At this some may reply: ‘You will be liable to the same criticism as when saying that cause and result must either be in contact or not during production. How so?’

‘Does your critique make contact with the criticised, or does it not?
This may be asked, and aren’t you then accountable to this same fault?’

‘If, during these critical remarks, the criticism makes contact with the criticised, there will be the same problem. And equally so if it does not make contact. Discarding these two options there is no other notion possible.’‘

Thus, as your criticism does not have the power to discredit the criticised, your criticism itself is discredited, and as a matter of course the reality of causes and results are then established. To express this point:’

‘As what you say will only serve to quash the view you hold yourself,
Your criticism lacks the power to discredit what you aim.’ (6.171)

‘Furthermore,

‘Because your cavilling is subject to the self-same consequence
And your denial of existent things is quite unreasonable,
Insightful persons will not be convinced by what you have to say.
You argue just to quarrel and have no position of your own.’ (6.172)

‘That your cavilling is subject to the self-same consequence has already been mentioned. That your denial of existent things is quite unreasonable shall now be explained. How to respond to the argument that things that are equally not in contact do not produce anything? A magnet will exert a pull on metals close to it without touching them, but not on all. And eyes can see forms within their scope without touching them, but not all. Similarly, even though causes can produce things without contact, that does not mean that everything not in contact with it will be produced. Also, you’re arguing just to quarrel: to argue just to refute others’ position without presenting any position of your own, is to argue just to quarrel. And you don’t have any position of your own, because your own presentation is made purely to refute the position of others.’

To this we reply:

To claim that it’s an issue whether this critique makes contact with
The criticised or not while criticising will only apply
To those thinking in absolutes, but we do not endorse a stance,
And therefore this unwanted consequence does not apply to us. (6.173)

Concerning the statement because your cavilling is subject to the self-same consequence; it is not in fact the case that this consequence applies equally to ourselves, because in our point of view the critique does not make contact with the criticised while criticising, nor does it not make contact, since neither the critique nor the criticised are inherently established.

Do not therefore entertain the idea that there must be either contact or not. As stated:

[…]: … Venerable Subhūti. Does the attainment when not yet attained already exist as something, or does it not?

Subhūti replied: Venerable Śāriputra. I do not think the attainment when not yet attained already exists as something, nor that it does not already exist as something.

Śāriputra said: But, venerable Subhūti, is there then no attainment and no realisation?

Subhūti replied: Venerable Śāriputra, there is both attainment and realisation, but not in a dualistic manner. Attainment and realisation are worldly conventions, venerable Śāriputra. The stream-enterer, once-returner, non-returner, arhat, solitary buddha and bodhisattva are worldly conventions, but ultimately there is neither attainment nor realisation.¹

Here, that the attainment attained can exist or not exist as something is refuted as duality would be a consequence, and duality is unreasonable for a non-entity, so attainment is accepted as a worldly convention when not analysed. Similarly, although the criticised and the critique neither connect nor do not connect, there can still be the convention of the critique discrediting the criticised.

Also,

As when the features of the sun being eclipsed
Are also seen in its reflected silhouette,
That sun and likeness meet or not is ludicrous,
It happens in dependence, just conventionally. (6.174)

Although unreal, it helps us beautify our face.
Just so, these arguments that have the power to
Refine the face of wisdom can’t be verified.
And still, know that the proof they give is realised. (6.175)

What we call a reflection is not real in the slightest, so it is neither here nor there to think that it must occur in contact with the disc of the sun or not. And still, with a certain proximity to the form, one will certainly have the perception of the reflection as expected. It is the same with the critique that is empty of inherent existence but can still discredit the criticised, and the argument which is empty of inherence and can’t be verified, but can still prove what it sets out to prove. One should take from this that our own words are not subject to the self-same consequence, since it does not follow that there is a duality.

Since it is the very visage of wisdom itself, it is referred to as the face of wisdom. To refine it means to make it immaculate by removing ignorance. That they have the power to means that this power or ability is seen in them. Since claiming that there is this duality does not make sense to those for whom it is an imputation, they will not be able to harm the Middle Way in any way whatsoever with critiques and replies based on this duality. As Āryadeva states:

However long one may attempt
One cannot pinpoint any fault
In he who holds to neither stance:
‘It is’, ‘is not’, ‘is both’, or ‘none.’²

Likewise:

When the argument is emptiness
And someone offers a reply,
It’s just like no reply at all
As it assumes what’s being proved.³

This also clarifies the case of productive causes. Some⁴ , however, will suggest that the Middle Way Treatise is here dealing specifically with productive causes and not with rhetorics, that the conflicts involved in contact versus non-contact apply to rhetorical causality and not productivity, and that this is why we are not guilty of making spurious arguments.⁵ But this will not suffice as a reply. One will not find the opponent very amiable when saying things that are so encumbered by problematic issues, and since rhetorics are alike to productivity in having such issues, this in an insufficient reply. Also, in their attempt to deflect the accusation of spurious reasoning they use the arguments they themselves accept to prove the assertions of the Treatise, only ending up at the receiving end of critiques made by opponents. This is what makes our own replies all the more elegant.

Furthermore,

Yes, if the reason used as proof were something real,
And real also the thing that we attempt to prove,
The argument of contact would be relevant.
Since it’s not so you’re only troubling yourself. (6.176)

You’re pointlessly wearing yourself out on our behalf by arraying the faults of a flawed position against a flawless position. For example, if someone has cataracts and sees hairs, discrediting that there are just one, or are many, that they are long, circular, black or the like, will have no effect on those with the disease. And it is the same when in the analysis of causes and results that have no inherent existence your criticism is based in dualism – it will have no effect. Understand therefore that the examples presented here, of there being activity without contact – such as the eyes, the magnet and so forth – are disproved, as the same consequence applies to them.

You give up the straight path of non-inherence for the windy road of philosophical speculation. Applying your atrocious conceptual handiwork, you gladly block the authentic route. Why make such immense trouble for yourself?!

Furthermore,

That all things lack reality we show with ease.
But it’s no easy matter for our challenger
To demonstrate how things exist inherently.
Why tax the world with webs of shoddy pedantry? (6.177)

To back up our position we use the examples of dreams, illusions and so forth, and are thus able to bring about an understanding that the things of the world lack inherent existence. But it is not as easy to demonstrate the idea that things have inherent existence, because there are no examples for that which are agreed upon by both of us. This being the case, we can repel any argument while none can provide adequate replies.

Is there anyone who is encouraging you to continue this disservice to the world? The afflicted world is like a silkworm trapped in the cocoon of its own concepts, so why add to that by stringing a tight web around it using the cords of shoddy pedantry? So give up this squabbling! Things are like reflections, and there are no such things as particular or universal characteristics, so what does it matter whether it’s direct perception or inference? There is only one direct perception when it comes down to it, and that is the wisdom of omniscience.

Also,

If having grasped the prior points, now please forget
This extra censure, that of touch, expressly made.
It wasn’t just for frivolous wrangling this was said,
But so that such additional points are recognised. (6.178)

When further types of criticism are already understood from the arguments directed at the opposing side using the principles of interdependence and dependent imputation, one should avoid replying to those who ask, ‘Does the cause make contact with the result during production, or not?’, with this criticism. The purpose of the Treatise is to counteract conceptions, and since our point has already been made, why should the Treatise be used to further frivolous wrangling (vitaṇḍa)?⁶ We are not here eliminating the others’ positions, because there are no real things to be eliminated. So how can this be frivolous wrangling? According to how frivolous wrangling is defined, the proper definition of it involves someone establishing their own position while refuting the position of others, which means that the definition of frivolous wrangling is not met in any way whatsoever. Similar additional criticisms may be understood from this point.

The selflessness of phenomena is clarified in the verses beginning, ‘It can’t come from itself …’ (6.8), until the verse ending with, ‘Analytical reasoning provides swift liberation’ (6.119). The selflessness of the person is dealt with from the verse beginning, ‘They see how each and every affliction and fault originates with the view of identity’ (6.120), until this point. To indicate this and express the classifications of emptiness, it was said:

That beings may be freed, this selflessness was taught
In two ways, of phenomena and personal.

In short, this selflessness was taught as being of two types: phenomenal selflessness and personal selflessness. Why was selflessness presented in these two ways? As it says, that beings may be freed: the Illustrious One presented these two types of selfless in order to liberate beings. The selflessness of the person is taught in order that solitary buddhas and hearers may be liberated, while both are taught in order that bodhisattvas may be liberated through attaining the state of omniscience. Although hearers and solitary buddhas do come to see the mere conditionality of dependent arising, they do not have a complete practice of the selflessness of phenomena, but only the means of abandoning the afflictions experienced in the three realms. It is explained that they do have a comprehensive practice of the selflessness of the person.

And to his followers our Teacher taught the same
By classifying it in various different ways. (6.179)

Apart from this twofold classification of selflessness, the Illustrious One also taught it in many other ways to suit the various inclinations of his students.

Concerning these,

When emptiness is taught elaborately
It is of sixteen types, and when condensed
It is of four types – this is the approach
Adopted in the Greater Vehicle. (6.180)

The sixteen emptinesses are taught in the statement:

Furthermore, Subhūti, the Greater Vehicle of the bodhisattva is the following: emptiness of the internal, emptiness of the external, emptiness of the external internal, emptiness of emptiness, emptiness of immensity, emptiness of the ultimate, emptiness of the compounded, emptiness of the uncompounded, emptiness of the boundless, emptiness of no beginning or end, emptiness of what should not be spurned, emptiness of true nature, emptiness of all phenomena, emptiness of defining characteristics, emptiness of the unobservable and emptiness of real non-things.⁷

And after that the four types of emptiness are taught:

Furthermore, Subhūti, things are empty of things. Non-things are empty of non-things. Self-nature is empty of self-nature. A nature beyond is empty of a nature beyond.⁸

These emptinesses are what we call the Greater Vehicle. Neither emptiness nor non-emptiness exist even in the slightest. These are nothing more than relative conventions, just like form and so forth, useful when instructing individuals. As the Treatise states:

If anything at all could be non-empty,
There could be something that is empty.
But as there is nothing at all that is not empty,
How could the empty then be?⁹

One should not declare ‘empty,’
‘Not empty,’ ‘both,’
Nor ‘neither’ – these are just
Nominal designations.¹⁰