 Title
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Preface
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 Chapter 1: Pramuditā
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Chapter 2: Vimalā
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Chapter 3: Prabhākarī
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Chapter 4: Arciṣmatī
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Chapter 5: Sudurjayā
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Chapter 6: Abhimukhī
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Chapter 7: Dūraṃgamā
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Chapter 8: Acalā
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Chapter 9: Sādhumatī
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Chapter 10: Dharmameghā
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Chapter 11: buddhabhūmi
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If dependent imputations are related to correctly, they will not encourage ideas such as those of constancy or inconstancy, and concepts such as permanence, impermanence and so forth will easily be avoided. To express this:
It is not real, thus not a constant entity,
Is not inconstant, has no birth and no decay.
Such qualities as permanence do not apply.
It’s not the same, nor something that is quite distinct. (6.163)
This self which is imputed in relation to the aggregates is not a constant thing, nor is it inconstant. If the self were inconstant, this would contradict the Treatise where it states:
The assimilated, which arise
And cease to be, are not the self.
How indeed could the assimilated
Become that which assimilates.1
And:
Something cannot come from nothing.
Unwanted consequences would ensue:
The self would be something produced,
And though arisen, would not have a cause.2
Therefore, if the aggregates were the self, it would then arise and cease, yet it is not held to be something arising and ceasing. It would therefore make sense to draw the conclusion that the aggregates are not the self. It is hence not tenable that it is something inconstant.
That it is constant is just as untenable, as it is stated:
It is not tenable to say
That it existed in times past.
What took place in former lives
Is not identical to this.
One may think, ‘That was myself,’
But the assimilated was different then.
And what indeed is your own self
Apart from what is assimilated.3
When saying it has no birth and no decay, this is indicative of the statement the Master made about these two qualities when giving the unwanted consequence that, ‘It would be appearing and disappearing.’4
And concerning the line such qualities as permanence do not apply, as the Master states when considering the self through the analysis of the Tathāgata:
How could there in this peace
Be the four of permanence and so forth?
How could there in this peace
Be the four of finiteness and so forth?
He who grasps the gross idea
That the Tathāgata exists,
Has the idea that when transcended
He will no longer exist.
But being empty of inherent nature
It does not make sense to think
That he is existent or non-existent
When having passed beyond.5
It is not the same, nor is it something quite distinct from the aggregates. As stated:
If the self were the aggregates,
It would be appearing and disappearing.
If it was different from the aggregates,
It would not have the aggregates’ characteristics.6
Similarly:
Fuel is not the same as the fire.
…7
And why can one not entertain these ideas of constancy and so forth in relation to the self? Because, as it says, it is not real. If the self were by nature a real entity, ideas such as constancy and so forth could be relevant to it. But the self cannot have any of these since it does not exist. As stated in a sutra:
Four imperishable dharmas
Are taught by the World Protector:
Beings, space, the awakening mind,
As well as the Buddha qualities.
If these were substantial
They would be considered perishable.
But being non-existent they do not perish,
And are therefore called imperishable.8