If there was such a thing there would be no fault. But being unsubstantiated,
… Well that will be a feat to prove:
Why?
Inseparable continua make little sense. (6.60)
Possible means that something is feasible. It is not credible that mutually distinct existent identities constitute an inseparable continuum, because they are different, just like things that are separate. To show this, it was said:
What makes for Upagupta’s and Maitreya’s traits
Are different, and not part of one continuum.
And when distinct things keep their separate character,
It’s nonsense to believe they’re one continuum. (6.61)
The idea is similar here: that a singular continuum does not hold up to reason.
It was suggested that, ‘It is the fact of a potential ripening or not that determines whether there will be a consciousness of something or not, and not whether a knowable object is present or not.’1
This has hereby been refuted by explaining how potential is an impossibility; and we are therefore left with the position that, ‘Without a knowable object there can be no consciousness.’
Title
Chapter 1: Pramuditā
