Now they reply, ‘It isn’t actually a case of another apprehending something else, but it has reflexive awareness. And since reflexive awareness apprehends itself, that shows it to be existent.’ To show how this can’t be, we explain:
It isn’t proven to experience itself.
It is unproven that it can so-called ‘apprehend itself.’
There are those who cite the Sautrāntika position in order to prove reflexive awareness: ‘When a fire is kindled it will simultaneously illumine itself together with vases and other things without distinction. And words signify both themselves and a referent. Similarly, when consciousness occurs it can fully discern itself and objects without distinction. Hence, reflexive awareness most certainly exists.
‘Though unwilling, one must by necessity accept reflexive awareness. Otherwise, when remembering the experience, “I saw …,” one wouldn’t then remember both the object as well as the experience, “I saw it.” Why? The memory would be of the experienced object, while the knowing of it would not have been experienced and could not then be remembered.
‘As long as awareness is not reflexive it cannot be experienced. And that there is another cognition experiencing it is unreasonable. Why? If the cognition experiencing it is other, the consequence will be that of infinite regress. If you accept that immediately following one cognition distinguishing the colour blue, there is a consciousness distinguishing that, one would need yet another experiencer of the cognition of the cognition of blue; and then yet another again; leading to the fault of infinite regress.
‘And it can’t be that cognition discerns something separate from it, since then all strings of awareness would be objects of distinct consciousnesses, and sentient beings only have a single stream of consciousness. It is like a stack of a hundred blue lotus-petals being pierced; consciousness engages with things in succession, but so rapidly that it appears to be happening simultaneously.1
Hence, to avoid the fault of infinite regress one must necessarily accept reflexive awareness.
‘With that, both objects involved when subsequently remembering the thought “I saw …” will be accounted for. But if the nature of cognition isn’t known by reflexive awareness, it’s illogical that its object can be remembered. And so, as the subsequent memory “I saw…” appears to one’s cognition, it may be inferred that the trigger for the cognitive experience of a subsequent memory containing both these objects must have been an experience of its own nature and the nature of the object. The subsequent memory proves the experience of oneself; and when experience of oneself exists, the dependent nature exists. You asked, “What would then know of its existence?”2
This is the answer.’
To show that this is illogical, it was said:
It isn’t proven to experience itself.
And if you say a later memory is proof,
You’re giving something that is unproven as proof;
And what’s not proven cannot function as a proof. (6.73)
If this is the proof they now present to substantiate it, since memory is impossible in that it’s produced neither from self nor from other, how could the unproven memory prove the unproven reflexive awareness? Even in terms of worldly conventions it would be impossible for memory to be the result of reflexive awareness. How so? If, as in the case of fire, cognition is used to prove reflexive awareness – and because of its presence, like fire is deduced from smoke, one is to be convinced of its existence via the subsequent occurrence of memory – since this reflexive awareness remains something unproven, how could memory, the result of reflexive awareness and something that doesn’t occur if reflexive awareness doesn’t exist, exist? One can’t be certain of the presence of a water-crystal gem just from seeing water, or a fire-crystal gem just from seeing fire, because even without these water may be the result of such phenomena as rain, and fire may be produced for instance by rubbing sticks together. In the same way, this shows that memory may arise in the absence of reflexive awareness. And therefore, since memory as a result of reflexive awareness is non-existent without it, you’re giving something unproven as proof. In proving reflexive awareness, this unproven term ‘memory’ has no relevance as evidence – just like thinking of sound’s impermanence as something perceived by the eyes.
Title
Chapter 1: Pramuditā
