up all those words, not used in ordinary talk, which decorated the early drama and are still used by the writers of hexameter poems. It is therefore ridiculous to imitate a poetical manner which the poets themselves have dropped;

(39) περὶ δ’ ἐκείνης εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.

.

and it is now plain that we have not to treat in detail the whole question of style, but may confine ourselves to that part of it which concerns our present subject, rhetoric.

2. (1404b1) Ἔστω οὖν ἐκεῖνα τεθεωρημένα καὶ ὡρίσθω λέξεως ἀρετὴ (2) σαφῆ εἶναι (σημεῖον γάρ τι ὁ λόγος ὤν, ἐὰν μὴ δηλοῖ (3) οὐ ποιήσει τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον), καὶ μήτε ταπεινὴν μήτε ὑπὲρ (4) τὸ ἀξίωμα, ἀλλὰ πρέπουσαν· ἡ γὰρ ποιητικὴ ἴσως οὐ τα(5)πεινή, ἀλλ’ οὐ πρέπουσα λόγῳ.

. . . .

The other——the poetical——part of it has been discussed in the treatise on the Art of Poetry. Part 2. We may, then, start from the observations there made, including the definition of style. Style to be good must be clear, as is proved by the fact that speech which fails to convey a plain meaning will fail to do just what speech has to do. It must also be appropriate, avoiding both meanness and undue elevation;

τῶν δ’ ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥη(6)μάτων σαφῆ μὲν ποιεῖ τὰ κύρια, μὴ ταπεινὴν δὲ ἀλλὰ (7) κεκοσμημένην τἆλλα ὀνόματα ὅσα εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιη(8)τικῆς· τὸ γὰρ ἐξαλλάξαι ποιεῖ φαίνεσθαι σεμνοτέραν· ὥσπερ (9) γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς ξένους οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ πρὸς τοὺς πολίτας, (10) τὸ αὐτὸ πάσχουσιν καὶ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν· διὸ δεῖ ποιεῖν ξένην (11) τὴν διάλεκτον· θαυμασταὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀπόντων εἰσίν, ἡδὺ δὲ (12) τὸ θαυμαστόν ἐστιν.

. . . . .

poetical language is certainly free from meanness, but it is not appropriate to prose. Clearness is secured by using the words (nouns and verbs alike) that are current and ordinary. Freedom from meanness, and positive adornment too, are secured by using the other words mentioned in the Art of Poetry. Such variation from what is usual makes the language appear more stately. People do not feel towards strangers as they do towards their own countrymen, and the same thing is true of their feeling for language. It is therefore well to give to everyday speech an unfamiliar air:

ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν μέτρων πολλά τε ποιεῖται (13) οὕτω καὶ ἁρμόττει ἐκεῖ (πλέον γὰρ ἐξέστηκεν περὶ ἃ καὶ (14) περὶ οὓς ὁ λόγος), ἐν δὲ τοῖς ψιλοῖς λόγοις πολλῷ ἐλάττω· (15) ἡ γὰρ ὑπόθεσις ἐλάττων, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνταῦθα, εἰ δοῦλος (16) καλλιεποῖτο ἢ λίαν νέος, ἀπρεπέστερον, ἢ περὶ λίαν μικρῶν· (17) ἀλλ’ ἔστι καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἐπισυστελλόμενον καὶ αὐξανόμενον (18) τὸ πρέπον· διὸ δεῖ λανθάνειν ποιοῦντας, καὶ μὴ δοκεῖν (19) λέγειν πεπλασμένως ἀλλὰ πεφυκότως (τοῦτο γὰρ πιθανόν, (20) ἐκεῖνο δὲ τοὐναντίον· ὡς γὰρ πρὸς ἐπιβουλεύοντα διαβάλ(21)λονται, καθάπερ πρὸς τοὺς οἴνους τοὺς μεμιγμένους), καὶ (22) οἷον ἡ Θεοδώρου φωνὴ πέπονθε πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ὑπο(23)κριτῶν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ λέγοντος ἔοικεν εἶναι, αἱ δ’ ἀλλό(24)τριαι.

. . . . . . . . . .

people like what strikes them, and are struck by what is out of the way. In verse such effects are common, and there they are fitting: the persons and things there spoken of are comparatively remote from ordinary life. In prose passages they are far less often fitting because the subject—matter is less exalted. Even in poetry, it is not quite appropriate that fine language should be used by a slave or a very young man, or about very trivial subjects: even in poetry the style, to be appropriate, must sometimes be toned down, though at other times heightened. We can now see that a writer must disguise his art and give the impression of speaking naturally and not artificially. Naturalness is persuasive, artificiality is the contrary; for our hearers are prejudiced and think we have some design against them, as if we were mixing their wines for them. It is like the difference between the quality of Theodorus’ voice and the voices of all other actors:

κλέπτεται δ’ εὖ, ἐάν τις ἐκ τῆς εἰωθυίας διαλέκτου (25) ἐκλέγων συντιθῇ· ὅπερ Εὐριπίδης ποιεῖ καὶ ὑπέδειξε πρῶτος.

. .

his really seems to be that of the character who is speaking, theirs do not. We can hide our purpose successfully by taking the single words of our composition from the speech of ordinary life.

(26) ὄντων δ’ ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος συν(27)έστηκεν, τῶν δὲ ὀνομάτων τοσαῦτ’ ἐχόντων εἴδη ὅσα τε(28)θεώρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιήσεως, τούτων γλώτταις μὲν καὶ (29) διπλοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ πεποιημένοις ὀλιγάκις καὶ ὀλιγαχοῦ (30) χρηστέον (ὅπου δέ, ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν, τό τε διὰ τί εἴρηται· (31) ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον γὰρ ἐξαλλάττει τοῦ πρέποντος), τὸ δὲ κύριον (32) καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ μεταφορὰ μόνα χρήσιμα πρὸς τὴν τῶν (33) ψιλῶν λόγων λέξιν.

. . . .

This is done in poetry by Euripides, who was the first to show the way to his successors. Language is composed of nouns and verbs. Nouns are of the various kinds considered in the treatise on Poetry. Strange words, compound words, and invented words must be used sparingly and on few occasions: on what occasions we shall state later. The reason for this restriction has been already indicated: they depart from what is suitable, in the direction of excess.

σημεῖον δ’ ὅτι τούτοις μόνοις πάντες (34) χρῶνται· πάντες γὰρ μεταφοραῖς διαλέγονται καὶ τοῖς οἰκεί(35)οις καὶ τοῖς κυρίοις, ὥστε δῆλον ὡς ἂν εὖ ποιῇ τις, ἔσται (36) τε ξενικὸν καὶ λανθάνειν ἐνδέξεται καὶ σαφηνιεῖ· αὕτη δ’ (37) ἦν ἡ τοῦ ῥητορικοῦ λόγου ἀρετή.

. . . .

In the language of prose, besides the regular and proper terms for things, metaphorical terms only can be used with advantage. This we gather from the fact that these two classes of terms, the proper or regular and the metaphorical—these and no others—are used by everybody in conversation. We can now see that a good writer can produce a style that is distinguished without being obtrusive, and is at the same time clear,

τῶν δ’ ὀνομάτων τῷ (38) μὲν σοφιστῇ ὁμωνυμίαι χρήσιμοι (παρὰ ταύτας γὰρ κακουρ(39)γεῖ), τῷ ποιητῇ δὲ συνωνυμίαι, λέγω δὲ κύριά τε καὶ συν(1405a1)ώνυμα οἷον τὸ πορεύεσθαι καὶ τὸ βαδίζειν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἀμφό(2)τερα καὶ κύρια καὶ συνώνυμα ἀλλήλοις. (3) τί μὲν οὖν τούτων ἕκαστόν ἐστι, καὶ πόσα εἴδη μετα(4)φορᾶς, καὶ ὅτι τοῦτο πλεῖστον δύναται καὶ ἐν ποιήσει καὶ (5) ἐν λόγοις, [αἱ μεταφοραί,] εἴρηται, καθάπερ ἐλέγομεν, ἐν τοῖς (6) περὶ ποιητικῆς· τοσούτῳ δ’ ἐν λόγῳ δεῖ μᾶλλον φιλοπονεῖ(7)σθαι περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅσῳ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων βοηθημάτων ὁ λόγος (8) ἐστὶ τῶν μέτρων· καὶ τὸ σαφὲς καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ξενικὸν (9) ἔχει μάλιστα ἡ μεταφορά, καὶ λαβεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτὴν παρ’ (10) ἄλλου. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐπίθετα καὶ τὰς μεταφορὰς ἁρμοτ(11)τούσας λέγειν. τοῦτο δ’ ἔσται ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάλογον· εἰ δὲ μή, (12) ἀπρεπὲς φανεῖται διὰ τὸ παρ’ ἄλληλα τὰ ἐναντία μάλιστα (13) φαίνεσθαι. ἀλλὰ δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ὡς νέῳ φοινικίς, οὕτω γέ(14)ροντι τί (οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ πρέπει ἐσθής) καὶ ἐάν τε κοσμεῖν (15) βούλῃ, ἀπὸ τῶν βελτίστων τῶν ἐν ταὐτῷ γένει φέρειν τὴν (16) μεταφοράν, ἐάν τε ψέγειν, ἀπὸ τῶν χειρόνων· λέγω δ’ οἷον, (17) ἐπεὶ τὰ ἐναντία ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει, τὸ φάναι τὸν μὲν πτω(18)χεύοντα εὔχεσθαι τὸν δὲ εὐχόμενον πτωχεύειν, ὅτι ἄμφω αἰ(19)τήσεις, τὸ εἰρημένον ἐστὶ ποιεῖν, ὡς καὶ Ἰφικράτης Καλλίαν (20) μητραγύρτην ἀλλ’ οὐ δᾳδοῦχον, ὁ δὲ ἔφη ἀμύητον αὐτὸν (21) εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μητραγύρτην αὐτὸν καλεῖν, ἀλλὰ δᾳδοῦχον· (22) ἄμφω γὰρ περὶ θεόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τίμιον τὸ δὲ ἄτιμον.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

thus satisfying our definition of good oratorical prose. Words of ambiguous meaning are chiefly useful to enable the sophist to mislead his hearers. Synonyms are useful to the poet, by which I mean words whose ordinary meaning is the same, e.g. ’poreuesthai’ (advancing) and ‘badizein’ (proceeding); these two are ordinary words and have the same meaning. In the Art of Poetry, as we have already said, will be found definitions of these kinds of words; a classification of Metaphors; and mention of the fact that metaphor is of great value both in poetry and in prose. Prose—writers must, however, pay specially careful attention to metaphor, because their other resources are scantier than those of poets. Metaphor, moreover, gives style clearness, charm, and distinction as nothing else can: and it is not a thing whose use can be taught by one man to another. Metaphors, like epithets, must be fitting, which means that they must fairly correspond to the thing signified: failing this, their inappropriateness will be conspicuous: the want of harmony between two things is emphasized by their being placed side by side. It is like having to ask ourselves what dress will suit an old man; certainly not the crimson cloak that suits a young man. And if you wish to pay a compliment, you must take your metaphor from something better in the same line; if to disparage, from something worse. To illustrate my meaning: since opposites are in the same class, you do what I have suggested if you say that a man who begs ‘prays’, and a man who prays ‘begs’; for praying and begging are both varieties of asking. So Iphicrates called Callias a ‘mendicant priest’ instead of a ‘torch—bearer’, and Callias replied that Iphicrates must be uninitiated or he would have called him not a ‘mendicant priest’ but a ‘torch—bearer’.

(23) καὶ ὁ μὲν διονυσοκόλακας, αὐτοὶ δ’ αὑτοὺς τεχνίτας κα(24)λοῦσιν (ταῦτα δ’ ἄμφω μεταφορά, ἡ μὲν ῥυπαινόντων ἡ δὲ (25) τοὐναντίον), καὶ οἱ μὲν λῃσταὶ αὑτοὺς ποριστὰς καλοῦσι (26) νῦν (διὸ ἔξεστι λέγειν τὸν ἀδικήσαντα μὲν ἁμαρτάνειν, τὸν (27) δ’ ἁμαρτάνοντα ἀδικῆσαι, καὶ τὸν κλέψαντα καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ (28) πορίσασθαι). τὸ δὲ ὡς ὁ Τήλεφος Εὐριπίδου φησίν,
κώπης ἀνάσσων κἀποβὰς εἰς Μυσίαν,
(29) ἀπρεπές, ὅτι μεῖζον τὸ ἀνάσσειν ἢ κατ’ ἀξίαν· οὐ κέκλεπται (30) οὖν.

. . . . . .

Both are religious titles, but one is honourable and the other is not. Again, somebody calls actors ‘hangers—on of Dionysus’, but they call themselves ‘artists’: each of these terms is a metaphor, the one intended to throw dirt at the actor, the other to dignify him. And pirates now call themselves ‘purveyors’. We can thus call a crime a mistake, or a mistake a crime. We can say that a thief ‘took’ a thing, or that he ‘plundered’ his victim.

ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς συλλαβαῖς ἁμαρτία, ἐὰν μὴ ἡδείας ᾖ (31) σημεῖα φωνῆς, οἷον Διονύσιος προσαγορεύει ὁ χαλκοῦς ἐν (32) τοῖς ἐλεγείοις κραυγὴν Καλλιόπης τὴν ποίησιν, ὅτι ἄμφω (33) φωναί· φαύλη δὲ ἡ μεταφορὰ †ταῖς ἀσήμοις φωναῖς†.

. . .

An expression like that of Euripides’ Telephus,
King of the oar, on Mysia’s coast he landed,
is inappropriate; the word ‘king’ goes beyond the dignity of the subject, and so the art is not concealed. A metaphor may be amiss because the very syllables of the words conveying it fail to indicate sweetness of vocal utterance. Thus Dionysius the Brazen in his elegies calls poetry ‘Calliope’s screech’. Poetry and screeching are both, to be sure, vocal utterances.

ἔτι δὲ (34) οὐ πόρρωθεν δεῖ ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ τῶν ὁμοειδῶν (35) μεταφέρειν <ἐπὶ> τὰ ἀνώνυμα ὠνομασμένως ὃ λεχθὲν δῆλόν ἐστιν (36) ὅτι συγγενές (οἷον ἐν τῷ αἰνίγματι τῷ εὐδοκιμοῦντι (1405b1)
ἄνδρ’ εἶδον πυρὶ χαλκὸν ἐπ’ ἀνέρι κολλήσαντα·
(2) ἀνώνυμον γὰρ τὸ πάθος, ἔστι δ’ ἄμφω πρόσθεσίς τις· (3) κόλλησιν τοίνυν εἶπε τὴν τῆς σικύας προσβολήν), καὶ ὅλως (4) ἐκ τῶν εὖ ᾐνιγμένων ἔστι μεταφορὰς λαβεῖν ἐπιεικεῖς· μετα(5)φοραὶ γὰρ αἰνίττονται, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι εὖ μετενήνεκται.

. . . . . .

But the metaphor is bad, because the sounds of ‘screeching’, unlike those of poetry, are discordant and unmeaning. Further, in using metaphors to give names to nameless things, we must draw them not from remote but from kindred and similar things, so that the kinship is clearly perceived as soon as the words are said. Thus in the celebrated riddle
I marked how a man glued bronze with fire to another man’s body,
the process is nameless; but both it and gluing are a kind of application, and that is why the application of the cupping—glass is here called a ‘gluing’. Good riddles do, in general, provide us with satisfactory metaphors:

καὶ (6) ἀπὸ καλῶν· κάλλος δὲ ὀνόματος τὸ μὲν ὥσπερ Λικύμνιος (7) λέγει, ἐν τοῖς ψόφοις ἢ τῷ σημαινομένῳ, καὶ αἶσχος δὲ (8) ὡσαύτως.

.

for metaphors imply riddles, and therefore a good riddle can furnish a good metaphor.

ἔτι δὲ τρίτον ὃ λύει τὸν σοφιστικὸν λόγον· οὐ (9) γὰρ ὡς ἔφη Βρύσων οὐθένα αἰσχρολογεῖν, εἴπερ τὸ αὐτὸ (10) σημαίνει τόδε ἀντὶ τοῦδε εἰπεῖν· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ψεῦδος· (11) ἔστιν γὰρ ἄλλο ἄλλου κυριώτερον καὶ ὡμοιωμένον μᾶλλον (12) καὶ οἰκειότερον, τῷ ποιεῖν τὸ πρᾶγμα πρὸ ὀμμάτων. ἔτι οὐχ (13) ὁμοίως ἔχον σημαίνει τόδε καὶ τόδε, ὥστε καὶ οὕτως ἄλλου (14) ἄλλο κάλλιον καὶ αἴσχιον θετέον· ἄμφω μὲν γὰρ τὸ καλὸν (15) ἢ τὸ αἰσχρὸν σημαίνουσιν, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ᾗ καλὸν ἢ οὐχ ᾗ (16) αἰσχρόν· ἢ ταῦτα μέν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον. τὰς δὲ (17) μεταφορὰς ἐντεῦθεν οἰστέον, ἀπὸ καλῶν ἢ τῇ φωνῇ ἢ τῇ (18) δυνάμει ἢ τῇ ὄψει ἢ ἄλλῃ τινὶ αἰσθήσει.

. . . . . .

Further, the materials of metaphors must be beautiful; and the beauty, like the ugliness, of all words may, as Licymnius says, lie in their sound or in their meaning. Further, there is a third consideration—one that upsets the fallacious argument of the sophist Bryson, that there is no such thing as foul language, because in whatever words you put a given thing your meaning is the same. This is untrue. One term may describe a thing more truly than another, may be more like it, and set it more intimately before our eyes. Besides, two different words will represent a thing in two different lights; so on this ground also one term must be held fairer or fouler than another. For both of two terms will indicate what is fair, or what is foul, but not simply their fairness or their foulness, or if so, at any rate not in an equal degree.

διαφέρει δ’ (19) εἰπεῖν, οἷον ῥοδοδάκτυλος ἠὼς μᾶλλον ἢ φοινικοδάκτυλος, (20) ἢ ἔτι φαυλότερον ἐρυθροδάκτυλος. καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις (21) ἔστιν μὲν τὰς ἐπιθέσεις ποιεῖσθαι ἀπὸ φαύλου ἢ αἰσχροῦ, (22) οἷον ὁ μητροφόντης, ἔστι δ’ ἀπὸ τοῦ βελτίονος, οἷον ὁ πα(23)τρὸς ἀμύντωρ· καὶ ὁ Σιμωνίδης, ὅτε μὲν ἐδίδου μισθὸν ὀλί(24)γον αὐτῷ ὁ νικήσας τοῖς ὀρεῦσιν, οὐκ ἤθελε ποιεῖν, ὡς (25) δυσχεραίνων εἰς ἡμιόνους ποιεῖν, ἐπεὶ δ’ ἱκανὸν ἔδωκεν, (26) ἐποίησε
χαίρετ’ ἀελλοπόδων θύγατρες ἵππων·
(27) καίτοι καὶ τῶν ὄνων θυγατέρες ἦσαν.
ἔστιν αὖ τὸ ὑπο(28)κορίζεσθαι· ἔστιν δὲ ὁ ὑποκορισμὸς ὃ ἔλαττον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ (29) κακὸν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἀριστοφάνης σκώπτει (30) ἐν τοῖς Βαβυλωνίοις, ἀντὶ μὲν χρυσίου χρυσιδάριον, ἀντὶ δ’ (31) ἱματίου ἱματιδάριον, ἀντὶ δὲ λοιδορίας λοιδορημάτιον καὶ ἀντὶ (32) νοσήματος νοσημάτιον.

. . . . . .

The materials of metaphor must be beautiful to the ear, to the understanding, to the eye or some other physical sense. It is better, for instance, to say ‘rosy—fingered morn’, than ‘crimson—fingered’ or, worse still, ‘red—fingered morn’. The epithets that we apply, too, may have a bad and ugly aspect, as when Orestes is called a ‘mother—slayer’; or a better one, as when he is called his ‘father’s avenger’. Simonides, when the victor in the mule—race offered him a small fee, refused to write him an ode, because, he said, it was so unpleasant to write odes to half—asses: but on receiving an adequate fee, he wrote
Hail to you, daughters of storm—footed steeds?
though of course they were daughters of asses too.
The same effect is attained by the use of diminutives, which make a bad thing less bad and a good thing less good.

εὐλαβεῖσθαι δὲ δεῖ καὶ παρατηρεῖν ἐν (33) ἀμφοῖν τὸ μέτριον.

.

Take, for instance, the banter of Aristophanes in the Babylonians where he uses ‘goldlet’ for ‘gold’, ‘cloaklet’ for ‘cloak’, ‘scoffiet’ for ‘scoff, and ‘plaguelet’.

3. (34) Τὰ δὲ ψυχρὰ ἐν τέτταρσι γίγνεται κατὰ τὴν λέξιν,

.

But alike in using epithets and in using diminutives we must be wary and must observe the mean.

ἔν τε (35) τοῖς διπλοῖς ὀνόμασιν, οἷον Λυκόφρων “τὸν πολυπρόσωπον (36) οὐρανὸν τῆς μεγαλοκορύφου γῆς”, καὶ “ἀκτὴν δὲ στενοπόρον”, (37) καὶ ὡς Γοργίας ὠνόμαζεν “πτωχομουσοκόλοκας ἐπιορκήσαντας (1406a1) κατ’ εὐορκήσαντος”, καὶ ὡς Ἀλκιδάμας “μένους μὲν τὴν (2) ψυχὴν πληρουμένην, πυρίχρων δὲ τὴν ὄψιν γιγνομένην”, καὶ (3) “τελεσφόρον” ᾠήθη τὴν προθυμίαν αὐτῶν γενήσεσθαι, καὶ (4) “τελεσφόρον” τὴν πειθὼ τῶν λόγων κατέστησεν, καὶ “κυανό(5)χρων” τὸ τῆς θαλάττης ἔδαφος· πάντα ταῦτα γὰρ ποιητικὰ (6) διὰ τὴν δίπλωσιν φαίνεται. μία μὲν οὖν αὕτη αἰτία,

. . . . . .

Part 3. Bad taste in language may take any of four forms: (1) The misuse of compound words. Lycophron, for instance, talks of the ‘many visaged heaven’ above the ‘giant—crested earth’, and again the ‘strait—pathed shore’; and Gorgias of the ‘pauper—poet flatterer’ and ‘oath—breaking and over—oath—keeping’. Alcidamas uses such expressions as ‘the soul filling with rage and face becoming flame—flushed’, and ‘he thought their enthusiasm would be issue—fraught’ and ‘issue—fraught he made the persuasion of his words’, and ‘sombre—hued is the floor of the sea’. The way all these words are compounded makes them, we feel, fit for verse only.

μία (7) δὲ τὸ χρῆσθαι γλώτταις, οἷον Λυκόφρων Ξέρξην “πέλωρον (8) ἄνδρα”, καὶ Σκίρων “σίνις ἀνήρ”, καὶ Ἀλκιδάμας “ἄθυρμα τῇ (9) ποιήσει”, καὶ “τὴν τῆς φύσεως ἀτασθαλίαν”, καὶ “ἀκράτῳ (10) τῆς διανοίας ὀργῇ τεθηγμένον”.

. . .

This, then, is one form in which bad taste is shown. (2) Another is the employment of strange words. For instance, Lycophron talks of ‘the prodigious Xerxes’ and ‘spoliative Sciron’;

τρίτον δ’ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις (11) τὸ ἢ μακροῖς ἢ ἀκαίροις ἢ πυκνοῖς χρῆσθαι· ἐν μὲν γὰρ (12) ποιήσει πρέπει “γάλα λευκὸν” εἰπεῖν, ἐν δὲ λόγῳ τὰ μὲν (13) ἀπρεπέστερα· τὰ δέ, ἂν ᾖ κατακορῆ, ἐξελέγχει καὶ ποιεῖ (14) φανερὸν ὅτι ποίησις ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ δεῖ γε χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς (ἐξ(15)αλλάττει γὰρ τὸ εἰωθὸς καὶ ξενικὴν ποιεῖ τὴν λέξιν), ἀλλὰ (16) δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι τοῦ μετρίου, ἐπεὶ μεῖζον ποιεῖ κακὸν τοῦ (17) εἰκῇ λέγειν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει τὸ εὖ, ἡ δὲ τὸ κακῶς. (18) διὸ τὰ Ἀλκιδάμαντος ψυχρὰ φαίνεται· οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἡδύσματι (19) χρῆται ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐδέσματι τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις <τοῖς> οὕτω πυκνοῖς (20) καὶ μείζοσι καὶ ἐπιδήλοις, οἷον οὐχ ἱδρῶτα ἀλλὰ τὸν ὑγρὸν (21) ἱδρῶτα, καὶ οὐκ εἰς Ἴσθμια ἀλλ’ εἰς τὴν τῶν Ἰσθμίων (22) πανήγυριν, καὶ οὐχὶ νόμους ἀλλὰ τοὺς τῶν πόλεων βασι(23)λεῖς νόμους, καὶ οὐ δρόμῳ ἀλλὰ δρομαίᾳ τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς (24) ὁρμῇ, καὶ οὐχὶ μουσεῖον ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆς φύσεως παραλαβὼν (25) μουσεῖον, καὶ σκυθρωπὸν τὴν φροντίδα τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ (26) οὐ χάριτος ἀλλὰ πανδήμου χάριτος δημιουργός, καὶ οἰκονό(27)μος τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων ἡδονῆς, καὶ οὐ κλάδοις ἀλλὰ τοῖς (28) τῆς ὕλης κλάδοις ἀπέκρυψεν, καὶ οὐ τὸ σῶμα παρήμπισχεν (29) ἀλλὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος αἰσχύνην, καὶ ἀντίμιμον τὴν τῆς (30) ψυχῆς ἐπιθυμίαν (τοῦτο δ’ ἅμα καὶ διπλοῦν καὶ ἐπίθετον, (31) ὥστε ποίημα γίνεται), καὶ οὕτως ἔξεδρον τὴν τῆς μοχθηρίας (32) ὑπερβολήν. διὸ ποιητικῶς λέγοντες τῇ ἀπρεπείᾳ τὸ γελοῖον (33) καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν ἐμποιοῦσι, καὶ τὸ ἀσαφὲς διὰ τὴν ἀδολε(34)σχίαν· ὅταν γὰρ γιγνώσκοντι ἐπεμβάλλῃ, διαλύει τὸ σαφὲς (35) τῷ ἐπισκοτεῖν. οἱ δ’ ἄνθρωποι τοῖς διπλοῖς χρῶνται ὅταν (36) ἀνώνυμον ᾖ καὶ ὁ λόγος εὐσύνθετος, οἷον τὸ χρονοτριβεῖν· (1406b1) ἀλλ’ ἂν πολύ, πάντως ποιητικόν· διὸ χρησιμωτάτη ἡ διπλῆ (2) λέξις τοῖς διθυραμβοποιοῖς (οὗτοι γὰρ ψοφώδεις), αἱ δὲ (3) γλῶτται τοῖς ἐποποιοῖς (σεμνὸν γὰρ καὶ αὔθαδες), ἡ δὲ μετα(4)φορὰ τοῖς ἰαμβείοις (τούτοις γὰρ νῦν χρῶνται, ὥσπερ (5) εἴρηται).

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

Alcidamas of ‘a toy for poetry’ and ‘the witlessness of nature’, and says ‘whetted with the unmitigated temper of his spirit’. (3) A third form is the use of long, unseasonable, or frequent epithets. It is appropriate enough for a poet to talk of ‘white milk’, in prose such epithets are sometimes lacking in appropriateness or, when spread too thickly, plainly reveal the author turning his prose into poetry. Of course we must use some epithets, since they lift our style above the usual level and give it an air of distinction. But we must aim at the due mean, or the result will be worse than if we took no trouble at all; we shall get something actually bad instead of something merely not good. That is why the epithets of Alcidamas seem so tasteless; he does not use them as the seasoning of the meat, but as the meat itself, so numerous and swollen and aggressive are they. For instance, he does not say ‘sweat’, but ‘the moist sweat’; not ‘to the Isthmian games’, but ‘to the world—concourse of the Isthmian games’; not ‘laws’, but ‘the laws that are monarchs of states’; not ‘at a run’, but ‘his heart impelling him to speed of foot’; not ‘a school of the Muses’, but ‘Nature’s school of the Muses had he inherited’; and so ‘frowning care of heart’, and ‘achiever’ not of ‘popularity’ but of ‘universal popularity’, and ‘dispenser of pleasure to his audience’, and ‘he concealed it’ not ‘with boughs’ but ‘with boughs of the forest trees’, and ‘he clothed’ not ‘his body’ but ‘his body’s nakedness’, and ‘his soul’s desire was counter imitative’ (this’s at one and the same time a compound and an epithet, so that it seems a poet’s effort), and ‘so extravagant the excess of his wickedness’. We thus see how the inappropriateness of such poetical language imports absurdity and tastelessness into speeches, as well as the obscurity that comes from all this verbosity —for when the sense is plain, you only obscure and spoil its clearness by piling up words. The ordinary use of compound words is where there is no term for a thing and some compound can be easily formed, like ‘pastime’ (chronotribein); but if this is much done, the prose character disappears entirely. We now see why the language of compounds is just the thing for writers of dithyrambs, who love sonorous noises; strange words for writers of epic poetry, which is a proud and stately affair;

καὶ ἔτι τέταρτον τὸ ψυχρὸν ἐν ταῖς μεταφοραῖς (6) γίνεται· εἰσὶν γὰρ καὶ μεταφοραὶ ἀπρεπεῖς, αἱ μὲν διὰ τὸ (7) γελοῖον (χρῶνται γὰρ καὶ οἱ κωμῳδοποιοὶ μεταφοραῖς), αἱ (8) δὲ διὰ τὸ σεμνὸν ἄγαν καὶ τραγικόν· ἀσαφεῖς δέ, ἂν πόρ(9)ρωθεν, οἷον Γοργίας “χλωρὰ καὶ ἄναιμα τὰ πράγματα”, “σὺ (10) δὲ ταῦτα αἰσχρῶς μὲν ἔσπειρας κακῶς δὲ ἐθέρισας”· ποιη(11)τικῶς γὰρ ἄγαν. καὶ ὡς Ἀλκιδάμας τὴν φιλοσοφίαν “ἐπι(12)τείχισμα τῷ νόμῳ”, καὶ τὴν Ὀδύσσειαν “καλὸν ἀνθρω(13)πίνου βίου κάτοπτρον”, καὶ “οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον ἄθυρμα τῇ (14) ποιήσει προσφέρων”· ἅπαντα γὰρ ταῦτα ἀπίθανα διὰ τὰ εἰρη(15)μένα. τὸ δὲ Γοργίου εἰς τὴν χελιδόνα, ἐπεὶ κατ’ αὐτοῦ (16) πετομένη ἀφῆκε τὸ περίττωμα, ἄριστα <ἔχει> τῶν τραγικῶν· (17) εἶπε γὰρ “αἰσχρόν γε, ὦ Φιλομήλα”. ὄρνιθι μὲν γάρ, εἰ (18) ἐποίησεν, οὐκ αἰσχρόν, παρθένῳ δὲ αἰσχρόν. εὖ οὖν ἐλοιδόρησεν (19) εἰπὼν ὃ ἦν, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὃ ἔστιν.

. . . . . . . . . . . .

and metaphor for iambic verse, the metre which (as has been already’ said) is widely used to—day. (4) There remains the fourth region in which bad taste may be shown, metaphor. Metaphors like other things may be inappropriate. Some are so because they are ridiculous; they are indeed used by comic as well as tragic poets. Others are too grand and theatrical; and these, if they are far—fetched, may also be obscure. For instance, Gorgias talks of ‘events that are green and full of sap’, and says ‘foul was the deed you sowed and evil the harvest you reaped’. That is too much like poetry. Alcidamas, again, called philosophy ‘a fortress that threatens the power of law’, and the Odyssey ‘a goodly looking—glass of human life’, talked about ‘offering no such toy to poetry’: all these expressions fail, for the reasons given, to carry the hearer with them. The address of Gorgias to the swallow, when she had let her droppings fall on him as she flew overhead, is in the best tragic manner. He said, ‘Nay, shame, O Philomela’. Considering her as a bird, you could not call her act shameful; considering her as a girl, you could;

4. (20) Ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ἡ εἰκὼν μεταφορά· διαφέρει γὰρ μικρόν· (21) ὅταν μὲν γὰρ εἴπῃ [τὸν Ἀχιλλέα] “ὡς δὲ λέων ἐπόρουσεν”, (22) εἰκών ἐστιν, ὅταν δὲ “λέων ἐπόρουσε”, μεταφορά· διὰ γὰρ τὸ (23) ἄμφω ἀνδρείους εἶναι, προσηγόρευσεν μετενέγκας λέοντα (24) τὸν Ἀχιλλέα.

. . .

and so it was a good gibe to address her as what she was once and not as what she is. Part 4. The Simile also is a metaphor; the difference is but slight. When the poet says of Achilles that he Leapt on the foe as a lion, this is a simile; when he says of him ‘the lion leapt’, it is a metaphor—here,

χρήσιμον δὲ ἡ εἰκὼν καὶ ἐν λόγῳ, ὀλιγάκις (25) δέ· ποιητικὸν γάρ. οἰστέαι δὲ ὥσπερ αἱ μεταφοραί· μετα(26)φοραὶ γάρ εἰσι, διαφέρουσαι τῷ εἰρημένῳ. (27) εἰσὶν δ’ εἰκόνες οἷον ἣν Ἀνδροτίων εἰς Ἰδριέα, ὅτι ὅμοιος (28) τοῖς ἐκ τῶν δεσμῶν κυνιδίοις· ἐκεῖνά τε γὰρ προσπίπτοντα (29) δάκνειν, καὶ Ἰδριέα λυθέντα ἐκ τῶν δεσμῶν εἶναι χαλεπόν. καὶ (30) ὡς Θεοδάμας εἴκαζεν Ἀρχίδαμον Εὐξένῳ γεωμετρεῖν οὐκ ἐπι(31)σταμένῳ ἐν τῷ ἀνάλογόν <ἐστιν>· ἔσται γὰρ καὶ ὁ Εὔξενος (32) Ἀρχίδαμος γεωμετρικός. καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος, (33) ὅτι οἱ τοὺς τεθνεῶτας σκυλεύοντες ἐοίκασι τοῖς κυνιδίοις (34) ἃ τοὺς λίθους δάκνει, τοῦ βάλλοντος οὐχ ἁπτόμενα, καὶ (35) ἡ εἰς τὸν δῆμον, ὅτι ὅμοιος ναυκλήρῳ ἰσχυρῷ μὲν ὑπο(36)κώφῳ δέ, καὶ ἡ εἰς τὰ μέτρα τῶν ποιητῶν, ὅτι ἔοικε τοῖς (1407a1) ἄνευ κάλλους ὡραίοις· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπανθήσαντες, τὰ δὲ (2) διαλυθέντα οὐχ ὅμοια φαίνεται. καὶ ἡ Περικλέους εἰς Σα(3)μίους, ἐοικέναι αὐτοὺς τοῖς παιδίοις ἃ τὸν ψωμὸν δέχεται (4) μέν, κλαίοντα δέ, καὶ εἰς Βοιωτούς, ὅτι ὅμοιοι τοῖς πρίνοις· (5) τούς τε γὰρ πρίνους ὑφ’ αὑτῶν κατακόπτεσθαι, καὶ τοὺς (6) Βοιωτοὺς πρὸς ἀλλήλους μαχομένους. καὶ ὃ Δημοσθένης (7) <εἰς> τὸν δῆμον, ὅτι ὅμοιός ἐστιν τοῖς ἐν τοῖς πλοίοις ναυ(8)τιῶσιν. καὶ ὡς Δημοκράτης εἴκασεν τοὺς ῥήτορας ταῖς (9) τίτθαις αἳ τὸ ψώμισμα καταπίνουσαι τῷ σιάλῳ τὰ παιδία (10) παραλείφουσιν. καὶ ὡς Ἀντισθένης Κηφισόδοτον τὸν λεπτὸν (11) λιβανωτῷ εἴκασεν, ὅτι ἀπολλύμενος εὐφραίνει. πάσας δὲ (12) ταύτας καὶ ὡς εἰκόνας καὶ ὡς μεταφορὰς ἔξεστι λέγειν, (13) ὥστε ὅσαι ἂν εὐδοκιμῶσιν ὡς μεταφοραὶ λεχθεῖσαι, δῆλον (14) ὅτι αὗται καὶ εἰκόνες ἔσονται, καὶ αἱ εἰκόνες μεταφοραὶ (15) λόγου δεόμεναι. ἀεὶ δὲ δεῖ τὴν μεταφορὰν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ (16) ἀνάλογον ἀνταποδιδόναι καὶ ἐπὶ θάτερα [καὶ ἐπὶ] τῶν ὁμο(17)γενῶν, οἷον εἰ ἡ φιάλη ἀσπὶς Διονύσου, καὶ τὴν ἀσπίδα (18) ἁρμόττει λέγεσθαι φιάλην Ἄρεως.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

since both are courageous, he has transferred to Achilles the name of ‘lion’. Similes are useful in prose as well as in verse; but not often, since they are of the nature of poetry. They are to be employed just as metaphors are employed, since they are really the same thing except for the difference mentioned. The following are examples of similes. Androtion said of Idrieus that he was like a terrier let off the chain, that flies at you and bites you—Idrieus too was savage now that he was let out of his chains. Theodamas compared Archidamus to an Euxenus who could not do geometry—a proportional simile, implying that Euxenus is an Archidamus who can do geometry. In Plato’s Republic those who strip the dead are compared to curs which bite the stones thrown at them but do not touch the thrower, and there is the simile about the Athenian people, who are compared to a ship’s captain who is strong but a little deaf; and the one about poets’ verses, which are likened to persons who lack beauty but possess youthful freshness —when the freshness has faded the charm perishes, and so with verses when broken up into prose. Pericles compared the Samians to children who take their pap but go on crying; and the Boeotians to holm—oaks, because they were ruining one another by civil wars just as one oak causes another oak’s fall. Demosthenes said that the Athenian people were like sea—sick men on board ship. Again, Demosthenes compared the political orators to nurses who swallow the bit of food themselves and then smear the children’s lips with the spittle. Antisthenes compared the lean Cephisodotus to frankincense, because it was his consumption that gave one pleasure. All these ideas may be expressed either as similes or as metaphors; those which succeed as metaphors will obviously do well also as similes, and similes, with the explanation omitted, will appear as metaphors. But the proportional metaphor must always apply reciprocally to either of its co—ordinate terms.

5. (19) Ὁ μὲν οὖν λόγος συντίθεται ἐκ τούτων, ἔστι δ’ ἀρχὴ (20) τῆς λέξεως τὸ ἑλληνίζειν· τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν ἐν πέντε,

. .

For instance, if a drinking—bowl is the shield of Dionysus, a shield may fittingly be called the drinking—bowl of Ares. Part 5. Such, then, are the ingredients of which speech is composed.

πρῶτον (21) μὲν ἐν τοῖς συνδέσμοις, ἂν ἀποδιδῷ τις ὡς πεφύκασι πρό(22)τεροι καὶ ὕστεροι γίγνεσθαι ἀλλήλων, οἷον ἔνιοι ἀπαιτοῦσιν, (23) ὥσπερ ὁ μέν καὶ ὁ ἐγὼ μέν ἀπαιτεῖ τὸν δέ καὶ τὸν ὁ δέ. (24) δεῖ δὲ ἕως μέμνηται ἀνταποδιδόναι ἀλλήλοις, καὶ μήτε μα(25)κρὰν ἀπαρτᾶν μήτε σύνδεσμον πρὸ συνδέσμου ἀποδιδόναι (26) τοῦ ἀναγκαίου· ὀλιγαχοῦ γὰρ ἁρμόττει. “ἐγὼ μέν, ἐπεί μοι (27) εἶπεν (ἦλθε γὰρ Κλέων δεόμενός τε καὶ ἀξιῶν), ἐπορευόμην (28) παραλαβὼν αὐτούς”. ἐν τούτοις γὰρ πολλοὶ πρὸ τοῦ ἀποδοθη(29)σομένου συνδέσμου προεμβέβληνται σύνδεσμοι· ἐὰν δὲ πολὺ (30) τὸ μεταξὺ γένηται τοῦ ἐπορευόμην, ἀσαφές. ἓν μὲν δὴ τὸ (31) εὖ ἐν τοῖς συνδέσμοις,

. . . . . . .

The foundation of good style is correctness of language, which falls under five heads. (1) First, the proper use of connecting words, and the arrangement of them in the natural sequence which some of them require. For instance, the connective ‘men’ (e.g. ego men) requires the correlative de (e.g. o de). The answering word must be brought in before the first has been forgotten, and not be widely separated from it; nor, except in the few cases where this is appropriate, is another connective to be introduced before the one required. Consider the sentence, ‘But as soon as he told me (for Cleon had come begging and praying), took them along and set out.’ In this sentence many connecting words are inserted in front of the one required to complete the sense; and if there is a long interval before ‘set out’, the result is obscurity.

δεύτερον δὲ τὸ τοῖς ἰδίοις ὀνόμασι (32) λέγειν καὶ μὴ τοῖς περιέχουσιν.

.

One merit, then, of good style lies in the right use of connecting words.

τρίτον μὴ ἀμφιβόλοις. τοῦτο (33) δ’ ἂν μὴ τἀναντία προαιρῆται, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν ὅταν μηδὲν (34) μὲν ἔχωσι λέγειν, προσποιῶνται δέ τι λέγειν· οἱ γὰρ τοι(35)οῦτοι ἐν ποιήσει λέγουσιν ταῦτα, οἷον Ἐμπεδοκλῆς· φενα(36)κίζει γὰρ τὸ κύκλῳ πολὺ ὄν, καὶ πάσχουσιν οἱ ἀκροαταὶ ὅ(37)περ οἱ πολλοὶ παρὰ τοῖς μάντεσιν· ὅταν γὰρ λέγωσιν ἀμφί(38)βολα, συμπαρανεύουσιν— Κροῖσος Ἅλυν διαβὰς μεγάλην ἀρχὴν καταλύσει (1407b1) —καὶ διὰ τὸ ὅλως ἔλαττον εἶναι ἁμάρτημα διὰ τῶν γενῶν (2) τοῦ πράγματος λέγουσιν οἱ μάντεις· τύχοι γὰρ ἄν τις μᾶλ(3)λον ἐν τοῖς ἀρτιασμοῖς ἄρτια ἢ περισσὰ εἰπὼν μᾶλλον ἢ (4) πόσα ἔχει, καὶ τὸ ὅτι ἔσται ἢ τὸ πότε, διὸ οἱ χρησμολόγοι (5) οὐ προσορίζονται τὸ πότε. ἅπαντα δὴ ταῦτα ὅμοια, ὥστ’ (6) ἂν μὴ τοιούτου τινὸς ἕνεκα, φευκτέον.

. . . . . . . . .

(2) The second lies in calling things by their own special names and not by vague general ones. (3) The third is to avoid ambiguities; unless, indeed, you definitely desire to be ambiguous, as those do who have nothing to say but are pretending to mean something. Such people are apt to put that sort of thing into verse. Empedocles, for instance, by his long circumlocutions imposes on his hearers; these are affected in the same way as most people are when they listen to diviners, whose ambiguous utterances are received with nods of acquiescence— Croesus by crossing the Halys will ruin a mighty realm. Diviners use these vague generalities about the matter in hand because their predictions are thus, as a rule, less likely to be falsified. We are more likely to be right, in the game of ‘odd and even’, if we simply guess ‘even’ or ‘odd’ than if we guess at the actual number; and the oracle—monger is more likely to be right if he simply says that a thing will happen than if he says when it will happen, and therefore he refuses to add a definite date.

τέταρτον, ὡς Πρω(7)ταγόρας τὰ γένη τῶν ὀνομάτων διῄρει, ἄρρενα καὶ θήλεα καὶ (8) σκεύη· δεῖ γὰρ ἀποδιδόναι καὶ ταῦτα ὀρθῶς· “ἡ δ’ ἐλθοῦσα (9) καὶ διαλεχθεῖσα ᾤχετο”.

. .

All these ambiguities have the same sort of effect, and are to be avoided unless we have some such object as that mentioned. (4) A fourth rule is to observe Protagoras’ classification of nouns into male, female, and inanimate; for these distinctions also must be correctly given.

πέμπτον ἐν τῷ τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ὀλίγα (10) καὶ ἓν ὀρθῶς ὀνομάζειν· “οἱ δ’ ἐλθόντες ἔτυπτόν με”.

. .

’Upon her arrival she said her say and departed (e d elthousa kai dialechtheisa ocheto).’ (5) A fifth rule is to express plurality, fewness, and unity by the correct wording, e.g.

(11) ὅλως δὲ δεῖ εὐανάγνωστον εἶναι τὸ γεγραμμένον καὶ (12) εὔφραστον· ἔστιν δὲ τὸ αὐτό· ὅπερ οἱ πολλοὶ σύνδεσμοι (13) οὐκ ἔχουσιν, οὐδ’ ἃ μὴ ῥᾴδιον διαστίξαι, ὥσπερ τὰ Ἡρα(14)κλείτου. τὰ γὰρ Ἡρακλείτου διαστίξαι ἔργον διὰ τὸ ἄδηλον (15) εἶναι ποτέρῳ πρόσκειται, τῷ ὕστερον ἢ τῷ πρότερον, οἷον (16) ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ αὐτῇ τοῦ συγγράμματος· φησὶ γὰρ “τοῦ λόγου (17) τοῦδ’ ἐόντος ἀεὶ ἀξύνετοι ἄνθρωποι γίγνονται”· ἄδηλον γὰρ τὸ (18) ἀεί, πρὸς ποτέρῳ <δεῖ> διαστίξαι. ἔτι τόδε ποιεῖ σολοικίζειν, (19) τὸ μὴ ἀποδιδόναι, ἐὰν μὴ ἐπιζευγνύῃς ὃ ἀμφοῖν ἁρμόττει, (20) οἷον [ἢ] ψόφῳ καὶ χρώματι τὸ μὲν ἰδὼν οὐ κοινόν, τὸ δ’ (21) αἰσθόμενος κοινόν· ἀσαφῆ δὲ ἂν μὴ προθεὶς εἴπῃς, μέλ(22)λων πολλὰ μεταξὺ ἐμβάλλειν, οἷον “ἔμελλον γὰρ διαλεχθεὶς (23) ἐκείνῳ τάδε καὶ τάδε καὶ ὧδε πορεύεσθαι”, ἀλλὰ μὴ “ἔμελλον (24) γὰρ διαλεχθεὶς πορεύεσθαι, εἶτα τάδε καὶ τάδε καὶ ὧδε (25) ἐγένετο”.

. . . . . . . . .

’Having come, they struck me (oi d elthontes etupton me).’ It is a general rule that a written composition should be easy to read and therefore easy to deliver. This cannot be so where there are many connecting words or clauses, or where punctuation is hard, as in the writings of Heracleitus. To punctuate Heracleitus is no easy task, because we often cannot tell whether a particular word belongs to what precedes or what follows it. Thus, at the outset of his treatise he says, ‘Though this truth is always men understand it not’, where it is not clear with which of the two clauses the word ‘always’ should be joined by the punctuation. Further, the following fact leads to solecism, viz. that the sentence does not work out properly if you annex to two terms a third which does not suit them both. Thus either ‘sound’ or ‘colour’ will fail to work out properly with some verbs: ‘perceive’ will apply to both, ‘see’ will not. Obscurity is also caused if, when you intend to insert a number of details, you do not first make your meaning clear;

6. (26) Εἰς ὄγκον δὲ τῆς λέξεως συμβάλλεται τάδε,

.

for instance, if you say, ‘I meant, after telling him this, that and the other thing, to set out’, rather than something of this kind ‘I meant to set out after telling him; then this, that, and the other thing occurred.’

τὸ λόγῳ (27) χρῆσθαι ἀντ’ ὀνόματος, οἷον μὴ κύκλον, ἀλλ’ ἐπίπεδον τὸ (28) ἐκ τοῦ μέσου ἴσον· εἰς δὲ συντομίαν τὸ ἐναντίον, ἀντὶ τοῦ (29) λόγου ὄνομα. καὶ ἐὰν αἰσχρὸν ἢ ἀπρεπές, ἐὰν μὲν ἐν τῷ (30) λόγῳ ᾖ <τὸ> αἰσχρόν, τοὔνομα λέγειν, ἐὰν δ’ ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι, (31) τὸν λόγον.

. . . .

Part 6. The following suggestions will help to give your language impressiveness. (1) Describe a thing instead of naming it: do not say ‘circle’, but ‘that surface which extends equally from the middle every way’. To achieve conciseness, do the opposite—put the name instead of the description.

καὶ μεταφορᾷ δηλοῦν καὶ τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις, εὐ(32)λαβούμενον τὸ ποιητικόν.

.

When mentioning anything ugly or unseemly, use its name if it is the description that is ugly, and describe it if it is the name that is ugly.

καὶ τὸ ἓν πολλὰ ποιεῖν, ὅπερ οἱ (33) ποιηταὶ ποιοῦσιν· ἑνὸς ὄντος λιμένος ὅμως λέγουσι
λιμένας εἰς Ἀχαϊκούς
(34) καὶ
(35) δέλτου μὲν αἵδε πολύθυροι διαπτυχαί.

. .

(2) Represent things with the help of metaphors and epithets, being careful to avoid poetical effects. (3) Use plural for singular, as in poetry,

(35) καὶ μὴ ἐπιζευγνύναι, ἀλλ’ ἑκατέρῳ ἑκάτερον, “τῆς γυναικὸς (36) τῆς ἡμετέρας”· ἐὰν δὲ συντόμως, τοὐναντίον, “τῆς ἡμετέρας (37) γυναικός”. καὶ μετὰ συνδέσμου λέγειν· ἐὰν δὲ συντόμως, (38) ἄνευ μὲν συνδέσμου, μὴ ἀσύνδετα δέ, οἷον “πορευθεὶς καὶ δια (1408a1) λεχθείς”, “πορευθεὶς διελέχθην”.

. . . . .

where one finds
Unto havens Achaean,
Here are my letter’s many—leaved folds. (4) Do not bracket two words under one article, but put one article with each; e.g. ’that wife of ours.’ The reverse to secure conciseness; e.g. ’our wife.’ Use plenty of connecting words; conversely, to secure conciseness, dispense with connectives, while still preserving connexion;

καὶ τὸ Ἀντιμάχου χρήσι(2)μον, ἐξ ὧν μὴ ἔχει λέγειν, ὃ ἐκεῖνος ποιεῖ ἐπὶ τοῦ Τευμησσοῦ,
ἔστι τις ἠνεμόεις ὀλίγος λόφος·

.

e.g. ’having gone and spoken’, and ‘having gone, I spoke’, respectively.

(3) αὔξεται γὰρ οὕτως εἰς ἄπειρον. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ (4) ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, ὅπως οὐκ ἔχει, ὁποτέρως ἂν ᾖ χρή(5)σιμον, ὅθεν καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα οἱ ποιηταὶ φέρουσιν, τὸ ἄχορδον (6) καὶ τὸ ἄλυρον μέλος· (7) ἐκ τῶν στερήσεων γὰρ ἐπιφέρουσιν· (8) εὐδοκιμεῖ γὰρ τοῦτο ἐν ταῖς μεταφοραῖς λεγόμενον ταῖς ἀνά(9)λογον, οἷον τὸ φάναι τὴν σάλπιγγα ἱέναι μέλος ἄλυρον.

. . . .

(6) And the practice of Antimachus, too, is useful—to describe a thing by mentioning attributes it does not possess; as he does in talking of Teumessus
There is a little wind—swept knoll... A subject can be developed indefinitely along these lines. You may apply this method of treatment by negation either to good or to bad qualities, according to which your subject requires. It is from this source that the poets draw expressions such as the ‘stringless’ or ‘lyreless’ melody, thus forming epithets out of negations.

7. (10) Τὸ δὲ πρέπον ἕξει ἡ λέξις, ἐὰν ᾖ παθητική τε καὶ (11) ἠθικὴ καὶ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις πράγμασιν ἀνάλογον.

.

This device is popular in proportional metaphors, as when the trumpet’s note is called ‘a lyreless melody’.

τὸ (12) δ’ ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν ἐὰν μήτε περὶ εὐόγκων αὐτοκαβδάλως λέ(13)γηται μήτε περὶ εὐτελῶν σεμνῶς, μηδ’ ἐπὶ τῷ εὐτελεῖ ὀνό(14)ματι ἐπῇ κόσμος·vεἰ δὲ μή, κωμῳδία φαίνεται, οἷον ποιεῖ (15) Κλεοφῶν· ὁμοίως γὰρ ἔνια ἔλεγε καὶ εἰ εἴπειεν [ἂν] “πότνια (16) συκῆ”.

. . .

Part 7. Your language will be appropriate if it expresses emotion and character, and if it corresponds to its subject. ’Correspondence to subject’ means that we must neither speak casually about weighty matters, nor solemnly about trivial ones; nor must we add ornamental epithets to commonplace nouns, or the effect will be comic,

παθητικὴ δέ, ἐὰν μὲν ᾖ ὕβρις, ὀργιζομένου λέξις, (17) ἐὰν δὲ ἀσεβῆ καὶ αἰσχρά, δυσχεραίνοντος καὶ εὐλαβουμένου (18) καὶ λέγειν, ἐὰν δὲ ἐπαινετά, ἀγαμένως, ἐὰν δὲ ἐλεεινά, (19) ταπεινῶς, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὲ ὁμοίως.

. . . .

as in the works of Cleophon, who can use phrases as absurd as ‘O queenly fig—tree’. To express emotion, you will employ the language of anger in speaking of outrage; the language of disgust and discreet reluctance to utter a word when speaking of impiety or foulness; the language of exultation for a tale of glory,

πιθανοῖ δὲ τὸ (20) πρᾶγμα καὶ ἡ οἰκεία λέξις· παραλογίζεταί τε γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ (21) ὡς ἀληθῶς λέγοντος, ὅτι ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις οὕτως ἔχουσιν, (22) ὥστ’ οἴονται, εἰ καὶ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει ὡς <λέγει> ὁ λέγων, τὰ πρά(23)γματα οὕτως ἔχειν, καὶ συνομοπαθεῖ ὁ ἀκούων ἀεὶ τῷ (24) παθητικῶς λέγοντι, κἂν μηθὲν λέγῃ. διὸ πολλοὶ καταπλήτ(25)τουσι τοὺς ἀκροατὰς θορυβοῦντες.

. . . . .

and that of humiliation for a tale of and so in all other cases. This aptness of language is one thing that makes people believe in the truth of your story: their minds draw the false conclusion that you are to be trusted from the fact that others behave as you do when things are as you describe them; and therefore they take your story to be true, whether it is so or not. Besides, an emotional speaker always makes his audience feel with him, even when there is nothing in his arguments;

καὶ ἠθικὴ δὲ αὕτη ἡ (26) ἐκ τῶν σημείων δεῖξις, ὅτε ἀκολουθεῖ ἡ ἁρμόττουσα ἑκάστῳ (27) γένει καὶ ἕξει. λέγω δὲ γένος μὲν καθ’ ἡλικίαν, οἷον παῖς (28) ἢ ἀνὴρ ἢ γέρων, καὶ γυνὴ ἢ ἀνήρ, καὶ Λάκων ἢ Θεττα(29)λός, ἕξεις δέ, καθ’ ἃς ποιός τις τῷ βίῳ· οὐ γὰρ καθ’ ἅ(30)πασαν ἕξιν οἱ βίοι ποιοί τινες. ἐὰν οὖν καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα (31) οἰκεῖα λέγῃ τῇ ἕξει, ποιήσει τὸ ἦθος· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ οὐδ’ (32) ὡσαύτως ἀγροῖκος ἂν καὶ πεπαιδευμένος εἴπειεν.

. . . . .

which is why many speakers try to overwhelm their audience by mere noise. Furthermore, this way of proving your story by displaying these signs of its genuineness expresses your personal character. Each class of men, each type of disposition, will have its own appropriate way of letting the truth appear. Under ‘class’ I include differences of age, as boy, man, or old man; of sex, as man or woman; of nationality, as Spartan or Thessalian. By ‘dispositions’ I here mean those dispositions only which determine the character of a man’s for it is not every disposition that does this. If, then, a speaker uses the very words which are in keeping with a particular disposition, he will reproduce the corresponding character;

πάσχουσι (33) δέ τι οἱ ἀκροαταὶ καὶ ᾧ κατακόρως χρῶνται οἱ (34) λογογράφοι, “τίς δ’ οὐκ οἶδεν;”, “ἅπαντες ἴσασιν”· ὁμο(35)λογεῖ γὰρ ὁ ἀκούων αἰσχυνόμενος, ὅπως μετέχῃ οὗπερ (36) καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες. (1408b1) τὸ δ’ εὐκαίρως ἢ μὴ εὐκαίρως χρῆσθαι κοινὸν ἁπάν(2)των τῶν εἰδῶν ἐστιν. ἄκος δ’ ἐπὶ πάσῃ ὑπερβολῇ τὸ θρυ(3)λούμενον· δεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ προσεπιπλήττειν· δοκεῖ γὰρ (4) ἀληθὲς εἶναι, ἐπεὶ οὐ λανθάνει γε ὃ ποιεῖ τὸν λέγοντα.

. . . . .

for a rustic and an educated man will not say the same things nor speak in the same way. Again, some impression is made upon an audience by a device which speech—writers employ to nauseous excess, when they say ‘Who does not know this?’ or ‘It is known to everybody.’ The hearer is ashamed of his ignorance, and agrees with the speaker, so as to have a share of the knowledge that everybody else possesses. All the variations of oratorical style are capable of being used in season or out of season. The best way to counteract any exaggeration is the well—worn device by which the speaker puts in some criticism of himself;

ἔτι (5) τοῖς ἀνάλογον μὴ πᾶσιν ἅμα χρήσασθαι (οὕτω γὰρ κλέπτε(6)ται ὁ ἀκροατής)· λέγω δὲ οἷον ἐὰν τὰ ὀνόματα σκληρὰ ᾖ, (7) μὴ καὶ τῇ φωνῇ καὶ τῷ προσώπῳ [καὶ] τοῖς ἁρμόττουσιν· (8) εἰ δὲ μή, φανερὸν γίνεται ἕκαστον ὅ ἐστιν. ἐὰν δὲ τὸ μὲν (9) τὸ δὲ μή, λανθάνει ποιῶν τὸ αὐτό. ἐὰν οὖν τὰ μαλακὰ (10) σκληρῶς καὶ τὰ σκληρὰ μαλακῶς λέγηται, πιθανὸν γίγνεται. (11) τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα τὰ διπλᾶ καὶ [τὰ] ἐπίθετα πλείω καὶ τὰ ξένα (12) μάλιστα ἁρμόττει λέγοντι παθητικῶς· συγγνώμη γὰρ ὀργιζο(13)μένῳ κακὸν φάναι οὐρανόμηκες, ἢ πελώριον εἰπεῖν, καὶ ὅταν (14) ἔχῃ ἤδη τοὺς ἀκροατὰς καὶ ποιήσῃ ἐνθουσιάσαι ἢ ἐπ(15)αίνοις ἢ ψόγοις ἢ ὀργῇ ἢ φιλίᾳ, οἷον καὶ Ἰσοκράτης ποιεῖ (16) ἐν τῷ Πανηγυρικῷ ἐπὶ τέλει “φήμην δὲ καὶ μνήμην” καὶ “οἵ(17)τινες ἔτλησαν”· φθέγγονται γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐνθουσιάζοντες, (18) ὥστε καὶ ἀποδέχονται δηλονότι ὁμοίως ἔχοντες. διὸ καὶ τῇ (19) ποιήσει ἥρμοσεν· ἔνθεον γὰρ ἡ ποίησις. ἢ δὴ οὕτως δεῖ, ἢ (20) μετ’ εἰρωνείας, ὥσπερ Γοργίας ἐποίει καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ Φαίδρῳ.

. . . . . . . . . . . .

for then people feel it must be all right for him to talk thus, since he certainly knows what he is doing. Further, it is better not to have everything always just corresponding to everything else—your hearers will see through you less easily thus. I mean for instance, if your words are harsh, you should not extend this harshness to your voice and your countenance and have everything else in keeping. If you do, the artificial character of each detail becomes apparent; whereas if you adopt one device and not another, you are using art all the same and yet nobody notices it. (To be sure, if mild sentiments are expressed in harsh tones and harsh sentiments in mild tones, you become comparatively unconvincing.) Compound words, fairly plentiful epithets, and strange words best suit an emotional speech. We forgive an angry man for talking about a wrong as ‘heaven—high’ or ‘colossal’; and we excuse such language when the speaker has his hearers already in his hands and has stirred them deeply either by praise or blame or anger or affection, as Isocrates, for instance, does at the end of his Panegyric, with his ‘name and fame’ and ‘in that they brooked’. Men do speak in this strain when they are deeply stirred, and so, once the audience is in a like state of feeling, approval of course follows. This is why such language is fitting in poetry, which is an inspired thing.

8. (21) Τὸ δὲ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως δεῖ μήτε ἔμμετρον εἶναι μήτε (22) ἄρρυθμον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπίθανον (πεπλάσθαι γὰρ δοκεῖ), καὶ (23) ἅμα καὶ ἐξίστησι· προσέχειν γὰρ ποιεῖ τῷ ὁμοίῳ, πότε πά(24)λιν ἥξει· ὥσπερ οὖν τῶν κηρύκων προλαμβάνουσι τὰ (25) παιδία τὸ “τίνα αἱρεῖται ἐπίτροπον ὁ ἀπελευθερούμενος;” (26) “Κλέωνα”· τὸ δὲ ἄρρυθμον ἀπέραντον, δεῖ δὲ πεπεράν(27)θαι μέν, μὴ μέτρῳ δέ· ἀηδὲς γὰρ καὶ ἄγνωστον τὸ ἄπει(28)ρον.

. . . . . .

This language, then, should be used either under stress of emotion, or ironically, after the manner of Gorgias and of the passages in the Phaedrus. Part 8. The form of a prose composition should be neither metrical nor destitute of rhythm. The metrical form destroys the hearer’s trust by its artificial appearance, and at the same time it diverts his attention, making him watch for metrical recurrences, just as children catch up the herald’s question, ‘Whom does the freedman choose as his advocate?’, with the answer ‘Cleon!’ On the other hand, unrhythmical language is too unlimited; we do not want the limitations of metre, but some limitation we must have,

περαίνεται δὲ ἀριθμῷ πάντα· ὁ δὲ τοῦ σχήματος τῆς (29) λέξεως ἀριθμὸς ῥυθμός ἐστιν, οὗ καὶ τὰ μέτρα τμήματα· (30) διὸ ῥυθμὸν δεῖ ἔχειν τὸν λόγον, μέτρον δὲ μή· ποίημα (31) γὰρ ἔσται.

. . .

or the effect will be vague and unsatisfactory. Now it is number that limits all things; and it is the numerical limitation of the forms of a composition that constitutes rhythm, of which metres are definite sections.

ῥυθμὸν δὲ μὴ ἀκριβῶς· τοῦτο δὲ ἔσται ἐὰν (32) μέχρι του ᾖ. τῶν δὲ ῥυθμῶν ὁ μὲν ἡρῷος σεμνῆς ἀλλ’ οὐ (33) λεκτικῆς ἁρμονίας δεόμενος, ὁ δ’ ἴαμβος αὐτή ἐστιν ἡ (34) λέξις ἡ τῶν πολλῶν (διὸ μάλιστα πάντων τῶν μέτρων (35) ἰαμβεῖα φθέγγονται λέγοντες), δεῖ δὲ σεμνότητα γενέσθαι (36) καὶ ἐκστῆσαι. ὁ δὲ τροχαῖος κορδακικώτερος· δηλοῖ δὲ (1409a1) τὰ τετράμετρα· ἔστι γὰρ τροχερὸς ῥυθμὸς τὰ τετράμετρα. (2) λείπεται δὲ παιάν, ᾧ ἐχρῶντο μὲν ἀπὸ Θρασυμάχου ἀρξά(3)μενοι, οὐκ εἶχον δὲ λέγειν τίς ἦν. ἔστι δὲ τρίτος ὁ παιάν, (4) καὶ ἐχόμενος τῶν εἰρημένων· τρία γὰρ πρὸς δύ’ ἐστίν, (5) ἐκείνων δὲ ὁ μὲν ἓν πρὸς ἕν, ὁ δὲ δύο πρὸς ἕν, ἔχεται (6) δὲ τῶν λόγων τούτων ὁ ἡμιόλιος· οὗτος δ’ ἐστὶν ὁ παιάν. (7) οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι διά τε τὰ εἰρημένα ἀφετέοι, καὶ διότι (8) μετρικοί· ὁ δὲ παιὰν ληπτέος· ἀπὸ μόνου γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι (9) μέτρον τῶν ῥηθέντων ῥυθμῶν, ὥστε μάλιστα λανθάνειν. (10) νῦν μὲν οὖν χρῶνται τῷ ἑνὶ παιᾶνι καὶ ἀρχόμενοι <καὶ (11) τελευτῶντες>, δεῖ δὲ διαφέρειν τὴν τελευτὴν τῆς ἀρχῆς. (12) ἔστιν δὲ παιᾶνος δύο εἴδη ἀντικείμενα ἀλλήλοις, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἓν (13) ἀρχῇ ἁρμόττει, ὥσπερ καὶ χρῶνται· οὗτος δ’ ἐστὶν οὗ ἄρχει (14) μὲν ἡ μακρά, τελευτῶσιν δὲ τρεῖς βραχεῖαι, “Δαλογενὲς εἴτε (15) Λυκίαν”, καὶ “Χρυσεοκόμα Ἕκατε παῖ Διός”· ἕτερος δ’ ἐξ ἐν(16)αντίας, οὗ βραχεῖαι ἄρχουσιν τρεῖς, ἡ δὲ μακρὰ τελευταία· (17) μετὰ δὲ γᾶν ὕδατά τ’ ὠκεανὸν ἠφάνισε νύξ. (18) οὗτος δὲ τελευτὴν ποιεῖ· ἡ γὰρ βραχεῖα διὰ τὸ ἀτελὴς (19) εἶναι ποιεῖ κολοβόν. ἀλλὰ δεῖ τῇ μακρᾷ ἀποκόπτεσθαι, καὶ (20) δήλην εἶναι τὴν τελευτὴν μὴ διὰ τὸν γραφέα, μηδὲ διὰ τὴν (21) παραγραφήν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸν ῥυθμόν.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Prose, then, is to be rhythmical, but not metrical, or it will become not prose but verse. It should not even have too precise a prose rhythm, and therefore should only be rhythmical to a certain extent. Of the various rhythms, the heroic has dignity, but lacks the tones of the spoken language. The iambic is the very language of ordinary people, so that in common talk iambic lines occur oftener than any others: but in a speech we need dignity and the power of taking the hearer out of his ordinary self. The trochee is too much akin to wild dancing: we can see this in tetrameter verse, which is one of the trochaic rhythms. There remains the paean, which speakers began to use in the time of Thrasymachus, though they had then no name to give it. The paean is a third class of rhythm, closely akin to both the two already mentioned; it has in it the ratio of three to two, whereas the other two kinds have the ratio of one to one, and two to one respectively. Between the two last ratios comes the ratio of one—and—a—half to one, which is that of the paean. Now the other two kinds of rhythm must be rejected in writing prose, partly for the reasons given, and partly because they are too metrical; and the paean must be adopted, since from this alone of the rhythms mentioned no definite metre arises, and therefore it is the least obtrusive of them. At present the same form of paean is employed at the beginning and at the end of sentences, whereas the end should differ from the beginning. There are two opposite kinds of paean, one of which is suitable to the beginning of a sentence, where it is indeed actually used; this is the kind that begins with a long syllable and ends with three short ones, as Dalogenes | eite Luki | an, and Chruseokom | a Ekate | pai Dios. The other paean begins, conversely, with three short syllables and ends with a long one, as meta de gan | udata t ok | eanon e | phanise nux. This kind of paean makes a real close: a short syllable can give no effect of finality, and therefore makes the rhythm appear truncated.

9. (22) ὅτι μὲν οὖν εὔρυθμον δεῖ εἶναι τὴν λέξιν καὶ μὴ (23) ἄρρυθμον, καὶ τίνες εὔρυθμον ποιοῦσι ῥυθμοὶ καὶ πῶς (24) ἔχοντες, εἴρηται· τὴν δὲ λέξιν ἀνάγκη εἶναι ἢ εἰρομένην (25) καὶ τῷ συνδέσμῳ μίαν, ὥσπερ αἱ ἐν τοῖς διθυράμβοις ἀνα(26)βολαί, ἢ κατεστραμμένην καὶ ὁμοίαν ταῖς τῶν ἀρχαίων ποιη(27)τῶν ἀντιστρόφοις. ἡ μὲν οὖν εἰρομένη λέξις ἡ ἀρχαία ἐστίν (28) [“Ἡροδότου Θουρίου ἥδ’ ἱστορίης ἀπόδειξις”] (ταύτῃ γὰρ πρό(29)τερον μὲν ἅπαντες, νῦν δὲ οὐ πολλοὶ χρῶνται)· λέγω δὲ (30) εἰρομένην ἣ οὐδὲν ἔχει τέλος καθ’ αὑτήν, ἂν μὴ τὸ πρᾶγμα (31) <τὸ> λεγόμενον τελειωθῇ. ἔστι δὲ ἀηδὴς διὰ τὸ ἄπειρον· τὸ γὰρ (32) τέλος πάντες βούλονται καθορᾶν· διόπερ ἐπὶ τοῖς καμπτῆρ(33)σιν ἐκπνέουσι καὶ ἐκλύονται· προορῶντες γὰρ τὸ πέρας οὐ (34) κάμνουσι πρότερον.

. . . . . . .

A sentence should break off with the long syllable: the fact that it is over should be indicated not by the scribe, or by his period—mark in the margin, but by the rhythm itself. We have now seen that our language must be rhythmical and not destitute of rhythm, and what rhythms, in what particular shape, make it so. Part 9. The language of prose must be either free—running, with its parts united by nothing except the connecting words, like the preludes in dithyrambs; or compact and antithetical, like the strophes of the old poets. The free—running style is the ancient one, e.g. ’Herein is set forth the inquiry of Herodotus the Thurian.’ Every one used this method formerly; not many do so now. By ‘free—running’ style I mean the kind that has no natural stopping—places, and comes to a stop only because there is no more to say of that subject. This style is unsatisfying just because it goes on indefinitely—one always likes to sight a stopping—place in front of one: it is only at the goal that men in a race faint and collapse;

ἡ μὲν οὖν εἰρομένη [τῆς λέξεώς] ἐστιν (35) ἥδε, κατεστραμμένη δὲ ἡ ἐν περιόδοις· λέγω δὲ περίοδον (36) λέξιν ἔχουσαν ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν αὐτὴν καθ’ αὑτὴν καὶ (1409b1) μέγεθος εὐσύνοπτον. ἡδεῖα δ’ ἡ τοιαύτη καὶ εὐμαθής, (2) ἡδεῖα μὲν διὰ τὸ ἐναντίως ἔχειν τῷ ἀπεράντῳ, καὶ ὅτι ἀεί (3) τὶ οἴεται ἔχειν ὁ ἀκροατὴς καὶ πεπεράνθαι τι αὑτῷ, τὸ (4) δὲ μηδὲν προνοεῖν μηδὲ ἀνύειν ἀηδές· εὐμαθὴς δὲ (5) ὅτι εὐμνημόνευτος, τοῦτο δὲ ὅτι ἀριθμὸν ἔχει ἡ ἐν περι(6)όδοις λέξις, ὃ πάντων εὐμνημονευτότατον.

. . . . . .

while they see the end of the course before them, they can keep on going. Such, then, is the free—running kind of style; the compact is that which is in periods. By a period I mean a portion of speech that has in itself a beginning and an end, being at the same time not too big to be taken in at a glance. Language of this kind is satisfying and easy to follow. It is satisfying, because it is just the reverse of indefinite; and moreover, the hearer always feels that he is grasping something and has reached some definite conclusion; whereas it is unsatisfactory to see nothing in front of you and get nowhere. It is easy to follow, because it can easily be remembered;

διὸ καὶ τὰ μέτρα (7) πάντες μνημονεύουσιν μᾶλλον τῶν χύδην· ἀριθμὸν γὰρ ἔχει (8) ᾧ μετρεῖται. δεῖ δὲ τὴν περίοδον †καὶ τῇ διανοία† τετελειῶ(9)σθαι, καὶ μὴ διακόπτεσθαι ὥσπερ τὰ Σοφοκλέους ἰαμβεῖα,
(10) Καλυδὼν μὲν ἥδε γαῖα· Πελοπίας χθονός· (11) τοὐναντίον γὰρ ἔστιν ὑπολαβεῖν τῷ διαιρεῖσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ (12) ἐπὶ τοῦ εἰρημένου τὴν Καλυδῶνα εἶναι τῆς Πελοποννήσου.

. . . .

and this because language when in periodic form can be numbered, and number is the easiest of all things to remember. That is why verse, which is measured, is always more easily remembered than prose, which is not: the measures of verse can be numbered. The period must, further, not be completed until the sense is complete: it must not be capable of breaking off abruptly, as may happen with the following iambic lines of Sophocles—
Calydon’s soil is this; of Pelops’ land (The smiling plains face us across the strait.)

(13) περίοδος δὲ ἡ μὲν ἐν κώλοις ἡ δ’ ἀφελής. ἔστιν δ’ (14) ἐν κώλοις μὲν λέξις ἡ τετελειωμένη τε καὶ διῃρημένη καὶ (15) εὐανάπνευστος, μὴ ἐν τῇ διαιρέσει †ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ περίοδος,† (16) ἀλλ’ ὅλη (κῶλον δ’ ἐστὶν τὸ ἕτερον μόριον ταύτης)· ἀφελῆ (17) δὲ λέγω τὴν μονόκωλον. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ κῶλα καὶ τὰς περι(18)όδους μήτε μυούρους εἶναι μήτε μακράς.

. . . . .

By a wrong division of the words the hearer may take the meaning to be the reverse of what it is: for instance, in the passage quoted, one might imagine that Calydon is in the Peloponnesus. A Period may be either divided into several members or simple. The period of several members is a portion of speech (1) complete in itself, (2) divided into parts, and (3) easily delivered at a single breath—as a whole, that is; not by fresh breath being taken at the division. A member is one of the two parts of such a period. By a ‘simple’ period, I mean that which has only one member.

τὸ μὲν γὰρ μικρὸν (19) προσπταίειν πολλάκις ποιεῖ τὸν ἀκροατήν (ἀνάγκη γὰρ ὅταν, (20) ἔτι ὁρμῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πόρρω καὶ τὸ μέτρον οὗ ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ (21) ὅρον, ἀντισπασθῇ παυσαμένου, οἷον πρόσπταισιν γίγνεσθαι (22) διὰ τὴν ἀντίκρουσιν)· τὰ δὲ μακρὰ ἀπολείπεσθαι ποιεῖ, (23) ὥσπερ οἱ ἐξωτέρω ἀποκάμπτοντες τοῦ τέρματος· ἀπολείπουσι (24) γὰρ καὶ οὗτοι τοὺς συμπεριπατοῦντας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ (25) περίοδοι αἱ μακραὶ οὖσαι λόγος γίνεται καὶ ἀναβολῇ ὅμοιον, (26) ὥστε γίνεται ὃ ἔσκωψεν Δημόκριτος ὁ Χῖος εἰς Μελανιπ(27)πίδην ποιήσαντα ἀντὶ τῶν ἀντιστρόφων ἀναβολάς
οἷ τ’ αὐτῷ κακὰ τεύχει ἀνὴρ ἄλλῳ κακὰ τεύχων,
(28) ἡ δὲ μακρὰ ἀναβολὴ τῷ ποιήσαντι κακίστη· (29) ἁρμόττει γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ εἰς τὰς μακροκώλους λέγειν.

. . . . . . .

The members, and the whole periods, should be neither curt nor long. A member which is too short often makes the listener stumble; he is still expecting the rhythm to go on to the limit his mind has fixed for it; and if meanwhile he is pulled back by the speaker’s stopping, the shock is bound to make him, so to speak, stumble. If, on the other hand, you go on too long, you make him feel left behind, just as people who when walking pass beyond the boundary before turning back leave their companions behind. So too if a period is too long you turn it into a speech, or something like a dithyrambic prelude. The result is much like the preludes that Democritus of Chios jeered at Melanippides for writing instead of antistrophic stanzas—
He that sets traps for another man’s feet Is like to fall into them first;
And long—winded preludes do harm to us all, But the preluder catches it worst.

(30) αἵ τε λίαν βραχύκωλοι οὐ περίοδος γίνεται· προπετῆ οὖν (31) ἄγει τὸν ἀκροατήν.

. .

Which applies likewise to long—membered orators. Periods whose members are altogether too short are not periods at all;

(32) τῆς δὲ ἐν κώλοις λέξεως ἡ μὲν διῃρημένη ἐστὶν ἡ δὲ (33) ἀντικειμένη, διῃρημένη μὲν, οἷον “πολλάκις ἐθαύμασα τῶν (34) τὰς πανηγύρεις συναγαγόντων καὶ τοὺς γυμνικοὺς ἀγῶνας (35) καταστησάντων”, ἀντικειμένη δὲ ἐν ᾗ ἑκατέρῳ τῷ κώλῳ ἢ (1410a1) πρὸς ἐναντίῳ ἐναντίον σύγκειται ἢ ταὐτὸ ἐπέζευκται τοῖς (2) ἐναντίοις, οἷον “ἀμφοτέρους δ’ ὤνησαν, καὶ τοὺς ὑπομεί(3)ναντας καὶ τοὺς ἀκολουθήσαντας· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ πλείω τῆς (4) οἴκοι προσεκτήσαντο, τοῖς δ’ ἱκανὴν τὴν οἴκοι κατέλιπον”· (5) ἐναντία ὑπομονὴ ἀκολούθησις, ἱκανὸν πλεῖον.

. . . . .

and the result is to bring the hearer down with a crash. The periodic style which is divided into members is of two kinds. It is either simply divided, as in ‘I have often wondered at the conveners of national gatherings and the founders of athletic contests’; or it is antithetical, where, in each of the two members, one of one pair of opposites is put along with one of another pair, or the same word is used to bracket two opposites, as ‘They aided both parties—not only those who stayed behind but those who accompanied them: for the latter they acquired new territory larger than that at home, and to the former they left territory at home that was large enough’.

“ὥστε καὶ (6) τοῖς χρημάτων δεομένοις καὶ τοῖς ἀπολαῦσαι βουλομένοις”· (7) ἀπόλαυσις κτήσει ἀντίκειται. καὶ ἔτι “συμβαίνει πολλάκις (8) ἐν ταύταις καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους ἀτυχεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἄφρονας (9) κατορθοῦν”. “εὐθὺς μὲν τῶν ἀριστείων ἠξιώθησαν, οὐ (10) πολὺ δὲ ὕστερον τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς θαλάττης ἔλαβον”. “πλεῦ(11)σαι μὲν διὰ τῆς ἠπείρου, πεζεῦσαι δὲ διὰ τῆς θαλάττης, (12) τὸν μὲν Ἑλλήσποντον ζεύξας, τὸν δ’ Ἄθω διορύξας.” “καὶ (13) φύσει πολίτας ὄντας νόμῳ τῆς πόλεως στέρεσθαι.” “οἱ (14) μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν κακῶς ἀπώλοντο, οἱ δ’ αἰσχρῶς ἐσώθησαν.” (15) “καὶ ἰδίᾳ μὲν τοῖς βαρβάροις οἰκέταις χρῆσθαι, κοινῇ δὲ (16) πολλοὺς τῶν συμμάχων περιορᾶν δουλεύοντας.” “ἢ ζῶντας (17) ἕξειν ἢ τελευτήσαντας καταλείψειν.” καὶ ὃ εἰς Πειθόλαόν (18) τις εἶπεν καὶ Λυκόφρονα ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, “οὗτοι δ’ (19) ὑμᾶς οἴκοι μὲν ὄντες ἐπώλουν, ἐλθόντες δ’ ὡς ὑμᾶς ἐώ(20)νηνται”.

. . . . . . . . .

Here the contrasted words are ‘staying behind’ and ‘accompanying’, ‘enough’ and ‘larger’. So in the example, ‘Both to those who want to get property and to those who desire to enjoy it’ where ‘enjoyment’ is contrasted with ‘getting’. Again, ‘it often happens in such enterprises that the wise men fail and the fools succeed’; ‘they were awarded the prize of valour immediately, and won the command of the sea not long afterwards’; ‘to sail through the mainland and march through the sea, by bridging the Hellespont and cutting through Athos’; ‘nature gave them their country and law took it away again’; ‘of them perished in misery, others were saved in disgrace’; ‘Athenian citizens keep foreigners in their houses as servants, while the city of Athens allows her allies by thousands to live as the foreigner’s slaves’; and ‘to possess in life or to bequeath at death’.

ἅπαντα γὰρ ταῦτα ποιεῖ τὸ εἰρημένον. ἡδεῖα δὲ (21) ἐστὶν ἡ τοιαύτη λέξις, ὅτι τἀναντία γνωριμώτατα καὶ παρ’ (22) ἄλληλα μᾶλλον γνώριμα, καὶ ὅτι ἔοικεν συλλογισμῷ· ὁ γὰρ (23) ἔλεγχος συναγωγὴ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἐστίν. (24) ἀντίθεσις μὲν οὖν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐστίν, παρίσωσις δ’ ἐὰν (25) ἴσα τὰ κῶλα, παρομοίωσις δὲ ἐὰν ὅμοια τὰ ἔσχατα ἔχῃ (26) ἑκάτερον τὸ κῶλον· ἀνάγκη δὲ ἢ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἢ ἐπὶ τελευτῆς (27) ἔχειν, καὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ μὲν ἀεὶ τὰ ὀνόματα, ἐπὶ δὲ τελευτῆς τὰς ἐσχά(28)τας συλλαβὰς ἢ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὀνόματος πτώσεις ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ (29) ὄνομα· ἐν ἀρχῇ μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, “ἀγρὸν γὰρ ἔλαβεν ἀργὸν (30) παρ’ αὐτοῦ”, (30) “δωρητοί τ’ ἐπέλοντο παράρρητοί τ’ ἐπέεσσιν·” (31) ἐπὶ τελευτῆς δέ “ᾠήθης ἂν αὐτὸν <οὐ> παιδίον τετοκέναι, ἀλλ’ (32) αὐτὸν παιδίον γεγονέναι”, “ἐν πλείσταις δὲ φροντίσι καὶ ἐν (33) ἐλαχίσταις ἐλπίσιν”. πτώσεις δὲ ταὐτοῦ “ἀξιοῖ δὲ σταθῆναι (34) χαλκοῦς, οὐκ ἄξιος ὢν χαλκοῦ;” ταὐτὸ δ’ ὄνομα “σὺ δ’ αὐ(35)τὸν καὶ ζῶντα ἔλεγες κακῶς καὶ νῦν γράφεις κακῶς”. ἀπὸ (36) συλλαβῆς δέ “τί ἂν ἔπαθες δεινόν, εἰ ἄνδρ’ εἶδες ἀργόν;” (1410b1) ἔστιν δὲ ἅμα πάντα ἔχειν ταὐτό, καὶ ἀντίθεσιν εἶναι τὸ (2) αὐτὸ καὶ πάρισον καὶ ὁμοιοτέλευτον. αἱ δ’ ἀρχαὶ τῶν περι(3)όδων σχεδὸν ἐν τοῖς Θεοδεκτείοις ἐξηρίθμηνται. εἰσὶν δὲ καὶ (4) ψευδεῖς ἀντιθέσεις, οἷον καὶ Ἐπίχαρμος ἐποίει,
(5) τόκα μὲν ἐν τήνων ἐγὼν ἦν,
τόκα δὲ παρὰ τήνοις ἐγών.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

There is also what some one said about Peitholaus and Lycophron in a law—court, ‘These men used to sell you when they were at home, and now they have come to you here and bought you’. All these passages have the structure described above. Such a form of speech is satisfying, because the significance of contrasted ideas is easily felt, especially when they are thus put side by side, and also because it has the effect of a logical argument; it is by putting two opposing conclusions side by side that you prove one of them false. Such, then, is the nature of antithesis. Parisosis is making the two members of a period equal in length. Paromoeosis is making the extreme words of both members like each other. This must happen either at the beginning or at the end of each member. If at the beginning, the resemblance must always be between whole words; at the end, between final syllables or inflexions of the same word or the same word repeated. Thus, at the beginning agron gar elaben argon par’ autou and dorhetoi t epelonto pararretoi t epeessin At the end ouk oithes an auton paidion tetokenai, all auton paidion gegonenai, and en pleistais de phrontisi kai en elachistais elpisin. An example of inflexions of the same word is axios de staoenai chalkous ouk axios on chalkou; Of the same word repeated, su d’ auton kai zonta eleges kakos kai nun grafeis kakos. Of one syllable, ti d’ an epaoes deinon, ei andr’ eides argon; It is possible for the same sentence to have all these features together—antithesis, parison, and homoeoteleuton. (The possible beginnings of periods have been pretty fully enumerated in the Theodectea.)

10. (6) Ἐπεὶ δὲ διώρισται περὶ τούτων, πόθεν λέγεται τὰ (7) ἀστεῖα καὶ τὰ εὐδοκιμοῦντα λεκτέον.

.

There are also spurious antitheses, like that of Epicharmus—
There one time I as their guest did stay,
And they were my hosts on another day.

ποιεῖν μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν (8) τοῦ εὐφυοῦς ἢ τοῦ γεγυμνασμένου, δεῖξαι δὲ τῆς μεθόδου (9) ταύτης.

.

Part 10. We may now consider the above points settled, and pass on to say something about the way to devise lively and taking sayings.

εἴπωμεν οὖν καὶ διαριθμησώμεθα· ἀρχὴ δ’ ἔστω (10) ἡμῖν αὕτη. τὸ γὰρ μανθάνειν ῥᾳδίως ἡδὺ φύσει πᾶσιν (11) ἐστί, τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα σημαίνει τι, ὥστε ὅσα τῶν ὀνομάτων (12) ποιεῖ ἡμῖν μάθησιν, ἥδιστα. αἱ μὲν οὖν γλῶτται ἀγνῶτες, (13) τὰ δὲ κύρια ἴσμεν· ἡ δὲ μεταφορὰ ποιεῖ τοῦτο μάλιστα· (14) ὅταν γὰρ εἴπῃ τὸ γῆρας καλάμην, ἐποίησεν μάθησιν καὶ (15) γνῶσιν διὰ τοῦ γένους· ἄμφω γὰρ ἀπηνθηκότα. ποιοῦσιν (16) μὲν οὖν καὶ αἱ τῶν ποιητῶν εἰκόνες τὸ αὐτό· διόπερ ἂν (17) εὖ, ἀστεῖον φαίνεται. ἔστιν γὰρ ἡ εἰκών, καθάπερ εἴρηται (18) πρότερον, μεταφορὰ διαφέρουσα προθέσει· διὸ ἧττον ἡδύ, (19) ὅτι μακροτέρως· καὶ οὐ λέγει ὡς τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο· οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ (20) ζητεῖ τοῦτο ἡ ψυχή. ἀνάγκη δὴ καὶ λέξιν καὶ ἐνθυμήματα (21) ταῦτ’ εἶναι ἀστεῖα ὅσα ποιεῖ ἡμῖν μάθησιν ταχεῖαν· διὸ (22) οὔτε τὰ ἐπιπόλαια τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων εὐδοκιμεῖ (ἐπιπόλαια (23) γὰρ λέγομεν τὰ παντὶ δῆλα, καὶ ἃ μηδὲν δεῖ ζητῆσαι), οὔτε (24) ὅσα εἰρημένα ἀγνοοῦμεν, ἀλλ’ ὅσων ἢ ἅμα λεγομένων ἡ (25) γνῶσις γίνεται, καὶ εἰ μὴ πρότερον ὑπῆρχεν, ἢ μικρὸν ὑστε(26)ρίζει ἡ διάνοια· γίγνεται γὰρ οἷον μάθησις, ἐκείνων δὲ (27) οὐδετέρου.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Their actual invention can only come through natural talent or long practice; but this treatise may indicate the way it is done. We may deal with them by enumerating the different kinds of them. We will begin by remarking that we all naturally find it agreeable to get hold of new ideas easily: words express ideas, and therefore those words are the most agreeable that enable us to get hold of new ideas. Now strange words simply puzzle us; ordinary words convey only what we know already; it is from metaphor that we can best get hold of something fresh. When the poet calls ‘old age a withered stalk’, he conveys a new idea, a new fact, to us by means of the general notion of bloom, which is common to both things. The similes of the poets do the same, and therefore, if they are good similes, give an effect of brilliance. The simile, as has been said before, is a metaphor, differing from it only in the way it is put; and just because it is longer it is less attractive. Besides, it does not say outright that ‘this’ is ‘that’, and therefore the hearer is less interested in the idea. We see, then, that both speech and reasoning are lively in proportion as they make us seize a new idea promptly. For this reason people are not much taken either by obvious arguments (using the word ‘obvious’ to mean what is plain to everybody and needs no investigation), nor by those which puzzle us when we hear them stated, but only by those which convey their information to us as soon as we hear them, provided we had not the information already; or which the mind only just fails to keep up with.

κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ λεγομένου τὰ (28) τοιαῦτα εὐδοκιμεῖ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων, κατὰ δὲ τὴν λέξιν (29) τῷ μὲν σχήματι, ἐὰν ἀντικειμένως λέγηται, οἷον “καὶ τὴν (30) τοῖς ἄλλοις κοινὴν εἰρήνην νομιζόντων τοῖς αὑτῶν ἰδίοις (31) πόλεμον”· ἀντίκειται πόλεμος εἰρήνῃ· τοῖς δ’ ὀνόμασιν, ἐὰν (32) ἔχῃ μεταφοράν, καὶ ταύτην μήτ’ ἀλλοτρίαν, χαλεπὸν γὰρ (33) συνιδεῖν, μήτ’ ἐπιπόλαιον, οὐδὲν γὰρ ποιεῖ πάσχειν. ἔτι εἰ (34) πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖ· ὁρᾶν γὰρ δεῖ [τὰ] πραττόμενα μᾶλλον ἢ (35) μέλλοντα.

. . . . .

These two kinds do convey to us a sort of information: but the obvious and the obscure kinds convey nothing, either at once or later on. It is these qualities, then, that, so far as the meaning of what is said is concerned, make an argument acceptable. So far as the style is concerned, it is the antithetical form that appeals to us, e.g. ’judging that the peace common to all the rest was a war upon their own private interests’, where there is an antithesis between war and peace. It is also good to use metaphorical words; but the metaphors must not be far—fetched, or they will be difficult to grasp, nor obvious, or they will have no effect.

δεῖ ἄρα τούτων στοχάζεσθαι τριῶν, μεταφορᾶς (36) ἀντιθέσεως ἐνεργείας. (1411a1) τῶν δὲ μεταφορῶν τεττάρων οὐσῶν εὐδοκιμοῦσι μά(2)λιστα αἱ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν, ὥσπερ Περικλῆς ἔφη τὴν νεότητα (3) τὴν ἀπολομένην ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ οὕτως ἠφανίσθαι ἐκ τῆς (4) πόλεως ὥσπερ εἴ τις τὸ ἔαρ ἐκ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ ἐξέλοι. καὶ (5) Λεπτίνης περὶ Λακεδαιμονίων, οὐκ ἂν περιιδεῖν τὴν Ἑλ(6)λάδα ἑτερόφθαλμον γενομένην. καὶ Κηφισόδοτος, σπουδά(7)ζοντος Χάρητος εὐθύνας δοῦναι περὶ τὸν Ὀλυνθιακὸν πό(8)λεμον, ἠγανάκτει, φάσκων εἰς πνῖγμα τὸν δῆμον ἄγχοντα τὰς (9) εὐθύνας πειρᾶσθαι δοῦναι. καὶ παρακαλῶν ποτὲ τοὺς Ἀθη(10)ναίους εἰς Εὔβοιαν ἐπισιτισαμένους ἔφη δεῖν ἐξιέναι τὸ (11) Μιλτιάδου ψήφισμα. καὶ Ἰφικράτης σπεισαμένων Ἀθηναίων (12) πρὸς Ἐπίδαυρον καὶ τὴν παραλίαν ἠγανάκτει, φάσκων αὐ(13)τοὺς τὰ ἐφόδια τοῦ πολέμου παρῃρῆσθαι. καὶ Πειθόλαος (14) τὴν πάραλον ῥόπαλον τοῦ δήμου, Σηστὸν δὲ τηλίαν τοῦ (15) Πειραιέως. καὶ Περικλῆς τὴν Αἴγιναν ἀφελεῖν ἐκέλευσε, τὴν (16) λήμην τοῦ Πειραιέως. καὶ Μοιροκλῆς οὐθὲν ἔφη πονηρό(17)τερος εἶναι, ὀνομάσας τινὰ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν· ἐκεῖνον μὲν γὰρ (18) ἐπιτρίτων τόκων πονηρεύεσθαι, αὐτὸς δὲ ἐπιδεκάτων. καὶ (19) τὸ Ἀναξανδρίδου ἰαμβεῖον ὑπὲρ τῶν θυγατέρων πρὸς τὸν (20) γάμον ἐγχρονιζουσῶν “ὑπερήμεροί μοι τῶν γάμων αἱ παρθένοι”. (21) καὶ τὸ Πολυεύκτου εἰς ἀποπληκτικόν τινα Σπεύσιππον, τὸ (22) μὴ δύνασθαι ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης ἐν πεντε(23)συρίγγῳ νόσῳ δεδεμένον. καὶ Κηφισόδοτος τὰς τριήρεις ἐκάλει (24) μύλωνας ποικίλους, ὁ Κύων δὲ τὰ καπηλεῖα τὰ Ἀττικὰ (25) φιδίτια· Αἰσίων δέ, ὅτι εἰς Σικελίαν τὴν πόλιν ἐξέχεαν· (26) τοῦτο γὰρ μεταφορὰ καὶ πρὸ ὀμμάτων. καὶ “ὥστε βοῆσαι (27) τὴν Ἑλλάδα”, καὶ τοῦτο τρόπον τινὰ μεταφορὰ καὶ πρὸ (28) ὀμμάτων. καὶ ὥσπερ Κηφισόδοτος εὐλαβεῖσθαι ἐκέλευεν μὴ (29) πολλὰς ποιήσωσιν τὰς συνδρομάς [ἐκκλησίας]. καὶ Ἰσο(30)κράτης πρὸς τοὺς συντρέχοντας ἐν ταῖς πανηγύρεσιν. καὶ (31) οἷον ἐν τῷ ἐπιταφίῳ, διότι ἄξιον ἦν ἐπὶ τῷ τάφῳ τῷ (32) τῶν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι τελευτησάντων κείρασθαι τὴν Ἑλλάδα (33) ὡς συγκαταθαπτομένης τῇ ἀρετῇ αὐτῶν τῆς ἐλευθερίας· (34) εἰ μὲν γὰρ εἶπεν ὅτι ἄξιον δακρῦσαι συγκαταθαπτομένης (35) τῆς ἀρετῆς, μεταφορὰ καὶ πρὸ ὀμμάτων, τὸ δὲ “τῇ ἀρετῇ (1411b1) τῆς ἐλευθερίας” ἀντίθεσίν τινα ἔχει. καὶ ὡς Ἰφικράτης (2) εἶπεν “ἡ γὰρ ὁδός μοι τῶν λόγων διὰ μέσων τῶν Χά(3)ρητι πεπραγμένων ἐστίν” μεταφορὰ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν, καὶ (4) τὸ διὰ μέσου πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖ. καὶ τὸ φάναι παρα(5)καλεῖν τοὺς κινδύνους τοῖς κινδύνοις βοηθήσοντας, πρὸ (6) ὀμμάτων <καὶ> μεταφορά. καὶ Λυκολέων ὑπὲρ Χαβρίου “οὐδὲ (7) τὴν ἱκετηρίαν αἰσχυνθέντες αὐτοῦ, τὴν εἰκόνα τὴν χαλκῆν”· (8) μεταφορὰ γὰρ ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀεί, ἀλλὰ πρὸ (9) ὀμμάτων· κινδυνεύοντος γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἱκετεύει ἡ εἰκών, τὸ (10) “ἔμψυχον δὴ ἄψυχον”, τὸ ὑπόμνημα τῶν τῆς πόλεως ἔργων. (11) καὶ “πάντα τρόπον μικρὸν φρονεῖν μελετῶντες”· τὸ γὰρ (12) μελετᾶν αὔξειν τι ἐστίν. καὶ ὅτι “τὸν νοῦν ὁ θεὸς φῶς (13) ἀνῆψεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ”· ἄμφω γὰρ δηλοῖ τι. “οὐ γὰρ δια(14)λυόμεθα τοὺς πολέμους ἀλλ’ ἀναβαλλόμεθα”· ἄμφω γάρ (15) ἐστιν μέλλοντα, καὶ ἡ ἀναβολὴ καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη εἰρήνη. (16) καὶ τὸ τὰς συνθήκας φάναι τρόπαιον εἶναι πολὺ κάλλιον (17) τῶν ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις γινομένων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὲρ μι(18)κρῶν καὶ μιᾶς τύχης, αὗται δ’ ὑπὲρ παντὸς τοῦ πολέμου· (19) ἄμφω γὰρ νίκης σημεῖα. καὶ ὅτι αἱ πόλεις τῷ ψόγῳ τῶν (20) ἀνθρώπων μεγάλας εὐθύνας διδόασιν· ἡ γὰρ εὔθυνα βλάβη (21) τις δικαία ἐστίν.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The words, too, ought to set the scene before our eyes; for events ought to be seen in progress rather than in prospect. So we must aim at these three points: Antithesis, Metaphor, and Actuality. Of the four kinds of Metaphor the most taking is the proportional kind. Thus Pericles, for instance, said that the vanishing from their country of the young men who had fallen in the war was ‘as if the spring were taken out of the year’. Leptines, speaking of the Lacedaemonians, said that he would not have the Athenians let Greece ‘lose one of her two eyes’. When Chares was pressing for leave to be examined upon his share in the Olynthiac war, Cephisodotus was indignant, saying that he wanted his examination to take place ‘while he had his fingers upon the people’s throat’. The same speaker once urged the Athenians to march to Euboea, ‘with Miltiades’ decree as their rations’. Iphicrates, indignant at the truce made by the Athenians with Epidaurus and the neighbouring sea—board, said that they had stripped themselves of their travelling money for the journey of war. Peitholaus called the state—galley ‘the people’s big stick’, and Sestos ‘the corn—bin of the Peiraeus’. Pericles bade his countrymen remove Aegina, ‘that eyesore of the Peiraeus.’ And Moerocles said he was no more a rascal than was a certain respectable citizen he named, ‘whose rascality was worth over thirty per cent per annum to him, instead of a mere ten like his own’. There is also the iambic line of Anaxandrides about the way his daughters put off marrying— My daughters’ marriage—bonds are overdue. Polyeuctus said of a paralytic man named Speusippus that he could not keep quiet, ‘though fortune had fastened him in the pillory of disease’. Cephisodotus called warships ‘painted millstones’. Diogenes the Dog called taverns ‘the mess—rooms of Attica’. Aesion said that the Athenians had ‘emptied’ their town into Sicily: this is a graphic metaphor. ’Till all Hellas shouted aloud’ may be regarded as a metaphor, and a graphic one again. Cephisodotus bade the Athenians take care not to hold too many ‘parades’. Isocrates used the same word of those who ‘parade at the national festivals.’ Another example occurs in the Funeral Speech: ‘It is fitting that Greece should cut off her hair beside the tomb of those who fell at Salamis, since her freedom and their valour are buried in the same grave.’ Even if the speaker here had only said that it was right to weep when valour was being buried in their grave, it would have been a metaphor, and a graphic one; but the coupling of ‘their valour’ and ‘her freedom’ presents a kind of antithesis as well. ’The course of my words’, said Iphicrates, ‘lies straight through the middle of Chares’ deeds’: this is a proportional metaphor, and the phrase ‘straight through the middle’ makes it graphic. The expression ‘to call in one danger to rescue us from another’ is a graphic metaphor. Lycoleon said, defending Chabrias, ‘They did not respect even that bronze statue of his that intercedes for him yonder’. This was a metaphor for the moment, though it would not always apply; a vivid metaphor, however; Chabrias is in danger, and his statue intercedes for him—that lifeless yet living thing which records his services to his country. ’Practising in every way littleness of mind’ is metaphorical, for practising a quality implies increasing it. So is ‘God kindled our reason to be a lamp within our soul’, for both reason and light reveal things. So is ‘we are not putting an end to our wars, but only postponing them’, for both literal postponement and the making of such a peace as this apply to future action. So is such a saying as ‘This treaty is a far nobler trophy than those we set up on fields of battle; they celebrate small gains and single successes; it celebrates our triumph in the war as a whole’; for both trophy and treaty are signs of victory.

11. (22) Ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἀστεῖα ἐκ μεταφορᾶς τε τῆς ἀνάλογον (23) λέγεται καὶ τῷ πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖν, εἴρηται· λεκτέον δὲ τί (24) λέγομεν πρὸ ὀμμάτων, καὶ τί ποιοῦσι γίγνεται τοῦτο.

. .

So is ‘A country pays a heavy reckoning in being condemned by the judgement of mankind’, for a reckoning is damage deservedly incurred. Part 11. It has already been mentioned that liveliness is got by using the proportional type of metaphor and being making (ie. making your hearers see things).

λέγω (25) δὴ πρὸ ὀμμάτων ταῦτα ποιεῖν ὅσα ἐνεργοῦντα σημαίνει, (26) οἷον τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα φάναι εἶναι τετράγωνον μεταφορά, (27) (ἄμφω γὰρ τέλεια), ἀλλ’ οὐ σημαίνει ἐνέργειαν· ἀλλὰ τὸ “ἀν(28)θοῦσαν ἔχοντος τὴν ἀκμήν” ἐνέργεια, καὶ τὸ “σὲ δ’ ὥσπερ (29) ἄφετον” [ἐλεύθερον] ἐνέργεια, καὶ <τοὐντεῦθεν οὖν> Ἕλληνες ᾄξαντες ποσίν· (30) τὸ ᾄξαντες ἐνέργεια καὶ μεταφορά· ταχὺ γὰρ λέγει.

. . . . .

We have still to explain what we mean by their ‘seeing things’, and what must be done to effect this. By ‘making them see things’ I mean using expressions that represent things as in a state of activity. Thus, to say that a good man is ‘four—square’ is certainly a metaphor; both the good man and the square are perfect; but the metaphor does not suggest activity. On the other hand, in the expression ‘with his vigour in full bloom’ there is a notion of activity;

καὶ ὡς (31) κέχρηται πολλαχοῦ Ὅμηρος, τὸ τὰ ἄψυχα ἔμψυχα ποιεῖν διὰ (32) τῆς μεταφορᾶς. ἐν πᾶσι δὲ τῷ ἐνέργειαν ποιεῖν εὐδοκιμεῖ, (33) οἷον ἐν τοῖσδε, “αὖτις ἐπὶ δάπεδόνδε κυλίνδετο λᾶας ἀναιδής”, καὶ (1412a1) “ἔπτατ’ ὀιστός”, καὶ “ἐπιπτέσθαι μενεαίνων”, καὶ “ἐν γαίῃ (2) ἵσταντο λιλαιόμενα χροὸς ἆσαι”, καὶ “αἰχμὴ δὲ στέρνοιο διέσσυτο (3) μαιμώωσα”.

. . . . . . .

and so in ‘But you must roam as free as a sacred victim’; and in Thereas up sprang the Hellenes to their feet, where ‘up sprang’ gives us activity as well as metaphor, for it at once suggests swiftness. So with Homer’s common practice of giving metaphorical life to lifeless things: all such passages are distinguished by the effect of activity they convey. Thus, Downward anon to the valley rebounded the boulder remorseless; and The (bitter) arrow flew; and Flying on eagerly; and Stuck in the earth, still panting to feed on the flesh of the heroes;

ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις διὰ τὸ ἔμψυχα εἶναι ἐνεργοῦντα (4) φαίνεται· τὸ ἀναισχυντεῖν γὰρ καὶ μαιμᾶν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐνέρ(5)γεια. ταῦτα δὲ προσῆψε διὰ τῆς κατ’ ἀναλογίαν μεταφορᾶς· (6) ὡς γὰρ ὁ λίθος πρὸς τὸν Σίσυφον, ὁ ἀναισχυντῶν πρὸς (7) τὸν ἀναισχυντούμενον. ποιεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς εὐδοκιμούσαις (8) εἰκόσιν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων ταὐτά· (9) “κυρτά, φαληριόωντα· πρὸ μέν τ’ ἄλλ’, αὐτὰρ ἐπ’ ἄλλα”· (10) κινούμενα γὰρ καὶ ζῶντα ποιεῖ πάντα, ἡ δ’ ἐνέργεια κίνησις. (11) δεῖ δὲ μεταφέρειν, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, ἀπὸ οἰ(12)κείων καὶ μὴ φανερῶν, οἷον καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ τὸ ὅμοιον (13) καὶ ἐν πολὺ διέχουσι θεωρεῖν εὐστόχου, ὥσπερ Ἀρχύτας (14) ἔφη ταὐτὸν εἶναι διαιτητὴν καὶ βωμόν· ἐπ’ ἄμφω γὰρ τὸν (15) ἀδικούμενον καταφεύγειν. ἢ εἴ τις φαίη ἄγκυραν καὶ κρε(16)μάθραν τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι· ἄμφω γὰρ ταὐτό τι, ἀλλὰ διαφέρει (17) τῷ ἄνωθεν καὶ κάτωθεν. καὶ τὸ ἀνωμαλίσθαι τὰς πόλεις ἐν (18) πολὺ διέχουσιν ταὐτό, ἐν ἐπιφανείᾳ καὶ δυνάμεσι τὸ ἴσον. (19) ἔστιν δὲ καὶ τὰ ἀστεῖα τὰ πλεῖστα διὰ μεταφορᾶς καὶ (20) ἐκ τοῦ προσεξαπατᾶν· μᾶλλον γὰρ γίγνεται δῆλον ὅ τι ἔμαθε (21) παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίως ἔχειν, καὶ ἔοικεν λέγειν ἡ ψυχὴ “ὡς (22) ἀληθῶς, ἐγὼ δὲ ἥμαρτον”. καὶ τῶν ἀποφθεγμάτων δὲ τὰ (23) ἀστεῖά ἐστιν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὅ φησι λέγειν, οἷον τὸ Στησιχόρου, (24) ὅτι οἱ τέττιγες ἑαυτοῖς χαμόθεν ᾄσονται. καὶ τὰ εὖ ᾐνι(25)γμένα διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἡδέα (μάθησις γάρ ἐστι καὶ μετα (26)φορά), καὶ (ὃ λέγει Θεόδωρος) τὸ καινὰ λέγειν. γίγνεται δὲ (27) ὅταν παράδοξον ᾖ, καὶ μή, ὡς ἐκεῖνος λέγει, πρὸς τὴν ἔμ(28)προσθεν δόξαν, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς γελοίοις τὰ παρα(29)πεποιημένα (ὅπερ δύναται καὶ τὰ παρὰ γράμμα σκώμματα· (30) ἐξαπατᾷ γάρ), καὶ ἐν τοῖς μέτροις· οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ὁ (31) ἀκούων ὑπέλαβεν· “ἔστειχε δ’ ἔχων ὑπὸ ποσσὶ χίμεθλα”· (32) ὁ δ’ ᾤετο πέδιλα ἐρεῖν. τούτου δ’ ἅμα λεγομένου δεῖ δῆ(33)λον εἶναι. τὰ δὲ παρὰ γράμμα ποιεῖ οὐχ ὃ λέγει λέγειν, (34) ἀλλ’ ὃ μεταστρέφει ὄνομα, οἷον τὸ Θεοδώρου εἰς Νίκωνα (35) τὸν κιθαρῳδὸν “θράξει σε”, προσποιεῖται γὰρ λέγειν τὸ (1412b1) “Θρᾷξ εἶ σύ” καὶ ἐξαπατᾷ· ἄλλο γὰρ λέγει. διὸ μαθόντι ἡδύ, (2) ἐπεὶ εἰ μὴ ὑπολαμβάνει Θρᾷκα εἶναι, οὐ δόξει ἀστεῖον (3) εἶναι. καὶ τὸ “βούλει αὐτὸν πέρσαι”.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

and And the point of the spear in its fury drove full through his breastbone. In all these examples the things have the effect of being active because they are made into living beings; shameless behaviour and fury and so on are all forms of activity. And the poet has attached these ideas to the things by means of proportional metaphors: as the stone is to Sisyphus, so is the shameless man to his victim. In his famous similes, too, he treats inanimate things in the same way: Curving and crested with white, host following host without ceasing. Here he represents everything as moving and living; and activity is movement. Metaphors must be drawn, as has been said already, from things that are related to the original thing, and yet not obviously so related —just as in philosophy also an acute mind will perceive resemblances even in things far apart. Thus Archytas said that an arbitrator and an altar were the same, since the injured fly to both for refuge. Or you might say that an anchor and an overhead hook were the same, since both are in a way the same, only the one secures things from below and the other from above. And to speak of states as ‘levelled’ is to identify two widely different things, the equality of a physical surface and the equality of political powers. Liveliness is specially conveyed by metaphor, and by the further power of surprising the hearer; because the hearer expected something different, his acquisition of the new idea impresses him all the more. His mind seems to say, ‘Yes, to be sure; I never thought of that’. The liveliness of epigrammatic remarks is due to the meaning not being just what the words say: as in the saying of Stesichorus that ‘the cicalas will chirp to themselves on the ground’. Well—constructed riddles are attractive for the same reason; a new idea is conveyed, and there is metaphorical expression. So with the ‘novelties’ of Theodorus. In these the thought is startling, and, as Theodorus puts it, does not fit in with the ideas you already have. They are like the burlesque words that one finds in the comic writers. The effect is produced even by jokes depending upon changes of the letters of a word; this too is a surprise. You find this in verse as well as in prose. The word which comes is not what the hearer imagined: thus Onward he came, and his feet were shod with his—chilblains, where one imagined the word would be ‘sandals’. But the point should be clear the moment the words are uttered. Jokes made by altering the letters of a word consist in meaning, not just what you say, but something that gives a twist to the word used; e.g. the remark of Theodorus about Nicon the harpist Thraxei se (’you Thracian slavey’), where he pretends to mean Thratteis su (’you harpplayer’), and surprises us when we find he means something else. So you enjoy the point when you see it, though the remark will fall flat unless you are aware that Nicon is Thracian.

δεῖ δὲ ἀμφότερα προσ(4)ηκόντως λεχθῆναι. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὰ ἀστεῖα, οἷον τὸ φάναι (5) Ἀθηναίοις τὴν τῆς θαλάττης ἀρχὴν μὴ ἀρχὴν εἶναι τῶν (6) κακῶν· ὄνασθαι γάρ. ἢ ὥσπερ Ἰσοκράτης τὴν ἀρχὴν τῇ (7) πόλει ἀρχὴν εἶναι τῶν κακῶν. ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ ὃ οὐκ ἂν (8) ᾠήθη τις ἐρεῖν, τοῦτ’ εἴρηται, καὶ ἐγνώσθη ὅτι ἀληθές· τό (9) τε γὰρ τὴν ἀρχὴν φάναι ἀρχὴν εἶναι οὐθὲν σοφόν, ἀλλ’ (10) οὐχ οὕτω λέγει ἀλλ’ ἄλλως, καὶ ἀρχὴν οὐχ ὃ εἶπεν ἀπό(11)φησιν, ἀλλ’ ἄλλως. ἐν ἅπασι δὲ τούτοις, ἐὰν προσηκόντως (12) τὸ ὄνομα ἐνέγκῃ ὁμωνυμίᾳ ἢ μεταφορᾷ, τότε τὸ εὖ. οἷον (13) “Ἀνάσχετος οὐκ ἀνασχετός” ὁμωνυμίᾳ ἀπέφησε, ἀλλὰ προσ(14)ηκόντως, εἰ ἀηδής.

. . . . . . . . .

Or again: Boulei auton persai. In both these cases the saying must fit the facts. This is also true of such lively remarks as the one to the effect that to the Athenians their empire (arche) of the sea was not the beginning (arche) of their troubles, since they gained by it. Or the opposite one of Isocrates, that their empire (arche) was the beginning (arche) of their troubles. Either way, the speaker says something unexpected, the soundness of which is thereupon recognized. There would be nothing clever is saying ‘empire is empire’. Isocrates means more than that, and uses the word with a new meaning. So too with the former saying, which denies that arche in one sense was arche in another sense. In all these jokes, whether a word is used in a second sense or metaphorically, the joke is good if it fits the facts.

καὶ “οὐκ ἂν γένοιο μᾶλλον ἤ σε δεῖ ξένος”· (15) “ξένος” <γὰρ> “οὐ μᾶλλον ἤ σε δεῖ” τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ “οὐ δεῖ (16) τὸν ξένον ξένον ἀεὶ εἶναι”· ἀλλότριον γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο. τὸ αὐτὸ (17) καὶ τὸ Ἀναξανδρίδου τὸ ἐπαινούμενον,
καλόν γ’ ἀποθανεῖν πρὶν θανάτου δρᾶν ἄξιον· (18) ταὐτὸ γάρ ἐστι τῷ εἰπεῖν “ἄξιόν γ’ ἀποθανεῖν μὴ ὄντα (19) ἄξιον ἀποθανεῖν”, ἢ “ἄξιόν γ’ ἀποθανεῖν μὴ θανάτου ἄξιον (20) ὄντα”, ἢ “μὴ ποιοῦντα θανάτου ἄξια”. τὸ μὲν οὖν εἶδος τὸ (21) αὐτὸ τῆς λέξεως τούτων· ἀλλ’ ὅσῳ ἂν <ἐν> ἐλάττονι καὶ ἀντι(22)κειμένως λεχθῇ, τοσούτῳ εὐδοκιμεῖ μᾶλλον. τὸ δ’ αἴτιον (23) ὅτι ἡ μάθησις διὰ μὲν τὸ ἀντικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον, διὰ δὲ τὸ (24) ἐν ὀλίγῳ θᾶττον γίνεται. δεῖ δ’ ἀεὶ προσεῖναι [ἢ] τὸ πρὸς (25) ὃν λέγεται [ἢ] ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι, εἰ τὸ λεγόμενον ἀληθὲς καὶ (26) μὴ ἐπιπόλαιον <ἔσται>· ἔστιν γὰρ ταῦτα χωρὶς ἔχειν, οἷον “ἀπο(27)θνῄσκειν δεῖ μηθὲν ἁμαρτάνοντα” [ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀστεῖον], “τὴν (28) ἀξίαν δεῖ γαμεῖν τὸν ἄξιον”, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀστεῖον, ἀλλ’ <ἢ> ἐὰν (29) ἅμα ἄμφω ἔχῃ· “ἄξιόν γ’ ἀποθανεῖν μὴ ἄξιον ὄντα τοῦ ἀπο(30)θανεῖν”. ὅσῳ δ’ ἂν πλείω ἔχῃ, τοσούτῳ ἀστειότερον φαίνεται, (31) οἷον εἰ καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα μεταφορὰ εἴη καὶ μεταφορὰ τοιαδὶ (32) καὶ ἀντίθεσις καὶ παρίσωσις, καὶ ἔχοι ἐνέργειαν. (33) εἰσὶν δὲ καὶ αἱ εἰκόνες, ὥσπερ εἴρηται καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄνω, (34) αἱ εὐδοκιμοῦσαι τρόπον τινὰ μεταφοραί· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐκ δυοῖν (35) λέγονται, ὥσπερ ἡ ἀνάλογον μεταφορά, οἷον “ἡ ἀσπίς”, φαμέν, (1413a1) “ἐστι φιάλη Ἄρεως”, καὶ “<τὸ> τόξον φόρμιγξ ἄχορδος”. (2) οὕτω μὲν οὖν λέγουσιν οὐχ ἁπλοῦν, τὸ δ’ εἰπεῖν τὸ τόξον φόρμιγγα (3) ἢ τὴν ἀσπίδα φιάλην ἁπλοῦν. καὶ εἰκάζουσιν δὲ οὕτως, (4) οἷον πιθήκῳ αὐλητήν, λύχνῳ ψακαζομένῳ [εἰς] μύωπα· (5) ἄμφω γὰρ συνάγεται.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

For instance, Anaschetos (proper name) ouk anaschetos: where you say that what is so—and—so in one sense is not so—and—so in another; well, if the man is unpleasant, the joke fits the facts. Again, take—Thou must not be a stranger stranger than Thou should’st. Do not the words ‘thou must not be’, &c., amount to saying that the stranger must not always be strange? Here again is the use of one word in different senses. Of the same kind also is the much—praised verse of Anaxandrides:
Death is most fit before you do
Deeds that would make death fit for you. This amounts to saying ‘it is a fit thing to die when you are not fit to die’, or ‘it is a fit thing to die when death is not fit for you’, i.e. when death is not the fit return for what you are doing. The type of language employed—is the same in all these examples; but the more briefly and antithetically such sayings can be expressed, the more taking they are, for antithesis impresses the new idea more firmly and brevity more quickly. They should always have either some personal application or some merit of expression, if they are to be true without being commonplace—two requirements not always satisfied simultaneously. Thus ‘a man should die having done no wrong’ is true but dull: ‘the right man should marry the right woman’ is also true but dull. No, there must be both good qualities together, as in ‘it is fitting to die when you are not fit for death’. The more a saying has these qualitis, the livelier it appears: if, for instance, its wording is metaphorical, metaphorical in the right way, antithetical, and balanced, and at the same time it gives an idea of activity. Successful similes also, as has been said above, are in a sense metaphors, since they always involve two relations like the proportional metaphor. Thus: a shield, we say, is the ‘drinking—bowl of Ares’, and a bow is the ‘chordless lyre’. This way of putting a metaphor is not ‘simple’, as it would be if we called the bow a lyre or the shield a drinking—bowl.

τὸ δὲ εὖ ἐστὶν ὅταν μεταφορὰ ᾖ· (6) ἔστιν γὰρ εἰκάσαι τὴν ἀσπίδα φιάλῃ Ἄρεως καὶ τὸ ἐρεί(7)πιον ῥάκει οἰκίας, καὶ τὸ τὸν Νικήρατον φάναι Φιλοκτήτην (8) εἶναι δεδηγμένον ὑπὸ Πράτυος, ὥσπερ εἴκασεν Θρασύμαχος (9) ἰδὼν τὸν Νικήρατον ἡττημένον ὑπὸ Πράτυος ῥαψῳδοῦντα, (10) κομῶντα δὲ καὶ αὐχμηρὸν ἔτι.

. . . . .

There are ‘simple’ similes also: we may say that a flute—player is like a monkey, or that a short—sighted man’s eyes are like a lamp—flame with water dropping on it, since both eyes and flame keep winking. A simile succeeds best when it is a converted metaphor, for it is possible to say that a shield is like the drinking—bowl of Ares, or that a ruin is like a house in rags, and to say that Niceratus is like a Philoctetes stung by Pratys

ἐν οἷς μάλιστά τ’ ἐκπίπτου(11)σιν οἱ ποιηταὶ ἐὰν μὴ εὖ, καὶ ἐὰν εὖ, εὐδοκιμοῦσιν· λέγω (12) δ’ ὅταν ἀποδιδῶσιν· “ὥσπερ σέλινον οὖλα τὰ σκέλη φορεῖ.” (13) “ὥσπερ Φιλάμμων ζυγομαχῶν τῷ κωρύκῳ.” (14) καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντ’ εἰκόνες εἰσίν. αἱ δ’ εἰκόνες ὅτι μετα(15)φοραί, εἴρηται πολλάκις. (16) καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι δὲ μεταφοραὶ ἀπ’ εἴδους ἐπ’ εἶδος εἰσίν· (17) οἷον ἄν τις ὡς ἀγαθὸν πεισόμενος αὐτὸς ἐπαγάγηται, εἶτα (18) βλαβῇ, “ὡς ὁ Καρπάθιός”, φασιν, “τὸν λαγώ”· ἄμφω γὰρ τὸ (19) εἰρημένον πεπόνθασιν.

. . . . . .

—the simile made by Thrasyniachus when he saw Niceratus, who had been beaten by Pratys in a recitation competition, still going about unkempt and unwashed. It is in these respects that poets fail worst when they fail, and succeed best when they succeed, i.e. when they give the resemblance pat, as in Those legs of his curl just like parsley leaves; and Just like Philammon struggling with his punchball. These are all similes; and that similes are metaphors has been stated often already. Proverbs, again, are metaphors from one species to another. Suppose, for instance, a man to start some undertaking in hope of gain and then to lose by it later on, ‘Here we have once more the man of Carpathus and his hare’, says he.

ὅθεν μὲν οὖν τὰ ἀστεῖα λέγεται καὶ διότι, (20) σχεδὸν εἴρηται τὸ αἴτιον· εἰσὶν δὲ καὶ <αἱ> εὐδοκιμοῦσαι (21) ὑπερβολαὶ μεταφοραί, οἷον εἰς ὑπωπιασμένον “ᾠήθητε δ’ ἂν (22) αὐτὸν εἶναι συκαμίνων κάλαθον”· ἐρυθρὸν γάρ τι τὸ ὑπώπιον, (23) ἀλλὰ τοῦτο πολὺ σφόδρα. τὸ δὲ “ὥσπερ τὸ καὶ τὸ” ὑπερβολὴ (24) τῇ λέξει διαφέρουσα. “ὥσπερ Φιλάμμων ζυγομαχῶν τῷ (25) κωρύκῳ”, “ᾠήθης δ’ ἂν αὐτὸν Φιλάμμωνα εἶναι μαχόμενον (26) τῷ κωρύκῳ”. (27) “ὥσπερ σέλινον οὖλα τὰ σκέλη φορεῖν”, (28) “ᾠήθης δ’ ἂν οὐ σκέλη ἀλλὰ σέλινα ἔχειν, οὕτως οὖλα”. (29) εἰσὶ δ’ αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ μειρακιώδεις· σφοδρότητα γὰρ δηλοῦσιν. (30) διὸ ὀργιζόμενοι λέγουσιν μάλιστα· (31) οὐδ’ εἴ μοι τόσα δοίη ὅσα ψάμαθός τε κόνις τε. (32) κούρην δ’ οὐ γαμέω Ἀγαμέμνονος Ἀτρεΐδαο,
(33) οὐδ’ εἰ χρυσείῃ Ἀφροδίτῃ κάλλος ἐρίζοι,
(34) ἔργα δ’ Ἀθηναίῃ· (1413b1) διὸ πρεσβυτέρῳ λέγειν ἀπρεπές· χρῶνται δὲ μάλιστα τούτῳ (2) Ἀττικοὶ ῥήτορες.

. . . . . . . . .

For both alike went through the said experience. It has now been explained fairly completely how liveliness is secured and why it has the effect it has. Successful hyperboles are also metaphors, e.g. the one about the man with a black eye, ‘you would have thought he was a basket of mulberries’; here the ‘black eye’ is compared to a mulberry because of its colour, the exaggeration lying in the quantity of mulberries suggested. The phrase ‘like so—and—so’ may introduce a hyperbole under the form of a simile. Thus, just like Philammon struggling with his punchball is equivalent to ‘you would have thought he was Philammon struggling with his punchball’; and Those legs of his curl just like parsley leaves is equivalent to ‘his legs are so curly that you would have thought they were not legs but parsley leaves’. Hyperboles are for young men to use; they show vehemence of character; and this is why angry people use them more than other people. Not though he gave me as much as the dust
or the sands of the sea... But her, the daughter of Atreus’ son, I never will marry, Nay, not though she were fairer than Aphrodite the Golden, Defter of hand than Athene...

12. (3) Δεῖ δὲ μὴ λεληθέναι ὅτι ἄλλη ἑκάστῳ γένει ἁρμόττει (4) λέξις. οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ γραφικὴ καὶ ἀγωνιστική, οὐδὲ δη(5)μηγορικὴ καὶ δικανική. ἄμφω δὲ ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι· τὸ μὲν (6) γάρ ἐστιν ἑλληνίζειν ἐπίστασθαι, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀναγκάζεσθαι (7) κατασιωπᾶν ἄν τι βούληται μεταδοῦναι τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅπερ (8) πάσχουσιν οἱ μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι γράφειν. ἔστι δὲ λέξις γρα(9)φικὴ μὲν ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη, ἀγωνιστικὴ δὲ ἡ ὑποκριτικωτάτη (10) (ταύτης δὲ δύο εἴδη· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἠθικὴ ἡ δὲ παθητική)· (11) διὸ καὶ οἱ ὑποκριταὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν δραμάτων διώκουσι, (12) καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ τοὺς τοιούτους. βαστάζονται δὲ οἱ ἀναγνω(13)στικοί, οἷον Χαιρήμων (ἀκριβὴς γὰρ ὥσπερ λογογράφος), (14) καὶ Λικύμνιος τῶν διθυραμβοποιῶν. καὶ παραβαλλόμενοι οἱ (15) μὲν τῶν γραφέων <λόγοι> ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι στενοὶ φαίνονται, (16) οἱ δὲ τῶν ῥητόρων, εὖ λεχθέντες, ἰδιωτικοὶ ἐν ταῖς χερσίν. (17) αἴτιον δ’ ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἀγῶνι ἁρμόττει τὰ ὑποκριτικά· διὸ (18) καὶ ἀφῃρημένης τῆς ὑποκρίσεως οὐ ποιοῦντα τὸ αὑτῶν (19) ἔργον φαίνεται εὐήθη, οἷον τά τε ἀσύνδετα καὶ τὸ πολλά(20)κις τὸ αὐτὸ εἰπεῖν ἐν τῇ γραφικῇ ὀρθῶς ἀποδοκιμάζεται, (21) ἐν δὲ ἀγωνιστικῇ οὔ, καὶ οἱ ῥήτορες χρῶνται· ἔστι γὰρ (22) ὑποκριτική. ἀνάγκη δὲ μεταβάλλειν τὸ αὐτὸ λέγοντας, ὅπερ (23) ὥσπερ ὁδοποιεῖ τῷ ὑποκρίνεσθαι· “οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ κλέψας (24) ὑμῶν, οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἐξαπατήσας, οὗτος ὁ τὸ ἔσχατον προ(25)δοῦναι ἐπιχειρήσας”, οἷον καὶ Φιλήμων ὁ ὑποκριτὴς ἐποίει (26) ἔν τε τῇ Ἀναξανδρίδου Γεροντομαχίᾳ, ὅτε λέγοι “Ῥαδάμαν(27)θυς καὶ Παλαμήδης”, καὶ ἐν τῷ προλόγῳ τῶν Εὐσεβῶν τὸ (28) “ἐγώ”· ἐὰν γάρ τις τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴ ὑποκρίνηται, γίγνεται “ὁ (29) τὴν δοκὸν φέρων”. καὶ τὰ ἀσύνδετα ὡσαύτως· “ἦλθον, ἀπήν(30)τησα, ἐδεόμην·” ἀνάγκη γὰρ ὑποκρίνεσθαι καὶ μὴ ὡς ἓν (31) λέγοντα τῷ αὐτῷ ἤθει καὶ τόνῳ εἰπεῖν. ἔτι ἔχει ἴδιόν τι (32) τὰ ἀσύνδετα· ἐν ἴσῳ γὰρ χρόνῳ πολλὰ δοκεῖ εἰρῆσθαι· ὁ (33) γὰρ σύνδεσμος ἓν ποιεῖ τὰ πολλά, ὥστε ἐὰν ἐξαιρεθῇ, δῆλον (34) ὅτι τοὐναντίον ἔσται τὸ ἓν πολλά. ἔχει οὖν αὔξησιν· “ἦλθον, (1414a1) διελέχθην, ἱκέτευσα” (πολλὰ δοκεῖ), “ὑπερεῖδεν ὅσα εἶπον”. (2) τοῦτο δὲ βούλεται ποιεῖν καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐν τῷ
“Νιρεὺς αὖ Σύμηθεν”, “Νιρεὺς Ἀγλαΐης”, “Νιρεὺς ὃς (3) κάλλιστος”. (3) περὶ οὗ γὰρ πολλὰ λέγεται, ἀνάγκη καὶ πολλάκις εἰρῆσθαι· (4) εἰ οὖν [καὶ] πολλάκις, καὶ πολλὰ δοκεῖ, ὥστε ηὔξηκεν, ἅπαξ (5) μνησθείς, διὰ τὸν παραλογισμόν, καὶ μνήμην πεποίηκεν, οὐ(6)δαμοῦ ὕστερον αὐτοῦ λόγον ποιησάμενος.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

(The Attic orators are particularly fond of this method of speech.) Consequently it does not suit an elderly speaker. Part 12. It should be observed that each kind of rhetoric has its own appropriate style. The style of written prose is not that of spoken oratory, nor are those of political and forensic speaking the same. Both written and spoken have to be known. To know the latter is to know how to speak good Greek. To know the former means that you are not obliged, as otherwise you are, to hold your tongue when you wish to communicate something to the general public. The written style is the more finished: the spoken better admits of dramatic delivery —like the kind of oratory that reflects character and the kind that reflects emotion. Hence actors look out for plays written in the latter style, and poets for actors competent to act in such plays. Yet poets whose plays are meant to be read are read and circulated: Chaeremon, for instance, who is as finished as a professional speech—writer; and Licymnius among the dithyrambic poets. Compared with those of others, the speeches of professional writers sound thin in actual contests. Those of the orators, on the other hand, are good to hear spoken, but look amateurish enough when they pass into the hands of a reader. This is just because they are so well suited for an actual tussle, and therefore contain many dramatic touches, which, being robbed of all dramatic rendering, fail to do their own proper work, and consequently look silly. Thus strings of unconnected words, and constant repetitions of words and phrases, are very properly condemned in written speeches: but not in spoken speeches—speakers use them freely, for they have a dramatic effect. In this repetition there must be variety of tone, paving the way, as it were, to dramatic effect; e.g. ’This is the villain among you who deceived you, who cheated you, who meant to betray you completely’. This is the sort of thing that Philemon the actor used to do in the Old Men’s Madness of Anaxandrides whenever he spoke the words ‘Rhadamanthus and Palamedes’, and also in the prologue to the Saints whenever he pronounced the pronoun ‘I’. If one does not deliver such things cleverly, it becomes a case of ‘the man who swallowed a poker’. So too with strings of unconnected words, e.g.’I came to him; I met him; I besought him’. Such passages must be acted, not delivered with the same quality and pitch of voice, as though they had only one idea in them. They have the further peculiarity of suggesting that a number of separate statements have been made in the time usually occupied by one. Just as the use of conjunctions makes many statements into a single one, so the omission of conjunctions acts in the reverse way and makes a single one into many. It thus makes everything more important: e.g. ’I came to him; I talked to him; I entreated him’—what a lot of facts! the hearer thinks—’he paid no attention to anything I said’. This is the effect which Homer seeks when he writes, Nireus likewise from Syme (three well—fashioned ships did bring), Nireus, the son of Aglaia (and Charopus, bright—faced king), Nireus, the comeliest man (of all that to Ilium’s strand). If many things are said about a man, his name must be mentioned many times; and therefore people think that, if his name is mentioned many times, many things have been said about him.

(7) ἡ μὲν οὖν δημηγορικὴ λέξις καὶ παντελῶς ἔοικεν τῇ (8) σκιαγραφίᾳ· ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν πλείων ᾖ ὁ ὄχλος, πορρώτερον ἡ (9) θέα, διὸ τὰ ἀκριβῆ περίεργα καὶ χείρω φαίνεται ἐν ἀμφο(10)τέροις· ἡ δὲ δικανικὴ ἀκριβεστέρα. ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἡ <ἐν> (11) ἑνὶ κριτῇ· ἐλάχιστον γὰρ ἔνεστι ῥητορικῆς· εὐσύνοπτον (12) γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ οἰκεῖον τοῦ πράγματος καὶ τὸ ἀλλότριον, καὶ (13) ὁ ἀγὼν ἄπεστιν, ὥστε καθαρὰ ἡ κρίσις. διὸ οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ (14) ἐν πᾶσιν τούτοις εὐδοκιμοῦσιν ῥήτορες· ἀλλ’ ὅπου μάλιστα (15) ὑπόκρισις, ἐνταῦθα ἥκιστα ἀκρίβεια ἔνι. τοῦτο δὲ ὅπου (16) φωνῆς, καὶ μάλιστα ὅπου μεγάλης. (17) ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπιδεικτικὴ λέξις γραφικωτάτη· τὸ γὰρ ἔργον (18) αὐτῆς ἀνάγνωσις· δευτέρα δὲ ἡ δικανική. τὸ δὲ προσδι(19)αιρεῖσθαι τὴν λέξιν, ὅτι ἡδεῖαν δεῖ εἶναι καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῆ, περί(20)εργον· τί γὰρ μᾶλλον ἢ σώφρονα καὶ ἐλευθέριον καὶ εἴ τις (21) ἄλλη ἤθους ἀρετή; τὸ δὲ ἡδεῖαν εἶναι ποιήσει δηλονότι (22) τὰ εἰρημένα, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς ὥρισται ἡ ἀρετὴ τῆς λέξεως· (23) τίνος γὰρ ἕνεκα δεῖ σαφῆ καὶ μὴ ταπεινὴν εἶναι ἀλλὰ (24) πρέπουσαν; ἄν τε γὰρ ἀδολεσχῇ, οὐ σαφής, οὐδὲ ἂν σύν(25)τομος, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μέσον ἁρμόττει. καὶ τὸ ἡδεῖαν (26) τὰ εἰρημένα ποιήσει, ἂν εὖ μιχθῇ, τὸ εἰωθὸς καὶ <τὸ> ξενικόν, (27) καὶ ὁ ῥυθμός, καὶ τὸ πιθανὸν ἐκ τοῦ πρέποντος.(28)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

So that Homer, by means of this illusion, has made a great deal of though he has mentioned him only in this one passage, and has preserved his memory, though he nowhere says a word about him afterwards. Now the style of oratory addressed to public assemblies is really just like scene—painting. The bigger the throng, the more distant is the point of view: so that, in the one and the other, high finish in detail is superfluous and seems better away. The forensic style is more highly finished; still more so is the style of language addressed to a single judge, with whom there is very little room for rhetorical artifices, since he can take the whole thing in better, and judge of what is to the point and what is not; the struggle is less intense and so the judgement is undisturbed. This is why the same speakers do not distinguish themselves in all these branches at once; high finish is wanted least where dramatic delivery is wanted most, and here the speaker must have a good voice, and above all, a strong one. It is ceremonial oratory that is most literary, for it is meant to be read; and next to it forensic oratory. To analyse style still further, and add that it must be agreeable or magnificent, is useless; for why should it have these traits any more than ‘restraint’, ‘liberality’, or any other moral excellence? Obviously agreeableness will be produced by the qualities already mentioned, if our definition of excellence of style has been correct. For what other reason should style be ‘clear’, and ‘not mean’ but ‘appropriate’? If it is prolix, it is not clear; nor yet if it is curt. Plainly the middle way suits best.

13. (29) περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς λέξεως εἴρηται, καὶ κοινῇ περὶ ἁπάν(30)των καὶ ἰδίᾳ περὶ ἑκάστου γένους· λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ τάξεως (31) εἰπεῖν. ἔστι δὲ τοῦ λόγου δύο μέρη· ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ τό τε (32) πρᾶγμα εἰπεῖν περὶ οὗ, καὶ τοῦτ’ ἀποδεῖξαι. διὸ εἰπόντα (33) μὴ ἀποδεῖξαι ἢ ἀποδεῖξαι μὴ προειπόντα ἀδύνατον· ὅ τε (34) γὰρ ἀποδεικνύων τι ἀποδείκνυσι, καὶ ὁ προλέγων ἕνεκα (35) τοῦ ἀποδεῖξαι προλέγει. τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν πρόθεσίς ἐστι (36) τὸ δὲ πίστις, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις διέλοι ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρόβλημα (37) τὸ δὲ ἀπόδειξις. νῦν δὲ διαιροῦσι γελοίως·

. . . . . . .

Again, style will be made agreeable by the elements mentioned, namely by a good blending of ordinary and unusual words, by the rhythm, and by—the persuasiveness that springs from appropriateness. This concludes our discussion of style, both in its general aspects and in its special applications to the various branches of rhetoric. We have now to deal with Arrangement. Part 13. A speech has two parts. You must state your case, and you must prove it. You cannot either state your case and omit to prove it, or prove it without having first stated it; since any proof must be a proof of something, and the only use of a preliminary statement is the proof that follows it. Of these two parts the first part is called the Statement of the case, the second part the Argument, just as we distinguish between Enunciation and Demonstration.

διήγησις γάρ (38) που τοῦ δικανικοῦ μόνου λόγου ἐστίν, ἐπιδεικτικοῦ δὲ καὶ (39) δημηγορικοῦ πῶς ἐνδέχεται εἶναι διήγησιν οἵαν λέγουσιν, (1414b1) ἢ τὰ πρὸς τὸν ἀντίδικον, ἢ ἐπίλογον τῶν ἀποδεικτικῶν; (2) προοίμιον δὲ καὶ ἀντιπαραβολὴ καὶ ἐπάνοδος ἐν ταῖς δημη(3)γορίαις τότε γίνεται ὅταν ἀντιλογία ᾖ.

. . .

The current division is absurd. For ‘narration’ surely is part of a forensic speech only: how in a political speech or a speech of display can there be ‘narration’ in the technical sense? or a reply to a forensic opponent? or an epilogue in closely—reasoned speeches?

καὶ γὰρ ἡ κατ(4)ηγορία καὶ ἡ ἀπολογία πολλάκις, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἡ συμβουλή· ἀλλ’ (5) ὁ ἐπίλογος ἔτι οὐδὲ δικανικοῦ παντός, οἷον ἐὰν μικρὸς ὁ (6) λόγος ἢ τὸ πρᾶγμα εὐμνημόνευτον· συμβαίνει γὰρ τοῦ (7) μήκους ἀφαιρεῖσθαι.

. . .

Again, introduction, comparison of conflicting arguments, and recapitulation are only found in political speeches when there is a struggle between two policies. They may occur then; so may even accusation and defence, often enough; but they form no essential part of a political speech. Even forensic speeches do not always need epilogues;

ἀναγκαῖα ἄρα μόρια πρόθεσις καὶ (8) πίστις. ἴδια μὲν οὖν ταῦτα, τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα προοίμιον πρό(9)θεσις πίστις ἐπίλογος· τὰ γὰρ πρὸς τὸν ἀντίδικον τῶν (10) πίστεών ἐστι, καὶ ἡ ἀντιπαραβολὴ αὔξησις τῶν αὐτοῦ, (11) ὥστε μέρος τι τῶν πίστεων (ἀποδείκνυσι γάρ τι ὁ ποιῶν (12) τοῦτο), ἀλλ’ οὐ τὸ προοίμιον, οὐδ’ ὁ ἐπίλογος, ἀλλ’ ἀνα(13)μιμνήσκει. ἔσται οὖν, ἄν τις τὰ τοιαῦτα διαιρῇ, ὅπερ ἐποί(14)ουν οἱ περὶ Θεόδωρον, διήγησις ἕτερον καὶ [ἡ] ἐπιδιήγησις (15) καὶ προδιήγησις, καὶ ἔλεγχος καὶ ἐπεξέλεγχος. δεῖ δὲ εἶδός (16) τι λέγοντα καὶ διαφορᾷ ὄνομα τίθεσθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, γίνεται (17) κενὸν καὶ ληρῶδες, οἷον Λικύμνιος ποιεῖ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ, ἐπ(18)ούρωσιν ὀνομάζων καὶ ἀποπλάνησιν καὶ ὄζους.

. . . . . . .

not, for instance, a short speech, nor one in which the facts are easy to remember, the effect of an epilogue being always a reduction in the apparent length. It follows, then, that the only necessary parts of a speech are the Statement and the Argument. These are the essential features of a speech; and it cannot in any case have more than Introduction, Statement, Argument, and Epilogue. ’Refutation of the Opponent’ is part of the arguments: so is ‘Comparison’ of the opponent’s case with your own, for that process is a magnifying of your own case and therefore a part of the arguments, since one who does this proves something. The Introduction does nothing like this; nor does the Epilogue—it merely reminds us of what has been said already. If we make such distinctions we shall end, like Theodorus and his followers, by distinguishing ‘narration’ proper from ‘post—narration’ and ‘pre—narration’, and ‘refutation’ from ‘final refutation’. But we ought only to bring in a new name if it indicates a real species with distinct specific qualities;

14. (19) Τὸ μὲν οὖν προοίμιόν ἐστιν ἀρχὴ λόγου, ὅπερ ἐν (20) ποιήσει πρόλογος καὶ ἐν αὐλήσει προαύλιον· πάντα γὰρ (21) ἀρχαὶ ταῦτ’ εἰσί, καὶ οἷον ὁδοποίησις τῷ ἐπιόντι. τὸ μὲν (22) οὖν προαύλιον ὅμοιον τῷ τῶν ἐπιδεικτικῶν προοιμίῳ· καὶ (23) γὰρ οἱ αὐληταί, ὅ τι ἂν εὖ ἔχωσιν αὐλῆσαι, τοῦτο προ(24)αυλήσαντες συνῆψαν τῷ ἐνδοσίμῳ, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιδεικτι(25)κοῖς λόγοις δεῖ οὕτως γράφειν, ὅ τι [γὰρ] ἂν βούληται εὐθὺ (26) εἰπόντα ἐνδοῦναι καὶ συνάψαι, ὅπερ πάντες ποιοῦσιν. (27) παράδειγμα τὸ τῆς Ἰσοκράτους Ἑλένης προοίμιον· οὐθὲν (28) γὰρ κοινὸν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς καὶ Ἑλένῃ. ἅμα δὲ καὶ (29) ἐὰν ἐκτοπίσῃ, ἁρμόττει, καὶ μὴ ὅλον τὸν λόγον ὁμοειδῆ (30) εἶναι. λέγεται δὲ τὰ τῶν ἐπιδεικτικῶν προοίμια ἐξ ἐπαίνου (31) ἢ ψόγου

. . . . . . . . .

otherwise the practice is pointless and silly, like the way Licymnius invented names in his Art of Rhetoric—’Secundation’, ‘Divagation’, ‘Ramification’. Part 14. The Introduction is the beginning of a speech, corresponding to the prologue in poetry and the prelude in flute—music; they are all beginnings, paving the way, as it were, for what is to follow. The musical prelude resembles the introduction to speeches of display; as flute players play first some brilliant passage they know well and then fit it on to the opening notes of the piece itself, so in speeches of display the writer should proceed in the same way; he should begin with what best takes his fancy, and then strike up his theme and lead into it; which is indeed what is always done. (Take as an example the introduction to the Helen of Isocrates—there is nothing in common between the ‘eristics’ and Helen.) And here, even if you travel far from your subject, it is fitting, rather than that there should be sameness in the entire speech.

(οἷον Γοργίας μὲν ἐν τῷ Ὀλυμπικῷ λόγῳ “ὑπὸ (32) πολλῶν ἄξιοι θαυμάζεσθαι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἕλληνες”· ἐπαινεῖ (33) γὰρ τοὺς τὰς πανηγύρεις συνάγοντας· Ἰσοκράτης δὲ ψέγει (34) ὅτι τὰς μὲν τῶν σωμάτων ἀρετὰς δωρεαῖς ἐτίμησαν, τοῖς (35) δ’ εὖ φρονοῦσιν οὐθὲν ἆθλον ἐποίησαν), καὶ ἀπὸ συμβου(36)λῆς (οἷον ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τιμᾶν, διὸ καὶ αὐτὸς (37) Ἀριστείδην ἐπαινεῖ, ἢ τοὺς τοιούτους οἳ μήτε εὐδοκιμοῦσιν (38) μήτε φαῦλοι, ἀλλ’ ὅσοι ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες ἄδηλοι, ὥσπερ Ἀλέ(39)ξανδρος ὁ Πριάμου· οὗτος γὰρ συμβουλεύει)· ἔτι δ’ ἐκ τῶν (1415a1) δικανικῶν προοιμίων· τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς τὸν ἀκρο(2)ατήν, εἰ περὶ παραδόξου λόγος ἢ περὶ χαλεποῦ ἢ περὶ τεθρυ(3)λημένου πολλοῖς, ὥστε συγγνώμην ἔχειν, οἷον Χοιρίλος
νῦν δ’ ὅτε πάντα δέδασται.

. . . . . . .

The usual subject for the introductions to speeches of display is some piece of praise or censure. Thus Gorgias writes in his Olympic Speech, ‘You deserve widespread admiration, men of Greece’, praising thus those who start,ed the festival gatherings.’ Isocrates, on the other hand, censures them for awarding distinctions to fine athletes but giving no prize for intellectual ability. Or one may begin with a piece of advice, thus: ‘We ought to honour good men and so I myself am praising Aristeides’ or ‘We ought to honour those who are unpopular but not bad men, men whose good qualities have never been noticed, like Alexander son of Priam.’ Here the orator gives advice. Or we may begin as speakers do in the law—courts; that is to say, with appeals to the audience to excuse us if our speech is about something paradoxical, difficult, or hackneyed;

(4) τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἐπιδεικτικῶν λόγων προοίμια ἐκ τού(5)των, ἐξ ἐπαίνου, ἐκ ψόγου, ἐκ προτροπῆς, ἐξ ἀποτροπῆς, (6) ἐκ τῶν πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατήν· δεῖ δὲ ἢ ξένα ἢ οἰκεῖα εἶναι (7) τὰ ἐνδόσιμα τῷ λόγῳ. τὰ δὲ τοῦ δικανικοῦ προοίμια δεῖ (8) λαβεῖν ὅτι ταὐτὸ δύναται ὅπερ τῶν δραμάτων οἱ πρόλογοι (9) καὶ τῶν ἐπῶν τὰ προοίμια· τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν διθυράμβων (10) ὅμοια τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς· “διὰ σὲ καὶ τεὰ δῶρα εἴτε σκῦλα”.

. . . .

like Choerilus in the lines—
But now when allotment of all has been made... Introductions to speeches of display, then, may be composed of some piece of praise or censure, of advice to do or not to do something, or of appeals to the audience; and you must choose between making these preliminary passages connected or disconnected with the speech itself. Introductions to forensic speeches, it must be observed, have the same value as the prologues of dramas and the introductions to epic poems;

(11) ἐν δὲ προλόγοις καὶ ἔπεσι δεῖγμά ἐστιν τοῦ λόγου, (12) ἵνα (13) προειδῶσι περὶ οὗ [ᾖ] ὁ λόγος καὶ μὴ κρέμηται ἡ διάνοια· (14) τὸ γὰρ ἀόριστον πλανᾷ· ὁ δοὺς οὖν ὥσπερ εἰς τὴν χεῖρα (15) τὴν ἀρχὴν ποιεῖ ἐχόμενον ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ. διὰ τοῦτο (16)
“μῆνιν ἄειδε, θεά”.
“ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε, μοῦσα.” (17)
“ἥγεό μοι λόγον ἄλλον, ὅπως Ἀσίας ἀπὸ γαίης (18)
ἦλθεν ἐς Εὐρώπην πόλεμος μέγας.” (19) καὶ οἱ τραγικοὶ δηλοῦσι περὶ <οὗ> τὸ δρᾶμα, κἂν μὴ εὐθὺς (20) ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης ἐν τῷ προλόγῳ, ἀλλά πού γε, ὥσπερ [καὶ] (21) Σοφοκλῆς
(20) “ἐμοὶ πατὴρ ἦν Πόλυβος”.
(22) καὶ ἡ κωμῳδία ὡσαύτως. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαιότατον ἔργον (23) τοῦ προοιμίου καὶ ἴδιον τοῦτο, δηλῶσαι τί ἐστιν τὸ τέλος (24) οὗ ἕνεκα ὁ λόγος (διόπερ ἂν δῆλον ᾖ καὶ μικρὸν τὸ πρᾶγμα, (25) οὐ χρηστέον προοιμίῳ)· τὰ δὲ ἄλλα εἴδη οἷς χρῶνται, ἰα(26)τρεύματα καὶ κοινά.

. . . . . . .

the dithyrambic prelude resembling the introduction to a speech of display, as
For thee, and thy gilts, and thy battle—spoils.... In prologues, and in epic poetry, a foretaste of the theme is given, intended to inform the hearers of it in advance instead of keeping their minds in suspense. Anything vague puzzles them: so give them a grasp of the beginning, and they can hold fast to it and follow the argument. So we find—
Sing, O goddess of song, of the Wrath...
Tell me, O Muse, of the hero...
Lead me to tell a new tale, how there came great warfare to Europe
Out of the Asian land... The tragic poets, too, let us know the pivot of their play; if not at the outset like Euripides, at least somewhere in the preface to a speech like Sophocles—
Polybus was my father...; and so in Comedy. This, then, is the most essential function and distinctive property of the introduction, to show what the aim of the speech is; and therefore no introduction ought to be employed where the subject is not long or intricate.

λέγεται δὲ ταῦτα ἔκ τε τοῦ λέγοντος (27) καὶ τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ καὶ τοῦ πράγματος καὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου (28) περὶ αὐτοῦ μὲν καὶ τοῦ ἀντιδίκου οἷά περ διαβολὴν (29) λῦσαι καὶ ποιῆσαι (ἔστιν δὲ οὐχ ὁμοίως· ἀπολογουμένῳ μὲν (30) γὰρ πρῶτον τὰ πρὸς διαβολήν, κατηγοροῦντι δ’ ἐν τῷ ἐπι(31)λόγῳ· δι’ ὃ δέ, οὐκ ἄδηλον· τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἀπολογούμενον, (32) ὅταν μέλλῃ εἰσάξειν αὑτόν, ἀναγκαῖον ἀνελεῖν τὰ κωλύοντα, (33) ὥστε λυτέον πρῶτον τὴν διαβολήν· τῷ δὲ διαβάλλοντι ἐν (34) τῷ ἐπιλόγῳ διαβλητέον, ἵνα μνημονεύσωσι μᾶλλον).

. . . . .

The other kinds of introduction employed are remedial in purpose, and may be used in any type of speech. They are concerned with the speaker, the hearer, the subject, or the speaker’s opponent. Those concerned with the speaker himself or with his opponent are directed to removing or exciting prejudice. But whereas the defendant will begin by dealing with this sort of thing, the prosecutor will take quite another line and deal with such matters in the closing part of his speech. The reason for this is not far to seek. The defendant, when he is going to bring himself on the stage, must clear away any obstacles, and therefore must begin by removing any prejudice felt against him.

τὰ δὲ (35) πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἔκ τε τοῦ εὔνουν ποιῆσαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ (36) ὀργίσαι, καὶ ἐνίοτε τὸ προσεκτικὸν ἢ τοὐναντίον· οὐ γὰρ (37) ἀεὶ συμφέρει ποιεῖν προσεκτικόν, διὸ πολλοὶ εἰς γέλωτα (38) πειρῶνται προάγειν. εἰς δὲ εὐμάθειαν ἅπαντα ἀνάξει, ἐάν (39) τις βούληται, καὶ τὸ ἐπιεικῆ φαίνεσθαι· προσέχουσι γὰρ (1415b1) μᾶλλον τούτοις. προσεκτικοὶ δὲ τοῖς μεγάλοις, τοῖς ἰδίοις, (2) τοῖς θαυμαστοῖς, τοῖς ἡδέσιν· διὸ δεῖ ἐμποιεῖν ὡς περὶ (3) τοιούτων ὁ λόγος· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ προσεκτικούς, ὅτι μικρόν, (4) ὅτι οὐδὲν πρὸς ἐκείνους, ὅτι λυπηρόν. δεῖ δὲ μὴ λαν(5)θάνειν ὅτι πάντα ἔξω τοῦ λόγου τὰ τοιαῦτα· πρὸς φαῦ(6)λον γὰρ ἀκροατὴν καὶ τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος ἀκούοντα· (7) ἐπεὶ ἂν μὴ τοιοῦτος ᾖ, οὐθὲν δεῖ προοιμίου, ἀλλ’ ἢ (8) ὅσον τὸ πρᾶγμα εἰπεῖν κεφαλαιωδῶς, ἵνα ἔχῃ ὥσπερ σῶμα (9) κεφαλήν.

. . . . . . . . .

But if you are to excite prejudice, you must do so at the close, so that the judges may more easily remember what you have said. The appeal to the hearer aims at securing his goodwill, or at arousing his resentment, or sometimes at gaining his serious attention to the case, or even at distracting it— for gaining it is not always an advantage, and speakers will often for that reason try to make him laugh. You may use any means you choose to make your hearer receptive; among others, giving him a good impression of your character, which always helps to secure his attention. He will be ready to attend to anything that touches himself and to anything that is important, surprising, or agreeable; and you should accordingly convey to him the impression that what you have to say is of this nature. If you wish to distract his attention, you should imply that the subject does not affect him, or is trivial or disagreeable. But observe, all this has nothing to do with the speech itself. It merely has to do with the weak—minded tendency of the hearer to listen to what is beside the point.

ἔτι τὸ προσεκτικοὺς ποιεῖν πάντων τῶν μερῶν (10) κοινόν, ἐὰν δέῃ· πανταχοῦ γὰρ ἀνιᾶσι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀρχόμε(11)νοι· διὸ γελοῖον ἐν ἀρχῇ τάττειν, ὅτε μάλιστα πάντες προσ(12)έχοντες ἀκροῶνται· ὥστε ὅπου ἂν ᾖ καιρός, λεκτέον “καί (13) μοι προσέχετε τὸν νοῦν· οὐθὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐμὸν ἢ ὑμέ(14)τερον”, καὶ “ἐρῶ γὰρ ὑμῖν οἷον οὐδεπώποτε ἀκηκόατε δεινὸν ἢ (15) οὕτω θαυμαστόν”. τοῦτο δ’ ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἔφη Πρόδικος, ὅτε (16) νυστάζοιεν οἱ ἀκροαταί, παρεμβάλλειν <τι> τῆς πεντηκοντα(17)δράχμου αὐτοῖς. ὅτι δὲ πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατὴν οὐχ ᾗπερ [ὁ] (18) ἀκροατής, δῆλον· πάντες γὰρ ἢ διαβάλλουσιν ἢ φόβους (19) ἀπολύονται ἐν τοῖς προοιμίοις·
(20) ἄναξ, ἐρῶ μὲν οὐχ ὅπως σπουδῆς ὕπο,
(21) τί φροιμιάζῃ;,

. . . . . . . .

Where this tendency is absent, no introduction wanted beyond a summary statement of your subject, to put a sort of head on the main body of your speech. Moreover, calls for attention, when required, may come equally well in any part of a speech; in fact, the beginning of it is just where there is least slackness of interest; it is therefore ridiculous to put this kind of thing at the beginning, when every one is listening with most attention. Choose therefore any point in the speech where such an appeal is needed, and then say ‘Now I beg you to note this point—it concerns you quite as much as myself’; or I will tell you that whose like you have never yet heard for terror, or for wonder. This is what Prodicus called ‘slipping in a bit of the fifty—drachma show—lecture for the audience whenever they began to nod’. It is plain that such introductions are addressed not to ideal hearers, but to hearers as we find them.

(22) καὶ οἱ πονηρὸν τὸ πρᾶγμα ἔχοντες ἢ δοκοῦντες· πανταχοῦ (23) γὰρ βέλτιον διατρίβειν ἢ ἐν τῷ πράγματι, διὸ οἱ δοῦλοι οὐ (24) τὰ ἐρωτώμενα λέγουσιν ἀλλὰ τὰ κύκλῳ, καὶ προοιμιάζονται. (25) πόθεν δ’ εὔνους δεῖ ποιεῖν, εἴρηται, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον (26) τῶν τοιούτων. ἐπεὶ δ’ εὖ λέγεται (27)
δός μ’ ἐς Φαίηκας φίλον ἐλθεῖν ἠδ’ ἐλεεινόν,
(28) τούτων δεῖ δύο στοχάζεσθαι. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς (29) οἴεσθαι δεῖ ποιεῖν συνεπαινεῖσθαι τὸν ἀκροατήν, ἢ αὐτὸν (30) ἢ γένος ἢ ἐπιτηδεύματ’ αὐτοῦ ἢ ἄλλως γέ πως· ὃ γὰρ (31) λέγει Σωκράτης ἐν τῷ ἐπιταφίῳ,
ἀληθές, ὅτι οὐ χαλεπὸν (32) Ἀθηναίους ἐν Ἀθηναίοις ἐπαινεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἐν Λακεδαιμονίοις.

. . . . . .

The use of introductions to excite prejudice or to dispel misgivings is universal—
My lord, I will not say that eagerly...
or
Why all this preface?
Introductions are popular with those whose case is weak, or looks weak; it pays them to dwell on anything rather than the actual facts of it. That is why slaves, instead of answering the questions put to them, make indirect replies with long preambles. The means of exciting in your hearers goodwill and various other feelings of the same kind have already been described. The poet finely says
May I find in Phaeacian hearts, at my coming, goodwill and compassion; and these are the two things we should aim at. In speeches of display we must make the hearer feel that the eulogy includes either himself or his family or his way of life or something or other of the kind.

(33) τὰ δὲ τοῦ δημηγορικοῦ ἐκ τῶν τοῦ δικανικοῦ λόγου (34) ἐστίν, φύσει δὲ ἥκιστα ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ καὶ περὶ οὗ ἴσασιν, (35) καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖται τὸ πρᾶγμα προοιμίου, ἀλλ’ ἢ δι’ αὐτὸν (36) ἢ τοὺς ἀντιλέγοντας, ἢ ἐὰν μὴ ἡλίκον βούλει ὑπολαμβά(37)νωσιν, ἀλλ’ ἢ μεῖζον ἢ ἔλαττον, διὸ ἢ διαβάλλειν ἢ ἀπο(38)λύεσθαι ἀνάγκη, καὶ ἢ αὐξῆσαι ἢ μειῶσαι. τούτων δὲ (39) ἕνεκα προοιμίου δεῖται, ἢ κόσμου χάριν, ὡς αὐτοκάβδαλα (1416a1) φαίνεται ἐὰν μὴ ἔχῃ. τοιοῦτον γὰρ τὸ Γοργίου ἐγκώμιον (2) εἰς Ἠλείους· οὐδὲν γὰρ προεξαγκωνίσας οὐδὲ προανα(3)κινήσας εὐθὺς ἄρχεται “Ἦλις, πόλις εὐδαίμων”.

. . . . .

For it is true, as Socrates says in the Funeral Speech, that ‘the difficulty is not to praise the Athenians at Athens but at Sparta’. The introductions of political oratory will be made out of the same materials as those of the forensic kind, though the nature of political oratory makes them very rare. The subject is known already, and therefore the facts of the case need no introduction; but you may have to say something on account of yourself or to your opponents; or those present may be inclined to treat the matter either more or less seriously than you wish them to. You may accordingly have to excite or dispel some prejudice, or to make the matter under discussion seem more or less important than before: for either of which purposes you will want an introduction. You may also want one to add elegance to your remarks, feeling that otherwise they will have a casual air,

15. (4) Περὶ δὲ διαβολῆς ἓν μὲν τὸ ἐξ ὧν ἄν τις ὑπόληψιν (5) δυσχερῆ ἀπολύσαιτο (οὐθὲν γὰρ διαφέρει εἴτε εἰπόντος (6) τινὸς εἴτε μή, ὥστε τοῦτο καθόλου)· ἄλλος τόπος ὥστε πρὸς (7) τὰ ἀμφισβητούμενα ἀπαντᾶν, ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἢ ὡς οὐ (8) βλαβερὸν ἢ οὐ τούτῳ, ἢ ὡς οὐ τηλικοῦτον, ἢ οὐκ ἄδικον (9) ἢ οὐ μέγα, ἢ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν ἢ οὐκ ἔχον μέγεθος· περὶ γὰρ (10) τοιούτων ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις, ὥσπερ Ἰφικράτης πρὸς Ναυσι(11)κράτην· ἔφη γὰρ ποιῆσαι ὃ ἔλεγεν καὶ βλάψαι, ἀλλ’ οὐκ (12) ἀδικεῖν.

. . . . .

like Gorgias’ eulogy of the Eleans, in which, without any preliminary sparring or fencing, he begins straight off with ‘Happy city of Elis!’ Part 15. In dealing with prejudice, one class of argument is that whereby you can dispel objectionable suppositions about yourself. It makes no practical difference whether such a supposition has been put into words or not, so that this distinction may be ignored. Another way is to meet any of the issues directly: to deny the alleged fact; or to say that you have done no harm, or none to him, or not as much as he says; or that you have done him no injustice, or not much; or that you have done nothing disgraceful, or nothing disgraceful enough to matter: these are the sort of questions on which the dispute hinges. Thus Iphicrates replying to Nausicrates,

ἢ ἀντικαταλλάττεσθαι ἀδικοῦντα, εἰ βλαβερόν, ἀλλ’ (13) οὖν καλόν, εἰ λυπηρόν, ἀλλ’ ὠφέλιμον, ἤ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦ(14)τον.

.

admitted that he had done the deed alleged, and that he had done Nausicrates harm, but not that he had done him wrong.

ἄλλος τόπος ὡς ἐστὶν ἁμάρτημα ἢ ἀτύχημα ἢ (15) ἀναγκαῖον, οἷον Σοφοκλῆς ἔφη τρέμειν οὐχ ὡς ὁ διαβάλ(16)λων ἔφη, ἵνα δοκῇ γέρων, ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἀνάγκης· οὐ γὰρ ἑκόντι (17) εἶναι αὑτῷ ἔτη ὀγδοήκοντα. καὶ ἀντικαταλλάττεσθαι τὸ (18) οὗ ἕνεκα, ὅτι οὐ βλάψαι ἐβούλετο ἀλλὰ τόδε, καὶ οὐ τοῦτο (19) ὃ διεβάλλετο ποιῆσαι, συνέβη δὲ βλαβῆναι· “δίκαιον δὲ (20) μισεῖν, εἰ ὅπως τοῦτο γένηται ἐποίουν.”

. . .

Or you may admit the wrong, but balance it with other facts, and say that, if the deed harmed him, at any rate it was honourable; or that, if it gave him pain, at least it did him good; or something else like that. Another way is to allege that your action was due to mistake, or bad luck, or necessity as Sophocles said he was not trembling, as his traducer maintained, in order to make people think him an old man, but because he could not help it; he would rather not be eighty years old.

ἄλλος, εἰ (21) ἐμπεριείληπται ὁ διαβάλλων, ἢ νῦν ἢ πρότερον, ἢ αὐτὸς (22) ἢ τῶν ἐγγύς τις.

.

You may balance your motive against your actual deed; saying, for instance, that you did not mean to injure him but to do so—and—so; that you did not do what you are falsely charged with doing—the damage was accidental—’I should indeed be a detestable person if I had deliberately intended this result.’

ἄλλος, εἰ ἄλλοι ἐμπεριλαμβάνονται οὓς (23) ὁμολογοῦσιν μὴ ἐνόχους εἶναι τῇ διαβολῇ, οἷον εἰ, ὅτι καθάριος, (24) ὁ <δεῖνα> μοιχός, καὶ ὁ δεῖνα ἄρα.

.

Another way is open when your calumniator, or any of his connexions, is or has been subject to the same grounds for suspicion.

ἄλλος, εἰ ἄλλους (25) διέβαλεν ἢ ἄλλος <ἢ> αὐτός, ἢ ἄνευ διαβολῆς ὑπελαμβάνοντο (26) ὥσπερ αὐτὸς νῦν, οἳ πεφήνασιν οὐκ ἔνοχοι.

.

Yet another, when others are subject to the same grounds for suspicion but are admitted to be in fact innocent of the charge: e.g. ’Must I be a profligate because I am well—groomed? Then so—and—so must be one too.’

ἄλλος ἐκ (27) τοῦ ἀντιδιαβάλλειν τὸν διαβάλλοντα· ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ ὃς (28) αὐτὸς ἄπιστος, οἱ τούτου λόγοι ἔσονται πιστοί.

.

Another, if other people have been calumniated by the same man or some one else, or, without being calumniated, have been suspected, like yourself now, and yet have been proved innocent.

ἄλλος, (29) εἰ γέγονεν κρίσις, ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης πρὸς Ὑγιαίνοντα ἐν (30) τῇ ἀντιδόσει κατηγοροῦντα ὡς ἀσεβής, ὅς γ’ ἐποίησε κελεύων (31) ἐπιορκεῖν,
ἡ γλῶσσ’ ὀμώμοχ’, ἡ δὲ φρὴν ἀνώμοτος.
(32) ἔφη γὰρ αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν τὰς ἐκ τοῦ Διονυσιακοῦ ἀγῶνος (33) κρίσεις εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια ἄγοντα· ἐκεῖ γὰρ αὐτῶν δεδω(34)κέναι λόγον, ἢ δώσειν εἰ βούλεται κατηγορεῖν.

. . . .

Another way is to return calumny for calumny and say, ‘It is monstrous to trust the man’s statements when you cannot trust the man himself.’ Another is when the question has been already decided. So with Euripides’ reply to Hygiaenon, who, in the action for an exchange of properties, accused him of impiety in having written a line encouraging perjury—
My tongue hath sworn: no oath is on my soul.
Euripides said that his opponent himself was guilty in bringing into the law—courts cases whose decision belonged to the Dionysiac contests.

ἄλλος (35) ἐκ τοῦ διαβολῆς κατηγορεῖν, ἡλίκον, καὶ τοῦτο, ὅτι ἄλλας (36) κρίσεις ποιεῖ, καὶ ὅτι οὐ πιστεύει τῷ πράγματι.

. .

’If I have not already answered for my words there, I am ready to do so if you choose to prosecute me there.’ Another method is to denounce calumny, showing what an enormity it is,

κοινὸς (1416b1) δ’ ἀμφοῖν [ὁ] τόπος τὸ σύμβολα λέγειν, οἷον ἐν τῷ Τεύκρῳ (2) ὁ Ὀδυσσεὺς ὅτι οἰκεῖος τῷ Πριάμῳ· ἡ γὰρ Ἡσιόνη ἀδελφή· (3) ὁ δὲ ὅτι ὁ πατὴρ ἐχθρὸς τῷ Πριάμῳ, ὁ Τελαμών, καὶ (4) ὅτι οὐ κατεῖπε τῶν κατασκόπων.

. . .

and in particular that it raises false issues, and that it means a lack of confidence in the merits of his case. The argument from evidential circumstances is available for both parties: thus in the Teucer Odysseus says that Teucer is closely bound to Priam, since his mother Hesione was Priam’s sister.

ἄλλος τῷ διαβάλλοντι, (5) τὸ ἐπαινοῦντα μικρὸν μακρῶς ψέξαι μέγα συντόμως, ἢ (6) πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ προθέντα, ὃ εἰς τὸ πρᾶγμα προφέρει ἓν (7) ψέξαι.

. .

Teucer replies that Telamon his father was Priam’s enemy, and that he himself did not betray the spies to Priam. Another method, suitable for the calumniator, is to praise some trifling merit at great length, and then attack some important failing concisely;

τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ τεχνικώτατοι καὶ ἀδικώτατοι· τοῖς ἀγα(8)θοῖς γὰρ βλάπτειν πειρῶνται, μιγνύντες αὐτὰ τῷ κακῷ.

. .

or after mentioning a number of good qualities to attack one bad one that really bears on the question. This is the method of thoroughly skilful and unscrupulous prosecutors.

(9) κοινὸν δὲ τῷ διαβάλλοντι καὶ τῷ ἀπολυομένῳ, ἐπειδὴ (10) τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνδέχεται πλειόνων ἕνεκα πραχθῆναι, τῷ μὲν δια(11)βάλλοντι κακοηθιστέον ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἐκλαμβάνοντι, τῷ δὲ (12) ἀπολυομένῳ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον, οἷον ὅτι ὁ Διομήδης τὸν Ὀδυσ(13)σέα προείλετο, τῷ μὲν ὅτι διὰ τὸ ἄριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν (14) τὸν Ὀδυσσέα, τῷ δ’ ὅτι οὔ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μόνον μὴ ἀντ(15)αγωνιστεῖν ὡς φαῦλον.

. . .

By mixing up the man’s merits with what is bad, they do their best to make use of them to damage him. There is another method open to both calumniator and apologist. Since a given action can be done from many motives, the former must try to disparage it by selecting the worse motive of two, the latter to put the better construction on it.

16. (16) Καὶ περὶ μὲν διαβολῆς εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα, διήγησις δ’ (17) ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς ἐστιν οὐκ ἐφεξῆς ἀλλὰ κατὰ μέρος· (18) δεῖ μὲν γὰρ τὰς πράξεις διελθεῖν ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος· σύγκειται (19) γὰρ ἔχων ὁ λόγος τὸ μὲν ἄτεχνον (οὐθὲν γὰρ αἴτιος ὁ λέγων (20) τῶν πράξεων), τὸ δ’ ἐκ τῆς τέχνης· τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν ἢ ὅτι (21) ἔστι δεῖξαι, ἐὰν ᾖ ἄπιστον, ἢ ὅτι ποιόν, ἢ ὅτι ποσόν, ἢ (22) καὶ ἅπαντα.

. . . .

Thus one might argue that Diomedes chose Odysseus as his companion because he supposed Odysseus to be the best man for the purpose; and you might reply to this that it was, on the contrary, because he was the only hero so worthless that Diomedes need not fear his rivalry. Part 16. We may now pass from the subject of calumny to that of Narration. Narration in ceremonial oratory is not continuous but intermittent. There must, of course, be some survey of the actions that form the subject—matter of the speech. The speech is a composition containing two parts. One of these is not provided by the orator’s art, viz. the actions themselves, of which the orator is in no sense author. The other part is provided by his

διὰ δὲ τοῦτ’ ἐνίοτε οὐκ ἐφεξῆς δεῖ διηγεῖσθαι (23) πάντα, ὅτι δυσμνημόνευτον τὸ δεικνύναι οὕτως· ἐκ μὲν (24) οὖν τούτων ἀνδρεῖος, ἐκ δὲ τῶνδε σοφὸς ἢ δίκαιος.

. .

namely, the proof (where proof is needed) that the actions were done, the description of their quality or of their extent, or even all these three things together. Now the reason why sometimes it is not desirable to make the whole narrative continuous is that the case thus expounded is hard to keep in mind.

καὶ (25) ἁπλούστερος ὁ λόγος οὗτος, ἐκεῖνος δὲ ποικίλος καὶ οὐ (26) λιτός.

.

Show, therefore, from one set of facts that your hero is, e.g. brave, and from other sets of facts that he is able, just, &c.

δεῖ δὲ τὰς μὲν γνωρίμους ἀναμιμνήσκειν· διὸ οἱ (27) πολλοὶ οὐδὲν δέονται διηγήσεως, οἷον εἰ θέλεις Ἀχιλλέα (28) ἐπαινεῖν (ἴσασι γὰρ πάντες τὰς πράξεις), ἀλλὰ χρῆσθαι αὐ(29)ταῖς δεῖ.

. . . .

A speech thus arranged is comparatively simple, instead of being complicated and elaborate. You will have to recall well—known deeds among others; and because they are well—known, the hearer usually needs no narration of them; none, for instance, if your object is the praise of Achilles;

ἐὰν δὲ Κριτίαν, δεῖ· οὐ γὰρ πολλοὶ ἴσασιν ....

.

we all know the facts of his life—what you have to do is to apply those facts.

(30) νῦν δὲ γελοίως τὴν διήγησίν φασι δεῖν εἶναι ταχεῖαν.

.

But if your object is the praise of Critias, you must narrate his deeds, which not many people know of...

(31) καίτοι ὥσπερ [ὁ] τῷ μάττοντι ἐρομένῳ πότερον σκληρὰν ἢ (32) μαλακὴν μάξῃ “τί δ’”, ἔφη <τις>, “εὖ ἀδύνατον;”, καὶ ἐνταῦθα (33) ὁμοίως· δεῖ γὰρ μὴ μακρῶς διηγεῖσθαι ὥσπερ οὐδὲ προ(34)οιμιάζεσθαι μακρῶς, οὐδὲ τὰς πίστεις λέγειν.

. .

Nowadays it is said, absurdly enough, that the narration should be rapid. Remember what the man said to the baker who asked whether he was to make the cake hard or soft: ‘What, can’t you make it right?’ Just so here.

οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν(35)ταῦθά ἐστι τὸ εὖ [ἢ] τὸ ταχὺ ἢ τὸ συντόμως, ἀλλὰ τὸ με(36)τρίως· τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ λέγειν ὅσα δηλώσει τὸ πρᾶγμα, (1417a1) ἢ ὅσα ποιήσει ὑπολαβεῖν γεγονέναι ἢ βεβλαφέναι ἢ ἠδι(2)κηκέναι, ἢ τηλικαῦτα ἡλίκα βούλει, τῷ δὲ ἐναντίῳ τὰ (3) ἐναντία· παραδιηγεῖσθαι δὲ ὅσα εἰς τὴν σὴν ἀρετὴν φέρει (4) (οἷον “ἐγὼ δ’ ἐνουθέτουν, ἀεὶ τὰ δίκαια λέγων, μὴ τὰ τέκνα (5) ἐγκαταλείπειν”), ἢ θατέρου κακίαν· “ὁ δὲ ἀπεκρίνατό μοι ὅτι, (6) οὗ ἂν ᾖ αὐτός, ἔσται ἄλλα παιδία”, ὃ τοὺς ἀφισταμένους (7) Αἰγυπτίους ἀποκρίνασθαί φησιν ὁ Ἡρόδοτος· ἢ ὅσα ἡδέα (8) τοῖς δικασταῖς.

. . . . .

We are not to make long narrations, just as we are not to make long introductions or long arguments. Here, again, rightness does not consist either in rapidity or in conciseness, but in the happy mean; that is, in saying just so much as will make the facts plain, or will lead the hearer to believe that the thing has happened, or that the man has caused injury or wrong to some one, or that the facts are really as important as you wish them to be thought: or the opposite facts to establish the opposite arguments. You may also narrate as you go anything that does credit to yourself, e.g. ’I kept telling him to do his duty and not abandon his children’; or discredit to your adversary, e.g. ’But he answered me that, wherever he might find himself, there he would find other children’, the answer Herodotus’ records of the Egyptian mutineers.

ἀπολογουμένῳ δὲ ἐλάττων ἡ διήγησις· αἱ (9) γὰρ ἀμφισβητήσεις ἢ μὴ γεγονέναι ἢ μὴ βλαβερὸν εἶναι ἢ (10) μὴ ἄδικον ἢ μὴ τηλικοῦτον, ὥστε περὶ τὸ ὁμολογούμενον (11) οὐ διατριπτέον, ἐὰν μή τι εἰς ἐκεῖνο συντείνῃ, οἷον εἰ πέ(12)πρακται, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἄδικον.

. . .

Slip in anything else that the judges will enjoy. The defendant will make less of the narration. He has to maintain that the thing has not happened, or did no harm, or was not unjust, or not so bad as is alleged.

ἔτι πεπραγμένα δεῖ λέγειν ὅσα (13) μὴ πραττόμενα ἢ οἶκτον ἢ δείνωσιν φέρει· παράδειγμα ὁ (14) Ἀλκίνου ἀπόλογος, ὃς πρὸς τὴν Πηνελόπην ἐν ἑξήκοντα (15) ἔπεσιν πεποίηται, καὶ ὡς Φάϋλλος τὸν κύκλον, καὶ ὁ ἐν τῷ (16) Οἰνεῖ πρόλογος.

. . .

He must therefore not waste time about what is admitted fact, unless this bears on his own contention; e.g. that the thing was done, but was not wrong. Further, we must speak of events as past and gone, except where they excite pity or indignation by being represented as present. The Story told to Alcinous is an example of a brief chronicle, when it is repeated to Penelope in sixty lines.

ἠθικὴν δὲ χρὴ τὴν διήγησιν εἶναι· ἔσται δὲ (17) τοῦτο, ἂν εἰδῶμεν τί ἦθος ποιεῖ.

. .

Another instance is the Epic Cycle as treated by Phayllus, and the prologue to the Oeneus. The narration should depict character;

ἓν μὲν δὴ τὸ προαίρε(18)σιν δηλοῦν, ποιὸν δὲ τὸ ἦθος τῷ ποιὰν ταύτην, ἡ δὲ προ(19)αίρεσις ποιὰ τῷ τέλει· διὰ τοῦτο <δ’> οὐκ ἔχουσιν οἱ μαθημα(20)τικοὶ λόγοι ἤθη, ὅτι οὐδὲ προαίρεσιν (τὸ γὰρ οὗ ἕνεκα (21) οὐκ ἔχουσιν), ἀλλ’ οἱ Σωκρατικοί· περὶ τοιούτων γὰρ λέ(22)γουσιν.

. . .

to which end you must know what makes it do so. One such thing is the indication of moral purpose; the quality of purpose indicated determines the quality of character depicted and is itself determined by the end pursued. Thus it is that mathematical discourses depict no character; they have nothing to do with moral purpose, for they represent nobody as pursuing any end.

ἄλλα δ’ ἠθικὰ τὰ ἑπόμενα ἑκάστῳ ἤθει, οἷον ὅτι (23) ἅμα λέγων ἐβάδιζεν· δηλοῖ γὰρ θρασύτητα καὶ ἀγροικίαν (24) ἤθους.

. .

On the other hand, the Socratic dialogues do depict character, being concerned with moral questions. This end will also be gained by describing the manifestations of various types of character,

καὶ μὴ ὡς ἀπὸ διανοίας λέγειν, ὥσπερ οἱ νῦν, (25) ἀλλ’ ὡς ἀπὸ προαιρέσεως· “ἐγὼ δὲ ἐβουλόμην· καὶ προειλό(26)μην γὰρ τοῦτο· ἀλλ’ εἰ μὴ ὠνήμην, βέλτιον”· τὸ μὲν γὰρ (27) φρονίμου τὸ δὲ ἀγαθοῦ· φρονίμου μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ τὸ ὠφέ(28)λιμον διώκειν, ἀγαθοῦ δ’ ἐν τῷ τὸ καλόν.

. . . .

e.g. ’he kept walking along as he talked’, which shows the man’s recklessness and rough manners. Do not let your words seem inspired so much by intelligence, in the manner now current, as by moral purpose: e.g. ’I willed this; aye, it was my moral purpose; true, I gained nothing by it, still it is better thus.’ For the other way shows good sense, but this shows good character;

ἂν δ’ ἄπιστον ᾖ, (29) τότε τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιλέγειν, ὥσπερ Σοφοκλῆς ποιεῖ· παράδειγμα (30) τὸ ἐκ τῆς Ἀντιγόνης, ὅτι μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ ἐκήδετο ἢ (31) ἀνδρὸς ἢ τέκνων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἂν γενέσθαι ἀπολομένων,
μητρὸς δ’ ἐν Ἅιδου καὶ πατρὸς βεβηκότων (32)
οὐκ ἔστ’ ἀδελφὸς ὅς τις ἂν βλάστοι ποτέ.
(33) ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἔχῃς αἰτίαν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι οὐκ ἀγνοεῖς ἄπιστα λέ(34)γων, ἀλλὰ φύσει τοιοῦτος εἶ· ἀπιστοῦσι γὰρ ἄλλο τι (35) πράττειν ἑκόντα πλὴν τὸ συμφέρον.

. . . . .

good sense making us go after what is useful, and good character after what is noble. Where any detail may appear incredible, then add the cause of it; of this Sophocles provides an example in the Antigone, where Antigone says she had cared more for her brother than for husband or children, since if the latter perished they might be replaced,
But since my father and mother in their graves
Lie dead, no brother can be born to me.
If you have no such cause to suggest, just say that you are aware that no one will believe your words, but the fact remains that such is our nature,

ἔτι ἐκ τῶν παθητι(36)κῶν λέγε διηγούμενος καὶ τὰ ἑπόμενα [καὶ] ἃ ἴσασι, καὶ (37) τὰ ἴδια ἢ σεαυτῷ ἢ ἐκείνῳ προσόντα·
“ὁ δ’ ᾤχετό με ὑπο (1417b1) βλέψας”.
καὶ ὡς περὶ Κρατύλου Αἰσχίνης, ὅτι διασίζων, (2) τοῖν χειροῖν διασείων· πιθανὰ γάρ, διότι σύμβολα γίγνεται (3) ταῦτα ἃ ἴσασιν ἐκείνων ὧν οὐκ ἴσασιν.

. . .

however hard the world may find it to believe that a man deliberately does anything except what pays him. Again, you must make use of the emotions. Relate the familiar manifestations of them, and those that distinguish yourself and your opponent; for instance,
‘he went away scowling at me’.
So Aeschines described Cratylus as ‘hissing with fury and shaking his fists’.

πλεῖστα δὲ τοιαῦτα (4) λαβεῖν ἐξ Ὁμήρου ἔστιν·
(5) ὧς ἄρ’ ἔφη, γρῆυς δὲ κατέσχετο χερσὶ πρόσωπα·
(6) οἱ γὰρ δακρύειν ἀρχόμενοι ἐπιλαμβάνονται τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν.
(7) καὶ εὐθὺς εἴσαγε καὶ σεαυτὸν ποιόν τινα, ἵνα ὡς τοιοῦ(8)τον θεωρῶσιν, καὶ τὸν ἀντίδικον· λανθάνων δὲ ποίει.

. .

These details carry conviction: the audience take the truth of what they know as so much evidence for the truth of what they do not. Plenty of such details may be found in Homer:
Thus did she say: but the old woman buried her face in her hands:
a true touch—people beginning to cry do put their hands over their eyes.

ὅτι (9) δὲ ῥᾴδιον, ὅρα ἐκ τῶν ἀπαγγελλόντων· περὶ ὧν γὰρ μη(10)θὲν ἴσμεν, ὅμως λαμβάνομεν ὑπόληψιν τινά.

.

Bring yourself on the stage from the first in the right character, that people may regard you in that light; and the same with your adversary; but do not let them see what you are about.

πολλαχοῦ δὲ (11) δεῖ διηγεῖσθαι, καὶ ἐνίοτε οὐκ ἐν ἀρχῇ.

.

How easily such impressions may be conveyed we can see from the way in which we get some inkling of things we know nothing of by the mere look of the messenger bringing news of them.

(12) ἐν δὲ δημηγορίᾳ ἥκιστα διήγησις ἔστιν, ὅτι περὶ τῶν (13) μελλόντων οὐθεὶς διηγεῖται· ἀλλ’ ἐάν περ διήγησις ᾖ, τῶν (14) γενομένων ἔστω, ἵνα ἀναμνησθέντες ἐκείνων βέλτιον βου(15)λεύσωνται περὶ τῶν ὕστερον, ἢ διαβάλλοντος ἢ ἐπαινοῦν(16)τος· ἀλλὰ †τότε οὐ† τὸ τοῦ συμβούλου ποιεῖ ἔργον.

. . .

Have some narrative in many different parts of your speech; and sometimes let there be none at the beginning of it. In political oratory there is very little opening for narration; nobody can ‘narrate’ what has not yet happened. If there is narration at all, it will be of past events, the recollection of which is to help the hearers to make better plans for the future. Or it may be employed to attack some one’s character, or to eulogize him—

ἂν δ’ ᾖ (17) ἄπιστον, ὑπισχνεῖσθαι δεῖ καὶ αἰτίαν λέγειν εὐθὺς καὶ δια(18)τάττειν ὡς βούλονται, οἷον ἡ Ἰοκάστη ἡ Καρκίνου ἐν τῷ (19) Οἰδίποδι ἀεὶ ὑπισχνεῖται πυνθανομένου τοῦ ζητοῦντος τὸν (20) υἱόν, καὶ ὁ Αἵμων ὁ Σοφοκλέους.

. .

only then you will not be doing what the political speaker, as such, has to do. If any statement you make is hard to believe, you must guarantee its truth, and at once offer an explanation, and then furnish it with such particulars as will be expected.

17. (21) Τὰς δὲ πίστεις δεῖ ἀποδεικτικὰς εἶναι· ἀποδεικνύναι δὲ (22) χρή, ἐπεί περ τεττάρων ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις, περὶ τοῦ ἀμφισ(23)βητουμένου φέροντα τὴν ἀπόδειξιν, οἷον, εἰ ὅτι οὐ γέγονεν (24) ἀμφισβητεῖται, ἐν τῇ κρίσει δεῖ τούτου μάλιστα τὴν ἀπόδειξιν (25) φέρειν, εἰ δ’ ὅτι οὐκ ἔβλαψεν, τούτου, καὶ ὅτι οὐ τοσόνδε (26) ἢ ὅτι δικαίως, ὡσαύτως καὶ εἰ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι τοῦτο ἡ (27) ἀμφισβήτησις.

. . . . . .

Thus Carcinus’ Jocasta, in his Oedipus, keeps guaranteeing the truth of her answers to the inquiries of the man who is seeking her son; and so with Haemon in Sophocles. Part 17. The duty of the Arguments is to attempt demonstrative proofs. These proofs must bear directly upon the question in dispute, which must fall under one of four heads. (1) If you maintain that the act was not committed, your main task in court is to prove this. (2) If you maintain that the act did no harm, prove this. If you maintain that (3) the act was less than is alleged,

μὴ λανθανέτω δ’ ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον ἐν ταύτῃ (28) τῇ ἀμφισβητήσει μόνῃ τὸν ἕτερον εἶναι πονηρόν· οὐ γάρ (29) ἐστιν ἄγνοια αἰτία, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τινες περὶ τοῦ δικαίου ἀμφισ(30)βητοῖεν, ὥστ’ ἐν τούτῳ χρονιστέον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις οὔ.

. . .

or (4) justified, prove these facts, just as you would prove the act not to have been committed if you were maintaining that. It should be noted that only where the question in dispute falls under the first of these heads can it be true that one of the two parties is necessarily a rogue. Here ignorance cannot be pleaded, as it might if the dispute were whether the act was justified or not.

(31) ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς τὸ πολὺ ὅτι καλὰ καὶ ὠφέλιμα ἡ (32) αὔξησις ἔστω· τὰ γὰρ πράγματα δεῖ πιστεύεσθαι· ὀλιγάκις (33) γὰρ καὶ τούτων ἀποδείξεις φέρουσιν, ἐὰν ἄπιστα ᾖ ἢ ἐὰν (34) ἄλλος αἰτίαν ἔχῃ.

. .

This argument must therefore be used in this case only, not in the others. In ceremonial speeches you will develop your case mainly by arguing that what has been done is, e.g., noble and useful.

ἐν δὲ τοῖς δημηγορικοῖς ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἔσται ἀμ(35)φισβητήσειεν ἄν τις, ἢ ὡς ἔσται μὲν <ποιοῦσιν> ἃ κελεύει, ἀλλ’ οὐ (36) δίκαια ἢ οὐκ ὠφέλιμα ἢ οὐ τηλικαῦτα.

. .

The facts themselves are to be taken on trust; proof of them is only submitted on those rare occasions when they are not easily credible or when they have been set down to some one else. In political speeches you may maintain that a proposal is impracticable;

δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁρᾶν εἴ τι (37) ψεύδεται ἐκτὸς τοῦ πράγματος· τεκμήρια γὰρ ταῦτα φαίνεται (1418a1) καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅτι ψεύδεται.

.

or that, though practicable, it is unjust, or will do no good, or is not so important as its proposer thinks.

ἔστιν δὲ τὰ μὲν παραδείγματα (2) δημηγορικώτερα, τὰ δ’ ἐνθυμήματα δικανικώτερα· ἡ μὲν (3) γὰρ περὶ τὸ μέλλον, ὥστ’ ἐκ τῶν γενομένων ἀνάγκη παρα(4)δείγματα λέγειν, ἡ δὲ περὶ ὄντων ἢ μὴ ὄντων, οὗ μᾶλλον (5) ἀπόδειξίς ἐστι καὶ ἀνάγκη· ἔχει γὰρ τὸ γεγονὸς ἀνάγκην.

. . .

Note any falsehoods about irrelevant matters—they will look like proof that his other statements also are false. Argument by ‘example’ is highly suitable for political oratory, argument by ‘enthymeme’ better suits forensic. Political oratory deals with future events, of which it can do no more than quote past events as examples. Forensic oratory deals with what is or is not now true, which can better be demonstrated, because not contingent—

(6) οὐ δεῖ δὲ ἐφεξῆς λέγειν τὰ ἐνθυμήματα, ἀλλ’ ἀναμιγνύναι· (7) εἰ δὲ μή, καταβλάπτει ἄλληλα. ἔστιν γὰρ καὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ ὅρος. (8)
ὦ φίλ’, ἐπεὶ τόσα εἶπες ὅσ’ ἂν πεπνυμένος ἀνήρ, (9) ἀλλ’ οὐ τοιαῦτα. καὶ μὴ περὶ πάντων ἐνθυμήματα ζητεῖ· (10) εἰ δὲ μή, ποιήσεις ὅπερ ἔνιοι ποιοῦσι τῶν φιλοσοφούντων, (11) οἳ συλλογίζονται τὰ γνωριμώτερα καὶ πιστότερα ἢ ἐξ ὧν (12) λέγουσιν. καὶ ὅταν πάθος ποιῇς, μὴ λέγε ἐνθύμημα (ἢ (13) γὰρ ἐκκρούσει τὸ πάθος ἢ μάτην εἰρημένον ἔσται τὸ ἐν(14)θύμημα· ἐκκρούουσι γὰρ αἱ κινήσεις ἀλλήλας αἱ ἅμα, καὶ ἢ (15) ἀφανίζουσιν ἢ ἀσθενεῖς ποιοῦσιν), οὐδ’ ὅταν ἠθικὸν τὸν (16) λόγον, οὐ δεῖ ἐνθύμημά τι ζητεῖν ἅμα· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει οὔτε (17) ἦθος οὔτε προαίρεσιν ἡ ἀπόδειξις. γνώμαις δὲ χρηστέον (18) καὶ ἐν διηγήσει καὶ ἐν πίστει· ἠθικὸν γὰρ “καὶ ἐγὼ δέ(19)δωκα, καὶ ταῦτ’ εἰδὼς ὡς οὐ δεῖ πιστεύειν”· ἐὰν δὲ παθη(20)τικῶς, “καὶ οὐ μεταμέλει μοι καίπερ ἠδικημένῳ· τούτῳ μὲν (21) γὰρ περίεστιν τὸ κέρδος, ἐμοὶ δὲ τὸ δίκαιον.” (20) τὸ δὲ δημη(22)γορεῖν χαλεπώτερον τοῦ δικάζεσθαι, εἰκότως, διότι περὶ τὸ (23) μέλλον, ἐκεῖ δὲ περὶ τὸ γεγονός, ὃ ἐπιστητὸν ἤδη καὶ τοῖς (24) μάντεσιν, ὡς ἔφη Ἐπιμενίδης ὁ Κρής (ἐκεῖνος γὰρ περὶ (25) τῶν ἐσομένων οὐκ ἐμαντεύετο, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν γεγονότων (26) μὲν ἀδήλων δέ), καὶ ὁ νόμος ὑπόθεσις ἐν τοῖς δικανικοῖς· (27) ἔχοντα δὲ ἀρχὴν ῥᾷον εὑρεῖν ἀπόδειξιν.

. . . . . . . . . . . .

there is no contingency in what has now already happened. Do not use a continuous succession of enthymemes: intersperse them with other matter, or they will spoil one another’s effect. There are limits to their number— Friend, you have spoken as much as a sensible man would have spoken. ,as much’ says Homer, not ‘as well’. Nor should you try to make enthymemes on every point; if you do, you will be acting just like some students of philosophy, whose conclusions are more familiar and believable than the premisses from which they draw them. And avoid the enthymeme form when you are trying to rouse feeling; for it will either kill the feeling or will itself fall flat: all simultaneous motions tend to cancel each other either completely or partially. Nor should you go after the enthymeme form in a passage where you are depicting character— the process of demonstration can express neither moral character nor moral purpose. Maxims should be employed in the Arguments—and in the Narration too—since these do express character: ‘I have given him this, though I am quite aware that one should Trust no man.’ Or if you are appealing to the emotions: ‘I do not regret it, though I have been wronged; if he has the profit on his side, I have justice on mine.’ Political oratory is a more difficult task than forensic; and naturally so, since it deals with the future, whereas the pleader deals with the past, which, as Epimenides of Crete said, even the diviners already know. (Epimenides did not practise divination about the future; only about the obscurities of the past.)

καὶ οὐκ ἔχει πολ(28)λὰς διατριβάς, οἷον πρὸς ἀντίδικον ἢ περὶ αὑτοῦ, ἢ παθη(29)τικὸν ποιεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἥκιστα πάντων, ἐὰν μὴ ἐξιστῇ. δεῖ οὖν (30) ἀποροῦντα τοῦτο ποιεῖν ὅπερ οἱ Ἀθήνησι ῥήτορες ποιοῦσι (31) καὶ Ἰσοκράτης· καὶ γὰρ συμβουλεύων κατηγορεῖ, οἷον Λακε(32)δαιμονίων μὲν ἐν τῷ πανηγυρικῷ, Χάρητος δ’ ἐν τῷ συμ(33)μαχικῷ. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς δεῖ τὸν λόγον ἐπεισοδιοῦν (34) ἐπαίνοις, οἷον Ἰσοκράτης ποιεῖ· ἀεὶ γάρ τινα εἰσάγει. καὶ (35) ὃ ἔλεγεν Γοργίας, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπολείπει αὐτὸν ὁ λόγος, ταὐτό (36) ἐστιν· εἰ γὰρ Ἀχιλλέα λέγει Πηλέα ἐπαινεῖ, εἶτα Αἰακόν, (37) εἶτα τὸν θεόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀνδρείαν, ἣ τὰ καὶ τὰ ποιεῖ ἢ (38) τοιόνδε ἐστίν. ἔχοντα μὲν οὖν ἀποδείξεις καὶ ἠθικῶς λε(39)κτέον καὶ ἀποδεικτικῶς, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἔχῃς ἐνθυμήματα, ἠθι(40)κῶς· καὶ μᾶλλον τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ ἁρμόττει χρηστὸν φαίνεσθαι (1418b1) ἢ τὸν λόγον ἀκριβῆ. τῶν δὲ ἐνθυμημάτων τὰ ἐλεγκτικὰ (2) μᾶλλον εὐδοκιμεῖ τῶν δεικτικῶν, ὅτι ὅσα ἔλεγχον ποιεῖ, μᾶλ(3)λον δῆλον ὅτι συλλελόγισται· παρ’ ἄλληλα γὰρ μᾶλλον τἀ(4)ναντία γνωρίζεται. (5) τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὸν ἀντίδικον οὐχ ἕτερόν τι εἶδος, ἀλλὰ (6) τῶν πίστεών ἐστι <τὸ> τὰ μὲν λῦσαι ἐνστάσει τὰ δὲ συλλογισμῷ. (7) δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐν συμβουλῇ καὶ ἐν δίκῃ ἀρχόμενον μὲν λέγειν (8) τὰς ἑαυτοῦ πίστεις πρότερον, ὕστερον δὲ πρὸς τἀναντία (9) ἀπαντᾶν λύοντα καὶ προδιασύροντα. ἂν δὲ πολύχους ᾖ ἡ (10) ἐναντίωσις, πρότερον τὰ ἐναντία, οἷον ἐποίησε Καλλίστρατος (11) ἐν τῇ Μεσσηνιακῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ· ἃ γὰρ ἐροῦσι προανελὼν οὕτως (12) τότε αὐτὸς εἶπεν. ὕστερον δὲ λέγοντα πρῶτον πρὸς τὸν (13) ἐναντίον λόγον λεκτέον, λύοντα καὶ ἀντισυλλογιζόμενον, καὶ (14) μάλιστα ἂν εὐδοκιμηκότα ᾖ· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον προδια(15)βεβλημένον οὐ δέχεται ἡ ψυχή, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οὐδὲ (16) λόγον, ἐὰν ὁ ἐναντίος εὖ δοκῇ εἰρηκέναι. δεῖ οὖν χώραν (17) ποιεῖν ἐν τῷ ἀκροατῇ τῷ μέλλοντι λόγῳ· ἔσται δὲ ἂν ἀνέλῃς· διὸ (18) ἢ πρὸς πάντα ἢ τὰ μέγιστα ἢ τὰ εὐδοκιμοῦντα ἢ τὰ εὐέλεγκτα (19) μαχεσάμενον οὕτω τὰ αὑτοῦ πιστὰ ποιητέον. ταῖς θεαῖσι πρῶτα σύμμαχος γενήσομαι·
(20) ἐγὼ γὰρ Ἥραν·
(21) ἐν τούτοις ἥψατο πρῶτον τοῦ εὐηθεστάτου. (22) περὶ μὲν οὖν πίστεων ταῦτα.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Besides, in forensic oratory you have a basis in the law; and once you have a starting—point, you can prove anything with comparative ease. Then again, political oratory affords few chances for those leisurely digressions in which you may attack your adversary, talk about yourself, or work on your hearers’ emotions; fewer chances indeed, than any other affords, unless your set purpose is to divert your hearers’ attention. Accordingly, if you find yourself in difficulties, follow the lead of the Athenian speakers, and that of Isocrates, who makes regular attacks upon people in the course of a political speech, e.g. upon the Lacedaemonians in the Panegyricus, and upon Chares in the speech about the allies. In ceremonial oratory, intersperse your speech with bits of episodic eulogy, like Isocrates, who is always bringing some one forward for this purpose. And this is what Gorgias meant by saying that he always found something to talk about. For if he speaks of Achilles, he praises Peleus, then Aeacus, then Zeus; and in like manner the virtue of valour, describing its good results, and saying what it is like. Now if you have proofs to bring forward, bring them forward, and your moral discourse as well; if you have no enthymemes, then fall back upon moral discourse: after all, it is more fitting for a good man to display himself as an honest fellow than as a subtle reasoner. Refutative enthymemes are more popular than demonstrative ones: their logical cogency is more striking: the facts about two opposites always stand out clearly when the two are nut side by side. The ‘Reply to the Opponent’ is not a separate division of the speech; it is part of the Arguments to break down the opponent’s case, whether by objection or by counter—syllogism. Both in political speaking and when pleading in court, if you are the first speaker you should put your own arguments forward first, and then meet the arguments on the other side by refuting them and pulling them to pieces beforehand. If, however, the case for the other side contains a great variety of arguments, begin with these, like Callistratus in the Messenian assembly, when he demolished the arguments likely to be used against him before giving his own. If you speak later, you must first, by means of refutation and counter—syllogism, attempt some answer to your opponent’s speech, especially if his arguments have been well received. For just as our minds refuse a favourable reception to a person against whom they are prejudiced, so they refuse it to a speech when they have been favourably impressed by the speech on the other side. You should, therefore, make room in the minds of the audience for your coming speech; and this will be done by getting your opponent’s speech out of the way. So attack that first—either the whole of it, or the most important, successful, or vulnerable points in it, and thus inspire confidence in what you have to say yourself— First, champion will I be of Goddesses...
Never, I ween, would Hera...
where the speaker has attacked the silliest argument first.

εἰς δὲ τὸ ἦθος, ἐπειδὴ (23) ἔνια περὶ αὑτοῦ λέγειν ἢ ἐπίφθονον ἢ μακρολογίαν ἢ ἀντι(24)λογίαν ἔχει, καὶ περὶ ἄλλου ἢ λοιδορίαν ἢ ἀγροικίαν, (25) ἕτερον χρὴ λέγοντα ποιεῖν, ὅπερ Ἰσοκράτης ποιεῖ ἐν τῷ (26) Φιλίππῳ καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἀντιδόσει, καὶ ὡς Ἀρχίλοχος ψέγει· (27) ποιεῖ γὰρ τὸν πατέρα λέγοντα περὶ τῆς θυγατρὸς ἐν τῷ ἰάμβῳ
(28) χρημάτων δ’ ἄελπτον οὐθέν ἐστιν οὐδ’ ἀπώμοτον,
(29) καὶ τὸν Χάρωνα τὸν τέκτονα ἐν τῷ ἰάμβῳ οὗ ἀρχὴ
(30) οὔ μοι τὰ Γύγεω, (31) καὶ ὡς Σοφοκλῆς τὸν Αἵμονα ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἀντιγόνης πρὸς (32) τὸν πατέρα ὡς λεγόντων ἑτέρων. (33) δεῖ δὲ καὶ μεταβάλλειν (34) τὰ ἐνθυμήματα καὶ γνώμας ποιεῖν ἐνίοτε, οἷον “χρὴ δὲ τὰς (35) διαλλαγὰς ποιεῖν τοὺς νοῦν ἔχοντας εὐτυχοῦντας· οὕτω (36) γὰρ ἂν μέγιστα πλεονεκτοῖεν,” ἐνθυμηματικῶς δὲ “εἰ γὰρ (37) δεῖ, ὅταν ὠφελιμώταται ὦσιν καὶ πλεονεκτικώταται αἱ κατ(38)αλλαγαί, τότε καταλλάττεσθαι, εὐτυχοῦντας δεῖ καταλλάττε(39)σθαι.”

. . . . . . . .

So much for the Arguments. With regard to the element of moral character: there are assertions which, if made about yourself, may excite dislike, appear tedious, or expose you to the risk of contradiction; and other things which you cannot say about your opponent without seeming abusive or ill—bred. Put such remarks, therefore, into the mouth of some third person. This is what Isocrates does in the Philippus and in the Antidosis, and Archilochus in his satires. The latter represents the father himself as attacking his daughter in the lampoon
Think nought impossible at all,
Nor swear that it shall not befall...
and puts into the mouth of Charon the carpenter the lampoon which begins
Not for the wealth of Gyes...
So too Sophocles makes Haemon appeal to his father on behalf of Antigone as if it were others who were speaking. Again, sometimes you should restate your enthymemes in the form of maxims; e.g. ’Wise men will come to terms in the hour of success; for they will gain most if they do’.

18. (40) Περὶ δὲ ἐρωτήσεως, εὔκαιρόν ἐστι ποιεῖσθαι μάλιστα (1419a1) μὲν ὅταν τὸ ἕτερον εἰρηκὼς ᾖ, ὥστε ἑνὸς προσερωτηθέντος (2) συμβαίνει τὸ ἄτοπον, οἷον Περικλῆς Λάμπωνα ἐπήρετο (3) περὶ τῆς τελετῆς τῶν τῆς σωτείρας ἱερῶν, εἰπόντος δὲ ὅτι (4) οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀτέλεστον ἀκούειν, ἤρετο εἰ οἶδεν αὐτός, φά(5)σκοντος δὲ “καὶ πῶς, ἀτέλεστος ὤν;” δεύτερον δὲ ὅταν τὸ μὲν (6) φανερὸν ᾖ, τὸ δὲ ἐρωτήσαντι δῆλον ᾖ ὅτι δώσει· πυθόμενον (7) μὲν γὰρ δεῖ τὴν μίαν πρότασιν μὴ προσερωτᾶν τὸ φανερὸν (8) ἀλλὰ τὸ συμπέρασμα εἰπεῖν, οἷον Σωκράτης, Μελήτου οὐ (9) φάσκοντος αὐτὸν θεοὺς νομίζειν, εἰρηκότος δὲ ὡς δαιμόνιόν (10) τι λέγοι, ἤρετο εἰ οὐχ οἱ δαίμονες ἤτοι θεῶν παῖδες εἶεν (11) ἢ θεῖόν τι, φήσαντος δὲ “ἔστιν οὖν”, ἔφη, “ὅστις θεῶν μὲν (12) παῖδας οἴεται εἶναι, θεοὺς δὲ οὔ;” ἔτι ὅταν μέλλῃ ἢ ἐναντία (13) λέγοντα δείξειν ἢ παράδοξον.

. . . . . . . . . . .

Expressed as an enthymeme, this would run, ‘If we ought to come to terms when doing so will enable us to gain the greatest advantage, then we ought to come to terms in the hour of success.’ Part 18. Next as to Interrogation. The best moment to a employ this is when your opponent has so answered one question that the putting of just one more lands him in absurdity. Thus Pericles questioned Lampon about the way of celebrating the rites of the Saviour Goddess. Lampon declared that no uninitiated person could be told of them. Pericles then asked, ‘Do you know them yourself?’ ‘Yes’, answered Lampon. ’Why,’ said Pericles, ‘how can that be, when you are uninitiated?’ Another good moment is when one premiss of an argument is obviously true, and you can see that your opponent must say ‘yes’ if you ask him whether the other is true. Having first got this answer about the other, do not go on to ask him about the obviously true one, but just state the conclusion yourself. Thus, when Meletus denied that Socrates believed in the existence of gods but admitted that he talked about a supernatural power, Socrates proceeded to to ask whether ‘supernatural beings were not either children of the gods or in some way divine?’ ‘Yes’, said Meletus. ’Then’, replied Socrates, ‘is there any one who believes in the existence of children of the gods and yet not in the existence of the gods themselves?’

τέταρτον δὲ ὅταν μὴ ἐνῇ ἀλλ’ (14) ἢ σοφιστικῶς ἀποκρινάμενον λῦσαι· ἐὰν γὰρ οὕτως ἀπο(15)κρίνηται, ὅτι ἔστι μὲν ἔστι δ’ οὔ, ἢ τὰ μὲν τὰ δ’ οὔ, ἢ πῇ (16) μὲν πῇ δ’ οὔ, θορυβοῦσιν ὡς ἀποροῦντος. ἄλλως δὲ μὴ (17) ἐγχείρει. ἐὰν γὰρ ἐνστῇ, κεκρατῆσθαι δόξεις· οὐ γὰρ (18) οἷόν τε πολλὰ ἐρωτᾶν, διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ· διὸ (19) καὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα ὅτι μάλιστα συστρέφειν δεῖ.

. . . . .

Another good occasion is when you expect to show that your opponent is contradicting either his own words or what every one believes. A fourth is when it is impossible for him to meet your question except by an evasive answer. If he answers ‘True, and yet not true’, or ‘Partly true and partly not true’, or ‘True in one sense but not in another’, the audience thinks he is in difficulties, and applauds his discomfiture. In other cases do not attempt interrogation; for if your opponent gets in an objection, you are felt to have been worsted. You cannot ask a series of questions owing to the incapacity of the audience to follow them;

(20) ἀποκρίνασθαι δὲ δεῖ πρὸς μὲν τὰ ἀμφίβολα διαιροῦντα (21) λόγῳ καὶ μὴ συντόμως, πρὸς δὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἐναντία τὴν (22) λύσιν φέροντα εὐθὺς τῇ ἀποκρίσει, πρὶν ἐπερωτῆσαι τὸ (23) ἐπιὸν ἢ συλλογίσασθαι· οὐ γὰρ χαλεπὸν προορᾶν ἐν τίνι ὁ (24) λόγος.

. . .

and for this reason you should also make your enthymemes as compact as possible. In replying, you must meet ambiguous questions by drawing reasonable distinctions, not by a curt answer. In meeting questions that seem to involve you in a contradiction, offer the explanation at the outset of your answer, before your opponent asks the next question or draws his conclusion.

φανερὸν δ’ ἡμῖν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν Τοπικῶν καὶ τοῦτο (25) καὶ αἱ λύσεις. καὶ συμπεραινομένου, ἐὰν ἐρώτημα ποιῇ τὸ (26) συμπέρασμα, τὴν αἰτίαν εἰπεῖν, οἷον Σοφοκλῆς, ἐρωτώμενος (27) ὑπὸ Πεισάνδρου εἰ ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ, ὥσπερ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις προ(28)βούλοις, καταστῆσαι τοὺς τετρακοσίους, ἔφη “τί δέ; οὐ (29) πονηρά σοι ταῦτα ἐδόκει εἶναι;” ἔφη. “οὐκοῦν σὺ ταῦτα (30) ἔπραξας τὰ πονηρά;” “ναὶ”, ἔφη, “οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἄλλα βελτίω”.

. . .

For it is not difficult to see the drift of his argument in advance. This point, however, as well as the various means of refutation, may be regarded as known to us from the Topics. When your opponent in drawing his conclusion puts it in the form of a question, you must justify your answer.

(31) καὶ ὡς ὁ Λάκων εὐθυνόμενος τῆς ἐφορίας, ἐρωτώμενος εἰ δο(32)κοῦσιν αὐτῷ δικαίως ἀπολωλέναι ἅτεροι, ἔφη. ὁ δὲ “οὐκοῦν (33) σὺ τούτοις ταὐτὰ ἔθου;” καὶ ὃς ἔφη. “οὐκοῦν δικαίως ἄν”, (34) ἔφη, “καὶ σὺ ἀπόλοιο;” “οὐ δῆτα”, ἔφη, “οἱ μὲν γὰρ χρήματα (35) λαβόντες ταῦτα ἔπραξαν, ἐγὼ δὲ οὔ, ἀλλὰ γνώμῃ.” διὸ (1419b1) οὔτε ἐπερωτᾶν δεῖ μετὰ τὸ συμπέρασμα, οὔτε τὸ συμπέρασμα (2) ἐπερωτᾶν, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ πολὺ περιῇ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.

. . . .

Thus when Sophocles was asked by Peisander whether he had, like the other members of the Board of Safety, voted for setting up the Four Hundred, he said ‘Yes.’ —’Why, did you not think it wicked?’ —’Yes.’ —’So you committed this wickedness?’ ‘Yes’, said Sophocles, ‘for there was nothing better to do.’ Again, the Lacedaemonian, when he was being examined on his conduct as ephor, was asked whether he thought that the other ephors had been justly put to death. ’Yes’, he said. ’Well then’, asked his opponent, ‘did not you propose the same measures as they?’—’Yes.’ —’Well then, would not you too be justly put to death?’—’Not at all’, said he; ‘they were bribed to do it, and I did it from conviction’.

(3) περὶ δὲ τῶν γελοίων, ἐπειδή τινα δοκεῖ χρῆσιν ἔχειν ἐν (4) τοῖς ἀγῶσι, καὶ δεῖν ἔφη Γοργίας τὴν μὲν σπουδὴν δια(5)φθείρειν τῶν ἐναντίων γέλωτι τὸν δὲ γέλωτα σπουδῇ, ὀρθῶς (6) λέγων, εἴρηται πόσα εἴδη γελοίων ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιη(7)τικῆς, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἁρμόττει ἐλευθέρῳ τὸ δ’ οὔ, ὅπως τὸ (8) ἁρμόττον αὑτῷ λήψεται. ἔστι δ’ ἡ εἰρωνεία τῆς βωμολοχίας (9) ἐλευθεριώτερον·ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα ποιεῖ τὸ γελοῖον, ὁ δὲ βωμολόχος ἑτέρου.

. . . .

Hence you should not ask any further questions after drawing the conclusion, nor put the conclusion itself in the form of a further question, unless there is a large balance of truth on your side. As to jests. These are supposed to be of some service in controversy. Gorgias said that you should kill your opponents’ earnestness with jesting and their jesting with earnestness; in which he was right. Jests have been classified in the Poetics. Some are becoming to a gentleman, others are not; see that you choose such as become you.

19. (10) Ὁ δ’ ἐπίλογος σύγκειται ἐκ τεττάρων, ἔκ τε τοῦ πρὸς (11) ἑαυτὸν κατασκευάσαι εὖ τὸν ἀκροατὴν καὶ τὸν ἐναντίον (12) φαύλως, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ αὐξῆσαι καὶ ταπεινῶσαι, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ (13) εἰς τὰ πάθη τὸν ἀκροατὴν καταστῆσαι, καὶ ἐξ ἀναμνήσεως.

. . . . .

Irony better befits a gentleman than buffoonery; the ironical man jokes to amuse himself, the buffoon to amuse other people. Part 19. The Epilogue has four parts. You must (1) make the audience well—disposed towards yourself and ill—disposed towards your opponent (2) magnify or minimize the leading facts, (3) excite the required state of emotion in your hearers, and

(14) πέφυκε γάρ, μετὰ τὸ ἀποδεῖξαι αὐτὸν μὲν ἀληθῆ τὸν δὲ (15) ἐναντίον ψευδῆ, οὕτω τὸ ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ψέγειν καὶ ἐπιχαλκεύειν. (16) δυοῖν δὲ θατέρου δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι, ἢ ὅτι τούτοις ἀγαθὸς ἢ (17) ὅτι ἁπλῶς, ὁ δ’ ὅτι κακὸς τούτοις ἢ ὅτι ἁπλῶς. ἐξ ὧν δὲ (18) δεῖ τοῦτο κατασκευάζειν [δεῖ], εἴρηνται οἱ τόποι πόθεν σπου(19)δαίους δεῖ κατασκευάζειν καὶ φαύλους.

. . .

(4) refresh their memories. (1) Having shown your own truthfulness and the untruthfulness of your opponent, the natural thing is to commend yourself, censure him, and hammer in your points. You must aim at one of two objects—you must make yourself out a good man and him a bad one either in yourselves or in relation to your hearers.

τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο, (20) δεδειγμένων ἤδη, αὔξειν ἐστὶν κατὰ φύσιν ἢ ταπεινοῦν· δεῖ (21) γὰρ τὰ πεπραγμένα ὁμολογεῖσθαι, εἰ μέλλει τὸ ποσὸν ἐρεῖν· (22) καὶ γὰρ ἡ τῶν σωμάτων αὔξησις ἐκ προϋπαρχόντων ἐστίν. (23) ὅθεν δὲ δεῖ αὔξειν καὶ ταπεινοῦν ἔκκεινται οἱ τόποι πρό(24)τερον.

. . . .

How this is to be managed—by what lines of argument you are to represent people as good or bad—this has been already explained. (2) The facts having been proved, the natural thing to do next is to magnify or minimize their importance. The facts must be admitted before you can discuss how important they are; just as the body cannot grow except from something already present.

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, δήλων ὄντων καὶ οἷα καὶ ἡλίκα, εἰς (25) τὰ πάθη ἄγειν τὸν ἀκροατήν. ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶν ἔλεος καὶ (26) δείνωσις καὶ ὀργὴ καὶ μίσος καὶ φθόνος καὶ ζῆλος καὶ ἔρις. (27) εἴρηνται δὲ καὶ τούτων οἱ τόποι πρότερον,

. . .

The proper lines of argument to be used for this purpose of amplification and depreciation have already been set forth. (3) Next, when the facts and their importance are clearly understood, you must excite your hearers’ emotions. These emotions are pity, indignation, anger, hatred, envy, emulation, pugnacity.

ὥστε λοιπὸν ἀνα(28)μνῆσαι τὰ προειρημένα. τοῦτο δὲ ἁρμόττει ποιεῖν οὐχ ὥσπερ (29) φασὶν ἐν τοῖς προοιμίοις, οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγοντες. ἵνα γὰρ (30) εὐμαθὴς ᾖ, κελεύουσι πολλάκις εἰπεῖν. ἐκεῖ μὲν οὖν δεῖ (31) τὸ πρᾶγμα εἰπεῖν, ἵνα μὴ λανθάνῃ περὶ οὗ ἡ κρίσις, ἐν(32)ταῦθα δὲ δι’ ὧν δέδεικται, κεφαλαιωδῶς. ἀρχὴ δὲ διότι ἃ (33) ὑπέσχετο ἀποδέδωκεν, ὥστε ἅ τε καὶ δι’ ὃ λεκτέον. λέγεται (34) δὲ ἐξ ἀντιπαραβολῆς τοῦ ἐναντίου. παραβάλλειν δὲ [ἢ] ὅσα (35) περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἄμφω εἶπον, ἢ [μὴ] καταντικρύ (“ἀλλ’ οὗτος (1420a1) μὲν τάδε περὶ τούτου, ἐγὼ δὲ ταδί, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα”), ἢ ἐξ (2) εἰρωνείας (οἷον “οὗτος γὰρ τάδ’ εἶπεν, ἐγὼ δὲ ταδί”, καὶ “τὶ (3) ἂν ἐποίει, εἰ τάδε ἔδειξεν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ταδί”), ἢ ἐξ ἐρωτήσεως (“τί (4) οὖν δέδεικται;” ἢ “οὗτος τί ἔδειξεν;”). ἢ δὴ οὕτως [ἢ] ἐκ παρα(5)βολῆς ἢ κατὰ φύσιν ὡς ἐλέχθη, οὕτως τὰ αὐτοῦ, καὶ πάλιν, (6) ἐὰν βούλῃ, χωρὶς τὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου λόγου. τελευτὴ δὲ τῆς (7) λέξεως ἁρμόττει ἡ ἀσύνδετος, ὅπως ἐπίλογος ἀλλὰ μὴ λόγος (8) ᾖ· “εἴρηκα, ἀκηκόατε, ἔχετε, κρίνατε”.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The lines of argument to be used for these purposes also have been previously mentioned. (4) Finally you have to review what you have already said. Here you may properly do what some wrongly recommend doing in the introduction— repeat your points frequently so as to make them easily understood. What you should do in your introduction is to state your subject, in order that the point to be judged may be quite plain; in the epilogue you should summarize the arguments by which your case has been proved. The first step in this reviewing process is to observe that you have done what you undertook to do. You must, then, state what you have said and why you have said it. Your method may be a comparison of your own case with that of your opponent; and you may compare either the ways you have both handled the same point or make your comparison less direct: ‘My opponent said so—and—so on this point; I said so—and—so, and this is why I said it’. Or with modest irony, e.g. ’He certainly said so—and—so, but I said so—and—so’. Or ‘How vain he would have been if he had proved all this instead of that!’ Or put it in the form of a question. ’What has not been proved by me?’ or ‘What has my opponent proved?’ You may proceed then, either in this way by setting point against point, or by following the natural order of the arguments as spoken, first giving your own, and then separately, if you wish, those of your opponent. For the conclusion, the disconnected style of language is appropriate, and will mark the difference between the oration and the peroration.

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