Rhet gre 1355a29-33ἔτι δὲ τἀναντία (30) δεῖ δύνασθαι πείθειν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς, οὐχ (31) ὅπως ἀμφότερα πράττωμεν (οὐ γὰρ δεῖ τὰ φαῦλα πείθειν), ἀλλ’ (32) ἵνα μὴ λανθάνῃ πῶς ἔχει, καὶ ὅπως ἄλλου χρωμένου τοῖς λόγοις (33) μὴ δικαίως αὐτοὶ λύειν ἔχωμεν.
Anonymus, 8th century (?) A.D. ara 3r1-3وقد يمكن الإقناع فى المتضادّين كما يمكن السلجسة فانا قد نقنع على ذى الجناية ليس لنعقد الأمرين جميعا بل لكيلا يخفا علينا المذهب فى ذلك وكيف نستطيع اذا المتكلّم تكلّم بغير العدل ان ننقض عليه
Rhys Roberts 1924 engFurther, (3) we must be able to employ persuasion, just as strict reasoning can be employed, on opposite sides of a question, not in order that we may in practice employ it in both ways (for we must not make people believe what is wrong), but in order that we may see clearly what the facts are, and that, if another man argues unfairly, we on our part may be able to confute him.
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