The Practice of the Bodhisattvas: Negative Dialectics and Provocative Arguments

Edition of the Tibetan text of the Bodhisattvacaryāmirdadā with a translation and introduction

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What was the culture that created the voluminous and also in certain respects rich literature which labelled itself as True Buddhism; or, as the Superior or Great Vehicle, the way to religious freedom deemed by its adherents, and creators of this literature, as superior to the earlier mainstream tradition of Buddhism? From what kind of social milieu, out of which historical setting came the people who sometime around, or just after, the beginning of the first Western millenium created the literature of the Mahāyāna faith, the enormous literature which was rejected as forgery by what at the time was mainstream Buddhism? The adherents of the Great Vehicle indeed called their critics the Small Vehicle, even the Petty, or Mean, Vehicle, and those who composed their writings never seem to tire of criticizing the Hinayāna – which word they coined to characterize their opponents – both as regards religious ideals, philosophy, ethics and social behaviour: how often do we not read in the Mahāyāna sūtras of monks who are caught up in their scholastic theories and thought-constructions and do not see reality as it is, monks concerned only with their role as monks, or arhats, and not really concerned about religious development at all, and even worse, monks who are corrupt and not interested in anything but extracting gifts from lay people. The ideals and religious roles, as well as the viewpoints of the Lesser Vehicle were criticized as
being nothing but empty illusions – as indeed was supposed to be the basic character of existence on the whole – they were even blamed as thieves of the true religion of the Buddha.¹

This voluminous literature has not been studied to any great extent in its own right. It has mostly been studied as the foundation of later Mahāyāna scholasticism, as the Words of the Buddha as cited by the later systematizers and commentators on later Mahāyāna dogmatics, be it the adherents of the Madhyamaka, the Yogācāra, or the different schools in China and Tibet. The doctors of the Mahāyāna tradition, like other religious traditions, chose what they considered most important from the canonical literature, quoting and systematizing to support the dogma they were building, but in this process leaving out much of the contents of the older canonical collections. Thus we are left with a quite limited set of loci classici, which are quoted throughout Mahāyāna Scholasticism, loci found in the writings passed down to us under the names of Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, Sīhāramati and all the others, loci collected in anthologies like the Sūtrarāmanuyāya and Sūtrarāmacaryāya and the later works in the genre found in Chinese and Tibetan. These works made the reading of the original sūtras obsolete, as discussions on doctrinal matters were conducted on the basis of this limited set of loci. Thus the sūtras seem to have been recited by later tradition only as a ritual practice with little or no regard for the meaning.

As historians we should, however, also be concerned with the culture which created this tradition, and employ as sources not only what caught the interest of later Buddhist scholasticism, but, as an ideal, use all available sources for the period in question. From the voluminous Mahāyāna sūtra literature, our sources – as for Indian history generally – are very meagre, even taking Ceylonese, Tibetan and Chinese historiographical literature (the Indian historiographical literature being practically inextinct), as well as archaeological evidence, into consideration.

And even the Mahāyāna sūtra literature is quite limited, if not in extent, then as to its value as source of the history of the period in which it originated. As a genre it is rather to be characterized as fiction, full of flowery language and incidents that never could have claimed to be anything but fantasy, with instant communications between universes as many as in the sands of the river Gaṅgā, and fanciful periods and epochs of time: it seems that Indian culture was more concerned with eternal questions than relating to a couple of thousand years or so. Thus these texts do not give us much historical information, though some historical incidents have been, and may be, identified in the so-called prophetic (vyākhyā) contained in many sūtras.

Nevertheless, in this often inconsistent mixture of Mahāyāna doctrine and legend which is set forth in the early Mahāyāna sūtra literature, a view of man and his place in a very rich religious, philosophical and ethical universe is displayed, a view of man created by what must be respected as a fairly sophisticated culture – a culture which influenced East Asian, and even world culture, profoundly. This culture deserves to be described by historical science with the help of its whole range of methods, even though the sources may sometimes be difficult of access, being mostly lost in Sanskrit and preserved only in Chinese and Tibetan.

The following, then, as a small step on the way to describe early Mahāyāna culture, is an attempt to describe one small text as expressing an important trait of this culture, namely the part played by dialogue and the peculiar kind of rhetoric of Mahāyāna to win over opponents, and even to win intellectual freedom, which seems to have been highly regarded by the adherents of early Mahāyāna. The tools and principles of this rhetorical discipline has been systematized in the works of Nāgārjuna and his successors in the Mahāyāna scholastic traditions.

Even the title of our small text, Bodhisattvacaryā[n]ideśa, “The Teaching on the Practice of the Bodhisattvas”, bears witness to the importance attached to the methods of discussion and dialectics: in the text the practice of negative dialectics and provoking arguments is the main topic, there is no description of any bodhisattva practice apart from understanding “things as they are” by means of negative dialectics in a process of discussion. This is the bodhisattva practice, as described by this small sūtra.

I have elsewhere² ventured the hypothesis that Nāgārjuna played a role in systematizing the earliest Mahāyāna canonical collections – this being behind the allegorical legend that Nāgārjuna brought Mahāyāna scriptures back from the realm of the Nāgas. This, however, may seem very difficult to prove on the basis of the meagre material. But that Nāgārjuna was a systematizer of the main arguments in the early Mahāyāna sūtras is very probable – notwithstanding the contention of Kalupabana that Nāgārjuna’s background does not need to be Mahāyāna, since his arguments

¹ Bcm § 15, verse 10.
² Aṣṭ. vol. ii p. xliii.
are not the expression of a specific Mahāyāna position, and that no specific Mahāyāna doctrines are necessary as explanation of his Madhyamakakārikās. This may to a certain extent be true, but if one accepts the other works ascribed to Nāgārjuna, like the Ratnāvali, as genuine works of Nāgārjuna, Kalupahana’s arguments become considerably weaker. It would also be consistent, of course, with Madhyamaka thinking to play down one’s own position – thus it really should be expected that there is no significant emphasis on Mahāyāna tenets in such texts as the Madhyamakakārikās and the Vīgrahavyāvartanī. But, indeed, the Bcn – with many other Mahāyāna sūtras –contains ways of arguing which are recapitulated in Nāgārjuna’s works. The Kārikās especially have been interpreted from the angle of logic, as well as that of mysticism, which are clearly legitimate perspectives of approach. But, with the Vīgrahavyāvartanī, the Kārikās may also be looked upon as a work summarizing the main Mahāyāna arguments for use in philosophical and religious discussion, and thus the works may even be designated as works on rhetoric. Both works contain the figures of rhetorics which are typical for the Mahāyāna philosophical position – or “non-position”, which it would be more appropriate to call it according to its own way of thinking. Eloquence (pratibhāna) and memory (dharanā), the two main parts of rhetoric, are very often mentioned among the main virtues of a bodhisattva, thus showing how much these qualities were emphasized in the Mahāyāna. Winning a religious debate might mean that the faction to which the winner belonged would get privileges from the rulers, and debates were often performed as entertainment at the ancient Indian courts. Thus elegant sophistry was an art to be practised for influence and political power to promote certain religious views. There is no reason to doubt that the adherents of the Mahāyāna would take part in such debates, and their “no own position” principle and emptiness arguments must have been very effective rhetorical tools to use, and thus win supporters of the Mahāyāna movement. The radical criticism of traditional ontologies with the “non-position” of emptiness must have been difficult to meet, whether such ontologies were propounded by the adherents of abhidharma systems or non-buddha systems. The adherents of Mahāyāna are, as documented by most of their scriptures, very critical of the śrāvakayāna, i.e. the life of the monks, who are criticized not only for not taking responsibility for “all living beings” in their thirst for peace and a pleasant life of meditation, but also for extracting gifts from lay people and being outright corrupt. The moral is that it is better to be an ordinary man, anybody, even a small child as stated by Bcn, and work for the good of all, rather than adopting the artificial role of a monk’s life, that of the prārūpya. Thus also the role of the arhat is attacked for being nothing but self-illusion, a constructed role to attain the right to speak when important matters were to be decided in the religious communities. The participants of the Buddhist councils were, according to the traditional accounts, always arhats. It seems that this originally inner-religious ideal as described in the abhidharma systems gradually became a religio-political role, in the way that a person socially defined as an arhat would have the right of speech and authoritative decisions, and as such might become a focus of criticism from opposing factions. To show that the arhat is only an empty role, as the Mahāyāna adherents are described as venturing in their anti-authoritarian endeavour, would take away the genuine religious authority of the arhat and make him only the creation of a religious convention, a social construction, or even the outcome of pride and conceit (māna, manyā). And the doctrines of the arhat would amount to no more than discursive thinking and rhetorical figures (prappallika), thought-constructions (kalpa) or illusionary concepts (upallamātha). “Things as they are” (uññātā) are the negation of all this, as is the true awakening of the Lord.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{a}} D. J. Kalupahana: Nāgārjuna. The philosophy of the middle way. Albany 1986. The view that Nāgārjuna does not necessarily belong to the Mahāyāna was first set forth by A. K. Warder in his paper “Is Nāgārjuna a Mahāyānist?” (1973). Most scholars, though, see Nāgārjuna as “one of the first and most important systematizers of Mahāyānist thought”, as D. S. Racee expresses himself (p. 7) in The literature of the Madhyamaka school of philosophy in India (1981).
\[\text{\textsuperscript{b}} Lefebvre, Christian: Nāgāranāsana on the genuine works of Nāgārjuna. All the ascriptions to Nāgārjuna in this work are not uncontroversial – Ratnāvali, though, is among the most certain, v. p. 163ff. The Ratnāvali unmistakably contains many of the key teachings of the Mahāyāna, and its last chapter is even called Bodhitattvavacarīśasūtra (Ratnāvali p. 168: bhūtādhipatī śāstra ṣaṣṭa ṣaṣṭa pu).
\[\text{\textsuperscript{c}} Cf. Braarvig 1985.
\[\text{\textsuperscript{d}} Bcn § 10: “You are clad in the orange monk’s robes (kusumottara), and hold on to the role of a holy man (arhatvarmin yabhakṣī), but is not the consciousness of this [role] (raudhrāja), as well as its object (yacana) [i.e. the role itself], only empty (śūṇya)?” The critique of the arhat may ultimately go back to Mahāvīra’s five theses on the arhat. Further, the entire § 15 is devoted to the description of the uselessness of the prārūpya and the conceit of the monk.
This is indeed the situation described in the Bcn, where the audacious three year old boy – not at all one expected to fill a religious role – criticizes not only the traditional doctrines of the abhidharma systems with his provocative arguments, but any doctrine and viewpoint, even those of the Mahāyāna itself, and shows himself to be spiritually more advanced than the Lord himself, at least in earlier incarnations.

The way of arguing, then, described in the sūtra, seems close to that described in the works of Nāgārjuna, and forms a link between the works of Nāgārjuna and the early sūtra literature – what is systematized and formalized in the sometimes intricate verses of Nāgārjuna seems to have been acted out as debates between parties in religious competition. Such debates seem also to be the background of depictions in Mahāyāna sūtras of the śrāvaka who has to admit his views are nothing but thought-constructions and illusory conceptions of discursive thinking, being vanquished by the rhetorics of nothingness.

The main counter-argument against Nāgārjuna’s position of emptiness in the Vīrāhavāyavānti is: a) if Nāgārjuna’s words are empty and without own being or substance (asa-vabhāva), the teaching of Nāgārjuna must be false, since words without substance can convey no meaning; and b) if Nāgārjuna’s words have substance (asa-vabhāva) and thus convey meaning, the teaching of Nāgārjuna must be false, since his position that all is empty is contradicted if the words are not empty. The kind of argument is presented by Maudgalyāyana to Ratnadatta who claims that everything is deceptive and illusory. The “boy said: Maudgalyāyana, the world has the form of nothing but untrue, deception and illusion (mṛṣa-ñāṇa-sādākāra), and it deceives only the foolish (bīja). Maudgalyāyana said: If the world consists only of states of untruth and deception, then also this teaching of yours must be untrue and deception. So why do you then teach it (maudgalyāyana śravac ca sace loka mṛṣa-sādākāraṁ ca svakhāṇām ca nīlareṁ pī mṛṣa-sādākāraṁ svaṁ kāmadh deśayasya)”? Nāgārjuna answers to the objections that the very emptiness of his words demon-

strates the emptiness of all things, which again is illustrated with the simile of an illusory man (māyā-prabhava) having created another illusory person which he refutes. The emptiness of his words is founded on the argument that the words are neither part of, nor not something apart from, dependent origination, one of the main arguments for emptiness. The argument of Bcn is that nothing can be definitely concluded about reality which is – in its emptiness – beyond description. Thus the religious practice, as well as all categories of spiritual development must be discarded as discursive thinking and thought-construction: “Ratnadatta said: Since all moments of existence cannot be definitely pointed out, they cannot be demonstrated, or have a conclusion reached about them (स्वयत्वान्वित मूर्तिर्दृश्य न ते प्रतिपद्यते प्राप्ते ते). Thus they can also not be realized, abandoned, fully known or cultivated in meditation (सत्क्षार्तत्वाया प्राप्तावश्याया परिज्ञातायाः).”

The ontological status of the Tathāgata after death, which is also the topic of the Bcn paragraph in question, is an old theme in Buddhism. It is among the topics on which the Buddha remains silent when asked, since this knowledge is not conducive to liberation, as is the knowledge of suffering, etc. The passage “Whether the Tathāgata is existent after death is left unexplained by me, whether the Tathāgata is both existent and not existent after death is left unexplained by me, whether the Tathāgata is neither existent nor not existent after death is left unexplained by me” occurs at several places in the Theravāda canon. This passage is also among the first instances of Catuskoti, the four ontological possibilities as viewed by Buddhism, which become such an important background for the structure of the later Madhyamaka negative philosophy and rhetoric. Thus the Tathāgata is also treated in paragraph xxii of the Madhyamakakārikās, but here the concern is rather to refute any
ontological attributions to the Tathāgata – even emptiness – the concern is not only to refute such ontological attributions to the Tathāgata after his death as in the Theravāda canonical passage quoted. The speculations on the after-death status is described as a consequence of assuming that the Tathāgata exists before his demise – thus Nāgārjuna’s polemical position towards earlier tradition is evident, even though his treatment of the Tathāgata question is clearly based upon the views preserved in the Theravāda quotations, also treating the topics of kāraṇa and anuṣṭan in the perspective of the four ontological possibilities. In Bcn the question is also not the status of the Tathāgata only after death, but his status generally: it is emphasized that the Tathāgata is beyond any discursive thinking (prapañca), any conceptions (upalamba) and thought-constructions (kalpatā, vitalpa, manyātā). The discussion in Bcn is also built up in accordance with positions which have a bearing on the above-mentioned ontological possibilities. Thus the caturkāti seems to have been used as a rhetorical instrument, to refute all possible positions into which one’s opponent successively has been led by the argumentation. In paragraph 11 of Bcn Maṇḍalārya accepts the position that the Tathāgata does not exist, after his rhetorical question as to whether the Tathāgata has awakened and teaches religion has been refuted by Ratnadatta, who asserts that the wise should not make thought-constructions in answer to the question. In the third move of the discussion Maṇḍalārya has to admit that the Tathāgata is still part of tathatā, “suchness”, or more freely translated “things as they really are”. To answer Ratnadatta’s next provocative question: “Maybe you foster discursive thinking about what is beyond discursive thought (nispapañcaś ca prapañcaś ca)”. Maṇḍalārya adopts the position that he teaches by means of the conventions of the world (lokasaṃvṛti). But Ratnadatta contends that the conventions are nothing but deception, to which Maṇḍalārya tries the argument that Ratnadatta’s teaching must also be deceptive, which argument has been analysed above. Then, at last, on being rhetorically asked what is his relation to the boy’s gift to the Lord, comes Maṇḍalārya’s aporia, or toṣṭhinabhava, he has nothing to say – which effect is the one desired in the kind of dialogue which has as its aim to cure the opponent of his untenable viewpoints – if not viewpoints on the whole – which oppose his understanding of things as they really are.

Real religious sentiment, as offering things to the Buddha or the clergy, without intellectual and scholastic conceptualizations, is, however, not denied: giving with faith and without conceptions – in accordance with the principle of rīmāṇḍalapariśuddhi – is still prescribed, viz., that one should have no conceptions of giver, giving or recipient. This principle of “threefold purity” is clearly polemical against earlier tradition, where purifying the gift to get the maximum fruit (phala) was important. The monk is by epithet called “Great purifier of gifts”. The Dākkhiniśvāna gives detailed treatment of how the gifts between the moral give better fruit than a gift between immoral people. Bcn and Mahāyāna generally would argue that giving up the fruit altogether, to give up all thought-constructions of giving, and dedicating the good of all beings is the true purification of a gift, as it is in accordance with the

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11 As related to Mk xxii, 15: prapañcaś ca ye buddhām prapañcattām avyayam / te prapañcattāḥ savē na paśyanti tathāgatah / “Those who foster discursive thinking about what is beyond discursive thought do not see the Tathāgata, they are destroyed by discursive thinking”.

12 Cf. Pāippamattaharīṣikī p. 264: iha bodhiśānto māhātvaś ca dūravam āvāsakāṃ sa ratiṃ avadhūtaḥ / prapañcaś ca dūravam āvāsakāṃ sa ratiṃ avadhūtaḥ / “One who is destroyed by discursive thinking”.

13 Cf. Pāippamattaharīṣikī p. 264: dīnāya vīrapītā lokānapāyaṇaṃ avirattate / “One who is destroyed by discursive thinking”.

14 Bhn 20.

15 Bhn 20.

16 Bhn 20.

17 Bhn 20.

18 Bhn 20.

19 As related to Mk xxii, 15: prapañcaś ca ye buddhām prapañcattām avyayam / te prapañcattāḥ savē na paśyanti tathāgatah / “Those who foster discursive thinking about what is beyond discursive thought do not see the Tathāgata, they are destroyed by discursive thinking”.

19 Cf. Pāippamattaharīṣikī p. 264: iha bodhiśānto māhātvaś ca dūravam āvāsakāṃ sa ratiṃ avadhūtaḥ / prapañcaś ca dūravam āvāsakāṃ sa ratiṃ avadhūtaḥ / “One who is destroyed by discursive thinking”.

20 Bhn 20.
egoless and empty state of things. Rather than being concerned with maturation in the future of one’s action, one should mature one’s own earlier actions, practise great concentration and concentrate on emptiness.\footnote{20} The Mahāyāna shares this morality of giving up the hope for the fruit of any action with the Bhūpavādīgī, the difference of the two contexts being that any merit of action should be offered to God in the Gīta, but to all beings, or to awakening, in the Mahāyāna. Thus the gift of Ratnadatta is, in accordance with the Mahāyāna doctrine of transforming every action into the imperishable activity of the bodhisattva, described as imperishable.

The last verse of chapter xxii of the Kārikās dealing with the Tathāgata, states that the essence of the Tathāgata is also the essence of the world – which essence is the absence of essence\footnote{21} – verses closely related to those of the Kārikās stating nirvāṇa and samsāra to be the same.\footnote{22} This basic idea of the Mahāyāna is also developed in the following paragraph of Bcn.\footnote{24} The foolish construct such dualities as awakening (bodhi) and existence (samsāra) superimposing it on reality which is nothing but emptiness (śūnyatā). And there can be no extinction (nirvāṇa) when there is really no origination. Seeing the true state of things (dharma-rūpa) is to know that awakening is nothing but a convention of speech (vyavahāra), as is also existence (samsāra), and as such samsāra and nirvāṇa are not different. True learning is acknowledging this state of things – being occupied with conventions of speech is really the opposite of true wisdom. In this way Bcn is concerned not only with negative dialectics and rhetorics, it is also concerned with what may be called negative pedagogics: the true bodhisattva should be educated in understanding that all religious concepts are empty, and thus he is advised not to give up his passion and aversion, to practise the bad things, etc., in a way reminding us of the later Tantric literature.\footnote{23} Already the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, however, and other fairly early commentaries, treat this avabodhodhūsa vazacyya, which consists in the “intentional” language (samsārātva) of the Buddha, the aim of which is to free the disciple of preconceptions and habitual thought-constructions.\footnote{28} It is also frequently employed in other sūtras of the Bṛha. This, then, is the way to teach the bodhisattva: if he does not get scared – or offended like the eight monks who ended up in Hell\footnote{27} – he is a bodhisattva who will not fall back in his spiritual development. The question of what bodhi is a designation (adhisthānaka), Ratnadatta replies that the awakening is no designation, and as such unthinkable.\footnote{26} The Tathāgata is completely freed from conceptions – if the Tathāgata has conceptions of himself as the Tathāgata he is no Tathāgata.\footnote{25} As such the state of the Tathāgata, or bodhi, can also not be attained\footnote{29} – thus Ratnadatta says he has given up becoming a Tathāgata, even though he in the distant past is described as a more advanced bodhisattva than the former incarnation of the present Buddha,\footnote{32} which is the background of Śāriputra’s question why Ratnadatta has not reached awakening. ‘Awakening’ is only a conception (apalambha), ‘Tathāgata’ is only grasping for something inexistente (parāgraha), ‘liberation’ is only discursive thinking or a rhetorical figure (propaṭika).\footnote{32} Any spiritual attainment is only emptiness,\footnote{32} and thus “what is the use of constructing the assuming of a monk’s life (pravrajyakalpana)?” Things are anyway what they are.\footnote{32}

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\item \footnote{22} Bcn § 17.
\item \footnote{23} Bcn § 16.
\item \footnote{24} Bcn § 15, verse 3.
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— but with a most anti-authoritarian and anti-intellectualistic flavour. As such it is very close to the way of thinking of which Naigatrana has been celebrated as the foremost exponent. But the dialectical gymnastics of early Mahāyāna, in our case called the bodhisattvacaryā, cannot have been the whole of the bodhisattva practice — both ethics and inner spiritual culture of meditation, as well as the vocational training of the Buddha as the Universal Being, were also an integral part of the early Mahāyāna movement, though this is not emphasized in the Bcn, as it is also not in the Madhyamakakārikās or the Vigrahaśāvyāvartī.

The Bcn may also be classed as a dārakā/dārikā sūtra — a few other sūtras also have children as their main characters. Their function seems to be based on the idea that quite unexpected persons may be the most religious. This, of course, is connected with the whole bodhisattva ideology — the bodhisattva takes rebirth in any being to help other living beings, etc. Another example of the dārakā type is Sūcinī, the main character of the Svacittadārakasūtra, depicted as the son of Vimalakīrti, also placed on the lap of his nurse, holding a flower. The contents and style of this sūtra are very close to Bcn. As a possible Gandhara depiction of this child character one may refer to the image of a small boy kept in the National Museum in Delhi, which is reproduced at the beginning of this article. As example of a dārakā sūtra may be mentioned the Candrotarādārakānyakaraṇa, the main character of which is Candrotarā, the eight year old daughter of Vimalakīrti. Also the main character in Bcn, Ratnadatta, seems to be associated with the house or family of Vimalakīrti he is at least said to be the son of one Licchaviśrīmaṇa — the licchavi being the ruling dynasty of Vaiśali. Ratnadatta is mentioned in the list of the present bodhisattvas in the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa. Eight year old is also the girl Sunati, who in the Suttadīrakāryaparipṛcchāsūtra poses intriguing questions to the monks and to the bodhisattva Mahāsjīr - just in the style of Ratnadatta in Bcn. Some sections are so close to Bcn that they certainly should be gathered together.

The impact of the Bodhisattvacaryāvāraṇa on later tradition, not as expression of a certain trait of Mahāyāna Buddhism, but as a specific sūtra-text, is not at all overwhelming: to my knowledge it is quoted only once in extant commentarial literature, viz. in the Sūtrasamuccaya, on the topic of how much more important the message of negative dialectics is than the practice of the six pāramitās without this expedient means (upāya).

Thus the importance of the text is not its direct impact on later tradition, but what it has to say as an expression of the culture of early Mahāyāna Buddhism which created this tradition.

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35 It also bears, with the Madhyamaka philosophy, the characteristic of anti-intellectual movements that, paradoxically, become more intellectualistic than any because of an intricate rhetorical language which tries to prove that intellectual categories are illusory, that reality is beyond the categories of intellectual activity — not unknown even in modern movements of deconstruction, which term (by chance) is the etymological counterpart of nirvikalpa.

36 Not in Sanskrit or Tibetan, but three Chinese versions: T. 477 (大方便毘尼經) tr. Dharmarakṣa, A. D. 3081, 478 (大乘方等經) tr. Upāpiṇī, A. D. 545, 479 (妙業品輕) tr. Jñānapada, A. D. 591, Lancaster no. 122—24 identifies this text with the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa, which precursors the sūtra in T. — the error seems to be a repetition of the Nanjō catalogue nos. 145, 144, 181. Cf. also the Gaudariva p. 51 where the śrāvakāśrama is mentioned, and Vkm, introduction p. 86—88.

37 A systematic treatment of all the personae in the Mahāyāna sūtras as compared with the pieces of art from Gandhara and Mathura has not been undertaken. As many of these pieces are naturalistic portraits of what seems to be ordinary people without a specific religious role, such identifications are very difficult. These are, however, indications of a connection between the two above-mentioned types of art and the Mahāyāna movement. It should also be no surprise that the Mahāyāna may have furthered a free style of aesthetics with a naturalistic language of art, being anti-ideological and anti-authoritarian, concerned with lay people and the ordinary person and their qualities — above all with the individual as the focus of religion — rather than a clerical and formalized way of expressing religious truths as a defined and generalized ideology with a corresponding formalized language in the creative arts.


39 And elsewhere, as far as my knowledge goes, only in the Śramaṇapīṭhakṣaṇapāramitā p. 61, and in the manuscript that Burnout employed for his translation of the Sūdramunātadīrakārya, Burnout p. 2 and 303.

40 T. nos. 310 (309) (Ratnadatta chapter 30), 334 (Buddhikṣarṇaśāstra) tr. Dharmarakṣa A. D. 265, 335 (स्त्रावरिकारिक) tr. Kumāraśīla, 336 (विद्योत्तर) tr. Bodhisukha A. D. 693, Lancaster nos. 22 (30), 39, 36. Tibetan versions in about 6 folios.

41 As the conversation of Sunati with Mahāsjīr on the topic of the relation between bodhi and adhivacana, which is the same topic as that of Bcn § 16.

42 Bcn § 19, Sūtrasamuccaya p. 176: khye ‘a rin po che byin pa’i mdo las ‘byin bu’i ‘jam dpal byin stobs dpa’i shabs la skyes pa dus dbul byed bka’i byung ston du phyol tu phya pha drug la snyig pa bzhin gis ches kyi rnam gnyis ‘di the bzhin dals byas pas ‘ram par byed nams de bzhin bzhin mdo du bsol ba i got the bzhin med par bu stons cu smod ston yis yi ger bris nas bzhin ‘bzhin pa’i ddba’i ‘chad pa’i ddba gzhan du smod yis yis cu sen cu bsod pa la cu smod pa las gnas so /
Translation of the Bodhisattvacaryānirdeśa

1) The Lord stays in Vaśālī in the Kūtīgāraśīlā with a thousand monks described with items from the catalogue generally used to describe them (evam maya śrīnām ekasmin samayame bhagavān vaśālīyaṁ viharati sva mohīvane kūtīgāraśīlāyaṁ mahatā bhūkṣyaśranghaṁ sādham bhūkṣyaśrasvaṁ sarvaiḥ kūtīgrasravāṁ niṣṭeśāṁ vaśālīhitaṁ etc.) Only Āṇanda is not an arhat (ekopudgalan ān āśeṣyāṁ vaḥ udiṣṭaṣvamantum anudam).

2) Qualities of the thousand bodhisattvas present (bodhisattvasahasraṁ apya avastavikāṁ dhānṝṇapratibhedāḥ samatākāṁ pratiṣṭhāḥ).


4) The arrival of the Lord to Vaśālī is accompanied by miracles.

5) The main character, the three years old boy (dāraka) Ratnadatta, is introduced. Sitting on the lap of his nurse he sees the miracles, and

6) he wonders, in seven verses, from where they arise.

7) The nurse then praises the Lord in thirty-three verses based on tathāgatasya paryāyāṁ, the dvārīsannamahāpurusalaksanaṁ, the aṣṭī-anuvyāñjanī, and the saṣṭya-garvaśayanī.⁴⁴

8) (Ratnadatta sees the Lord and offers Him a lotus of gold.) Then the boy Ratnadatta told his nurse: “Put me in the window so that I can see the Tathāgata!” The nurse then put him in the window. The Lord read the thoughts of Ratnadatta (rātrataṇaya dārakasya cetasāvato cetotpavi-vitarkam ājñayā) and went to that lane. The boy Ratnadatta saw the Lord approaching, and he thought: “Those who do not produce the thought of awakening (bodhīcitta) have seen the Tathāgata with all his qualities (gama), are indeed unlucky!” Then the Lord went to the gate of Ratnadatta. Ratnadatta thought: “Such a remarkable being is to find even in a hundred thousand times ten millions of worlds aeons (satasahasrakotikula). I have to give an offering from this pavilion”, and he carried on his palm of his hand a lotus with a hundred thousand petals made of pure gold. Then he jumped down from the pavilion, and by the power of the Buddha (buddhanāma) he sat down in the air. Then the boy Ratnadatta offered the lotus, made of pure gold and with a hundred thousand petals, to the Lord; and as soon as it was out of the hands of the boy, the Lord made it into a lotus parasol in the space over his head and spread out a net of jewels.

9) (Verses on the meaning (artha)⁴⁶ of making an offering) Then the boy Ratnadatta spoke the following verses: When I offer this lotus to the Lord I do not wish anything in particular. Rather, in taking away the meaning (saravirūpapadhanāya), I seek the ultimate awakening (varadbodhī) (1). In accordance with the fact that in the unborn (anutpanna) awakening there is no attainment or loss, no accepting or giving away, I am giving this lotus (2). As for the meaning (artha) constructed (kālita) by ignorant people (bāla), this construct (kālita) is at least not the meaning. Rather, I give this offering to the supreme person (varapugdala) to take away all constrictions (sarvakalpadhāna) (3). Thus this flower offering will give me no maturing fruit (vipakapahala). Rather, I give this offering to take away all substances (sarvarasthāpānāya) (4). In my Buddha-land (budhahakṣetra) only the victorious supreme way (jina-

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⁴³ The first seven paragraphs, as well as the last three (22–24) are given only in summary, as the contents are more or less common to the sūtra literature, and thus not in a specific way related to the main problems to be treated in this paper.

⁴⁴ Cf. Mvy, Edg., etc., on the lists of these descriptions of the Buddha.

⁴⁵ The full translation starts from here.

⁴⁶ Artha may also be translated as “purpose”, “aim”, etc., in this context.
varāyana) will be followed, the words śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha are not even mentioned (5).

10) (On the emptiness of any spiritual attainment.) Then the venerable Mahāmaudgalyāyana spoke the following verse to the boy Ratnadatta: Even if you have given an offering to this teacher with faith (śraddhā), how will you ever become a Buddha with such a perverted attitude (viparitamāna)? Then the boy Ratnadatta spoke the following verses to the venerable Mahāmaudgalyāyana: All these things are unborn (anatman), the composite things (samskṛta) are empty (tacchā) and worthless (rūka). So, among such things (dharma), where is something which really originates (vastuta upadāyate) (1)? You are clad in the orange monk’s robes (kaśāyaśīvā), and hold on to the role of a holy man (ārhatvamān grhini), but is not the consciousness of this role (tattvajñāna), as well as its object (gocara) [viz. the role itself], only empty (śūnya) (2)? The ten millions Buddhas are not pleased (ārūgā) by one based on concepts (upalambo), but if one peacefully (dātā) regards them, there is not one of the ten millions who are not pleased (ārūgīta) (3). So how can Maudgalyāyana be the victim of such concepts? You should rather purify your thoughts (citta) [cf. preconceptions], whoever the person is making an offering (4)!

11) (Dialogue between Ratnadatta and Mahāmaudgalyāyana on the ontological status of bodhi and tathāgata.) Then the venerable Mahāmaudgalyāyana addressed himself to the boy Ratnadatta: But, my boy, has not the Tathāgata realized the incomparable perfectly complete awakening, does he not teach religion (kathām dāraka tathāgata nānuttāryāyam sa-myakshambodhaḥ abhisaṃbuddhaḥ na dharmaṃ deśayaṁ sma)? Ratnadatta answered: the wise should not make awakening the object of discursive thoughts (na paññitena bodhiḥ prapaññayatiya) or construct the Tathāgata by his conceived thoughts (na ca tathāgato maññayati), he should not make construction as “moments of existence do not arise” (na dharmaṃ na tattvayaṁ ṣaṣṭi na kalpayaṁ viṣṇu), he should not make construction as “all moments of existence are composite” (na sarvadarmah samskṛtāḥ iḥ kalpayaṁ), he should not make construction as “all moments of existence are non-composite” (na sarvadharmaḥ anasaṃskṛtāḥ iḥ kalpayaṁ), he should not make construction as “being born and unborness (upāddhatāpāda), “existent and non-existent (bhāvabhāva),” “grasping and giving up (heypośeyā),” “connection and disconnection (saṃyogav- yoga),” “going and coming (gatyāgati),” “remaining and changing existence (sthitiyati),” “states of desire, dislike or bewilderment (ṛaga-dharmadeve-dharmamohadharmam),” he should not make constructions like “truth or untruth” (na dharmadharmaḥ iḥ kalpayaṁ).” Because of ignorance (avidyā) there is birth (upapati) in the states of ordinary men, disciples, isolated Buddhas (prthagjanadharmadravakadharmopr- yekabuddhabuddhabuddhabuddhaḥ), in pure and pure states (saṃ- klīṣadharma varavādītadharma), in states of forms (rupīnaṃ), without form (ārūgīya), with or without conceptual thinking (saṃjñayamānībhūtāḥ), with or without essential character (lakṣānaṃākṣāna), of pure conduct (purusuddhāryā), where things are seen as universally equal or non-equal (saṃavāsāyatā), in body (kūṣṭa), mind (citta), where all things are fundamentally understood or not fundamentally understood (sarvadharmaḥ yoniso’ yonītāḥ), such constructions he should not make (iti na kal- payayaṁ).

So what do you mean, Maudgalyāyana, has the Tathāgata realized the incomparable perfectly complete awakening (tat kīṃ manyasate maudg- alyāyanaḥ tathāgato nānuttāryāyam samyaksaṃbodhaḥ abhisambuddhaḥ)?: Maudgalyāyana answered: Well then, [according to what you have said] he cannot have (udvīca no hādam).

Ratnadatta said: But can it be accepted that the Tathāgata is not included in things as they are, that awakening is not included in things as they are, that an ordinary being is not included in things as they are (udvīca kīṃ tu na tathāgatas tathātūntārangama na bodhis tathātārga ma na prthagjanas tathātārga iṣayate)? Maudgalyāyana answered: No, it can also not be [accepted that he is not included in things as they are] (maudgalyāyana udvīca no hādam).

Ratnadatta said: Maybe you foster discursive thinking about what is beyond discursive thought (ratnatto dāraka udvīca tvam maudg- alyāyanaḥ na prapañcaḥ prapañcaḥ)? Maudgalyāyana answered: As

47 Cf. the similar argument in Vīgy commentary to verse 2 as opposing ātāvāta and refutation in verse 23: śarvbhūtvāyāntaṃ ca viṣvarūpaṃ l kāmic cūñeyuṣa sarvabhūtvā yādavat maṅgalaṃ, yendhāntīyāt sarvabhūtvābhavābhav pratiṣed- hikāh i l and udvīva by āsavass na sarvabhūtvāyāntaṃ mukvamās, nādaś āśīrpan, udvīya sarvabhūtvā āśīrpanaḥ “Your statement is included in all things, but how then can it be that among all void things your statement is non-void, the statement by which the absence of substance in all things is refused?” and “Since things thus is this not the case that my statement is not included among all things, and it is not non-void, as all things are not non-void.”
for me, I teach by means of conventions [understood by] the world (maudgalyāyana avaca aham tu lokasambhavā devaśāṃ). The boy said: Maudgalyāyana, the world has the form of but untruth, deception and illusion (māsājosankalpaka), and it deceives only the foolish (bala). Maudgalyāyana said: If the world consists only of states of untruth and deception, then also this teaching of yours must be untruth and deception. So why do you then teach it (maudgalyāyana avaca sace loka māsājosankalpaḥ ayaṇa ca nireṣehi 'pi māsājosā-
dharmā tuṣṇā kṣaṇām devaśāṃ)?

Ratnadatta said: Since all moments of existence cannot be definitely pointed out, they cannot be demonstrated, or have a conclusion reached about them (avaca sarva dharmā maudgalyāyanaṁ nādiśaṁ na te prati-pādīḥ prayāya ca). Thus, they can also not be realized, abandoned, fully known or cultivated in meditation (na sākṣāktaṁ avaca prabhātāvā na pariṣṭhitāvā na bhavati).

Maudgalyāyana said: But for what reason do you make an offering to the Tathāgata (maudgalyāyana avaca ahaṁ tuṣṇa yadāḥ samhātaṁ tathāgatam purīyasa)? The boy said: Maudgalyāyana, are you the Tathāgata? Are you the giver of the offering? Or are you one of the others who gives (dāraka avaca sarva maudgalyāyanaṁ tathāgatavo dātā vau dānām vāpālambhate)? To this the venerable Maudgalyāyana had nothing to say (athaśyaṁ maudgalyāyanaṁ tāṁśaṁ bhūvahāvā).

The boy Ratnadatta said: Thinking in this way, Maudgalyāyana, I have completely given up becoming a Tathāgata – those fostering the attitude found in the way of disciples have in fact not attained much (ratnadatta dāvaka avaca maya maudgalyāyana tuvaśa cintayitaṁ tathāgata bhavāṁ pari parivartaṁ. ye śravakaṁ cāditaṁ uppādyāyanti lābhā te durādhaṁ hi).

12) (Verses by Ratnadatta on true and conventional learning, and the empty identity of sansāra and nirvāna) Maudgalyāyana said: As for your age, you are very young, but you are like an ocean by your insight (prajñā) How long have you been trained (sākhī) in those teachings (dharma)? Ratnadatta said: All my learning (sākṣa) has disappeared, because what is learning is really not learning: That in which there is no learning is the learning of the wise (1). The topics (artha) on which you have asked me are all within the common concepts of any being (sat-tvāsāyita). In this teaching, however, no origination (upādā) is found among any moments of existence anywhere (2). The foolish (bala) construct (kalpayanta) awakening (bodhi) and existence (sansāra), but how can you the reverend monk (bhaddante), admit the teachings of the foolish (buddhodharma) (3)? The wise do not teach (kalyayanta kaśalā); questions like “How long?” “How short?” since moments of existence have no age: this is the way one should understand them (4). “Foolish (bala),” “teachings of the foolish (buddhodharma),” “teachings of the Buddha (buddhodharma),” “The Victorious (vina),” the wise (dhiṁa) do not make such distinctions. You should rather see such teachings as part of emptiness (śūnyata) (5). “The great sage (maharṣi) attained Awakening (buddhi),” this is an illogical construction (ayuksakalpita). Since there is no origination (upādā) among the moments of existence, how can there be an extinction (nirvāna) be obtained (6). The moments of existence are endless (ananta), the Lord has said, and a liberated (vimala) being is inexistent (abhava). So do understand that there is not a difference between existence and extinction (7). Among all these forms there is no increase or decrease, the wise are not deluded (en mahyante) by the moments of existence without distinctions (aprabhinnā) (8). The foolish believe they have attained and found, the foolish believe they have attained extinction (nirvāna): they are rather passionately attached to existence (sansārasamprākta), conceited thinking (māyaya) is the snare of the 5th One (mārāvahana) which binds them (9). One thinking “I have attained” has not attained anything, he has rather succumbed to the ignorance (avidya) by which he goes to new rebirths (punarbhava) (10). After one is placed on the seat of awakening (buddhi) there are no viewpoints (drsti) and nothing more to get rid of. And this awakening (bodhi) of the Buddhas is only a conventional expression (yuvahāra) without meaning (anartha) (11). It is impossible to express the awakening (bodhi) and extinction (nirvāna) with conventional expressions (yuvahāra). Those viewing things this way discern (vijñānati) the true state of things (dhamma) (12).
13) (The Lord relates Ratnadatta's earlier lives): Then the venerable Sāriputra asked the Lord: How long, Lord, has the boy Ratnadatta practised this teaching? The Lord said: At the time the Tathāgata Dīnapākka gave me the prophecy of awakening (vyūkāraṇa), when I had reached the kind of tolerance that all moments of existence are unborn (anuttaptakadharmānāṁ prajñāpratītiḥ), at that time this boy was the greatest of the bodhisattvas established in emptiness (vikāra-vajra), according to the words of Dīnapākka. And at the time I was one for the first time to produce the thought of incomparable perfect awakening (anuttarānāmyaṃ pārskṛtaṃ prajñāpratītiḥ), Sāriputra said: But Lord, what is the cause (hetu), what is the reason (pratīti) why this boy Ratnadatta has not reached the incomparable perfect awakening? Ask the boy himself, he will tell you, the Lord said.

14) (Why Ratnadatta has not attained awakening): Then the venerable Sāriputra addressed the boy Ratnadatta (bhikṣuṇī sāriputā ratnadatṭha dīrapagāmā ānāmaṃ samādhiṃ sāmāyamānāhā nābhāsbhāsadhūḥ?) Ratnadatta answered: I do not have any concepts of an incomparable perfect awakening (tvaṃ kasya hetor anuttarāyam samākṣaṇaḥ bhūtah ānāmānāhā rashmā nābhāsbhāsadhūḥ?), therefore I do not wake up (ratnadatta vācā anuttarāsamāyakṣaṇendhārā anāpalanabhāt tasmā nāham abhāsbhāsadhūhe), Sāriputra said: But this Tathāgata, after his perfect awakening, does not believe according to such conceptions, does he (kīṃ tu tathāgataḥ 'yam abhāsadbuddhānā mūpalambhe care?) Ratnadatta said: If the Tathāgata grasps at the [idea of] complete awakening (yadu tathāgataḥ bhāsadbuddhiṃ grāhāyaḥ), he is one who is possessed of concepts (upalambha), and so he does not wake up, he does not renounce (nābhāsbhāsadbhūte na praṣādhāya), such is the teaching (iti dhammayavanā). Sāriputra said: How far have you reached in progress in the four qualities (caturdharma-praṇāpāti) and in tolerance (kṣīṃtā) by

53 Reading ma dīpa pa for ma dīpa pa with the support of T. p. 702c23-24. 荊雲云 何 = 如來成佛相稱
54 The meaning of chos gnyi bu ni is also difficult, it may be a late Tibetan insertion, as there does not appear to be any trace of it in the Chinese version. The meaning of the sentence, however, seems clear: if the Tathāgata holds on to the conceptions of buddha-nature, he is no Tathāgata, since the Tathāgata, according to Mahāyāna premises, is beyond any conceptions, thought-constructions, discursive thinking, etc.
55 What the "four dharmas" are, is not clear, nor the reconstruction paripakvasamaṇaḥ.
56 Is "When they have put on the garb of the monks" to be implied? sūkṣma gosā bha correspond to chādāyān āsā according to Mvy 5179.
thought (citta/svabhāvata) in all the aspects of thought, and thus they do not understand that the viewpoint (ārthi) of our teacher (vināya) is without any real nature (nītisvabhāvata) (5). Because in the viewpoint (ārthi) proclaimed by the Victorious One (ājnatā) with the pure eye (of wisdom) (vijñānakṣaṇa), there is really no view (ārthi nātī). And that is why the wise (praḥūtā) do not hold on to a view like “I am liberated” (nāham mukta iti grāhah) (6). Those who do meditation in grasping for distinguishing marks (niśittapraṇāhahāvata) become bewildered (mūryante) by conceptions of themselves (ātmanapalāmbha), thus some unwise people (akṣalā) reject emptiness (śūnyatā) calling it inexistence (abha-)

47. Existence things (bhāvā) are like a dream, an illusion (svapn-avāśā). But having constructed (kalpayaṇā) their existence in their thoughts (matinā), these unwise people (akṣalā) call it extinction (nir-), when things existent (bhāvā) have disappeared (māta) (8). Rather, when they base themselves on the body, their [true] concept of morality (śīlesanījā) is destroyed (vināṭa), and by mental conceptions (cittapalāmbha), their [true] concept of meditation (bhāyanusājījā) is destroyed (vināṭa) (9); and in the same way, by conceptions of what insight is (prajñāpalāmbha), the concept of their true potentiality (bhajasanījā) is confused (vināśita). Because they really are only clever in the ways of the world (lokantarikakālaśa) such people should rather be called thieves of religion (dharma). (10). In all these moments of existence (dharma) it is found the unfulfilled light (asamjñātāpagrabhāvata) of true reality (dharmanātha), so what can you tell me of the meaning of assuming a monk’s life (pravrajyārtho) (11)? All moments of existence are without difference (nānātīva), they are like an echo (pratāsrutka). The wise people never make thought-constructions (nā kalpayanti) concerning the field of the saints (āryagacchā) (12). In the moments of existence (dharma), which have the essential character of not being anything else but what they are (anamalaksana), being what they are (tathātā), not being in another way than they are (anamathyā), being without change (nirvikāra), what is the use of constructing the assuming of a monk’s life (pravrajyākāpānta) (13)?

16. (On the designation bodhi and the instruction of the bodhisattva in the beginning of his development) Then the bodhisattva Mahāprajñāpati-

bhūta spoke to the boy Ratnadatta: Boy, of what is “awakening” a designation (bodhī iti dāraka kasya tatha adhivacanam)? Ratnadatta said: Mahāprajñā, awakening is no designation (ratnadatta uvacca nāsti mahāprajñā bodhī adhivacanam). Mahāprajñā said: Thinking what (yatatā cintayati) do you say so? Ratnadatta said: Mahāprajñā, the nature of things is unthinkable (dharmanā mahāprajñā acintyā), thinking thus I will teach about it (tā maṣṭikavat cintayati nīrdeṣyā). Mahāprajñā said: But what kind of instruction will you teach, how will you instruct the bodhisattva in the beginning of his development (atra katham ādikarmikaya bodhisatt- tvasvāsāvādō nīrdeṣya katham anuśāsaṇyā)? Ratnadatta said: One should speak like this – do not give up your passion (rāga), do not fight your aversion (dvesa), do not clear away your bewilderment (moha), do not liberate (ucchā) yourself from your body (kāya), practice (ca-r) the bad things (akṣa), do not hold back (nīgrhaḥ) your views (ārthi), do not be conscious of the bonds (ātma) worldly things (sanyojana), grasp for (prarēgah) the personality (kāsinā), amass (āpanīkē) the spheres of sense-perception (dhitu), move about (ca-r) among the fields of sense-perception (āyata), do not leave (ati-) the stage of fools (bālbhānā), frequent (āgama) the bad (akṣa), give up the good (ka-, do not think of (manaskṛtya) the Buddha, do not reflect (cinti) on religious teachings (dharma), do not give offerings to (pīj) the congregation of monks (śaṅgha), do not take the training (śikṣā) upon yourself (samādhi) do not seek (prābhava-) the peacefullness of existence (bhavacmayya), do not cross over (utr-) the river [of existence] (aṅgha). This kind of instructions one should teach and give to the bodhisattva in the beginning of his development (ādikarmikā). Why? Because this state of the moments of existence and nothing else is their [true] state (iṣya dharmanām dharmasthitānāḥ śūnya eva). Foolish people (bāla) explain things (vyākhyā) in accordance with moments of existence of arising (upadharma) and moments of existence of disappearance (nīrodha-)

dharma). This sphere of all moments of existence distinguishes itself by being beyond thought-constructions (sa tva dharmanāma nirvikāpābhāvāhā), and understanding the essential character of all these moments of existence in this way is awakening (yasya esā yām anāmām sāvahāsīyam anubodhāḥ sā bodhī iti). If he taught in this way and does not become afraid, scared or terrified, then he is a bodhisattva not turning back in his development, one who has a part in the stage of never turning back (sva evam upadhiṣṭo nātṛsana na sāṃrūṣaya na sāṃrūṣaṃ āpadyeta sattvaivaśvārtho bodhisattva śvāttvāvāśvārtho iti jñā-
17) (Eight provoked monks: At that time eight monks (bhikkhus), victims of their preconceptions (asupalambhika) did not approve of this kind of religious exposition (dhammaparyaya), and left, going away from that congregation (parisaad). But warm blood flowed out of their mouths and they died. Then they were born in the great hell (mahānāraka) Raurava. Then Mahāsīkharabhūta addressed the Lord: Lord, did you see the great harm that appeared when these monks had heard this exposition of religion? The Lord said: Do not say that, Mahāsihi. If these monks had not heard this exposition of religion, they would never have been born in the good places of the universe (sagāri) in a million kalpas (kalpanayata), and so, how could they meet and please a Buddha? Now they will, even though they heard this exposition of religion with doubt (sākāra), be born in the Tusiita heaven after they have died (cīryā) in the great hell Raurava. Then, in sixty-eight kalpas, they will please (ārājgatiyantti) ten times hundred thousand millions of Tathāgatas, and they will by miraculous birth (asapādikā) be born as universal kings (cakravartirājā). And during one kalpa, they will be born as Tathāgatas, Arhats, Perfect Buddhhas with the name Vimalaprabha.

18) (Sons of gods praising the teaching:) Then those sons of gods (devaputra) heard those prophecies, and, with eighty thousand others went to the place where the Lord was staying, and sprinkled divine flowers (devapuppa) all over the city of Vaśāli. All of them were overjoyed by this exposition of religion (dhammaparyaya), saying: Lord, we are so happy, and we pray that you will disseminate this way of awakening (bodhinayā) of the Tathāgatas. In the moment of their happiness they became [bodhisattvas] never turning back (avaiyoartika) from the incomparable perfect awakening, and eighty-four thousand beings in Vaśāli became [bodhisattvas] never turning back (avaiyoartika) from the incomparable perfect awakening. Twelve thousand developed a pure sight for the moments of existence, without impurities (vīra vijñata-agamānā bhāma nīcākṣa-viśuddham).

19) (On the merit of the teaching:) Then the Lord addressed Mahāsihiṣkharabhūta: Mahāsihi, if you compare a bodhisattva who practises the six perfections (sādārāmīśa) in a period of hundred thousand kalpas without expedient means (upayakusālaya) with whoever hears this exposition of religion even with doubt (sākāra), then the last-mentioned has acquired more merit (punya) than the former. So what shall we say about whoever hears it without doubt (sākāra)? And what shall we say about whoever writes it down, whoever reads it, remembers it and teaches extensively to others? Mahāsihi, whoever wishes to attain the stage of a saint (arhatva) should be trained in this teaching (dharma), whoever wishes to attain isolated awakening (pratyekabodhi) should be trained in this teaching, and whoever wishes to attain the incomparable complete awakening (anuttarasaṃyaksambho) should be trained in this teaching.

20) (Ratnadatta’s imperishable offering:) Then the boy Ratnadatta said to his nurse: Nurse, give me some food so that I can give an offering to the Lord! Ther the boy Ratnadatta’s nurse filled a bronze vessel with food of human nature, and the boy Ratnadatta said to the Lord: Lord, as long as the whole of this congregation of monks is not satisfied with the truth which is the truth of the imperishability of all moments of existence (sāravatthakāyata-saṅkha), there will be no decrease of what is in this bronze vessel! Then, after filling the almsbowl of the Lord, the boy Ratnadatta said to the congregations of monks: Venerables, he who is out of compassion (asukampī puṇḍāya) for me will accept these alms (piṇḍapāta) which will bring me great fruit (bhavaphala), he who will not purify the gift by his body (yo na dukṣinām kālāna vissāyata), who will not purify the gift with his thought (yo na cātāna vissāyata), who will not purify the gift by his speech (yo na cātāna vissāyata), who will not purify the gift by his mind (yo na cātāna vissāyata), who will not make any merit (punya) or maturing result (vipāka), for whom there is no action (karma) by body, speech or mind, who does not cling to the unconditioned (sankha), who is not sullied by the qualities of the ordinary person (prahāganadharmanupāla), not dependent on the qualities of the disciple (śrāvakadharmānāśrita), he who has not started on the way of the Buddha (bhuddhayānānirvāya), who wishes not to start on the way of the Buddha, may he receive it! After this no-one from the congregations of monks received the vessel. Then the boy Ratnadatta said: As for me, I wish to give, and you wish to eat, and I have no expectations whatsoever (nipratīkāya) to the venerables, so accept! The splendour of qualities of the buddha-fields (bhuddhayānānirvāya) of a hundred thousand times ten million bodhisattvas of the greatness of Mahāsihi, a hundred thousand times ten million times greater than this will be the qualities of my buddha-field! By this truth (saṅkha), by the truth in this word of truth
(satyavacana), by this word of truth, may the almsbowls of all of you be filled from this bronze vessel, and may the bronze vessel never be exhausted (parikṣiṣṭa)! Then the almsbowls of the monks in all those congregations were filled, and as many were the crowds of inhabitants in that city, all of them were satisfied by the boy Ratnadatta with food having hundred tastes. But the alms were not consumed (ma kṛṣṇa).

21) (The admonition of the Lord to a bodhisattva:) Then the Lord spoke to the boy Ratnadatta: These, Ratnadatta, are the five kinds of purification of a gift. What five? (a) the bhūvāvan ramadattam dīvāvaram ānānāvartvate svam, padaṁsthitī ratnadatta bodhisattvasya daksināparishuddham, palaṁ katanāmī, tad yathā; He does not have conceptions of the body (kāyaṁ nāpalaṁbhe), he has no conceptions of the thoughts (cittam nāpalaṁbhe), he is not attached to the gift (dānaṁ 'nabhitāvijñāt), he wishes no result (vipāke nāsphraits), he wishes no result for the one receiving the gift (pratigrabhdākānām avipākāh). And these four things, Ratnadatta, the bodhisattva should realize. What four? (c) vacravyā ime ramadattā nityāṁ sakṣatkaravāvṛti, katanāmī civrṛrtī, tad yathā; Concentration on eminence (śānyaśravaṇadhiḥ), recollection of the Buddha (buddhānaśmrtih), absolute compassion (mahākaruṇa), manumutation of own former actions (svakarmavipāka).

22) Prophecy of Ratnadatta given by the Lord: Ratnadatta will be a perfect Buddha in thirty kalpas with the name Amoghabalakir. The number of disciples will be immeasurable (ananta), they will all be avatārīkā bodhisattvas, their lustre will be immeasurable, as well as their span of life.

23) Mañjuśrī asks for the title of the exposition of religion, which is given as Bodhisattvacaryā, (as in the title above) and “The being from the real nature of the moments of existence” (dhammatattājana).

24) Concluding paragraph on the joy of all on hearing the sermon of the Lord.

The Tibetan text of the Bodhisattvacaryānirdesa

The text as here established is based on nine versions, viz. the Derge (D), Narthang (N), Lhathang (J) and Peking (Q) xylographs, and the London (L), two Hughpar (P., and P'), Stog (S) and Tokyo (T) manuscripts. It has been edited on the principles laid down by the careful work of Helmut Einzer and Paul Harrison. The different versions fall into three groups, in which LST, DJNQ, and P,P have most readings in common. JNQ form a subgroup of DJNQ since D shares more readings with LST than does JNQ. All the versions seem to go back to one archetypal version which may possibly be the Old Narthang—different from D. KFP and AK seem to be a more accurate copy of the original from which it is copied than P., P may be a second copy which was made as the first copy was not considered satisfactory, though even P has many errors compared to the other sources. P, however, may be a direct copy of the Old Narthang, notwithstanding all errors. In one case, P and P have as the only sources the correct reading rab for ra. If it is accepted that P is positioned this way on the stemma codicum, readings which P has in common with one or more other sources should with a high degree of probability be the readings of the Old Narthang. D seems to have most correct readings. To which extent these readings are a result of confabulations or not is difficult to decide. The divisions into paragraphs as numbered from 1 to 24 are not in the original text, but are made to clarify the contents of the text.

1) rgya gar skad du / rgya bo dhi satva' tsera' nir de  să nā ma ma há' yā na sā tra / sod skad du / p'i phags pa bya' chub sems dpa' i spyod pa bstan pa žes bya ma tshog pa chen po'i med po / sars rgyas da / bya' chub sems dpa' thams cad la phag yis 'tshal lo /
(1) 'দি স্কাদ ব্যাগ গিস থোস (Q107a) পাই (P2: 219a) দুই গিস না / বিমান লাম 'দস যাত্রা পান ক্যান' না / তাল চেন 'পুরুষ থাকে ব্রেডসে পাই' গ্রাস না 5 / দে শন শন (D93a) থাম পাই / দে শন গিস না 'দুই চেন পর থামস কাদ ক্যান 6 / দ্রাগ ব্রো পা / জাগ পার 7 / ওয়ন মো পা (T305a) মে পা 8 / দ্বার দান দান পর গ্যান পা / সুম সিন দ্বার নাম পর গ্যাল 9 / আখর সিন তু 10 / রাম পা (P3: 30a) গ্যাল (N153b) বা 11 / চার সেস পা / তাল চেন পর থাম / ব্যান পা / ব্যাগ পা 12 / প্লার চেন পা / নাম জাগ পা / যাদ (S33o) পা / দান পা (T83o) সিস সিন 13 / রাম পর গ্যাল 8 / সমস ১৮ থামস কাদ ক্যান দ্বার 14 / দান পা / প্লার ২০ 15 / ব্যাপার যান 16 / ব্যান পা / দান 17 / দান পা / প্লার ২২ 18 / দান পা / প্লার ২৩ 19 / লস্ট বান 20 / দান 21 / প্লার ২৪ 22 / লস্ট পা 23 / প্লার ২৫ 24 / লস্ট পা 26 / লস্ট পা 27 / লস্ট পা 28 / লস্ট পা 29 / ন্যাসেস ৩০ / ন্যাসেস ৩১ / পা ৩২ 25 / পা ৩৩ / উন্মাদ ৩৪ / লস্ট পা ৩৫ / লস্ট পা ৩৬ / লস্ট পা ৩৭ / লস্ট পা ৩৮ / ন্যাস ৩৯ / ন্যাস ৪০ / ন্যাস ৪১ / ন্যাস ৪২ / ন্যাস ৪৩ / লস্ট পা ৪৪ / লস্ট পা ৪৫ / লস্ট পা ৪৬ / লস্ট পা ৪৭ / লস্ট পা ৪৮ / লস্ট পা ৪৯ / ন্যাসেস ৫০ / ন্যাসেস ৫১ / ন্যাসেস ৫২ / লস্ট পা ৫৩ / ন্যাসেস ৫৪ / লস্ট পা ৫৫ / ন্যাসেস ৫৬ / লস্ট পা ৫৭ /}
The text in the image is not legible due to the quality of the image.
ナセイのネガティブな影響とアプローチの違いの説明

khun du bâg go // de nas bcom ldan 'das kyis khye'u rin chen byin gyi' sems kyi yôts pa srot' pa thugs kyi' mkhyen nas 39 sran de kho nang gêgs (N158a) so // khye'u rin chen byin gyis kyân' 40 bcom ldan 'das gêgs pa mthông no // mthông nas kyân 41 de 'di sâm du dums te / gan dag de bzin gêgs pa yon (P, 34h) tan thams cad dan dán pat' // 'di la bu mthông nas byan chub kyis sems skyed par so bi mi byed pa de dág ni (J16a) rîed pa las rîed pa gîn sâm mo // (T309a) de nas bcom ldan 'das khye'u rin chen byin gyis skyed dru de gêgs so // de nas khye'u rin chen byin 'di sâm du dums te / sams can khâyad par can 'di la bu' ni sksald pa (L312a) bye ba phrag 'bum du yain' rîed par dka' bas? // khan bziag 29, 'di las dag gis mchod par bya o sâm mo // (N158) de nas de'i tshe khye'u rin chen byin gyis ral gis gyis ser las bya pa'i pad ma 33 'dâb ma 'bum dan ldan pa btsren' // lag mthîl de khyer no // de nas khye'u rin chen byin gyis khan bziag 29, 'di las dag gis gyis mchod mchos 34 so // de sâns râggya kyi mthins nas mkhâ 35 bar snan la 'dag go / de nas de'i tshe khye'u rin chen byin gyis skyed par bya o sâm mo // de nas bcom ldan 'das khye'u rin chen byin gyi' lag nas bni nas 'di bcom ldan 'das dâm la 'di phuls 20, 36 de khye'u rin chen byin gyi' lag nas bni nas 'di bcom ldan 'das khye'u rin chen byin gyis skyed par bya o sâm mo // de nas bcom ldan 'das kyis dün bi dra thad kyi sti 37 nam mkhâ 26 bar snan la (N158) par 38, 39 dugs du byas te 39 rin po 'di dra ba yain bres so // (P, 224a)

(10) de nas tshe dán ldan pa maud gal' gyi' 40 byu chen pos' khye'u rin chen byin 'li shtsigs pa de smârs pad' khôy ni ston' pa 'di 'dra la // dad phos mchod pa byed mod' 41 // blo gro phyin ci log gyur na 42 ngsu snyi ni ji ltar 'gyur 43 // de nas khye'u rin chen byin gyis' te dâm ldan pa maud gal' gyi' 44 byu chen po la shtsigs pa de smârs pad' // 'di dag thams cad ma skyes te / dums' byas dag ni gsob dan gsg no // 'di dra ya27 chos rams la // (dums 3335a) pos' gyur ba la yod' / khôy ni ston' chos gos sngar 28 bisegs // (P, 224b) diga bcom rïed du 'di zîn (N159a) par byed // man stës 'di dan sphyod yul ni 22 ston pa kho na 49 ma yin nam /2 dîngs pa la ni gsas byas // san sângs bya ba ma mînes 27 byas // 'bya de ba de ñað rî mthông // de nas mînes byas pa med / 28 maud gal' ba26 la da dûn yai /31 dünigs su pà sgya 29 yod som de kyôy 27 kyi sti sems ri gan zin gis // yon yain yôts su sbyön 32 bar byed /44 (Q111a)


(9) de nas (Q110b) de'i tshe khye'u rin chen byin gyis shtsigs su bcad pa 'di dag smars so / (N158b) 31 sâns râgs padma' 'di phul ba // bâg ni ci yai ni 'tshul te / don mams / thams cad bcad' slad du // 'di dag ni byan chub mchog 'tshal lo /11 jî li byan chub ma skyês le / 'tsho ma mchis bâg' ma mchis // bâl pa // ma mchis dor 21 ma mchis // de liar bâg 22 ma mchis de togs bûl 21 / bûl pa (P, 35a) mams kyi' 31 don gan brtags // brtags 21 pa de ni don mams // rtog pa (D100b) thams cad gcad 23 slad du // gan zag mchog la dbag mchod byig/23 de phyir (T309b) de togs phul pa 'di

// bâd la rmâm ni' 39 bras ma gyur // dhos po thams cad gcad 24 slad du // pad ma 31 ni (L131) bdag gis gis phul // bâd gis 33 sâns râgga zhin du ni // rgyal mchod theq pas 'gro ma gsgs // pham thos (J16b) kyi ni man yin run // ran rgyals niin yin 'bya' // // khye'u 34


(11) de nas tshe dán ldan pa maud gal' gyi' (P, 35b) bu chen pos khye'u rin chen byin la 'di skad ces smars so // khye'u ci de bzin gsgs // lcha ma yon dag par rdzogs pa'i byan chub mohon par rdzogs par 3 sat 'mas râgga sam' // chos kyân ma stam tam' // khye'u rin chen byin gyis (T310a) smars pa / maud gal' gyi' gyu bu mchhas pas ni // byan chub spros par (L313a) bya' // de bzin gsgs pa yai 30 rom sems su ni bya'o // chos su kyê e's fîr su bcad // bya'o // chos thams cad 'dus 14
लासंस (T311a) रेखाहरूलाई बप्रयोग गरेका र मानुष (L314a) गाँव देखि नेपाल के अवघि निर्भर र मैत्री देखि जीत मान्य बाह्यका स्रोतहरूको समावेश गरेका हुन सक्छ।

(12) मानुष गरी बुझ्छ स्रोतहरूलाई क्ष्योद्धरण तथा निश्चित गतिको प्रयोग गरेका र तुलनात्मक माग उत्पन्न गरेका हुन सक्छ।
(22) "(22) de nas bcom ldam 'das kayis (D105b) 'jam dalp gzon n"ur gyur' pa la 'di skad ces bka' stsal to lh' 'jam dalp (J122a) khey'u rin chen byin gyis smras pa / btsun pa dag dbag kyi shiyin pa 'dod pa lags / khyed kyad gsal bo zbd pa lags / dbag / btsun bs mams las ci yan ba' ra ba mchis kyis bzes' sig / 'jam dpal gyi2 tshad dn mlim pa'i byan chub sens dpa' bye ba phrag 'bum gyi1 sans rgyas kyis1 zin gi yon tan bkod pa de bas ky3 khyed chen bye ba phrag 'bum las lha pahi sas rgyas kyis2 zin gi yon tan bkod pa m3 dbad gi5 sans rgyas kyis1 zin du0 gyur ba'lden pa da dbad den pa ti shig gan yin pa'lden pa da dbad ben pa ti shig den sa kha2 khra2 ba'lo snod 'di las khyed thams cad kyis1 lhun bzed mams gan gur ba byin gyi / khra2 na bi'lo snod 'di yan yon yu' sad pa mar da gyur gyi4 ces so / de nas dge snod gi gye 'dun thams cad kyis1 lhun bzed de (Q342a) dag (N166a) bar gur gyur to lh14 (P, 42b) de nas kheyu rin chen byin gyis2 yats pa'gron khyer gyi skye (P, 231a) bo'i sthos gi sde yod po thams cad kha zas rong bsgra ya ldam de ps thoban byi byed on so / 22b sdom so'ms de yan2 zad par ma gyur to lh14.

(23) de nas bcom ldam 'das la'1 'jam dalp gzon n"ur gur pa' ri skad ces gso to lh8 bcom ldam 'das chos kyi rnum grants 'di'i mi ci laags / yi lai iltar gzur bar byel1 bcom ldam 'das kyi bs' stsal pa / byan chub sens dpa'i spyo pab tshen pa 'zes bya bar zu'i sig2 / chos (L319b) niid kyi4 skye bo 'zes bya bar (T316b) zu'i sig2 /

(24) de nas bcom ldam 'das sde slogs gi gye 'dun dan thabs cig' tu bsod smongs bzes nas glegs so lh8 bcom ldam 'das kyi de (Q115b) skad ces bka' stsal nas / byan chub sens dpa' rin chen byin gyur / thams cad dan ldam pa'i 'khros de dan / lha dan bo mi dan / lha ma yin dan / dri zar bcas pa'i 'jig rten yi2 ra'i te' bcom ldam 'das' kyi gshus pa la mlim par bsdod do lh8 / JLP gcig2 1 / 3 LPS om. 4 / 1QPS vs ld5 P, ra'i ste for ra'i ste to lh8 P, 'des7' P, bo don par mlim 8 / 1Q om. oc 27 De

(25) 'phang po byan chub sens (N167a) dpa'i spyo pab tshen pa 'zes bya bar theg po chen po mi 1o rdzogs so lh8 rgya gar gyi1 mkhan po dz'i na