With this analysis it therefore does not make sense for the person to be substantially existent.
The basis of the sense of self is thus no thing,
Not other than the aggregates, nor them themselves;
It isn’t their support, or else possessing them.
When the abode of the sense of self is analysed, that it is substantially existent makes no sense. It cannot be distinct from the aggregates, isn’t constituted by the aggregates, and doesn’t have a supportive relationship with them either. The words it is their support would imply that the aggregates exist based upon it, but as a succinct description it is meant to cover both options in the support-supported relationship. It also does not make sense that it possesses the aggregates.
Hence, it is still acceptable to assert that the self is an imputation, or imperceptible. But the aforementioned aspects may not be used to proclaim a self:
And yet related to the aggregates it’s there. (6.150)
With the simple expression, ‘based on this, that arises,’ no claim to production that is causeless and so forth is made, and the framework of the relative truth is not infringed upon. Similarly, in this case: when contingent on a dependent imputation, the faulty aspects mentioned are avoided, and thus retaining worldly convention and being accepted as an imputation contingent on the aggregates, a self is seen according to conventional designations.
Title
Chapter 1: Pramuditā
