To this they reply, ‘Although the cause and effect are indeed different, a consequence of this is not that everything may arise from everything, since one may observe that there is a specific order (niyata) to things. This specific order is such that,
‘What has potential to be made defines result.
What can produce it is the cause, though something else.
In one continuum, from makers, things arise,
And rice sprouts won’t therefore produce barley and such.’ (6.15)
Here, result has a kṛtya-affix1
indicating the sense of potential. ‘That which has the potential to be produced by something is its result, while that which can produce that result, although it is other, is the cause. Therefore, it is only through a specific sense of otherness that entities are related as cause and result, and not a general type of otherness. They are of one continuum, and the producer yields produced – it is not the case that it belongs to a separate continuum, such as for instance a barley seed, nor that it belongs to the same continuum but is not the producer, as is the case for a former instance that cannot come after a latter instance – and therefore it does not follow that everything can arise from everything.’
This too is inadequate. What is it that makes for this specific order? Where does this come from when saying that, ‘The cause of the rice sprout is only the rice seed and nothing other, and the result of the rice seed is only the rice sprout and nothing other’? This is the question that may be asked of those who claim cause and result. If they say, ‘Because we observe a specific order,’ and when further questioned they reply, ‘A specific order is observed,’ that is non-sensical; because by just saying that, ‘Because of observing a specific order, a specific order is observed,’ they provide no reason for the specific order and are not able to even slightly avoid the faults that have been stated.
Title
Chapter 1: Pramuditā
