Bibliotheca Polyglotta

Plato: Meno

Complete text

Σωκράτης
τί ποτε οὖν τοῦτο οὗ τοῦτο ὄνομά ἐστιν, τὸ σχῆμα; (75a) πειρῶ λέγειν. εἰ οὖν τῷ ἐρωτῶντι οὕτως ἢ περὶ σχήματος ἢ χρώματος εἶπες ὅτι ‘ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ μανθάνω ἔγωγε ὅτι βούλει, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, οὐδὲ οἶδα ὅτι λέγεις,’ ἴσως ἂν ἐθαύμασε καὶ εἶπεν: ‘οὐ μανθάνεις ὅτι ζητῶ τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν τούτοις ταὐτόν;’ ἢ οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τούτοις, ὦ Μένων, ἔχοις ἂν εἰπεῖν, εἴ τίς σε ἐρωτῴη: ‘τί ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῷ στρογγύλῳ καὶ εὐθεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἃ δὴ σχήματα καλεῖς, ταὐτὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν;’ πειρῶ εἰπεῖν, ἵνα καὶ γένηταί σοι μελέτη πρὸς τὴν περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀπόκρισιν.

SOCRATES. Quid igitur istud cuius hoc nomen ‘scema’? Experiar dicere. Si ergo querenti sic seu de colore seu de figura dixisses: ‘immo minime adverto ego quid velis, o homo, neque novi quid dicis’, fortassis autem admiraretur et diceret: ‘nonne perpendis quoniam investigo quid in cunctis hiis idem?’ An non in hiis, o Menon, habes dicere, si quis inquireret: ‘quid est in tereti et recto et in reliquis, que quidem figuras vocas, idem in cunctis?’ Temptabo dicere, quatenus et fiat meditatio tibi ad eam que de virtute responsio.

SO. Quid igitur est, cui figura competit; declarare enitere. Si itaque sic percontanti de figura sive colore, te nequaquam intelligere quid ipse velit respondeas, vehementer admiretur arbitror, ac dicat an non intelligis quod in iis omnibus quæro? Non habeas o Meno qod dicas, siquis quærat quid in rotundo sit ac recto, et cæteris quas figuras apellas in omnibus idem? Explica quæso, ut hoc pacto ad disputationem virtutis te pares.

SOCRATES: To what then do we give the name of figure? Try and answer. Suppose that when a person asked you this question either about figure or colour, you were to reply, Man, I do not understand what you want, or know what you are saying; he would look rather astonished and say: Do you not understand that I am looking for the ‘simile in multis’? And then he might put the question in another form: Meno, he might say, what is that ‘simile in multis’ which you call figure, and which includes not only round and straight figures, but all? Could you not answer that question, Meno? I wish that you would try; the attempt will be good practice with a view to the answer about virtue.

(75b) Μένων
μή, ἀλλὰ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπέ.

MENON. Minime, sed tu, o Socrate, dic.

ME. Nequaquam, sed ipse o Socrates edissere.

MENO: I would rather that you should answer, Socrates.

Σωκράτης
βούλει σοι χαρίσωμαι;

SOCRATES. Vis tibi gratus sim?

SO. Visne tibi gratificer?

SOCRATES: Shall I indulge you?

Μένων
πάνυ γε.

MENON. Funditus.

ME. Omnino.

MENO: By all means.

Σωκράτης
ἐθελήσεις οὖν καὶ σὺ ἐμοὶ εἰπεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς;

SOCRATES. Velis itaque michi dicere super virtute?

Vis tu contra virtutis quęstionis deinde solvere?

SOCRATES: And then you will tell me about virtue?

Μένων
ἔγωγε.

MENON. Ego sane.

ME. Equidem.

MENO: I will.

Σωκράτης
προθυμητέον τοίνυν: ἄξιον γάρ.

SOCRATES. Nitendum ergo; dignum namque.

SO. Expediendum iam est, decet enim.

SOCRATES: Then I must do my best, for there is a prize to be won.

Μένων
πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

MENON. Omnino quoque.

ME. Et maxime quidem.

MENO: Certainly.

Σωκράτης
φέρε δή, πειρώμεθά σοι εἰπεῖν τί ἐστιν σχῆμα. σκόπει οὖν εἰ τόδε ἀποδέχῃ αὐτὸ εἶναι: ἔστω γὰρ δὴ ἡμῖν τοῦτο σχῆμα, ὃ μόνον τῶν ὄντων τυγχάνει χρώματι ἀεὶ ἑπόμενον. ἱκανῶς σοι, ἢ ἄλλως πως ζητεῖς; ἐγὼ γὰρ κἂν (75c) οὕτως ἀγαπῴην εἴ μοι ἀρετὴν εἴποις.

SOCRATES. Age certe, temptabimus tibi dicere quid est figura. Intuere igitur, an hoc recipias ipsam esse: esto namque nobis hoc figura, quod solum eorum, que sunt, est colori semper comitans. Satis tibi, an aliter quocumque modo queris? Ego quippe licet ita gratum habeo quam michi virtutem dicas.

SO. Age experiamur quid figura sit exprimere, et vide utrum istud admittas. Esto itaque id nobis figura, quod solum ex omnibus semper colorem sequitur. Satisne tibi hoc est, an forte aliud exigis? Ego enim sat habeam, si mihi posthac virtutem ipsam ostendas.

SOCRATES: Well, I will try and explain to you what figure is. What do you say to this answer? --Figure is the only thing which always follows colour. Will you be satisfied with it, as I am sure that I should be, if you would let me have a similar definition of virtue?

Μένων
ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε εὔηθες, ὦ Σώκρατες.

MENON. Immo istud stolidum, o Socrates.

ME. At istud absurdum quidem est o Socrates.

MENO: But, Socrates, it is such a simple answer.

Σωκράτης
πῶς λέγεις;

SOCRATES. Quid dicis?

SO. Quamobrem?

SOCRATES: Why simple?

Μένων
ὅτι σχῆμά πού ἐστιν κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον ὃ ἀεὶ χρόᾳ ἕπεται. εἶεν: εἰ δὲ δὴ τὴν χρόαν τις μὴ φαίη εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ ὡσαύτως ἀποροῖ ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ σχήματος, τί ἂν οἴει σοι ἀποκεκρίσθαι;

MENON. Quoniam scema est iuxta tuum dictum, quod semper colorem comitatur, esto. Si autem colorem minime dicat nosse, verum eodem modo ambigat quemadmodum de scemate, quid utique putas tibi respondere?

ME. Quoniam figura secundum rationem tuam est quæ semper colorem sequitur. Si ergo colorem quis nosse negaret, eodem modo quo circa figuram dubitans, quid illi potissimum responderes?

MENO: Because, according to you, figure is that which always follows colour.

(SOCRATES: Granted.)

MENO: But if a person were to say that he does not know what colour is, any more than what figure is--what sort of answer would you have given him?

Σωκράτης
τἀληθῆ ἔγωγε: καὶ εἰ μέν γε τῶν σοφῶν τις εἴη καὶ ἐριστικῶν τε καὶ ἀγωνιστικῶν ὁ ἐρόμενος, εἴποιμ᾽ ἂν (75d) αὐτῷ ὅτι ‘ἐμοὶ μὲν εἴρηται: εἰ δὲ μὴ ὀρθῶς λέγω, σὸν ἔργον λαμβάνειν λόγον καὶ ἐλέγχειν.’ εἰ δὲ ὥσπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ νυνὶ φίλοι ὄντες βούλοιντο ἀλλήλοις διαλέγεσθαι, δεῖ δὴ πρᾳότερόν πως καὶ διαλεκτικώτερον ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἔστι δὲ ἴσως τὸ διαλεκτικώτερον μὴ μόνον τἀληθῆ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ δι᾽ ἐκείνων ὧν ἂν προσομολογῇ εἰδέναι ὁ ἐρωτώμενος. πειράσομαι δὴ καὶ ἐγώ σοι οὕτως εἰπεῖν. (75e) λέγε γάρ μοι: τελευτὴν καλεῖς τι; τοιόνδε λέγω οἷον πέρας καὶ ἔσχατον —πάντα ταῦτα ταὐτόν τι λέγω: ἴσως δ᾽ ἂν ἡμῖν Πρόδικος διαφέροιτο, ἀλλὰ σύ γέ που καλεῖς πεπεράνθαι τι καὶ τετελευτηκέναι—τὸ τοιοῦτον βούλομαι λέγειν, οὐδὲν ποικίλον.

SOCRATES. Que vera sunt ego certe. Atque si sapientum quis esset et litigiosorum et certatorum qui quereret, dicerem equidem ei, quoniam ‘michi sane dictum est; si vero minus recte dico, tuum opus assumere, verbum et redarguere’. Si autem ut ego et tu nunc amici existentes velint alternatim disputare, oportet modestius aliquo modo et magis dialetice respondere. Est profecto forsan dialetice non solum vera respondere, sed et per illa, quecumque confitetur scire respondens. Temptabo tibi ad hoc modum dicere. Dic siquidem michi: finem vocas quid? Tale quid dico quale terminus et extremitas - cuncta hec idem quid dico. Fors autem nobis Prodicus dissidebit, ceterum tu aliquo modo vocas terminari quid et finiri - hoc modo volo dicere, nichil varium.

SO. Vera equidem. Nam si quis rogat sapientum illorum et contentiosorum ac litigantium aliquis fit, respondeam utique me dixisse. quod si minus recte dixi, ad te nunc attinet respondere, ac mea dicta refutare. Sin autem quemadmodum nos sumus illi amici sint, velintque tantum disputare, decet profecto mitius, et magis dialectico more respondere. est autem dialecticum magis non modo verum proferre, sed iis illud rationibus approbare, quas et ille qui rogat, plane se nosse fateatur. Hoc itaque more nunc te cum differendo uti conabor. Dic ergo, num finem appellas terminum quendam, atque extremum? Hæc enim omnia velut idem profero, forte vero Prodicus iis tanquam differentibus uteretur. Tu autem nun dicis terminari aliquid atque finiri? nihil quippe diversum iis verbis intelligo.

SOCRATES: I should have told him the truth. And if he were a philosopher of the eristic and antagonistic sort, I should say to him: You have my answer, and if I am wrong, your business is to take up the argument and refute me. But if we were friends, and were talking as you and I are now, I should reply in a milder strain and more in the dialectician’s vein; that is to say, I should not only speak the truth, but I should make use of premises which the person interrogated would be willing to admit. And this is the way in which I shall endeavour to approach you. You will acknowledge, will you not, that there is such a thing as an end, or termination, or extremity? --all which words I use in the same sense, although I am aware that Prodicus might draw distinctions about them: but still you, I am sure, would speak of a thing as ended or terminated--that is all which I am saying--not anything very difficult.

Μένων
ἀλλὰ καλῶ, καὶ οἶμαι μανθάνειν ὃ λέγεις.

MENON. Immo voco, et autumo perpendere que dicis.

ME. Dico sane, et quod ais, intelligere arbitror.

MENO: Yes, I should; and I believe that I understand your meaning.

(76a) Σωκράτης
τί δ᾽; ἐπίπεδον καλεῖς τι, καὶ ἕτερον αὖ στερεόν, οἷον ταῦτα τὰ ἐν ταῖς γεωμετρίαις;

SOCRATES. Quid vero? Epipedum vocas quid, et alterum item solidum, velut hec que in geometricis?

SO. Et planum aliquid vocas, et solidum aliud, cuiusmodi quæ in Geometria tractantur?

SOCRATES: And you would speak of a surface and also of a solid, as for example in geometry.

Μένων
ἔγωγε καλῶ.

MENON. Ego utique voco.

ME. Voco equidem.

MENO: Yes.

Σωκράτης
ἤδη τοίνυν ἂν μάθοις μου ἐκ τούτων σχῆμα ὃ λέγω. κατὰ γὰρ παντὸς σχήματος τοῦτο λέγω, εἰς ὃ τὸ στερεὸν περαίνει, τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι σχῆμα: ὅπερ ἂν συλλαβὼν εἴποιμι στερεοῦ πέρας σχῆμα εἶναι.

SOCRATES. Iam ergo iterum percipis michi ex hiis scema quod dico. Nam de omni figura hoc aio, in quod solidum desinit, hoc esse figuram; quod equidem comprehendens dicam solidi terminum scema esse.

SO. Iam igitur quid figuram esse dicam, ex iis percipies; in omni quippe figura id affero, figuram esse id in quod solidum definit. Atque ut summatim dicam, figuram appello solidi terminum.

SOCRATES: Well then, you are now in a condition to understand my definition of figure. I define figure to be that in which the solid ends; or, more concisely, the limit of solid.

Μένων
τὸ δὲ χρῶμα τί λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

MENON. Colorem profecto quid dicis, o Socrates?

ME. Colorem vero quid vocas o Socrates?

MENO: And now, Socrates, what is colour?

Σωκράτης
ὑβριστής γ᾽ εἶ, ὦ Μένων: ἀνδρὶ πρεσβύτῃ πράγματα προστάττεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλεις (76b) ἀναμνησθεὶς εἰπεῖν ὅτι ποτε λέγει Γοργίας ἀρετὴν εἶναι.

SOCRATES. Contumeliosus es, o Menon, viro seni questionum impedimenta precipis respondere, ipse vero non vis recordatus dicere, quid utique dicat Gorgias virtutem esse.

SO. Procax nimium es o Meno; homini iam seni onus imponis, ac respondere tibi iubes; ipse autem memor quid Gorgias virtutem esse dixerit, definire minime vis.

SOCRATES: You are outrageous, Meno, in thus plaguing a poor old man to give you an answer, when you will not take the trouble of remembering what is Gorgias’ definition of virtue.

Μένων
ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδάν μοι σὺ τοῦτ᾽ εἴπῃς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐρῶ σοι.

MENON. Ast ubi michi tu hoc dixeris, o Socrates, dicam tibi.

ME. At postquam tu mihi hoc declaraveris o Socrates tibi illud referam.

MENO: When you have told me what I ask, I will tell you, Socrates.

Σωκράτης
κἂν κατακεκαλυμμένος τις γνοίη, ὦ Μένων, διαλεγομένου σου, ὅτι καλὸς εἶ καὶ ἐρασταί σοι ἔτι εἰσίν.

SOCRATES. Quamvis velatus quis agnoscat, o Menon, disputante te, quoniam bonus es et amatores tibi adhuc sunt.

SO. Etiam absconditus hic aliquis, et loquentem tantummodo te audiens, intelligat, pulchrum esse te et amatoribus non carentem.

SOCRATES: A man who was blindfolded has only to hear you talking, and he would know that you are a fair creature and have still many lovers.

Μένων
τί δή;

MENON. Qud vero?

ME. Quid ita?

MENO: Why do you think so?

Σωκράτης
ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἐπιτάττεις ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ τρυφῶντες, ἅτε τυραννεύοντες ἕως ἂν ἐν ὥρᾳ (76c) ὦσιν, καὶ ἅμα ἐμοῦ ἴσως κατέγνωκας ὅτι εἰμὶ ἥττων τῶν καλῶν: χαριοῦμαι οὖν σοι καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαι.

SOCRATES. Quia nichil nisi iubes in disceptationibus, quod equidem faciunt deliciantes tamquam tyrannizantes, quamdiu in hora fuerint; et simul me forsitan contempsisti, quia sum minus bonus. Deferam igitur tibi et respondebo.

SO. Quod nihil quam continuo in sermone imperitas, quod facere delicati isti et formæ fiducia adhuc tyrranidem exercentes solent. Simul ita de me statuis forsitan, inferiorem elegantibus illis esse; gratificabor itaque tibi et respondebo?

SOCRATES: Why, because you always speak in imperatives: like all beauties when they are in their prime, you are tyrannical; and also, as I suspect, you have found out that I have weakness for the fair, and therefore to humour you I must answer.

Μένων
πάνυ μὲν οὖν χάρισαι.

MENON. Omnino itaque defer.

ME. Gratificare obsecro.

MENO: Please do.

Σωκράτης
βούλει οὖν σοι κατὰ Γοργίαν ἀποκρίνωμαι, ᾗ ἂν σὺ μάλιστα ἀκολουθήσαις;

SOCRATES. Vis ergo tibi secundum Gorgiam respondeam, qualiter nempe tu precipue consequeris?

SO. Vis ne tibi secundum Gorgiam respondeam? Sic maxime assentieris?

SOCRATES: Would you like me to answer you after the manner of Gorgias, which is familiar to you?

Μένων
βούλομαι: πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

MENON. Volo; quomodo enim minime?

ME. Quod nivelim?

MENO: I should like nothing better.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν λέγετε ἀπορροάς τινας τῶν ὄντων κατὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέα;

SOCRATES. Igitur dicitis effluxiones quasdam eorum, que sunt, iuxta Empedoclem?

SO. Nonne defluxus quidam secundum Empedoclem a rebus manare dicuntur?

SOCRATES: Do not he and you and Empedocles say that there are certain effluences of existence?

Μένων
σφόδρα γε.

MENON. Firmiter equidem.

ME. Et maxime quidem.

MENO: Certainly.

Σωκράτης
καὶ πόρους εἰς οὓς καὶ δι᾽ ὧν αἱ ἀπορροαὶ πορεύονται;

SOCRATES. Necnon poros in quos et per quos effluxiones cedunt?

SO. Ac pori, id est meatus in quos et per quos etiam defluxus huiusmodi manant?

SOCRATES: And passages into which and through which the effluences pass?

Μένων
πάνυ γε.

MENON. Penitus.

ME. Omnino.

MENO: Exactly.

Σωκράτης
καὶ τῶν ἀπορροῶν τὰς μὲν ἁρμόττειν ἐνίοις τῶν (76d) πόρων, τὰς δὲ ἐλάττους ἢ μείζους εἶναι;

SOCRATES. Et effluxionum has quoque competere aliquibus pororum, illas certe minores seu maiores esse?

SO. Ex defluxibus autem quosdam poris quibusdam congruere, quosdam minores, aut maiores esse?

SOCRATES: And some of the effluences fit into the passages, and some of them are too small or too large?

Μένων
ἔστι ταῦτα.

MENON. Sunt ista.

ME. Sic est.

MENO: True.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν καὶ ὄψιν καλεῖς τι;

SOCRATES. Ergo et visum nuncupas quid?

SO. Nunquid et visum aliquid vocas?

SOCRATES: And there is such a thing as sight?

Μένων
ἔγωγε.

MENON. Ego sane.

ME. Voco.

MENO: Yes.

Σωκράτης
ἐκ τούτων δὴ ‘σύνες ὅ τοι λέγω,’ ἔφη Πίνδαρος. ἔστιν γὰρ χρόα ἀπορροὴ σχημάτων ὄψει σύμμετρος καὶ αἰσθητός.

SOCRATES. Ex istis utique ‘intellige quid aio’, infit Pindarus. Est namque color effluxio figurarum visui commetibilis et sensibilis.

SO. Ex iis quid velim, ut ait Pindarus, accipe. Est enim color defluxus quidam rerum, visui congruens, atque sensibilis.

SOCRATES: And now, as Pindar says, ‘read my meaning:’--colour is an effluence of form, commensurate with sight, and palpable to sense.

Μένων
ἄριστά μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταύτην τὴν ἀπόκρισιν εἰρηκέναι.

MENON. Optime michi videris, o Socrates, hanc responsionem dixisse.

ME. Optime mihi o Socrates respondisse videris.

MENO: That, Socrates, appears to me to be an admirable answer.

Σωκράτης
ἴσως γάρ σοι κατὰ συνήθειαν εἴρηται: καὶ ἅμα οἶμαι ἐννοεῖς ὅτι ἔχοις ἂν ἐξ αὐτῆς εἰπεῖν καὶ φωνὴν ὃ ἔστι, (76e) καὶ ὀσμὴν καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων.

Fortassis enim tibi de ritu dictum est; et pariter arbitror intelligis, quod habeas ex eo dicere, et vocem quid est, et odorem et alia plurima talium.

SO. Forte quia quæ solitus es audire nunc responsum est tibi, et simul advertis, quod ex hac responsione facile etiam definire queas, quid sapor, quid vox, quid odor sit, cæteraque huiusmodi plurima.

SOCRATES: Why, yes, because it happens to be one which you have been in the habit of hearing: and your wit will have discovered, I suspect, that you may explain in the same way the nature of sound and smell, and of many other similar phenomena.

Μένων
πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

SOCRATES. Prorsus quidem.

ME. Prorsus.

MENO: Quite true.

Σωκράτης
τραγικὴ γάρ ἐστιν, ὦ Μένων, ἡ ἀπόκρισις, ὥστε ἀρέσκει σοι μᾶλλον ἢ ἡ περὶ τοῦ σχήματος.

Tragica quippe est, o Menon, responsio, unde placet tibi magis quam que de figura.

SO. Atqui tragica o Meno ista responsio est; ideoque tibi magis atque figuræ definitio placet.

SOCRATES: The answer, Meno, was in the orthodox solemn vein, and therefore was more acceptable to you than the other answer about figure.

Μένων
ἔμοιγε.

MENON. Michi profecto.

ME. Mihi vero.

MENO: Yes.

Σωκράτης
ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ παῖ Ἀλεξιδήμου, ὡς ἐγὼ ἐμαυτὸν πείθω, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνη βελτίων: οἶμαι δὲ οὐδ᾽ ἂν σοὶ δόξαι, εἰ μή, ὥσπερ χθὲς ἔλεγες, ἀναγκαῖόν σοι ἀπιέναι πρὸ τῶν μυστηρίων, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ περιμείναις τε καὶ μυηθείης.

SOCRATES. Verum non est, o puer Alexidimi, ut ego michi ipsi persuadeo, at illa potior. Reor autem nullatenus tibi videri, nisi, velut heri dixisti, necessarium tibi abire ante misteria, sed si mansisses et docereris.

SO. At mihi quidem o Alexidemi fili minime persuadeo; est enim illa altera melior, ac puto neque tibi ita placebit, nisi forsan quod heri dicebas, mysteriis nondum absolutis abire vis; sed mane, atque hic mysteriis initiare.

SOCRATES: And yet, O son of Alexidemus, I cannot help thinking that the other was the better; and I am sure that you would be of the same opinion, if you would only stay and be initiated, and were not compelled, as you said yesterday, to go away before the mysteries.

(77a) Μένων
ἀλλὰ περιμένοιμ᾽ ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴ μοι πολλὰ τοιαῦτα λέγοις.

MENON. Immo manebo, o Socrates, si michi multa huiusmodi dixeris.

ME. Manerem o Socrates, si huiusmodi multa inculcares.

MENO: But I will stay, Socrates, if you will give me many such answers.

Σωκράτης
ἀλλὰ μὴν προθυμίας γε οὐδὲν ἀπολείψω, καὶ σοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ ἐμαυτοῦ, λέγων τοιαῦτα: ἀλλ᾽ ὅπως μὴ οὐχ οἷός τ᾽ ἔσομαι πολλὰ τοιαῦτα λέγειν. ἀλλ᾽ ἴθι δὴ πειρῶ καὶ σὺ ἐμοὶ τὴν ὑπόσχεσιν ἀποδοῦναι, κατὰ ὅλου εἰπὼν ἀρετῆς πέρι ὅτι ἐστίν, καὶ παῦσαι πολλὰ ποιῶν ἐκ τοῦ ἑνός, ὅπερ φασὶ τοὺς συντρίβοντάς τι ἑκάστοτε οἱ σκώπτοντες, ἀλλὰ ἐάσας ὅλην καὶ ὑγιῆ εἰπὲ τί ἐστιν ἀρετή. τὰ δέ γε παραδείγματα (77b) παρ᾽ ἐμοῦ εἴληφας.

SOCRATES. Atqui attentionis nichil pretermittam, et tui gratia ac mei ipsius inquiens talia. Sed uti minus non sufficiens ero plurima talia dicere! Ceterum tempta et tu michi pollicitum reddere, de toto dicens de virtute quid est; et desine multa facere ex uno, quod quidem dicunt eos, qui conterunt quid undique, qui contumeliis afficiunt; verum dimittens totam et integram, dic quid est virtus. Exempla profecto a me cepisti.

SO. Nihil utique prætermittam, quin talia quædam et tui simul et mei gratia dicam. Vereor tamen ne minus possim huiusmodi talia dicere. Cæterum iam ad promissa servanda nobis accingere, ac in commune quid virtus sit exprime nec ut fecisti hactenus, unum in multa discerpas, quod iaci in eos solet, qui idem ubique inculcant; sed integram atqui sanam, dic tandem quid virtus sit. exempla vero loquendi a me accepisti.

SOCRATES: Well then, for my own sake as well as for yours, I will do my very best; but I am afraid that I shall not be able to give you very many as good: and now, in your turn, you are to fulfil your promise, and tell me what virtue is in the universal; and do not make a singular into a plural, as the facetious say of those who break a thing, but deliver virtue to me whole and sound, and not broken into a number of pieces: I have given you the pattern.

Μένων
δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀρετὴ εἶναι, καθάπερ ὁ ποιητὴς λέγει,
‘χαίρειν τε καλοῖσι καὶ δύνασθαι’:
καὶ ἐγὼ τοῦτο λέγω ἀρετήν, ἐπιθυμοῦντα τῶν καλῶν δυνατὸν εἶναι πορίζεσθαι.

MENON. Videtur itaque michi, o Socrates, virtus ceu poeta ait: “gaudere quidem bonis et valere.” Et ego hoc dico virtutem, desiderantem bonorum honestorum possibilem esse habundare.

ME. Videt mihi o Socrates virtus esse, ut Poeta inquit, gaudere honestis ac posse. Atque ego idipsum virtutem voco, honesta quidem appetere, aeque consequi posse.

MENO: Well then, Socrates, virtue, as I take it, is when he, who desires the honourable, is able to provide it for himself; so the poet says, and I say too--

‘Virtue is the desire of things honourable and the power of attaining them.’

Σωκράτης
ἆρα λέγεις τὸν τῶν καλῶν ἐπιθυμοῦντα ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμητὴν εἶναι;

SOCRATES. Ergo dicis honestorum desiderantem bonorum appetitorem esse?

SO. Num honesta cupientem, bona cupere dicis?

SOCRATES: And does he who desires the honourable also desire the good?

Μένων
μάλιστά γε.

MENON. Precipue autem.

ME. Omnino.

MENO: Certainly.

Σωκράτης
ἆρα ὡς ὄντων τινῶν οἳ τῶν κακῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, ἑτέρων δὲ οἳ τῶν (77c) ἀγαθῶν; οὐ πάντες, ὤριστε, δοκοῦσί σοι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμεῖν;

SOCRATES. An vero existentibus aliquibus qui mala desiderent, aliis autem qui bona? Non universi, o optime, videntur tibi bona appetere?

SO. Nun quid ita loqueris quasi sint nonnulli qui bona cupiant, quidam vero qui mala?

ME. Imo.

SO. SO. Non omnes igiter o optime vir bona tibi appetere videntur?

SOCRATES: Then are there some who desire the evil and others who desire the good? Do not all men, my dear sir, desire good?

Μένων
οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

MENON. Nequaquam michi.

ME. Mihi nequaquam.

MENO: I think not.

Σωκράτης
ἀλλά τινες τῶν κακῶν;

SOCRATES. Ceterum quidam mala?

SO. Quidam itaque mala?

SOCRATES: There are some who desire evil?

Μένων
ναί.

MENON. Ita.

ME. Ita.

MENO: Yes.

Σωκράτης
οἰόμενοι τὰ κακὰ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, λέγεις, ἢ καὶ γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι κακά ἐστιν ὅμως ἐπιθυμοῦσιν αὐτῶν;

SOCRATES. Arbitrantes mala bona esse, ais, sive etiam cognoscentes quia mala sunt, tamen appetunt ea?

SO. An ita dicis quasi quę mala sint, bona esse opinenteur, aut etaim noscentes quod mala sint, nihilomninus illa cupiant?

SOCRATES: Do you mean that they think the evils which they desire, to be good; or do they know that they are evil and yet desire them?

Μένων
ἀμφότερα ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν.

MENON. Ambo michi videntur.

ME. Utrunque.

MENO: Both, I think.

Σωκράτης
ἦ γὰρ δοκεῖ τίς σοι, ὦ Μένων, γιγνώσκων τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακά ἐστιν ὅμως ἐπιθυμεῖν αὐτῶν;

SOCRATES. Prout enim videtur quis tibi, o Menon, cognoscens mala quoniam sunt, tamen appetere ipsa?

SO. An senses aliquem cognoscentem mala quod mala sint, illa tamen appeterem?

SOCRATES: And do you really imagine, Meno, that a man knows evils to be evils and desires them notwithstanding?

Μένων
μάλιστα.

MENON. Maxime.

ME. Arbitror.

MENO: Certainly I do.

Σωκράτης
τί ἐπιθυμεῖν λέγεις; ἦ γενέσθαι αὐτῷ;

SOCRATES. Quid appetere dicis quam fieri sibi?

SO. Quid autem exoptare hunc dicis? Num hac sibi adesse?

SOCRATES: And desire is of possession?

Μένων
γενέσθαι: τί γὰρ (77d) ἄλλο;

MENON. Fieri; quid enim aliud?

ME. Adesse sane. nam quid aliud optet?

MENO: Yes, of possession.

Σωκράτης
πότερον ἡγούμενος τὰ κακὰ ὠφελεῖν ἐκεῖνον ᾧ ἂν γένηται, ἢ γιγνώσκων τὰ κακὰ ὅτι βλάπτει ᾧ ἂν παρῇ;

SOCRATES. Utrum ratus mala prodesse illi cuicumque fit, an agnoscens mala quod ledunt cuicumque assunt?

SO. Utrum qui mala desiderat, mala esse cognoscens, prodesse cum adsint existimat? an unumquodque potius sua præsentia lædere?

SOCRATES: And does he think that the evils will do good to him who possesses them, or does he know that they will do him harm?

Μένων
εἰσὶ μὲν οἳ ἡγούμενοι τὰ κακὰ ὠφελεῖν, εἰσὶν δὲ καὶ οἳ γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι βλάπτει.

MENON. Sunt autem qui arbitrentur mala prodesse, sunt vero qui cognoscunt quoniam ledunt.

ME. Sunt certe qui mala prodesse putent, nec desunt qui obesse cognoscant.

MENO: There are some who think that the evils will do them good, and others who know that they will do them harm.

Σωκράτης
ἦ καὶ δοκοῦσί σοι γιγνώσκειν τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακά ἐστιν οἱ ἡγούμενοι τὰ κακὰ ὠφελεῖν;

SOCRATES. An etiam videntur tibi agnoscere mala quoniam mala sunt, qui arbitrantur mala prodesse?

SO. Videntur tibi mala nosse quod mala sint, qui mala prodesse cuiquam opinantur?

SOCRATES: And, in your opinion, do those who think that they will do them good know that they are evils?

Μένων
οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτό γε.

MENON. Haud omnino videtur istud michi.

ME. Haud sane id mihi videtur.

MENO: Certainly not.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν δῆλον ὅτι οὗτοι μὲν οὐ τῶν κακῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, (77e) οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες αὐτά, ἀλλὰ ἐκείνων ἃ ᾤοντο ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, ἔστιν δὲ ταῦτά γε κακά: ὥστε οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες αὐτὰ καὶ οἰόμενοι ἀγαθὰ εἶναι δῆλον ὅτι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. ἢ οὔ;

SOCRATES. Eapropter perspicuum quod hii quidem mala non appetunt, qui ignorant ea, immo ea que estimabant bona esse; sunt autem hec mala. Quas ob res qui ignorant ea et rati bona esse, liquidum quoniam bona appetunt, an non?

SO. Ex iis igitur patet eos non appetere mala, qui illa minime norint, sed illa potius, quæ bona esse putaverint cum tamen mala sint. Quapropter ignarantes illa, bonaque existimantes, perspicuum est boan potius exoptare. An non?

SOCRATES: Is it not obvious that those who are ignorant of their nature do not desire them; but they desire what they suppose to be goods although they are really evils; and if they are mistaken and suppose the evils to be goods they really desire goods?

Μένων
κινδυνεύουσιν οὗτοί γε.

MENON. Nituntur hii vero.

ME. Sic isti se habere videntur.

MENO: Yes, in that case.

Σωκράτης
τί δέ; οἱ τῶν κακῶν μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦντες, ὡς φῂς σύ, ἡγούμενοι δὲ τὰ κακὰ βλάπτειν ἐκεῖνον ᾧ ἂν γίγνηται, γιγνώσκουσιν δήπου ὅτι βλαβήσονται ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν;

SOCRATES. Quid sane? Bonorum desiderantes, uti dicis tu, autumantes quoque mala ledere ilium cuicumque assunt, agnoscunt quolibet modo, quoniam ledentur ab eis?

SO. At vero qui mala quidem affectant, ut ipse inquis; eaque cuiqunque accidunt, obesse censent; norunt ne quod illorum præsentia lędentur?

SOCRATES: Well, and do those who, as you say, desire evils, and think that evils are hurtful to the possessor of them, know that they will be hurt by them?

Μένων
(78a) ἀνάγκη.

MENON. Necesse.

ME. Necessario sequitur.

MENO: They must know it.

Σωκράτης
ἀλλὰ τοὺς βλαπτομένους οὗτοι οὐκ οἴονται ἀθλίους εἶναι καθ᾽ ὅσον βλάπτονται;

SOCRATES. Verum lesos isti nonne putant miseros esse secundum quantum leduntur?

SO. Quid vero læsos homines, nonne isti miseros esse quatenus læsi sunt, opinantur?

SOCRATES: And must they not suppose that those who are hurt are miserable in proportion to the hurt which is inflicted upon them?

Μένων
καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη.

MENON. Et hoc necesse.

ME. Hoc quoque necessarium.

MENO: How can it be otherwise?

Σωκράτης
τοὺς δὲ ἀθλίους οὐ κακοδαίμονας;

SOCRATES. Miseros certe numquid non infelices esse?

SO. Miseros autem nonne infelices?

SOCRATES: But are not the miserable ill-fated?

Μένων
οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

MENON. Existimo ego.

ME. Reor equidem.

MENO: Yes, indeed.

Σωκράτης
ἔστιν οὖν ὅστις βούλεται ἄθλιος καὶ κακοδαίμων εἶναι;

SOCRATES. Est igitur qui velit miser et infelix esse?

SO. Est ne aliquis, qui miser et infelix esse velit?

SOCRATES: And does any one desire to be miserable and ill-fated?

Μένων
οὔ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

MENON. Neutiquam michi videtur, o Socrates.

ME. Non videtur.

MENO: I should say not, Socrates.

Σωκράτης
οὐκ ἄρα βούλεται, ὦ Μένων, τὰ κακὰ οὐδείς, εἴπερ μὴ βούλεται τοιοῦτος εἶναι. τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἄθλιον εἶναι ἢ ἐπιθυμεῖν τε τῶν κακῶν καὶ κτᾶσθαι;

SOCRATES. Non igitur vult, o Menon, mala quispiam, siquidem noluerit talis esse. Quid enim aliud est miserum esse quam desiderare mala et habere?

SO. Nemo igitur mala vult, si quidem talis esse minime velit. Nam quid aliud est esse miserum, atque cupere mala, in eaque incurrere?

SOCRATES: But if there is no one who desires to be miserable, there is no one, Meno, who desires evil; for what is misery but the desire and possession of evil?

Μένων
κινδυνεύεις (78b) ἀληθῆ λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες: καὶ οὐδεὶς βούλεσθαι τὰ κακά.

MENON. Laboras vera dicere, o Socrates; et nullus vult mala.

ME. Vera loqui videris o Socrates; nemo enim vult mala.

MENO: That appears to be the truth, Socrates, and I admit that nobody desires evil.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν νυνδὴ ἔλεγες ὅτι ἔστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ βούλεσθαί τε τἀγαθὰ καὶ δύνασθαι;

SOCRATES. Non itaque modo dicebas, quia est virtus bona velle quidem et posse?

SO. Nonne paulo ante dixisti virtutem esse bona velle, ac posse?

SOCRATES: And yet, were you not saying just now that virtue is the desire and power of attaining good?

Μένων
εἶπον γάρ.

MENON. Dixi enim.

ME. Dixi equidem.

MENO: Yes, I did say so.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν τοῦ λεχθέντος τὸ μὲν βούλεσθαι πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει, καὶ ταύτῃ γε οὐδὲν ὁ ἕτερος τοῦ ἑτέρου βελτίων;

SOCRATES. Non igitur hoc dicto velle quidem omnibus inest, et ita utique minime alter altero melior?

SO. An non ex eo quod dictum est, voluntas quidem ipsa omnibus adest, atque hac ratione alius alio melior non est?

SOCRATES: But if this be affirmed, then the desire of good is common to all, and one man is no better than another in that respect?

Μένων
φαίνεται.

MENON. Apparet.

ME. Apparet.

MENO: True.

Σωκράτης
ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι εἴπερ ἐστὶ βελτίων ἄλλος ἄλλου, κατὰ τὸ δύνασθαι ἂν εἴη ἀμείνων.

SOCRATES. Ceterum patet quoniam, si est potior alius alio, secundum posse sane erit melior.

SO. Ergo si quidem est alius alio melior, nec id secundum voluntatem, sequitur ut secundum potdntiam fit melior.

SOCRATES: And if one man is not better than another in desiring good, he must be better in the power of attaining it?

Μένων
πάνυ γε.

MENON. Prorsus.

ME. Sequitur.

MENO: Exactly.

Σωκράτης
τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον ἀρετή, (78c) δύναμις τοῦ πορίζεσθαι τἀγαθά.

SOCRATES. Hoc est igitur, ut videtur, iuxta tuam sententiam virtus: potentia acquirendi bona.

SO. Secundum igitur rationem tuam hoc est virtus, bonorum comparandorum potestas.

SOCRATES: Then, according to your definition, virtue would appear to be the power of attaining good?

Μένων
παντάπασί μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς σὺ νῦν ὑπολαμβάνεις.

MENON. Omnifariam michi videtur, o Socrates, ita se habere, ceu tu nunc suspicaris.

ME. Sic prorsus se habere videtur, ut nunc accipis.

MENO: I entirely approve, Socrates, of the manner in which you now view this matter.

Σωκράτης
ἴδωμεν δὴ καὶ τοῦτο εἰ ἀληθὲς λέγεις: ἴσως γὰρ ἂν εὖ λέγοις. τἀγαθὰ φῂς οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι πορίζεσθαι ἀρετὴν εἶναι;

SOCRATES. Inspiciamus autem et hoc an verum dicis, fors etenim bene ais. Bona inquis sufficientem esse vendicare, virtutem esse?

SO. Animadvertamus posthac, utrum id vere afferas necne; forte enim bene loqueris. Dic igitur, bona vendicare posse virtutem esse dicis?

SOCRATES: Then let us see whether what you say is true from another point of view; for very likely you may be right:--You affirm virtue to be the power of attaining goods?

Μένων
ἔγωγε.

MENON. Ego sane.

ME. Isthuc ipsum.

MENO: Yes.

Σωκράτης
ἀγαθὰ δὲ καλεῖς οὐχὶ οἷον ὑγίειάν τε καὶ πλοῦτον;

SOCRATES. Bona certe vocas haud quemadmodum valitudinemque et divitias?

SO. Bona vero nonne hæc vocas, ceu sanitatem, divitias,

SOCRATES: And the goods which you mean are such as health and wealth and the possession of gold and silver,

Μένων
καὶ χρυσίον λέγω καὶ ἀργύριον κτᾶσθαι καὶ τιμὰς ἐν πόλει καὶ ἀρχάς.

Et aurum inquam et argentum vendicare, et honores in civitate et magistratus.

aurum atque et argentum plurimum possidere, honoribus præterea et magistratibus in Repub. fungi?

and having office and honour in the state--

Σωκράτης
μὴ ἄλλ᾽ ἄττα λέγεις τἀγαθὰ ἢ τὰ τοιαῦτα;

Numquid alia quedam dicis bona quam talia?

num alia quædam præter ista bona nuncupas?

those are what you would call goods?

Μένων
οὔκ, ἀλλὰ (78d) πάντα λέγω τὰ τοιαῦτα.

MENON. Neutiquam, immo universa dico huiuscemodi.

ME. Nequaquam, sed omnia bona huiusmodi esse dico.

MENO: Yes, I should include all those.

Σωκράτης
εἶεν: χρυσίον δὲ δὴ καὶ ἀργύριον πορίζεσθαι ἀρετή ἐστιν, ὥς φησι Μένων ὁ τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως πατρικὸς ξένος. πότερον προστιθεῖς τούτῳ τῷ πόρῳ, ὦ Μένων, τὸ δικαίως καὶ ὁσίως, ἢ οὐδέν σοι διαφέρει, ἀλλὰ κἂν ἀδίκως τις αὐτὰ πορίζηται, ὁμοίως σὺ αὐτὰ ἀρετὴν καλεῖς;

SOCRATES. Esto; aurum revera et argentum acquirere virtus est, vel ut ait Menon, magni regis paternus amicus. Utrum apponis quid huic questui, o Menon, videlicet ‘iuste et sancte’, an nichil penes te differt; sed quamvis iniuste quis ipsa vendicet, similiter tu ea virtutem vocas?

SO. Eia aurum atque argentum acquirire virtus est, ut inquit Meno magni regis patrius hospes. Utrum vero addis huic lucro o Meno, iuste ac sancte lucrari? an nihil interest, sed et si iniuste quis ista possidet, nihilominus quęstum huiusmodi virtutem vocas?

SOCRATES: Then, according to Meno, who is the hereditary friend of the great king, virtue is the power of getting silver and gold; and would you add that they must be gained piously, justly, or do you deem this to be of no consequence? And is any mode of acquisition, even if unjust and dishonest, equally to be deemed virtue?

Μένων
οὐ δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.

MENON. Nequaquam, o Socrates,

ME. Nequaquam o Socrates,

MENO: Not virtue,

Σωκράτης
ἀλλὰ κακίαν.

at vitium.

sed vitium.

Socrates, but vice.

Μένων
πάντως δήπου.

SO. Omnino igitur,

Σωκράτης
δεῖ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τούτῳ τῷ πόρῳ δικαιοσύνην ἢ σωφροσύνην ἢ (78e) ὁσιότητα προσεῖναι, ἢ ἄλλο τι μόριον ἀρετῆς: εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἔσται ἀρετή, καίπερ ἐκπορίζουσα τἀγαθά.

tamquam videtur, huic questui iustitiam seu sobrietatem sive sanctimoniam adesse, vel aliam aliquam particulam virtutis; sin autem, non erit ei virtus, et quidem lucrifaciens bona.

ut vident, huic possessioni, iustitiæ, vel temperantiæ, vel sanitatis, aut alterius virtutis præsentia opus est. Alioquin virtus minime erit, quamvis bona sibi vendicet.

SOCRATES: Then justice or temperance or holiness, or some other part of virtue, as would appear, must accompany the acquisition, and without them the mere acquisition of good will not be virtue.

Μένων
πῶς γὰρ ἄνευ τούτων ἀρετὴ γένοιτ᾽ ἄν;

Quo pacto enim sine hiis virtus fiat unquam?

ME. Qui enim sine iis virtus existat?

MENO: Why, how can there be virtue without these?

Σωκράτης
τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐκπορίζειν χρυσίον καὶ ἀργύριον, ὅταν μὴ δίκαιον ᾖ, μήτε αὑτῷ μήτε ἄλλῳ, οὐκ ἀρετὴ καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπορία;

At non lucrifacere aurum et argentum, cum non iustum fuerit, neque ipsi neque alii, nullatenus virtus, et hec erit penuria?

SO. At non suppeditare arum et argentum, quando minime iustum sit, aut sibi, aut alteri neque etiam virtus est hæc egestas?

SOCRATES: And the non-acquisition of gold and silver in a dishonest manner for oneself or another, or in other words the want of them, may be equally virtue?

Μένων
φαίνεται.

MENON. Patet.

ME. Videtur.

MENO: True.

Σωκράτης
οὐδὲν ἄρα μᾶλλον ὁ πόρος τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθῶν ἢ ἡ ἀπορία ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη, ἀλλά, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὃ μὲν ἂν μετὰ δικαιοσύνης γίγνηται, ἀρετὴ ἔσται, ὃ δ᾽ (79a) ἂν ἄνευ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων, κακία.

SOCRATES. Nichilo igitur magis questus huiuscemodi bonorum quam penuria virtus utique erit. Atqui ut videtur, quicquid cum iustitia fit, virtus est, quicquid autem sine omnibus huiuscemodi, vitium.

SO. Ninilo magis igint horum bonorum copia virtus erit atque inopia. Verum ut videntur, quodqunque cum uistitia sit, virtus est. quod autem absque illa, eiusque similibus, pravitas.

SOCRATES: Then the acquisition of such goods is no more virtue than the non-acquisition and want of them, but whatever is accompanied by justice or honesty is virtue, and whatever is devoid of justice is vice.

Μένων
δοκεῖ μοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ὡς λέγεις.

MENON. Videtur michi necessarium esse veluti dicis.

ME. Videt mihi neccessarium esse quod dicis.

MENO: It cannot be otherwise, in my judgment.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν τούτων ἕκαστον ὀλίγον πρότερον μόριον ἀρετῆς ἔφαμεν εἶναι, τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα;

SOCRATES. Nonne igitur horum singulum paulo prius particulam virtutis dicebas esse, iustitiam ac sobrietatem ac cuncta talia?

SO. Nonne unum quodque horum paulo ante virtutis partem esse diximus, iustitiam et temerantiam, cæteraque huiusmodi.

SOCRATES: And were we not saying just now that justice, temperance, and the like, were each of them a part of virtue?

Μένων
ναί.

MENON. Ne.

ME. Diximus plane.

MENO: Yes.

Σωκράτης
εἶτα, ὦ Μένων, παίζεις πρός με;

SOCRATES. Dehinc, o Menon, ludis ad me?

SO. Siccine o Meno me deludis?

SOCRATES: And so, Meno, this is the way in which you mock me.

Μένων
τί δή, ὦ Σώκρατες;

MENON. Quid nempe, o Socrates?

ME. Quorsum hæc o Socrates?

MENO: Why do you say that, Socrates?

Σωκράτης
ὅτι ἄρτι ἐμοῦ δεηθέντος σου μὴ καταγνύναι μηδὲ κερματίζειν τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ δόντος παραδείγματα καθ᾽ ἃ δέοι ἀποκρίνεσθαι, τούτου μὲν ἠμέλησας, λέγεις δέ μοι ὅτι ἀρετή (79b) ἐστιν οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι τἀγαθὰ πορίζεσθαι μετὰ δικαιοσύνης: τοῦτο δὲ φῂς μόριον ἀρετῆς εἶναι;

SOCRATES. Quoniam me modo orante te, non conterere neque dispergere virtutem, atque dante exempla iuxta que oporteat respondere, hoc certe neglexisti, dicisque michi quia virtus est possibilem esse bona vendicare cum iustitia; id autem ais particulam virtutis esse?

SO. Quoniam cum te orssem ne amplius virtutem discerperes, et exempla respondendi dedissem, hoc neglecto virtutem esse dicis, bona cum iustitia comparare posse, iustitiam vero virtutis partem esse consessus es.

SOCRATES: Why, because I asked you to deliver virtue into my hands whole and unbroken, and I gave you a pattern according to which you were to frame your answer; and you have forgotten already, and tell me that virtue is the power of attaining good justly, or with justice; and justice you acknowledge to be a part of virtue.

Μένων
ἔγωγε.

MENON. Ego sane.

ME. Sic est.

MENO: Yes.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν συμβαίνει ἐξ ὧν σὺ ὁμολογεῖς, τὸ μετὰ μορίου ἀρετῆς πράττειν ὅτι ἂν πράττῃ, τοῦτο ἀρετὴν εἶναι: τὴν γὰρ δικαιοσύνην μόριον φῂς ἀρετῆς εἶναι, καὶ ἕκαστα τούτων. τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο λέγω; ὅτι ἐμοῦ δεηθέντος ὅλον εἰπεῖν τὴν ἀρετήν, αὐτὴν μὲν πολλοῦ δεῖς εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἐστίν, πᾶσαν δὲ φῂς πρᾶξιν ἀρετὴν εἶναι, ἐάνπερ μετὰ μορίου (79c) ἀρετῆς πράττηται, ὥσπερ εἰρηκὼς ὅτι ἀρετή ἐστιν τὸ ὅλον καὶ ἤδη γνωσομένου ἐμοῦ, καὶ ἐὰν σὺ κατακερματίζῃς αὐτὴν κατὰ μόρια. δεῖται οὖν σοι πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τῆς αὐτῆς ἐρωτήσεως, ὦ φίλε Μένων, τί ἐστιν ἀρετή, εἰ μετὰ μορίου ἀρετῆς πᾶσα πρᾶξις ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη; τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν λέγειν, ὅταν λέγῃ τις, ὅτι πᾶσα ἡ μετὰ δικαιοσύνης πρᾶξις ἀρετή ἐστιν. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι πάλιν δεῖσθαι τῆς αὐτῆς ἐρωτήσεως, ἀλλ᾽ οἴει τινὰ εἰδέναι μόριον ἀρετῆς ὅτι ἐστίν, αὐτὴν μὴ εἰδότα;

SOCRATES. Nonne contingit ex quibus tu confiteris cum particula virtutis agere quicquid agat, [id est] istud virtutem esse. Nam iustitiam particulam ais virtutis esse, et singula horum. Quid ergo dico hoc? Quoniam me rogante in toto dicere virtutem, ipsam autem multo deficis dicere quid est, omnemque actum inquis virtutem esse, siquidem cum particula virtutis agatur, ac si dixeris quid virtus est in toto, et iam non cognoscente me, atque si tu dispergeres eam per particulas. Opus est itaque tibi iterato a principio, ceu michi videtur, eadem questione, o amice Menon, quid est virtus, si cum particula virtutis omnis actus virtus quoque sit. Hoc enim est dicere, cum inquiat quidam: omnis cum iustitia actus virtus est. An non videtur tibi denuo opus esse eadem questione, sed autumas quempiam nosse particulam virtutis quid est, ipsam nescientem?

SO. Nonne efficitur ex iis quæ iam concessisti, virtutem esse agere cum parte virtutis quicquid agitur? Iustitiam enim huiusmodi singuala virtutis particulas confiteris. ME. Quid tum? SO. Quia cum rogassem ut totam ipsam virtutem ostenderes, quid ipsa fit, nullo modo explicuisti; omnem vero actionem quæcunque cum parte virtutis sit, vistutem esse dixisti, quasi quid tota virtus sit summatim prædixeris, atque ipse intelligere tum queam, si abs te in particulas dividant. Eadem igitur quæstio rursus o Meno tibi suboritur, quid virtus sit, si quidem omnis actio cum virtutis parte fit virtus. Id nanque tunc dicitur, cum omnis actio cum iustitia virtus esse definint. An non eadem iterum quæstione opus esse vides? Num putas quempiam virtutis partem aliquam nosse, qui totius naturam minime norit?

SOCRATES: Then it follows from your own admissions, that virtue is doing what you do with a part of virtue; for justice and the like are said by you to be parts of virtue.

MENO: What of that?

SOCRATES: What of that! Why, did not I ask you to tell me the nature of virtue as a whole? And you are very far from telling me this; but declare every action to be virtue which is done with a part of virtue; as though you had told me and I must already know the whole of virtue, and this too when frittered away into little pieces. And, therefore, my dear Meno, I fear that I must begin again and repeat the same question: What is virtue? for otherwise, I can only say, that every action done with a part of virtue is virtue; what else is the meaning of saying that every action done with justice is virtue? Ought I not to ask the question over again; for can any one who does not know virtue know a part of virtue?

Μένων
οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

MENON. Non michi equidem videtur.

ME. Non videtur.

MENO: No; I do not say that he can.

(79d) Σωκράτης
εἰ γὰρ καὶ μέμνησαι, ὅτ᾽ ἐγώ σοι ἄρτι ἀπεκρινάμην περὶ τοῦ σχήματος, ἀπεβάλλομέν που τὴν τοιαύτην ἀπόκρισιν τὴν διὰ τῶν ἔτι ζητουμένων καὶ μήπω ὡμολογημένων ἐπιχειροῦσαν ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

SOCRATES. Si enim et reminisceris, quid ego tibi nunc respondi de figura, abiciemus talem responsionem, que per adhuc quesita et nondum concessa articulatur responsum dare.

SO. Si enim memineris quæ in superioribus de figura tibi respondi, reiecimus utique responsionem illam quæ per ea fit quibus ulteriori probatione opus est, nec dum rata habentur.

SOCRATES: Do you remember how, in the example of figure, we rejected any answer given in terms which were as yet unexplained or unadmitted?

Μένων
καὶ ὀρθῶς γε ἀπεβάλλομεν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

MENON. Et recte quidem abiciemus, o Socrates.

ME. Et merito quidem reiecimus.

MENO: Yes, Socrates; and we were quite right in doing so.

Σωκράτης
μὴ τοίνυν, ὦ ἄριστε, μηδὲ σὺ ἔτι ζητουμένης ἀρετῆς ὅλης ὅτι ἐστὶν οἴου διὰ τῶν ταύτης μορίων ἀποκρινόμενος δηλώσειν αὐτὴν ὁτῳοῦν, ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τούτῳ τῷ αὐτῷ (79e) τρόπῳ λέγων, ἀλλὰ πάλιν τῆς αὐτῆς δεήσεσθαι ἐρωτήσεως, τίνος ὄντος ἀρετῆς λέγεις ἃ λέγεις: ἢ οὐδέν σοι δοκῶ λέγειν;

SOCRATES. Neque igitur, o optime, neque tu adhuc quesita virtute tota quid est, neu per ipsius particulas respondens enucleatum ire ipsam cuilibet, aut aliud quicquam hoc eodem modo dicens. Verum rursus eadem opus est interrogatione, qua existente virtute dicis que dicis, anne nichil tibi videor dicere?

SO. Neque tu igitur o vir optime, cum quæritur, quid ipsa in universum, ac tota sit virtus, partes respondens eam quærentibus patefacias, neque aliud quiquamque eodem modo respondens, sed rursus eadem interrogatione opus erit, quidnam virtus sit, qua subiecta ista dicis. Num aliquid tibi dicere videor?

SOCRATES: But then, my friend, do not suppose that we can explain to any one the nature of virtue as a whole through some unexplained portion of virtue, or anything at all in that fashion; we should only have to ask over again the old question, What is virtue? Am I not right?

Μένων
ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς ὀρθῶς λέγειν.

MENON. Michi quoque videris recte dicere.

ME. Mihi quidem probe loqui videris.

MENO: I believe that you are.

Σωκράτης
ἀπόκριναι τοίνυν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς: τί φῂς ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ σὺ καὶ ὁ ἑταῖρός σου;

SOCRATES. Responde itaque rursus a principio, quidnam ais virtutem esse et tu et amicus tuus?

SO. Responde itaque iterum a principio, quid esse virtutem et tu et amicus ille tuus afferitis.

SOCRATES: Then begin again, and answer me, What, according to you and your friend Gorgias, is the definition of virtue?

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