 Title
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Preface
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 Chapter 1: Pramuditā
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Chapter 2: Vimalā
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Chapter 3: Prabhākarī
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Chapter 4: Arciṣmatī
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Chapter 5: Sudurjayā
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Chapter 6: Abhimukhī
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Chapter 7: Dūraṃgamā
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Chapter 8: Acalā
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Chapter 9: Sādhumatī
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Chapter 10: Dharmameghā
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Chapter 11: buddhabhūmi
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They might then say: ‘Although the former and latter moments are indeed different, they form a single continuum and we are therefore not at fault.’
To reply:
‘It’s really one continuum, thus we’re not at fault;’
The problems with continua were shown before.
This was treated when it was said, things related respectively to Maitreya and Upagupta…1 And as stated:
If being a human is different from a god,
That would mean impermanence.
If being a human is different from a god,
A continuity becomes untenable.2
Thus, since it does not make sense that things that are mutually distinct can be included within a single continuum, this consequence cannot be avoided.
To express that neither the aggregates nor the mind can therefore be the self, it was said:
The aggregates or mind as self thus makes not sense,
The foregoing discussion of unwanted consequences is not the only thing that shows how untenable it is for the aggregates or the mind to be the self. In addition:
The world as finite and so forth was not endorsed. (6.129)
Since it was not mentioned whether there is an end to the world and so forth, it does not make sense to say that the aggregates or the mind is the self. The fourteen indeterminable issues are mentioned by all schools:
‘The world is eternal’ or ‘the world is not eternal;’ or ‘the world is both eternal and not eternal’ or ‘the world is neither eternal nor not eternal…;’3
Since the Illustrious One said that no reply could be given to these, they are classified as indeterminable issues (avyākṛtamūla).
These were hence dismissed, and if a mendicant upholds the idea that the world is eternal, the scriptures of the Pūrvaśaila school state that, ‘The one who upholds the view that the world is eternal is subject to expulsion. The one who upholds the view that the world is not eternal is subject to expulsion. The one who upholds the view that the world is both eternal and not eternal is subject to expulsion. The one who upholds the view that the world is neither eternal nor not eternal is subject to expulsion;’ and that one should not associate with them.4
There are thus said to be fourteen indeterminable issues. And if you take the word world to mean the aggregates, since the aggregates arise and cease and are therefore impermanent, one would in effect determine that the world is not eternal. And by saying that the aggregates are not present subsequent to nirvana, one is determining that the world is finite. One would similarly have determined that the Tathāgata does not exist after death. But since the statements saying that the world is finite and so forth were dismissed, it is thus unreasonable that the aggregates themselves can be the self.